PREFACE.

The existence and the importance of the present work have long been known to all familiar with the works of Appayya Diksita. While the present editor was making a study of it in connection with the philosophy of Śrīkanṭha, its publication was suggested to him by Vedānta Viśārada S. K. Padmanābha Sāstrin of Mylapore, who willingly contributed in a very able measure the patience and scholarship required for the preparation of a critical edition. The University of Madras, who generously undertook to publish the work, required a translation to be provided. In this part of the task, the editor has had invaluable help from the University Department of Sanskrit, particularly from the University Professor, Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. The two Fellows in Sanskrit, Mīmāṃsakācārya S. K. Rāmanātha Sāstrin and Mahopādhyāya Pandit V. Venketrāma Sharma, have rendered considerable assistance in going through various Manuscripts and the press copy, in correcting proofs, and in various other ways. The authorities who obliged with the loan of Manuscripts are mentioned elsewhere. Among friends who by offering suggestions and in other ways gave considerable encouragement to the editor, special mention must be made of Mr. T. G. Āravamuthan, Advocate, Kilpauk, and Prof. P. P. S. Sāstrī, Presidency College, Madras.

The paragraphing of the Sanskrit text has been made to approximate to that of the translation, with the result that the former looks artificial in some cases. It was the editor's hope to make the presentation of the argument look clearer by such an
<table>
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<td>Kaṭha.</td>
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<td>Kauḍ. or Kauḍṭaki.</td>
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<td>भ.</td>
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<td>शा. भा.</td>
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<td>ब. सू.</td>
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INTRODUCTION.

LIFE OF APPAYYA Dīkṣita

Time and again in the history of a country, there rise up figures of considerable interest and importance in respect of moral sincerity or religious zeal or political sagacity or scholarly erudition. These are almost gigantic in their proportions, and are not infrequently acclaimed as incarnations of an element of godhead. Appayya Dīkṣita was such an outstanding figure in the history of South Indian scholarship. He was a marvel of learning, in width as well as depth, with remarkable powers of clear thought and forcible expression, and an indefatigable worker in the cause of truth.

Appayya's place of birth is known to be Adayapalam, a village near Conjeevaram. His works inform us that he enjoyed the patronage of three royal masters—Cinna Bomma, Cinna Timma and Venkaṭapati. His descendants are still found flourishing in various stations of life, in most of the Southern districts of the Presidency. The period of his life and work is known to be the 16th Century A. D. It was also generally thought on the strength of a horoscope, that he was born in 1552—1553 A. D. and that he died in 1624. But the ravages of research have not spared us this certainty. The horoscope given to the world by Śivānanda Yogin

1. See the introductory verses to 'Śivārkaṇḍamāridipikā' and the 'Commentary on Yādavabhyudaya,' and the concluding verses of 'Kuvalayānanda.'
(a 19th Century descendant and biographer of Appayya) has been disputed by a 20th Century descendant of Appayya's who calls in epigraphical aid from his ancestor's native village of Adaya-palam to support the suggestion that Appayya must have been born some 30 years earlier, about 1520. For the view so pro pounded, corroboration is sought in the tag of a verse said to be quoted by Mahāmahopādhyāya Rāju Sāstri of Mannārgudi, purporting to be from an ancient and lost biography of Appayya Dikṣita. The arguments require to be elaborated and examined much more fully than they have been, before being accepted or rejected. That being no part of the present task, we shall pass on, contenting ourselves with the knowledge that the latter half of the 16th century seems undoubtedly to have been the period of Appayya's literary activity.

Appayya's father and grand-father were eminent teachers of Advaita. The grand-father was known as Ācārya Dikṣita or more familiarly as Ācān Dikṣita. He married twice, and the second wife was Tōtrāmbi, a Vaiṣṇava lady, daughter of Ranga Rāja, a Vaiṣṇavite. The son of this union was also called Ranga Rāja, after the maternal grand-father. This Ranga Rāja, the Advaita Ācārya, reputed as a performer of the Viśvajit sacrifice, became the father and the spiritual preceptor of the renowned Appayya. Appayya remains the most illustrious member of that family, to this day. Next to him, but next only to him comes the famous Nīlakaṇṭha, poet and prime minister, who flourished at Madura, during the days of Tirumala Nāyak. Nīlakaṇṭha was

1. See 'The Date of Appayya Dikṣita' by Y. Mahālīṅga Sāstri (The Hindu, 20—6—28) and two articles on 'Appayya Dikṣita's Age' by the same author in the Journal of Oriental Research, II, 226. and I, I, 140.
the grandson of Appayya's brother, Ācān Dīkṣīta.

It is said that Appayya married one Sumāṅgala or Maṅgala-
nāyaki, the daughter of Ratnakhetā Dīkṣīta who, having rashly
undertaken to make Appayya prostrate before him, found no other
means of doing so, except by becoming his father-in-law.1 There
seems to be also a bare tradition that the lady was of Vaiśāva
birth. The dispute with Ratnakhetā and its sequel find men-
tion in the 'Ācān-Dīkṣīṭendra-Vaṁśāvalī,' a poetical genealogy
composed by Viṁarāghava Kavi, a descendant of Ācān Dīkṣīta.

Appayya is reputed to be the author of 104 works. Many of
these are lost, not even the names being known. Of those said
to be his, the authorship, ascribed often by vague tradition, is,
in many cases, doubtful. The confusion is increased by the fact
that some of his descendants—the father of Rājū Sāstriār of
Mannārgudi, and an anubhava—advaitin of recent days who died
in the early years of the present century—bore the same name
and were also writers, more or less prolific. Among the 104, we
have to include commentaries written by Appayya on works
composed in verse by himself. Thus, the 'Ānanda Lahari' and
the 'Ānanda Lahari Candrika,' count as two works, though they
may be looked upon as constituting the verse and prose parts
of one work.

The greatest number of these works relate to Śaiva religion
or Advaita philosophy. Our author, however, was a redoubtable
authority on other subjects, such as rhetoric and poetics, while
his knowledge of Mīmāṁsā was unrivalled, as shown in his hand-
ling even of other subjects. The full extent of his grasp of
Mīmāṁsā Sāstra may be gauged by his discussion of some knotty

1. See 'Appayya Dīkṣīta's Age,' Journal of Oriental Re-
search, II, 286.
topics in the ‘Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃṣa-Vāda-Nakṣatra-Mālā.’ His ‘Kuvalayānanda’ and ‘Citra-Mīmāṃsa’ evince his knowledge of poetics and rhetoric. His appreciation of literature as such is shown by his ‘Commentary on Yādavābhūyaṇa’.

True, many of these books were written to order, having been commissioned by different royal patrons, but they are none the less thorough and masterly, for that.

Appayya combined in himself the clear-sightedness of the philosopher with the zeal of the devotee. This accounts at once for his thoroughness and his catholicism. He could sympathise with all shades of thought and belief, since to him was vouchsafed the vision of their harmonious blending in the one Resplendent, Colourless Whole. He would yield to none in his passionate devotion to Śiva; but he would not like sectarian devotees pull down Viṣṇu to the level of a finite self (see commentary on verse 35 of the ‘Ānanda Lahari’). As an advaitin, he held that Brahman was Nirguna; but he also held that for facility of human comprehension, He appears “as if possessing gunas, taking on the form of the blue-throated, three-eyed Being, accompanied by Amba” (‘Śiva-tattvaviveka’, Verse 13). Though the bed-rock of all the Vedās, Āgamas and so on is but Advaita, “the fragrance of Advaita breaths in man only by the Grace of Him whose crest jewel is the tender digit of the Moon” (‘Śivārkaṇṇamādi-pīkā’, introductory verse 7; translation by Dr. V. V. Ramana Sastri).

As an advaitin, release meant for him realisation of identity with Brahman; but this is not to be, so long as there continues in the world even a single unredeemed soul. Till the final release of all, individual release is but the attainment of the being of Īśvara.

We thus find throughout a spirit of sympathetic understanding and reconciliation, very far removed from dogmatic sectarianism.
And yet our author could wield his dialectical weapons forcefully, sometimes pitilessly. The extended hand of reconciliation not infrequently became the mailed fist. He does not hold, for instance, with the exaggerated claims of Madhvaśārtya to divinity, and inveighs against him furiously in a notable passage in the commentary on verse 31 of the Śiva-tattva-viveka. Though, as noted before, he had a profound regard for Viṣṇu, holding that "only by reaching Him can that place be attained, which belongs to the Immortal, primaeval blissful Being; who is Light, etc." ('Bṛhma-traya-parikṣā, verse 5), yet he could not brook those self-styled Viṣṇavas who reviled Śiva or contemplated treason against His supremacy. Against these he directs his righteous indignation, quoting passages condemnatory of them, from the 'Bhāgavata,' and commenting on them with great gusto (explaining "dur-bhagāh" of the original as "samkīrṇa kṣetra jātāh"). For error as ignorance, he seems to have had comprehension and sympathy, but none for error masquerading as the whole truth.

One of Appayya’s pupils was Bhatṭoji Dīkṣita, famous as the author of the ‘Siddhānta Kaumudī.’ Bhatṭoji was from Upper India, where, among other things, he earned the opposition and ill-will of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, a favourite of the Emperor, Shah Jehan. Bhatṭoji’s preceptor, Appayya, also came in for a share of Jagannātha’s enmity, the pupil’s evil ways being set down to the master’s evil influence. This Jagannātha wrote a critique of Appayya’s ‘Citra-Mīmāṁsā,’ called ‘Citra-Mīmāṁsā-

1. It must be noted that for Appayya, Śiva is above and beyond the three mārtis,—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. He is not to be identified with Rudra, who is the embodiment of Tāmas, and the Lord of Destruction, as the other two are Lords of Creation and Sustentation.
Khandāna'. It is thought that, about the period of this controversy between Bhaṭṭoji and Jagannātha, Appayya himself was at Benares. However that may be, he spent his last days in the South, and died at Cidambaram. In his last moments, he is said to have composed a verse and a half in praise of Cidambaram and the Dancer in the Golden Hall. "This city of Chidambaram is well-known for its sacredness. Splendidly modest sons (have been born to me). Some good works have also been written. My years are more than seventy. Longing for pleasure I have none. I want nothing. Only I am anxious to see my Lord's place. There flashes in my heart the rising Sun of the light of the Lotus-feet of the Dancer of the Golden Hall" (translation by A. V. Gopalachariar, 'Yādavābhuyadaya,' II. xvii). He expired in the middle of the second verse. One could wish for no more fitting finale to such a great life.

[For further information, see 'Appayya-Dīkṣitendra-Vijaya' by Sivānanda Yogin, 'Life of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita' by A. V. Gopalachariar, in Vol. II of 'Yādavābhuyadaya' (S. V. V. Press), 'Appayya Dīkṣita' in the Siddāhānta Dīpikā, IV, 261, and two articles on 'Appayya Dīkṣita's Age' by Y. Mahāliṅga Śastri, Journal of Oriental Research, II, 225, and III, 140.]

The present work of Appayya's—known as the 'Śivādvaita Nirṇaya' or the 'Śivādvaita Vinirṇaya,' sometimes as the 'Advaita Nirṇaya,' has its merits and defects, from the view-point of the average reader. It has the merit of being entirely in prose, and directed to one central idea. It has the further merit of expounding Appayya's conception not merely of Śivādvaita, but also of Suddhādvaita, some of his distinctive conceptions in regard to the latter, such as that about release finding expression here. But, in
spite of fairly extensive quotations from the bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha, it is not possible to appreciate the latter or assess it at its true worth, except in conjunction with an independent study of the bhāṣya. A study of the ‘Nirṇaya’ by itself would be like reading up the criticism of a literary work, in the absence of direct acquaintance with that work. The difficulty is increased by the fact that certain doctrines of the bhāṣyakāra—such as the atomicity of the self are not mentioned or discussed by Appayya. But the ‘Nirṇaya’ deserves to be studied, if for nothing else, at least as a remarkable example of our author’s dialectical skill and clearness of thought. One other reason why the work is valuable to the students of Śrīkaṇṭha is the reference to Sudarṣanācārya otherwise known as Haradatta. With reference to a verse quoted by the dialectical opponent from this author’s ‘Śruti-Sūkti-Mālā’, it is said that Śrīkaṇṭha came after Haradatta. This, combined with very definite suggestions in the ‘Ānanda Lahari’ to the effect that Rāmānuja followed in the footsteps of Śrīkaṇṭha, seems to be of great help in fixing the period of Śrīkaṇṭha. If the date is still uncertain, it is because Haradatta’s period is not known; for, the obituary verse, wherein reliance used to be placed as giving the date of his death, proves to contain conflicting astronomical details and is inaccurate or spurious.¹

Appayya tries to be as clear in his exposition, as in his thought. His attempts, however, are not always successful. He frequently labours his points to the extent of being tiresome. And, often enough, he leads us into a labyrinth of words from which he escapes, leaving us to find our way out, as best as we can. A single sentence may contain half-a-dozen distinct points

1. See further an article on ‘Divine Omnipotence,’ by the present writer, in the ‘Triveni’ for March 1928.
and run nearly to a whole page. The task of the translator, who has to steer clear of the Scylla of unintelligible literalism and the Charybdis of free paraphrase is not enviable.
THE WORKS OF APPAYYA DİKSİTA.

The following list is based primarily on an article on Appayya Diksita in the Siddhānta Dipikā (Vol. IV). The writer of that article would seem to have drawn principally from Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum and Bhaṭṭaśri Bālasaraswati Pandit Nārāyana Sudarṣana's introduction to the Advaita-maṭajari edition of the "Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha". These sources have also been consulted in the preparation of the present list. Prof. P. P. S. Śāstri of the Presidency College, Madras, has prepared a list mainly based on the manuscripts mentioned in the Descriptive and Triennial Catalogues of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras; he has also made use of the information available from the Tanjore Palace Library. Mr. Y. Mahāliṅga Śāstri, Advocate, Mylapore, a lineal descendant of Appayya Diksita has made out a list from material that was in the possession of his great-grand-father, Brahmaśri Rāju Śāstrin. These two lists have also been availed of. Many of the works here enumerated find mention in all the lists, while some are mentioned in only one or other of the lists. The initials given after the name of each work indicate briefly the authorities relied on in each case. Thus, A is Aufrecht, M is Mahāliṅga Śāstri, N is Nārāyana Sudarṣana, S is P. P. S. Śāstri, and SD is the Siddhānta Dipikā. Works wrongly listed by some of these are also mentioned, together with a note indicating the error actual or probable. It is hoped that the list here made out will provide a useful basis for further research.
1. Adhikaraṇa-mālā (SD; possibly identical with the Mimāṃsā-viṣaya-saṅgraha-dīpikā listed by S).

2. Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali (M).

3. Adhikaraṇa-kuṇḍikā (S; M). This is probably the same work as No. 2. Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin mentions an Adhikaraṇa-kaṇcuka, which purports to be a commentary on the adhikaraṇa ślokas of the Dakṣinā-mūrti brahma-sūtravṛtti. A Paper Ms. of this work in Devanāgarī characters is to be found in the Adyar Library. It is so different in style and doctrine from the general trend of Appayya's works that its attribution to him is strongly open to suspicion. It is not known whether this is the same as the Adhikaraṇa-kuṇḍikā listed by S and M.

4. Apītakucāmbā-stava [S. V. V.]

5. Amarakośa-vyākhyā (A; followed by SD. This is possibly identical with Śabda-prakāśam listed by S and M).

6. Arūṇācalevāra-stuti (SD; M).

7. Ātmārpaṇa-stuti (or Śivapaṇcaśikā) [B. V; S. V. V.]

8. Āditya-stava-ratna (or Dvādaśāditya-stava) [B. V.]

9. A commentary on the above [B. V.]

10. Upakrama-parakrama (A; M; N; S; SD).

11. Kuvalayānanda [Nirṇayasāgar]. Basikarañjani, a commentary on the Kuvalayānanda is wrongly listed by Aufrecht, as that work appears to have been by one Gaṅgādhara Adhvarin.

12. Kṛṣṇa-dhyāna-paddhati (M; N; SD).

13. A commentary on the above (N; SD).

14. Gaṅgādhara-asṭakam (M; S).
15. Durgācandrakalā-stuti [S. V. V.].
16. A commentary on the above (M; N; SD).
17. Citra-puṣa (M; N; S; SD).
18. Citra-māṁśa [Nirṇayasāgar].
19. Jayollāsanidhi (A; SD).
20. Tattva-muktāvali (A; SD).
21. Taptamudrā-khaṇḍana (or-vidrāvaṣam) (A; M; S; SD).
   Taptamudrākhaṇḍana-khaṇḍana (A; probably identical with No. 21).
22. Tiṅ-anta-śeṣa-saṅgraha (A; SD)
23. Daśakumāra-caritra-saṅgraha (or samkṣepaḥ) (A; M; S; SD).
24. Dharma-māṁśa-paribhāṣā (SD; possibly the same as Tāntrika-māṁśa listed by M alone).
25. Nayamaṇjarī (M; SD).
27. A commentary on the above (M; SD).
28. Nayamayūkha-mālikā (A; M; N; SD).
29. A commentary on the above (SD).
30. Nāma-saṅgraha-mālā (A; N; SD).
31. A commentary on the above (A; N; SD).
32. Nigrhaṅgakam [By Śivananda Yogin at Benares].
33. Nyāya-muktāvali (M; N; SD).
34. A commentary on the above (N; SD).
35. Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi [S. V. V.].
36. Nyāya-ratna-mālā (M; SD).
37. A commentary on the above (M; SD).

Nyāya-saṅgraha-mālā and a commentary thereon listed by M alone are possibly identical with Nos. 36 and 37.
38. Pañca-ratna-stava (or -stuti) [S. V. V.].
39. A commentary on the above [S. V. V.].
40. Pañca-svara-vivṛti (SD).
41. Parimalā [Nirṇayaśāgar].

Pañcagranthī a Vedānta work, listed by A and SD, is probably the same as No. 41, that being the fifth of the five Advaita works—The Brahma Sūtras, Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, The Bhāmati, the Kalpataru, and the Parimalā—which belong to one line of Advaita tradition.

42. Pādukā-sahasra-tīkā (A; M; SD).
43. Paṣinīya-nakṣatra-māla [or Paṣinī-tantra-vāda-nakṣatra-māla published by R. V. Kṛṣṇamācāri, Kumbakonam].
44. Purvottara-māṁśapsa-vāda-nakṣatra-māla [S. V. V.]
45. Prabodha-candrodaya-tīkā (A; SD).
46. Prākṛta-candrikā (N; SD: probably the same as Prākṛta-maṇi-dīpa listed by S).
47. Brahma-tarka-stava [S. V. V]
48. A commentary on the above [S, V. V.].
49. Bhakti-sataka (A; M; SD).
50. Bhārata-sāra-śaṅgraha [S. V. V.]
51. Bhārata-tātparya-śaṅgraha [S. V. V.; a commentary on No. 50].
52. Maṇimālikā (N; SD doubts if it is different from No. 26).
53. Mata-sārārtba-śaṅgraha (N; SD; N says it is a work of seventy verses; it should then be different from the Catup-mata-sāra-śaṅgraha, which comprises the Nyāya-muktāvali; the Nayamayūkha-mālikā, the
Nayamāṭa-mālā and the Nayamāṭarī; this work is possibly the same as Śrīmāṭi-mata-sāra listed by M alone).

54. Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana [B.V.]

55. Madhva-mata-vidhvamsana [B. V.; a commentary on No. 54].

Madhva-mata-khaṇḍana is listed by A and SD; this is probably the same as Nos. 54 and 55.

56. Maṇḍukhāvali (S).

57. Mānasollāsa [S. V. V.].

58. Mārgasāhāya-stotram (S).

59. Yādavābhuyadaya-tīkā [S. V. V].

60. Ratna-traya-parikṣā [B. V.].

61. A commentary on the above [B. V.].

62. Rāmānuja-mata-khaṇḍana (or Rāmānuja-śrīgā-bhāṅga) (S; M; SD).

63. Rāmāyana-sāra-saṅgraha [S. V. V.]

64. Rāmāyana-tātparya-saṅgraha [S. V. V.; a commentary on No. 63].

Rāmāyana-tātparya-nirṇaya (SD).

Rāmāyana-bhāratasāra-saṅgraha (A; SD).

Rāmāyana-sāra (A; SD).

Rāmāyana-sāra-stava (A; SD); these four would seem to be but repetitions of the titles of §3, §4, 63, and 64.

It is not likely that as many as eight books were written on the interpretation of the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata.

65. Laghu-vivaraṇa [B. V.]

66. Varadarāja-stava [S. V. V.]

67. A commentary on the above [S. V. V.].
68. Vasumatī-cihrasena-vilasa-nāṭaka (A; SD).

69. Vidhi-rasāyana (A; M; N; S; SD).

70. Vidhi-rasāyana—sukhopājaśvini (or—sukhopayojaśvini; A; M; N; S; SD).

71. Viṣṇu-tattva-rahasya (A; SD).

72. Vīra-saivam (A; M; SD).

73. Vṛtti-vārtikam (A; M; N; S; SD).

Vairāgya-śataka is erroneously listed by A and SD relying on the authorship ascribed in Kāvyamālā I, 91. The work printed there turns out to be Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita's. See the latter's Minor Poems, published by S. V. V.

74. Sānti-stava (A; SD).

75. Śikharinī-mālā [Advaita-mañjarī].

76. Śiva-tattva-viveka [Advaita-mañjarī; a commentary on No. 75].

77. Śiva-karmāṁrtam [S. V. V.]

A commentary on the above is listed by SD. This is improbable, as the original itself is a short prose-work, hardly needing any commentary.

78. Śiva-dhyāna-pādhati [B. V.]

79. A commentary on the above (N; SD).

80. Śiva-puraṇa-tāmasatva-khaṇḍana (A; SD).

81. Śiva-pūja-vidhi (S; M; SD).

82. Śiva-mahima-kalikā-stuti [B. V.]

83. A commentary on the above, known as the Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-parimalōlāsa [B. V.]

84. Śivādvaita-nirṇaya [Madras University].

85. Śivānanda-laharī (or Ānanda-laharī) [S. V. V.]

86. Śivānanda-laharī-candrikā [S. V. V.; a commentary on
87. Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā (or Śivāditya-maṇi-dīpikā) [Nirṛta-yasāgar].
88. Śivārcana-candrikā [Devakotah].
89. Bāla-candrikā, a commentary on No. 88 (N; SD).
90. Śivottkarṣa-maṇjarī (A; SD; it is doubtful if this is not identical with Nilakanṭha Dīkṣita's work of the same name).
91. Saiva-kalpadruma (A).
92. Siddhānta-ratnakara (A; SD).
93. Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha [Advaita-maṇjarī].
94. Stotra-ratnakara (M).
95. Hamsa-sandhāsa-tīkā (A; SD).
96. Hari-hara-stuti (S; M).
97. Harivamsa-sāra-caritra-vyākhyā (A; S; SD; the Ms. is in the Tanjore Palace Library; see Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Vol. VI. A and SD wrongly assign the original work itself to Appayya; that work was composed by one Govinda-mantrin, a minister of the Konḍavīdu chieftains).

Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana quotes several verses which enumerate many of the above works and mention in addition the Abhidhālakṣaṇa-vṛtti, treating of the same topic as Vṛtti-vārtikam. The verses, he says, are of Appayya's own composition, but we are not informed of the authority for the statement or of the source of the verses. If we count the Mīmāṃsā-viśaya-saṅgraha-dīpikā, the Sabda-prakāśa, the Tāntrika-mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya-saṅgraha-mālā and its commentary, the Śruti-māta-sāra and the Abhidhālakṣaṇa-vṛtti as independent works, we shall have a hundred and four on the whole. Information is now to hand from Tanjore of an
alamkara work in Ms. called the Lakṣaṇa-ratnāvīl-avyākhyā.

Note: The initials in the square brackets refer to the name of the publisher or the series, where the work has been published:

S. V. V. is the Śrī Vāṇī Vilāś Press, Srirangam;
B. V. is the Brahma Vidyā Press, Chidambaram;
Nirūyahāgar is the press of that name in Bombay;
Advaita-mañjārī is the series of that name published at Kumbakonam;
Devakotah refers to the Śaivāgama-paripālana-śāṅgam, Devakotah.

It would appear from the British Museum Catalogue that the text of the 'Śivādvaita Nirūya' was published at Benares in 1905 by one Śrī Kaptha Prasāda Nārāyaṇa Simha.¹ It did not form part of any known series and copies seem to be very difficult to obtain.

¹. This information was not available to the present editor earlier than January 1930.
THE SYSTEM OF SRIKANTHA.

Srikantha, like the Siva Siddhantin, believes in three principles—Pati (the Lord),Paśu (the bound soul), and Pāśa (the bonds). The impurity of the bound soul is beginningless, like the presence of verdigris in copper. The impurity can be got rid of only by getting the souls to engage in action and enjoy the fruit. The creation of the world is for this purpose. The Lord has no object of His own to gain by creating the world; He does it, however, in the interest of the bound souls, in order to purify and to redeem them.

The Lord is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The world is, thus, the result of a transformation of Brahman. But transformation would imply change, that is, defect, in Brahman. Hence, Brahman's pariṇāma (transformation) has to be understood as holding only of His Cit-Sakti (Intelligence-Energy). This Cit-Sakti is the material cause, which takes on the form of the world, Intelligent and Non-intelligent. Brahman Himself (whom Srikantha identifies with Siva) is the efficient cause. But these are distinguishable aspects of Brahman, not different entities; for, between Energy and the possessor thereof, there is non-difference. Because of the relationship to the Lord, through Cit-Sakti, the world partakes of the Existence, Intelligence and Bliss of the Lord. The existence of particular things is a fraction of the existence of Brahman; in-

1. The first manifestation of Cit-Sakti is Nārāyana, who is thus the material cause of the world. He is of the form of the universe (Viśvākāra).
individual knowledge and bliss are fragments of the Knowledge and Bliss of Śiva. All this is taught by the Vedānta.

The Vedānta also appears to teach identity of Brahman and the finite self. This, however, is not to be taken literally. The identity is only of the kind that subsists between the body and the embodied, the pervader and what is pervaded. When the faggot is pervaded by fire, we speak of it as itself fire.

Release comes through meditation on the Lord, after the acquisition of the necessary preliminaries of tranquility, faith, non-attachment to fruit whether in this world or the next, and so on. The meditation should take on any one of the forms prescribed by Upaniṣadic seers. The Lord may for instance, be contemplated as the small ākāśa within the heart or as the One Existence that evolved into all this. In all cases, the distinctive qualities of Śiva will have to be understood, such as blissfulness, freedom from sin etc., and blue-throatedness, companionship of Uma and so on; for, the Lord is the abode of all auspicious qualities, and the texts, which make Him out to be attributeless, intend to deny only objectionable qualities.

In meditation, the Lord is to be thought of as the Self, for, so have contemplated sages of yore, saying, “I am, verily, Thou, O Lord, O Divinity; Thou, verily, art I”. Release is the abandonment of the condition of bondage (Paśutva) and the attainment of the state of bliss (Sivatva). This cannot come about until the bonds are destroyed in the torrent of continuous meditation of identity with the Supreme. It is this identity that ancient seers have taught their disciples through texts like “That Thou art”.

As the fruit of meditation, properly performed, one goes up to Brahman, after death, along the path of the gods. For those, who
go along this path, there is no return. Some say, however, that there is no need for all to travel along this path, since for the devotees of the Non-related (presumably what the pure-non-dualist calls Nirguna Brahman), there is attainment of release even here, i.e., with release from the physical body.¹ This exception in favour of the devotees of the Non-related (niranvaya-upāsakas) is made by Śrīkanṭha, as often as there is occasion to talk of the path of the gods, for the others. Such statements naturally give rise to speculations as to whether Śrīkanṭha’s system is really qualified-non-dualism (Viśistādvaita), though he chooses to call it so. And once the question is raised, there appear to be a number of indications which all tend to point to pure-non-dualism (Śuddhādvaita) as his ultimate doctrine. All these indications have been examined and exploited fully by Appayya Dīkṣita in his ‘Ānanda Laharī,’ as also in the present work. Though the ‘Śivādvaita Nirñaya’ contains no explicit reference to the other work, yet there seems to be no doubt that it is the later of the two. While a number of passages—such as the discussion of Āpastamba’s exaltation of the house-holder’s state, Śaṅkara’s conception of release as the attainment of the nature of Īśvara, and so on—are common to both works (in words, as well as in thought), there are certain elaborations of the argument, in the ‘Nirñaya,’ which would definitely make it out to be later.² Further, ¹. Or, possibly, ‘even while in this life’. Śrīkanṭha does recognise, in a half-hearted way, the possibility of jīvanmukti, release while still in the world; this recognition constitutes one more breach between his system and qualified-non-dualism. See B. M. III, 4,50.

². One or two of these may be noted here: (a) in the discussion of the view that the identity of the jīva and Brahman is
referring to an argument about ākāśa, in the sense of Cit-Śakti, being identical with Brahman, in his 'Ratna-traya-parikṣā,' Appayya makes mention of the 'Śivārkamanidātipiśa' and the 'Śivānanda Lahari' (what we know as the 'Ānanda Lahari') but not to 'Śivādvaīta Nirṇaya,' though the argument is common to this work also, which, thus, seems to be later even than the 'Ratna-traya-parikṣā.' We shall next proceed to study Appayya's arguments in brief, for, a detailed consideration will easily become longer than the book itself.

but imagined, the 'Nirṇaya' sets out both the view and the criticism in greater detail than the 'Lahari'; (b) Saguna Brahman is shown in the 'Nirṇaya' to be not merely the avāntara tātparya of Vedānta texts, but the indispensable pre-supposition of the synthesis of such texts as relate to Nirguṇa Brahman; (c) the consideration of Āpastumbha's criticism of Saṁnyāsa is fuller, further reasons being given for treating this as but arthavāda; there is also a reference to similar condemnation by Kṛṣṇa and some ancient sages; (d) there is an attempt to show, with reference to the Suvardalā-Svetaketu discourse in the Mahābhārata, that vivartavāda is acceptable to Bādarāyana; (e) the arguments in support of the final position of the 'Lahari' figure here also, but certain objections thereto are stated and met.
IV.

APPAYYA'S ARGUMENTS.

The starting point of the discussion, as we have already noted, is the statement about niranjayopāsākas, a statement which is made not in one place but in three—III, 3, 32; IV, 2, 13; IV, 3, 1. The expression "niranjaya" is far from clear; it means "non-related", presumably non-related to the universe, what Appayya Diksita understands by the repeated use of the word "nis-prapaśca". It seems to refer to Nirguna Brahman, as conceived by the advaitin, it being well-known that he postulates the attainment of release even in this life, and certainly at death, without travelling along any path or tarrying anywhere. Śrīkanṭha, in such statements, apparently recognises the existence and validity of the concept of Nirguna Brahman. The reason for his referring to it only casually is not that he attaches no value to it, but that his purpose for the moment is the creation of faith in and devotion to Saguna Brahman; for, such devotion is a necessary propaedeutic to the attainment of the mental steadiness and concentration needed for the uninterrupted contemplation of Nirguna Brahman. The object he has primarily in view can be secured best by emphasising the Saguna aspect and concealing (nay, even condemning) the Nirguna aspect, though the latter be known to be the final truth. The procedure is paralleled by the condemnation of Samnyāsa by the very sages who recognise it as an exalted order of life and extol it elsewhere. These are not moved by ignorance or error, but by the desire to save those of dull-wit who may take to the higher path of renunciation, having heard of the glories thereof, without having first acquired the requisite degree of firmness. Śrīkanṭha's procedure in suppressing and
condemning the Nirguna significance is similarly motivated. But since the truth may not be wholly concealed, it is partially indicated in these statements of Śrīkāṇṭha, which occur wherever there is occasion to mention departure along the path of the gods.

1. It will be seen that Appayya's interpretation is conceived in the dominant spirit of Hindu philosophy and founded on the notion of adhikāra bheda (differences of competency). For any such notion, error is a degree of truth. The difficulty of such a theory, (as realised by Bradley and others of his mode of thought) lies in the element of positive opposition to truth. Error claims to be the whole truth, not merely a degree of it, and opposes the recognition of the higher truth. The partiality of the part is intelligible; but its opposition to completion and its claim to be complete, these seem hard to reconcile with the coherence-notion of truth and with absolutist metaphysics. The analogy of Āpastamba's condemnation of Samnyāsa applies just to this positive aspect of error; the sage is not merely praising the house-holder's state of life, (which is a partial good), but is setting it up as the only good order, even running counter to Śruti. This, says Appayya, is for the purpose of securing undisturbed concentration on the grade of truth for which the subject is fit. When perfection in that stage is attained, the higher truth will dawn of itself. On such a hypothesis, one is led to speculate on the influence of the horrors of the Inquisition in the development of the Copernican theory. The cases would, of course, not be parallel, since the Inquisitors, to the best of our knowledge, were ignorant of the higher truth, and in this respect were unlike Āpastamba or possibly Śrīkāṇṭha. There would thus seem to be a difference between the opposition set up by the lower grade of truth, and the opposition set up for it by those cognisant of the higher truth.
Nor may it be thought that the words "some say", with which the remark about niravayopāsakas is introduced in every case, clearly shows that opinion not to be Śrikantha's own; for, elsewhere, Śrikantha introduces an opinion acceptable to himself, with the words "some say". This is in connection with the view that the Self of Bliss of the Taittirīyopanisad is Cīt-Sakti, and Brahman there spoken of as the tail, the support, is the Supreme Brahman; though mentioned as a secondary view, this is really what is acceptable to him, as seen from his commentary on Śūtra 1, 1, 2. The statement about non-departure for niravayopāsakas should therefore be taken to be Śrikantha's own opinion; this view is further re-inforced by his apparently supporting that position in his own person, in the commentary on III, 8, 32, where he says that therein is no inconsistency.¹

The latter is defensible, not the former. This is probably the reason why Appayya himself loses temper with the self-styled Vaiṣṇavas, though he considers Vāyu to be an element of godhead, one of the three gems, the worship of whom leads to that shining glory, which is the abode of the Immortal.

1. A modern translator of Śrikantha's Bhāṣya into Tamil doubts the genuineness of these passages and therefore jettisons them wholesale. The wisdom of the procedure is, however, doubtful; for, difficulties of reconciliation can at best lead to suspicion of their genuineness, not to proof of forgery. It is worth nothing that besides the Manuscripts and traditions of Appayya's time, about ten Manuscripts from different parts of India have been consulted in bringing out two of the printed editions of Śrikantha's Bhāṣya— that of the Pandit (1872), and that of the Government of Mysore. It is difficult to discard as spurious statements which evidently have such strong support. See.
The next point of considerable importance is the mode of meditation prescribed by Śrīkānta. The Lord is to be meditated on as identical with the self, not as standing thereto in the relation of the embodied to the body. The latter relationship expresses the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's manner of understanding Scriptural declarations of non-difference; and at one stage of his exposition Śrīkānta too leans to the same view. But this relationship is intended to appeal only to those who betake themselves to the path of service (dāsa mārga), look upon the Lord as a Master in relation to servants, and can rise to no higher conception. For these, release comes about only very much later, after they have passed through the stage of servitude to Śiva. Those who desire release itself and are fit to seek it at least through Saguṇa meditation, as on the ākāśa within the heart and so on, should contemplate Śiva as identical with themselves.

The very text of the Jābālas quoted by Śrīkānta supports this view; for, it asserts identity both ways: "I am Thou. and Thou art I". The Viśiṣṭādvaitin too quotes this text, but without realising its implications. If, as he says, the finite self is an attribute of the Lord, the Lord may be said to be the finite self, not vice versa; for, the substantive may be identical with the adjective, but not the adjective with the substantive. The latter is more than any one attribute or aggregate of attributes. The Śrutī declaration "I am Thou" becomes, in this case, meaningless. The text, "That Thou art ", also teaches real identity, for, we are told that sages realise Śiva to be identical with their own Self and pass on this realisation to their pupils through texts like "That Thou art ". This latter interpretation must be taken to further, the relevant portions of Sentinathier, 'Brahma' Sūtra Svāttuvita Saivapādiyam.'
negative the earlier interpretation even of "tat tvam as" in II, 3, 42, etc.; for, the two are contradictory and contradictory cannot both be accepted, as Śrīkaṭṭha says in his commentary on II, 1, 22. Even the Saṅgīna upāsaka has thus to contemplate the Lord as identical with himself; hence Śrīkaṭṭha's doctrine of non-difference is more akin to Saddhādvaita than to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The non-difference so indicated is confirmed on an examination of the relationship between Brahman and the universe. Cit-Śakti is of the form of the universe and Brahman is of the form of Cit-Śakti; hence, the universe is non-different from Brahman. But the advaitin maintains the Non-intelligent universe to be an illusory manifestation. True, says Appayya, and Śrīkaṭṭha is bound to entertain the same view; for, how can Cit-Śakti which is Intelligence evolve into what is Non-intelligent? Evolution must be understood literally in the case of the Intelligent universe, and figuratively in the case of the Non-intelligent. The latter being thus fictitious, there is no difficulty in comprehending the perfect identity between Brahman and the jīva which has thus been rid of its limiting conditions. Nor can it be said that the Intelligent world may be similarly fictitious, that too being an evolute of Cit-Śakti, as in that case, there will be none to experience release. Further, there is no need to declare it fictitious, for it is not subject to modifications like the material world. In the latter case, real identity has to be denied, as otherwise Brahman would be subject to change; but in the former case, the jīva is eternal and from its identity with Brahman, no evil consequence may be foreseen.

This argument, which establishes the non-difference of Brahman and the universe, through Cit-Śakti, is liable to attack at two points. Non-difference may be denied as between Brahman and
Cit-Sakti or as between Cit-Sakti and the universe. The latter cannot be attempted, for the existence of existents like pot, cloth, etc., is said to be part of a larger, non-variable Existence, while individual bliss is a fragment of a larger Bliss. This more universal Existence and Bliss, if it is not Brahman, is at least Cit-Sakti. But for participation in some such universal Bliss, the gradations of Bliss mentioned in the Ānanda Valli would be unintelligible; for, each grade would be, otherwise, distinct from the rest, and there would be no sense in saying that the sage "untormented by desires" partakes of each grade. Nor could Cit-Sakti, which is the Bliss of Brahman, make others happy, if it were different from them, for one man's bliss cannot as such cause the happiness of another.

Nor is the attempt to make out Brahman to be different from Cit-Sakti any more successful. Their non-difference is repeatedly declared in Śrikaṇṭha's commentary, as when he says that the Supreme ākāśa (not the elemental ether) is the cause of the world, because it is non-different from Brahman or that both Brahman and His Cit-Sakti are to be meditated on in the Dahara Vidya.

That Śrikaṇṭha looks upon Brahman as in Himself unchanging is evident from his novel doctrine of transformation (apūrva pariṇāma), a transformation through Cit-Sakti, which leaves Brahman unaffected. It is also seen from his making out that Brahman in so far as He is distinguished from Cit-Sakti is only the operative cause.

Nor have we to depend only on our inference for the view that for Śrikaṇṭha the Non-intelligent world is illusory. The difference between that and the Intelligent world is stressed by himself in his commentary on II, 1, 28, where he shows that while even the Intelligent world is designated as other than
Brahman, the Non-intelligent world, which has no kinship with Brahman, cannot claim to be non-different from Brahman.

It will also be noticed that the sūtras which seem to establish difference between Brahman and the finite self, (such as that about deep sleep and departure—I, 3, 43) seek to prove only that Brahman in his omniscience is superior to the finite self, as such, in his little-knowingness. No doctrine of utter difference is propounded here.

The advaitin, for his part, does not insist solely on the illusoriness of the universe. To a certain stage and for certain purposes, he is prepared to admit that the universe evolves from Brahman. This doctrine of evolution (parināma vāda) is, indeed, helpful to him in establishing his illusion-doctrine; the former is the first step on which one rises to the latter, as the second. Śrīkanṭha’s advocacy of parināma vāda is not, therefore, inconsistent with his holding to vivarta vāda, as the final truth.

Further, Śaṅkara himself has shown that the Vedānta Sūtras are capable of being interpreted as referring to Saguna Brahman. Very few of the sūtras, as a matter of fact, teach the Nirguna doctrine. Even in establishing this, Śaṅkara has to make use of Brahman’s attributes, that being the only way to show that the Vedānta texts do not refer to the Non-intelligent pradhāna or to the finite self. He has also given an indication, in his commentary on I, 1, 3, that the sūtras in their entirety may be made to bear a Saguna significance.

There is also another reason why Śaṅkara has to make use of the concept of Īśvara. Until the final redemption of all, release can take the form only of the attainment of the nature of Īśvara, not of merger in Brahman. That this is Śaṅkara’s conception of release is evident from numerous passages in his
commentary. Thus, while Śrīkaṇṭha's notion of creation as parināma is not opposed to Śaṅkara's vivarta vāda, there is some identity in respect of their notions of release.

It is also evident from numerous indications that, for Śaṅkara, Sagunuṣa Brahman is Śiva, a Being other than Viṣṇu or Saṃbhara Rudra, the lord of destruction. One such indication is the frequent use of the term Parameśvara which generally denotes Śiva; another is the comparison of Brahman's presence in the body to Hari's presence in the sālagrāma stone. The subject and object of a comparison cannot be identical; hence, Sagunuṣa Brahman (who is spoken of there) must be other than Hari. But such indications are extremely subtle and cannot appeal to the hearts or heads of devotees. Hence it is that what has been concisely indicated and provided for by Śaṅkara is elaborated by Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācaryā in his Śivādvaita.
EXAMINATION OF APPAYYA'S ARGUMENTS.

The thesis set forth above is exceedingly attractive to any one who is not a confirmed Viśisṭhādvaitin, and is almost convincing. Perhaps, the strongest of the points is that about the identity of the universe with Brahman, through Cit-Sakti. The philosophical problem of the One and the many, the permanent and the changing is sought to be solved by the introduction of a third factor, which is one-and-many, permanent-yet-changing, viz., Cit-Sakti. If this is not a mere name, we are entitled to examine the concept closely to discover how, if at all, it can be intelligible. The only possibility of taking it as intelligible lies, according to Appayya, in treating the Non-intelligent world as an illusory manifestation, not as an evolute of the same grade of reality as the alleged cause. If this central position is once conceded, the rest of Appayya's argument and his conclusion may well be admitted.

Now, what the inherent logic of an argument demands is not always realised by those who urge the argument. Śrīkantha's position may logically culminate in vivarta vāda; but this of itself is no proof of his awareness or acceptance of the culmination. Appayya seeks to build on a statement in the commentary on I. 1, 23 (the sāmādīvacca sūtra). The statement in question, runs thus: "thus, even of the Intelligent, there is non-appropriateness of the being ofĪśvara, because of their difference in respect of excess of attributes; what then of the Non-intelligent, which is essentially of a different character? This is the sense." Now it is not Appayya's case that stones etc., are different from
Brahman in the same way in which Intelligent beings are. Nor would he admit that the difference between the two is one of degree. And yet in the absence of community of nature, to some extent, the comparison of the two is unintelligible. On the hypothesis that both are of the form of Cit-Sakti (which is non-different from Brahman), this difficulty does not arise, but the original difficulty continues. Further, there is no point in the comparison at all, except on the basis of the difference of the finite self from Brahman. Comparison with the finite self is resorted to, as if the finite self were an intermediate link between the Non-intelligent world and Brahman. If that link proves to be not other than Brahman, it can be no link at all and the object of the comparison is frustrated. There is no such difficulty in taking the sūtras, as they stand. The jīva, they seem to say, is different from Brahman, and the material world is still more different. The former conclusion is based on the latter, which requires no proof beyond the bare statement. What Śrikanṭha is driving at in his commentary is the view that the Supreme Being is other and higher than the world of both Intelligent and Non-intelligent beings. It cannot, therefore, be said on the strength of the commentary on II, 1, 28, that Śrikanṭha is prepared to view the Non-intelligent world as vivarta.

The explanation of the sūtras which teach difference between the finite self and Brahman is also very thin. It is said that I, 3, 43, teaches not absolute difference between the two, but a difference of degree in respect of their knowledge, Brahman being omniscient and the jīva little-knowing. But then the Viśistadvaitin does not maintain absolute difference between the two. He supports identity of a sort, as between body and the embodied, pervader and what is pervaded. He too speaks of
the expansion and contraction of the intellect of the finite self, implying the difference in knowledge to be a difference of degree. It may well be that, in the last resort, such conceptions are unintelligible, except as synthesised in a theory of pure-non-dualism. To say, this, however, is not to admit that Śrīkantha recognised the need for or the possibility of such a synthesis.

It would, indeed, appear from his treatment of the finite self as atomic that he was far from conceiving of a synthesis of the kind. He maintains the doctrine of aṇātva (atomicity) of the jīva, (B. M. II, 3, 20-26), adopting in this the same view as the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaīta, and departing strangely enough from the conclusions of the Saiva Śiddhānta. And it is still more strange that in Appayya’s extensive analysis of Śrīkantha’s Bhāṣya, this doctrine alone has come in for neither mention nor comment. It may be that the dāsa mārga requires the text “That Thou art” to be interpreted on the basis of master and servant. Does it also require that the servant should be considered atomic? If so, the point is at least worth the trouble of statement and support. And one is all the more surprised at seeing no support for the atomic view from Āgamas like the Kāmika which recognise the dāsa mārga (as evidenced by Appayya’s own quotation therefrom in the present work). This much at least seems certain that there is a very real difference in Śrīkantha’s system between Brahman and the jīva. The difference is as great as that between the aṇāt and

1. For the Śiddhāntin’s criticism of the doctrine of atomicity of the finite self, see ‘Śivajñāna Siddhiār,’ IV, 2, and Umāpati’s ‘Paṇḍaka Bhāṣya’ pp. 274, 275. The latter says that the texts about departure etc., (whereon the view of atomicity is based) refer to the puryaṢṭaka,—the subtle body composed of the internal organs and the subtle elements.
the vibhu. To say that it is a difference of degree cannot serve to explain it away. And the difficulty is all the more significant, if we remember that the Viśiṣṭadvaitin is always prepared to admit some community of nature of between the two.

It is said that though the text "That Thou art" is mentioned in introducing the sūtra I, 3, 48 (about deep sleep and departure), no dualistic interpretation is offered of it in the commentary on that sūtra. But no dualistic interpretation is necessary for the purpose of that sūtra. A doubt is created by such texts as "That Thou art" as to the identity of Brahman and the jīva. That doubt is set at rest by appeal to other texts which make clear the difference between this self and another Self which mounts it, embraces it and so on. The difference between the two selves being thus established, a dualistic interpretation of the other text does not become necessary, though it may not be inappropriate. The need, such as it is, is certainly met later by the interpretation given in the amāśa section (II, 3, 42, et seq).

If now, we turn to Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of release, we do not find Appayya's case any stronger. We may, for our purpose, admit that the passages about nirāṃvaya-upāsakās are genuine; even then, they would seem to admit of being interpreted otherwise than as referring to knowers of Nirguṇa Brahman. Before considering this aspect of the question, however, it will be interesting to examine Appayya's exposition of the similarity between Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha as to the concept of release and the kind of meditation necessary therefore. It is contended that for Śaṅkara too, release is but the attainment of the nature of Ṭīvra, until final release comes about for all. This argument is developed with some elaboration and with reference to various statements made by Śaṅkara throughout his Bhāṣya. Admitting the
conclusion to be correct, one has still to remember that his conception is not identical with that of Śrikanṭha; for, as Appayya himself points out in his 'Siddhānta-leśa-sāmgraha' (pp. 450–451), Īśvaratva attained by meditation on Sagunā Brahman is not the same as Īśvaratva attained through knowledge of Nirguṇa Brahman, as preliminary to the final release of all. In the latter case, there is intuition of the One, Impartible Being that is Brahman, not in the former. Sagunā Vidyā (in the sense of meditation) does not bring about the final destruction of ignorance or egoity; and as is but natural in the circumstances, equality with the Lord extends not to all aspects. In respect of creatorship etc., of the worlds, the souls released by Sagunā Vidyā are not equal to the Lord. No such limitations are known to release through Nirguṇa Vidyā. It is not evident from any indication given by Śrikanṭha that he contemplated release in this sense, involving absolute equality with the Lord, without any reservations. His released souls can create not worlds, but only such objects as they desire for their enjoyment and bliss. It is evident, then, that there is a difference of considerable significance between the Śivādvaitin’s conception of release and that of the advaitin. Nor is the difference one merely of degree; the difference of degree is so great that it involves a difference of kind, the difference between the wisdom of the fully released soul and the ignorance of the partially released soul.

In elaborating the advaitin’s conception of release, however, Appayya seeks primarily to show not the identity of that concept with that which is the goal if Sagunā Vidyā, but the necessity for the advaitin to entertain and expound a concept of the Sagunā Brahman. Our author cannot, therefore, be suspected of sup-pressing the truth or basing an argument on an insufficient
analogy. But it must be said that if he had developed the contrast between the Saguna and Nirguna conceptions of release, in the present work, as in the ‘Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha,’ his other arguments in favour of his general position about Śrīkāntṭha would have lost some part of their weight.

As for the mode of meditation, there can be no doubt that Śrīkāntṭha’s words are clear and emphatic on the need for contemplating the Lord as identical with the self. Appayya’s interpretation is eminently sound, while his refutation of the Rāmānujaśyaśas, who seek to bolster up their śārīra-śānti-bhāva with the Jābala text, is brilliant. The dual statement with the change in the forms of the subject and the corresponding predicate (I am Thou, Thou art I) is unintelligible, except on the basis of full identity. But it may still be contended that the identity between Brahman and the jīva is only imagined for the purpose of contemplation. And it is in meeting this suggestion that Appayya’s case appears comparatively weak. He points out truly enough that the consciousness of identity—what Śrīkāntṭha calls “perfect-self-consciousness”—persists in release, even when the soul goes about singing as he pleases, “I am the food, I am the food, I am the food, I am the eater of the food, etc.” The world, it is said, is realised as of one texture with Brahman, not as the body of Brahman. Such arguments, it must be confessed, are very interesting and all but conclusive. The difficulty, such as it is, is due to the fact that even an imagined identity is fruitful of certain results, and there seems to be no means of asserting that the very results contemplated may not follow therefrom.

The example usually given of imagined identity is the Garuḍa bhāvāṇa, wherein the magician by contemplation of Garuḍa, acquires the distinctive property of Garuḍa, viz., nullifying the
effect of snake-poison. In so far as there is this practical success, the identification, though imagined, must be taken to have been complete. May not the imagined identity of the jīva and Brahman have similar practical results? It seems mere dogmatism to deny the possibility of any practical results or of such results as the perception of the world as of one texture with Brahman; for, he who makes the assertion about such matters must claim something of omniscience. But it may be contended that the magician never becomes Garuḍa, the object of his contemplation, while in contemplation of Brahman, the object is to become Brahman. Such a contention would be irrelevant; for, the Saguṣa-Brahma-vādin looks forward to the attainment of Īśvaratva, not to becoming Īśvara; and the magician certainly attains Garuḍatva. It is true he does not become the bird Garuḍa, but the bird is not what he contemplates. He meditates on the presiding deity of the bird, and in so far as he succeeds in nullifying the effect of snake-poison, there is no reason to suppose that he does not become the deity.¹ The jīva may be only a part (aṁśa), may be external to the Lord, as it were, and yet through contemplation of imagined identity may acquire release, and the powers of the Lord in respect of wisdom and enjoyment. The identity is but partial, but that may well serve for the perfection aimed at, which is also partial.

In saying all this, one need not hold the notion of imagined identity to be intelligible in itself. One may indeed go further and say that identity is capable of being imagined in part only because of the perfect identity of the self with all that is, i.e. with Brahman. To say that the identity contemplated is not between the magician and a bird, but between him and a deity is

¹ See further “Dravidā Māpādiyam,” p. 315.
not to solve the problem, but to make it more mysterious. We
do know he does not become the bird, but we do not know and
cannot say whether he has or has not become the deity, for, we
know little of the deity. There is also the difficulty that while
the Śaiva Siddhānta notion of the self will permit of such imagi-
nary identification, Śrikanṭha’s conception offers many difficulties.
According to the former, the soul in itself is pervasive, not atomic.
It is also sat-asat capable of identifying itself either with the
Lord who is sat or with the material universe which is asat,
according as one or the other is contemplated. For Śrikanṭha the
soul is atomic; and so far as we know, any such notion as sat-
asat would have been scouted by him as self-contradictory and
unintelligible. That he took those attributes to be contradictory
is evident from what he says in the commentary on II, 2, 31 (in
discussing Jainism).

It must, however, be confessed that while all this reasoning
and much more may have been self-evident to Appayya, there is
not sufficient indication to impute the same knowledge to Śri-
kanṭha. Except as culminating in pure-non-dualism, Sivādvaita
may be riddled with inconsistencies, but this of itself is no proof
that Śrīkanṭha was either aware of or desired that culmination.

Again, though by released souls, the world is perceived as one
with Brahman, not as the body of Brahman, it must be remembered
that the very same passage (from the commentary on the vīkārā-
varti sūtra) goes on to speak of Brahman as the harmony of Śiva
and Śakti; and as Śakti is spoken of as the seat of Śiva, the body
of Śiva and so on, all reference to the notion of a body cannot be
taken to have been excluded. Further, the intelligence of Brah-
man and the released souls is said to be such as perceives diversity
in the universe. In commenting on the Taittirīya text (II, 1)
"He enjoys all desires along with Brahman, the vipaścit", Śrīkaṇṭha explains "vipaścit" to mean "he, whose intelligence perceives diverse kinds of things" (Commentary on III, 2, 16). The commentator thus seems to postulate a richness and a diversity in the intelligence of Brahman and the released souls, a diversity alien to the contemplation or the realisation of him who knows Nirguṇa Brahman.

As for the statements about nirānvaya-upāsakas, the very word "upāsaka" would seem to be a stumbling-block to Appayya's interpretation. The word vidyā signifies either knowledge or meditation, according to the context. No such variable meaning seems to attach to upāsanā. The Non-related (nirānvaya) too would seem to be an object of meditation. Hence, one would be justified in seeking to understand that term in some sense other than Nirguṇa Brahman. And such a reference seems not impossible to trace, especially, if we turn to the Āgamas for guidance.

The Sarva-jñānottara Āgama, is, as its name implies, the culmination of all wisdom. The doctrine expounded herein is taught by Śiva not to other sages, as in the rest of the Āgamas, but to his own son, Subrahmanya; this is taken to be a mark of the higher grade of the wisdom inculcated. Unlike the main body of Śaiva doctrine, it distinguishes four principles instead of three, Śiva the fourth being other than Patī (the Lord), Pāśu (the bound soul) and Pāśa (the bonds). Patī is the Lord who engages in the five-fold activity of creation, sustentation, destruction, concealment and the bestowal of grace, in relation to the world. Śiva is unconnected with the world. In the language of advaita, Patī is Saguna Brahman or Īśvara, while Śiva is nisprapañca Brahman. The description of Śiva approximates to that of
Nirguna Brahman, for, He is said to be stainless, (niranjanaḥ, nirñmayaḥ), free from colour (classe?) and form (varṇa rūpa vivarjitaḥ) and so on. But He is not to be identified with Nirguna Brahman, for, there is some positive characterisation too of Śiva, as omniscient (sarvajñāḥ), omnipresent (sarvagataḥ), peaceful (śīntaḥ), the Self of all (sarvīttānaḥ) and so on. Thus, though He is higher than Pati, who is the Being that brings about creation and destruction (ṣāti-samhāra-kāraṇaḥ) and is otherwise known as Sadāśiva, He is not identical with the characterless Brahman of the advaitin. And the doctrine propounded cannot be identified with pure advaita either, for, so far as one can judge, this seems to be specifically mentioned and condemned. "Som e, with confused minds" it is said, "declare the doctrine of mere non-difference."¹

The meditation prescribed in this Āgama is that of non-difference (advaita bhāvanā). "He who thinks 'I am the self; Śiva, the Supreme Self is, verily, different' or he who, because of delusion, meditates thus does not attain Śivatva. Abandon the thought of difference, 'Śiva is other than myself'; contemplate (them) always as not two, (but) in the form 'I alone am that which is Śivā'". We have not, in this particular verse, a dual statement, as in the

1. See verse 24 of the Tripadārtha pañcaka; and on the whole of this topic, see pp. 8 and 4 of Muthiah Pillai’s edition of this Āgama. Some of the negative characterisations are striking in their resemblance to the advaitin’s conception of Nirguna Brahman. Śiva is thus said to be above speech, thought and name (vān mano nāma varjitaḥ) the knowledge that is devoid of characteristic marks (alingam), imperishable (akṣara), above sense-objects (svaptyātman) unattainable (agocaram), indubitable (asam-dehyām) and so on. See "Śivānānyasakṣātkāra pañcaka".
Jābāla Śruti; but what is here said is identical with that part of the Jābāla statement—the part, "I am, verily, Thou"—which is significant for pure-non-dualism. Neither the Āgamic nor the Vedānta statement is reconcilable with the conception of the finite and the Supreme Self being related as the body and the embodied.

The conception of Śiva who is unrelated to the creation etc., of the world (srotisamhāra-varjitaḥ), who is to be attained by meditation of perfect identity, would thus seem to have been entertained by a non-advaitic system such as that propounded by the Sarva-jñānottara. It may be that the claims of logical consistency or metaphysical intelligibility do not allow one to rest for long in this half-way house, but force one on inevitably to pure-non-dualism. But the traveller may be too tired to go on or may not even realize that his resting place is only a half-way house. In such a case, it is highly speculative to impute either a knowledge or the attainment of a higher goal. If Śrīkaṇṭha is really responsible for the passages about nirānava-upāsakās, he need not have meant a reference to any others except the devotees of Śiva, as distinguished from Pati or Sadāśiva. The devotees of the latter attain release through the path of the gods; the devotees of Śiva, who is higher than Pati, must necessarily have some distinct fruit; since the attainment of release is common to both classes of devotees, the distinction can be only in respect of the path. Those who contemplate identity with Śiva have no need to go along the path of the gods. Nor does it require much thought to


The Tamil translation published by Mr. P. Muthiah Pillai declares the non-difference from the aspects of both Śiva and the self: "Saṃkarṣaṇa is Śiva, Śiva is myself, I alone am Śiva"; see p. 48 of his edition.
realize that Śrīkanṭha—the pupil of Śvetāchārya who taught the harmonious sense of the various Āgamas (nānāgama viññāyin)—must have been familiar with an Āgama of such importance as the Sarvajñānottara.

But the suggestion has to face at least one difficulty with indifferent success. For him who knows Nirguṇa Brahman, it may be shown by the sheer weight of logic that departure is neither possible nor necessary: whereas, in the case of the devotee of Śiva, recourse has to be had to conjectural arguments.¹ We thus seem to be reduced to the necessity of choosing between two possibilities, neither of which has clear advantages over the other, in respect of consistency with the position expounded by Śrīkanṭha, while one of them, however, has the merit of being in itself more consistent logically. And Appayya has laboured, not without success, to show that this logical self-consistency does not demand failure to harmonise with positions like Śrīkanṭha’s apparent Viśiṣṭādvaita, that the latter is, indeed, the first step on which one rises to the former, as the second step. But when all this is admitted, one has yet to beware of confounding logical with actual perfection. The vision of the critic may be fuller and more perfect than that of the philosopher who propounded the

¹. The Āgamas do distinguish between release immediately on the dissolution of the physical body, and release which comes only at the close of all the enjoyment that has been earned. The former is the privilege of preceptors (ācāryas), and those purified by the ceremony of dikṣā (dikṣita). See particularly ‘Mokṣa Kārikā,’ v. 117. It would thus appear that even on an Āgamic basis, and without any thought of Nirguṇa Brahman, one may speak of a mode of release, which does not involve departure on the path of the gods.
system; and the fact that the latter has here and there made statements that may possibly bear a deeper significance is not adequate proof of that significance having been intended. Though, as Appayya shows, our author has introduced, at least in one place, a view acceptable to himself, with the words "Some say", it does not follow that in every case, the view so introduced is really Śrīkanṭha's own. And though Appayya does not demand the latter of us, his arguments demand very little less. For, between the passage about the Self of Bliss being understood as Cit-Śakti, and the passages about 'nirāṇavāya-upāsakas' there is this significant difference: while the identification of Cit-Śakti and the ānandamaya self is explicitly affirmed in the commentary on I, 1, 2, there is no such affirmation in the present case. We have indications scattered throughout the exposition without a doubt, but scattered in such a fashion that one realises their significance only when they are strung together, as they are by Appayya. When, added to this, there is the explicit condemnation of Advaita along with Bhedabheda vāda in the section II, 3, 42 et seq, it seems exceedingly improbable that Śrīkanṭha intended pure-non-dualism as the culmination of his system. But it is also evident that such a culmination may be worked up to with the materials derived almost entirely from Śrīkanṭha's exposition. To have exhibited this successfully is the great merit of Appayya's work.

A brief mention has to be made of a school of thought which attempts to reverse the relation of Śaguna and Nirṛgaṇa Vidyā, as understood by Appayya. Devotion to Śaguna Brahman, it is ordinarily thought, brings about mental purity, firmness, and the capacity to concentrate on Nirṛgaṇa Brahman. Śaguna Vidyā is the preparation for Nirṛgaṇa Vidyā. According to the Śaiva
Siddhānta, however, Nirguṇa Vidyā is a preparation for Saguna Vidyā. The outlook of the average man is materialistic. He identifies himself with the presentations and experiences of the external world; he wrongly imagines himself as enjoying and sorrowing. His knowledge at this stage is called pāśa-jānāna. When this stage is passed, and the Self is realised as free from these extraneous qualities, as different from Matter to which alone both enjoyment and suffering belong, we have the Nirguṇa Vidyā, the Knowledge that the Self is above and other than what has the guṇas (i.e., Matter). With this, however, we have but paśu-jānāna, which is not the goal of knowledge. Puruṣa (Spirit) is above and other than the twenty-four principles of Matter (Prakṛti tattva and subordinate tattvas). But above the Puruṣa there are other categories, and above them all, there is Śiva. The advaitin does not recognise these categories nor the Supreme Being who is above them. If the materialist erroneously identifies Spirit with Matter, the advaitin no less erroneously identifies it with himself, forgetting the possibility of higher truths and reaches of experience. Both views are partial, though the advaitin's view marks a distinct advance in the progress to truth. The materialist identifies Reality with what is seen, the advaitin identifies it with the seer, but above both and including both these is the revealer, but for whom neither would be, He who is neither subject nor object, but in whom subject and object live and move and have their being. This is Śiva, the Supreme Being, the Resplendent Abode of all auspicious qualities, the ever-gracious, ever-merciful Lord, who engages in creation as a sport so that souls may be rid of their beginningless taint of impurity, through the accumulation of merit and demerit and the enjoyment thereof. This knowledge is the Saguna Vidyā of the Siddhānta and the Āgamaṇta, a knowledge
which is not opposed to, but is rather the fulfilment of the Vedānta.

The view thus presented is based on the triple distinction of the revealer, the seer, and what is seen (darśayitā, dṛk and dṛṣṭa), a distinction at least as old as the Śiva-jñāna-bodha (See sūtra XI). It obtains further support from the distinction between Vedas and Āgamas, (as general and special doctrine), a distinction known at least to Tirumūlar, if not to earlier writers. This distinction of doctrine is analogous in some ways to that between the Old and the New Testament (as pointed out by Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin). Umāpati, writing in the beginning of the 14th century, says that the Āgamas are for perfected souls, the Vedās for the rest; the distinction is thus allied to that between 'pakva' and 'apakva adhikāra.' These suggestions which exhibit the Siddhānta as a fulfilment of the Advaita Vedānta, have been specially stressed by some present-day writers.¹

Attractive as such a hypothesis is, to the theist, it has to face insuperable difficulties. For one thing, the Nirguṇa Brahma-Vādin declares the world to be illusory. In passing beyond that

¹ See, in particular, Sentinathier, 'Mahā Ugra Vīrabhadra-stram,' and Ambalaya Nāvala Parāśakti, Introduction to his edition of Umāpati's 'Pauḍkara Bhāṣya;' also Schomener, pp. 322-325, 332, 387. The first of these errs egregiously in claiming Appayya as an adherent of this school of thought, in the face of the plain drift of the Ānanda Lahart, the Śiva-dvaita Nirgūṇa and repeated statements in the Śiva-tattvaviveka, the Śivākamāṇi-dīpikā and so on, to the effect that reality ultimately is Nirguṇa. Sentinathier makes short work of all such passages, declaring them to be interpolations, one and all; this method of escape, however, hardly recommends itself to the conscientious student of any system.
stage of knowledge, it is not conceivable that we shall arrive at a stage of knowledge, where the world ceases to be illusory. The perceiving self may possibly be declared to be also illusory from a higher point of view, but from no higher point of view can the partial or defective cease to be as such partial or defective. If the Siddhānta is a fulfilment of the Advaita Vedānta, we may expect to find in the former the doctrine of the illusoriness of the world; but we do not find any such doctrine. The world, it is true, is said to be an evolute not of Cit-Śakti, but of māyā-Śakti, but māyā does not mean illusion for the siddhāntin, as it does for the advaitin; and though, in release, the world as such counts for nothing, it can hardly be said to be nothing.

Further, the advaitin maintains that in his concept of Nirguṇa Brahman, all distinctions are transcended. It is superior to the differences of the seer and the seen; it is itself seer and seen as also what reveals. It is, therefore, unjustifiable in the first place to identify that Brahman with the seer, the bare subject, and thereupon, in the second place, to seek to re-introduce distinctions already transcended. The attempt is due to a failure to comprehend the Nirguṇa Vidyā. Āgamānta, thus presented, would seem to fall short of the Advaita Vedānta, which appears to have a legitimate claim to be the fulfilment of the former.
The following Manuscripts have been utilised in the preparation of this edition:

1. A paper Ms. in Nāgari characters, from the Library at Adyar, No. VIII, E. 24; referred to as "A".

2. A palm leaf Ms. in Malayālam characters also from the same Library, No. XXXIV C 1; referred to as "Mal".

3. A paper Ms. in Nāgari characters, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore, No. C. 1170; referred to as "My".

4. A Nāgari transcript (No. 454) of a Ms. in Telugu characters (No. 9768), from the Palace Library at Tanjore; referred to as "T".

5. An incomplete paper Ms. in Nāgari script, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore; referred to as "O".

The editor takes this opportunity of expressing his grateful thanks to the Hon. Director of the Adyar Library, to the authorities of the University of Mysore, to the Curator, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, to the Hon. Secretary of the Tanjore Palace Library, and to Prof. P. P. S. Śāstrī, Editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of the Tanjore Palace Library. The portion of the work dealing with the discourse between Suvārcalā and Śvetaketu was not clear in any of the Ms. But the discussions and the relevant passages from the Mahābhārata are repeated in almost the same words in ‘Brahmavidyābharaṇam,’ pp. 108-109. This proved invaluable in making out a clear and correct text.
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2:41 Prima facie view that the only form of Siva is that
   of Bliss.
2:42 The siddhaanta that the physical form and other
   attributes are true because of purportful repetition
   by Sruti.
2:421 Objection: repetition in different sakhas cannot serve
   as a mark of significance.
2:422 Reply: since 'gunopasamhara' secures contemplation
   of all qualities wherever mentioned, their repeti-
   tion even in different sakhas cannot but be
   purportful.
2:48 Texts declaring absence of qualities indicate absence
   only of undesirable qualities.
2:5 III, 8, 40 shows that Brahman is Saguna, Saprapa-
   nca, etc., and that there is no higher Nirguna
   Brahman.
2:51 Prima facie view based on texts like "Brahmavid
   Brahmaina bhavati".
2:52 Refutation of the above: qualities are declared of
   the faultless one who attains equality with
   Brahman; hence, negation can apply only to
objectionable qualities. And ēru in Brahmaśā
bhavati must be taken to mean ēru.

2.6 The view that departure on the arcirādīmārga is
unnecessary for niranvayopāsakas, being intro-
duced by the words “Some say”, does not re-
present Śrīkāntṭha’s own final position.

2.7 The identity with the Supreme indicated in the
Śāstradrṣṭi sūtra (II, 1, 31) is but imagined, as
that between Garuḍa and him who incants the
Garuḍa spell.

2.81 Difficulties due to statements in I, 1, 2 and II, 1, 15
about Brahmān being the object of perception in
‘san ghaṭaḥ’ etc. The relationship implied can
only be super-imposition.

2.811 Support for the above view from the interpretation
of the Yadā tama hymn in I, 2, 9 et seq.

2.812 Further support for that view in declarations as to
finite intelligence and happiness being fragments
of Brahmān’s Intelligence and Bliss.

2.82 Refutation of the above view: Brahmān is not the
object of perception—III, 2, 22. The statements
in I, 1, 2 and II, 1, 15, relate to the attributive
aspect of Brahmān, i.e., Cit-Śakti.

2.821 Objection: IV, 4, 10 et seq declares the bliss of the
liberated one to be the unlimited Bliss of Brahma-
man, not a mere fragment thereof. This is not
consistent with difference between Brahmān and
the jīva.

2.822 Reply: There is no inconsistency since Cit-Śakti
which is the Supreme Energy and Transcendent
Bliss of Śiva is of the form of the entire world, intelligent and non-intelligent, and is non-different therefrom.

2.823 The view of identity between Brahman and the jīva has been explicitly refuted in II, 3, 42 et seq.

3.1 Statement of the Siddhānta: Pure Non-dualism is Śrīkṛṣṇa's final view.

3.11 Support for the above from the aniyama section (III, 3, 32).

3.12 Further support from IV, 2, 8 et seq.

3.121 Preliminary view in that section—that for the enlightened one there is no departure. Texts about departure &c., relate to those knowers of Brahman, who seek liberation by degrees.

3.122 Refutation of that view: the attainment even of the ever-present Brahman can come about only by stages; nor is there any difficulty in respect of this going, since a subtle body continues to exist. The text ‘na tasya prāṇaḥ utkramanti’ really means ‘na tasmāt’ etc.

3.1221 Objection: the ground of departure is the body, not the finite self, as implied in ‘na tasmāt’ etc.

3.1222 The finite self, not the body, is mentioned as related to prāṇa; if a ground of departure has to be understood, the former is preferable. The interpretation is supported by the Mādhyaandīna reading.

3.123 But rising and departure do not apply to those who know Brahman without attributes.

3.124 The text ‘na tasya prāṇaḥ’ etc., is intended to state some special feature of the enlightened soul and
is hence inconsistent with rising and departure from the body, which hold of the unenlightened. Nor do principles of interpretation demand a different sense, the sense being determined by the upakrama, as in the story of Prajapati's gift of horses.

3'125 The Brhadāraṇyaka text IV, 4, 6, also supports this view. Attainment (ujjeyati) does not necessarily imply distinction, since it means identification like the word 'gamaya' in 'Tamaso mā jyotir gamaya' etc.

3'126 The Brhadāraṇyaka text IV, 4, 7 also supports this view.

3'127 The Mādhyandina text should be interpreted in the light of the Kārṇa, not vice versa; for, non-departure of the vital airs is made clear by the words "they remain even here", uttered in reply to Ārtabhāga's question.

8'1271 Objection: Ārtabhāga's third question relates to the unenlightened one, as seen from his fourth and fifth questions.

8'1272 Reply: Mere proximity of questions relating to the avidvān cannot counteract the clear indication of characteristic marks pertaining to the vidvān. Nor is there unity of context, as seen from the diversity and indirectness of the questions, which were designed to perplex and humble Yājñavalkya.

8'13 Support for the view of Pure Non-dualism from IV, 8, 1.
3.131 The *prima facie* view of that section set out.

3.132 The conclusion of that section: the path of light etc., applies to all modes of meditation.

3.133 The paths described in the various *vidyās* are identical.

3.134 The *Śaṃskar* verses lead up to Brahman, as accessories to meditation, not as constituting a path.

3.135 The text "by the very same rays he goes up (Ch., VIII, 6, 5)" does not exclude other stages of the path.

3.136 Nor does the *tvarā* *vacana* (Ch., VIII, 6, 5) exclude earlier stages on the path.

3.137 But the path of light is not for 'niranjayopākas'.

3.138 Even views acceptable to the *bhāsyakāra* are introduced with the words "Some say" as in I, 1, 18 *et seq*.

3.139 I, 1, 29 *et seq* accepts non-difference in meditation, between Brahman and the *jīva*.

3.140 IV, 1, 3 also establishes that non-difference.

3.151 *Prima facie* view in the above section.

3.152 Final view.

3.153 The two-fold statement of the Jābāla Śrutī that is cited here 'Tvam vā aham asmi, aham vai tvamasi' cannot be justified except on the basis of identity. So also of the Aitareya text *Yosau so'ham* etc.

3.154 Interpretation of *Tat tvam asi* compatible only with identity, not the 'śartra-śartra-bhāva.'

3.155 Nor is the non-difference barely imagined as seen from I, 1, 31; IV, 1, 3; and IV, 4, 19. The consciousness of identity persists even when the soul
in release sings as he pleases ahamnamah, abh-
mannam etc.

3'16 The commentary on I, 4. 6 shows indirectly that non-difference is acceptable to the bhāṣyakāra. The Sāṁkhya cannot claim that Kaṭha, III, 15 declares of the unevolved that it is to be known, since that verse relates to Prājūa as seen from Kaṭha, III, 18. But Prājūa in Kaṭha, III, 18 refers to the jīva; and its citation would be in-
appropriate except on the basis of identity of the jīva and Parameśvara.

3'161 Objection: even on the hypothesis of identity there is a recognition of distinction of topics as relating to the finite or the Absolute. Hence, the refe-
rence to the jīva, in any case, is inappropriate.

3'162 Reply: Śrutī has examples of a reply being given about Brahman, when the question is about the jīva, e.g., Yama's answer to the third question of Naciketas, which certainly relates to the departed jīva. It is equally certain that the reply relates to Brahman. There would be lack of congruity between question and answer, but for the non-
difference of Brahman and the jīva.

3'1621 Objection: the question does not relate to the finite self, since Naciketas has already faith in its exis-
tence. Even on the basis of non-difference, the reply should not go beyond the terms of the ques-
tion. In truth, the question relates to the released souls, that being the sense of pretā.

3'1622 The difficulty about a question being barred by prior
knowledge applies even to the released souls, of whose existence and nature Naciketas has knowledge, as seen from his question about the fires. If partial knowledge alone be admitted, that may hold in the case of the mṛta jīva too. The reply goes beyond the question on either interpretation of preta.

3·17 The commentary on I, 1, 1 rests on non-difference, it being said that in view of the many apparent differences between the two, their identity is a matter for legitimate inquiry, but not to be discredited.

3·18 The jīva is admitted to be non-different from Cit-Sakti and Cit-Sakti to be non-different from Brahman.

3·181 Objection: Cit-Sakti is non-different even from the inert world, but Brahman is not non-different from the latter. Hence, non-difference from Cit-Sakti can establish not pure, but only qualified non-dualism. Further, Brahman's non-difference from Cit-Sakti is only figurative, the two being really different, as support and what is supported, abode and what abides, etc.

3·182 Reply: The doctrine of attributeless Brahman is not opposed to the doctrine of transformation. The latter is helpful to the doctrine of illusion, as is seen from the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya and also the Samkṣepa Sāṁraka. Sṛikanṭha too makes judgments like 'san ghaṭāh' rest on the reality not of the world, but of Brahman.
Further, the non-difference of Cit-Sakti from Brahman is declared in many places, e.g., I, 1, 28; I, 3, 16; I, 2, 1; III, 3, 11—14.

Prima facie view in III, 3, 14, that the sheaths of anna, prāna etc., should in all cases be contemplated.

Refutation: their contemplation serves no purpose: they are mentioned only to indicate Brahman’s superiority to all else.

The sheaths of food etc., are not to the thought of as the cave wherein Brahman is present, because each of them is spoken of as a self; and no other self but Śiva is to be contemplated for release.

Objection: the exclusion enjoined in “abandoning all else” applies to Uma also. the expression “self” in the “Self of Bliss” being common to the selves of food etc., as well.

Reply: the Self of Bliss is the Supreme Self, the expression being used in that sense elsewhere even in the Ānanda Vallı, in the statement “From the Self, ether originates.”

Further Objection: Cit-Sakti being identical with the entire world—retana and vocetana—, the other intelligent beings, like Brahmā etc., are also non-different from Brahman, and should be so contemplated.

Reply: not so, since then the exclusion enjoined by Śruti would have no application at all, its logical reference being to such intelligent beings as are mentioned in the context, viz., Brahmā, Viṣṇu,
Rudra and Indra.

3'1835 Objection: the Self of Bliss is Siva, according to Srikantha, not Cit-Sakti. Reply: that Self is Cit-Sakti, according to the second of the interpretations given; and that this is the one acceptable to him appears from I, 1, 2. Further, the former identity being evident from the first chapter, there is no need to reiterate it in Chapter III.

3'1834 Non-difference of Cit-Sakti and Siva is established in I, 3, 12. Prima facie view that the world led up to by the Sāman verses is Viṣṇu-loka, and that the person seen is Viṣṇu.

3'1835 Refutation of the prima facie view: between Viṣṇu and Siva, there is a difference not of substance, but of state.

3'18351 Objection: the refutation goes beyond the doubt which is about the worlds of Viṣṇu and Siva. Further, Viṣṇu is directly identical not with Siva but with Cit-Sakti, being a mode thereof.

3'18352 Re-interpretation of the commentary: the “supreme abode of Viṣṇu” is Siva-Cit-Sakti, and it is the identity of this with Siva that is asserted.

3'18353 Another interpretation: expressions like “the supreme abode of Viṣṇu etc.,” refer to Siva, proceeding on the basis of non-difference between Viṣṇu and Siva. Even thus, non-difference of Cit-Sakti from Siva is secured.

3'184 Cit-Sakti as non-different from Brahman recognised by the Saṃkṣepa Sārīraka and the Pancapādikā.

3'185 Justification of the treatment of them as different
in the dahara vidyā, Gārgi Brāhmaṇa etc., also of the statement in I, 1, 2 as to the Self of Bliss being figuratively spoken of as Brahma.

3'19 The above arguments indicate the conclusion that for Śrīkanṭha, Brahma is nirguṇam, nirupam, nirprapañcam etc.

3'191 There is not in Śrīkanṭha’s system anything analogous to the Viśeṣa of the Madhvas; nor would such a principle help, for, if it did the work of Difference, it would be Difference itself, and Difference is unacceptable to Śrīkanṭha.

3'192 From non-difference follows the illusory nature of the non-intelligent world.

3'1921 Nor is empirical difference irreconcilable with this doctrine of illusory manifestation.

3'1922 Nor does it follow that the cetana-prapañca is also vivarta, as, then, there would be no experience of release.

3'1923 The statement in section I, 4, 23 et seq that Ātma-Sakti transforms itself into beings intelligent and non-intelligent signifies not that intelligent beings are not eternal, but that there is transformation for them in the way of contraction and expansion of knowledge and happiness.

3.2 Reason for a fresh commentary though subscribing to pure non-dualism: intuition of the non-specific Brahma can be gained only through concentrated meditation; and concentration is gained by the Grace of God, through worship.

3'21 Objection: inculcation of devotion and worship does
not justify condemnation of the Supreme truth. Reply: such condemnation is justifiable as seen from the procedure of sages like Āpastamba.

3.211 Āpastamba’s condemnation of Saṃnyāsa in the Kalpa Śūtras.

3.212 Untenability of Āpastamba’s condemnation in the light of his own statements. Object of that condemnation is to secure dull-witted people in the practice of house-hold virtues, so that they may thereby acquire the strength of mind necessary for renunciation.

3.213 Similar condemnation inspired by a like purpose in Chapter XVIII of the Śānti Parva.

3.214 Condemnation of early renunciation in the Manu Śuṛti should be similarly explained.

3.215 Śrīkanṭha’s Saguṇa interpretation of Vedānta texts and the concealment of their Nirguṇa bearing are conceived in the like spirit. His interpretation has the merit of not going against the truth, but expounding an intermediate aspect of the final truth.

3.22 Objection: if Śrīkanṭha acknowledged Nirguṇa Brahmaṇ, he should have recognised that alone to be the purport of the Śūtras, as shown by Saṃkara. Reply: Saṃkara himself has shown the existence of a reference in the Śūtras to Saguṇa Brahmaṇ, e.g., in śūtras 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 11 of Chapter I, pāda 1, and also in the introduction to I, 1, 12: Ś. So also in the rest of the Śūtras, synthesis is exhibited of some with Nirguṇa and
some others with Saguṇa Brahman.

3:28 Objection: if Śaṅkara too has exhibited the Saguṇa learing of the Sūtras, where was the necessity for Śrīkaṭṭha’s commentary? Reply: the fresh commentary goes further than Śaṅkara’s in determining the form and nature of Saguṇa Brahman.

3:231 Śaṅkara himself gives clear indications of his own view that Saguṇa Brahman is Śiva, a being other than Viṣṇu (I, 3, 14: 8);

3:232 Or Śaṁkāra Rudra (III, 3, 32: 8).

3:233 Vācaspati Miśra who knew what the Bhagavatpāda had at heart, identified Saguṇa Brahman with Śiva, in his preliminary invocation.

3:234 All such indications are far too subtle for the average devotee. The specific nature of Saguṇa Brahman should be determined by examining and discounting references to deities other than Śiva; this is what Śrīkaṭṭha does.

3:235 Objection: the need for a fresh commentary shows Śaṅkara’s discussion of the Saguṇa interpretation to have been in vain. Reply: not so, for these implications had necessarily to be recognised in demonstrating that Śruti references were to Brahman, not to the finite self or pradhāna, and in exhibiting the nature of the fruit of Brahman-knowledge. This fruit is the attainment of the nature of Īśvara i.e., Saguṇa Brahman.

3:2351 That Śaṅkara holds release to be of the above nature, until the final liberation of all, is seen
from I, 3, 19: Ś.

3.2352 I, 4, 16;
3.2353 II, 3, 43, et seq: Ś;
3.2354 III, 2, 3: Ś;
3.2355 IV, 4, 7: Ś.

Objection: if the enquiry into Saguṇa implications is necessarily involved in the other enquiry, why promise it, as it were, by framing the definition of Brahman in I, 1, 2: Ś, so as to apply to both forms? Reply: the object of the promissory statement is to show that there is a Saguṇa interpretation for the Śūtras, in their entirety. This is indicated clearly in I, 1, 3: Ś alone, on the Śṭālīpurāka nyāya, a principle followed by the author of the Kalpataru in commenting on IV, 1, 16: Ś.

3.241 Objection: Śrīkṛṣṇa for his Saguṇa interpretation relies not only on the Saguṇa contexts, but draws on Nirguṇa contexts also, making it appear that the Nirguṇa doctrine has no basis at all. Hence, his commentary is opposed to the doctrine of Nirguṇa Brahman.

3.242 Reply: even Śaṅkara has to speak of Brahman's characteristic marks in establishing his doctrine of the characterless Brahman. The texts about the latter have an intermediate reference to the former.

3.2421 Objection: but Śrīkṛṣṇa twists even Nirguṇa texts with much effort, to suit his doctrines.

3.24211 Interpretations of the Vṛcārambhāṇa Śruti—first interpretation.
The same—second interpretation.

Doctrine of difference expounded in III, 2, 11 et seq., and also in I, 3, 44; II, 1, 22; and III, 4, 8.

Declarations of non-difference are explained as referring to non-otherness, as between the pervader and the pervaded.

Explanation of the above as not inconsistent with pure non-dualism. II, 1, 22 implies that the bonds of agency etc., are illusory. II, 1, 23 only removes the erroneous notion engendered by II, 1, 15 that even the inert world is non-different from Brahman. 1, 3, 48 and 44 refer to the superiority of Brahman, not to His difference from the finite self.

The interpretation set out in II, 3, 42 et seq. favouring difference is negatived by the interpretation favouring non-difference in IV, 1, 3.

Objection: such negation, being self-contradictory, is inconceivable. Non-difference must be only imagined for purposes of meditation.

Reply: the interpretation offered in II, 3, 42, et seq. is opposed to the Jābālā Āruti cited in IV, 1, 3, to the drift of the commentary on IV, 1, 8, and to the commentary on III, 8, 14. Nor can both interpretations be accepted, they being contradictory.

Non-difference is not merely imagined; the experience thereof persists even in release, as shown by the commentary on IV, 4, 19.

Objection: the notion of the relationship of bod...
and the embodied is of no value either in the knowledge of Nirguna Brahman or in meditation on Saguna Brahman. Why then should it have been propounded?

3.242225 Reply: that notion is for those of least capacity who are qualified only for the dasa marga.

3.24223 The interpretation of the Varcarambhaṇa Sruti serves only to strengthen faith in Saguna Brahman. Further, the asmadi sutra (II, 1, 23) makes it clear that in the view of the commentator, the inert world is not non-different from Brahman, and that, consequently, it is to be understood as fictitiously imposed on Brahman.

4. Vivarta vada is the view of the Sutrakara too, as seen from Suvarcala—Svetaketu Upakhyanā in the Mokṣa Dharma Parva of the Mahābhārata.

4.1 Support for the above view from another context in the Mokṣa Dharma and the Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

5 The qualified-nondualism of others is not susceptible of being interpreted as favourable to pure nondualism. Srikantha alone has provided a commentary suitable to all three grades of capacity.
श्रीवाहैतनिर्णयः

अपपदीशिक्तकः

ॐ

श्रीकण्ठशिवाचार्यः
सिद्धा-तं 'निजगृहः शिवाहितम् ।
तत्त्वं विद्विषेदम् विहितः
मधिगिर्वेति विन्यथामोऽसि ॥

आरङ्गाधिकरणादिभाष्यः विशिष्टाइतविनयवहारायामपक्षोऽदभिमत् इति, अनियमाधिकरणादिभाष्यः निरूप्योपासकानामिश्रेशु मुक्किर्ष्याविनयवहारे: द्वितीयपक्षः अभिमतः इति च प्रतीयते । न च द्वापि

पक्षः परस्परानुपासत्महेऽ इति अन्यायाकः परमासिद्धान्तो निर्णेकः।

तद्विनिह विचारः कियते ।

इवम्ह तावत प्रतिवारि। आचार्यः ब्रह्म प्रीसांलाभये यत यत ॥

1 जगड़ु (P. My.) 2 आभिमत (I') 3 सिद्धान्तभाषम (I')
सिद्धान्तभाषम भजते (My)
शिवाघ्रैतिनिवेषः।

शिवाघ्रैतं निर्विपत्तनूनिति वा तत्र सवेत्र विशिश्तावैविभिन्न्मेव यथवहारो हदयते।

2.21 यथा तावदारभुपाभिधिकरणे “शुद्धप्रपायोऽस्मिन् चथमसन्तभवेद्वादिनो घटपाणोरिय तदन्त्यलपरशुतिविरोधात्। न चालन्तभवेद्वादिनः। न वा शुद्धित्यायारियाकतरिएव्यालथकादिनः। तस्तामावहिएवगमनेदपरशुति-वियोधात्। न च भेदामद्वादिनः। बस्तुपदधात्। किं तु शरीरश्चारिणोरिय गुणगुणिनोरिय च विशिश्वाभृतवादिनः।” इति। तथा च भोक्त्रापत्याभिधिकरणे “यदुक्मू फूलेत्र चित्रास्तपङ्क्राबिषिदः शिव एक्ष्ठरिति। कार्यः कारणः च भवति। इति विशिश्वाभृतेत्मू।” इति।

2.22 शुद्धाघ्रैतं तु इज्ञाभिधिकरणे शक्तिराभ्यां निराकर्मू। “नरः
शदेव सोन्येदसम आसीत्। एकमवाभिधिति।” इत्यादिना सदृस्य वस्तु
निर्वियोशभेदवालोखारणनुभुवते। कारणावस्थेशत्कर्ष चुस्तमप्रपायनिविष्टमि-नियोध्ये।” इति शाश्वान्य। “सदेववेद्वारणन्त न विशेषनिपेधः। किं तु असत्यारणनिपेधः। असद्ध इद्धम असीत। ततो वे सद्यायत्र इति
अवाकासत्कारणात्मकता आत्मान्वसिकत्त्वात्।” किं च “शदेव सोन्येदसम
आसीत्।” इत्यत्र कथ निर्विभोगल्प भवन्तः। “आसीत्।” इति दि कियाविवेशः।
“अम” इति काव्यवेशः। “एकमेव” इद्धवारणागयात्मान्तनिपेद-धपरमू। “अद्वितीयम्।” इति जघापाटायान्तव्युथे। अते च वं विकारसन्त-शाखिविविष्टम्। कथं विकारसवेधशक्तिविविष्यप्रमुखतोरण जगाभवमकारणं
भवणो भवति।” इति परिधारणः।

2.22 सदेवशाप्सकामयापि विशिश्वाघ्रैतं तत्राभिधिकरणे सम-पि
चित्रमू। “प्रमादिऔपात्मकस्य सत्वदर्श नैवसुपरतवं युक्मू, प्रक्षन्या
प्रत्येक च तत्त्व वस्तुःप्रतिपादनपरस्तः। तथा अभियुक्तसूक्ष्मः—

शर्तः शिवाछ सच्चिदेश्वरःप्रकृतिमयोदितः।

tौ ब्रह्मस्तामर्शेन समस्तजगद्रत्मकः।

इति। स्थुलस्वरूपस्त्रिविचित्रपद्धप्रशक्तिविशिष्टं। परस्तेऽवरूप काय्यकारणपूर्वः सत्पुरुषियव इति।” अव श्रद्धायकःचन्दनः— शक्तिश्रव्यः प्रत्येकं न शक्यतः, किं तु शक्तिश्रव्याशिव एव—— इति झापनार्थः। यथा

“व्यक्त्याधिकारिता: वदार्थः” इति न्यायसुङ्गः— व्यक्त्याधिकारिता नां न प्रयोक्तमः, तात्त्वाधिकारिविश्वाद्यक्रर्चितः— इति झापनार्थेऽकर्ष्यः।

समस्तजगद्रत्मकः चित्रविशेष तु सद्याधानः— शक्तिश्रव्याशिववाचकस्य सारः न विशिष्टात्तत्ततमिति:। तदस्य विश्वादिप्रस्थवस्य सद्यावाद्यिति शद्धा—

निरावक्षणाय नस्तः शक्यमांतः शक्तिश्रव्याशिवसमस्ताधिकारिविश्वाद्यः।

वदेशत्स्यूसूचिप्रतिपादनाधिकारिविश्वाद्यः सप्तही। तत्र सत्यस्य द्विषेषोऽन्यः

समान एव ब्रह्मपद्धार्थः; प्रभुत्तत्वात्तपनाधिकारिविश्वाद्यास्य तद्भवाढ्यः।

अतः एव भूमाभिका: भवं भूमाध्येन ब्रह्मवापपथः— २३२६।

त्वा एव भूमाभिका: भवं भूमाध्येन ब्रह्ममवापपथः— २३२६।

स्थाक्तमिति द्विः। तत्र हि “यत्र नान्यत्ववध्यति नान्यस्यूत्त्वंति नान्य—

र्हिज्ञाता त स भूमा” इति भूमाघणावाषेन कथं भूमान्यभूमान्यभूमान्यभूमान्य

दश्यानाप्रभा: उच्येत्। प्रपश्चस्य सतः द्वीनार्धानां परिहुँमाधिकारिती—

मामाभ्यामः। “प्रपश्चस्य सतः कथं मुक्तमानामप्रस्थत्यवयस्य तस्य द्वैनां परिर—

हित्येत्।” इति बाव्येनोऽद्वित्य प्रपश्चस्य तत्त्वनेष्ट्रीष्टि तस्य भूमाभावार्धामृतमूल—

द्वैत द्वीनीभार्तता भवति न तद्वस्त्वत्वनि सम्मथो न तत्त्वेऽति द्वैत:—

“न हि मुक्तानां प्राणतपश्चो द्वैनार्थविषयः किं तु निराभावान्यक्षत्तृष्टो

ब्रह्मः प्रपश्चाकारं द्वैनीभार्तता भवति” इति। तद्वस्त्वं भूमान्यभूमान्य—

वाद्यायर्यस्यान्तर्यानांवेषोऽपि प्रपश्चस्य तपस्यं प्रति, द्वैनीभाववता भवतीवति प्रति—
पादयन्ति श्रुतिः संभविते नेत्रात्मात्मा। कदाचित् "तथाहि श्रुति: 'प्रयत्नतो भविष्य
आकाशार्थैरं ब्रह्म' " इति; प्रयत्नतो भविष्य
ततो सुक्षमतरं परमाकाशार्थैव भविष्यैश्च तथा
सुक्षमत्तेव द्वितीयवोच्छर भविष्यै। अयस्मनिः
पूर्वः श्रुतिरुपच्यायार्यवर्मकुसङ्गमतिः अयस्मनिः
श्रुतिः; " 'आपेक्षितः स्वाराज्यम्। आपेक्षितः मनस्सततिम्।' इत्यादिना
मुक्तमना प्रस्तुत। तस्य "वाक्यतः" इत्यातिना स्वाधीनामात्मिकत्वं श्रुति-वाचितः
द्वितिः संधिहि अक्षरः। तस्य पुनः श्रुतिभावाभास्यं
तवं तवं प्रभावस्तव्याभ्यासंतत् तवं तवं श्रुतिमानम्
श्रुतिप्रभावस्तव्याभ्यासंतत् आकाशार्थैरं ब्रह्मविश्वनषुभाविश्वनषु
तत्पथोऽभितः।" इति।

2.222

चक्षुवहिन्यायेष्विनः "भावे जायन्तः।" इति सुयोगाये "नन्दु शुक्लसा
वदि प्राकृतवस्तुहिनीवरूपाकस्यतमः तस्य श्रुतिपरार्थप्रभावस्तुविनाति न संसार-
दुःखाविकायितिचेतन, सुक्षमत्तेवार्थेन प्रभावस्तुनामाभास्यात्।
सुकुल विवाकारं हि द्वितिः विवेशस्य इति शाक्तो चाविश्वासम्, तद्वतं तमः
"तथा हि शून्यते।" इत्यकर्म "प्रयत् ततो भविष्य" इत्यादिशुष्मुहिने
विता आचारणोन चार्थेनः प्रभावितः।। स्वादिशन्यानां शक्तिविशिष्टिन्याववाहा
विकल्पमात्रेन कथं विशिष्टहर्दिक्षितेः, तदस्य प्रश्नस्य सुझावात्।। इति
श्रुत्या परिवारः "समस्तजगद्वालयम्।॥ इति संभवितः।" इति श्रुत्या चुन्नि।
समस्तस्य जगत: शक्तिपरिणामस्वसमध्येन भविष्याधिकरणार्थेनत्वे स्पहो
अवति:।। एवं विशिष्टद्वेषे एव वर्ण भावितायाने क: प्रकरः श्रुत्यां उत्तरायी-कारश्चायाः।।

2.3
किवच निर्दोषः कल्याणविसिसं स्पर्शवर्ण ब्रह्मण: स्वरूपम्, न दुः
शिलाहठतिनिर्णयः

निरिष्टेशम् इति ¹न्यवस्थापनार्थतयेयः "न स्थानोपसि" (२४. ३. २. १४) इत्यावधिकरणद्वयं प्रर्वतनम्। तपृशः मायुर्धाबिकरणम्। दश्चन निरिष्टेशम् सन्धिशेषं बेंि क्रयमवः संसङ्गः। तमोऽर्थम् "यः प्रविष्ट्या निष्णुः" इत्याविच्छिन्नभित्तिपर्वं ब्रह्माण्डः प्रविष्ट्यांत्वस्थानतःचीर्क्रमवतशिभ्रश्वरश्रवशशरस्यां उत्त्वादिकमक्तत्वसिद्धवं ताधिकं बेंि संसङ्गः। तद् तस्य ताधिकतः ब्रह्माण्डः तत्वयुक्तवोऽः प्रसज्ज्वलनः। न वा इति संसङ्गः।

एवं सति पूर्वः पक्षः। ब्रह्माण्डः सवःः प्रविष्ट्यां नवस्थानानतःचीर्क्रमः। ².३१

रत्नाविद्युधः यथा जीवस्य जागरस्वपनस्मृतिमूलांसराजावश्याम्। सूक्ष्मशून्यः दश्चिरेष्ठराविशिष्टतिनिविचचन्ता दोषः। तथा श्रीभगोकस्वप्नः। शरीरराविस्तितेनविशिष्ट:। "त्रेवेद्योगास्मां सांकोऽपि" (२४. ३. २. ५) इति सूक्ष्मश्च संस्कारावि०णां शरीरसंवर्गभिवा वर्त्मकः योकः। समुद्रपः कूदपः पूर्वशोकिताविद्वादिकमित्वेतुः। शरीरभूमृ ० रूपवाविशिष्टवः ²वस्थानस्य अविवेशः। सवःः श्रीकार्यवाचः।

न च यथा राष्ट्रो विष्ये नवतां राजाशाही ममतुः। समानव्यास्तीति ².३१.१

tासिन्स् सतोऽपि राष्ट्रो न नवँवति, एवंसिहापि स्थान इति बाध्यः। न हि राजविष्यवस्वभावेऽ राजाशाहुविद्विन्युक्तज्ञ:। भास्के स्मिष्टिः। किं दुः राजाशाह्यविभविषेवितम्। राजा हि न राजाशाह्यविष्यः। अतो युक्त राष्ट्र: सवाविष्यवासित्वेवः। स्वाभाविविद्युक्तः। वास्तेवः। शरीरभूमि वः। भाग्येन ० शरीरे वास्मार्थं स्मिष्टिः। अतो यथा पूर्विगन्धाविविद्युक्तकारायणः। प्रयुक्तः। भाग्ये ो कारागह्युविशिष्टतमाङ्कं स्मिष्टिमिति तत्कारायणे। निरिष्टेशम्। तेष्यां स्निन्यस्वतेव नवाश्विषुतस्यापि भवति। एवं वेद्युक्तज्ञः। इह वदसवेच वा। तस्मिन्स्य तस्मिन्तपालितत्वस्यापि बहेद्वेचः।

न च भुः अत्यं नरस्थत्वातूः सलापि मद्यः। शरीरे निवासे कर्मः। ².३१४

1 न्यायसाधारणेऽनुसार (मू)। ² वास्तेवानुसारविशेषव्यवहार संस्कृत: (२)।
शिवाण्डग्निनिर्वेशः

राहतस्य तत्स्य शरीरवासप्रयुक्तं दुःखं न भवेदिन्ति वाच्यम्। कर्मांक्षिपः हि
दुःखविशेषारुपुरुणं देशानुरुपपत्तिः। पश्चात: शरीराधिकारिः तदनुग्रहिः जीवं दुःखं
भोजयति। िश्वरस्तस्य विनापि तत्त्रकपिलः। तेन तेन शरीरेण शरीरित्वं स्वातं
तदा कर्मानुभोधस्य एतसः तद्विनोहि प्रमृत्त्वा। न खलु राजाराजेन्य करार-
हृथे निवेदयि भवति तदहृददर्प्याविरूपुरुणं दुःखम् निवन्तत्वा। कराराद्वारस्य...

किर्त्य ब्रह्मण: सर्वशीर्षरक्तव विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्वि-
विषयवत्तापि अवज्ञीयतत्वा तत्कालिनिषेधाधिकारिः तथां स्थापितं श्वादेव। अपत्तापपृर्ववादः ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दुःखावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
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विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
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विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-
विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्रह्माणिविधवाद्विवस्त्वापि दु:खावतं स्वादेव। अपहतपत्तापपूर्ववादः: ब्रह्मणः: कसौ-

अत्र सिद्धान्तः— खलो निर्विशेषः ब्रह्मण: प्रथित्याग्यावस्थानस्वा-
अपि दोषाः न प्रस्वेदः। सत्रां हि श्रुतिः स्वति षु च। “एषा आत्मा

1 पश्चात:स्यापिवासाचर्यसंधिपरिप्रयाा (T) 2 खःसीतिक (T)
अष्टतपापम् बिजरो विस्तुः विशोको विनिघत्तो विपिपासं सत्यकामः
सत्यसंहुः
अनादिमलसंहुप्रागभावास्वभावम्
अत्यन्तपरिद्रुढः द्रात्म इत्यभिचिते
अत्कोषद्वयंतरस्याधवणाः
सद्योकस्य निर्माता पशुपाणिविनासणः
इत्यवेष्मायाः निरस्तमस्थतदोषकः सिद्धविचकुलगुणास्य
चेतेर्मुतभयिचि ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धम्
अतः शरीरमनंदनेण प्रसावतं पापमुक्तामः
रणाधोकद्रिष्टोषणाभावस्य तत्त्वोपपरिपन्थितमवन्धुपलवादिगुणास्य च
अव्यात्त्व न द्वोषापावनसिद्ध प्रमवति

tथयापि जीवनमु च वत्सोऽपह्न्यपाप्यत्तवादित्युक्तस्यापि भ्रमणः
शरीरः
संबन्धशास्त्राः तत्त्वयुक्ता दृष्टाः स्थूः
इति वेदः तत्परिहारायथेऽव अन्तवामि
वाच्यः "या गुरुभयू विचारः इत्यार्द्धयशेऽपि अतिपरमायमः
चतुः त आत्मा अन्त्यायमस्यतः" इति अत्यमः द्रोपाधार्यस्वप्रिपावनात्
अचर्यः
"स्वाभाविकनान्तरं प्राविशल्" इति शिवस्यान्त्यामि भवेऽन सः
हुः
"सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्" इति शिवस्यान्त्यामि भवेऽन सः
हुः
"यो येन संहानां सः भगवानां यष्ट च चात्मा तस्मै तै नमो नमः" यष्ट विष्णुः
यष्टः
सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्
तत्त्वयुक्तारायथेऽव अन्तायमि
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यष्टः
सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्
तत्त्वयुक्तारायथेऽव अन्तायमि
वाच्यः
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"यो येन संहानां सः भगवानां यष्ट च चात्मा तस्मै तै नमो नमः" यष्ट विष्णुः
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सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्
तत्त्वयुक्तारायथेऽव अन्तायमि
वाच्यः
गुरुभयूः
"सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्" इति शिवस्यान्त्यामि भवेऽन सः
हुः
"यो येन संहानां सः भगवानां यष्ट च चात्मा तस्मै तै नमो नमः" यष्ट विष्णुः
यष्टः
सोक्तत्रादान्तरं प्राविशल्
तत्त्वयुक्तारायथेऽव अन्तायमि
वाच्यः
न्यायः । किन्तु "तुस्य च साम्प्रदायिकम्" इति न्यायात । उभयेऽपि तारिकवैभवसमस्येनातुअहो न्यायः । तथा च ब्रह्मण: शरीरस्वाभावप्रतिपादक्षेरं शृवृत्तायः। तस्य तत्पर्यक्रेष्टातिपादानात् । "आकाशाः के बै नाम नामकुट्याइनिवित्ता ते यद्वस्त्रा वद्वृत्ता वद्वृत्ते स आत्मा" इति शुद्धी परमाकाशस्य नामकुट्याविभागितया तावालयेन त्वरितवा त्र्वान्तिपादनाते नन्दरं ब्रह्मण: प्रकृते नामकृते प्रावःत्तत्त्वात्वापि। ते यद्वस्त्रा" इति तदवस्त्राविपादनस्य आकाशायुक्तः। तात्मा तावालये नासित किन्तु शरीर-शरीरिभावमात्रायति प्रतिपादनात्ताः। "तावालये हि तदवस्त्राविस्मया अस्तक्षः। शुद्धेऽवापि। न तेवदृष्टः। शरीरविषयां तु नामत्तस्य प्रसालितस्त।" इति-स्वाभास्य विभावनाच। तदसुविश्वासः अरुपत्वाशुभानाम्। "अरुपुनियम् चाच्छ। यथा खलुक्षरीरमाकाशादिकं शरीरविषिष्टितियुक्तदोषः। न स्यास्तेते एवं शुद्धापि।" इति।ब्रह्मणः। योजनं शुद्धम्।

न च काराग्रह्मणात्यतीनियन्तानुशर्यक्षातो ब्रह्मणो नियन्त्रत्वापि शरीरेष्वस्थाने तत्पर्यकारः। जविकवृित्त्यं भवेदिति न्यायात्तुण्डव्यतितानां अरुपशान्तीं नाम तत्पर्यकारः। तद्विरोधेन रुपम्यत्तुष्ठयं एव यथाकथाचिन्तेत्या इति शुद्धी नीयमम। यत: कर्मचिन्तेन अर्थानां दुःखादिकतं न वस्तुस्वभावरुपकम्। पुनःवार्तालाम्बरथावेशः समस्येद्वेद्र महामायाधिनां जातिमेदेन च शुद्धुःकर्त्तव्यदैसनातः।

"तदेव श्रीतेेभूतवा भुदुःखकाये जायते।
तदेव कोपाये यत: प्रसादूर्द्धाच च जायते।
तस्माहुःछात्वं नासित न च कित्विशुद्धास्तमकम्।" इति श्राद्धवः।

4-24 चतु: भरायनं नितिधारिते विभिन्नविविधगततास्थानादिकं। तस्याद्र: तयायारं तत्त्वापि। विभिन्नसंवक्षालोष्टनुकामङ्गांक्षावंसिद्धियाः।
नलकुटुङ्क्षामक्ष्य स्थानिति, ततुच्छम। लोकेन्द्रसाधारणप्रतिविधिउपस्थायान्
भाषणादिशैत्ये: प्रथमोपस्थानां तत्तद्विरीरिसामानिजीवानामेवावेष्यने
हस्तिनि काव्यार्थवाचनित्यतो तथा तानैव वाक्यार्थाणां च चरितार्थत्या
ईश्वरस्य सर्वोपन्नामितमुः, अनन्यामिनि प्रति निस्थायानां शरीरस्यम्,
शरीरबाधाचेचनां शरीरिप्रेति तथाति, श्रुतिवाच्यायानं वगलथवचयमुख्य सिद्धान्ते अनिर्विदोपाध्यायितकस्य तस्य इश्वरस्यावेष्यने पुनर्वाक्यार्थावोधातृत्वायानां।
अत एव "चिरः प्रथमस्या। विशुर्यात्" इत्यत्र प्रथमोपस्थायानां
श्रीमोतप्सीतकायाः: प्रथमचरमस्थान्योरेष वाक्यार्थान्यव: न तु प्रथमचरमस्
स्थानानुवचनित्याः: "प्रथम स्वाजा।" "आजुद्रोता" दिनःवाचिलिन्वितोष-
2.326 न केवलयुभयुषिकृतश्चृतिसूत्रितविलासः पृथिव्यास्तिस्थितावर्ती
तत्स्थुक्षोपयोगसः; किंतु श्रुत्युक्तहत्दश्यान्तमाम्येनापि। एवं हि द्यान्त-
मुद्यादरति श्रुति:—

"आकाशभेंक हि यथा घटादिपु प्रवक्त् सब्धेत्।
तथासेवेप्राणेषकसो जात्याहरेषविवांक्षुमान्।" इति।

अतराश्यान्ते "य: पृथिव्यां निषुर्।" इत्यदश्रुतिस्विद्ध सर्वंग्र
स्थितिमुखपारिता। तेन कथमेक्षामूलेस बहुपु विभिन्न: कल्लकेक्षामूलेस चित्रीन
कल्पपायत्वादिति श्रुता निवारिता। स्त्रीलिङ्गान्ते तेषु स्थितस्यापि
तेष्वास्तिकाकाशस्येव तत्स्थुक्षोपयोगस्य उपपायित:। तेन तच्छउपरकोकमयी
तत्स्थुक्षोपयोगम्यां न भवेदतिति श्रुता निवारित। कर्मबद्धत्वाद्विभाव्यां
विशेष इति श्रुतेरेनामाः। न चेतुसास्त्रानांस्यम्—अनुसूचि सूचनेनव्यव-
स्थित एव तत्त्व स्थिर इत्र 'गूढ़ते। तथा परस्परात्मानो वस्तुः पृथिव्यास्तिना-
वस्थितस्य स्थितेनाम्रहानात्। वस्तुः पृथिव्यातः स्थिर इत्येवास्तुनमात्।
न श्राण: सूर्यस्योपाधिश्चृतुक्षोपयोगक्षुमपप्रति—इति। यथा जलाद्विस्य
जलोपाधिश्चृतुक्षोपयोगक्षुमदिव्याविभावकत्वं वस्तुतो न भवति। एवं श्राण: पृथिव्यान्तरवस्थितामुखः गृहोष्णवक्त्वं न भवतीतिति तत्स्थुक्षोपयोगाविभाव्यां
भाववार्ते द्यान्तोत्तमम् "जात्याहरेषविवांक्षुमान्।" इति। द्यान्तद्वायमहणसां-
भावसात् एवसमवास्येत। सूर्यसाम्यानुसारौ ब्रह्मण: पृथिव्यास्तिवनवस्थितिर्वर्ते-
न्वविशेषस्विद्धाः हि 'स्थापक्षान्तरीपायाम्। स्वात्त। न च सर्वसेव्यं द्यान-
न्त्वाविभाव्याः सम्बन्ध भावमितिकातिनाम्यः। लोकनूक्षेत्रों: विबंप्रार्कोक-
साम्याविभावण्ड्यान्त्विकरणविवांक्षुमाः। इति।

2.33 इत्यम् "न नृथानवस" इत्याविभि: द्रश्यि: सूर्येन: ब्रह्म सापेखं नि-

1 दत्तायेत् (M) 2 पर्यन्तविभावां र्घम (M)
वृषकल्याणः युगान्तररविभिन्नता समथनिहरू एकसम्बन्धमणे कुलम्। तदनन्तरं नेवा-
क्षेपसमाधानः तदीकृतम्। “प्रकृतेनाथवलं हि प्रतिपथि ततो अविवि च
सूर्यः।” (छ। २। २। २।१) इतिहासिनेवविभि: सूर्यधिकरणान्तरे कुलम्।
तत्र चुरुगांधिकरणसम्बन्धितं क्लाणं उभयालंकृतसं उपपथि न वेति संज्ञायः।
तद्विन् उद्योगसं “इत्यावश नवणो सूर्य चाल्मर्म च” (छ। २। २। २। ५।)
इत्यादिः स्वभाणः। पुरुषस्वामीवाक्याः समूहसन्दर्भास्त्रास्त्रकं रूपसुक्तवा
“अध्यात्म आदेशो नेति नेति” (छ। २। २। ६।) इति किरिमणं निपेधः
प्रकृतस्वृत्तसूर्यस्यहृदायविपयः। चुरुगाणो सूर्यस्यप्रयोगखालम्यकुपृषं तद्विन्
नास्ति, अथवा अवधाण: प्रकृतस्वृत्तसूर्यस्यहृदायविपयं च प्रकृतस्वृत्तसूर्यस्य
अवधाणः अध्यात्मसिद्धिविज्ञानविपयः। इति संज्ञायः।

तत्र पूर्वः पश्चात् — “नेति नेति” इति इतिहासेन परास्त्रस्य नवणः
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सिष्येषः। इति तावलिबिविवादः। इतिवर्द्धः। प्रकारावतीं पूर्वप्रकृतं प्रकारं परास्त्र-षेत्।
पूर्व ओर सूर्यास्त्रास्त्र: अवधाणः। प्रकारावतां प्रकृतम्। अस्तस्तिर्विवेदयुक्त
इति युक्तम्। नेति नेतीति। वीष्णुवायुं विष्किर्षति:। पूर्वेष्वर्त्तव रूपद्वयं साक-ल्येण निपेघप्रयायवायताः। अथवा एकेन सूर्यस्य अन्येनास्वास्त्रस्य च रूपास्त्र
सिष्येषः। इति दिरकिमाफळम्। प्रकृतेन्तता निपेदियतु इति तु न युक्तम्।
रूपद्वयानिपेदं इत्यतिष्ठिते हिर्सिमाफळ-ल्याभावाशः। इति।

सिद्धांतस्य — प्रमाणान्तराध्यात्मप्रत्यया पूर्ववाक्यः सूत्वेच विहितं
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अवधाणोऽसूर्यस्यवेशिष्यं तदनन्तरवाक्येण निपेधंदु न शक्यते। पूर्वौपिरिरोहा-
पते।। शेषिनिर्विहायमहान्वात् बलृनि बिक्ष्मायमात्त्। अतः पूर्वः सूर्यस्यरूपस्य-
वेशिष्योक्त्या दुर्द्वष्ट्रस्यहृदायविपयं। प्रकृतस्वपैतावस्त्रास्त्र:। प्रकारो निपेदियते—इति युक्तम्।

1. सूर्यस्यरूपस्य (My)
तत: तदनन्तरस्वेच्, "नहोत्सामादिति नैत्यन्यत्ः परमस्ति। अथ नामावेः सत्यस्म मद्यम" इति "प्राणाः च सत्यं तेपामेष मद्यम्" (ढू. २.३.-६.) इति वाक्यशोषो मूले गुणजान बच्चिति। अत्र प्रथमवाक्येन इति नेति प्रक्र-तेयातारिण्यश्रेणिकोनोकैतालामान सङ्ग्रामः पर्युतक्षमाणास्तिर्मि स्वाधिकराहितस्मानुक्रपमः। "अथ नामावेः" इत्याविवाक्येन सङ्ग्राम उत्क्राणावेचदयि मूलसांस्कृतिपञ्चश्चारीकत्रेवेत् तदुभावनियन्तरस्य समा: सन्तेषव। अति हि मूलभित्रानां योगिनिः सुकानां च राजवेदेव तदुभावारीरकालेव नामिनचुन्न-त्वम्मिति शाखानियवार्थेऽसङ्ग्रामः "सत्यस्म मद्यम" इति नामविधानमुपूर्वकं तत्रिभेष्चं नियोगं। तत्र प्राणश्रवद्व आवार्थादानारूपेऽजीवा लक्ष्यं। ते तावतं सङ्गमत्वा: अविकराः, बियाविविचित्रं स्वपपायत्वाभाववावपंतचत्वाभावाः। तेषामपुतर्कं सवं ब्रह्म जीवचतुः ज्ञानास्मोचविकासाविमाकाय अन्य-ल्वतेररमावात्। अतो: योगिनाः सुकानां च ज्ञानविकासानवरं तत्त्वालक्रमप्रआनितन्त्वस्वाभविपि अन्तः ज्ञानमनोकोकाले तस्मान। अतः सार्विगिर्मर्म-प्रभावलिप्नवृत्त भ्रान्तिवेति न तस्मान: कोषिपि जीवोस्तीविशिष्याः। यद्रा इत्येक-नामिव वाक्योपन्यसं समसाहित्वसम वेष्टेति; अधिकराहितं तु कैत्यतिकन्यायेन सिद्धातिः। अस्मात् पशु प्रारम्याक्षरेण योजना— इति नेति नियेष्येत्तता-प्रतिबियोगितृतात: मूलयूत्त्रापञ्चदाय परं उतर्त्व ब्रह्मवेत्, ततो: अन्तः नियन्त्रतास्यात्मः प्रपञ्चातुक्रिया नास्तिश्च। यद्रा इति नेति प्रक्रतेताऱीमीषश्चरात् एत्मसात्म भ्राणोत्त्म एत्मसात्म भ्राणोत्त्म परं नियन्त्रवेत् प्रपञ्चातुक्रिया नास्तिश्च योजना। अस्मात् योजनानाभेऽन्नान्नदेशायशेषानि विशेषः।

मन्त्यं वाक्योपन्यासं प्रक्रतलवल्प्नानियंपिपिरुषोद्ध सर्वचः। कथम्? इति वेशि नियिनङ्कुष्ठायातु प्रतिरूः भ्राणोत्त्म अन्यतयं प्रतिभास्तामाः परं नास्ति वसुस्तो व्यायार्तकं नास्त्यदिवावाक्यस्याः। कथम् भूदशेषाय प्रतिरूः।
शिवालिकग्निः । तत्र प्राणायंनिद्रायभाषिना तदिष्टया लक्षणन् । तेन "मनं श्रुति-पण्डं, मनं चट, मनं कपालं, मनं चूर्मम्" इत्यादिप्रत्यज्जित्याय श्रुतिप्रेष्ठचक्षुमालायायो व्यावर्त्तनमानसमायः; तथा तु मर्मेन्द्रयेनुषु प्रवृत्तेषु मद्विनिप्रत्यज्जिते वेष्यमण्डलमुगुतं मयं । व्यावर्तः नामात्मादृवर्तनः कल्याणं द्या । तथा राजविद्या इदम् (रजाविद्यमं रे) सकर्पःषुषुष्टाद्यः । अतो व्यावर्तः चदाद्यः
केवलं प्रतिभासनं: मन्या अति नेपासुन्भ्रेः मनं पारसाधिकं ब्रह्मानि तम्माथेः।

एवमितिनाट्यः प्रक्षुलप्रप्यः यपरामहिन्दन्वन्यामन्वसामन्वग वाक्योऽ- 2.3332
प्रस्तादोऽकारितुं श्रवणं डूट नामाधुर्यवर्णं युनासिनि चेन्, स्वादेवम्,
यदि रजोगित्रोद्दार्थेन श्रवणं: मद्वपण प्रत्यज्जित्यायनमुपपनेताः; न तु नदु-पपणेताः। "न मन्नद्य निषिद्धत: सम्पद्यान: न च श्रुत्या प्रद्याति काशनेम्" इत्यादिश्रृद्धिः
ब्रह्मानवक्तः प्रत्यज्जितायां नामात्मानाचारः। प्रत्यज्जिततः तु संगताः सम्पूर्णः
हतज्ञान्योपकृतेण व्यावहर्षेनारायणाः सति प्रसः मन स्वात्मानां संगाधकारं प्रक-शयति। वदिश्ये—

"नामात्माः प्रवचनेन घणयो
न मेधया न बहुता श्रुतेन ।
गम्भृतेषु द्रुपेते तेन घण्ये-
स्तस्येष आत्मा विद्धुष्टे तनू ब्रह्म ।"

"अर्थ तु परस्त्या श्रवणं द्वितीयो नामाधुर्यः काविताः ।
हरिमाहि च हुभस्तः तथानीचे च सुरसुराः ।
तपोभिस्मेत्तकार्तित तस्य" दुर्शानामकालिणः।"

इत्यादिश्रृद्धित्वसितम्याकारावनम् । एवं संगाधकारं श्राधानाभाकारस्य
कारणवस्तृक्तः।

1 चूर्म (My) 2 चन्द्र (My)
तत्कारण तु ज्ञानान्वयान्वितं जगद्विशयस्मण्यवेश्यसम्। यथा
तेषां ज्ञानान्वय: श्रद्धाज्ञानान्वयतो विश्वेश्याव:। तथा तेषां जगद्विशयस्मण्यवेश्यसम्
श्रद्धां जगद्विशयस्मण्यवेश्यसम:। अत एव भववत: कण्यस्योपासना-
कर्मण्यस्यासां च चित्तिनिर्त्रांक्रियायात् श्रद्धासाधारकोऽरतत्वु जगद्विशयस्यावध्ययः
अस्तुनाय तत्कारणं गीतार्थु दद्यते। अर्धस्वविश्वासित्रां च ज्ञातिनिर्त्रां
पालस्वराग्न्तरस्मण्यवेश्यसम:। पुराणेण दद्यते। न बैतलंमधानि
तस्य; बोक्षेन पि हि गरुडमन्त्रोपासकानां गरुडोपास्यवन्य तदार्थाधिकस्य द्वीरं
नमोंग्रणे च विशेषांगस्मण्यवेश्यसमः। कियतो यास्मथ शास्त्रेस्त्रयेति, तथा श्रद्धामानाय
वन्यापि श्रद्धासाधारणक्षिप्यदेहभावमि: युक्तेऽ। एवं श्रद्धामं महारथां करारं
सम, क्वः श्रद्धामानाय:। कार्यार्थिन्यं स्थिते “मय भट्टं” इत्यैः श्रद्धाले कङ्क-तत्कारणारण्योपस्त्रनानाहृते:। “नेति नेति” इत्यैः प्रक्षेत् तत्तासिद्धेः। न तु
प्रक्षेत् रूपदेहभावमि: इत्यावगम्येति। कथम् ? श्रद्धासाधारकरता च देहार्थव्यामान
विन्यावति दश्मासाधारं रूपमिति बक्त्राम्, “निर्धारन: परमम साम्यं रूपमिति”
इति श्रुते। अतः यथा तेषामार्थिन्यावश्यानन्तरुपर्वं श्रद्धा:। शीक्षयते, एवं जगद्विशयस्मण्यवन्य तदयाजोकर्तव्यम्। अन्यथा परमसाम्यसात्त्विकः। सवृष्टि
गुणे: किष्ठित्किष्ठितस्य हि इत्यवगम्याम्। न तु येनकेनचित्रुणेन किष्ठित्किष्ठितसाम्यमात्रम्।
तस्मात् श्रद्धामानात तदार्थाधिकस्य द्वीरं नस्तात् कर्मणुगार्थिक्षुक्तस्तन्यात् अनन्तनं कल्याणगुणेन श्रद्धांगे योगे न विवाच बसिद्। तस्मात् भवते चित्रमेव भ्रम।

नन्दम् “देवं वाच श्रद्धाये रूपये” इत्याविद्वत्स त्रप्त्यस्य भ्रमस्यरूपं
श्रद्ध्यपूर्व्योराध्यासिकसंतप्तेन निर्वाचः। विधाप्तरेन तत्तत्राधासंभवात्।
तत्रात् “नेति नेति” इत्याविद्वत्प्रवाचिनिषेध इतेव युक्तभावितं चेत्ता, आध्यासि-

1 कपार्थ (My) 2 युक्तह्र (My)
कसम्बन्ध बिना प्रकारांतरेण प्रस्त्राय प्रश्रृंखलनीयांसंबंधानु।

तथाहि— स्माचाराय वस्तुपारा न धर्मपर:। नतिः “एक 2:334।
एव क्रमः” “सवर्य वै क्रमः” हेतुनं अवलोकनग्रं । अहंकर द्विधः भावज्ञायाभवसंबंधाय श्रद्धा एव “दे वा बहु श्रद्धा रूपः”
इलाहनकः प्राथित्यानिर्देशानेन:। नस्तानिविषेष इत्युपस्तन।

अथवा श्रद्धास्म्योऽर्थेन प्रतापस्त:। तथापि “श्रद्धा रूपः” इति 2:3342
श्रद्धास्म्योऽर्थेन प्रतापस्तन। “सवर्य स्वतंत्र ब्रजः” (छा. 2. ५) इति धुन:। सवर्य-स्वापि ब्रजात्मकायज्ञितायोगः ततः। इति इति । प्रभायाभवसंबंधेन त्रिज्ञनस्तुरूपः- कल्याणायोगः— सत्वमिदं तेजः।।

अथवा मा ज्ञातं प्रस्त्रायमः। अयोपायं हि श्रद्धा:। परिश्रमित्वं 2:3343
जबलं वेदितं दोषधनं स्थानं। द्वितीयपशुधिं दत्तात्त्वं। ब्रजात्मकायाभवसंबंधेन प्रश्रृंखला प्रस्त्रायमसंबंधानु। तथा च पशुधिकमतं श्रद्धानं निर्विभद्वस्थानिपात- वुद्धकदशुतिविरोधां भवेनु। अतः दुःयद्वाधिवायुपवाचनिनयमः। पूर्वेन हि
"अशो नानावचेतात्" (बृ. २. ५. ४५) इत्याविवकरण। प्रभायाभवसंबंधेन वद्यकि दशिविशेषाणे कल्याणभवयात्। विषयाकर्मेनविचारे श्रद्धामात्रूपः एवमैतनिविषेषायलस्तु। दुःखितं श्रद्धानं रूपभिवबोधनानाच्छयत इति न कल्याणेषः। एवं च “वस्त्र प्रहृती श्रीरस्मृ” (बृ. ३. ७. २) इत्यादिशुला

“विदाधिविद्वार्तस्म वस्त्र विभिन्न विभागुरोर्तिमशः।
रूपमेव न सन्देहो विषय तस्म वशो यतः।।”

इलाहिस्तुलावचनके जिविविधविद्वस्तुष्णोन्मादिरायितकं सर्वेऽकारायः सर्वाः।

“नास्त्य जर्जेतीति।” “अस्थिवान्विवःप्रस्त्रायमः” इलाहित्वित्रु 2:34
श्रद्धाने जयाधिविबेदाने प्रस्त्रायाभवकल्याणसंबंधात्मवतियोऽव। तस्मान सत्वे।
शिष्याध्यात्मिकृतिः

हि ब्रह्मणः तत्त्रयुक्तोपप्रस्थातः तत्त्वज्ञितेऽध्वजप्रदायुपवेदने। तस्मात्मात्मिभवेः सर्गां सदायथां महाभाषेति। एवकथितिकरणद्वेषायेन ब्रह्मणः सर्गां सर्गवशमिश्रवेस्थापननान्तरं सर्गवशार्थः। परमुत्तेऽयमेव ब्रह्मणः परमवचारऽहार्यात्मिभवेः। (व्र. ३. २. ३०) इत्यथिविचारान् पूर्वालं एवार्थायं सामयितम्

अथ च विश्वस्य गुणविभाविदं सत्यं नित्यं च। न तु कल्पितान्तः.

अनन्दरूपः शिवस्य विमः इति "आकाशश्रीरं ब्रह्म", "आनन्दरूपमूर्तं यद्विधिताति" इत्ययादिशुल्युसाराविक्षिप्ते। न च शास्त्रव्यवहारशः कर्ष्यातःकुमारशुल्युधरोपयेण खैत्याव्यायः सांख्यविद्यायः। तस्मात्वर्त्ता कीर्तित: 

अनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मणः "तथा प्रियामेव चिरेऽः, सोऽऽ विषयः। पक्षंः, सोऽऽ उत्तरं च पक्षंः, अनन्दभास्माता, ब्रह्म पूर्णऽऽ प्रविष्टाः" इत्ययां च। प्रियार्थरक्तव्याविदिकार्मेऽ तार्थिकार्य त्वयाः। तथा सति "प्रियविश्वस्यायुपश्चिमरथाविक्षिप्ताः च। तथां च। रथाविवेकः कल्पितः तत्त्वस्यातिपुनः ब्रह्मणाविदिकार्य गुणगणाविदिकार्यः विमः। " (व्र. ३. ३. १२) इति श्राद्धः सुविक्षिप्त विमः। अंतथां विमः अस्त्वात्वस्य कल्पितः तत्त्वस्यातिपुनः प्रियास्यायुपश्चिमरथाविक्षिप्ताः। अनन्दरूपात्वस्य भवस्यायुपश्चिमरथाविक्षिप्ताः। नाबुधां नावस्यायुपश्चिमरथाविक्षिप्ताः। क्रियाविन्यासः खलु यथाश्रृंवयोऽव्याप्तगत्यमूऽ, श्रृतिप्रामाण्यः। अनन्दरूपात्वस्य परमाश्रयायुपश्चिमरथाविक्षिप्ताः। परिणामः विमः। प्रियार्थरक्तव्याविदिकार्मेऽ दुः न तथा, तत्वस्य-
माहुक्रप्तमाणाभावान्, अनस्मयाविश्व कलिपत्: पश्चपुण्यादिनः। नान्द: क इह¹ तात्पर्यमाहकोल्पमस: इति चेतुनयने। साधितृमण्डलितविशिष्टम् " "नमो विनःष्क्द्रावः विनःष्क्कर्णाय विनःष्क्किर्माय विनःष्क्कप्रयोगाय अवभक्तिकावपतया आमापने।" इति उपायतित्सृष्य शत्रुवनेवाध्यायः। श्रीदातीर्थार्थोऽदि " "नमो नीर्जस्वाय च दिनिकण्डाय च" इति नीर्जकण्ड-लाभं नाथाध्यायः। उदरविषयाः केवल्यपापनिधि—

" "उमासहार्य परमेश्वरं प्रसुं
विलोच्यतं नीर्जकण्डं प्रभासनम्।"

इति समासहार्याःसामाहेष्योद्विनलकलं:। नस्यपैवष दहर्विषयाः तैतिरी-चयानिसंहि " "पुरुषं कृष्णपिठलम्। उःःकतं विरूपाक्षम्।" इति कृष्णपिठल-विरूपाक्षश्रावद्यामः। एतर्न दहर्विषयार्थार्थार्थाः मत्यस्यक्लपत्तार्थाः शारण्डल्यविश्वादिशु पुनरासामायमः।

नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः। शाश्वाभेदेन हि नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः। शाश्वाभेदेन हि नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः। शाश्वाभेदेन हि नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः। शाश्वाभेदेन हि नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः। शाश्वाभेदेन हि नन्त शाश्वाभेदेन पुनरासानं कथमभासः।

"आनन्दवाद्य: प्रभासम्" (म. ३. ३. ११) इति। इज्ञिकरणे २४२२।

ताबद्यमय: स्थितं। सत्यानन्दानन्दायो गुणाः। नीर्जकण्डतोमासामहात्माः। तिविशिष्ट:। परमानन्दामानो विमहविशेष इत्येव सर्वं परमाण:। शिष्यश्च सर्वोपन्तक्षणान्तरस्त्यात्। वर्यामु परबिश्वामु उपसंहारः।। तेनं प्रभाविष्ण्वा

¹ क इह तद्वै (१)।
शिवाद्रीतनिषेधः।

दिनेशकेतरबिळ्कुलतपेनादुभवाकृतया तद्तद्यपत्ताचारप्रक्षिपत्तांगिनिः।

तदनन्तःनवरःकु रे प्रियाशिष्टस्वाभाविकल्पे स तेथनादसुत्त्वत्वात्वाया भुक्तायायायः गुणः।

तेजस्विपरेबस्वरस्तु परविद्यास्तु यथाप्राप्ता फलस्मिन्न्यायेनापिश्विन्तवादुपसंहाराय इति निरङ्गितम्।

तदनेनन्तःनवरः अपेक्षितविभाव वियाशेषेरुप परस्यांहारे सूख्ममुृतो न्यायः इति।

अनेनेव न्यायेन यहार्दिनां शमारीनां उद्दिनान्तिव्यपृगृःविधानामानुसृतः।

आचार्याण्य तद्रुव्यानस्य पूर्वौत्तरपापविद्वालांशेषेरुपोः

अर्जः

राधिकविवेशोऽपरेतां चेतेद्वासाद्रिनां कालुक्ते विशालथु मुक्तादायापि सर्वस्वु परविद्यास्तु आपत्तिः इति।

तथा तत्र संभावितम्भाविशेषिधिरकारणपूर्वेकं सारोपेशविकरणादिद्रु शास्त्राध्यात्मकम्

एवं प्रत्यक्तविभाविध्वागानामेक-तःक्षेणप्रि सर्वस्वु परविद्यास्तु संबन्धातिकलां विद्वान्तेऽरु पुनराद्वारांतः

अनन्त्यायोजनतःतत्तपावाहामिसेवतः इति।

तस्मादध्यासेनाधृशागामाद्विपो विनाशवाणायवः।

2.43

निन्यागुल्ल्यादिद्रु तु सर्वगणश्वरविशिष्टपरिशिरीण हेदयुगादिराहिः

विषयवत्यावतिने, पदात्मनीयन्यायेन श्रुतिश्रावासप्रायावहामाय विश्वविवाहो

बस्काल्पम्नीचित्यात् इति।

2.5

एवं निथ्यनिर्मित्तुगानविधाविविविभिचित्रों विवेकपूर्वेकं ब्रह्म युक्तामाय, न

तदुत्तीर्ण विषवेषेरुप मक्खानायं भ्रामात्स्तित निष्ठायार्धम "उपस्थितेतस्तद्रह-

वनात् " (म. ३. ३. ४०) इति तदनेनन्तराविकल्प श्रामम्।

विद्वान्तम्—

सुधार्वांप्रभु शिवान्तः, उत दिवं एवंति संधायः।

तदर्भः वैकित: निर्खर्य शेषब्रह्मावापि; उत सविवेषेरुपमुद्रायावपि: इति संधायः।

2.51

तत्र पूः: पक्षः— नौरते निर्विन्यायं च परं भ्रोति परशवः

श्रुत्यः प्रतिपाद्वतिः।

वधावापतियुक्तिः इति च "ब्रह्मव सन्न भ्रामायेति" श्रुति इति।

"स चो ह वै तपस्यं श्रवं चेतु भ्रोतेप भवति" इति साविख्यात्र श्रुति।
प्रतिपाद्यता अतो कृपयानः सन्याणः दिनशा न परं प्रभा, नापि तत्साध्यापनः पर्यंतः परभुनिर्धितः ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—उक्तम्: शिलः पृथ्व परं प्रभा; तत्साध्यापनं प्रति २·५२

च परमसुक्तिः। द्रुपदःपुर्णरक्षार्कः वजुहुपायेन तस्मिनिन्येवाद्यकः उपायेन

प्राम मतः, अनुः नन्यायप्रमनर्माविधयमया भाषाधिनिधिः तस्य अजु-

णिः्विधिहरूः, "यह सम्बन्धे व्याख्या न दक्षिणम् परं भोजनिः परम्यं प्रेम स्वेन

कुंभकामिनिः परम। वा हनमः पुरुषः।" (श्री २·१२·३)

"क तत्र पर्यंतः ज्ञान कृपा। रमानायण: श्रीमान्यो यानेवः श्रामिकसी।"
The यथाउद्धार्थविवेचनः, "निर्रः परमं नामस्तुपैति।" इति श्रवते निरज-

स्ने न वियासस्यायपतिकृतिपद्यासारः। न हि ब्यटमुक्तिेन यथा स्वरूपार्थित-

पैतिः। अन्यानाथयमलापरमे चारिः।" इति श्रुतै दृष्टिः परब्रह्माणि

रूप्याणिप्रेरितः। शिवे परम्भुविणि

रूपयुक्तविनवेते यथारुपयुक्तविपेक्षेण परः।। "व्रजोऽव सन् वृजापेति।। " श्रवति व्रज-

बृहस्पति। वर्णिताः हरणारुपीयावरालारं रुपष:।। अन्यायो अवतापिः रोज्द्रावी । विनायकावपि भवति।। इति सुपुर्णवियावस्तावकारे-

स्वाभाविवृत्तीयतानां अत्यधिकततः। अथवा—हानिविकासे श्रव्यान्त्रं प्राप्तवर्जैश्रव्यान्त्र भ्रान्तो-

ति, यः परं श्रव्य वेदृस्ति न: स्त्रयान्ति हानिविकासे ब्रह्मचर्याशास्त्रेऽ भवति, इति

तथोः। श्रव्यायो इति। एवं सम्यूणां सर्वेऽम्ब्रमणं नारायण्यो रूपसेवेऽ भ्रान्तकोऽनेत्रो-

धिकरणाविवर्तवेत्र मये तथायथ उपस्थाप्तमेव भ्रान्तकान्त्येऽ व्यवस्थाप्तवेत्र अनेका-

धिकरणाविवर्तवेत्र च विश्रामिःैवेत्र प्रक्षन्ते परमसहान्तं व्यवस्थापितवेत्र अनेकाधिकरणाविवर्तवेत्र मये । एवः कः श्रुतात् परमसहान्त । इति त्युपस्थायाके। ।

1 समापक्षांपास्खः (१) 2 परतथा: नेवम् (My) 3 सवल्पतः

दीनिः (०) 4 ब्रह्रस्वः (०) 5 सते न श्रुताश्र्वेत (T)
2.6 येव अनियमाधिकरणाय निरन्तरोपायकान्तो अतैत्रेय मुक्ति-प्रिति निद्‌रणनिराचितविशिष्टतेत्वसंकल्पत्वभिधानम्। तत्त् "केवलवाहः" इत्युपक्रमान्तो सति-नत्रोपन्यासपरमिति तत्त् तत्त् म्याप्तेवः।

2.7 यद्व "शांकश्च तूर्येऽशो चामदेववत्" (म. १. १. २१) इत्यद्रित्यरूपायक्रमः शिवाभेदभावना मुक्तिदेतुप्रिति प्रतिशास्यामः, तत्त्वारोपनाभेदभावनापरः। अत् एव "प्रकाशभिंद्रशोषणेन प्रकाशश्रवकर्मण्यश्चायासाल्" (म. ३. २. २४) इति प्रक्षेतप्रवचनाविशिष्टकरणात्मकायः—

"किमान्तो तेषुः प्रवेशः च तस्माः सहजमेवादृश्यः" (म. ७. १. ८) इत्यादिपु स्रोतानि तदेक्षयमयथाय तदेक्षय्यप्रकाशानि इत्यतः। ब्रह्म-भावान्वयेत् विद्याभित्रे अनस्यातुरां त्वसंतरकलंजलितिबलवनात्मिकसंगम: सध्ये, लोके य सन्मिष्ठां ग्रहंभावनया ग्रहंभावसारायण्यमिति: इति आरोपितविशेषगुणान्वेक्ष्यमानाभिजङ्गतेन शिवेन्यिवान्वया आरोपितिविश्व-त्वाभित्रत्वम्। सुदर्शनाचार्यः पार्थीसंवचः ग्रहंन्यानाभिजङ्गतान्त्योऽव-पातः—

"श्रीकोन्ये परमसौ परमं च तात्वः
श्योति: परं च परमेश्वर पदानामः।

तात्वानेकरसिद्धत्वत्वान्यभवान्व-न्यानिः यथा ग्रहंभावनया स्वत्मानः।" इति।

(शुन्तरूपकात्मकः, ४२)

तवतुलवत्तनां श्रीकण्ठाचार्यामार्गित तत्‌तवम मेवतस्मित तुम्कुम्कु।

2.81 नन्द यदि भाष्यकाराणशी विशिष्टहेतु दृष्टि: जीवमस्मिदेव चै, तदा

1 जीवमार्गादेव च दृष्टि: विशिष्टहेतु यस्यके तव: (M)
"मनु घटे, मनु पदे।" इन्हे सर्वसंगतं तुलस्यतंया स्त्रृपत्य विव्यागः सर्वो-पादान्ति न सिद्धयति। "स्त्रृपत्यं हि शदातिं समुद्रपादास्मिष्टे।" इति जन्मायाधिकरणे, "स्त्रृपत्यं घट इतयत्र अथा स्त्रृपत्यं इतयते, तथा ब्रह्मां जगदिति ब्रजग्यायमः न इतयतं इति चेन, "मनु पदे।"

"मनु पदे।" इति सर्वेत्रेति इतयत एव स्त्रृपत्य इतयताऽ व्यामिः।" इत्यादिना आरम्भणाधिकरणे च, "मनु पदे।" इत्यादिप्रथाक्षमः स्त्रृपत्यं श्रावयपिवयं गृहुक्त नन्दे पदने। इति हि वचनमुवर्तनमां श्रावण श्रावणि व्यावर्तनमां घटपादाक्तिकः कल्याणं रजितज्ञानामः। इति न च ब्रजण उपाधानत्वोपपादास्मिनेण वचनम्, कांगतस्तथेऽवक्तव्याविति शक्त्ययम्।

ब्रजणाः कार्यमित्यप्रियामुपादानत्वे वश्यमां चेन चेन नुस्त्रृपत्यादानायाम्—

इति हि इत्यादिना कार्यात्मानाबंधारभागिः प्रामुसुदार्णीयम्।

तथा ब्रजिकारणो निरक्ततत्। अनो रजो—अर्थमपि, इति भूवंक्तम्।

इत्यादिब्रजिवनं कस्तितातद्यावरणाहिन्महान्यमेन व्याजानत्तेऽदाहरणाभिलेच अुक्तम्।

तथांत्याधिकरणे "यदा तमो।" सन्तुप्पौर्वस्यायात्मावरे "सन्तु मित्यस्=

प्रकाशे शिवे परश्राणि मत्यापि कथ मोहम् जगदिति चेन। स्त्रम्यास्याक्षमः दिश्यस्य शव्वषाणिः का हा: ! नामरुपोपनिः। प्रहणणयोग्येऽसु विश्रयेऽसु विष्टकरणानारीशक्तिः जीवाः प्रपञ्चमवह नासिः, मधुरिरोहितव्यावहन- 

तथा। दिश्यस्य स्त्रम्यास्याक्षमं पूर्वीस्वर ब्रह्मां नासिः। तस्मात् निष्ट- 

समस्तकार्यविशेषणतः। इति शक्त्ययम्।

1. स्नद्वानमित्यत्व (Śrīkanṭha Bhāṣya)
2. विशेषज्ञाना (Do)
2.812 वर्गतप्रदातिविविधकुशुराणपच्चिम च धुरकम्, वचारसंपादिकरणे "मक्षि-
द्रूपण शिवेन यदि न व्यायां जगत्, तदा मनस्कृतिभागा विनाक्तं कथमुः-
अस्ति, स्कुर्ति— इति च हदयेत? अवस्तेव सवेन्." इति- गदो मम
स्कुर्ति— इत्याविदर्शीच्छविभुमसूचयमानस्य स्कुर्णास्य राशिष्ठपत्तमासिष्ठमुः, यथा
"इति द्वावान्धायति" इति जीवन प्रत्यावन्धान्दुपहान्नदमयोः। शृद्धते, खचं
भ्रुणानंदो हि परानान्धायति" इत्यावन्धसाधिकरणे, "‘को द्वावान्धान्तकः
प्राणावत्, यदेष आकाश आकाश न श्वात्, एप द्वावान्धायति,' 'रसो
वै स; रसं द्वावायं ठहरावान्ती भवति' इति सर्वांभविष्ठत्वसम्यः
शुद्धते। तथा च 'स एको मातृ आनन्दः' इत्यावन्धम् 'स एको श्रद्धा
आनन्दः' इति श्रद्धयथेष्टमुपराभिचित्ररोधानानान्नाविवर्धनस्तरस्य शृद्ध्यते
इति, "अभाजं बादति," इत्याविकरणे च- अहं सुखी—इति जीविरुपयुधरा-
स्य सुखस्य श्रद्धावन्धुपपर्षाक्रमेष्टस्य-स्यस्य, इत्यामि संबं न घटते।
इति हि जीविना ब्रह्मदेवोपपादानाथम्, भेदप्रभो तद्भूषम्। अन्य्यान्ना-
न्यान्या स्कुर्णवस्थसखान्नान्तेनन्या सुखितवस्य चायोगावुः। इति चैतन्य
2.82 उच्यते— "सन् घट:” इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षं विशेष्यांश्रुप्रावृविष्ठमिति
नावायोः मतम। "अथात्त आदेशो नैति नैति" इति वाक्यण्डवः-

1 राजकालक्रृत्त (T; A)
2 स्कुरणेश्या (Srikantha Bhāṣya, Mysore edition).
3 प्रज्ञातक: (Do)
तिपेक्षातिथिगिरिविचारार्थ प्रस्तुत प्रकरणविन्यासाधिकरणे "नसु " सनू घटः"
"सनू पटः" ईश्वरिक्षविधानं सदृशं श्रद्धा संत्वम्, अन्यश्वार्थस्वानं चतुर्दिकं
नेति नेतृत्वित प्रतिचित्ति पुनः" तत्यथार्थात् त्तथात् कहिं "तदनुयक्तमाहं हि"
(ब.२.२.२२) इति सूत्रपाद तर्य "सर्वमस्त्रप्रयोगसत्त्वातिनिर्देशानि प्रकाशणात्तराणेन नाभिकोऽवज्ज्यते,
"न सन्नद्धे निस्थिति रूपसङ्ग्य न चतुष्पद पद्यति कश्यर्मानम्" इत्यादिना यथा
श्रुतिरहारं जन्मार्धिधिकरणरूपभाषाधिकरणशुरुने
’वाच्यशब्दं विशेषणांश्रुप्रभाविवर्ण्यथा मोक्षम्, तस्य समस्तप्रभावाकरणं परिद-
प्रामितस्वाचारिन्नम् एवं नामेत्यज्ञम् दाहरणं तदुपायदयोचित्ति न। न चत
स्वेक्षणाधिकरणभाज्ये श्रवणात्काव्यात्नत्त्वतः सर्यं मददत्वेव तस्याद्वयोवे-
किरुद्धेऽवै वाच्यम्, श्रद्धा प्रति ज्ञानान्तरदिकप्रय तस्य स्वयंपि ज्ञात्वा-
नान्दविवर्णम् श्रद्धा प्रति सत्तात्कथा तस्य स्वयं मददत्वाद्रागुप्तपते:। यदृ
स्वस्यावैर्सार्पीकन्तन्दरवैर्गत्वयोऽहं ज्ञानान्तरदिकप्रय, ततौ जीर्णवेषों
स्वयंपते: ततः संकेतज्ञातिविषयस्य नभम् दिलीपस्य द्विःस्य च तत्जीवासा-
वारणश्रुतंतवंतत्तदन्तः करणं भृदंशस्मिष्ठस्य अहं ज्ञानान्तरदिकस्य तत्जीवा-
साहारणस्वादिकप्रयातिकारसम्भवात्।

नसु "अभायं भावेरः" ईशास्थिकरणे ¹ तदनुयं करारभृदं पञ्चमेऽ २.८.२१
मनोवनमान्तविन्यासस्येव परिपूर्णस्य अहं ज्ञानान्तरस्य शुक्लाभाष्यपरमधुरवर्त्तमस्य-
पद्धमकेम्। तत्तरि "प्रकषुतितरिपुः परमसताराक्षानन्दसमस्ततः परा श्रीकिरीः
श्रद्ध: स्वहं स्ता परमकाश उच्चेते, यथा शुक्लाः परमदशास्य च साधारात्
तथेश्चकिरीः परमभाषयलोकायामुः" श्रति प्रस्तुत, "तथा हि 'को हीरावान्यात्क:
प्राण्यात्'" ईश्वरिना "आन्तरार्थिकसत्त्वतेऽत्त्वेत् श्रृंगते" ईश्वरेन परम्-

¹ रिखार्धिकरणे (My)
रथय स्वनेष्ठाय—इति संक्षिप्तमधै निविचित्य, "निरुपाधिकतया श्रवणि सुखे च परिपूर्णो वतते स आनन्दः, 'श्रवणेष्ठया चाकाँमहत्तस्य' इति अवणान्।" इति सन्दर्भेण—यथा सुकृतान धर्मस्वरूप च साधा्धर्मिक्याद्वितैः—इति भाष्यावर्थः विवेचिति। तदन्तरं व "यथकामहत्ः श्रवणियो मुक्तस्वरूप कथं मान्यमन्नन्दश्रृष्टीनां भाजायामान्यस्त्रवानां उपायिनिःषुपक्षम्वत्तारत्तमेश्वरावर्त्तमान्यवम- नकामात् श्रोत्रयायमुभावायत्तवमभिहितम्।" इत्यावश्चापिर- हाराय छुक्म्—"श्रवणेष्ठया निध्यामानुष्ठितानिहोवात्तिकमाविद्यान- महत्: श्रवणियः; तस्य श्रवणम्व श्रवणम्व तस्य एवानन्दः; तस्य योगिनिःश्रवणन कत्वमिमिशितान्व पूर्वत् पूर्वत्ः भूमावभासः वस्त्रिन्दिति तत्तवसर्वार्थ मां तदस्यविनिः भूमिर्यावर्त्तमान्य भावावर्त्तमान्यान्वितिविचारशि न विरोधः।" इति।

तदेतल्कथः जीवनस्मरेदक्षेत्र्य मन्तवङ्गन्। अन्यानन्दः धि स्वकृतिकिऩ्नि- श्वप्तवच्छेदेऽ वायुसावार्यनामाभिमानितस्याभिवान्यपरपुषार्यमर्यभवत् न युक्तिः। ॥

28.22 — इति चेतन्दपि सन्तर्कल्य एव। परा: श्रवण: श्वरस्व पराशास्त्ररूपः परा शास्त्रवाहिनी सकलविवृत्तिपर्वस्त्राकारः भास्त्रकैरीन्योऽरस्त्रोऽरस्त्र। तथा च तस्यः तस्यः सबौतिन्य जीवान प्रभुवत्तवस्तिपेल्वा श्रवणस्वेदक्षेत्र्य तत्तच्छित्वात्काशयानेशिवानन्दस्तमपृत्तिः। तथापि भवास्त्रपत्तान: संसारिण: प्रभुत्तववाच्चेदक्षेत्र्य तत्तवस्त्रान्त्रधान: करणात्तिविवृतिशीलात्काशेदक्षेत्र्य तत्तत्तमाध्वता देशापर्य: सा पुरुषार्यः। मुक्तन: प्रभुवत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: तस्य भिनिवेशनाप्रभुवत्तवहेत: भास्त्र प्रभुत्तवहेत: ॥

1 मुख्य एव (M y; O.) 2 अत एव (M y; O), 3 साधर्म (0)
शाब्दिकतनिषेधः
कर्मात्मानं (०)

तथा "तद्दृष्टः" (३. ४. २. ८) इत्याधिकरणावस्थानेने वतन्त्रः
तान्तरसुप्रवन्यः। तद्वधिकरणस्ववम्—"समाना चासुसुप्रकाशादिःतवं च"
(३. ४. २. ७) इति पूर्वाधिकरणस्वपरितोऽकान्तिसत्त्वसितिका गतिसः स्वयं विदुषः
उपपायः नवेन संस्कृतं सति, नोपपथः

"यद्वा सर्वं प्रस्मुख्यन्ते कामाय वेषस्य हि विनाय:।
अथ मल्लोदमृतो भवचन्त्र श्रद्धा समसिन्ते ॥
"
इति विदुषोजीवेऽव श्रद्धारितिः अवगात्। "तस्य ह्वतसः ह्रदयाहां अवभो-
वते। तेन प्रधोत्सैव अस्त्मा निष्कामति" इत्यादिना "इति तु कामयमानः"
इत्यन्तोक्तान्तित्रयकारं वेदान्तपरिसहि ब्राह्मणमंवस्मानः
तेन वेदान्तस्त्रोऽकारं कर्मस्ध्यायोऽऽणः कर्मज्ञातोऽछलकारः उत्तमः
उक्तान्तान्तित्रयकारं वेदोऽकारं अस्त्मां "अतःकामयमानो योक्तामो निष्काम आत्मकाम आस-
कामो न तस्य भ्राणा उत्काममिति श्रृद्धी च तत्न श्रद्धाप्रेणितः" इति विदुषः
उत्काम्यात्तित्रिपीयात्। न च विदुषः एव। "तव इच्छस् विदुषः" इत्यादिने
श्रुतिः अतिरिक्तिः, "तयोर्वभावायामुग्यते" इत्यादिश्रुतिः मूलीकान्तिः
शृवत्त इति श्रुत्यम्। "अस्य सोऽस्य पुरस्य श्रव्दो वाक्यानां संप्रवेदवे। सनः
प्राणे प्राणस्नेत्यसि तेजः परस्य संसारात्मः" इति श्रुत्तो विदुषः वेदपावसमयः
एव वागादिर्मम्। प्राणमुक्तपथः। परस्य धृतराजः परार्थिणि धीनत्वस्या
कर्मेन तस्यक्षमम्। गर्भावसंपत्तिः। नाथीरुपसिद्धिविशेषः। च"
अत्रेव ब्रह्मानि ज्ञातं हस्तकान्तिनिपिधि व्रतमेतः प्रवचनय तदवसारेण गतथाकान्तिनिपिधि लब्धविनिपिधिषितुष्णः। न च "अथ सोंभ्य पुरुणस्य" हृदयार्थः वागार्थः परस्याऽद्वितयः दृष्टितः विचित्रितः न स्थऽपलः। विधीतविधितमारणस्य भावणस्य निलुभमारणस्य बागावर्त्यां सत्वः अभ्रुतिनि स्वस्पर्पलस्यीवासस्माभिवित्तति तत्तथां संप्ययति शिवम् श्रुणिवार्यात्मकं तस्य पुनःर्वैष्टयत्राभ्यायोगाचरि वाच्यम। 

tालम्बतः सत्त्वाविविशारंगार्यानलविदेशः तत्सां निलुभमारणस्य भावणस्य विधीतकविशारंगान संप्ययति इत्यस्य मनः अभ्रुतिचन्तिनविमानम् वृत्तिवार्यात्मकं। "स्थांवलक्ष्यः ब्रह्मानि।" (रे. २. ३. ८)

इति न्यायेऽऽर्थः तद्वतानामविवाच्यामानाधिकत्वान स्वस्थुपलार्यायित्वापप्तेः

केशरी: पश्चातः।

भिन्हान्तम् — सर्वं प्रत्ययमण: सुलका पिते ज्ञाविविशारंगतस्य 3.122

तस्य श्रामी वर्णोऽऽर्थः वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः। तत्साधिक्षर्यान वेदवन्धविगमः।

रे. २. ३. ८
नतु तस्येति पश्चया श्राजानां सम्बन्धित्वेति जीवो निर्देष्टः, न तुक्कमन्यपादाठत्वेति। तदपारष्ट्रां दु: शरीरसेव, जीवाः श्राजानामूर्तिकार्यसः सक्यया त्वत्तदिशायोगार्थिति चेत अपारापेश्वराः अन्तरतालिनार्थ सम्बन्धतः। 3.1221

निधित्वा श्रुतस्य जीवसंबन्धत्वेतन्तत्वेऽपि श्राज्यत्वात् श्राजानां जीवसंबन्धित-वैय प्रास्तावानं तत्सम्बन्धकथनं प्रकोटतत्वाभिनव सम्बन्धमान्यत्वार्थ्येऽ पश्चयाः —नवस्य श्रुत्वौति — इवद्या जीवविषयपरान्तरविश्वेषप्रतीचातमः। स्पष्टाः केवल माध्यमिकानां शास्त्रायां जीवसंबन्धत्वाभिनवां:। "न तस्मात्स्वात्त्व उद्धारिति” इति हि तत्वां पाठः। न चाप्रकाशक्तिप्रेषित्वा: “अन्त अश्व समस्तोऽ इवद्याविद्वन्तब्रह्म प्राणानामापितात्मतेऽ कर्मश्च
काशि विद्यापीठ जीवन विज्ञापन । क्षेत्र विद्यापीठ शृंखला नाट्यात्मकता—

“उद्योग: खिंचवाय या भिखा सूर्यसप्तम्। ब्रह्मलोकमन्त्रम् नन्द शरीर प्राण गानिम।” ॥

इति। एवमिद्वारःकरणम् “तद्यथाः: नेमि-ियहि स्वाम्। “सूधर्म प्रभा-
ञुता तद्यथाः” । “नायिङ्गनानं:”; “अस्यथेष चाप रेनुमानं”; “प्रति-
पेधादिति चेत्र, शारीरनु याण्या याणकामं।” “स्त्रावन्या।” (1) दू.2.8-१६)।

इति नयसि: सूः: वाणितम।

एवं अवि विद्यापीठ गद्य-काव्यीकारणमयमभावनेत्र भूषणवाक्यवृद्धिको

ब्रह्मस्मपत्तिचारीतता स्वार्थते श्रीग्रापाराधारालिताधिकारणाभासान स्थिर्तम्

मतान्तरेऽमेतुद्धिकरणाभाििधिमयौ विशिष्टम् — “केशरिसन्योगोपालकानाभि-भु

शारीरिपात एवु मुरुकिरति अत्थिकातुतागंगाथिनमादु:” इति।

एतनसि परिस्थितिवतायायायामयमादिच:— “इति नु काम- ३.१२४

यमान:।” इति अविद्विधिपथे परिस्थितय: “अथाकामयमान:” इति विद्वि-

धिपथे विशिष्टापयमध्रे प्रतिपादय “न तत्स्थ प्रणां उक्तकामिनि।” इति युक्तयेन

तद्विदुप्ते: प्रणाणा: यददापादसामक्षमण प्राणुकं तदपादसाेवोक्तमणमणस्य प्रति-

पेधपरमिति विद्विधियशेषापादितानाधिशिणावतात्यधार्यस्वारस्वेन प्रतीयेति। अवि-

दुष्ट्रे प्रणाणा: शारीरापादानकम्योक्तक्षमण प्राणुकम्। “तप्तकामलं प्रणां-

उददकामलि, प्राणसामूलकमलं सर्वे प्रणां अनुदकामलि।” इति। अव जीवस्य

उत्कमणमसुस्कन्ते न न योक्तक्षमण सूक्ष्मप्रणाणयोग्यताभाराण्य व विद्विधिपरमिति

जीवन-दुर्योगक्षम्यावस्थितो िश्रीरापादानकम्योक्तक्षमण प्रतिके

एवं। “न तत्स्थ प्रणां।” इति वाक्यस्य शारीरिपादानकम्योक्तक्षमणप्रतिके—

(1) इव बाणि परमां गहिस् (My)
शिवाइतूनिषेढः

प्रेधपते स्वरसत : प्रतीयमाने केंसः हेतुना तस्य तस्यक्रमम् ! न तावनः प्राणसम्प्रतिविंश्तया श्रुतस्य जीविक्षेत तद्वत्रक्रमणाग्निर्माणतयापि श्राहेि संबंधित मनस्त्विनुपरिवर्तमानस्याप्तिन् आन्तरिका कल्पेिनं न युक्तम् — इति न्यायानुसारेण, पूर्वसन्तरसमारूढ़ीकारूढ्या किरोवस्य तद्वागाधारान्ते बिपरिवर्तमानत्वात्।

"प्रजापतिविभक्तिपाद्याध्यायमन्त्रस्य तथा िकं देवतामान्तृवस्तिः पयोत्तिषि तस्य स एवं वारुणं चतुङ्कपायाध्यायमन्त्र संतिषितपत्रोधों वं व वरुणपायाध्यायमन्त्र।"

इतुप्रक्रम:-

च्छाया अथवातः वाणगतुफक्तपालोहितशिवायतः इत्यादिः नासिस विपश्चितार्थे विविधार्थेषु सवत्ताने "वर्णोऽव एवं गुङ्गालः योद्धार्थं प्रतिगुङ्गालः प्रतिगुङ्गालः या तावतं वारुणानं चतुङ्कपायान् निषेधेन"। इति तद्वाराकर्षणे विविधार्थे भांग्रादेखिरिसम्पर्कतत्त्वः शुल्त् "योज्याः प्रतिगुङ्गालः" इति शब्द म्यिनिषित प्रतिगुङ्गालितार्थिकिर्यते नेशते; इदं जीवंमानत्वभ्रमितपञ्जकशङ्खेऽधर्मस्तस्य केवल्यायायमानेनान्तत्वकल्पनं नेशत्वामिति वितु वक्रमम् !

नायि तद्वाराकर्षणेन नेशनं वाचकस्तम्बोपस्यार्धेन। तद्धते द्विः "श्राहीव सन्तो भ्राह्मचर्येऽति" इति, "वदेष इतरोको भवनति —

यदा सर्वो प्रमुच्यते कामा येश्याः ह्रदि श्रिताः।

अथ मल्लोकऽतुतो भवन्ति अत्र श्राहं समज्यते॥ इति

तत्वथा अहुर्रिनेत्यथानं बस्मौि गुङ्गाया प्रत्यक्षा शारीरिकम् िशेषेि शेिव। अथायामशरीरोप्तसः प्राणो श्राहीव तेजं एव। इत्योतावान् वाक्यस्तम्बेिन् शूष्येि !

3.125
tतत्र भ्राह्मचार्यां तातूऽ निर्मित्तयाजजभाराभावित्यकते विद्वृतः

प्रतिपादयत्वस्य भावानीवस्प्रचारयोऽगवेधाभावातृ तद्वत्रावपूण्योऽगवेधाभावातृ ग्राहानायुः संष्टि स्वप्नेश्वतिमिति शारीरिकपाणकतुक्रमणप्रतिष्ठायार्थं श्राहमाणुः न तु जीवभाराभावाबिकिर्षस्यर्थं। न च "श्राह्मचर्येऽति" इति वचनं ग्राहणो विद्वृतः श्राहमाणुः भावानीवपाण्डेयानं ग्रेवव विपिपादयति तस्य तद्वाराभाराभावित्यकिर्षप्तर्न भव-
वि; अतो "अन्तर्गत सन्" इत्यस्तिकाय इवादी ईति ज्ञानविकासं वेदज्ञानोऽवशेषं श्रव्य श्रव्योऽप्राप्तोतिः तद्भवं भाग्यं ईति वान्यम्। अव्यवस्थितं हि न प्राप्तं, किंतु लवायः। दुर्धर नस्त समाप्तिमनोर्विविवेदि स्थूलम् विहाय शुद्धेन सुक्ष्मरूपेण तदात्म्याभिव्यक्तिकिर्तिवर्तेऽर्थं।

तदि चार्याः प्राप्तेऽर्थं स्वात्, तदात्म्यात्

तदात्म्याभिव्यक्तिकिर्तिवर्तेऽर्थं पर्यवस्थित। इत्यावध्यकः ईति "अतो वा सत्

गमय तस्मात् वा व्यावित्स्मय ब्रह्मांडः समयम्।" ईति संभान्। पाठलब्ध्या "स

ब्रह्मांडः स्तुः शत्रुः असतंस्तुः सत्रां यथा

सम्यक्। तस्मात् च व्यावित्स्मय, शत्रुः तस्मात् व्यावित्स्मय

सम्यक्। तस्मात् च व्यावित्स्मय, शत्रुः तस्मात् व्यावित्स्मय

सम्यक्।

तथा स्तुः एक्षेरस्यृविक्षीणमापि शरिरगणपादनात्मकम् विनात्मकम् 3.126

रूपार्थमहन् प्रवाहुक्तमिति स्वप्पंचथं। न च तद् "अत्र ब्रह्म ममादुते" ईति

बर्तमानसमान्येऽत्र बर्तमानप्रत्ययः ईति ईति "अत्र" ईति ब्रह्मान्यविशेषभ्रमति

पथर्वोऽर्थवान् ईति योजनायम्, शुल्यायथमहः स्यूरियामान्यमात्मानितत्वात्। एक्षेरस्याट्यक्षणमापिविद्युः

स्तुः वायुवायुक्तयुक्तम् बलवृहदक्षाकृतिप्रत्ययः न स्वप्पंचथं अतिक्रमित्वात् ईति "तेजः

एव" ईति विद्युतद्विधानः कथायच्यो विद्युतः ईति ब्रह्मान्यविशेषभ्रमप्रत्ययः

अतो न वायुस्मय-विच्छेदस्मयोऽपि "न तद् ग्रामं उद्भासमिति" ईति च धारासिकार्यादागो

युक्तः।

नन्दु सम्विन्द्रशाखायाम्, उदाहतवाक्यस्याने "न तस्मात्म्या 3.127

उद्भासमिति" ईति पाठोऽद्यते। अतिक्रमितलोपकाण्डोऽनवाक्षाक्षाभासमापि तस्येऽति
षष्ठाः सम्बन्धासामान्यावाचिन्याः। अपावानन्तकृपस्बाॅन्नत्विशेषपर्यावसानन् कल्यं दुःक्तम्। एवं ध यथापि "न तस्य प्राणा उत्कामिती" धिति प्रश्न-बाक्ये विद्वान्: शरीरसाते अविद्वेपक्ष्या विशेषाभिवाचां न दम्यते, तथाया: प्रकाशाप्यन्त्यक्ष्या विशेषाभिवाचां दम्यत इति तन्मात्राविशेषथा विशेषाभिवाचारार्थविशेषतः कथिति कथकिच्योजनीयविशेषति चैतम्बिकम्। "न तथ्यावाणा उत्कामिती" इत्येतदन्तन्तरसर्व "अस्त्रेषु १समवनीयते" इति प्राणानाम। "अस्त्र श्रवय सम-भूते" इति द्वाराभारपृण्यन्यात्वेऽ छण्यवायात, तदन्तावागृणत सस्मादिति पद्धश्य शरीरसारीरिग्रीकर्मोपयोगार्थवर्ग शरीरपत्रं नेनव्यवातः। अत एवात्त-भागार्थे "यथायं पुष्यो दियते उद्दस्यायः कामाद्वाहीना न इति" प्रते, उसरे "नेति होवाच यायाविस्तयो अवर २समवनीयतेऽ; स उच्चत्वायाम्या यायाय-भ्यामाग्य सूत: शेषे" इति प्राणापकाशापदान्याख्यानेन वायुपुष्येन द्विभवः-च्छृङ्ख्यनम् शरीरसार्यें कौटिन्य शृङ्खलेः इति ।

नन्वार्थभागादोते न विद्वद्विषिषे, उत्तरसुन्दरविरोधाताः। उत्तर-सन्दर्भं हि "यथायं पुष्यस्य सूत्सार्यी वाग्यते च तां प्राणायाम्या चित्यं सन्यन्त्रो दिशः। ओचों गृहिणिः: गृहीतागांवावामात्मा ओषधी:। लोमानि बनस्व-तीनकृत श्रेस्ति। अस्त्र द्वितीयं च रेतस्य निस्सिद्धं, कायं तथा पुष्यो भच्चित। इति पुनरात्माभागार्थे पायावलयवेचालोवेचालो च ग्राहि संन्यन्त्र: पन्यपपक्ष्यं कर्मं तदाध्यक्तवेचालो निस्सिद्धाभासायते, तदन्तावाहसर्वात्मेः श्रृङ्खलाय तथा प्राणायाम्या। तत्र हि सूङ्खिते। "तौ होवाच यायाविस्तयो अवर २समवनीयतेऽ; कर्मं हैव तद्त्रूचटः। अथ यतू प्रसां: कर्मं हैव ततू प्रशस्तंदुः। पुष्येः हैव पुष्येन कर्मं भच्चित पापः पापेन" इति। न च "अपयुष्येऽऽ जयति" इति पूर्वावाक्ये संसारसत-रणकृपावृप्तेऽ। तेन प्रकृतानन्दिः धितसुभकान्तिनिर्धितेध्यामसीत्यत्।
वाचनम्। "अशिंचे मुशुः सावपसमम्" इत्यपामन्यः वापसनमुक्तवा हि तस्य
फलम्। "अरुपसुद्देशु जयति।" इत्यचः त। तस्मातासिरजयज प्रयास
विद्युः। २ संसारस्तरं । अनोऽस्य बावकस्वापि अविद्विधिसत्वविविधुः
द्विः शरीरम् शाशुकान्तकेन्द्रया नैव जीवा। तपायुक्तकालित्यरथेषु प्रयासकृत्
यद्यो योऽधि। इत्रत्वनिधेम् "यत्रायं पुरुषो भ्रमयेत्।" इति पूर्ववाके पुरुष-
शन्तेन प्रस्तुतात जीवा इति "उद्वस्मेत्यः क्रमः।" इत्यत्र मन्वनामा परा-
सर्वोत्तरः। न च तत्र पुरुषशन्तेन शरीरपरम् शाशुकान्तके। "यत्रायं
पुरुषस्मिन्ने वाग्येति।" इत्यत्वनिधेम् "प्रत्येकं शाशुकं।" इति प्रकटः
पुरुषस्मिनन्तरस्त्रेण शरीरस्त्रयुक्ताय तत्रायं निर्मिताः। न च "आकाशम्।" इत्या-
त्वापि प्रथकः कीर्तिता इति चान्यायं। तन्वातःशन्तेन् "आनन्दः आयाम।" इत्यत्रेषु
मध्यवाचविचरितेन् "हृदयाचाकारपर्यन्तः।" इत्यादि।

एवं च "स उच्चृयाति।" इति बावके तन्वः चान्यायं। शरीरसत्वारिष्णोऽदिरेषु
भेदापराणाः शरीरपरम् नैव इति चान्यायाः। अस्ति क्षिप्रे जीवांगमायि।
विद्विधिसत्वविविधोऽदिरेषु तत्त्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवा प्रारूपायोऽदिविधिसत्वविविधतः
विविधतः। नूत पुरुषस्मिनन्तरस्त्रयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-
विद्विधिसत्वविविधतः। जीवांगमायित्वादित्स्थवालयुक्तवाळे अन्योऽपि प्रस्तूतस्त्रयोऽदिव-

1 जय प्रामाण्य मुः (A)  2 इत्याचाकारपर्यन्तः (A)
त्वेकाविषयत्वात् चतुर्थप्रमाणोतिर तत्तीवस्यापि प्रस्थाविद्धिष्ठायलबं वक्तुं युक्मः। तत्स्थित्विवाहादिति नेतुचोते। अन्यथाप्रक्षाति: याहंखल्केन सह मस्तरतो विजिगितुक्तायां प्रवृत्ताः समस्ताः पालितः। प्रायं प्राप्त निगुणा प्रश्नः: कुंतः। यथा आर्टभगानेव तात्तक, "कनिः महः: काव्यात:।"

इति यक्षा:त्वाःतिविपयत इच्छ प्रश्नः: कूटः। अध्यायसंस्कारात्मात्वः आय बच्चुता:तिविषय इति प्रश्नः: कौटिस्वयंबन्धु। "प्राणवाचित्त्वाचाचाचाचाचा: ओऽमनोहः। तत्त्वं महः। अपनानामसरस्वतीकामकर्मेऽपि: अत्वाहः।" इत्युच्छ: युक्मः।

तथा लाखारिता च पारिक्षिता अभवनः। इत्यमिदेर्षविन पारिक्षितशब्देन प्रश्नः: कूटः। "मर्यामेदयदुखिनो अभवन।" इति तद्भवः विवृष्णतेव याज्ञावल्क्येऽत्तुर्मुक्मः।

तथा गार्था। अहं वे त्वा याज्ञावल्क्य यथा कायो वा वैदेहो वा समस्तारः उद्वः भुवुपस्यं कः वा हृ वायण्वती सप्नाभिव्यायनिः इसे कुत्तोगौरिन्येले। एवेवाहाः त्वा धाियाः प्राव्फाः ब्योद्वस्तो तौ से रूहः।" इति प्रभवावक्यन्या:वेष मस्तररिवरण युक्मः।

एवं चात्र तत्तीवस्याविद्धिष्ठायचतुर्थप्रमाणसाधिनिर्पायिष्ठप लव्यार्मेकविष- वल्याभायोहजनार्थम्बनान्यायसिद्धो सार्वत्वकवस्तः। समां कहाति: महद्युक्षस्वतान्तः नरप्रस्थाविद्धिष्ठा भाविताद्वितीयप्रभाविनिर्पायिष्ठाय:। नतं समां ऄ त्तीवस्यांतविद्धिष्ठायत्वाविष्ठादित्तेन इऽवित्त्रः। तपस्वसुमाणोहविक्षावामात्र- वास्तवितता:त्वामाश्चिमित्तूरिविवाकारिष्ठात्तित्। न विवृष्णद्विवारिष्ठाचारायणी। अधिप्रवृत्ते सूत्रजोनाश्रयस्य शाक्तरमाण्यदार्शित एवाचाराञ्जामाभित। इति इशतनमः।

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तथा "अधिकारिनी तत्प्राप्तिः।" (अ. ५. ३. १) इत्यविकरणां-बसानेवेष-मलान्तरसुष्णसम्। तत्विविकरणमेवः मूःरणवार्याः निजाक्षर-श्रोषः तत्त्वाप्राप्तिर्विरितिनेकेन भारक्षण उत्त भार्नात्तेऽपावित् संशोषः।

1 तम्मातिभवायादितुं (My); भामाण (I)
पूंब: पञ्चः; मागीलार्थापि अम्बांमार्शित। न निरूपम् "अन्त्येऽण तालुके, 3.131
य एप स्तन म्वातःम्वातः, मेंद्यमयीः; गवासी केशात्सी विशवते, 
व्यपेक्ष शीर्षकपाटे।" दिवस व्याहतिविद्यायां वृत्तानि तालुकांतराबल-
स्मानामवाच नवाध्यक्षायिन्यं मुक्तिगमा: मार्गमार्गविशिष्ठिकमाः स्वयम्। देश-
वयस्वे "य धामाद्वितीयं ध्यान्ते रस्स्यकम्।" दिवत् गामनादपधितानां सारसा-
मेण वशलोकपारणं शापकतबं शृगप।। दृढ़रिविद्यायं "महेत्तत्वसाङ्ग- 
रीरागुच्छामध्यमः मत्तसाङ्गवधातीलां साक्षे
चेष्ट्यकाभुतम् आक्रमं।" दिवस मूळार्धसीवानिवेदनशङ्ग-
क्चेष्ट्यकाभुतम् आक्रमं।। तथायः न यथार्थ शिष्यमनसःमार्दार्द्यं 
गच्छित।। दिवस लघुवचनालाक्षारं भागुवचनालाक्षारं परात्राः प्रतीतयं।।
एवं च यथार्थानं प्रकाष्मतें विशिवार्तुव: च व्यवस्थितेन तेन तेन मायेण 
महाप्राप्; न लघुवचनालाक्षात्केनिन्वति।।
स्थिरांत्स्थितः—प्रभुवस्मानवन्तिविदित्रिमार्गं: महर्षिवस्मायायारण इति। 3.132
छान्दोऽपि पञ्चायामविद्यायाम् "ततो इत्यं विद्युः चेतं अरणं अध्यात तप: इत्रु-
पास्ते।" दिवस, तथा व्याहतिविद्यायं "ये चामी अरणं अध्यात साध्यमुपास- 
ते।" इति अरणात॥
नतु यात्र विशामु न कश्चित्विपि मार्गे: शृणुते, तदेवःशस्त्रम्— 3.133
उपास्ते— इति विद्वतेवकर्तं आभिष्वत। 1 भवेभवेभवें वद्रि मागीक्षम- 
क्षापयोपास्ते स्वात; शक्यसम हि तदुपपादाविषुः।।
तथाहि— व्याहतिविद्यायं स्थानात्स्रोतेन्द्रस्य जीवस्य वर्तेत्यस्फर्तय च स्वाधीनालाम्बन विनायक 
केशान्तस्वात्स्य सिद्धान्तस्वात्स्य:। केशान्तस्वात्स्य सिद्धान्तस्वात्स्य:। केशान्तस्वात्स्य सिद्धान्तस्वात्स्य:। केशान्तस्वात्स्य सिद्धान्तस्वात्स्य:।
तदन्तः "मूर्तिधार्यो त्रिपरित्यागि, भुज्ञ इति वायो, छुयारिलियो।" 
इति यद्यात्मनासवत्कर्तं नवनिविदुर"मार्गपन्थवृत्तानामेव।। तञ्च अदकण्डुर्ध्व 
प्रतिष्ठितात्मक्ष्यवन्ते ततेतु किन्तुकाले विशाबार्तिरस्विभायायेप्य।।
व्याहतिविद्या-

1 मवेदवेग (T; My)  2 दत्तम्वाहीनामार्गि (O)
शिवाधुतनिषेधः

याम्—महः—हि चतुर्थ्वचारतिथिरस्य त्रद्ध व्याहतित्रद्धत्रुपाणाम् यादि—

3.134 नामपुपाप्वत्स्मस्तीति तद् नालोकात् लोकेऽपि विश्वास्तिवचन्न युक्तम्। “स सा-
भिवर्षीयते श्रद्धालोकम्” इति। “यः पुनरेत् त्रिमाणोनिषेयते विचारणे 
परं पुरुषभिधारीति” इत्येकमार्थित्वावर्णनमाधिकारोनुरूप्तान्तरं 
विमाणवक्षपापकरस्माधिवानात् अर्थावस्त्राणां अर्थणुसमस्यामुन्तरया 
प्रतिपादितत्वाच। विमाणावक्षपापकरस्माधिवानात् अर्थावस्त्राणां त्रजायमात् 
सा—

3.135 मालि विवाहाधिकरणार्थ अर्थोपकल्याणानवृत्तीनामि, न तु मार्गतथा। “अयो— 
तेवरः राजंभिषः” इत्यावधारणार्थ राजद्विधानाथ्यश्राधाराण्यक्षणस्वच्छव्यक्तस्वाधूधाक्ष—
कम्, न ल्यार्थार्थानाः व्यवच्छक्षरकम्, एकस्त्र वाक्यस्य राजोपाध्यायो तद्वि—

3.136 तर्न्यबक्षिते च तत्त्वारसंस्कावात्। त्वरावचारं पिटधाराणणप्रेक्ष्योप्यक्षम्, न 
पूर्वपारंपरिच्छन्नन्ति। नापि विद्यमैव वेगान्त्वरसंस्कर्णापापेश्यते। 
एवं भार्यंक्योपपादे न संभावति जाववन्याण्यामुक्तिनात्मकोमुक्खाध्यक्ष—
मितरुचारावहतितुल्यं न युक्तस्मि।

3.137 एवम्बुधिरादिते नक्षत्रावधुतसाधारणायस्यवस्थापनात् निरूपण— 
वादविदोल्लेख वादसंपत्तितव्यायतिति स्वाधिति शब्दार्थितेन अविश्वास्यसम्पूर्णसूतकरणा— 
बसावेंद्रि तन्मतान्त्रमुप्पुस्तकम्— “निरन्थयोपासकानां नाविराधितिके 
शिरू” इति। तस्मिन मते “अर्थिराधित्वत्त्यथिततें” (व. ४. ३. १) 
इति संसर्गं प्रत्यथम्मणात्व प्रायोगिकमोऽन्तरव्यक्तयम। अविश्वास्य 
अविश्वासपरिषपारति स्वेतर्पियो चक्षुस्य, द्विन्दुपेन्दर्यन्तानां वेषानां स्वत—
लोकेऽपि स्थितस्वेच्छुष्मानानामार्थिदिकामार्जंसंभावात्। न च सुभवि विधाम्— 
न्याय स्वस्मानानां स्वस्त्यामायमे पर्वं मार्गं इति नियमो विबक्षित 
इति बाच्यम्। सत्वविभोस्तकानां वसुदेवद्विधमस्वस्त्यात्यसम्पूर्णीणां 
मुख्यां तथा। वश्वादिपद्वर्तकमार्गान्तरवस्त्ववाच्यावृत्तालावणासम्मितिः। 
एवं यह यथाधिकरणे श्रद्धाविदो गर्तवस्तनां यम्यस्यान् किष्टे, तत्र
वर्तापि सत्य नस्याधिकरणस्य सकस्त्राब्राह्मास्त्रावारणवाक्षपारित्रिकारथस्य सतत्त्योपन्नवासात्, अनिमाबिधिकरणस्य स्वयमन्त्रस्यपपाविनाधावचार्यायोणां तत: 
त्यााँतिएम्बिधायर्गम्यते। न च वर्तापि “केचिन्” इत्युपन्नवासाद्विमितिः 
तत्त्वं शहीद्यम्, स्वयमिदानेन समग्नपितामिष्टम् न तु निर्गुणविधिताः 
इति थोतनाथेर्गनेनस्वार्थास्मिन्नयमः तत:। स्वयमुपन्नवासाद्विमितिः 
स्वगतस्य निस्मन संत त्याविन्दिष्यस्यस्यप्राप्तामुस्खालनाद 
आलाशुस्माणि। वर्तापितामिष्टम्। परं तद्न नन्तिमागुर्म पुष्च्चक्रमः 
तत्त्वार्यस्य शर्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः योजानिया तदनत्तरं “केचिन्त्राहुः” 
इति त्याविन्दिष्यस्यस्यप्राप्तामुस्खालनाद इति। 
त्यामुदव्यवस्थिताः। तत्त्वार्यस्यपुष्च्चक्रमः। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा 
शार्म्यालाक्षिकम्रिताभिकरणशाटीैः। योजानिया तदनत्तरं 
इति। वा अन्नद्रोणां वर्तापि। इति। तदनत्तरं या वा
इत्युपवेश इत्यमेकमथेसुपत्ता स्वामपरमात्माभेदविषयया "तत्त्वमासि" इत्य-विशालमथयत्रवया व तथोपदेश इत्यस्तूलसुमुक्तम् — "अथवा वेदात्माबिज्जा-नोपल्लवर्या वद्धात्मास्मारस्माभवत् वद्धाभाववुपपातस्य विगलितमुनुसादि: 
वेदान्तत्वाधिकप्रियताहन्तांकथानको प्रत्येकः संप्रवृत्तिसाराकपराभवास्य बायादेवस्य सर्व- 
गत्तवागमानमुसूर्यापिनधभावोकः। एवंभिन्नार्थाय निन्दुक्ते" इति।

इतथ निन्दुणाविभिषेखायमभेदभावनामने ¹सागुणाविभायां सा न 
संभवतिः स गुणस्य परस्मेक मुख संवर्गस्तुक्षिक्षित्वासाधिविस्मयोत्तमम् बेदमरणात्मविद्याशुक्लम् व्याहारिकसीमादते दिपं तांत्रिकाभेद- 
द्रष्टा तदनेवभावना कार्यवि अनन्दनां अद्वितिवें "आत्मवि तूपस्मे गच्छन्ति ग्राहः। 

³-१५१ यथा " (३.४.१.२.) इत्यविकारण प्रवतितम्। तदितथम्— 
वायोपासनवपातके स्वाभावितदत्ता कार्यम्, उत स्वाभावितदत्ताय संख्ये 
पूर्ण: पश्चात्:— "विवाः को रोडः सहारिः।" "अधिकं तु वेदविन्द- 
शालू" इत्यविरुध्धस्त्रेषु अन्यायात्मनः पश्चात्वात्मखः परावणोपरिस्थ- 
रत्नेन निकृष्टत्वात सर्वस्ववादिना जीवस्य वायोमावयाचनात श्रीधरपास्नचर्चग

³-१५२ स्वाभिकर्षणेन कार्यक— इति। सिद्धान्तस्य— यथापि जीवाधिकर्षण 
शिवार्ये परं ब्रह्म, तथापुपासिता "अहं ब्रह्मासि" इति तदुपस्तीत, यत: पुरीप्तपासितार: "तत् वा अहमस्य भगवो देवते अहं वै 

³-१५३ त्वमसि" इत्याविदेनावगच्छिन्ति। न च तत्र शारीरिकर्षिनाविवर्नां 
रामानाधिकर्षणाम्। तत्सि हि: "अहं वै ल्वमसि" इति निरदेश एवोपपत्त, 
तत् शारीरिनिर्देश परस्मेके व्याधिकर्षणयं तस्यांवदक्रमस्य द्विःसंघाताम्। 
"तत् वा अहमसि" इति निर्देशातु नोपपयते, अहंशारीरिनिर्देश परस्मेक- 
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1 संबंधित (०)
நேரடையே ஹௌக்குற்றுப்படி தவர்ணத்தை புனிதநிறுத்தக்காணிக்கப்பட்டு வருகின்றன, அருணான்கள்

தன்வரைத்தன்னித்தான்தேங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்ங்
सिद्धार्थोत्तरवेदि तानुपासितत्तवुद्गाति स्वरूपवत्वा परं ब्रह्म” इत्युक्तक्या-चामेवेदयो तातित्तिकवागमात। न हमेदयो तातित्तिकवादावो वस्तुत्स्तत्तत्वप्राप्युक्तिकर्मरथे। उपाख्यातिरधोत्तरवेदस्तीतित्तत्तत्तवास्वद्य व्यावहारिकनेत्रस्तृत्वाते-पीत्वेतदेह:। पूर्बक्षमीजशान्त्वनिराकरणाङ्ग इति न विरोधः। अत एव निकि-चामान्यात्यदेवेदुपर्याप्तत्वप्राप्यपूर्वमेकं परमात्मिवादोके तत्त्वातुकं शास्त्रस्यापि शिवां-हंभावातुरदि: विकारार्थितं सूक्ष्मालयं (ब्र. ४. ५. १९) प्रतिपादिता “सदा-शिवायेनासमतिज्ञारिणां वदान्तानां मण्डातेषु स्वेष्याया सर्वभावानः कामाक्षी कामपुर्वी बिगालितन्यात्याविदेहस्वामिनां। सत्त्वते विचित्रतात्त्वविम्याणारः। परमात्म-न्यायकायाभिमूद्वितमकङ्कीन्यायारस्तरायेद्रह्पेक्षामयापद्याहिं निर-पुर्णस्माहारं प्रकटमुनभवित। तथाहि—‘अह्मममहामहामहामूः। अह्महं-दोह्महायोह्महाइ।’ इति। भोगमोक्षसानकड़पात्मत्त्वपरिपूर्णाः व्यास्मातान्यायारन्तप” इति। यत्रिपुर्विकारात्मात्मवात्मयाचिन्तिकथे। न जगात्तक्ताशास्त्रमयास्तत्त्वप्रपंचचतिक्यमाकल्यमीलानात, मवेशरीरकत्व सत: सकलभोग्यभोगक्तरीरकत्त्वायुक्त: पराहँभावं: शिवाभेदभावालम्पत्त्वेयां सत्त्रो-ज्ञपी संभविता, “असत्तोताइकतिरेकः” (ब्र. २. ३. ४८) इत्याविसूर्भायेयु परस्त्य तथामूत्त्वारपि पराहँभावस्य सतो दोहितत्वातु, तथापि सूक्ष्मायें न वि-विक्षितः सः, किंतु ब्रह्माण एव परोह्माभावं “परार्थावर्षेककारसमपन्वाच-गाहिनम्” इत्याविभविस्मत्िहरस्तायात। तत्र हि प्रपतचर्य ब्रह्मकुपशा-वान्तैतितेवर्भां, न तु खण्डेरत्तम्। आदेहपातं शिवाह्माभावानादायो। वत्त्व भृक्ष्य यथेष्टानसमवेष्टपि तदनुविरितेऽव वक्तुस्बुचिता।

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एवमभेदभावान्यावेदर्शककायाः। स्वाभिमात्त्वेनाविश्वतो जीवाभाव-भेदः। “बद्विति चेति प्राणो हि प्रकरणात्” (ब्र. १. ४. ५) इत्य-युगान्तिकादिकन्यात्तत्वाभयेंपि कायचित्तकिंतभाविः। तत्राधिक-रणे “महत्: परमश्वक्रिमयकावंयुः पर:।” इति। कठानीभन्द्र-
श्रुतस्वरूपः साक्ष्याविस्मयं प्राधानयिन्यावाहंश्वतिमूलः: साक्ष्याविद्वानं यत्र पूर्ववश्यनिराकरणार्थः प्रदेशः "श्रेयंत्वाचनाय" (म. १. ५. ४) इति
गुणसूत्रेण सिद्धातेन हृत्यन्तरमुक्तम्। यददेशमेव वाक्यं साक्ष्यश्चाच्च पूर्व-मभविष्यतः द्रुकातिपुष्पविवेकात्मकार्तानि। केवलयमिति चतुः: साक्ष्यं-विस्मयं प्राधानयं पुरुषावत्स्मयं यत्र न न्द्रन्तरस्मयमपि चतुः तत्र तत्त्वार्थार्थवार्तां नाविर्मिति पुनर्गतः इति।

नन्दनिभ्यं श्रेयंत्वाचनम्: "अश्वद्रमस्वर्मस्मम्" इति सम्मेलनः
कठवाहित्रिविधि: शास्त्रादिविद्वितीनं सत्यतन्त्रवान्। परस्यात्माका श्रेयां न बाह्यति
punः। साक्ष्यमञ्चानां तत्त्वार्थार्थम् "बुद्धतीति चेन्" (म. १. ५. ५) इति
सूक्षमः। तेन नद्रनेन परमेश्वर उच्चतं न प्राधानयं, परमेश्वरपूविक प्रकरणाविदि
तत्त्वार्थार्थकार्यार्थशीनाय शाक्ष्यमिनेके परमेश्वराविरपेः मन्त्रे उदाहरणीये

"चतुष्क्रेणांस्विनां प्रासंस्वच्छेत ज्ञान आत्मनि।
आत्मनात्मनि महति नियमीयूनां तथचेत्यां आत्मनि।"
इति मन्त्र उदाहर्यो भावे। एवं इति तथां सूक्ष्मत्वाय भाष्यम्—

"अश्वद्रमस्वर्मस्मस्मद्ययं
तबारस्य नियममन्दिरवाच यत।
अनाधनतं महतं परं धृवं
नियमम् तनस्तुसुमुक्तात्मसुचये।"

इत्यादिनमन्न्यास्ताविक। भास्तातं वद्विभयं चेन्, "चतुष्क्रेणां स्विनां प्रासां
" इति: पार्थकाय चेन्नै: द्रुकातिवादां।" इति। अतः सुने प्राक्षस्यन्यासादानाय-क्रियां, मन्त्रे स्व: प्रात्मावदित: तस्येवं प्रकाशमिति: शाख्याचार्यवच्च स्वरुपकोषि:।
अथे: प्रस्तीचिते। अवशेषम् मन्त्रे प्राक्षस्येवः सुपुरुषार्जुनः उक्तः। तस्मात्वेव
वाक्यनसाधितिनियमवाक्यस्थायिकत्ववाचतः । परमात्मनश्च । प्रकरणमिष्मूः
“महत् दरमत्यक्तमुक्ताकारपुरुषः । परः ।"

पुनः कारणम् प्रक्षिप्तस्य काह्वां सा परा गतिः।"

इस्ते तत्स्यत्र प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादिषितस्यात। एवं चात्र यदि आचार्यकारणां
वैवर्मप्रावतात्त्वादि वृद्धेऽयो न भेद्यत्, तदर्श प्रसाध्यपरमेयो श्यादेन प्रकर-
गतिन्युद्वाहरणीयो जीवपरमेयो श्यादेन तदुक्तवाहिनस्य महत्यक्तमिव श्यादि।

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नन्यैचार्यमपि कथिन्ता नासाध्यार्थस्य, जीवपरमात्मनोक्तत्वाभिधाशुभ-गतिन्यैष्यमपि व्यावहारिकस्य तथोर्द्धबायेन वेदान्तेश्वराय जीवृक्षकरणपिदं पर-

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मात्रापरमेयमिति व्याख्यातेषुपरमांगतवाभिविष्यति वेदुक्तवते। कठवह्निः

“वे वे यत्र भिषयक्तस्य मनुष्यो अतीतोऽयेक साध्यसततृतिः चैत।

पराक्रियालिङ्गस्य स्वेतायमयोक्तत्वायें वर्णालापं वर्षांतीयः।"

इस्ते सुतसाधितिस्य नन्यैचार्यमपि नन्यैचार्यमपि छौः

“ति पुरां गुढमन्त्रायिदं गुढाहितं गहरें पुराणम्।

अवधार्यायवाचारिगमने देवं मलया धौरो दर्शनोऽये वहाति।"

इस्ते वैवस्मेतेन परमात्मायं दुहुदस्यकरणम्। तथा हि—प्रत्यय साध्य-वैचारिकमलं सुदृढं; प्रेतवश्वस्य तत्र रूद्वतात्;

“इति रासाय: सरसाय: सतृत्रव न हीद्यता चम्पनीया मनुष्ये।

आभिप्रयत्नात्तात्त: परिवार्तस्य नन्यैचार्यस्य मर्यो मानुषायाः।"

इस्ते वैवस्मेतेन तदद्वाप्राय सुतसाधितिस्य व्याख्यातस्य फलकरणात्; “यथाग्रं विषयक्तस्य सुदृढं यतसाम्पत्याय महति ब्रूढः नर्ततः” इति पुनः नन्यै-

केतस्य मर्ययुक्तत्वामसाम्पत्त्याय वैवस्मेतेन निन्यंत्रितस्य स्वप्रभ्यत सिद्धे-

केतस्य पुरुषतात्; तर्कन्तरं वैवस्मेतेन

“न साम्पर्याय: । प्रतिभाति बाँझ भ्राकं भ्राकमाणं विच्छेदनं सुदृढं।

अर्थ लोको नासित पर इति मानी पुनः पुत्रब्राह्मणवाचे मे।”
शिष्यावैतात्मिकतयः।

इति नायमसेरीति चैकः इति पञ्चतुपपुर्वकस्मे पत्रस्य चापकान्तत्वात्, अभे च
"इन्नतु इर्दं प्रवक्षयांभि गुरुं ब्रह्म सनातनम्।
यथा च मरणं ग्यायं आत्मा भवति गौतमं।
योनिमन्ये प्रपचन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिन्।
स्वामन्येन सहस्रं गृहस्थयति वथाकर्मं वथासुतम्।"

इति सादान्ध्युयत्वजीववृत्तान्तविषयोतरदशानात्। तथा तं दुर्दश्यमित्याभुचरं
परमात्मविषयमित्यापि सुद्रः। प्रभानंतरं वैवस्वतेन—
"देवैराग्यापि विचित्तितं सं पुरा न वृि युविभयमणुमेरे परमः।
अन्यं वरं निचकेतो वृणीष्व मामोपरैसीरति मा सूर्यनम्।"

इति प्रश्नोत्तरमचारिगस्यायियं वर्कतु दुःशाकमित्युक्तत्वात्। ततो नचि-
केतसा

"देवैराग्यापि विचित्तितं किं तं च सूर्यो यथा सूर्ययमाति।
बक्षा चास्य त्वाद्गायनं न तथ्यो नानारं बरस्तुतः एतस्य काशित।"

इति पुष्पमेवोपेष्टमय्यभि प्रायथितं वैवस्वतेन पुनस्त्याधिकाराव्यपरिची-
क्षिप्या

"शतापुरुषः पुरापौराण वृणीष्व बहुतं पशृष्टं हस्तिभिषयमय्यानं।
भूमेहवायतनं वृणीष्व स्वयं च जीव शरदयो यावदिक्षिः।"

इत्यार्थः "निचकेतो मरणं मातुप्राणीः। इत्यन्ते प्रुष्ट्यमानार्थपिण्यम्
पुनर्दिन्येवेद्यापुरुषार्थिपिण्योक्तेवेद्यपि निचकेतसा

"शो भावा मृत्युया वद्यकैत्तस्बैन्धिकाणां जरपलिन्ति तेजः।
अपि सर्व जीवितमलयेषः"

इत्यादिना "अरभंवत्र्यन्तरितिमोदालिीयें जीविते को रमेश।" इत्यन्ते
विचारणं द्वस्तायित्यापि सन्तिविभागसंबद्धाविभागसंबंधितवेत्ति
विर्जीविकाप्रि प्रभाविकोदानसकद्धार्पाणिविन्दिनं: सर्वस्वपि जीविनस्यात्।
शिवाझ्येतनिषेधःः

काठिन्यन सिद्धित्वा, प्राकृतण्मज्जोपवेदन्यामिति हृडः प्रारंभते तस्याधिकान्ती-सुप्रभव्य निरेखसम्बन्धमुद्रयं च पुरुषार्द्धानुविन्ध फलवन्यं श्रेयः प्रेयस्यशब्दव्यम् प्रविश्यति तदर्शनं विविधं ददान् । धीरः श्रेयः वृणाति, मन्दस्तु प्रेयः । इत्याच्युक्त्या नापरकेतसो वरं प्रशास्य, "विधानीशिष्यं नापरकेतसं सङ्केर्ने न त्वा कामा वहनो लोकान्तः" इति विधानीशिष्यं तदुपयोगिद्वैरायणवत्तेन च नापरकेतसं प्रशास्य, "न साम्प्ररायः" इत्याहिता वेऌमात्यानिर्दानरकरणपूर्वः

"अवणायापि वहुसिद्धोऽन छयः

श्रवणनोदापि वहनो थं न विगुः।

आश्रयोऽन कुशलोकायन छन्दः

आश्रयोऽन ब्राह्मणः कुशलानशिशुः।"

इत्युदेश्यस्यात्मनो दुरुस्तमवसुकचा वेंसकते तः "तु दुर्योधनः" इत्याच्युक्त: कान्तत्वः । एवं जीवित्यवप्रस्थर्षा परमात्मा भिषु च चरुपश्यानात् जीवित्यवप्रगे रङ्गे: अत्यस्मिने वदेः उपरितः अन्यः श्रीमतरः: वेंशिकरणवापि:।

नन्दनः परमात्मा च वेंशिकरणवापि: श्रोऽन भूतजीवातिसत्वनाशिल्विष्ठ इत्येवदुपपपनमूः, नापरकेतसं: प्राप्तव तद्विस्तवप्रवहसहवत्ताः । अन्यः वतेः: कथः वैधक्ष्यम्वत्तरिहारा: "तत् कस्यो मां दस्यासि" इति वचनवा

"मुखो त्वा दिक्षाम्।" इत्युक्ततः: पितुरुत्तपपिरिहाराय च खव्यः ब्रह्मोक्षेत्र: गम्यः

"साक्षात्विषयं वर्षते अभिविवालायः पुनः।" इति तवीस्तर: वचनस्य वर्गोऽक्षायिष्ठिष्ठब्रवर्षस्य चालुपपत्ते।। वस्तुः जीवित्यवप्रगे: भाषापेदमत्र: सत्तेभी भूतजीवातिसत्वनाशिल्विष्ठवें श्रीमतरः साक्षात्विष्ठिष्ठब्रवर्षस्य चालुपपत्ते।। जीवित्यवप्रगे: दिरिष्टिः । तन्मात्रस्त्र निवृत्तिययताः परमात्मत्वस्य अनुपाय: इत्युदेश्यस्यात्मनो दुरुस्तमवसुक्चा वेंसकते तः । जीवित्यवप्रगे: भाषापेदमत्र: साक्षात्विष्ठिष्ठब्रवर्षस्य चालुपपत्ते।। जीवित्यवप्रगे: भाषापेदमत्र: साक्षात्विष्ठिष्ठब्रवर्षस्य चालुपपत्ते।।
वर्णमात्र: "न गेत्र संज्ञाती" इति बाक्ये सुकौ नेत्रपाद्यायोगद्वारस्य; प्रकरणेन: चन्द्रद्रविरहितां गलिः प्रामाण्य इति नेत्रसंज्ञास्य सुकौ ब्रह्मपंचाशः।

वेचार, प्रसस्मय सुर्यस्य सनायनविस्तरकल्पनां स्थानान्नाश्चानाशीलिं।

"सत्यां लोकों न भर्त्र किंवा नातिनि न तत्र तिं न जरया विशेषतः।

उँहे तीत्वे अझाताया पिपासे शोकातिगां मोदेते स्वर्गालोके।"

इति स्वर्गालोकमहिमसर्गणिनुपूर्णम्——

"स त्यामापि स्वर्गमेघोपि सुस्वां श्रव्यं तं श्रद्धानावरं महामूर्ताः।

स्वर्गालोकाधिकारस्त कुस्तयं भजन्तं एवं चिंतामण्ये व्रृणं वरेण।"

इति तत्साधनानिषिद्धोपेदेशस्य वृत्तवाच, वैवेदोषेन च तदुप-वेशाननं तत्तिथियप्रस्तावे, "स ब्रह्मापादार्थं ज्ञान आरामलोके सोदेते स्वर्गालोके।"

इति तत्तुलसर्गालापम: सकर्मस्याप्राविश्वनिश्चितप्रेक्षकेन विशेषपित्यतः।

यदि हिन्दूविवेचनाविद्याभवत्स सुकासतिविविष्यासंख्या द्विविकारणार्थ विवेधानाविश्वानावा च तत्तिथियप्रस्तावे उपस्थतम् इति समर्थतेन, तदेवेव सुतासि-विविष्यव्रमोऽपि सम्योजितं जरायतेन इति प्रेताश्चकुलय।" सर्गाणेन श्रव्याशीलिं।

इत्यथायुगसन्तर्णस्वायत्तेन च प्रार्थ सुतासिविविष्यासंख्यायश्रमं अक्षुं न उक्सुम। इत्यानामपि हिन्दूविवेचनाविवेचनाययान पार्लीककककोकुशाल्यानिधिः एव।

किंवल्लभमनो वेदात्मकात्व: कर्म च तत्तिथियप्रस्तावे। इति विवेचनामातार्यतेत। वैवेदोषेनान्तरं वैभवकमुद्यायनविश्वः। पतितवेदेश्व शाखेकु वेदात्मकात्वः। विवेधाश्चकुलयानिधिः।


नाखळ्यविषयषे तवसित्वभाचूनरे वक्तव्यमितः परमाल्यसङ्केषपत्तायुपावऽ‌
ग्रान्तिरूपः न सक्रृततः श्र्ति चेचः, तस्य मुखजीवानित्वनालित्वविखः
यत्र तद्वित्तवाचूनरे वक्तव्यमितः तद्वित्वप्रसाज्जस्य परमेश्वरि
तुल्यतः। न हि सुतुरान्तविषयं पिन्यग्रामांग्रान्तिरूपः तत्त्वार्थचन्द्रा
निशवः तत्त्वापूर्वाविषयः श्रद्धते। यथारे परमाल्यसङ्केषपत्तायुपाव
निशवः तत्त्वापूर्वाविषयः तत्त्वार्थचन्द्रा निशवः श्रद्धते। त्वो च परमाल्य सङ्केषपत्तायुपाव
tतत्त्वार्थचन्द्रा निशवः तत्त्वापूर्वाविषयः तत्त्वार्थचन्द्रा निशवः श्रद्धते।
त्वो च परमाल्य सङ्केषपत्तायुपाव

मृत्तिका क्षणमिति व इह नानेव पश्चात्॥

इल्लाविकेरोऽपि न च वाच्यं इह वेदे विद्यमानसंस्मृतादित्वमण्डलाशः
विद्यमानस्य च परमेश्वराभ्येक नानात्रं निषिद्धते, न तु वेदे विद्यमानस्य
जीवविद्यामण्डलाशः सतः परमेश्वराभ्येक देवो निषिद्धतः श्र्ति, स्थाने
वेदेन परमेश्वराभ्येक देवसिद्धानायात्। तथा “अक्षुष्मालः पुरुषः” श्र्ति मन्वेन
जीवविद्यामण्डलाशः सतः परमेश्वराभ्येक देवो निषिद्धतः श्र्ति, स्थाने


dयोद्धरं दुरं दुरं पर्वतमेकं विश्रावात्।

परं दुरं दुरं परं स्थानेवातुर्विश्रावात्॥

इति मन्वेन जीवे भावः पुरुषमयाविषयं भवं अभेदिविरोधिनः
सत्तात् परमेश्वराभ्येक पुरुषमयाविषयं संसारालतटतपत् चोषतो च।
इत्यभेदनः प्रकरणं जीवपरामेश्वरपरामेश्वरमिदमू, न केवलः जीवस्य परमः
वा प्रकरणमितिः सूचयितुमेवः परमाल्यमेवः प्रकरणमितिः श्रवणः प्रकरणित्वुपागरपर:
पुष्मेव, ज्वमिश्रतयं प्रकरणस्य प्रतिपदा प्रचितिः तत्परयानं श्रवणं तत्स्यो
वाहृतं सूत्रज्ञतः सूत्रमयित्वाभिनव्य प्रकरणप्रविषयमनस्तः विद्माश्र्यं संकेषपत्तायुपाव


dयोद्धरं दुरं दुरं पर्वतमेकं विश्रावात्।

परं दुरं दुरं परं स्थानेवातुर्विश्रावात्॥

इति मन्वेन जीवे भावः पुरुषमयाविषयं भवं अभेदिविरोधिनः
सत्तात् परमेश्वराभ्येक पुरुषमयाविषयं संसारालतटतपत् चोषतो च।
इत्यभेदनः प्रकरणं जीवपरामेश्वरपरामेश्वरमिदमू, न केवलः जीवस्य परमः
वा प्रकरणमितिः सूचयितुमेवः परमाल्यमेवः प्रकरणमितिः श्रवणः प्रकरणित्वुपागरपर:
पुष्मेव, ज्वमिश्रतयं प्रकरणस्य प्रतिपदा प्रचितिः तत्परयानं श्रवणं तत्स्यो
वाहृतं सूत्रज्ञतः सूत्रमयित्वाभिनव्य प्रकरणप्रविषयमनस्तः विद्माश्र्यं संकेषपत्तायुपाव
"माण्यो हि प्रकरणात्" (म.१.४.५) इति युत्ताक्षराद्वेयवेणे प्राणाश्यवेदन्मन्नो भाष्यकारारुढादृढः। इत्यमन्योर्कालकः या श्रृंखलामिलितमतियोगतनस्य-तत्तचिप्रा-भेदाभिमतिराहिनिः।

तथा प्रथमांशिकर्षणपि "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म" इति तत्त्वं: 3.17
अयमिति प्रथमेण भाष्यानिविदसमवालामां ऋतुयुपद्रव्याति। "अतः तुलो-भव सन्नेनः" इति शास्त्रियवित्वाभिमाने व्रजणि सन्तेरेश्यापपादणैने कृतस्य शास्त्रान्नर्म्पूर्वकमत्रस्य भिज्ञाने तीव्रशब्दकेदारीविभिन्नभाष्यकारानर्वनत
tयोऽर्दसमयवधाने। "यतु अय्मात्मा ब्रह्म" इत्यादिसूत्रित्युमेवाद्ब्राह्मणर्वं
संसारिण व्रजे्तेंविभें; तत् एव सन्नेहः। निराक्षरसमस्तोपकुक्कलवनिर-
तिशाब्दानन्दाशकिमहिमातिशिवर्वं हि ब्रह्मतमू; अनावश्यानवमाणवस्म्भम-
विज्ञमितत्वेविचित्रकर्मष्टोमातुगानुगाणवहुश्रवीशेषाविश्मनाववार्तपवस्थानिसी-
मतापाधिष्ठात् तु जीवत्वम्; कथेत्त्वात्: परस्परविक्कृष्णोरोक्तमायमाहुः।
शुद्ध इति संस्थः किन्न स्थानः" इति तेज्जेवदशृंखलताप्यर्म्पदेहपादिविषष्ठय- सन्तेरेश्यापपादणैने जीवश्रापेदाप्रश्यायनाद्विशरिणिः।

तथां बद्वेषा, भाष्ये श्रृंखलसं: सकलप्रकाराकलेन तद्भिमात्रः 3.18
प्रायः सर्वाद्युप्रेक्षितम्। तथेष विचारसं: श्रृंखलामिलमपि सर्वात्रोंप्रेक्षितम्।
तत् एव जीववाक्षादेशः परस्मिद्वान्: लिःभयं कथं निवार्यितुं शक्यते।

स्वाधिकर्षय। विचारसं: सकलप्रकाराकलेन यदृच्छय तद्विद्यादिरीत्वस्ये-
वातुक्तमः, तेन चतुर्मलप्रक्षेधी विद्यादिरीत्वस्यात् तद्भेदेन सत्त्व- प्रासेः। यदृच्छय चतुर्मलविचारसं: श्रृंखलामिलितमात्रेनाचतुर्मलश्रव तद् तद्भेदेन सत्त्वम्।
तत्स्य: सकलप्रकाराकलेन यदृच्छय तद्भेदेन सत्त्वम्। तदा हि श्रृंखलालितविधिय स्वाधिकर्षय। न तद्विद्यादिरीत्वस्य: प्रक्षेतापरविशखेताय तत्स्य: सर्वप्रकाराकलेन प्रक्षेतापरविशखेताय तद्विद्यादिरीत्वस्य:।

तत्स्य: श्रृंखलामिलितविधिय स्वाधिकर्षय। यदृच्छय काल्पनिके तथः।
अपचारक्रम। अते एव जन्माधिकरणे सुखुमल्याम् “आनन्देऽ श्रद्धा” इति सामानाधिकरणमोपचारक्रियामितुक्रम। “यें खुदें “अन्योक्तन्त्र आत्मानन्द-मयें” इति प्रस्तुत्यस्तरितमं श्रीमालं भवति” इत्यारम्यवाच्यासात् निराननिष्ठानमुदर्शष्ट्रक्षणेनः “स एको श्रवण आनन्दें” इति निदर्शितं परजनाशमयेन, स एव आनन्देऽ श्रद्धा इति प्रमुखतात् श्राध्वेनोपचर्येते” इति। श्राध्वेच्छाक्षत्रयोभूतस्तु भूतुः स्थरेवाविष्करतः। यथार्थारिकरणे

तापत्—“अनुभागान्तरेत्” (ब्र. १, ३, ९) इति सौत्रेतुन्यात्यावाससमेते “पत्तिन्य लल्लव्यरे गायत्री आकाश आत्मानं गौतमं सुदोषं” इति गायत्रिवाच्यान्द्राख्यु-धराकाशब्रह्मविदिषयोः श्राध्वेच्छाक्षत्रयोपाध्यायेवभूमिः आविष्करतः। द्विराधिकरणे (ब्र. १, ३, १३) “द्विराधिकरणे आकाशवाच्युत्त्र यद्यत्वस्तु क्रियामितुम्” इति द्विराधिकरणे तत्त्वावस्त्रित्योऽक्षमेन्। विच्छचिक्षितप्रज्ञानोपाध्यायेनसन्ततिभूतानिकोऽक्षमेन्।

“आकाशोऽहा वै नाम नामस्मुख्योन्निविष्करतः,” तें ब्रह्मलोकः तद्वा, तद्वृत्ति स आत्मा।” इति छान्दोवाच्यान्द्राख्यु धराकाशविदि आत्मानं “आकाशोऽ-धराकाशविदि आत्मानं।” (ब्र. १, ३, ४२) इत्याविष्करणे श्राध्वेच्छाक्षत्रयोपाध्यायेनस्तूतिः भूतानिकोऽक्षमेन्। जन्माधिकरणे “आकाशारूढेऽ श्रद्धा” इति श्रृविवाच्यान्द्राख्युपुराणासरे परमाच्छातिवं विद्वानाकाशायसयं “सहीणे ह वा इमानि मूतानि आकाशावेश सभु-त्वरितम्” “आकाशोऽहा वै नाम नामस्मुख्योन्निविष्करतः” इत्याविष्करणे तत्त्वावस्त्रित्योऽक्षमेन्। तत्त्वावस्त्रित्योऽक्षमेन्। नामस्मुख्योन्निविष्करतः। भूतानिकोऽक्षमेन्। आविष्करतः। प्राकृताविष्करणे (ब्र. १, ४, २३) च “आकाशारूढेऽ श्रद्धां प्रश्नारूढेऽ प्रश्नारूढेऽ प्रक्रियावेश कष्टं विष्करणे निरस्तानस्तः विस्मितविक्रियः विनिमयसत्तरस्तः भज।” इत्याविष्करणे “भवनात्मस्तु विरुक्षणात्मस्य परिश्रमिष्ट” (ब्र. १, ५, ५) इति सुत्राविन्यस्त्वाकाशानावरे। “नित्यसुधादन्द्राख्युनिरंतरितस्य” इति आत्मानं नित्यस्य स्त्रवर्त्तिवेश प्रक्रियावेश स्त्रवर्त्तिवेश ज्ञाताकारके जुरकोऽबूतं, निद्राविष्करणे।
दाकांशं परिणामात्  "इति सांग्रहेतुवचनश्य शास्त्रार्थ प्रदद्वर्य " ‘हन्त्  कार-णविकाररूपो द्वि परिणामोऽपि, पूर्वकारपरित्यागोऽगुणवान्तरापावति: परिणाम इति; कथं परमेवदुरोपतिमत्स्वत् परिमुखे इति चेन्" इति तत्र शास्त्रासुख्यव, "यथा निम्नलिखिताः प्रकृतित्वदेवपि न विकारादि:पशुः, तथा परिणामं संभ-वति" इति गृहालिनिधिययोऽस्मुक्त्वा, "कोज्यमपूर्वः परिणामं? कुतुहलिनो वयं ततचकवे, विचिन्त्यताम्" इति युनराकाःशास्त्राव, " ‘अघु विशेष-भम्' इति तदृसऽसीते प्रतिश्च, यदातस्मात्रिक्षेत्रविचरणपूर्वक् "शिवाय परविच्छ: प्रसाधारविच्छिकत्वगतः परिणामस्तु न स्वाप्तं निविकारत्वस्य विदेशीय' इति प्रतिश्चातादाश्वयः परिणामित्वाप्रणामित्वद्वावृत्येत्याविभूतः। तत्रोऽस्मि आविभूतः। तत्तवानेकाहि व च विच्छेत्रकाविश्वास्य विकारित्वं श्रवणं एवार्थां स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

तत्समविश्वविक्रेत्रेण च चिच्छेत्रकाविश्वास्य विकारित्वं श्रवणं एवार्थां स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या।

तूलीत्वात् श्रवणं विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।

उच्चते—परिणामित्तविनिरूपणस्याधिकरणादिविविविनिर्विद्या। क्रिया साधनामाध्यमविक्रेत्रं श्रवणं एवार्थाः स्पष्टवि तथस्विविकारित्वस्निदानः विदेशोढेखोपरिवारः।
पावित्रम्। पुनःप्रारंभायाचिकरणे (श्र. भा. २. १. २४) कृत्यसाक्षात्कारित्वम्
(श्र. भा. २. १. २६) प्रपन्धस्य श्रद्धापरिणामस्य एवं संभावितविशेष-
प्रतिक्षेपेन बुद्धिसंबांबाचारीति। सह्यूपाकीर्तिकेयस्य भाष्यानुसारे रिपरिणामी-
(म०१)त्वप्रलोकस्य विवर्तवादातुक्तूल्यं प्रपन्धेऽन्न्वस्थापितम्—

“आर्यसंहारतिबिकाराविवर्तवादः

नाथित्वा बादिजनता स्तुतु वाचितादि।

आर्यसंहारात्मते परिह्ला बादेः

झावऽत्र संग्रहपदं नये तुलिन्त्रः।

त्रािपम् पूर्वमपुराणम् बिकारवादः

भोक्ताविकृत्वमवताश्च विरोधस्त्वः।

प्राचात्तम व्यवहरः परिरक्षणाय

¹धममात्सीतिनिर्बलविधातापुपयोगते।

साक्षादिहतिभविभावावहे विवर्तवादः

माहूः सुत्ववति² प्रवर्ममेक्षमाणः।

आर्यणाविवचनन्ति विवर्तवादं

शक्रोति वक्तुमुदिते परिणामवादे।

आर्यश्च भूमिधारामितराविभोऽरुः

शक्रयति शा:मपिकारणकार्यमावम्।

उक्तवा पुरा परिणतिप्रतिपादनेन

संब्रह्मपदस्य विकारस्यपांतिभृते॥

1. कामाक्षि (Anandåśrama edn.)
2. सूचयति (Anandåśrama edn.)
शिवादृशतिनिर्णयः ।

बिवर्त्तवाद्वस्तः हि पूर्वभूमिः:

बेदान्तवादः परिणामवादः ।

व्यवस्थितेऽसिन् परिणामवादे

स्वयं समायाति विवर्त्तवादः ॥

उपायमातिष्टिति पूर्वेऽस्मि

रघुपमाप्तं जनता स्थायी ।

श्रुतिनिविष्ट्रेव विवर्त्तमिष्टैः

विकारवादं वदुस्तत्वैः ॥

* ॥

अहं प्रजायेपं बहु स्वयं स्मरि

तित्वादिनादृशं परिणामसुक्तवा ।

विकारमिल्याश्वमथ हुष्टाणाः

विवर्त्तवादु श्रुतिरादिनाय ॥ ॥

इत्यादिभि: श्रोके: । आचार्यंपि भावे परिणामवादप्रपञ्चमं विवर्ते

वायाध्युपगमामृतकुलतेष्यमां ज्ञापकवें " सन् गतः " इत्यविश्वसङ्ग्यं प्रपञ्च

क्षत्तविष्यताद्वित्वताद्वित्यमेव उपास्त्रात्यत्वक् विषयान्तरं अद्वितिमू।

तस्मादिवर्त्तवादथुपगमामृतकुलतेष्य परिणामस्ववस्वस्थापनं प्रकथिति युक्तम्

से भवते ।

यत्र विचारः ब्रह्मामित्रात्म नोकमित्युक्तं तदविद्यम् सत्तुधारे । बहुधु न्तः भुजः ३·१८३

तदुक्तिवर्धनात् । तथादि— " आकाशस्तिनोऽवादू " इत्यविच्छेदः (वृ. १. १.

२३) " अस्य लोकस्य गतिरित्याचाषि इति इवावचेरति " बालित्वातिपाधः

आकाशो मूर्तिकाशो न भवति, किन्तु परमेत्यं इति सिद्धान्तव्यवस्थापना-

१. वायाध्युपगम (My)
शिवायेतनिबंधः।

नन्तरम्, "नन्तु भूताकाश्याकाश इति स्वाक्षे भूतपूर्वमहं किमचर्यम्" इति शाश्वाङ्गावृत्त, "परमाकाश्य धर्मावध्यात्मकारणवस्तुकालः बासी तथिरूपेणम्।" इति तव: भूवरित्वाद, "तद्हि परमाकाश्यापि सर्वभूतः ततः कारणविचार्यें अयोक्तम: परमेश्वर इति कथं निरूपे।" इति यु: शाश्वाङ्गावृत्त, "तद्वरात्" इत्यत्सेवकम्। दुहराधिकरणे (ब्र. १. २. १२) "दुहरोपसिंहन्तरकाश्याकाश्याकसम्बन्धस्तास्त्त्रस्तृत्रज्ञानम्।" इति छन्दोपोजाराश्च दुहराकाशः परमेश्वर इति सिद्धान्तवच्चापनानंतरम्, "य एकोन्तहद्य आकाशस्त्रिपति श्रेष्ठिती सर्वभूतं बाह्य शरणयेव सः॥ इति धातुसर्वसाराभासिकः"। परमेश्वरो भवितमहति, कथम् दुहराकाशः परमेश्वर इत्यत्सेवकम्, इति शाश्वाङ्गावृत्त, "अत्रापि दुहराकाशस्वरवति परमेश्वर उपाध्यायान इति परिहार: चतुः। "सर्वभूतां प्रसिद्धेऽपेते स" इत्यत्सेवकरणे (ब्र. १. २. १) व्रजनम्: सर्वस्ववद्वाच्छायां युग्मायां नावसे "धृतिस्ततिविद्भुतपुराणामिन्यस्वरुपिकायामायात् सकलद्विविधभराप्रभुमहाविभूतिरूपम् महासंविदानन्दस्तुति देशकाश्यादिपरिवर्त्येवस्य श्लोभनायिकी परमेश्चक्ष: परमेश्वरान्: हिववश्च स्वरूपं च गुणमध्यभति। तववावदतो दुहराधिकरणे इति न च भविनुव भविनुवं च न संभवतः। किम्ब्रजानां सर्वभूतान्यस्वरूपिकायामायाव्यक्तिः च च न संभवति। इति विच्छच्छके परमेश्वरूपतं तद्वात्स्वाच्छायसंस्करितं भविनुव चोकम्। तथा आध्यात्मनाथनाचित्तोनि (ब्र. ३. ३. १४) चिच्छके: ब्रह्मस्वरूपमिचाचनोऽपि।‌

1. न परमेश्वर उपाध्यायः— अर्थ पाठो मुद्रितलालोकाभाष्येण हृदयते; शिवायेतनिकृतिवाचकाद्विख्यातिः और अनुदाहरणायां च नव्यित एव पाठो हृदयते; द्वितीयः सम्प्रेषणः प्रतिभाति।
समार्थिनयः। तथा हि—"आनन्दः प्रभावस्य" इवाधिकरणे (ब. ३. ३. ११)— असिर्विश्वश्यानन्दार्ज्ञीयमुजां नीळकंठवत्वादिविशिष्यितः। प्रज्ञानिक्षेत्र ज्ञान: स्वरुपाक्षः तस्मात्स्वपि बिधासु प्रकरणमेवदेशयु-परस्परार्थम्, तेन हि प्रज्ञाप्रचारिणमकलंतरितमज्ञः ब्रह्म शृङ्गार्थितं चावरूढं भवति, यथा। प्रकाश्वकाणि नकलमाळकयन्त्रं कादिविषयित्यत्वम् चन्द्रमः। अतः आदिदश्रेष्ठः सर्वप्रथम प्रकाश्वकाणि श्रृङ्गार्थितं चावरूढं ब्रह्मविषयाः ज्ञान-

नन्दार्ज्ञीयमहविशेषार्ज्ञित्रिचित्रियाः—इति प्रमाणितम्। वदन्तन्त्रम् "प्रव- 

शिरसंसवाध्यायासित्रुष्टवचारपत्रोऽहि भेदः" इवाधिकरणे (ब. ३. ३. १२)

"सह ज्ञाना विप्रिष्ठिता", "सहस्त्रं भविष्यः।" इवाधिश्रुतिप्रपन्निक्षम- 

धम्मविशेषार्ज्ञानोपसंहारे। तद्वातंत्रलविशेषार्ज्ञालक्ष्यात् "अ- 

न्योञ्जार आत्मानस्यः।। तस्य विद्याधिक श्रवः।" इवाधिश्रुतिप्रपन्निक्षम- 

ंतिरिक्षणादीत्वोपसंहारे। तद्वातंत्रलविशेषार्ज्ञालक्ष्यात् कार्य इवाधिश्रुतः, 

—प्रयासीयानाधिश्रुतिप्रपन्निक्षम—तेषु निरस्वात्रिक विचारविचित्रे ब्रह्म- 

नन्दस्य निरस्वात्रिक्षमात्राप्रतिसाधिकारायं कल्पितम्, न दुः तात्तिकम्; 

ब्रह्मनन्दस्य तत्त्वः शिरः श्रुतिमतः हि कविच्यायं कवित्व कार्याएव- 

वाज्येदार्ज्ञात्। एव तस्मानुपचारपत्रोऽस्मान्यायात्।। पुरृष्यनूपवधाराति तात्तिकम् भेदः। अतः सर्वावतंसारसाध्यात्मान् ब्रह्मनन्दस्य अनन्यातिले तत्तत्वांसंहारः।। ब्रह्मनन्दस्य उत्तमस्य सत्यायनचार्ज्ञात्। सत्यायन: परिचारकपुस्तकां तत्तत्व निरस्वात्रिक्षमात्राप्रतिसाधिकारायं 

इति प्रसाधितम्।

वदन्तन्त्रम् "आध्यात्मिक प्रकृतिनावाचारे" इवाधिकरणे (ब. ३. ३. १२)

३. १२) यज्ञानन्दस्यशास्त्रोऽक्षणं �ाधिश्रुतिप्रपन्निक्षम सर्वात्मकः शिरसंसवात्मक: निरस्वात्मकः परिचारफलकान्ताद्यात्। तत्तत्व निरस्वात्मकः शिरसंसवात्मकः परिचारफलकान्ताद्यात्। ।

1. सरस्वतेः (ः)।
कलिपतत्त्वान्तोपसंहार्यम्, तथा व्यवस्थानिकोशचतुर्याचार्यांतरभुंपुरसंहारेष्व, अ-
कलिपतत्वादिति पूर्वपक्षसुक्राण्य सिद्धान्तितम्।

3.1832 अन्नमयादिकं विचारु नानुपन्नेवयम्, प्रयोजनासायाम। न सुखिः
प्रयोजनम्: तस्या: सर्वंतरपरिसर्यगूढ़कृष्णवधायनसाध्यत्वात। किमयं तस्माः
अन्नमयाविकृतीनम्? आध्यात्मार्थम्, आधेषुवेदेनार्थेन ध्यानावधायनम्,
आदर्श सर्वोक्त्तत्त्वादित्यत्वात् भवतीति तत्ततिएकत्तरसौम्यमयादिकोण्डीते-
नम्। अतो भूतातिश्रस्वसतिःअयोजनसर्वोक्त्तत्त्वादित्यत्वात् हद्ध्वमक्तिश्रम-
पूर्बंकर्त्तावधायकारुणामात् प्रागैतिहासिकवधितेनान्नमयादिकममुनेवयम्।

3.1833 नन्नमयाधिकं न केवलमुक्तविश्वासिनेवनान्नमुनेवयम्, किन्नु ध्यान-
कार्याणुपस्यान्तरबं गुणावधितेनापि, गुहालेखन निरूपितत्वात्; अतो दृष्-
रविविशयम् ग्रहणमर्मावतःविविधरूपोंकृत्तां व्रजाभुस्त्यानायामः व्रजपु-
रवहलपुण्डरीकाणुपस्यानामितभ्रमाध्यायांसुन्यां ध्यानकोडे नित्यम्—— इति
चेत्स, तेषु प्रतिपूर्वस्योपदेशः आत्मेशात्मश्रद्धायानान्। यथासंवर्ध्यः
शरीरस्वरूपमॊनैतृज्ञरूपम् अचेतनास्युः; तद्व तेषां ध्यानकोडे व्रजपुराबिविदु-
सन्नेतरता स्वात्। नन्नमुनेः; ते यज्ञाय्यविधातारो ग्रहणविषयुःन्त्रा बिधानेऽनुः: चेतन-
बिधाय:, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः चेतन:न्त्रा बिधायः, ये अथवा भिक्षुकापि "ग्रहणविषयुः

1. आन्तरयम (O)
शिक्षाधृतिनिरीक्षणः ।

त्वासनाधानविद्यां गुहातः द्वायवर्तार्थमानविन्द्रोक्तर्मार्गानि यथास्थिरि तथा तेपामुनसनन्धानामाच्छलकर्मकमुः । अन एव नृभाविविदोरिति परम्। इति श्रुत्युक्तः फलं प्राप्तज्ञातो तद्नसनन्धानकमुः तत्त्वं प्राप्तः "एतत्समयः।" इवाचि-वाक्यं शून्यते । तथापि गुहातः द्वायवर्तः कमुः नियुक्तसंहरणसिद्धानावित्तकमुः तः उपायसनन्धामा साधनाविवरणः ।

गुहाताशिविविद्वारुसनाथागायोगायो-गृहानिष्ठ्यातुसनाथानस्त्रियविविद्धित्वादि शिवयानार्थमभावानं भाषणं कर्ममध्ये नासनान्याये पूर्ववर्धमानायुवक कर्मसमयानं अनुसङ्गोऽविवाहानं विवाहानं तदन्तन्त्रं

"एततुकः भवसंध गारि नाबांसी बरे।

नाबांसीकार्यव्रुपाणि से से संहर्ष्य कारण।

युक्तसंहरणसो योजयेत्वर्मेद्रे।"

इति तथैव प्रतिपादित्वातः। एवं च शिवयानार्थमभावानं गुहाश्रम- लेन वर्तितानमभयानं स्मरणोत्तमविविद्धानमयानं श्रीदेविगुन्युवरं नात्र विविद्धानमयानश्वरोऽविवाहायस्यास्यामायामा बाधाविविद्धं द्वीतीयशाश्वति च शिवागमं योगायायवस्तुत्वानुसारानाः इर्वतावत्वाशिवकमयपति श्रीविविद्धं द्वितीयशाश्वति शिवानां च कर्मोऽनसनन्धानं अनंपूर्वपुरुषार्थोक्तर्मानोऽत्तरायकां शिवासम- नहये परमणुयोक्ति च प्राणीं मानविवर्ति परमणुयोक्ति शिवाकविविद्धित्वादि- न्तत्र क्षत्र्यानं कार्यमूः । न दु स्मित्वा नासनाकाले तस्यानमाच्छलान्तरत्वनि ध्वनि

तथ्यमूः।

नन्दवि सति उज्जात्साहित्यमभाषी तस्य ध्वनि । च्यातः । सन्तपतपरि- ३'३८३१

लागविविद्धित्वानातः । नाव्शमन्त्यत्विविद्धम् । इवाचि-वाक्यं शून्य सन्तपत्तिक नाव्शमन्त्यत्विविद्ध- द्वेः नायविविद्धानमभावातपियार्तेन हयान्तरतं साधित्वार्थमस्मभयान्तवियार्तेन ।
न चानन्दस्यवश्यते स्वक्षणवाचकितः उमायाः: शिवाभिन्नतपरिधागविचे तद्वियत्वप्रसारिति बाच्चमुः, अनंतोदिदुः श्रुतस्यात्मशाख्ययन्नदयेनुष्म्वतिरेषु दुःखविशेषेन तद्वादानन्दद्वालमोऽधिपति जीवत्वीचित्रवदिति चेत्

3.18332

येव ान्नदमये आत्ममहं गं परस्माविषयं न तवस्याद्विष्ठित: जीवा जीवाविषयम्, उत्तरान्नन्मयादिभुपसंक्रान्तेष्वानन्दसयुपसंक्रान्त-शह्योपसंक्रितवान्तोरक्षभावेन तद्वारेऽयुत्तिकितवायणात्। तथा च

“आत्मा जीवे धृतिए धे ख्याव ात्मानि।” इति जीवपरसाधारणवेतालुस्यात्मशाख्यस्य यथाहस्येष्यां गं युक्तम्। न चानन्दश्यामस्यशाख्य जीवविषयवेष्टिनितं दृष्टिनित ग्रापाध: शाक्नीयः। “आत्मा आकाशसंभुवं” इत्यत्र जगाधारणविस्तरम् तथा जीवविषयत्वयोनिपरसामविषय- त्वोपपते: ग्रापाधावाचकम् हिज्योभयभासत्विनिषिद्वत्। तस्मादभावाः: शिवाभिन्नतवात् तद्वादानकान्त सन्तुसंधानां न विशेषते।

3.18333

नन्देववास दमयशाख्याकारः सक्तवेतानचेतननप्रभकारः वेतान्नपुप: गतायाः। श्के: शिवामे तदान्ननानां सर्वेशमापि चेतनानां शिवामेश्यानिवारणीत्वात् अन्नसमवादेश्योग्णानां वश्यानां पूर्वपरसाधयोः: परमात्म:-

3.18334

परतयं कठोभन्नवात्रेवनानवायादिपि शिवामेवेत्रीत्वे: तेथान्नुमावाचं शिव- व्याकारेऽसुन्नानमविहितिमिति चेत्

न, “शिव एको ध्येवशिष्यवेव: सर्वसंस्थपरिष्वित्” इति शिवस्यवध्येयत्वावधारणात्। तस्यायतारागः प्रक्रतिमशाख्यविषयते हि कलङ्क विषयः

्यात्! नाचेतनानेः प्रक्रतिमशाख्याविष्कारितेऽवतेतरानेः वा, अन्यश्चस्य सर्व: शाख्यशिष्यवाचायात्। इती काशिचिन्देशोपकाः विवाह तद- 

नन्दसंस्थानायेः “समाधिपिरवाचे शीले” इति वाक्ये अन्यस्थत्वाचारस्य प्रतिद- 

योगिनिरुद्धेऽवे वैशेषिकाक्षात्राध्येय वैशेषिकाक्षप्रत्वबन् प्रतियोगिनिमूलविश्वस-
हस्तचेतनान्तरपरत्वस्य, तद्वापि वृद्धिस्वरुपादिरूपविनाशपरत्वस्यावदस्यावयनाभाबान्, सर्वेश्वरसमभव्याःहारायुगस्यार्धारा वृद्धिस्वरुपादिरूपविनाशपरत्वस्य असज्जातेन निवेदितयेक्यात्, चतुर्दशार्णाम् अम्बिका ब्रह्माण्डाभिषेकलोकन तद्विषय- तेउपयुपपरपतितील्याः । तस्मादन्तुः शिवादिच्छत सनन्त्य परिलोके निश्चितं ; किंचिद् श्रापं मेधनेन प्रतीयमानस्य । अते एवं जलसिद्धात्रू शिवोद्दसमस्ती शिवाभवेतनामुनोपन्यास स्वामनो न परिलोक इति प्रतिष्ठा- यायम् **अन्योन्तर आत्मा** इति अवगाहिष्ठीभवान्ति शिवान परस्परस्थापि रेणातीर्तिनिवार्यार्थाः परिलोकः । उत्साहान्तु तथापि **“परं स्वयमः”** इति आसासानिविषये**स एको ग्रन्थं आद्यतः”** इति धर्मेनांसाधारण च भेदः प्रतीयते, तथाप्यसनन्त्यपेन निरालितायान्तनन्दरपेन च ना भेदत्तिति; नत्त्व- स्विष्कामके चतुरन्दरपेन; नेन तु भेदेणाभेद एव प्रतीयते **“पुरुषं क्रम- पिक्षितमू”** इति सर्वेविधायुपमांवेणाराणाद्विषेक मेण (ः ३. ३. ११) सम- चित्तवेन तत्र क्रमपिक्षितमितयेत दिवसायाविनिविषयाः श्रीमणवेनान्तनन्दरपेन रूपयं रूपमणज्ञातिमिति शिवाशक्तिमेकोवर्जित्यानान्तरम् । तस्मादभावा इव शिव- भानकान्ति नान्तनमणान्ति नान्तनान्ति नार्येन कार्यितमि। एवमेवत्रेविषयमुहम्मते**“आध्या- नाय्य प्रयोजनाभावाः”**, “आत्मशत्रांब”, “आत्म्योद्विनिरविलयं- रात्”, “अन्यप्राविति चेतन स्वादवधारणाः” इति चतुर्मिति: सूत्रः (ः ३. ३. १४-१६) प्रवर्तितम् ।

**अन्तर्नमधयवर्ण विच्छिन्नः** परमात्मा शिव एव, न ततो भिन्नताः हेम-३.१८३३५

यथायें: तद्वायं साधनावर्षेवाव्यक्तियो वर्णित: । न च तद्वायं साधनावर्षेव: पर- मात्मा शिव इति आनन्दमयाविषयार्थमप्रात्मात्माकालाकालिन्यान्तरमयः परमात्मा- त्रसाधनपरम, नानानन्दमयाविष्कारितित तद्विषयकारणस्तिरीर्षेवकालिन्यान्तरे चि- च्छिन्नः: परमात्मार्थर्थसाधनपरस्मिति वाच्यम्, प्रथमप्रार्थणे आनन्दमयः परमात्माविषयान्तरमयाविषयार्थम् (ः १. ५. १२) एव सिद्धान्तेनात्म वस्तुभिन्नः.
नस्त्राणपेशितत्वात्; आन्तर्वाचारिकरण व्यतिक: पश्च एव भाष्यकारारम्भत
इति जन्मादिसूलेण (३. १ २) स्पष्टवमवगततः। तस्मादाध्यायानाधी-
करणे (३. २ १४-१६) भाष्यकारं: शक्ते: शिवामेद: प्रसाधित इत्ये-
tतत्समवधानसमेव।

3.1834 तथा "इश्वरकर्मणेपश्चादात् स: " (३. २ १२) इत्यवरकरणे-
षुष्ठ तत्त्रा: शिवामेदेवो वर्णित:। तत्र हि "एवेत् सर्वकाम परं चापरं च
ब्रह्म यवदेशाः।" इत्यादी सर्वकामप्रभोतरसन्दर्भेण एकमात्रभ्रणवोपसानस्य
tतत्रथममात्रात्मकक-प्रापणीसमुद्भोक्त्रारस्यहिसाप्रभणवोपसानस्य इत्र-
tीषमात्रात्मकक्युब्धापणीतातुरक्षोक्त्रारस्यहिसाप्रभणवोपसानस्य
चाबिधाय यवदेशायते "व: पुनरेति बिमार्गण ओढ़रण परं पुरुससमिष्ठायीतः ढूढः यथा पादोधस-
स्वच्छा विनिकृष्णते एवं हृदे स पापसना विनिमुक्त: स सामिबिनहठीयते ब्रह्म-
कों स एतसामायीवचनात् परातपरे पुरिश्यं पुरुपमीक्षते।" इति, तत्र ब्रह्म-
कों: परन्नाण: शिवस्य छोक: तास्मानीश्वरीय: पुरुष: शिव इति सिद्धान्तोभिमत:। तद्वर्त्तमहूँ त्राद्योकों=विगुणोकों; "श्रीमरेतिष्ठ जगुजम्-
रन्त्योऽखिता सामिभ्यंतरतः क्रयो वेद्यथाने।" इत्युक्तार्थिसमाहिके तदन्त्यंतरम्ये
"विगुणोः परम् पदं सवा पदवृत्ति स्वरूपः।" इति मन्त्रेण विगुणोऽके प्रति-
पन्नाश्व विद्धनाधिविष्यत्वस्य तस्किन्तु त्राद्योऽके प्रतिभाष्यमात्रत्वात्; अत-
स्नानिर्भीतीच्छयौः पुरुषो विगुणेऽर्ति पौर्णपञ्चमस्य सिद्धाते तद्व-
3.1835 सुवाद्युवृद्धसंवन्धिनारायण इत्ये क्रमः "या तुक्त विगुणोः परम् पदवृत्ति तत्र
प्रपञ्चाकाराकर्ममयं हिन्नित्विशेषवाच्यानेव विगुणोः परम् पदोऽकपुरूस तदेव
शिवामेन्यं परं पन्नाश्वविरोधः; यतो विगुणशिवोऽधायानानिनिमित्त्योरवस्याभ-
मेमन्तरे स्याम्बेद्यो नाशि।" इति।

3.1835 अत्र शिवलोकः विगुणोरिपि मन्त्रायुपसांविषयमानस्थानोऽथ तस्य नम:-
शिवलोकविषयत्वमेव वर्तु युक्तम्। न तु शिवचिपलच्चम्। अत्र एव—
“सोकथनः पारसामोनि नाद्रिणौः परसं पदम्” इति कठवहीमन्त्रस्मि शिवोक्तिविषयतमू " कार्थ्य बाद्वारिस्त्र गत्युपनेिः" इतविधिकरणः (व. २. ३. ६) आचे बगितम्। तत्त्विग्नेऽगिति मन्त्रस्वेनद्राध्ययोऽर्धिताऽवलम्बनेऽनूणविषयसुपपादविदितात्मकेन। न हि प्रपंचाकारणावस्थितिसद् विषयोः शिवः साहास्त्रुपायपरि भाष्याकारबिध्वस्तः। किन्तु शिवशक्तिरुपः परमानन्दः। तत्त्वात्साहास्त्रुपायपरि नत्त्व शिवशक्त्यक्ष्यापरस्परः विसेच हि प्रकृतविधिकरणः (व. १. ४. २३) भाष्यादिधि प्रतिपादितम्।

तस्मादित्यथमुद्याभाष्यायथः कर्मीन्यः-- "प्रपंचाकारत्वसम्बन्धे प्रच्छिन्नः ३१८५२
रतिश्यायाननन्दस्मां विषयोः परसं पदः रूपम्" इत्यनेन जगद्दाराकारपरिभाष्यक्तविषयवस्याप्रकृतिभूता विषयाक्तिरुपः। नैव परंशिवशेषोक्तत्वाधि। वर्तत हि तेन तत्त्विग्नेऽगिति मन्त्रस्य शिवशेषोक्तिविस्तः दृश्यं भवति। "तदेव शिवाभियोऽधेयं परं ब्रह्म" इति तस्यः शिवशेषोपाविभिज्ञान्यूत्तदर्षे। नतु अर्थभिधान- विरोधस्मां तत्त्विग्नेऽगिति मन्त्रस्य शिवशेषोकारतापायविषयक्तिविन्यासात् वक्तव्यम्। विन्यासः शिवशेषोपाविभिज्ञां तत् नोपपुष्प्ये— इत्यादिः शास्त्रविदेशोपनिशदेन तत्त्वोऽग्युते भूविभिज्ञ् "यते विषयशिवोः" इत्यादि वक्तव्यम्। इत्यमेत् शास्त्रविश्लेषणः— विषयोः परसं रूपं शिवशक्तिरित्य- दुरुपम्, पुराणविद्यासाधिश्रुति विषयोः: शिवाभिमर्यावेष्वेव बहुवा प्रतिपादित्वा- विश्वा। निर्यायं परिभाषोऽनेन वाक्येन सूचितः— यथो विषयोः: शिवात् स्वरुपमेवो नासि, तत् एव विषयवस्तुप्रकृतिमूलाया: शास्त्रविदेष्यात् स्वरुपमेवो नेयत्वे, कृपेनुराधिश्रुति शिवस्य शाश्वर्द्धिणोंईव्याप्रतिपादनवृत्ती- नाशेति।

यथा "तदेव शिवाभियेयं परं ब्रह्म" इति भाष्याकारक्ष्यायम्बि- ३१८५३
प्रायः— पुराणविद्यासाधिश्रुति सकलवेदान्तप्रतिपाठ्य सर्वकारण सुरक्षायं परं

1. एकुण्या विवेक इति प्रतेय (Mv; O).
श्रवण विषोगेर पूर्णिमि विषोः: परमं पद्मिनि विश्वास्यं परमं पद्मिनि
च तत्र तत्र प्रतिपादिते तथा महाभारते सोक्ष्यन्ते नारायणाय शूरवते—
नारायणे ग्रहशत्रपाये काळां कन्यां तस्या नृणमणसमे तन्मुखांश्वर्तमाय
1. रत्निकुंभिताज्ञानः आदिविशंसदशायां शिक्षा मणि भारत: पुरुषार्थां तां
प्रस्तुतिगीत्य सुनयं तामेव गितांशः हृदयां श्रुण्यं सतिनयं “का त्वमः”, के
ते त्रथ: पुरुषः, तेषां गात्रेषु विन्दः: के, मूर्त्तेषु ज्योतिः किम्” इति प्रथा
2. “माविन्द्याम्, ते पुरुषः, बलो बनेण्; तदार्जेऽर्न विन्दः: यवत्कलङ्कः: वेदान-
थः, मूर्त्तेषु ज्योतिः: ब्राह्मणलक्ष्मिया विन्ध्यः किमेऽ महाज्योति:, तदुः सर्वायि-
3. दुविज्ञानम्” हत्युषः: तत्त्वयोति: किमिति निर्जनसारं विपरितं भगवन्तरं
विषुमाराध्यं तत: प्रस्तुतं पुरुसाराध्यं भगवत्तमार्गोऽवस्थतः महाः म्या
“विविश्वितं जगन्नाथं मम ज्ञातं तथ्याच्युतं।
तत्रसताद्विषेको योगसंबंधितम तत्स्थानं।”
इति प्रथा

“यहेऽं समं रूपं तदेवानं विरतति तथा।
निर्भवेऽं निरिक्ष्यार्य चुबच्छद्युक्ष्योचना:।
ते मां पद्मिनि सतस्तवं तात्रु पुरुषं यद्विक्षितस्त।”
इसें भागवतोपविष्टं इति। तत्र समं रूपमित्रीमेवदुस्त्रश्च शिवसन्ध्यं
नेतृर्ज्ञये। अत एव समं रूपमित्रीमेवदुस्त्रश्च नारायणाय श्रुतिः
1. “तात्रु पृष्ठर” हत्युषम्। अत एव “प्रत्र ये योगमेवदस्त।” इति
2. “प्रस्तुतं रूपमेवदस्त।” इति च गोकुल भगवतत्व चक्रविवेचन प्रवृत्तयां
3. “विषोः: परमं पद्मः” इति, “विषोः: परमं पद्मः” इति च भारतादिति तस्य
प्रतिपाद्यमां विषुशिवयोऽ

1. रत्न (T) 2. विषितराज्ञान (My; O)
3. यद्व वेष्टिस (My, T); यद्व वेष्टिस (O).
र्येदुदस्त्या अशुचि विशपरेशसावियं द्वारावर्तितमिति। अविद्यापि पश्चे तेन 1 ईशः लाभितर्वाक्षेत्रों चिन्तिके विशामर्तं वार्षिकों भवत्वेव, चिन्तक्षेखरस्य-
विशेषधर्मः चिन्तिके विशामर्तं चेष्टेवाणांति। तथादि चिन्तकी चिन्तकिद्वस्तो मेधायेवानं।

एवं परमेश्वरस्य चिन्तकिद्वस्तनि: तस्या: परमेश्वराभिष्ठतं तथावेः। 3.184
तपितथा तत्स्थात्तं दुःसत्वेववित्त्वेवतस्य-नेवेत्तं दुःसत्वेववित्त्वेवतस्य ताबे निदेहितमम। तथादि
संधृष्ट्विदीर्वे—

"चिन्तकिद्वस्तो परमेश्वरस्य विस्वाय वेदन्येकार्के भूक्ष्यबान्होऽवाूऽवाॆ। ॥
सत्त्वान्धुतथा ग्यात्र परा भावनं शक्तिस्वविचित्रः तथे ॥
संपरिग्रह संस्कृत्यविश्वांभावत: शाक्त्यांहंगामाः ॥
सच्चत्त्वमां शरीरार्थं भावनं चिन्तकिद्वस्तं त्रितीये। ॥
इत्येवं कथाविन्धते केविधुपरे श्रावङ्गसङ्गतुपु:।
काश्वाचिच्छुवि समस्तं च विषुपां नेष्टं च भ्रुषुभन्ते ॥
कार्याल्पक्षिविशिष्ठभूमिपु तथा तत्त्वत्त्वं निशुण्डे
तवे तत्त्वपरेवद्वाश्यविषये व्यालोणिते नेष्टं ॥
"

एवं पद्रपाबधाकायापि— "आनन्दः विपयात्तुभयो नित्यत्वं चैति
सम्पि ध्वम: अप्राणत्वेदपि वैत्यायात्तुभभामसमनं ॥
इत्युक्त: अवमेश्वरार्वेदार्थं। 3.185

एवं स्वहुपाबधान्या एव चिन्तिके: व्यवहारविद्यायां धर्मेष्वममज्ञाति
गार्गिश्चार्भविद्वर्हविचारिकुरु धर्मेष्वदिम्मार्वाविद्वंद्वर्हविचारिकिष्ठोपि युक्त: एव।
यथा: जन्माग्निः ३ (व. १. १. २) "स परानन्दः श्रोतति प्रशुत्वायां श्रद्धा-
व्याधोङ्गपरिष्ठते" इत्युक्तः तथाय: आनन्दवल्लयम् "स एको श्रद्धा आनन्दः।"
इति, "आनन्दः ब्रह्मणो विब्राहः" इति च ब्रह्मधमत्वेऽनोक्तवात् व्याब्धाकरिकाचैवकिन्तु नामानाविकवर्णामूलप्रचारिकां नेत्रविभिन्नारुपणे, न तु सर्वेषेष भेदाभिमाणे। एतम् "तद्वन्नार्तवावात् तत्त्वपदशेषः भास्वत्" इति लूिे (म्. २. २० २९) भर्मणानवाचक्कलहव्यानां धार्मिकप्रचारिकालोकारके के नेत्रवया।

3.191

एवं च ब्रह्मचिन्ताचे: सकलवेदनानेतनतप्रशाकारात्वं तस्य एव ब्रह्मचरुपल्यं तद्वन्नार्तवावात्वरत्त्वभवन्तं व्यात्रो निविकारवाचित अर्थविगुतप्राचृतायार्यं पन्नगं निर्गण्ये निष्प्रम्पत्रं जीवाधिकारं शुद्धाकृतरुपं ब्रह्मीत्वे तथा परस्मिस्त्रात् इति असुमर्थः हृदवंगमस्त्वेऽ। तथा हि—चिन्नेच्वेत्वेशे तस्य एव तद्वन्नार्तवावात्वतं च ब्रह्मन: स्वभिषा युमण न सत्त्व; फिन्तु स्वयमेष कल्पितेषेष्व गुणविद्धमयस्येन। बस्तुतो निगण्येष ब्रह्म—इलेवा स्वयम् सिद्धेन। नहाेवें सुख्यो गुणगुणिभाव उपस्थते। न चाभेद इवः गुणगुणगुणिभावाचोपपादको भेदोऽवधाचेत्येऽक्षक हि इवः शब्दश्चः। आरम्भाविकरण (म्. २. १. १५) साध्याभिषु विरोधेन भेदाभेदङ्कस्य प्रत्यक्षार्थस्य।

3.191

न च भ्रमवेद इवाचारायाम् माते गुणगुणिनोः भेदाभेदः च भ्रमपतिनिचिक्षेपेऽस्युपगतोऽक्षित। न च तेनापि गुणगुणगुणिभावनिविवेष्कतयुपगतत्वेन ततो भेदाभेदः। तस्य भर्महृिे भेदरूपवाचाराविकवारिकामहाक्षम्बुप्तत्वेन ततो भेदाभेदावतस्याभिप्राप्तिसंस्कृतः। विशेषस्य भेदनिर्देशस्यकल्पकार्यिनिविवेष्कते विशेष हि पयायेन भेदस्याभिकारणे। अत पवान्नार्तवावात्त्वमयं स्मरये—२

"भेदो नौसे भवेषतो इति, सत्य तत्त्वु पिनयतां पदार्थां तत्त्वयोऽभेदकृपते, तदार्थायाम् न्यायमुदाभायाम्। कथा भेदशालकानां व्यपदेशाः

1 वत्तू (T, My, and O)
2 Anuvyākhyā, II, २, p. २५ (Sarvamūla edn.)
मेहळीनीं विशेषाद्यं यज्ञवाचस्यासिद्धिः, तथा सत्यपि नासिन्नमनस्तवस्यापि विशेषेष्ठेष्ठ निवाहः। किन्तु किं पेशामेद्रायुपगमन? ” इति यद्यलं कृत्वा,
“विशेषस्य मेहळीनीं यज्ञवाचस्यासिद्धिः।” प्रायः व्याहस्य तत्वसाधिनीं सकलः वड़ाकार्यार्थे। विशेषायं वेदिः एव स्वाम्, न तत्त्वसाधिनीं। स्वाम्। “इति परिहारः। इति।” तत्समाधुपाविष्टः। तत्त्वसाधिनीं। “अनुभवक्षेत्रायं चेतन्यवाचस्य स्वामिनीं भासन्ते।” इति पद्माणांकृतांकः। एवानिकितं इत्यतत्त्। सुधर्मेऽव।

तथा सकल्प्रप्ताङ्काराया। चिन्छकः। ब्रह्मायणमेद्रायुपगमन वियन्ति- 3.192
परम्। तद्विष्ठ इति सिद्धिः। अन्यथा वियन्तिदेवनिवः। तत्परिणामस्य थ्युपगमे। तद्विभिन्नतरणी। भ्राणो निविष्काराणमेद्रायुपगमविरोधयात्।।

नन्तः। ब्रह्माण्डार्णक्नाये।। तात्कितवाच्येश्वर गारीङ्करणं दुःस्वाभावनां। विश्वाराणन्द- 3.1921
वल्यादिनिऊस्य धर्मेंसिमम् भावान्तन्यनिभावाण्व। निदिनाह्वः। व्यवहारिको। भेरोंस्यवाचस्यायुपगमन्त्व। इति। तत स्व चिन्छकः। परिणामित्वायुपगमे।
अपि। ब्रह्माण्डार्णक्नाये।। निविष्कारतत्वस्याविकाराणम्यः। धर्माण।। जीवनभ्राणो- रसेद्वपि। कालवृकंकांकः।) तद्विभिन्नत्वस्यावाह्वः। चेतु। तथापि। परस्मुकिन्त।
उस्वायं। व्यवहारिकभेरनिदिनाया। जीवसत्वकेहं। कालशाखांवद्रुवतु। वियन्तिदेवनिवः। थ्युपगमेश्वाय।
निन्दिनेतः वर्णो वर्णो वर्णविभोविभिन्नमिलिती। तत्समात। सक्षेपवाचस्य्मोकारीवात्। भावे। परिणामवाचस्यायं व्यवहारश्रृढी। कृमोपासनां।
दिनिवता वर्णो त्रस्तायं। तत्त्वसाधिनाधिशिवितत्वसध्यं। चेति। भ्राणो। निध्यपन्नतः
क्रमेऽवानिकितं इत्यां। सुधर्मेऽव।।

चिन्छकः। सक्षेपवाचस्याकारत्वस्तु। सक्षेपवाचस्याकारत्वस्तु। 3.1922
स्यायुक्तकेश्वर चेतन्यपन्नस्तु। वियन्तिदेवाविशेषवत्। न सिद्धिः। तथा

1. अतः स्यायुक्तः। “व्यवस्था। यथा मेहळीनीं।” इत्यादि।।
2. “स्यायुक्तः।” इति। स्यायुक्तः।।
3. स्यायुक्तः, अतः २. पा. २. १०।
सति तस्य तत्स्मानात्मित्वम् युक्तिकर्मांबध्यार्थाभाबामस्माचारूपार्थ, नित्यस्य तत्स्य श्रवणे श्रवणे सार्थकारूपाभूतिविरोधव्रतस्तत्त्वः।

3.1923

नन्दु प्रक्ष्यविकारः "परिणामात्" इति सूचे (व. १. ४. २७) चिद्र-चिद्रविकारः परिणामादित्वे व्याख्यातम्। परिणामवोकोः च शिविरतावः। 

सत्यस्य तथा प्राप्ते परिणामवोकोक्षतिवधर्मसः चिद्रविकारः चिद्रविकारः सत्यस्यापि चिद्रबिकिष्ठार्थामानसु क्षणात्मकानुसरणोक्षतितिवधर्मसः। यत्र: शृङ्खलविरोधस्य नियत्तबं व्यवस्थापितम् "नताम अस्तनित्यवच तत्स्य:।"

हेष्टिनि चिद्रसि निग्रहपठेः जीवानिविष्टं शुभादित्तथापि श्रवणीति आचार-योगानामशिष्टात्मित्वेत्तैव निर्खलाः।

3.2

नन्दे वेपाविहारात्मां चिद्रबिकिष्ठाः चाचायोऽर्खणां सत्यस्याद्वैतानबधितोऽधितामता। 

बिशेषे किमथे प्रथमाचार्यवस्य इति चेदुच्यते। निर्खले श्रवणात्मकारानु खलु श्रवणाभाबाविष्ठाः। तत्स्कारतत्स्कारशिष्ठविद्यास्थवस्यः। तत्स्नेत्तत्तत्तते निद्ध्यास्वनयोऽनु बुद्धिस्थिरेऽसु न रहस्ते, तेषा तत्र बुद्धिस्थिरेऽहस्तविभवः। 

क्षणिकास्मिनन्तरोपाध्यायानाथेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थेश्वरार्थे।

तस्मात् मसाविध्यामन् "स नो तुष्या शुष्या सर्वनकतु:।" इति तुर्यिते, "इत्यतौ: द्वारापि महानविष्ठेठः" इति व्यक्तेत। अत्र एवाहुः खण्डनकराः।

"इहद्रातुमहारक्षणा पुष्करस्माहृत्ववसा ।

महाभाष्यमात्राणां द्विगाः यद्य जातेन।" इति।

इहद्रातुमहारक्षणा तत्वपासनाभवः।

"व्याक्तिररोपनार्यं नरः ब्रम्हा परस्वात। तत्तानार्य व्यायामन प्रसीद्वति महेश्वरः।"
शिश्नानुसार निर्देशित: । 

इस्ती पुराणवचनात्। अविकररकालं तद्विनिर्धारितोपयोगितविद्वारसिद्धं
तदेश परं श्रद्धा नात। परस्मय तारिकं कुणमस्तीती प्रतिपाद्यक्रिया
चार्यंतदागुणेन विभाज्यतावक्यात् अत्तमुत्त्राणं च छोजनापृद्वंशायस्मिन्
भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम्।

ननु लस्मिन् भक्तिविद्वायस्यश्रुतिः 
शृंगारमुद्रितपुराणश्रवणम् पञ्चतद्रीयमहि। ।
मविशेषप्रवणप्रमेय वुक्तम्; न तु ततः परस्मय वस्तुमयः न्यायानुगृहीत-
वेदान्तायत्तवेण स्वाभिमानं सहापुराणप्राप्तमवयोध्वस्य तद्रीयह्रुपा-
लस्मिन् श्रुतिमिश्रितमिष्टमिष्टमध्येत। पूर्वस्याथिष्ठ अध्वेणानिष्ठं क्षेती इत्यः; यत् दूरे
कस्मिन्हद्वियुक्तेऽशङ्कारः प्राप्तः: तदवेत सूत्रस्वमेव वदादिकारस्वयम्
तत्रानन्मनमानि शृंगारमूलिरोधेऽप्रवृत्तं प्रयत्नं तत्र पुरवस्तु प्रथमप्रणजाति
निरूपण पूर्वस्वपनेऽवयस्यथापनम्।

यथा कल्याणेऽशृंगारमुद्रियमरोधमध्येऽसूत्रशिल्प संन्यासं दृष्टान्तवता तत्र
प्रथम प्रवृत्त निरूपण तदविकारविशेषणमाध्ववैयोध्वस्यतःकरणायमेऽविद्वार
कर्माविकारस्वमुक्तेऽशङ्कारः सूत्रस्वमेव तत्र पुरवस्तुस्मिन्। तथा
हि आपस्तयायायः—— "अथ पुराणे इत्यक्ष्वादःहर्तिं——
अध्वेणानिष्ठस्याथिष्ठस्य वे प्रजामीपिरं रघुयः।
दृष्टिशेषयाम्यः: पन्नां तं इमशानानि मेष्टिरे ॥
अध्वेणानिष्ठस्याथिष्ठं वे प्रजां नेपिरं रघुयः।
कष्टेणाविकारः: पन्नां तं अभ्युतवं हि कल्पते। ॥

इत्यौवर्तेऽस्माः प्रशंसाः। अथापि सद्र्शप्रशस्यमो भवति। यथा वर्ते
प्रजावाने दुःरोधाने मनोजवत् यदानवर्त्येऽवृत्तम। पद्माच्छुल्लिः प्रक्षप
कष्टेणाविकारः विश्वात्मानांश्रमानेतानं क्रियते। कैलाविद्वृत्तां हु वैद्यः: प्रमाणमिति
निष्ठा। तत् यानि वृृत्येऽश्रीक्षितप्राृत्यम। पपाठमप्रस्थव्यम्। युजुलाविचः:

1 श्रमित (A, Mal.)
कायमित्रित तैविरिध आचारोप्रमाणांमतिं मन्यते। यदू इतिमादमुच्यते नानाक्रमणेनेनाते पुरुषसंस्कारों विधीयते। अतः परस्परन्तः फलं स्वर्गं-शांब्रं शून्यं। अथायतः प्रजातिमृत्तमानवर्त्त आह— प्रजामुः प्रजायसे, तदु ते मन्त्रायुक्तमिति। अथापि स एवायं विषुतः पुराणं मात्रश्चीतोपक्षम्यते।

दृश्यते चापि सार्थं वेदवेदवान्त्यं। ते शिष्येषु कर्मसं वर्तमाना: पूर्वेषां सांपरायोण कोळं सागरं च वर्ययति। एवमचरोवरः परेषाम्। आभूतसं-ष्रवाते ष्ट्रद्वित। ‘पून: सरसं ग्रीजार्थं भवान्ति’ इति महिष्यतुरुपणे। अथापि प्रजापतेवर्तनम्— तर्यं विछ्वं भवांच्छं प्रजाति श्रद्धा तपोजममुः प्रचारम्।

य एतांि कुष्टे तैरिसत्तह स्मो रजो भूमा भवस्तेवदृश्यत्त्वशास्त्रमिति। तत्र ये पापक्रमः त एव ध्वनिन्ति; यथा पुर्णं वस्ते त। न परानं दिस्ति। नास्तिसिद्धं होकर कर्मभिसमस्तं विहृतो, तथा परसिद्धं कर्मसङ्कोः। तदेवेन वेदविवृग्नें। प्रजापतेवेदीवामिति सश्रोतम्य। तत्र ये पुष्पक्रमः

तेषां प्रकृतम: प्राणवर्तनः उपस्थितन्ते प्राचु प्रमाणवेन तपस्या वा काधिक: सहरीरोऽभावनां दोषे नृति सञ्चालप्रियद्विरूपस्त्र्य: स्त्रात्त, न हु तत्त्वाच्छत्व-मात्रमाणाम्।

1) इति महाद्वा चलनं पूर्वोऽत्तरपरिप्यां सत्यात्मस्व यथाविद्वेषः विकपाकालवेदविवृत्तेनात्रामाणार्थिकां ग्रहिते, प्रहस्त्यं रस्त्रमालाक्तवक्षण्यं तवपुराणतवक्षण्यं सत्यात्मस्व यथाबिद्वेशः

2) परिष्ठ्यं, पुजारीवादिकतं स्थानाभावं चेनतत्त्वुपश्चायिभिर्येषां निश्चितस्व यथाविद्वेषं शास्त्रं वृक्षा परिष्ठ्यं, सञ्चालप्रियोद्विरूपकिं यथाप्रथमक्षण्यं प्रहस्त्यं वेदविषुः चेन-केनापि संपाद्यितं शक्तेत इत्याभासातः तक्षत्वमृत्तमृत्तमृत्युपपथं, यथाविद्वेषं कर्मकाल्यानंतः गाहेऽध्वस्त्यं प्रश्वतिनेनादेवतेरत्वाणि: मन्त्राविकारणामनं।

1 आपस्तम्बसमूहम्, 11, 9, 23, 24.
2 कर्मसः साध्यं (O)
करणश्रुद्धया क्रमेण चंद्ररागशिरस्वर्याय गार्हस्थ्ये तद्वच्चवस्थापनं ज्ञातम्। तेषु
सूत्रेऽु अभावाधीनस्य अति चेतयः। अमृतत्वं हि कल्पत इति अभूतल्याय
कल्पन्त इत्यतः। अन्तर्य खण्डपित्म यकारोपणं छान्तसः। दृष्टंमवानः दिति वेदं प्राचार्य
इत्यतः। ते श्रेष्ठाजिनः पुनः सभें बीजार्थां मद्वनतीति
प्राप्तप्राप्तातिर्देश्ये: पारस्तीकिते: स्त्रकम्भं: आप्पर्यज्ञ स्वर्य चतुष्प्रति: ते पुनः
सभादो जनत्सुध्यायः प्रजापत्यो भवन्तीति:। तैरिरसह स्म:ै, तैरेव सह
बसाम्:। चंद्रविचार्युदवनश्चावेशः। अस्मलोकशास्त्रित्यतः। नास्यार्थिनः
हृढोक इति। अस्य इत्यकन्चनम् चतुर्थं:। एवं पितार्दिनाः इत्यको पुत्रार्दि-
न्ते:। दुष्कर्मिः: पराग्नक सत्कदिः सतसीतायः।

अत्र तैरिरः आचारो अग्रमाणात्मिति सन्यासां साध्या मूलप्रमाणार्य:। 3.212
हिताचनम्:। तस्य प्रत्यक्षानांत्य-ध्वितिमिति द्वितीयानुक्रमः। स्वयं स श्रावापस्याचारः:।
“चतुर्यां आश्रया:। गार्हस्थ्यं आचार्यकुलं सों एवं बानप्रार्थितः। तेषु “यथापद्येऽस्मितः
वर्तमानः: श्रेयं गण्यति” इत्याध्यान्न:। राणामाय:।
सन्द्वत्रोऽज्ञा।। यथापद्येऽस्मितिक्तया सर्वेष्वपि: सूहस्त्रस्वस्वकः
तम्। गार्हस्थानूकोणेन चतुर्द्वितिकेः:। चतुर्यां इत्युति। एतकारण्या अनीतार्थिनिति
राकरादिः।। एवं स्वचवनविरुद्धो चेष्ट तैरिरः आचारो अग्रमणात्मिति
वचनमू।। “ततः परम्यन्तय फलं स्वर्येश्वरं श्रुतेताः” इति चुदकः। तदवपि
काश्चुश्रवशः सन्यासार्थिनः। तथाभूत्वतृतिवाक्यस्यः तस्य
“अक्षरं है भै चा: मूर्म्यानाजिनः:। मुखं भवति” इत्याविद्वव्ववादमानः।।
 एतो न “ग्रामाय:। जातायसे” इत्याविद्वव्ववादमानः।।
 पितायुगः सूर्येऽव्रहृष्णाय चतुर्धिकं तदत्तसाधनम्।। न हि। वेष्याः। चार्याः
 सत्यमात्माः।।
 तथा पुत्राविचुदकर्मिः:। पितार्दिनाः नरकमाण्यभावचनमापि “पितु-

1. विद्या अध्यायनादिर्मित्रकः (I)
2. तेषु सूत्रेऽु इति वर्माकुपाय:। (सं. सू 2-9-2)
भिक्षु संज्ञांति इत्यादिवचनविरोधविचिन्नयम् । प्रज्ञापतेैवेदीणामिलाविदिशुकस्तु "तेषां तेजेविशेषण प्रवेशयो न विषये"1 इति स्वमेवाप्रस्तम्बाचार्यं श्राकू फलपूर्वता । इद्वं सर्वसापस्तम्बाचार्यर्हानांनामस्थिनम् चा नोकम् ।

किन्तु, संन्यासस्फोटवर्णमात्रसनन्दीनुषय मन्द्रा: तद्दुर्दुर्दश्वदारामाभवेदिः हस्तान्नुषयम् पुनः निवृद्ध अहस्कृतम् वतन्; । ते तथा सापस्तम्बित तदनुमहाधिविषय: "किन्तु सन्न विमलिः विवेकं इमश्रूणि किन्तु: पुनः श्राण्णन इच्छा-स्वं वै त्योजकप्राचारवः:"2 इत्यादिशुतात्तेजोऽनुषय हस्तान्नूषयनां कुतम॥

तथा महामार्तितदिः शालिनिप्रकृष्ण संन्यासस्फकुकम् ॥

"अंैःकाठिको वाहमेककसिन् विन्यये।
चरवे मैत्र सुविष्णुः क्षपिष्ठे कर्मयवम्॥"

इति संन्यासस्वातोऽथावत्यां श्रावधानमुः खुशिगुरं शाति श्रीकृष्णेः संन्यासाध्वं तत्रार्थं
भारतान्त्यं वैराग्यवादस्वामविन्यस्य तदार्थत्वसंकालं करणसुवृत्तायं तं यन्नानि
प्रवर्त्तितुकमेन स्वयमृत्यादिविधारा च संन्यासाध्व चहुः दृष्टां कुतम् । तत
जनकोपास्थानान्तर्गते,

"पन्नपानं पावनं हितवा जनकस्मृतिमतम् ।
तं दुःखं प्रिया मार्थरे भैश्वर्यमाहलक्ष्यन्॥"

इति शिष्योऽपि पावननित्य विश्वेषणं हस्तान्नत: करणसुवृत्तायं कर्ममान्य विश्नुविद्या नान्मोक्षात्माः महामनस्युक्तमतिः विभावितम् ।

तथा सदुप्रस्तरोऽच—

"कषणसि श्रीप्रकृत्य सनो मोर्चो नवेशास्तु ।
अन्यप्रकृत्य मोर्चो तु सेवास्वयं मघत्वः॥"

1 भ. सु. २. ६. १२।
2 Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, II, pp. 836, 837 (Ānandāśrama edn.)
ढ़ि हि अहदबङ्ग्रायथपुरपापेश्येि म "यदहेि विरजनदहेि अहजेि, गुहाणि वनािा" इि, "मक्खण्डि-देव प्राग्रजेत" इि च म सारक्षणुतिमनाध्य तद्भवोध्यानयित्व सत्वम्।

इत्यथेअवाचाइयिसे गुहाणि वांग्रायमुर्काकलितसाधनमार्थमं तुष्टस्वार्थाय थ ३-२१५

tāसाविध्यासनलाकारलावणसम्मतीकांग्रहितो मनः। तदद्ययोगिन सरुणोपासनांग्रामपद्याय गुहाणि वांग्रायथपुरपापेश्येकय अवभमाननितिध्यायसंगत हठान-हठानः तदुलिं चित्रकायमनविगुणन उभयस्तो रा भूविते तदनुसिद्धाङ्ग्ला तं निरुग्नविपयप्रवृत्ते। प्रथ्यान्य सरुणोपासनास्तेि स्थिरया भक्तिा भवित- पितुं वेदान्तानि सरुणे ममनव्यां प्रविष्टेन्तः। । न चेतं तेज समन्व्यमदृश्येन्तम्। कलपसूने "प्रामातु म जावसे" इत्यादिवाक्यसू पुनस्तानो गुळख्राम्फु सत्वासियन्यः एष्टान्तकायपिते निगुणप्रकरण- झारनामपि "एस्यादिभ्रेक्षय प्रशासिे गार्थि सरुणोपासनाति विपुति तिं- ष्टे!"; "सर्वस्य चवि सविर्येशिा:। सर्वस्याधिपति:। इत्यादिवाक्यानं निगु- 

णामतियस्युपार्थतया भविष्यान्यानवतात्तैतिःसत्तात्।। "तत्: परं बिपुहं तत्त्वान्तरं नासि।" इि तु तथाभूतसम्बन्धिकारिश्रायते तदुलिं-सिद्धावेत्यायोस्तिपाय लक्ष्मूिे सनन्वसमनिशः।।

तसो मन्नद्वाधिकारिणं ग्रहि प्रस्थानान्तरं कविस्य चेतन स्वतन्त्रसेि करवः-

विष्णुम्। । तं तु ब्रह्मस्वयं ब्रह्मकालक्षण्।।

विद्युष्म ब्रह्माचार्यस्युपगतिशििाकारे शाक्षस्मर्धकारकारीस्य तस्मां विष्णुसमालकारकारीस्य 

स्वामिको स्वच्छोम् तेषा सुवर्णानुक्षेपितः यथेच्येकयतः। शाक्षस्मर्धकारकारीस्य तेषा सुवर्णानु 

हिन्धुतोमुलम् सुरस्वात्त्वां मूर्खानांविद्याधुरायन्त्रि प्रसवायातम्।।

वैर्मण्डि - प्रभुसुस्वायत्त् ३२ तावर्।। अति तावद्यो तिलय-
विश्वविद्यालयों: 

लघुवल्लभाद्वारों सर्वें संरचनासम्बन्धित च। ब्रह्माण्डस्य हि व्युत्पादकामस्य नित्यलघुवल्लभाद्वारों: प्रतीगमनुर्” इति विश्रुद्ध समुद्रे च ब्रह्माण्ड संरचनस्य व्युत्पादकामस्य नित्यलघुवल्लभाद्वारों: तत्व विचार्यसंरचनस्य ब्रह्माण्डस्य तदुपयोगस्य सुविदितम्। तेन विश्रुद्धब्रह्मचन्द्र समुन्द्रमाणि ब्रह्माण्ड स्वरूपमाणिसाधनमस्यः सह विचार्यमित्या शय आविष्कृतः। तद्युक्ततया जन्मादिपुरुषः (श. भा. १. १. २) जन्मचन्द्रभन्निमित्योपादानतथवर्मं जगत्कारणात्वं विशेषणतया सभुवन्योपक्षणतया लघुवल्लभाद्वारों च लघुवल्लभाद्वारों भिन्नतियम्। शाख्योगिनिलघुवल्लभाद्वारों (श. भा. १. १. ३) समुन्द्रस्य जगत्कारणात्वाभिःसःसः जलभवल्लभाद्वाराकर्षणियां योजनां प्रवृत्तेषु समुन्द्रस्य भिन्नतियम्। शाख्यमाणिभिःसःसःसःसाधनार्थतया योजनान्तर्वर्तमाणिश्च दृष्टिमयू। समन्वयस्थः (श. भा. १. १. ४) पूर्वभवत्रांकेन ब्रह्माण्ड शाख्यमाणिवासुरालाश्च बेदानन्तरप्रसःक्त्व तत्स्य समुन्द्राणिलघुवल्लभाद्वारवेश तासमन् तत्वविषयान्यां वर्णित:।

स च——

“सभुवन्यावाक्यमपीत समन्वितं
भवति निर्गुणवल्लभु सर्वेभ:।
न बल्च निर्गुणवल्लभसमन्वयं
न सहस्ते सभुवन्य समन्वयः॥
सत्यात्मवपुस्तथासिः सभुवन्य ब्रह्माण्ं विचा तथा
तदात्मिसस्यस्य बेदवचस्चतात्म्येमविभिन्धम्।
तेनाबुल्लभस्य बेदवचस्थतात्म्येमन्वाद्यां
भान्यनिलघुवल्लभ: तत्वविषयसं संस्कृतिते भागः॥
इति संक्षेपकशालोककर्तिकायः निर्गुणे सर्वेः बेदानन्तवाक्याः महातत्त्वसं
प्राप्तिः सभुवन्यातत्त्वान्तिको वन्यस्यात: परिवर्तितः। निर्गुणावात्म-रणात्मानामि वाक्याः वर्तमात्त्वात्मप्रद्वंसिनिमित्युन्यविषयिषेः सभुवन्ये।
अवस्थानार्ततत्वम् युद्धन पवित्र। इन्द्रधनुशिरकरणे (शा. भा. १. १. ५) वेदान्तानां साज्ञावामिषत्रधानकारणत्वपरताः निरस्त्र समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येतेः व्रज-कारणत्वपरता प्रस्तावितं। अतः एव तत्त्व स्वाभ्यस्तूपपर्यंतं (शा. भा. १. १. ९) सहिष्णुविनिर्गुणप्रकरणगताति वाक्यान्तरग्रामधारण्येति सत्त्वानेनस्मृतियो गतिमानस्तुत्र भाष्ये (शा. भा. १. १. १०) समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति सत्त्वानेन वैद्यतानां समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति सत्त्वानेन श्रुत्वानेन सम्बन्धायेति (शा. भा. १. १. ११) समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति सत्त्वानेन श्रुत्वानेन सम्बन्धायेति (शा. भा. १. १. १२) समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति सत्त्वानेन श्रुत्वानेन सम्बन्धायेति।

“न तस्य कश्चिद्वित्यस्तिः ठोके
तचाइति नैव च तस्य विक्रमः।
स कारण करणात्विपरिपि
न चास्य कश्चिद्वित्यस्तिः न चाचिपि।”

इति मन्त्र उद्धृतः। तद्वत्नंतरमानन्दमालिकनवाचार्यतरण (शा. भा. १. १. १२) उत्सवसाध्यश्चर्प्य समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति समुल्लानं वर्णितम्।
“विक्रमं हि वधानवस्थेऽति, नामसंधिकारोपाधिकं वाक्यपरित् च सर्वोपाधिकं वर्णितम्।” इत्यावधिना “एवेकेनि वधानवस्थेः पञ्चसिकारोपाधिकं सम्बन्धं चोपाधिकं वेदान्तत्वेऽति” इति परो ग्रंथं आर-स्यायेः। इति यथा “आनन्दमयोद्याचार्यास्तो” (शा. भा. १. १. १२), “सुसमा संवकादवस्यपदेशाय” (शा. भा. १. ३. ८), “अश्रुरसारसरान्तवातूणि” (शा. भा. १. ३. १०), “अद्वियवादशुद्युपको धार्मिकैः” (शा. भा. १. २. २१), “शव्दाधेव प्रसिद्धिः” (शा. भा. १. २. २४), “शुद्धशुद्धकालवेष्टिते” (शा. भा. १. ३. ४२), इत्यादिवेंवै। सत्त्वानेन समुखान्तरग्रामधारण्येति प्रतिविधिस्वूच्चवित्वासिष्ट्वेऽति सम्बन्धाये। इति अन्तं समन्तवः प्रवर्तितः। पवित्रम् “आनन्दमयोद्याचार्यास्तो” (शा. भा.
१ १ २०), "सर्वेच प्रिंसिपोपदेशात" (शा. भा. १ २ १), "हृदय- 
क्षत्रिय" (शा. भा. १ ३ १५) इत्यादिसूत्रैैपरस्कादगृहार्थे विद्यमान-
नियुक्तिके सत्यामात्रसम्बन्धतःवाचनतकस्यांमणुमात्रांशाखिं साहित्याः-
पि ब्रह्मणि तेना च चाहां सम्बन्ध: प्रदर्शितः। अविरोधाद्वायेकपि "तद- 
नव-तत्कालभागणनवाचिंशः" (शा. भा. २ १ १५) इत्यादिसूत्रैै- 
विशेषः इव "न विकिरणातवाचर तथाते च शय्यानि"(शा. भा. २ १ ४),
"न प्रयोजनवलंतानू" (शा. भा. २ १ ३२), "वैपम्यैैपैैे न सांपेष- 
व्याचरातिः दृष्टानि" (शा. भा. २ १ ३५) इत्यादिसूत्रैैसेवायुपादां 
त्वंभत्वितस्तिति भूतोवेदमहकृतविशेषमुख्यात्तिदिनिभुषणशाखिं साहित्याः
पि ब्रह्मणि सम्बन्धिस्वरोधारको वाचिं। साधनात्मकावेयेकपि "आनृवा- 
व्युः प्रधानस्य" (शा. भा. २ ३ ११), "अन्तरोषात त्वंवरोः सांमा- 
त्नद्वायास्थामुपस्थवत्तुकात्" (शा. भा. ३ २ ३२) इति निर्विषेषे 
ब्रह्मणि बानत्थमात्मवेदान्तीस्वादिनास्यमशुल्तवारीनास्यम "कामालितव तथा चायन्ताना- 
दिनिः" (शा. भा. ३ ३ ३९) इत्यादिभिन्वेदिः सूत्रैैपात्मानाय साहित्याः
पि ब्रह्मणि सत्यामात्रवाचिंसूनामानामपरस्कारारी वर्णितः। फलात्मके "आनृ- 
दिनिःसूनेदास्तानू" (शा. भा. ४ १ १), "आत्मति तृपपपर्श्चति भ्रां- 
तिचः च" (शा. भा. ४ २ ३), "आसीनः संभवादः" (शा. भा. ४ २ १ २), "चछत्त 
आसीनः तत्तत्राविशेषात्" (शा. भा. ४ २ २), "तदविगयम उत्तरपूर्वीययोरविषेषविनाशो तदापदेशात्" (शा. भा. ४ २ २), इत्यादिसूत्रैैनिर्णैैै अव्यदानीनम्, समुण्ा उपायनानां चात्रार्थः कायी इत्येक- 
सादायः केतिविविवः समुण्ानिर्णयोयोरविनाशण प्रथापादेषः निलिपितः। हिंदीती 
पौधसुमुणीपात्मानात्मरास्यविद्युष्टचिन्तितारो निर्णयानाद्वायाय 
वेदान्तवेदात्मकाशास्त्रावर्णितः। तत्तत्त्वाबध समुण्ानिर्णयाविद्वामतितिहारः। 
तस्मानानां ग्राम्यः समुण्ा वेदात्मको वर्णितः। चतुष्ये पौध "संप्याचारि-
भावः स्वेत शब्दार्” (शा. भा. ४. २. १) इत्याविद्विविद्विबित्ति
गुणज्ञानित्वायां फलश्चूर्पम् “स्वतःपाद्येव तु तत्त्वातः” (शा. भा. ४. ४. ८)
इत्याविद्विबिकरणः समुखोपायोपायात्वफलश्चूर्पम् च विवेचित्म।

नन्वेसुकरीया मुन्त्राणां समुगुणशास्त्राविचारार्थसम्बन्धत्वमीविपक्षविद्यः ३.२३
शद्राकाश्चैवेतः सर्गुणपूर्व रश्च रश्चर्मसमापनायापदः।
विचारते चेतः किमतिं सर्गुणविभयो आङ्केणायायेः।
मायाण्तरं कृतम्। सूर्याणां काल्यन्यं सर्गुणरत्नयोजनायसमाप्ने।
विभागाविश्वासितश्च चेतः निरुपेणे विश्वासाविद्वियाश्चैषौ
शद्राकाश्चैवेतः काल्यन्यं निरुपर्वत्योजनाय किमसिदत
न उत्तेन चेतुः ब्रह्मः — शद्राकाश्चैं सर्गुणशास्त्राविचारम् वितिनिर्घतम्; न तु तत्त्वराशियः
इति विश्वाविद्विदेशतान्तरशास्त्राविचारसंगनिर्घतम्।

वय्यवि — वहराधिकरणः (शा. भा. १. २. १४) “परमेश्वर एवात्र ३.२३१
वहराकाशों भविनमहतः, न मूताकाशो जीवो वा” इति सिद्धान्तसुपपकम्
“शिवद्वमासिन् ब्रह्म पुरे” इति पूववाक्ये ब्रह्मशब्दे जीव उच्चवे, तत्सः
देहरूपपुर्वत्मकिवाच, अतः प्रकृतः स एव वहराकाशो भवितमहतः।
इति शहापरिवारसखाए, “अयान्य जीवपुर्व एवासिन् ब्रह्म साध्वहिदुपपदेवाचे
यथा साध्वाः विणुः वाचिदहिति:” इति विणिऔधेरहराकाश
श्चताः निर्णीतिभिः सर्गुणशास्त्रायापायोपायाविचारविद्वियांविनिर्घतिः
सर्गुणं ब्रह्म न विणिऔपमित सुविचितम्; वहराधिकरण एव “वच्च्चि
कावयवण्यो मूताकाशो रहूः; तथापि तेनेच तस्योपमा नोपपदेवाचे।” इति भुताकाश
काश्चतु सर्गुणशास्त्राविचारश्चविद्याः उपायोपायोपायाविचारसम्बन्धाः
श्वीतकृत्वा इति च तत्त्वस्वयमप्रत्यक्षे:। यावन्य अयान्यातः तावनेवोकताहृद्वय आकाशः।”
इत्युपायोपायाविचारविद्वियाने वहराकाशस्य भूताकाशसिद्धश्चतल्यबय
विनिर्घताः। तथा यथावत्म निर्णीतिभिः विद्याविद्वियांविनिर्घताः।

तथा वहरुधिकारधिकरणः (शा. भा. १. २. १२) भाजे, “चाप - ३.२३२.
शिवाधूत-परिवर्तनश्रृंगः

तत्स्थत्र नाम वेदांतायः पुराणस्तुतिरस्विंगुलनियोगात् किल्लिपरयोः सत्त्वी
कणंद्रेपयनस्वंभुवः। सत्त्वकुमारोपियः क्रियान्मानः पुत्रः स्वमहत
वर्षवानात् सकन्दशेषे प्रातुषंभूवः। इत्युक्तिमः यथा विष्णुर्वस्यस्वामिनि
निर्यिनीं सत्यगुण भ्रम न सत्त्वति तु कैमु-नित्यावेन वृक्षितः। संहारस्वरूपं एव छि-

“लभेव पुत्रस्मिच्छाभि तया वा सदां चिन्होः।”

इति त्राधेयस्योऽस्मार ज्ञानं यती वर्षवानात्तपुत्रवेन भ्रष्टमुृतः कृतार- संस्कारोपयायविचारय इति पुराणेऽः प्रसिद्धम्। एवं विश्वद्रष्टिभ्रष्टवेन सुचिंतं
सत्यगुण भ्रम त्रिमूर्ते चिन्तोः। परमश्रिव इत्यपि अन्तरादित्तिबिचाराचित्तं गुण
निर्यिनीं सत्यगुणानुभाषणं प्राप्
परमश्रिववाचकपरमेश्वरश्रंभायेण सुचिं
वम्।

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भगवतसुद्वाहाभिस्मृतायाचार्यवाचस्पित्तिमिश्रयं शाक्यांवके— ...

“श्रवणोपयोपेताय विविधेत्रययुधिरपि।
शात्ततू नमसक्येन वेदस्य च भवाय च।।”

इति बेदभवंशायामार्जिताय भस्माभ्रवेनानन्निवक्तयोः नमसक्येन
ततवेन निवैशाश्च पंडितशायायाः पालक्यमणुंगणविशिष्टवेन सवत्रवाचकम्
ततोऽः प्रसिद्धः परमश्रिव एवतार शाश्वे निरुपणीयं सत्यगुण ब्रह्मति वृक्षितम्।

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तथापि बाघ्योपरिकरणविस्तावाक्यानां देवतान्तपरत्तेनिरितसन तत
व्याख्यापितम्। अतिगुल्लम् सूचनामात्रेण श्रोतृणं हद्रयसाधिकं प्रयोगो न
सत्त्वति तत्क्रम त्रिमूर्तेचिन्तोः। परमश्रिव एवताल शाश्वे अतिपार्श्व सत्यगुण भ्रम,
हृदसाधितयात्रोपकोशवक्तवनातरक्षिताविभोक्तं कप्तारण तस्योपमासधितस्य
पालनं कार्यं, सरुणोपात्नाभिभर्विविस्तारिष्यण प्रायं च शासति तद्विद्वन्द्व-
कोकरुपेविवेकसुभृः वेदांतान्य न्यायः सामस्यपुपप्रदिभुविचारायं पुष्कर
आध्यात्मतः।
नन्देवं सति शंकरभाष्यं समुपर्युक्तसाृजणः व्यधिश्चवदयारवेत्तद्येनात् 3-235

नेव भाष्येण

"निविषयं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात् तदामोमनिनाथं।
ये मनोज्ञसत् कर्मयन्ते साधोस्यपरिवर्त्तये।
वशिष्ठः सन्नेत्यं समुपर्युक्तसाृजणं श्रीरमाथीः।
तदेवार्थविभेद्येवात्सादापनेर्द्वीतित्वादिनेहः।"

इति कल्पततः कस्य तथ्रुपरिवर्तणः सिद्धेरितित' चेल्लणु तस्यापि साफळ्यम्।
निगृहणः तथ्रुपरिवर्तणान्येव महाभाष्य प्रकाशः: भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम्।
तन्त्रपरिवर्त्त्वादिकर्मसाध्वायायायां जीवान्यन्तिरपवगुणार्थः श्रुतिपुरुषपरिवर्त्त्वायायां कार्यम्।
तत्त्वार्थः सर्वरूपवार्त्तपरिवर्तितत्वमस्थापासंदुल्हविद्वादिविन्धि: कार्यः।
तत्त्वार्थः श्रुतः भवेन्तः — प्रतिपद्धतिः सर्वरूपवार्त्तपरिवर्तितत्वमुक्तिसारेणानिराधारः
निरूःणीयस्य कार्यम्। केवलम्: शै: ब्रह्मचन्द्रकामिनिः।
क्रियत इति।
तत्त्वार्थः परिहाराः बाण्यः — वस्तुतः निर्धारितकर्मसाध्वायायां
सन्ति व्यवहाराद्वायां कल्पततः साः सन्तः
तत्त्वार्थः धार्मिकम् प्रायः: श्रुत्वार्थः: केवलम्:।
तदुपार्थविशेष: तदैव निर्विषयं ब्रह्म साधोस्यपरिवर्त्ततः ।
तस्य साधोस्यपरिवर्त्ततः श्रुतिपुरुषपरिवर्तः
साधोस्यपरिवर्तः केवलम्: निर्विषयेप्रकरणोत्पि तत्त्विपन्त्यपायत्वेन तत्त्विपन्त्यात्
व्यवहाराद्वायां केवलम्: निर्धारितकर्मसाध्वायां केवलम्:।
क्रियत इति।
तदुपार्थविशेष: श्रुतिपुरुषपरिवर्तः
साधोस्यपरिवर्तः केवलम्:।
तथा हि—वृद्धिः वस्त्रेऽर्थः 3-2351

1 अंशदीति। (My)
2 वृद्धिः सदृशः (My).
परमेश्वरभावापतिरूपमापि भवति तत्तद्वूऽ। अतः एव प्रथमाभ्याये दृढ़राधि-करो दृढ़राधिा वाक्यशोषणः संख्यामत्वादिगुणः परमेश्वर इति प्रसाध्यः। प्रजापतितिविधायाम्, "य आलम्पर्वतपापमा विजयो विमुक्तिविषोको विशि-विचिृत्वो विचिविशाश: संख्यास्तत्रयस्तस्ततः।" इति जीवेशपि तेषां गुणानं श्रवणात् ते तेषां परमेश्वरात्तिः स्थिताः प्रवृत्तस्य "उत्तर-राचेदारित्वेतस्तुस्तु" (शा. भा. १. ३. १९) इति सुतस्य, सुकौ जीवस्य परमेश्वरभावापतिरूपमापि भवति तत्तद्वूऽ। तद्विराणां प्रवृत्तस्य "तस्मात्तिविधाप्रायस्य-स्थापितस्यपरास्यत्तमकृतिः जैवं रूपं कर्त्तवोकर्त्तरगुणादिराविविषितस्यनकाल-विषयोधिः, तत्त्वेण तत्त्वपरितप्रतिपत्तादिगुणानं परमेश्वरं रूपं विचायता रूपा प्रतिपदे।" इति।

3.2352 प्रथमाभ्याय एव जनरात्मनितिकारणेऽपि (शा. भा. १. ४. १६) बालक्षणात्मशुरुंसाबाह्योपकोषसंहारायां परवद्यमानास्यमाच्छारायां तथायपसंहारसाराधिक निरतिशयकं अर्थविश्वर्तं हृदये तः, 'सर्वान् पापोऽपदस्तता सर्वानं भूतानं श्रावणं श्लाभायामाधिनं परस्य। य एव बैद्यति।' इत्युत्क्षयं मुक्तिकालं सुरुऽगुणेश्वरभावापतिरूपमापि दर्शितम्; परमेश्वरान्त्यतं सर्वभूतात्मकास्यमाच्छारायां।

3.2353 तथा दृतारायाम्यायेऽपि अन्वाधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. ३. ४३) "जीवेश्वरं श्रवणार्मुकामलेवं तद्विदेशं संसारः-कभोगेर्वतमात्मायापि दुःखितं स्थानः। यथा छोके इस्तपादाध्यन्तमाकामेते दुःखितं विशेष। अंतः तत्त्वां महर्षं दुःखं प्राप्तायाः। अतो वरं पूर्वांश्, संसारं एवास्वतं सन्यासान्तत्वाय कर्मसः" इति शास्कपरक्येन प्रस्तुतिकरणीयविनवणेन क्रतुसामुक्तकालम्बनम् समाधिते सुकौऽगुणेश्वर-भावापतिराविशेषज्ञ:। न च तदेशरश्वरं कर्माचन दुःखचितत्वपरं श्रेष्ठः।
नीः। यतः "परातु तन्भुः" इति तत्त्वाचिकरणे (शा. भा. २. २. ४१, ४२) जीवसाधारणायां कर्त्तव्यसंसाधिता प्रसाध्य, "नन्देनभीष्मसन्तः कार्यित्वे मति वैपूर्णेन अग्नि स्वातांपूर्भ्" इति शास्कोवतवेन कुत्रप्रवत्तापेक्षस्तु विदितंतभिषिप्दातैवमयित्रवर्मिभिः (शा. भा. २. २. ४१) इति तदविद्युग्यसुकृतायात्तारितत्त्वापूर्वविद्विधारणं नतुन्येतरविषयविस्मृतिः तदनस्तः प्रत्यक्तसंवर्गाधिकरणमपि नमण्येत्र सन्तृप्तं "जीवनवर्त्तमानकारौध भाव उकः। स च सम्मन्त्येन द्यो देवों लोके। यथा स्वामिन्यः। यथा वा अन्यस्वामिन्यः। ततः जीवनवर्त्तमानकारौधकारमाध्यममाणात् किं स्वामिन्यस्वतस्वातवः। आहस्त्विमात्रस्वामिन्यस्वातवः विचित्रितसाध्यायमनयः या वाच्यमः; अथवा स्वामित्वस्वातवःं किंवदविषयबिशिष्ठविशिष्ठस्वातवः प्रभुव सट्ट्वात्त्विध्येष एव सम्बन्धः अवाच्यमः। याच्यमः। इति पूर्वप्रवत्तत्वतेन तस्त्वाविलक्षणस्य पूर्वालिकरणसमावस्तिपत्तस्तुकृतेऽएतः।

तृतीयावधिकृति सन्त्वालिकरणे (शा. भा. ३. २. १) परस्मेरवार्षः ३.२३५४

सन्त क्षेत्रस्यवर्त्तमानात् स्वेष साधारणेन रथातिकति विषयतीति शाब्दोऽचारस्य-नावतारितस्य "पराशिव्यातानु तिरोहितः ततो त्रस्य वन्यविशेषवः" (शा. भा. ३. २. ५) इति सुतरस्य वात्विष्यकथानवासरे "जीवनवर्त्: सत्त्वाविशेषां विश्वासे जीवनमन्यस्तविषयपित्तमेवसमस्यः किं पुनर्जीवनवर्त-समाभवतेत्त वै स्वातः नास्ते नास्त्: स्वातः; विश्वासनवासरे तिरोहितं अविश्वास-विष्यवाच्यानात्। तत्त्वज्ञिविशेषां सत्त्वमेव जीवनमन्यस्तविषयसत्यमेव ज्ञातौ: विश्वासवाच्यस्य विभिन्नरूपसमस्ताय दक्षिणक्षिप्तायहिनायाध्यात्मसाधीरूपसमस्तरुपातिभवित्। इति गवटस्तर्येंगु मुक्तस्य सर्येवाध्यात्मसाधीरूपिणविभिन्नरुपातिभवित्। केवलविखितस्थानोऽन्तः सत्त्ववधिकृतिवाच्यसाधारणमेवः।

चतुर्वेदीयम् तु "स्येन रूपेणान्मनिन्नातः" इति मूलमानविषयायां ३.२३५५

हुः पैल रूपेणान्मनिन्नातः: विभिन्नरूपेण दुस्युमस्य: "स्येन जैसः तत्।"
न्यासादिके" (शा. भा. ४. २. ५) इति सूत्रेण यत् श्रावं रूपमपहतपापमत्वादि सत्यसब्दलयत्वायसानं सर्वेषतवसंबंधरत्वादि तेनामिनिष्पत्तिः "य आलमपपतपापमा" इत्यावुपपत्त्वसेन "स तत्र परेंति ज्ञात्र नौडनं रसमाणः। वीमिवा नौंटेन" इत्यावैतरवेदनेन चेति जैनमिनयमः "चितितमासात्रैं तदातकत्वादित्यङ्गोत्रोसिः" (शा. भा. ४. २. ६) इत्यन्न्तरसूत्रेण "एवं वा अर्थार्थमात्राकृतोऽवा। कृत्वा प्रभानचन्व एव" इत्याविष्ठ्वा चैतन्यात्मात्मनेन। शक्तमित्यवगतेत्तमात्राविष्ठ्वामिनिष्पत्तिः सतानां चोपन्यं तदन्नतरपरिलक्ष एवम्पुपपन्यात्रातृ पूर्वभावाक्षविरोधे बादरायणः। (शा. भा. ४. २. ७) इति निधान्तसूत्रयः "एवसापि चारसायिकचैतन्य-शक्तपापायुगमेवापि न्यथवारायेदतया पूर्वस्थापुपुपन्यायादिपत्त्वकत्वं वा-वायाययूपस्थायपत्रायायानादिबिरोधे बादरायण आचायों मन्वे।" इति तात्पर्यकथनेन मुक्तं निपतिष्यैवैशाखाचाती संगुणेश्वरभावापित्रितिस्य स्पष्टीकृता। निगुणावधावेद तद्वाभावितिरेव मुक्तिर्ति वक्तव्ये कथं संगुणेश्वरभावापितिरेव मुक्तिर्तिः इति शास्त्र्व च समाहिता। बसुसद्वा शुभवन्या चैतन्यात्मात्मत्वोदये प्रभृत्तम्यम् भावोभावं च तत्स्य पर्यंतभर्त्वे वेदपुराण-व्यवहारस्त्य याब्जसमूहिक निर्देशधातुम् पारस्येश्वरेश्वरेन प्रसिद्धि अन्नव तस्य घरमहिति संभवती। तदेव निर्देशयापनिरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्योपयोगितेषु तस्विन्त्याभिप्रवतेषु संगुणेश्वरभावस्मित्रप्रकृतियोपयोगितेन च आयः सन्तूपत्रसुगुणविचारकरणात्रातः सर्वेच्छ परस्येश्वरकल्याणगुणः। प्रदेश-नीति जाता इति निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्योपयोगिताय प्रतृतेषुपि संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातुने संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातुने संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातुने संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातुने संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातुने संगुणेश्वरणे भावस्यदृष्टान्यातुने स युक्तं, निगुणावधावेद निरूपणातिश्राविशालिष्टादृष्टान्यातु
नन्देवं सरुणविचारस्य लिङ्गविचारार्थतः लिङ्गविचारार्थतः 3.2356
सरुणविचारः यथावतः विचारश्चित्वार्थं कर्तव्यतथा् सिद्धीतीति किंतर्थं सरु-
णविचारस्यापि अर्थसंश्वाससि:स्याः प्रथमसूचारगतस्य विचारयप्रश्वासब्रुखः
सरुणसाधारणम्। “अस्ति तात्त्” इवादिब्हाषणोक्तिमति चेतु, भ्रमसूक्ष्मान).
यों साक्ष्येन सरुणपरात्मा योजनान्तरमन्यस्यतिः सूचनाः तद्वस्त्रर्थस्योऽर्गिता तद्वकसिद्धार्थतः। तन्नाजनान्तरं कथ्यमित्यकास्त्राः समासदेवाध्य-
णादिनेच्यं ध्यानपुराणकर्ष्येऽन्न कवितर्शिष्यत्वेऽव शायोंसौलोऽधितेः । (शा. 
माण. १. ९. ३) वर्णनकाश्चैन ऋतुम्। कल्पनसकारेर्षिः भाष्यकारीत्वं शास्त्र-
योनिः श्रुतस्य सरुणनिर्णेोऽभयपरत्यो योजनाश्वं स्थानीयुक्ताध्यायाबः।
स्मेवन प्रश्वासमिति । प्रश्वासिनेनेच्यं तथ्यमपि “अमिक्रोत्राचि दु: तत्कार्योऽय 
वादशानात्” इति तूरतः (शा. माण. ४. १. ६) सरुणनिर्णेोभयपरयो-
जनाश्वं भाष्यसूचितं सूतकार्यम्। तेजः खलु “अमिक्रोत्राढि दु: तत्कार्योऽय 
वादशानात्” इति तूरतः—अमिक्रोत्रार्ष तथे “तद्देशायम उच्चरपुर्वाः-
योः” इति सूचे (शा. माण. ४. १. ६) तद्देशायमश्वातः प्रस्तुताय निर्धरे
क्शेत्रश्वारस्थिकाः रुपाय कार्याहे। “विबिलिष्तति यहेन्” इवादिः
तिदशानात्। समस्तमेवसब्रुकालकाने कर्मकाजविरोधर्वाति तस्य बांधो
निर्माणाधिकर्मस्योपकारस्याः नायुक्तम्। समस्तत्वनदाहिकार्याः दुब्रुकाला
सवात्मात्त्वविवाविद्याधिकार्यताश्च इति तिय्रुणाधिकारस्य योजनाः प्रश्वासा-
मात्। अमिक्रोत्रार्ष तस्य सरुणसब्रुकार्यामस्य कार्याहे। सरुणबिधं केक्षमा-

1. योऽतिविक्ष (O) 2. योऽतिब (O)
3. प्रयुः न दु: तन्मात्रानिःशिल्मति (O)
4. तेजः बलविधुताधिकारेऽतिज (O)
5. नित्येशशिपाधिकार (O)
ढींत्र यदाच्याच्यानि देशसंतोषे| श्रीगृहालिके प्रवविषयक गहनमें रूपकमा-चें| नायुकम, बाबाजोककृषि मोगपुस्त तस्य साहित्यविद्वानदेशसंतोषे—इति सगुणविषय योजनान्तर प्रदर्शितम। एवं निजसाधुः (शा. भा. १. १. १) विचारिक्षयश्रृवः सुगुणसाधारणसंबंधितेन कवितानिरुचिकोश-विषयग्राहाद्वयुक्तेन च श्राकाचार्यः स्वितमेव। सर्वोपरि श्रवनोत्तरं संगुणरेण योजनान्तरप्रयत्नकालीप्रवर्तिकेऽस्मात् क्रिष्टाचार्यः भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम्।

2.241 नायें सिद्धान्तक्रियारूपस्वनामार्थिकोशे श्राकाचार्यांभितम एवः सगुण-श्रवणक्रियारूपकारः विषयारूपिकेत्यतन्त्रे यथा सगुणश्रवणक्रियारूपकारः संगीतरूपांनि वेदाच्यसङ्गमानि धार्मिकविषयानि उद्भावितविशेषानि परत्वाणि धार्मिकविषयानि साधियान्त्रबन्धीमात्त्रविश्वासिकाक्षणतयतं-निर्णयितिकं क्रियारूपिकं संगुणारूपिकं तत्त्वज्ञानीयविषयत्वं निर्णयितिकं तत्त्वज्ञानीयविषयत्वं निर्णयितिकं ५ तत्त्वज्ञानीयविषयत्वं निर्णयितिकं। तत्त्वज्ञानीयविषयत्वं निर्णयितिकं ५ तत्त्वज्ञानीयविषयत्वं निर्णयितिकं।

3.242 चेतनाचेतनार्तमकं सर्वं जगतः अविचारप्रति रूपम्, सा च श्राकाचार्यः

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>विशालक्रमश्चार्यत्वं (A); विशालक्रमश्चार्यत्वं (O)</th>
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<td>चार्यमयं एव (O)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>ओमित्र सगुण—प्रकारः</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>इतवेद्वन्त्वान्तर (O)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>वांच्यतानि (O)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ओमित्र वधवेते</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>अंख्यं भिमा (O)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 तद्विद्यमयां तथायमा।
देवविषयसंविधि च श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धपोषयोगिनीकृतपरम्यादानेन साधारणतत्त्वान्तः
कः "निर-व्यापारसंकासानीस्वतः सुक्तः" इति समन्तः तद्विरोधाय-भस्मः सर्वेऽपविद्वतातः।
तत्सच अविद्वयितां तद्विद्वयितां श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
सन्धिपञ्च तर्कािसंविधि। तथा श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
तथा श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
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श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
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श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
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श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
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श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः श्रुद्राष्ट्रसिद्धिकः।
कर्मणे (शा. भा. १. ३. ८, ९), "धर्मोपपत्तेऽव " इति गुणसूत्राय पातम् "अत्मात्र व्रण: " इत्यादिवाक्योंकं सर्वकाराण्त्वादिहितः; अष्टराधिकरणे "सा च प्रशासनात्" (शा. भा. १. ३. ११) इति गुणसूत्राय पातम् "एतस्य-वाक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्भी सुसूचनात्रस्या विभूती तितिष्ठत्" इत्यादिवाक्योंकं प्रशासितत्वादिहितः; सुप्रस्तुतकायपिकरणे "पत्यादिवाक्यवेवः" इति गुण-सूत्राय पातम् (शा. भा. १. ३. ४३) "सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येषांनां सर्वस्याधिकारः" इत्य-विकरणे (शा. भा. १. ४. १६) सौत्रेत्त्वादिहितम् "यो वै बालक एतेऽथा पुरुषाणां कतो वस्य वै तक्तम् स वै वेदितवयः" इति वाक्योंकं सकलजग-तन्त्रितिविद्वः; "वाक्यावन्यायाः" इत्य-विकरणे (शा. भा. १. ४. १९) अन्व-चक्षस्य कर्मिक्षात् "अस्य महत्तो मूलस्य मित्रसत्मीतचक्षस्य च चुजोऽवाः" इत्यादिवाक्योंकं सकलजगात्मप्रवृत्त्वा चेयेऽथ निगुणाविशेषविद्विकरणेतुतु सगुणसाधनारूपाणां खिङ्गानासूपनाः द्वदत्तेः। तेन निगुणप्रकरणगतानां-मृति तत्काय-अन्ततिवाक्यांनां तत्तदिशिष्ठे सगुणात्मकस्याणां समन्यत्वात्मकनातां द्वदत्तेः। तदवम्बनं श्रीकाण्डाचार्यांनां तत्त तत्ताधिकरणे तस्य तस्य विषयावक्ष्यस्य सगुणे परस्परे समन्यत्वकनाम न। महात्मात्मार्याविवेक निगुणं समन्याकारणं नु तत्म्रात्मानेन सगुणे भक्तितिश्रयंत्यस्यायिनिश्चयः।

3-2421 नमु निगुणे समन्याकारणमेऽवत्मानस्य समन्यविविधतम्। निगुणप्रकरणगतानां सगुणवाक्यानां धृतवाक्यवत्स्य महात्मात्त्वेऽन्तरं निगुणपरममस्यायिन्यं समन्याकारणमेऽवत्स्य तेषां साधारितुगुणविषयवाणामपि वाक्यानां प्रधानेन सगुणे योजने क्रत्व धृतयेत; यथात्वत्ताधिकरणे (शा. १. १. ५) "एकमेवाहितीयम् " इति बालकस्य, यथा वा मूलसाधिकरणे (शा. १. ३. ७, ८) "यत्र नान्य-लब्धयति इत्यविवाक्ष्यस्य, यथा वा आरम्भणाधिकरणे (शा. २. १. १५) "यथा सौत्रेऽथे कृत्यमेऽथे सर्वं सूच्चयं विशेषां म्यात्माचारार्थम् विकारो नाम-
वेषं सृष्टिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥ इति वाचकस्य। तत्रायथोऽवैवयः पत्सगुणपरत्या
योजनं ज्यतम्, तत्सूङ्ख्यं एवोदाहत्मम्। सृष्टियस्य तिथियं योजनाध्यायं दृष्टितम्—
"विकारो नामरेण च वाचारंभं वाचाया: अर्थसापथेऽकृत्याध्वनिवहारस्य
निष्पादकं भवति। सृष्टिकेत्येव घटायवस्था, घटादिनामध्येः चार्थिकायातित्वाभित्
रूपन्यवहारनिष्पादकं भवतीत गायनः। भस्तुतो घटादिनकापि सृष्टिकेत्येव
सत्यं प्रामाणिकम्, सृष्टिकेत्येव घटायवाध्योऽर्था। अथवा वाचारभंगं
विकारः, विकारो घटो वाचारभंगं घटोध्वनिति वाचारभवचित्वमात्रम्। सृष्टिकेत्येव,
व्यवस्थं, व्यवहारसिद्धं जायमानाः सस्तनत्तमम्, न तु सृष्टिकेत्येव; सृष्टिकेत्येव
नामरेण सत्यम्। घटादिनकापि सृष्टिकेत्येव तत्त्र सर्वं युक्तदारि:—
नामरेण सत्यम्, सति प्रामाणिके श्च साधु, न तु दृष्टितममनिति कलव; यतो
घटो सृष्टिकेत्येव इति योजनाध्यायं कारणव्यापत्तिरिकत्वं कार्यसं मिश्र्यत्ववर्तिनपरोती
वाचारम्भं भवति। काष्ठिकायामनोत्तरपरोती प्रतिनिः साधु:। कार्यसं कारणाध्यायोऽलिति
तत्तत्त्वभेदद्रश्चित्वपरतेऽति रूपिणिः सिद्धम्। तथादि—प्रागेककाब्यमेव सर्वविशेषः
ब्रह्मां प्रतिनिः साधु:। ततुपपावनाथरूपम्” यथा सूक्ष्मकेऽनि सृष्टिकेत्येव सर्वं
सुभाष्यविकल्पं स्वातः। इति दच्चन्ति उपन्यासः। तत्र नामं दच्चन्ति उपपथे।
सृष्टिकेत्येब्रह्मां तद्दशिकाराणां घटादिनामनोत्तरपरोती चार्थिकायात्तित्वाभितवेदेवनात्तितित्वाभितस्य
सृष्टिकेत्येकारणमभेदद्रश्चित्वपरतेऽति ब्रह्मानुसारे घटादिनकापि चार्थिकायात्तित्वाभिः
कारणमभेदद्रश्चित्वपरतेऽति ब्रह्मानुसारे घटादिनकापि चार्थिकायात्तित्वपरतेऽति ब्रह्मानुसारे
योगामासिद्धमतः।

तथा: प्रामाण्योजनायामस्यतः—विकारः घटादिनकापि भवति। ॥३२४॥
नामरेण, स्वक्रियानिमित्तक घटादिनकापि, न ततुपपावनाथरूपम्। वाचा—वाकः।

1. युक्तदारि is the reading of most Ms. of this work; but all editions of Srikantha Bhāṣya read युक्ति पिण्डादि.

2. प्रकटेः (O).
बटमाने याथायथाभिनियमः; तेन तज्ज्ञायार्थाक्षेपायम् लक्ष्यते । आराम्यते निष्पादये अनेनेतारंगमम् कारणम् । बाचाय आरंभं विकारो नामवेयं च क्षेत्रार्थेन श्रेयस्याभिनियमायी: कारणमिति यावत् । विकारानामथेयोभृत्यद्वारारंगमिन्न्त्यन्यस्त नरुस्तिनकसामन्यस्तन्त्रस्तायः इति। नरुस्तिनकक्षेत्रे कर्तव्यश्च । अनेनेतरके सर्वं भवति— सूक्ष्मपरतकल्याणानि द्रवयाक्षेपेनि पिण्डत्वप्रक्षेपों मार्दि क्षेत्रारंगमिन्न्त्यत्तत्वस्थित्वमान्यति । नामाचारस्तेन तत्त्वाचिनिर्मिति कल्याणकारिः इति।

नातू गोमाहिन्दुस्त्रयेदेशेन तद्रक्षेत्रं: किमिति नेष्टतु इत्याश्रयोक्तं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम, चतुर्वाराजार्थीसमपि तार्थिकतेव गृहाणमाक्षेत्रम् । तद्रेव मृृत्तिकेशावीं नामवेयं तत्त्वप्रक्षेपेनि पिण्डत्वप्रक्षेपों मार्दि क्षेत्रारंगमिन्न्त्यत्तत्वस्थित्वमान्यति ।

यस्मात् नामाचारस्तेन निविधानायार्थेन श्रेयस्याभिनियमानगारमेयेन च तद्वेद्या राष्ट्रारंगमिन्न्त्यत्तत्वस्थित्वमान्यति ।

3,2412

द्वितीयोपजनानान्तः लयपर्यं— वाचारंभं बिकारः, चतुर्वाराजार्थीनि

विकारारो च वो अभासित्य व्यवहारविशेषमार्थम्, न नु सृवाद द्रव्यान्तरम् । नातू सृवाद द्रव्यान्तरावेच सुभ: पिण्डत्वप्रक्षेपातिर्भवन्तं च चतुर्वाराजार्थीमेयं कर्म पञ्चालवर्तेन— इत्याश्रयागृहयङ्क्त नामवेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् । उपास्माद्

भिव चतुर्वाराजार्थीमेयमध्यमपि तह्ववेच मृत्तिकेति क्षेत्रम् सति नामाचारिः चार्थु, न न द्रव्यान्तरमिति क्लेश, प्रत्याभिधारिकराधिन्न्द्राल्यादों द्रव्यान्तराल्यामाणार्थिवा गृहाणमार्थिवा क्षेत्रारंगमिन्न्त्यतत्त्वस्थित्वमान्यति ।

अतिश्च पश्चि: “सत्रो सार्थो च सच्छिद्वः” इति समूहे: नामाचारिकराधिवाच सत्यशब्दाचार्थाय सच्चिद्व्यापक्तत्त्वस्य साधज्याचितु मध्यवत्तमः ।

आरंभाणंस्तीति च पिण्डतापावेच निष्पादक: च वदन: विषयत्वपर्यंतास्तिकः; तस्य उक्तिश्रेष्ठविकर्षेपान् “क्षेत्रारंगमम्” इति विकारिसामान्यविचार नरुस्तिनकक्षेत्रम् इति विशेषः ।

1 Pāṇini, I, 2, 39. 2 सल्लस्य पिण्डार्थश्राविक (Q) 3 नामाचारिप्रकर्षेपान् (My). 4 Pāṇini, II, 4, 1.
एवं त्रांगणो निरुणलनीयरुपत्वपरागां निष्प्रपश्चात्तपरागां व बाणांना 3·24213
हेवुणलुपरात्तिवरिष्टत्वा सप्तपश्चात्तविष्टत्वाचे न "न स्वातः" (व. २.
२. ११) इत्यादिधिकरणपुरुषो योजनेन क्रमम्। किवा जीवस्य त्रांगण-पश्चात्तपरागानुरूपीत तत्त्त्वमध्यतार्तित महाभाक्यानुरूपे "इतरःपश्चात्तविष्टात्तकरणादिप्रसक्ति:।" (व. २. १. २१), "हेपत्वान् पुरुपश्चात्तविष्टि यथास्वत्तविष्टि जीविनिः"," (व. ३. ४. २) इत्यावर्धिनः जीवस्य तत्त्वमध्यपश्चात्तविष्टपरागानुरूपीति विविधविधे, "अधिकं तु सेच-निहिँचान्, " (व. २. १. २२), "अधिकारपनातु वादार्थपयः तदस्य नातः।" (व. ३. ४. ८) इत्यातः नितिवादात्तसृज्ञमध्यपश्चात्तविष्टितः सदाविष्टितः दैवीयपश्चात्तविष्टारितः, "समुद्युक्तकालंयोधमेवं " "पत्यादिलोभे:।" (व. १. ३. ४३, ४४)
इत्याता वैदिकाशिकारणपश्चात्तविष्टत्वात् इतवादिकारणपश्चात्तविष्टत्वात् परमे तत्त्वमानि जीवाचारीवेदाविष्टित, "समुद्युक्तकालंयोधमेवं " "पत्यादिलोभे:।"
(व. २. २. ८२) इत्यावर्धिनः जीवाचारीवेदाविष्टित इतवादिकारणपश्चात्तविष्टारितः "समुद्युक्तकालंयोधमेवं " "पत्यादिलोभे:।"
(व. २. २. ८२) इत्यावर्धिनः जीवाचारीवेदाविष्टित इतवादिकारणपश्चात्तविष्टारितः "समुद्युक्तकालंयोधमेवं " "पत्यादिलोभे:।"
(व. २. २. ८२) इत्यावर्धिनः जीवाचारीवेदाविष्टित इतवादिकारणपश्चात्तविष्टारितः "समुद्युक्तकालंयोधमेवं " "पत्यादिलोभे:।"
(व. २. २. ८२)

1. प्रामाणिकारणम् (O).
2. अपूर्वप्रकृतिभूतात्तवावधनन्तरित (Mv).
3. वाकीवाचकम् (O).

शिवासैनिनाथः।

विदेशान्तः। इति सूतं जीवनभावेद्वैयवस्थापकः। न भवति; किन्तु किय्येवस्मयं वहनस्तवचतुर्विदेशान्तं साक्षात्विद्यागैर्यावाचिकं वर्णं, तथा च जीवे कवृत्तवोपकृत्ववादिन् च। आत्मालभिकं इति जानतं: तस्य तदापादनमप्रमुख सुटिगिरिकारणीति मूढः जीवस्येव तस्य आन्तरेमानात्।

“प्रतिविवर्गाता: पद्यन्तर्पुकाराविकः किया:।
पुमान क्रिड़ौधा ब्रह्म तथा जीवस्विक्रिया:।”

इत्युक्तकाले। तस्य तीर्थायें सा भवतिकेतयवस्थापनपरम्। अन्यथा जीवनभावेद्विवस्थापनव्यक्ति शक्तिस्वयं हिताकरणादिवीरेषय तयोऽमेतसाधने नित्यानित्यावाचिकाति सार्वत्राधिवैभाषिपुः च यात। यथापि अररामार्गस्य तदुपपति।” (ल. २० १ २३) इति तदनन्तरसूक्ष्मेण असमकार्योक्तयावङ्गाधि जीवनसाध्यावधानतिः सर्वाधिवैभाषिक० श्राधीर्यान्तरेमानात् तयोरेक्षाभावात्यपाते।” इति तदनन्तरायणे च जीवनभावेद्विवस्थापनवेश्येवत जीवनभावेद्विवस्थापनम् भवतिकेतयवस्थापनात्, तथापि किय्येवस्मयं जातीयस्य जीवनभावेद्विवस्थानो नोपपत्ते, किय्युक्तान्तरेजातीयस्य जीवनभावेद्विवस्थायेति कैनुतिकालयन जड़वार्थकश्राधीर्यान्तरेमानात् तस्य तात्त्वत्यां। अत एव तदनन्तरात्मायां।—“यथैतरस्तुतित्वाचिकमुक्तिपार्यैवेवादौ स्वरूपान् तात्त्वविशेषनेति तात्त्वपर्यं” इति। च अरसमुक्तियां हिताकरणादिवीरेषय जीवनभावेद्विवस्थानम् शक्तिस्वयं हिताकरणादिवीरेषय जीवनभावेद्विवस्थापनम् न्यायवाचिकमुक्तिपार्यैवेवादौ। जड्यवार्थकश्राधीर्यान्तरेमानात् नाग्नोपयुक्तं इति वाचमयाः। अत्राभ्येन नित्यार्यांक्ष्मेण “तदनन्तर्वृत्तमम् भण्युपायविद्याः” (ल. २० १ १५) इति सूत्तक्षमन्तर्यां जड्यवार्थकश्राधीर्यान्तरेमानात् न भवतित्व न्यायवाचिपने तत्तुपपर्यं। अत एव इतरत्वदेशात्।

1 म्यवस्थापर (०) 2 आपाति (०) 3 इबापाणि (०)
4 भाषि (०) 5 o omita ता
इत्यादीनि सूत्राणि (३. २. १. २१-२३) भाष्यान्तरबद्धः भाष्ये पृथग
गतिकरणार्थतः न योजितानि। एवम् "अधिकोपेदेशानि" इति पुरुषार्थीगतिकरणसूत्रांगि (३. १. ८) परमेश्वरे नाम कल्याण नासति, ओपनिधितवमात्रां जीवगोचरसन्धि ज्ञातमिति पूर्वपक्षानिराकरणां जीवाधिकः परमेश्वरेऽसतीतेवान्मात्रानिनिराधिनप्राप्तम्। एवं सुपुस्युक्तः सत्िवाणिरुत्रयमहि (३. २. ४२, ४४) जीवाधिकपरमेश्वरस्त्रांख्यमात्राप्राप्तम्, न मेवन्यवस्थणापनप्राप्तम्। अत एवंतेषां सूत्राणि भाष्येऽु पूर्वपक्षे तद्वस्तुमन्यतन्त्रेन झिलितानि वाच्यमात्रविचारकाणि भेदपरंतु योजनं नृः कृतम्।

यथाप्राधिकरणाभाष्ये (३. २. ३. ४२) तेषां भेदपरंतु योजनं कृतः ३.२४२२२

मसि, तथापि तत्त् "आत्मिते तौपग्न्दन्ति माहस्यनि च" (२. ४. १. ३) इत्याधिकरणाभाष्येण प्रवाख्यातम्, न स्वाधिकरणकल्पम्। तत्र हि सुपुस्युक्तः ब्रह्मपासनं स्वाधिकरणकल्पकारणं स्वमितत्वेऽति कार्यं, न तु स्वाधिकरणकल्पकारणार्थ प्रस्तावं सिद्धान्तामहिष्यः "यथापि जीवाधिकरणेऽति झिलितां परं ब्रह्म, तथापुष्पसिताः— अहं ब्रह्मसिद्धिः — इति तदुपासीत; यथः पूर्वपुष्पसिताः— तत्त् वा अहमसिद्धिः भगवः देवते अहं वै त्वमात्र— इत्याधिकरणाभाष्यानि उपासितोत्स्था तदुपासितां तानुपासितां तनुपासितां स्वस्व रूपतया परं ब्रह्म, ते च पुनः स्वात्मतया माहस्यति च परानि शिक्षानि तत्तमस्वितादिना" इति। अत्र तत्तमस्वितादिनात्मेऽति तदुपासितां प्रायुक्तं शरीरस्विद्धानिभावतया कृतप्रवाक्यायमितिः यथार्थायमितिः प्रायायमितिः स्वमिते।

तदुपासिताकल्पेऽति "तत्त् वा आहसिद्धिः" इति ज्ञात्वाक्यमयुवाहाः। तदि शरीरस्विद्ध्यात्मानं सामाननिहितकरणस्य, तदा "तत्त् वा आहसिद्धिः" इति निदेशो नोप्तयत् इति वृत्तियुप माहस्यपद्धारातोऽधिकरण्यः। तत्तमसि-

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1 माहस्यपद्धारातोऽधिकरण्यः  (O)
2 विशिष्टानि (O)
3 Omits न  4 माहस्यमाहस्यपद्धारातोऽधिकरण्यः (O)
शिवाहृतिमिश्रयः

वाचकस्त्रायमेव एव स्वार्थस्मिथापि प्रामेव प्रपश्रितम्।

3.242221 एतेनाशाविधिकरणांकंस्यं प्रयास्थानं न भवति, सुविज्ञनाशायिकारणं
प्रान्नवस्थापितसिः स्थायमेव पश्चात् प्रयास्थानायोगात्। किंतुशाविधिकरणोऽ
करीया वंद्वराविविधायु ब्रह्म शारीरकर्त्तवेन वालसन्धेयम्, अहंसाशायिकारणोऽ
करीया स्वाभिमानकर्त्तवेन वेदि भाव्याभिप्रायो वर्णनियः। एवं च "ते च
पुनः स्वाभावया माहृत्युन परापि शिष्यान् तत्त्वसमसीत्यादिना" इत्यहमहाशायि
करणमाह्यवाक्यशापि तत्त्वस्मात्रिवाक्यस्मेव दृष्टां
तात्त्वेऽन्तरनियः। न तु तात्त्विकाभेदपरमिति, भेदाभेदिः विरहत्वात्

3.242222 इति श्रद्धापि निरस्ता, जावालबाक्यस्तारसाविरोधेन, आत्माभेदस्वारस्विवि
रोधेन, "सिताधिकपरमान्त्रभयशिश्वासाशििूविकः। शिवाहृतिसरलानं
पछ्यानिनिःसिमसिंरणं न भवति। पछ्यानिनिःसिः न तद्वार्ता विना,
अतः निरस्तां शिवोद्भिमति भावानास्रवाहणं शिविचित्रनामात्यां
गतंशुभमावं उपांसकः शिवेन एव भवति।" इत्ययं शिवाभेदप्रावणं विना
न सुपरिशिवि व्यवादिपार्थाविश्वाहिकरणभाव्याविरोधेन, मुक्तमर्यं शिवि
भण्यानि सिवाद्विश्वेन प्रतिष्ठानासंस्कृत सर्वस्यापि परिप्रावायत्वांव्यव्याप्तकायां
नाशाविधिकरणमाह्यवाक्यशीरोपेन च तत्त्वस्मिसिवाक्यसंग्रामिकरणोऽकायं भाव्यः
कार्यसङ्ग्रामिकायं कल्पनायायोगात्, जीवितं ब्रह्मणं सह भेदाभेदोऽरिव तत्त्वसर्वि
शायकस्याककस्य इयायोगायोपि विरहत्वात्, अशाविधिकरणोऽकं भेदाभेदकर्मां
हृ- पुनरमेवोपास्यसङ्गमयोऽसमपि भाव्यापारोक्तितिति कल्पनायोऽ
गायब।

3.242223 नृत तः तः मा भूत्रं तस्म शरीराशिरिमिश्रयः; आरोपितभेदाभेदाशिि
रूपं एक प्रवाहोपस्तिक्षति चेचः; "परस्यान्तरधारितमयूरिक्षितिशिवाक्यानां
राष्ट्रयात्राशििकृक्षकाभीप्नाप्रतिवादगतिः परिपुष्पमहापुष्पं अश्रुसमस्यति"
इति मुक्तमान्तिविश्वाक्यानिनिःसिश्वासायः, "निरुक्ताध्यायिनिष्ठाहेषामान-
नन्दविशारीकरण (२, ३, ५२) प्रतिपाद्याधिकारिकात्मकत्या तत्त्व स्वरूप २४२२२४

उच्चत्ते— येंपां मोक्षः परस्परदर्शने इत्यन्त्र आयुष्मानि-प्रयुक्तमेतिप्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमेति-प्रयुक्तमें—

1 अविकारेके बिभ (०)
शिवायैतानिकैः।

“महिष्ठारिणोऽः लोके देशिका सत्यराज्यः।
मदेकररणान्तः योग्यं नेवार्यजन्तुः॥
स्वाच्छन्न स्वाधीनार्थः पेयान्यन्यन्ति यानि च।
देयानि तानि वै शंभोराथीयाहासामावतः॥
दार्समार्गपथं वेः श्रीवेप पालवपि शिखतः॥
तैःख्रेष्ठ पेयं मोक्यं च वातव्यं च मुदुष्यामिः॥”

इति शिवप्रसादस्वीकरणयोग्यायोग्यविबेचने दार्समार्गपथं श्रीमुदुष्यविशेषणम्।
एवं चोपासनानविष्कृता: श्रृधुनुदशोकसिन्न दार्समार्गं क्रमवात्तिक्षके
प्रवर्तनेतनामुवाक्यं इति तत्र तेवं चतुरुपुत्रद्वितियं दार्समार्गं एव सवस्यापि
मोक्षशािकवशिष्यं इति (तावदा !) तदाचार्यान्तः चटलक्षसनि तदापि कविति
पद्मशैलिकाभिविख्यमेवतः तत्त्वमसार्वदिवादाक्यानं शरीराकरीरीतिमाल्पलश्चाँत्वामी-
भाषोऽर्थं इति मार्गान्वर्मान्वशास्त्रिकरणं कल्पितानंति न कामिनिद्रोऽतः।

3:24:223

यत्कारमभाषादिबृहतीनामधानिपरकल्पनं तदुपि सुगुणविषयायुक्तार्थं-
योजकामिलापतारिकार्थं वादादाम्यम्। इदम्यमार्गसुरभावेन बागुदाहि वेन
शिवायितम्। तेन हि मार्गेन जडवर्गस्य ब्रह्माण्ययत्वं तद्वादरुपं न भवति-
लुक्मू। तेन तदन्यत्वं (व्र. २. ११५) स्वल्पकं तस्य ब्रह्माण्ययत्वं
ब्रह्माण्यतिरिक्ष्ठं निविष्णाम्यमत्वस्वहस्र्यवती, तस्य ब्रह्माण्यपि ब्रह्मां-
भिषत्वस्यक्षमेद्वायाग्यस्यः संभावनं तस्य चिन्हाकं परिणामतवोक्षाद्विवर्त्तायाग्यमेव
पर्यवसानात। अतो विकाराणामुपादाने कल्पिततवं वाचारमभाषामेयं।

1 Kāmika, Uttara bhāga, p. 113 reads महिष्ठारिणोः; Sivārocanā Candrikā reads महिष्ठारिणोः。
2 स्वाच्छ्यन्न चादनीयानि (My), स्वाच्छ्यन्न चादनीयानि (Sivārocanā Candrikā)।
3 रूपमिब (O).
शिवासेतनिषेध: ।

इत्येव यथादृश्यकार्यमति भाष्यकारार्थायामः ।

सूक्तकारस्य तथा मातिस्य तैनावं प्रणीते सहाभारते मोक्षस्वरूपः उपाये ॥
सुवर्णस्यांशेषकार्यस्यवादाय विवाचये । एवं हि तत्रोपाल्यायते— देवंहस्य
कन्या सुवर्णा जन्मान्तरसंसिद्धतया सहस्त्रसिद्धवर्धतस्वाभोजया खसदआः
पतिमन्विच्छन्ति शेषकेतुसुमहातकमुः तथासूक्ष्मस्वरूपः तद्वृत्तार्थः, पिलापि
तसैं दृष्टा । ततःस्य श्रवत्वस्वाभोजत्वोकत्र्या दस्यपतिभ्यां तदनुगृहन्याः श्रावित्वमात्राः
श्रवणयुक्तः गाहिष्ठ्यार्थात्प्रस्ताविताः स्थितातिमति । ततः तत्वेऽर्थं ब्रह्मचक्रारूपः
संबादो वर्णितः—

"तत: कदाचिद्वितौ श्रेष्ठकेतुं सुवर्णवः ।
प्रवच्छः को भवान्त्र वृहि मे तह्योजः ॥
तामाह भगवान् वाम्यी त्या झाटो न संशयः ।
ह्रियोजमाँस्ते सुमगे सत्तन्द्रपर्ययः ॥
सा तमाहास्मार्यानि प्रत्या शाश्विनमृ ।
तच्छुलः प्रत्युवाचानां स न वक्ष्यते भामिनि ॥
मनस्तैव समायुक्तमार्यान मन्यसेय श्यदि ।
तत्म्यागोत्रस्त्रोऽर्थे वरंते देववनन्यः ॥
अह्मियेव भावोऽवः त्वाधि चापि समाहितः ।
लक्ष्मणवहस्तं सर्वमहिमेऽव वर्तिते ॥
नात्र लक्ष्मणर्मां ॥ तदनम् लक्ष्मणुप्राचिः ॥” इति ।

अज संदिग्धायां तत्तदमसीतीतस्चक्त विप्रोपिद्यये: शेषकेतुः कथमाल्यानमवनदनस्य
अभ्यत इति जिज्ञासामायना सुवर्णेऽव र्षमाः “कस्तं ह्रियोजः” इति

1 माधवालाम्बन् (Br. V. p. 104).
2 सर्वं गुणिप्रत्याः (Do.) 3 इत्यमः नासित (Do.)
4 तत्त्वार्थ्याः (Do.; also O) 5 परिप्रेक्ष्या (O).
प्रश्न: क्वः। तत्त्वभावित्रयमवशक्षण्ति शेषकेतुना क्रमणं तयमथि सा चोखनीयति सत्या तत्रोघरकुकम् — डिजोभेति संवोऽध्यन्यस्य तथा शाश्वस्त्वस्मिच्छयाने च, किंचित श्रवणं — इति। तत् सुवचेतवया — देशुपाधिकी त्वेनात्मसि कलिपत प्रवश्यं भाषण्यं न प्रुच्छामि, किंतु डिजोभेति शाश्वस्त्वस्मिच्छयाने शब्देन देहात्विके हा। बसन्त् भमात्मानं निर्दिशामि तं प्रुच्छामि — इत्युक्ते तत्रोघरकुकम् — आह्वश्यवो मनःशचित्तालब्धस्य बसन्ते । ततु सिद्धांत्यसुवम्, वसिष्ठार्य भाषणकुलादिविजयनेन भाषणादिदेहश्चैव कलिपतरूपे भाषणादिदेहश्चैव। अतो भाषणरूपवर्तू, कलिपतत्वपत्वाद्वाध्मयोुपायसेस्यखुवत्र जिल्लामुम्नि: न प्रवणुद्याः। अर्थं चाहुमवल्लवम सत् च तिर्थक्षयांतनां सर्वपां च साधारण इत्यं प्रश्नं: परमाथेवक्ष्यत्वाभावादालसक्षूपं जिल्लामानयथा तवम् कथुू नाहः — इति। तदवन्तरस्य — कर्त्तव्येवक्ष्यत्वादिविचुक्तं अहमथं यदि कलिपतमवशक्षणसि तत्सवभ्रमिवाचनम् तं कथं तदरुपे तयमथिस्य अध्यायानं प्रव- चेतस — इति प्रश्नेषु तयस्, श्रनुपकारकेति। वसिष्ठज्ञ द्वेककसत्चार्यः प्रव- चेतस — इत्युक्तसुवम्। तदवन्तरवर्ते भविन्तामिति भ्रुच्छमनोधःश्च्यावर्तयं कथं तदवन्तं न श्वादिश्विश्वायाणं शच्यावर्तयं: सम्बंधपरम् चहेति तयोभोतिसि संयोगादिरूपः सम्बंधः, किंतु वाच्यवाचकमवालस्य इत्युक्तसुवम्। तदवन्तरं द्वंध्यो- रियं प्रश्चरपरम्परा —

सुवचेतवया

सदाभ्यात्रवल्लवम् विन्यासकालम् स्वभिस्तितः ।

कन वाच्यस्त्र वर्षेन इति सिद्धांत्य भक्ष्म्यति ॥

शेषकेतुः

अह्वश्चद्व चाहुमवल्लवम् प्रव-विचीन्त्येष वाचः सयुण्डक्षणः ॥

1 परमाथेवक्ष्यत ॥ 2 श्रनुपकारेष्व (Br. V. p. 105). ॥
शिखाइतिनिर्देशः

चांदीला—
अहंमात्मात् को नाम ह्यात्मात्मस्तथेषव च।
ततः मृत्ति च्यात्माट्याभेदं चेतनात्मस्तथस।

वेतकेतु—
सूप्तमुच्यहि बद्धामासः तामभाव इहेच्छधते।
अहंभावः परेद्विंक्ये ह्यात्माभावः परेऽस्माभाव।

तस्मादानं चिवर्चितं इति नेव विस्मित्यद्वारे।

हृति। अति शस्त्रार्थ्योवाचन्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धोऽस्ति चेतनाश्वातः कथमात्म-वाचको न स्याधिनिति प्रवेश छेते, अहंशंस्त्रो जातमनि श्रवणवृत्तवाय प्रमुख्यते,
किन्तुहास्त्रे ह्यस्तरसुखमथो। ततः को नामावमृणोवत् आलामृति प्रवेश छेते,
श्रृद्धि षट्यारः विषालाम्यांहभावः: कल्पत हृति तथा: विकेकं कुतवा— कल्पनः ताकारोपथानेन प्रवर्तिमानशवार्येन न ह्यालिमायपर्यंतं प्रवर्तिते, 
हृद्यक्ति-स्वर्यं राजात्मन्यद्वारे। अतः कर्त्तृत्वार्थ्योपाद्वारूप्लीक्ष्माक्षवाचकावस्तुः ह्यालिमानः
सकाशाशिष्यस्वातः न कम्बिदिदिग्धेऽरं— ह्यस्तरसुखमथो। तवन्तरं अहंमात्माति-
ष्ठ्रूट आलामृति नामप्राप्तविवाहित्यान्यूए व्रेप्ति सितश्चन्त्यत्यथा यथा आकारोऽप्रस्तुतः ह्याद्वामानसेल्पि तवस्सिद्धत्वमाध्यमाक्षारस्य, 
एवं श्रवणोऽपितमाध्यमाक्षारस्य हृद्याः। वेतकेतुनोपपादितं पुतरिः प्राविष्ठायाः—

चांदीला—

निर्विकारः हामूर्तः च निर्विशेषं सबंगं तथा।
हृद्यार्थ च विषालाम्यं वाचनात्मा न ह्यात्मे।

1 महानू पर: (Br. V. p. 105)
2 न वाचश्चत्र बिच्याते (Do., P. 105)
3 बद्धामास (Do. p. 105)
4 कल्पिताभाव (Do. p. 105)
शेषेकेतुः

तत्थ्यं गत्यं तथा प्राति व्योति: पद्यति चांदुष्या ॥
तस्मोगुरसमां कैव संघाजां तथैव च ॥
वर्ष तारागम्यं कैव नाकां दृश्यते पुनः ॥
आकाशवाच्यवाच्यां सदृढुपिति निपितम् ॥
सद्यं कल्पितं हेतुतत्सत्यं विभुरेः च ॥
याति नामाति गौणाति श्रवचारात्मकानि ।
व चांदुष्या न मनसा न चान्येन परो विमुः ॥
चिन्त्यं सृष्ट्यां बुध्या बाचा वक्तुः न शक्यवे ।
एतत्तपख्यातिं तस्मिनेव प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ इति ।

अत्र आकाशश्चत्वरप्रभाविष्यां ब्रह्म कुटो न हस्ततः इति प्रभृः, वायुवादेः
राकाशश्चत्वरप्रभाविष्यां; न तु बिविधवाच्यवाच्यः; यदेववाच्यो चौक्किकः
व्येषा गति: तथा किमु वक्तव्यमाध्वाध्वायसही जापेष्ये इति ब्रह्मानि ! अतः
सद्यं कल्पितं सर्वम्; तदेव सर्वं त्रयां च; गुणोपाधिना प्रत्वत्सानाः; सवैं
श्वाः: गुणे श्वाः निष्क्रियं तस्मिन् तत्रविवेदकमाणोऽस्यं मूर्त्वृत्तत्वा न प्रवत
चेतः—हत्युतरसुक्षमूः। अस्यां प्रभोत्तरसुत्तमरामाः, "शुद्धमयो धी षट्ठाभाः:"
इति ह्रद्यान्तोक्ता वाचारमभ्रणशुर्वम्:; "सदृढुपितिनिपितम्" इति प्रकृ
तस्य ज्योत्त्वं सदृढुपितिनिपितम् तस्मिन्वाच्यवाच्याः:; "सद्यं कल्पितं हेतुत
त्तत्सत्यं बिभुरेः च" हत्युक्तम् "प्रभोत्तरसुतिं सवैं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा"
इति शुद्धमयो निपितिनिपातजीवविभिन्नविनिर्देशवंस्त्रिक्वनुसन्धे वर्षित इति
स्पष्ट एवः ॥

1 सवर वस्तवे (Br. V. p. 115)
2 स्पष्टेव अः सृष्ट्यावर्तिः (0)
शिवाध्वेतनिर्णयः ॥
किं च मोक्षामेव एव प्रदेशान्तरेषु —
“निकेषचां परिण देव कालेश्वरं परसे तव ॥
एकोमात्स्यत्वमेव जलस्तु न मे सत्य अवेलुनः ॥
भेदवस्तुष्मदेव जानाति स यदा पुष्पात् ॥
तद्वा पुनः परात्मातो भवयेव निरुचनः ॥”

इशादिभिर्मेवः प्रतिपावतः ॥
“न भूतसाधसंस्थानो दृश्वोक्ष्य परमात्मनः ॥
ब्रह्मान्विन्यो ब्रह्मणुरत्साग्यो हरिः ॥”

इशादिभिन्नस्तवतादिकं प्रतिपाविदम् । ब्रह्मणुरणादिविशु च—
“प्रत्सरसमितिभवेऽव ब्रह्मान्तात्रात्रमोचरयम् ॥
वच्छादापासवेऽव तत्वानं ब्रह्मसंहितम् ॥”

इशादिभिषेषणां निर्ततसम्मेवदनिर्विन्नेषर्चिन्मात्रकुपत्रमुखम् । ततः
इशाद्वेतेव सूक्तकारामितमिति तद्गुहयात्रुसारः ततः तत्र प्रदेशे मायव-कौरूः। क्षुद्रास्त्वयं ब्रह्मव विभावितज्ञानं तद्वुसारिणाम् प्रदेशान्तरेषु विशिष्य-वैतात्प्रतिपावस्यस्मादुक्तकीयाविभागायो वर्णानि: ॥

तत्तु परेऽखः विशिष्याद्वेतेनिन्नुपमां । यथानेष्यां भाषे हुश्वाद्वेतनी-रूपमाः । तत्तु वदस्तुस्तवमितिवाभिमायेः। ते तु श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणामिति तेषां
इशाद्वेतसमास्तृत्य तत्वमां कल्पितं शक्तयम् । श्रीकण्ठाचार्यरिनधान: । कापि इशाद-द्वेतत्वः स्थरस्य ग्राम्बोणिस्यार्थतृ इशाद्वेताविपिदित्वात् । तद-धृष्टकारभेदः
विविधान्यज्ञानपर्यंतीत: । स्वरूपे परेऽन्ये क्षुद्रास्ते इशाद्वेतेनिराकरण एव सत्वामान-ल्याः । अतः श्रमाणिणां निर्विन्नेषर्च परमाण: तस्ता सावदोषयम् । तस्येव

1 This is a conjectural reading, no Manuscript being clear.
अपास्तवस्य or अपास्तवम् are, perhaps, better conjectures, corresponding more closely to the original, वृद्धप्रज्ञयः.
साधकायाय साविशेषप्राप्तस्य निपिन्तकल्याणगुणगणार्दित्यमंजुरिबिमह- विशेषविशिष्टस्य श्रव्याधिकारिकतंत्राचलमोपासनार्थूँ, अवभाविकारिकतंत्र- 
स्त्राविसाधारणोपासनातु च तस्य सर्वस्यापि उथाविशिष्टस्य। प्रतिपाद्य 'श्रीकण- 
णठायोगमेव' सार्थ्यं उपदेयायमिति सर्वं समवन्जसमुः।

इति 'श्रीमद्वधाराद्वाराजकृतज्ञहियकौस्तूमश्रीमद्वैद्वेदविद्याचार्य श्रीविद्या-
जिवाजिश्रीरघुराजाध्वंशविरिरसूनोरकविकव्' श्रीकण- 
साध्वादन्त्रीपत्यं वालिकाशस्य विरुद्धप्रर्कितव्यस्य

वीरभाष्यचिरिणोऽयं 'श्रीवादकृतिनिर्णयायः

ग्रन्थस्तपूर्णः।

सदांशिवपदाम्बोजन्यस्तधीरप्रविष्टः।

श्रीकणस्वभिमतं सर्वसारस्मिन्स्य समग्रहात्।

1. विविधम् (O)
2. This couplet is found only in O.
ŚIVĀDVAITA NIRMĀYA

AUM

Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācārya has expounded the doctrine of Śivādvaita; we consider here whether it is qualified- or non-qualified- non-dualism that is there upheld. One is led to believe that the first position is what is accepted from the statements of qualified-non-dualism and so on in the Āraṁbhāṇa (II, 1, 15, e¹ seq) and other sections; and that the second position is what is accepted from statements like "for the devotees of the Non-related, there is release even here," in the commentary on the aniyama section (III, 3, 82). Both of these positions cannot claim to be considered final; hence

1. The word "adhikaraṇa" has been throughout rendered by its nearest equivalent "section." An adhikaraṇa comprises one or more sūtras directed to the elucidation of a particular topic. It is divisible into five heads: the subject-matter, the doubt, the prima facie view, the refutation thereof and the final conclusion. This is the order in which they are enumerated by Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentary on I, 1, 1. The Vedānta Sūtras are cited throughout the present text and translation merely by numbers. When other works are quoted from, the name in full or in abbreviated form is always given along with the number of the page, verse, or sūtra. The Āraṁbhāṇa adhikaraṇa is directed to showing the non-otherness of effect from cause, the world from Brahman, with special reference to the Śrutī "Vācāraṁbhāṇam vikāro nāmādeyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam (Ch. VII, 1, 4)". Two interpretations of this text are offered by Śrīkaṇṭha. A discussion of them will be found later on, in the text.
one of these two must be determined to be conclusive. The present inquiry is undertaken for that purpose.

This is what appears here at first sight. It is seen that wherever Śivādvaita is dealt with or referred to by the ācārya in his commentary on the Brahma Mīmāṃsā, in all those places, (the position) is stated only as qualified-non-dualism.

Thus, for instance, in the ārambhāṇa section (it is said): “We are not (among) those who maintain absolute difference between Brahman and the world, as between a jar and a cloth, that being opposed to the texts which declare their non-distinctness; and we are not (of) those who maintain their absolute non-difference, nor do we declare the illusoriness of one of them, as in the case of silver and mother-of-pearl, that being opposed to the texts which declare difference between their natural qualities. Nor are we (of) those who posit both difference and non-difference, that (relationship) being opposed to fact. We are, however, of those who maintain qualified-non-dualism, as exists between body and the embodied or between a quality and the qualified”. So too (it is said) in the bhokṭrāpatti section (II, 1, 14): “what has been set out already as to Śiva alone, without a second—the Self qualified by the universe both intelligent and non-intelligent—becoming both cause and effect, that constitutes (the doctrine of) the qualified-non-dualism of Śiva.”

The position of pure non-dualism is refuted through the statement of objection and reply in the “Īkṣatyaadhikaraṇa” (the section beginning with Īkṣaternāśabdam, I, 1, 5). “Now, from (the words) ‘Existence alone this was in the beginning, one only without a second’ and so on, it is understood that the substance which is (but) of the nature of existence is free
from qualification, because of the exclusion (implied by *alone* in *existence alone*). How may that causal condition be said to be qualified by the universe in a subtle form?" Such is the statement of the objection. "By the exclusion (implied) in *existence alone*, what is excluded is not qualification, but the causality of what is non-existent; for, there is possibility of confusion as to the causality of the non-existent, because of the declaration, ‘Non-existence this was in the beginning; from that existence was born’ (Taitt. II, 7). Further, how does Brahman’s freedom from qualification result from (the text) ‘Existence alone this was in the beginning, one only without a second ’? ‘Was’ (refers to) a qualifying act; ‘in the beginning’ is a temporal qualification; the limitation ‘one only without a second’ excludes the existence of any other controller; the words ‘without a second’ declare the property of being the material cause of the world, and consequently, omniscience and omnipotence. How can Brahman become the cause of the world in both senses, in the absence of omniscience and omnipotence?”. This is the statement of the reply.

Qualified-non-dualism is established in the very same section, in the consideration of the primary significance of the word "Sat" applied to Brahman. "It is not proper to take ‘Sat’ which is of the form of both stem and suffix to indicate only one object; for through its stem and through its suffix it denotes two objects. Thus the dictum of the learned: ‘the word Sat indicates Sakti and Siva by means of the stem and suffix; they both are Brahman; through (their) harmony, they ensoul all the worlds.’ It is Paramesvara alone, as qualified by Sakti of the form of the world subtle and gross, intelligent and non-intelligent, that is the object denoted by the word ‘Sat’." The use of “Brahman” in the singular in that context is for the purpose of reminding (one) that
Sakti and Siva should not be understood separately, but Siva alone as qualified by Sakti; just as the singular (is used) in the Nyāya Sūtra "The meaning of a word is the individual, form, and genus (N. S. II, 2, 65)" to remind (one) that the individual, the form, and the genus are not distinctly signified (as being other than) the nature of the individual as qualified by the genus and the form. The qualification "they ensouled all the worlds" dispels the doubt that qualified-non-dualism does not result merely from the fact that the word "Sat" meaning Brahman denotes Siva qualified by Sakti, since there exists the inert world composed of ether etc.; (and thereby) it serves to show the inseparability of that (world) from Sakti and Siva, through the element of Sakti. The same is made clear in the later portion of the commentary (beginning with) the words "gross, subtle," etc. The meaning of the word "Sat" as explained there applies equally to the word "Brahman." Since the determination of the meaning of "Sat" is under discussion, that alone is taken.

Hence it is that in the section about bhūmā, (I, 3, 8 and 9) in explaining the word "Brahman" along with "bhūmā," all the worlds are shown to enter therein. Now, by the definition of bhūmā as "That wherein nothing else is seen, nothing else heard, nothing else known," how can it be declared that where the bhūmā is experienced, there is absence of all other perception? For, if the world exists, it is not possible to prevent the perception etc., thereof. (This objection) is raised in the words "when the world exists, how is it possible to prevent the perception by the released souls, of that which does not serve the goal of man?"; and the reply is shown by establishing that though the world is real it becomes the object of perception only as entering into what is signified by the word bhūmā, and not as separate therefrom.
"This material world is not indeed what is perceived by the released souls. Brahman Himself, of the nature of unsurpassed Bliss, comes within the range of (their) perception, in the form of the world." Thereupon is cited with approval a text which declares that the world becomes an object of perception to liberated ones, only as entering into what is denoted by the word Brahman which is of the same significance as the word bhūmā. "So, indeed, the Śruti (says) 'then he becomes that, Brahman embodied in ākāśa;' to released ones, after their attainment of release, the variegated universe, the object of perception, becomes Brahman qualified by Energy (Śakti) of the form of Supreme Light (paramākāśa), and comes within the range of (their) perception only in the form of Brahman." This sense is explained later in the commentary, on an elucidation of what goes before in the context (of the Śruti): "The released soul is praised in such words as 'he attains independence, he attains lordship of the mind (manas)' and so on. By (the words) 'lord of speech' and so on, is declared his possession of speech and other senses, pure, under his control and untainted by matter. On his attaining such a state, this visible variegated universe becomes Brahman Himself embodied in Light (ākāśa); this is the inner-significance (of the text)".

Again, in the fourth chapter, in commenting on the sūtra 2.222 "Bhāve jāgradvat, (if there is a body, then as in the waking state)" (IV, 4, 14), this sense is elaborated (1) by the (following) statement of objection and reply: "Now, if it be said that when

1. The text of the Śruti is, "āprnoti svārājyam, āprnoti manasspatim, vākpaticakṣṇapatiḥ, ēkottrapātrī vijñānapatiḥ, etat tato bhavati, ākāśa sartrām Brahmana, satyātma prāṇārāmam, mana ānandam" (Taitt. I, 6).
(there is) enjoyment in the nature of perception of the things of this world by released ones, then by their experience of what does not serve the goal of man, the absence of the train of bondage and suffering cannot be secured, no, (we reply), since there is no perception of the world by liberated ones in the form in which it does not serve the goal of man. This universe is indeed perceived as of the form of Brahman, by released ones"; (2) by his later citation of the text, "So, indeed, the Sruti, 'then he becomes that'" and so on; and (3) by his explanation thereof.

The answer to the objection "since the inert world exists, how can qualified-non-dualism result from the mere fact that words like Sat denote Śiva as qualified by Śakti", is indicated in the verse (cited as) authoritative, in the words "they ensoul all the worlds". This has been made clear by its being established in the Prakṛty-adhikaraṇa (I, 4, 23 et seq) and the following sections, that the entire universe is the transformation of Śakti. Qualified-non-dualism alone being thus expounded everywhere, how does the doubt arise as to the acceptability of pure non-dualism?

Further, the section "Na sthānato'pi" and the following one set out only to establish that the form of Brahman is characterised by stainless auspiciousness and exists in relation to the world, and that it is not devoid of qualities. Thus (proceeds) the first of these sections: the initial doubt is whether Brahman is endowed with attributes or not. For that purpose, (there arises) the doubt whether, in the case of Brahman revealed by texts like "He who stands within the earth etc.", the predicates of (1) residence in the earth and so on, (2) the possession of these as his body, and (3) the controllership of these are true or untrue. For that, the (further) doubt (arises) "if the predicates are true, will
the consequent defects (of such residence etc.,) affect Brahman or not?"

This being the position, the prima facie view (is as follows): If residence in the earth etc., embodiment therein and so on were true of Brahman, then just as for man there are defects bound up with the subtle and gross bodily conditions in the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, swoon and death, similarly would they (attach) to Brahman also; for, there is no difference (between the two) in respect of embodiment; because, (further) it is declared in the sūtra “Deha yogādvā so’pi (or it, the concealment, may be due to conjunction with the body)” (III, 2, 5) that the evils of transmigration are dependent on connection with the body; and (also) because, it is admitted by all that residence in bodies made filthy by (the presence of) faeces, urine, flesh etc, is as highly distasteful as residence in Raurava and other (hells).

Nor may it be said that while pleasure and pain are experienced by him who resides in a city belonging to a King, as a consequence of the King’s orders, to the King himself, though resident therein, that does not occur, and that the same (difference) may hold here also. The cause of the suffering consequent on the operation of the King’s orders, is not, indeed, mere residence in the King’s city; rather is it a special (consequence) of being subject to the King’s orders. The King indeed is not subject to his own orders. Hence, it stands to reason that the King though resident in his own city is untainted by the suffering consequent on the operation of his own orders. In the case, however, of evils experienced in the body, residence in the body is itself the cause. Hence, just as of the suffering connected with an evil-smelling prison, the presence in the prison is itself the cause, affecting him
who resides there, of his own will, as the governor thereof, in the same way as him who is cast in the prison cell, similarly the suffering consequent on the body will surely occur to him who is present therein as the controller, in the same way as to him who is bound therein.

2.312 Nor may it be urged that since suffering is controlled by karma, though Brahman may reside in the body, for Him who is free from karma, suffering consequent on bodily residence cannot come about. Even karmas only endow (different kinds of) bodies such as those of gods, men, cattle, birds, etc., suitable to the special varieties of suffering and cause the souls that enter therein to suffer. If for the Lord, embodiment in various bodies may come about irrespective of the suitable karmas, then, from the statement of the non-existence of karma, what (indeed) can be gained? It cannot, verily, be said that the suffering caused by evil smell etc., that may come to him who is cast in jail for transgressing the King's orders does not occur to the person in authority that enters the jail as its governor, merely on the ground of his not having displeased the King.

2.313 Further, experience of suffering will certainly come to Brahman, since, as present in all bodies, He becomes the object of denotation of such terms as Brāhmin and so on, which enter into injunctive and prohibitory statements; and being, therefore, unavoidably affected by the sins resulting from the disregard of injunctions, He becomes subject to karma. If it be said that because of the text about freedom from sin etc., (apahata pāpmatva etc.), there is no possibility of Brahman being subject to karma, (we ask), how can that text prevail against the conclusions that Brahman is the subject of denotation of terms like Brāhmin etc.
entering into injunctive and prohibitory statements and that He is subject to karna, (conclusions) that result if we accept as true the presence of Brahman in all bodies? Hence, because of opposition to texts which are purportful only as enjoining and prohibiting (action), that (other) text may be (declared to be) mere arthavāda, whose object is praise of Brahman; desiring to conserve its truthful character, in order to maintain it, one can only show that statements in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa (Bṛh. III, 7, 1, et seq) about residence in the earth, embodiment therein etc., are not true, but are figuratively made for the purpose of praise. This being done, there results consistency with the Brāhmaṇa statement “neither gross nor small, neither short nor tall” (Bṛh. III, 8, 8) etc., and of the Śvetāsvatara hymn “What is higher than what is higher than the world, that is without form and without pain (Śvet. III, 10),” (texts) which predicate flawlessness only in the absence of the body. Therefore, Brahman’s residence in the earth etc., His embodiment therein, His control thereof, the omniscience, omnipotence etc., needed for that control, all these are imagined. Brahman is free from qualifications; because of the text “Truth, knowledge, (Taitt. II, 1)” etc., only the form of Intelligence is to be admitted.

Here is the siddhānta: to Brahman in Himself flawless, 2:32 even though present in the earth and so on, defects do not attach. The dual characteristics of the absence of the taint of any defect and the presence of unsurpassed auspicious qualities are well known to belong to Brahman, from all texts, both Śruti and Smṛti, such as the following: “This Self, free from sin, old age death, grief, hunger and thirst, whose desires come true, whose purposes come true”; “the absolutely, innately pure Self is called Śiva, because of the non-existence of the beginningless taint of...
impurity”; “there is a certain abode of illimitable qualities, (who is) the controller of all the worlds, distinct from both the bound soul (pāśu) and the bonds (pāśa).” No defect can thus result here (for Brahma), since we hear of the absence of sin, old age, death, grief, and so on, consequent on connection with a body, as also of the presence of a host of qualities, viz., the entertainment of purposes which come true and so on, which are opposed to those defects.

If it be said that even here, though naturally endowed like the finite self (jīva) with freedom from sin etc., the consequent defects may attach to Brahma, in the state of connection with a body, (we reply) not so. It is only to cure that (doubt), that in each hymn of the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa, (Bṛh. III, 7, 1, et seq), beginning with “He who stands within the earth”, absence of defects is declared by the term “Immortal” in the statement “This Self, the internal ruler, immortal,”; in the Atharvaśiras, after the description of the entry of Śiva into all things as their internal ruler, in the words “He entered within that which is within”, by the gods who thereby understood the self-hood (of Śiva) in all things, the following words of praise are offered: “He who is Rudra and Brahmā, He is the Lord, to Him, verily, we bow”, “He (who is Rudra) and Viṣṇu”, and so on (A. Śirasasi, II, 1–32); in each hymn thereof, it is only to remedy the defects that may follow from connection with the respective bodies (of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara etc.,) that the entire host of lordly and other qualities, opposed to those defects, is predicated by the term Lord (bhagavān). Further, though Brahma and the jīva are connected with the same body, the difference in the enjoyment and non-enjoyment of the fruit of that (connection) is declared in the hymn “Two birds of beautiful plumage, inseparable friends” etc., (Śvet. IV, 6).
If it be asked "how is it possible, even then, to avert the distinctionlessness resulting from statements of formlessness and so on?", (we reply) thus: if two texts conflict, it is not meet to deny the significance of one of these by making it out to have an untrue purport. Rather is it proper to uphold both on the principle that "(all) traditional doctrine is equal (in authority)", by endowing both with true purport. Thus, the very texts which predicate Brahman's connection with bodies declare his non-connection with the defects resulting therefrom. In the text "What is known as ākāśa is, verily, the dispenser of names and forms; what is within that, that is Brahman, that is immortal, that is the Self, (Ch. VIII, 14, 1)," after declaring of the Supreme ākāśa, its controllership of name and form, because of its identity therewith as transforming itself into them, it is made out that, though immanence in name and form is mentioned of Brahman, yet by the statement of non-contact therewith in (the text) "What is within," (it follows that) for Brahman there is no identity with them, as in the case of ākāśa, but rather the relationship only of body and the embodied; if, indeed, there were identity, there would be occasion to suspect (the presence of) the defects thereof; that, however, does not exist; there is no occasion for the presence of defects of the body in the embodied; thus is the meaning (of the text) explained. Following this, it is proper to understand the text about formlessness also in some such manner as that Brahman is comparable to what is formless, that just as ākāśa etc., which are bodiless are not affected by flaws due to presence in the body, so also Brahman (is unaffected) and so on.

Nor may it be objected that the texts which declare form should be re-interpreted in some fashion because of their opposition to the declarations of formlessness, which are important, on the
ground that, as in the example of the governor who enters a prison, for Brahman present in the body, even if it be as controller, consequent suffering is bound to result; for, the production of suffering by things is due to control by karma, not to the nature of things, as is seen from wife and children, cold and heat, refuse and urine causing joy and sorrow, according to the differences in the time (of the experience) or the class of the object. Smṛti too says “That which was pleasant, later becomes painful; what was agreeable becomes disagreeable; hence, nothing is essentially painful or pleasant.”

2.324 As for the argument that, if Brahman be present in all bodies, because of His being denoted by terms entering into injunctive and prohibitory statements, there may be experience of suffering for Him also, as a consequence of sins due to the disregard of injunctions and prohibitions, necessarily attaching themselves to Him, that is futile. The understanding of the meaning of a sentence comes about quickly by relating terms like Brāhmin etc., only to what is primarily known thereby, i.e., the finite selves related to the respective bodies, in accordance with the preponderance of well-established usage common to both Vedic and worldly parlance; their function being thus fulfilled, there does not result a fresh understanding of the sense of the sentence through the relation of the purport of that very sentence indirectly to Ṣvāra, who is (only) remotely understood by having regard to what is derived from such doctrines of Śruti as those about Ṣvāra being the internal ruler of all, the controlled serving as bodies to the internal ruler, and terms denoting bodies having an extended application also to what is embodied. Hence, it is that in (the injunction) “the first is to be chanted thrice, the last thrice”, in understanding the sentence, the terms first and last relate only to what is soonest understood, viz., the first and last places, not to what are under-
stood later, as connected with the first or last places (in the particular sacrifice which is the model—the Prakṛti rite—), i.e., the Ṛks beginning with "Pravo Vājā" and "Ājuhotā."

Nor does it follow from the text about "Truth, Knowledge" (Taitt. II, 1) and so on, that the form of Brahman is Knowledge alone; for, as the form of Knowledge (is accepted) to safe-guard the non-futility of that text, the attributes of omniscience etc., should also be admitted in the interest of the non-futility of such texts as "He who knows all, he who understands all (Mu. I, 1, 9),", "the Lord of all, Sambhu, in the middle of ākāśa (A. Śikhā, III)", and so on, since there is no difference in the revealed character of both kinds of texts. And there being no conflict between the form of Knowledge and the other attributes, there is no need to discriminate between the two. If the text "Truth, Knowledge" etc., (Taitt. II, 1), declared that Brahman is of the form of Knowledge alone, then, indeed, there would be opposition (between that and other attributes). But that is not what it says, but only this much, that Brahman is of the form of Knowledge; that, however, does not conflict with attributes known from other texts. The attribute of "being golden" known from the statement "a golden crown" does not indeed conflict with the attribute of "being set with gems" known by perception. Further, the statement that few Vedānta texts predicate the attributes of omniscience etc., of Brahman, is too trifling; the entire host of Vedānta texts about Brahman shows His possession of attributes. There is not, indeed, any expression about Brahman in the Vedānta from the use of which does not result the absence of some defect or the presence of some suspicious attribute. It is well-known that the two-fold characteristics of Brahman are also established by sages who produced the Upabrahmanas of the Vedānta.
The non-attachment of defects to Brahman, though present in the earth etc., is established on the strength not only of the declarations of His two-fold characteristics by Śruti and Smṛti but also of the illustrations cited by Śruti. Thus (run) the illustrations cited by Śruti: "Just as the one ākāśa becomes manifold in jars etc., so also the one Self is present in the many, as the Sun in sheets of water." By the first of the similes is taught immanence in all (things) as derived from texts like "He who stands within the earth" etc. Thereby is answered the objection as to how one super-sensible Being (can be) present in many, either option, the presence of the whole or of a part, having to be rejected. By the second simile it is taught that, though present therein, just as in the case of ākāśa so present, there is no taint of defects resulting therefrom. Through that is the objection answered as how to for that which has (the many) for its body, there can be no experience of defects consequent thereon. It is the opinion of Śruti that there is difference in respect of subjection to karma and the absence thereof. Nor can the (following) objection be raised: the Sun while not present in the water is understood as present there; since, however, the Supreme Self, is not in the same way understood as present, while not really present in the earth etc., but is admitted to be really present in the earth and so on, non-contact with defects consequent on the limiting adjuncts cannot hold good of Brahman, as of the Sun. The example "as the Sun in sheets of water" is (cited) only to show the non-existence of the experience of resultant merit or defect, that just as the experience of increase and decrease consequent on the limiting adjunct, water, does not really occur to the Sun in the water, so too experience of merit or defect consequent on presence within the earth etc., does not occur to
Brahman. This results from the harmonious understanding of the two illustrations. By explicating the scope of (the simile) to the extent (of making out) the non-presence of Brahman in the earth etc., as of the Sun in water, the first mentioned simile would indeed, be nullified. Nor is there a rule that the illustration and what is illustrated should be similar in all respects; for, comparisons are made both in the Vedas and in worldly parlance only on the basis of similarity in respect of the particular quality intended.

Thus, a section consisting of ten sūtras beginning with “Na sthānata” etc., is devoted to establish that Brahman is endowed with attributes, that He is the abode of faultless auspicious qualities. After that, the same is confirmed by (the process of) objection and answer. A further section is made up of nine sūtras commencing with “Prakṛtaitāvatvam hi pratiṣedhāti tato brāvīti ca bhūyāḥ (it is the this-muchness of the context that the text denies; and it declares more)” (II, 2, 21). The doubt there is whether the possession of two-fold characteristics, established by the previous section, holds good of Brahman or not. In that connection arises this doubt: in the Brhadāraṇyaka, after stating of Brahman the form of the universe, sensible and supersensible, i.e., of earth, water, fire, air and ether, in the words “Two, verily, are the forms of Brahman, sensible and super-sensible” (Brh. II, 3, 1), there is the negation “then follows the teaching, not thus, not thus”. Does the negation so made have for its object the sensible and super-sensible forms declared of Brahman, so that what was said to be the form of Brahman, viz., the universe, sensible and super-sensible, is really not so? Or does it refer to the declared this-muchness so that the declared form, of the nature of the universe, sensible and super-sensible, does not alone become the form of Brahman, there being a host of other attributes as well?
This is the *prima facie* view: it is undisputed that by the negative prefix (najī) in (the sentence) "not thus, not thus," (there is) denial of what is signified by the world "iti" (thus); thus far, there is no dispute. The term "iti" (thus) which denotes a mode, relates to the mode already mentioned. And what are declared earlier are the two modes of Brahman, of the form of the worlds, sensible and super-sensible. Hence, it is proper (to hold) that the denial is of that. The repetition for the sake of comprehension, in "not thus, not thus," is for the purpose of demonstrating the denial in entirety of the two previously mentioned forms. Or else, the two-fold statement may have the purport that by one the sensible world is negated, and by the other, the super-sensible world. That the declared this-muchness is denied, is not (a) suitable (interpretation); for, that does not enter into the context, like the two forms; further, the two-fold statement is not purportful in that negation as in the denial of the two forms.

The siddhānta, however, is thus: (the knowledge of) Brahman's being qualified by the form of the worlds, sensible and super-sensible, being conveyed by Sruti itself in the earlier statement, and not being attainable by any other means of knowledge, cannot be negated by the succeeding statement, as contradiction will result between the earlier and the later, option not being possible in the case of facts, as (it is) in the use or rejection of the योधासिन cup. Hence, it is proper to conclude that the mode of the nature of the declared this-muchness, which is entertained in the intellect because of the earlier statement about being qualified by forms, sensible and super-sensible, is here denied.

Immediately afterwards, (the Sruti) predicates again a host of attributes in the residual sentences "there is verily nothing else higher than this 'it is not so.'" Then (comes) the name, "the truth
of the true. The senses are the true, He is the truth thereof" (Brh. 11, 3, 6). By the first statement "It is not so," it is said that a being, higher greater than this Brahman said to be within the range of the declared this-muchness, does not exist, thereby being asserted the quality of having none superior to Him. Though there may be none higher than Brahman, yet there are His equals, in respect of embodiment in the sensible and super-sensible world, and the control of both of them. There are indeed, among the inhabitants of this planet, adepts in Yoga, and released persons, in whom is (found) as much as in Brahman the capacity to control both (the forms), as embodied therein. To remove this doubt, the sentence beginning with "Then the name" etc., after mentioning the name "the truth of the true", gives the derivation thereof. By the term "prāṇa" the individual souls who control the senses are there indicated. They are of the nature of the true; they are unchanging, as there is no origination of their form from another form, as in the case of ether and so on. Superior even to these, is Brahman, the truth, since (for Him) there is no origination even in the sense of the contraction and expansion of knowledge, as in the individual soul. Hence, though in Yogins and in released souls, there may be, after the blossoming out of knowledge, the power to control the world at that time, that did not exist previously when knowledge was in a state of contraction. Hence it is held that Brahman alone is the eternal controller of all the worlds, that there is no finite self equal to Him. Or else, by the entire residual sentence only the absence of equals is taught; the absence of superior (beings) results by the argument a fortiori. In this position, this is the construction of the first sentence. "It is not so"—Brahman alone is higher, greater than the sensible and super-sensible worlds, (which are) the
correlate of the this-muchness that is negated; superior to this
world, as controller (thereof), there is none other than He. Or
else, this (other) construction (is possible): “it is not so”—other
than this Brahman, who is within the range of the negation of the
declared this-muchness, there is no great being, superior to the
world as its controller. In both of these constructions, there
is the merit that the word “other” in the text cannot be
thought to be purportless.

2.3331 Now, this residual sentence harmonises also with the position
which negates both the forms (sensible and super-sensible). How?
This is the meaning of the first sentence: “it is not so”—there is
no being higher than the two forms negated, which appears
to be other than this Brahman. The second sentence is for the
purpose of confirming that. By the term “prāṇa” signifying the
senses, sense-objects are indicated. Of the objects of know-
ledge, in the statements, “the lump of clay exists, the pot exists,
the potsherd exists, dust exists” etc., the lump of clay, the
potsherd etc., are variable reals, whereas Brahman is the real that
is constant along with whatever is known by the predication of
existence in all those judgments. The varying (forms) are seen to
be imposed on the constant (real), as garland, snake, a fissure in
the ground etc., (are imposed) on the “thisness” of the rope.
Hence, the variable pot etc., merely appear to be real; Brahman
is superior to them, the final truth; this is the sense of that
(text).

2.3332 If it be said that, since it is possible thus to interpret the
residual sentences in conformity with the understanding of “thus”
as referring to the two declared forms, any other mode of inter-
pretation is unsuitable, (we reply) that it would be so, if Brahman
could be an object of perception in the form of existence, like the
"thisness" of the rope. That, however, is not possible. Texts like "His form does not stand within the reach of vision, no one sees (Him) with the eye" etc. (Kaṭha, V, 1, 9) declare that Brahman, verily, is unmanifest, beyond the reach of perception and other (means of knowledge). The nature of Brahman is revealed by Himself to His worshippers, if pleased with the worship through the sacrifice that is meditation, based on firm devotion. This is understood from the following statements of śruti and smṛti. "This Self is not to be attained by discourse, by intelligence or by a multitude of texts; Him alone whom He has chosen, by him is (He) attuned; to him this Self reveals His form" (Kaṭha, 1, 2, 28). "This (Being) is to be seen by supreme devotion, by no other means whatever. Hari, and I, and Rudra and similarly other Gods and Asuras with fierce austerities are to this day desire to get a sight of Him." Thus, devout contemplation (saṃrādhana) is declared to be the means of the intuition of Brahman.

(The realisation of) even the lordship of the world is not different from the attributes of knowledge and bliss, in being the effect (of such meditation). Just as there is no difference between their knowledge and bliss and those of Brahman, so there comes to be no difference between their lordship over the world, and Brahman's lordship over the world. Hence it is that Lord Kṛṣṇa by the repeated practice of meditation, by uninterrupted concentration for a long period, attaining through intuition of Brahman, lordship similar to His over the world, is seen to reveal that to Arjuna in the Gītā. The exhibition by Agastya and Viśvāmitra of their capacity to drink up the ocean and to create another heaven, is seen from the Purāṇas. Nor is this improbable; even in our experience, it is seen that those who contemplate the
“Garuda Mantra”, attain through the meditation of Garuda, the distinctive property of Garuda, that of counter-acting poison by mere presence. Hence, it is but proper that some distinctive attribute of Brahman’s is realised by meditation on Brahman. It being thus settled that devout meditation is the cause of knowledge of Brahman, that its result is the attainment of His lordship and so on, it follows that because of the settled cause and effect not being seen in perceptions like “the pot exists” etc., the statement “not thus, not thus” denies the declared this-muchness, not the declared two-fold forms. How? The lordship manifested in those who have intuited Brahman may be said to be of a nature similar to Brahman’s, because of the text “the stainless one attains absolute equality (with the Supreme)” (Mu. III. 1, 3). Hence, just as it has to be accepted that Brahman’s nature of knowledge and bliss appears in them, so His lordship too has to be accepted (as appearing in them), as, otherwise, absolute equality does not result. Verily absolute equality is equality of all qualities in every detail, not merely some amount of similarity in respect of some one quality. Hence, since even in devotees of Brahman is seen the manifestation of the distinctive attributes—knowledge, bliss, lordship and endless other auspicious qualities, there is no room to dispute the conjunction of an infinitude of auspicious qualities with Brahman. Therefore, Brahman is certainly of two-fold character.

Now, if it be said that declaration of the world as of the form of Brahman, in “Two, verily, are the forms of Brahman” can be maintained on the (basis of the) relation of super-imposition between Brahman and the world, any other mode of maintaining it being impossible, and that, therefore, the statement “not thus, not thus” is suitably understood only as negating the
super-imposed world, no (we reply), since it is possible to maintain that the world is of the form of Brahman in other ways than by the relation of super-imposition.

That, indeed, is as follows: the term ‘rūpa’ is indicative of state, not of quality. As both unity and multiplicity are predicated in “Rudra is one only.” “All, verily, is Rudra,” it stands to reason to understand that what is declared of Brahman in statements like “Two are the forms of Brahman” is a multiplicity of states, like the multiplicity of postures of a single serpant such as being coiled, straight or crooked.

Or else, let there be but difference between Brahman and the world; even then, (the treatment of the world) as of the form of Brahman—in the words “forms of Brahman”—is valid, since from the text “All this, verily, is Brahman” everything is related to the form of Brahman as one genus. Though there is difference between luminosity and what is luminous, yet since they are related to the same genus, brightness (Tejastva), the usage “All this is of the form of brightness” is, verily, observed.

Or else, let neither of these two positions be accepted; on the first view, indeed, two defects—transformation and inertness—may attach to Brahman; on the second view too, that may happen, since the world, dependent on the genus Brahman, is also admitted to be Brahman. Hence, on both views, there will be conflict with all texts predating of Brahman freedom from faults. Therefore, (the relation) is to be taught here, as on an earlier occasion. Earlier, indeed, in the section “Amsa nānāvyapadesāt” (II, 3, 42, et seq), it is declared of the class of intelligent beings, that it is an amsa (element) of Brahman, as a particular mode of what is qualified, being of the same nature as inseparable attributes like light,
genus, quality, and the body. Let this be (true) of the class of non-intelligent beings as well; it is that which is said to be a form of Brahman; (hence) there is no flaw. In this way, the Puranic statement about things intelligent and non-intelligent constituting the body of Brahman (as stated in the verse), “The whole world of the nature of intelligence and non-intelligence is without a doubt the form of the all-pervasive Teacher of the Universe, for the reason that the Universe is under His control,” comes to have the same meaning as the text “He of whom the earth is the body” and so on (Bṛh. III, 7, 3).

2.34 From the negation of old age etc., of Brahman in such texts as “By the ageing of this, that does not age.” (Ch. VIII, 1, 5), “Not gross, not minute, not small, etc.” (Bṛh. III, 8, 8), the inference as to embodiment in the world is necessitated. Only if present therein, can we explain the declaration of the denial of the consequent defects, when there is a possibility of their being in Brahman. Hence, Brahman is flawless, possessed of attributes, related to the world. After having thus in two sections established of Brahman that He is endowed with qualities and connected with the world, in the section beginning with “Param atassetun-
māna-sambandha-bhode-vyapade-saḥḥyāḥ (because of the mention of bridge, measure, connection, difference, there is a higher Being)” (III, 2, 30), it is shown by statement of prima facie view and conclusion that there is no other real, higher, greater than this Brahman.

2.4 Further, the section “Ādarādalaḥ (Non-omission, because of emphasis)” (III, 3, 3.3) is set forth in the third chapter to prove that the attributes, physical form etc., of Śiva are true and eternal, not fictitious and impermanent. This is how (it is done). In the doubt whether Śiva’s physical form characterised by blue
throatedness etc. and His hosts of qualities like having purposes which come true, are but imaginary or the reverse, whether (consequently) any of them are to be dropped (in contemplation) or not, the prima facie view is (as follows).

It is acknowledged, because of texts like “Brahma is embodied in ākāśa,” “He who saucer in the form of Bliss, immortal” and so on, that Śiva’s physical form is of the form of Bliss. Nor does stoutness or thinness result for Bliss through the (the existence of) sides, throat, hands, fingers and so on. If that were admitted to happen, the possession of joy as the head etc., as declared of Brahman that is abundance of Bliss, in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, in the words “of him, joy is the head, satisfaction is the right wing, supreme satisfaction is the left wing, Bliss is the body; Brahman is the tail, the support” would also be true. In that case, what is concluded earlier in the sūtra “Priyāśira- śvādyaprāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede (having joy as the head etc., do not apply; with difference there would be increase and decrease)” (III, 3. 12) would be contradicted. Therefore, the physical form is imagined; and the collection of attributes mentioned therewith is also imaginary, that being opposed to texts (teaching) absence of attributes.

As for the siddhānta, (it is as follows). From the emphasis secured by repetition of (the qualities of) blue-throatedness, lordship of Umā, having purposes which come true and so on, the truth of the physical form and of the collection of attributes necessarily results. Since Śruti is authoritative, only as stated in the Śruti may (anything) be admitted, by those who take refuge therein. For the Supreme ākāśa of the nature of Bliss, change in the nature of increase and decrease is admissible; not so however, the possession of joy as the head and so on. It follows that they
are imaginary, since there is no means of ascertaining their significance, and further, they are mentioned along with the (clearly) imaginary wings, tail etc., of the (selves) of food and so on. If it be asked, what then is the purportful repetition here, we reply thus: in the meditation of (the Being within) the solar orb, in the words “obeisance to the golden-armed, golden-coloured, Him of the form of gold, the lord of gold”, there is repetition of the (idea of) lordship of Umā in different terms. In the Śrī Rudopaniṣad, there is repetition of blue-throatedness in the words “obeisance to the blue-necked one and the blue-throated one.” In the Dahravidiyā, (as) in the Kaivalyopaniṣad, the companionship of Umā and the possession of three eyes are mentioned together, in the words “The companion of Umā. Paramēśvara, the noble one, the three-eyed, blue-throated, gracious one” (Kaivalyopaniṣad I, 7). In the same Dahravidiyā, (as) in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad, there is repetition (of the ideas), through the words “dark and tawny”, “diverse-eyed”, in the statement “the person who is dark and tawny, whose virility is the (upward-rising) fire, who is diverse-eyed” (MN, XII, 1). So, also, the re-statement in the Śāndilyavidyā of the qualities mentioned in the Dahravidiyā, such as having purposes which come true and so on, is repetition.

How can re-statement due to differences of Śākhā (branches of the Veda) amount to (purportful) repetition? Where there are

1. The word abhyāsa has been used in the present context
to refer to such repetition as may convey significance, serve, in other words, as tātparya liṅga. Other repetition is but re-statement (punar-śīnaṇānam). In the translation, the wearisome re-iteration of the word “purportful” is avoided, it being understood wherever “repetition” is used, and not any other synonymous word.
differences of śākhā, re-statement is for the purpose of their being known by those who study the respective branches; re-statement where meditations are different, is for the purpose of having a knowledge of the various qualities (to be contemplated), since the qualities of one form of meditation cannot be understood in another, except by combination (upasamhāra). The re-iteration of certain qualities even in the same śākhā and meditation, is for the purpose of reminding (one) of the identity of meditation, (which is) serviceable to the combination with one another of the qualities mentioned. If it be said that re-statements which have thus other purposes, should not be considered as repetition, whereby significance may be ascertained, (the answer) is (as follows):

This is the sense of the section beginning with “Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya (Bliss and so on as belonging to the subject, have to be understood everywhere)” (III, 3, 11): the qualities of Truth, Knowledge, Bliss etc, the distinctive physical form of the nature of Bliss, qualified by blue-throatedness, companionship of Umā and so on, since all these are included in the definition of the essential nature of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, they are to be combined in every meditation on the Supreme, since they are required for the purpose of attaining to Him in experience, as distinct from all other deities such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc. It is also established in the Priyāśirastvādi section, which succeeds the above, that even the qualities of having purposes which come true and so on, attained by released ones, these too are to be combined in all meditations on the Supreme, since they are required there, on the principle that the fruit is of the same nature as the meditation. In both these, the cardinal principle of combination (of qualities) even where meditations are different, is only the need for the same. It is only on the same principle that, though (the
performance) of sacrifices, (the acquisition) of calmness etc., the wearing of sacred ashes, the repetition of meditations, the cessation and non-attachment of past and future karma as the result of the observance of meditation throughout life, and the distinctions of path and seasons, such as those of light and so on, all these are mentioned only in some one meditation or other, their being understood in all meditations on the Supreme is established in the Sarvāpekṣā (III, 4, 26) and other sections, by the removal of the special objections that arise in each case. Thus, since qualities like having purposes which come true, though mentioned in one place are understood in all meditations on the Supreme, their re-statement in other meditations, serving no other purpose, remains only as repetition capable of imparting significance. Hence, since by repetition emphasis is secured, physical form and the host of qualities are not to be omitted.

2·43 As for the texts predicating absence of qualities, (they), corrected by texts predicating qualities, continue (authoritative) as denoting the absence of objectionable qualities; for, on the principle of the padāhavanīya, it is desirable to postulate that mode of settlement which would secure authoritativeness for both texts.

2·5 The next section “Upasthite’tastadvacanāt (Of him who has approached Brahman; because of that being declared)” (III, 3, 40) is set out for the purpose of proving that Brahman attained by the released ones is of the nature of Śiva alone, endowed with physical form and qualified by eternal faultless attributes, that there is no Brahman, free from qualities, (and) transcending that (other), which is attained by the released ones. This is how (it is done): the doubt is whether Brahman attained by the released ones is other than Śiva or is Śiva Himself. For that, there is the doubt whether release is the attainment of the condition of Brahman without
qualities or the attainment of similarity to Brahman with qualities.

(This is) the prima facie view: hundreds of texts proclain the position that the Supreme Brahman is formless and attributeless and that the attainment of that condition is liberation. The text declares with emphasis that "being Brahman alone, he attains Brahman (Brh. IV, 4, 6)", "he, who knows that Supreme, Brahman, verily, becomes Brahman Himself, (Mu. III, 2, 9)." Therefore, Siva, endowed with form and qualities is not the Supreme Brahman; nor is the attainment of equality with Him, ultimate release.

But the siddhānta (is as follows): only Siva of the form above declared, is the Supreme Brahman; only the attainment of equality with Him is supreme release. Because, after the devotee has attained (Him) through meditation, as present within the small lotus (dahara puṇḍarīka) and so on, there comes about the manifestation of his own form, only as a consequence of which, there are his enjoyments, such as laughing etc., which are described in the texts "This serene being rising above the body, having reached the Supreme Light appears in his true form; he moves about there laughing, playing and enjoying, with women or vehicles or relatives (Ch. 8, 12, 3)" and so on; and further because, in the text "(the) stainless (one) attains supreme equality (Mu. III, 1, 3)", the attainment of supreme equality is declared of the stainless one.¹ The manifestation of one's own form or the destruction of the impurity called aṇjana does not indeed exist except in the condition of final release. The texts that deny qualities

¹ The expression niraṇjana, free from aṇjana, i.e., the impurity known by that name, for convenience, is translated here as "(the) stainless (one)"
like those which declare them of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, have the purpose of negating objectionable qualities. The particle "eva" in the texts "becoming Brahman alone, he attains Brahman", "he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman alone" (though apparently meaning alone), in conformity with texts about equality here means "iva (like)"; for, the "eva" particle is seen to be used in the sense of "iva" in the text about sleep "(he) becomes blind, sheds tears as it were, reaches annihilation as it were," where vināśāneva meaning annihilation alone, is used in the sense of annihilation as it were. Or else, this is the meaning of the two texts: "he attains Brahman only after obtaining Brahman's nature through the expansion of knowledge; he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes himself capable of expansion through the expansion of knowledge. Thus, Brahman is only (that Being that is) endowed with attributes, possessed of physical form, connected with the world and with qualifications, not devoid of qualifications; in the system of Śrīkanṭhācārya who has established qualified-non-dualism as the final conclusion, by himself establishing (the above conclusion as to Brahman) in many places, and by expounding that sense through the sūtras in several sections, where is the room for imagining that pure-non-dualism is his final view?

For those who take their stand on Brahman without qualities, release without any need of departure (on the path of light etc.,) is declared in the words of the aniyama and other sections, "for devotees of what is non-related. there is liberation even here"; since, (however) that declaration begins with the words "Some say", it is clear in every case that it is a statement of opinion other than (the author's),

And as for the conclusion in the sūtra "Sastradṛṣṭyātūpadeśo
Vāmadevavat (The instruction is due to the insight based on Scripture, as in the case of Vāmadeva)” (Iī, 1, 31) and other such sūtras, that the cause of release is the devotee’s contemplation of non-difference with Śiva, that relates to imagined non-difference. Hence, it is that in the commentary on the sūtra “Prakāśādvaccā vaiśeṣyam prakāśaśca karmaṇyabhyāṣāt (And there is non-difference as in the case of light; and the light is intuited by repeated meditation)” (III, 2, 24), occurring in the Prakṛtaitāvattva section, it is shown that the basis of the contemplation of identity with Śiva is imaginary, by means of the illustration of the contemplation of identity with Garuḍa, the basis of which is imaginary; (these are the words of the commentary); “The manifestation by Kṛṣṇa and others of His (Brahman’s) lordly qualities by contemplation of identity with Him, is seen in the words ‘I give thee celestial vision; look at my lordly Yoga (my identification with Īśvara).’ By the repeated contemplation of (identity with) Brahman, in Viśvāmitra and Agastya (are seen) the capacity to create another heaven and to swallow the ocean; in (our) experience too (there is) the attainment of the distinctive qualities of Garuḍa by magicians, through contemplation of Garuḍa.” Even by Sudarśanācārya in the “Tātparya-Saṃgraha,”1 only this illustration of contemplation of identity with Brahman is cited; “Padmanābha is said to be the Supreme Brahman, and the Supreme Real, the Supreme Light, and the Supreme Lord, since delighting only in contemplation of Thee, he is non-different from Thee, as the magician by contemplation of Garuḍa, is non-different from Garuḍa” (“Śruti-Śūkti-Mālā,” verse, 42). It is reasonable to hold that that is the opinion of Śrīkanṭhācārya too, who follows him.

1. This is the “Catur-Veda-Tātparya-Saṃgraha,” known as the “Śruti-Śūkti-Mālā.” The author had another name-Ḥaradatta.
Now, if the commentator's vision is directed to qualified-nondualism and the difference of the finite self from Brahman, then what is said in the janmādi section (I, 1, 2) and the Ārāmbhaṇa section (II, 1, 15, et seq.) about Brahman of the form of existence being the object of such perception as the "pot exists", fails to fit in (to the system): (those statements are as follows): "Material causality of all results for Brahman, the persistent existential element in all things, (as seen from the judgments) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists'. It is of pots etc., of the nature of clay, that clay is regarded as the material cause" (I, 1, 2); "if it be said that just as the presence of clay is seen in (the judgement), 'the pot is clay,' the presence of Brahman is not similarly seen in (the judgment) 'this world is Brahman', (we reply that) the presence of Brahman of the form of existence is certainly seen in all, (as in the judgments) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists' " (II, 1, 16). This statement (is made) for the purpose of giving room for the inferential conclusion as to the illusoriness of the world (on the ground) that the variable pot, cloth and so on are imagined in the continuous existent Brahman, like snakes etc., imagined in the thisness of the rope. Nor may it be objected that the statement is for the purpose of exhibiting the material causality of Brahman, that (purpose) alone being explicitly mentioned. If, of Brahman, material causality of the variety that transforms itself into the effect, as non-different therefrom, were acceptable, then indeed, for the purpose of explaining it, perceptions like "mud pot", "mud jar" which make one understand the non-difference of the effect from the material cause, would have to be cited in illustration. And Brahman being the material cause of the world in that fashion, is not acceptable to Śiṅkaraṇaśārya, that (view) being refuted in the Prakṛti section (I, 4, 28 et seq.). Hence, it is proper to take
this as an illustration of another mode of presenting the perception of imagined identity, analogous to the perception "this is a serpent" or "this is a fissure in the ground" in the rope.

Thus, in the Atṛ section (I, 2, 9 et seq), while commenting on the first half of the "Yadā tama" hymn (Śvet. IV, 11) the word "tamas", darkness, is explained by the (following) objection and reply, as referring to the ignorance prevalent among finite selves at the time of the deluge: "Now, if it be asked how can the world be of the nature of darkness, if the eternally luminous Śiva, the Supreme Brahman exists, no, (we reply), for, what defect can there be in the self-luminous Śiva, the witness of all? For the finite selves lacking bodies and sense-organs capable of apprehending objects, which as devoid of name and form are incomprehensible, there is no apprehension of the world, through their own cognitive faculty, enveloped in impurity; even for the self-luminous Śiva, there is no apprehension as before (the deluge). Hence, the final state, of the nature of Supreme sleep, marked by the absence of all diversity of effects, is called tamas (darkness)"; then in commenting on the latter half of the same hymn, in the Prakṛti section (I, 4, 23 et seq) in the words "the dispeller of the darkness of that period, the Supreme Prajñā, the energy of Knowledge, of the form of the great manifester, came forth", there are predicated of the Intelligence-Energy (Cit-Sakti) of Śiva, the function of dispelling the darkness, of the nature of ignorance,—(which is) declared in the first half (of the hymn), (to be) of the nature of ignorance among the finite selves—and the function of manifesting objects like pot, cloth, etc., to finite selves, (as seen from the name) the great manifester.

In the śrambhaṇa section, it is shown that the manifestation experienced in finite intellects, as "the pot appears to me" is of
the nature of Brahman's Intelligence, in the words, "If the world were not pervaded by Śiva of the nature of existence and intelligence, then, deprived of existence and manifestation, how could it be seen to exist or to appear? It would be but unreal" (II, 1, 16). Of the happiness experienced by the finite self when he says "I am happy", it is said in the following works of the ānandamaya (I, 1, 13 et seq) and the abhāvam Bādari (IV, 4, 10 et seq) sections, that it is of the nature of a fragment of the supreme Energy that is of the form of Brahman's Bliss: "Of the self of Bliss, it is declared in the text 'This, verily, causes delight', that He is the cause of the bliss of finite selves. Only he who is full of Bliss himself can cause delight to others" (I, 1, 15); "Who indeed could breathe, who could live, if this ākāśa that is Bliss, were non-existent? This, verily, causes delight. He is the essence: having obtained this essence, one becomes blissful;" in these words, it is declared of that (Cit-Sakti) that it is the object of all enjoyment; thus it is that the gradations in the manifestation of Bliss, up to Brahman, due to obscurations by limiting adjuncts, are declared in the text commencing with 'This is one bliss of a human being' up to "This is one bliss of Brahman'" (IV, 4, 14); all this fails to harmonise (with the view of difference between Brahman and the finite self). This is indeed (taught) for the purpose of expounding the non-difference of finite selves from Brahman, for, it is inconsistent with the view of difference, since one's knowledge does not result from another's nor one's bliss from another's bliss.

282 If such an objection be raised, it will be said that it is not the view of the Ścārya that the perception "the pot exists" etc., has for its object Brahman that is the Viśeṣya element (i.e., the subject of qualities). For, in the Prakrttātāvattva section (III, 2, 21 et seq) directed to inquire with the correlates of the negation in
the text, "then the teaching 'not thus, not thus'," this doubt is raised: "now, Brahman of the form of existence that persists in (such perceptions as) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists', etc., is real; other variable objects like pot etc., are negated by the text in the statement 'not thus'"; then, introducing by way of reply the sūtra "Tadavyaktamāhahi (the Śruti says indeed, that it is manifest)" (III, 2, 22), the purport of that sūtra is explained by himself in the words: "Brahman's form is not manifested by other means of knowledge, such as perception. For the reason stated by Śruti, 'His form does not stand within reach of vision, it is not perceived by the eyes' and so on, it follows that the existence cognised through perception is not Brahman." Therefore, the two texts cited above from the janmādi (I, 1, 2) and the ārambhāna (II, 1, 15, et seq.) sections should be related to the attributive element of Brahman (i.e., that aspect which is made up of attributes, in other words, Cit-Sakti). For, by accepting the transformation of that into the form of all the worlds, the suitability results of explaining by the illustration from perception of non-difference. Nor may it be urged that since in the Ikṣati section (I, 1, 5, et seq.) Brahman is himself said to be existence, it is not proper to predicate of Him the experience of existence. For, it is just as reasonable to predicate existentiality of Brahman, though He is Himself existence, as to predicate Knowledge and Bliss of Him, who is himself the knower and the enjoyer. As for what is said of individual knowledge and enjoyment of objects being fragments of Brahman's Knowledge and Bliss, that holds even if Brahman and the finite self are different. For, just as the distinct hearing of various individuals belongs to the ether as delimited by the hollow space in (different) ears or to 'space' as delimited by the cardinal points, the distinctively individual
cognitions and enjoyments may be recognised to be elements of Brahman's Knowledge and Bliss, as particularised by their respective internal organs (antaḥkarana).

Now, in the abhāvam Bādari section (IV, 4, 10 et seq.), it is said without reference to delimitation due to the functioning of the internal organs, that the form of the supreme goal enjoyed by liberated ones, is but the replete, unlimited Bliss of Brahman. Then, after praising it in the words "It is the Supreme Energy of the form of the Supreme Primal Being, the Highest Existence, the Harmony of Resplendent Bliss, that, as the form of Brahman, is called the Supreme ākāśa, which is the means of attainment of the goal directly for Brahman and the released souls, indirectly for the rest" (IV, 4, 14), after expanding the sense of "indirectly for the rest," in the passage beginning with the words "Thus, indeed; 'who, verily, can breathe, who can live', and so on, and ending with the words "the manifestation of Bliss is declared as of (varying) grades", the sense of the passage, "that which is the means of attainment of the goal directly for Brahman and released souls" is explained, through the statement "That Bliss is present in full in Brahman and the released ones, without limitations, because of the text 'and of the sage untormented by desires'." Then raising the objection as to how, if the sage untormented by desires is a released soul, there can be a declaration of the experience by the sage untormented by desires of the bliss of human beings and so on, ending up with the bliss of Prajāpati,—which are (but) fragments of the Bliss of Brahman, manifested in varying degrees, because of the distinctive nature of limiting adjuncts—it is said in reply, "The wise one, the sage untormented by desires, is he who performs agniḥotra and other rites, without desires and with intellect dedicated to Brahman. Of that liberated one, and of Brahman, the bliss is
equal. In the case of him, who, by the excellence of his meditation (Yoga), transcends each stage, realising that what is gained at each prior stage is little, the bliss manifested to him at each stage may be compared to the bliss of human beings and so on; thus there is no contradiction.” How is this consistent with the view of difference between Brahman and the finite selves? To the happiness of another, not appropriated as distinctly one’s own, by some special act, the character of being the Supreme human goal to be experienced cannot surely attach.

If this (objection) be urged, it does harmonise (we reply), for, it is the Supreme Energy of the form of the Transcendent Bliss of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, that is acknowledged by the commentator to be of the form of the whole world, intelligent and non-intelligent. Hence, from the non-difference thereof in essence from the finite selves, there results blissfulness in essence; and from non-difference in respect of their qualities, of the nature of their respective intelligence-energies, (there results) blissfulness in respect of attributes. But to those, who, enveloped in impurity, are bound in the migratory cycle, that (Supreme Energy) does not shine either in itself or as non-different from them in respect of essence or attribute; therefore, it becomes an object of human endeavour, (only) as a fragment admitting of gradations, due to the limitations imposed by the special activities of the respective internal organs. As for liberated ones, it shines in all these three ways (i.e., in itself, and as non-different from them, both in essence and in attribute), hence, impartibly and fully; this is the difference (between the two experiences). It (Cit-Śakti) becomes the goal of man, in the form of Bliss, which is an attribute of Brahman and the liberated ones alike; this is made plain even in the present commentary, in the words “This
bliss is present in full, without taint or limitations, in both Brahman and the released souls” (IV, 4, 14). Therefore, even if the finite self be different from Brahman, the Bliss of Brahman may appropriately be the goal in respect of finite selves; in conformity with this, there is no need to suspect any flaw in the view explicitly declared by the commentator as to the difference between Brahman and the finite selves.

This has, indeed, been declared clearly even in the amśa section (II, 3, 42, et seq). There, the prima facie view being stated that Brahman Himself, because of the influence of limiting adjuncts, real or fictitious, attains the form of the finite self, as a consequence of the refutation thereof, it is established of the finite self, that it is an element of Brahman, being of the nature of a particular attribute of the qualified Brahman. Four of the sūtras of that section—“Ābhāsa eva ca (they are but fallacious arguments)”, “Adhātā’ niyamāt (since the unseen principle exercises no regulative influence)”, “Abhisandhyādīśvapi ca ivam (so also of the desires and so on)” and “Pradesāditi cennam, antarbhavāt (if it be said, because of difference of place, no, since they are all included in Brahman)” (II, 3, 49—52)—are directed to the refutation of prima facie view that Brahman Himself attains the nature of the finite self by either the limitation of ignorance or real limiting adjuncts. Therefore, the final conclusion of the ācārya is the position of qualified-non-dualism—that Brahman is qualified by Energy of the form of the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, not the position of pure-non-dualism—that Brahman is attributeless, formless, and unrelated to the world.

Though this is what appears from beginning to end, yet on a careful examination of the implications of the commentary, pure-non-dualism alone is (seen to be) the final conclusion.
Thus the śūtra "Aniyamasarvēśaṃ avirodhaḥ satānunmānā-bhyāṃ (No restriction; there being no opposition to any text revealed or inferred)" (III, 3, 32) favours this view. The commentary is first directed to the restitution of the *prima facie* view that departure on the path of light etc., are to be understood only in those meditations like the Upakāśā Vidyā where they are mentioned, not in other meditations, since they are not heard of (there). There is no restrictive principle that departure on the path of light etc., are (confined) only to those places where they are mentioned. They come in, rather, in all meditations on Brahman. Only then is there no contradiction of the following Śruti and Smṛti texts, "Those who know this, and those who in the forest meditate upon Faith and Truth, etc.," (Ch. V, 10, 1); "Fire, light, day, the bright half of the month" and so on (Bh. G., VIII, 24). Then comes this commentary: "Some say, 'No restriction', there is no restriction as to departure along the path of light etc., in the case of all devotees. Even if that be so, there is no contradiction of Śruti and Smṛti." Though this appears to be the statement of an opinion other than his own, yet he says later, "Even to that (interpretation) there is no objection, since, for devotees of that which is Non-related, there is no need of that (travel along the path of light)", explaining thus the non-objectionable nature of the other interpretation, on the ground of the needlessness of the departure on the path of light for devotees of Nirguna Brahman, as if by a reason acceptable to himself; hence, it has to be inferred that both interpretations in the form of two varṇakas are recognised as expressing his own

1. A varṇaka is one of several interpretations of the same sūtra, where the interpretations are fundamentally different, not different ways of expressing the same conclusion.
position, the first of these for the purpose (of showing that the path of light etc., is) common to all meditations on the qualified Brahman, the second for the purpose of negating its applicability to meditation on Brahman without qualifications.

3.12 Similarly, the other opinion is expressed even at the close of the Tadāpīteḥ section (IV, 2, 8, et seq.). This is how that section (goes).

3.121 The doubt is whether the departure taught in the prior section "Samānāca aṣṭtyupakramādamṛtatvam ca (equal up to the commencement of the departure and immortality)" (IV, 2, 7) and the subsequent departure apply to the enlightened one or not. They do not apply; for, attainment of Brahman even here is declared by Śruti in the case of the enlightened ones, in the words "when released of all desires that entered the heart, then does the mortal become immortal, then does he attain Brahman" (Bṛh. IV, 4, 7). (Further), modes of departure etc., in the case of the unenlightened are declared in the statements relating to the mode of departure, the attainment of another body, enjoyment of the fruit of karma (while) in that body so long as the karma lasts, and the return to this world, having acquired fresh karma, (in the words) beginning with "the tip of his heart glows, by that glow, this self goes up" (Bṛh. IV, 4, 2), and ending with "So much for him who desires," (Bṛh. IV, 4, 6); departure of the enlightened one is then denied in the words, "he who does not desire, who is desireless, free from desires, desiring the Self, with desires satisfied, of him the vital airs do not depart; being Brahman, he attains Brahman" (Bṛh. IV, 4, 6). Nor may it be objected that it is of the enlightened person that departure and travel along the path of light etc., are predicated in the following texts—"Those who know this" etc., (Ch. V, 10, 1), and "going
up thereby he attains immortality” (Kaṭha. VI, 16). For, since at the death of the enlightened person, the merger of all subtle elements, viz., speech, mind, vital air in the Supreme Divinity, Brahman, is declared in the text, “Of this person, dear one, speech is merged in mind, mind in the vital air, the vital air in fire, fire in the Supreme Divinity” (Ch. VI, 8, 6), for him there can be neither departure nor going, dependent on the (possession of) the subtle elements—the senses, mind and vital air. (Again), since the Supreme Brahman is everywhere, there is no need for departure or going. Thus, the texts asserting attainment of Brahman even here, and denying departure, (prove) stronger by showing (their own) consistency and avoiding the inconsistency (of the contrary position). In conformity with this, the texts about departure and going should be said to relate to that knower of Brahman, whose object is liberation by degrees. Nor may it be said that in the text, “of this person, dear one,” etc., merger of speech and the rest, in the Divinity, is declared in respect of function only, not of their essence, since, on the latter interpretation, the departure common to both enlightened and unenlightened persons being described, merger of being in Brahman would result (even) of the speech etc., of the unenlightened, and it would not be proper to adopt a fresh interpretation of the expression “merges” in that case (alone). Since the text cited occurs in the context of the Sad Vidyā (the teaching of Reality as Existence), (Ch. VI, 2), and the Rūpa Vidyā (the teaching about the colours of elemental fire, water and the earth, as constitutive of the visible fire, Sun, Moon and Lightning, Ch. VI, 4), the departure described therein relates only to the enlightened person; further, even though of the expression “merges” as related to the merger in mind and the rest, the meaning is merger of
function alone, yet on the principle adopted in the śūtra "Syāc-caikasya Brahma śabdavat (different senses may hold good of the same word, as of the word Brahman)" (II, 3, 4), the sense of merger of being is preferable, as suitable in relation to the Supreme Divinity. The above is the *prima facie* view.

3·122 Now for the siddhānta. Though Brahman is present everywhere, only on the attainment thereof at a particular place, is there release from the bonds of the body; the bodily bonds continue until the stage of attainment; for, from the declaration of the destruction of the bonds of karma only on reaching the abode of the Supreme Brahman, after crossing the river Virajñā, it follows that the subtle body caused by (those bonds) continues to exist. Hence, the mention of the path of light etc., in various places, is only for the purpose of the attainment of the fruit of release, since their mention is in connection with meditations whose fruit is release, and since there is need of that (path). As for what is said about the inappropriateness of going, in the case of the enlightened, since speech and the rest are merged in their being in the Supreme Divinity, that is not (true), for the reason that even after the falling away of the (gross) body, a subtle body continues for the enlightened one, that being seen on the authority of the text about discussion with the Moon and so on. In the Paryanka Vidyā is declared the enlightened one's discussion with the Moon, on the path of the Gods; beginning with the words, "those, verily, who depart from this world, they all go up only to the Moon", it goes on thus: "this Moon is the door-way to the world of Heaven. Him who answers, he (the Moon) sets free. He who does not answer, (the Moon) showers him down here as rain. He is born here as a worm or a moth or a bird or a tiger or a fish or a bull or a man or anything else, in various places,
according to his deeds and his knowledge. Him arriving, one asks, ‘Who art thou?’ To him he should reply,’’ etc., (Kauśitaki, I, 2). Hence, in conformity with this, the text “then the mortal becomes immortal” should be interpreted to declare only imminence of the attainment of immortality, not to declare immortality even on the cessation of connection with the body. It cannot be said that on the destruction thereof, immortality is declared, since the subtle body may be known to exist in some place; even in enlightened ones about to depart, somewhere, a quality of the subtle body is, verily, seen, viz., heat; that is not a quality of the gross body, not being perceived elsewhere (as in corpses, etc).

As for what is said about the departure of the vital airs of the enlightened one being denied by the text “of him, the vital airs do not depart”, that is not (true). What is denied there is the departure of the prāṇas from the embodied one, not from the body, since the words “of him” relate to the finite self of the context, spoken of as one who has no desires.

Now, by the possessive “of him”, the finite self is indicated as that which is related to the prāṇas, not as the basis of ablation (apādāna). The apādāna is certainly the body. There being no question of the departure of the prāṇas from the finite self, the denial thereof is inappropriate.

If it be objected thus, no (we reply). If a basis of ablation be needed (to complete the sense), in preference to the body that is not mentioned, the finite self which is mentioned as related (to the prāṇas) should be understood; further, since of the prāṇas understood to be in relation to the

1 The basis of ablation (apādāna) is that from which something departs.
finite self, the statement of their Relatedness would be unfruitful, the possessive which mentions bare relationship should be preferably interpreted to connote the specific relationship of ablation, as in "He listens to (the singing) of the actor" and so on, (where the bare possessive "of" means "proceeding from"). That the finite self alone is the apādāna is clear in the recension of one branch, the Mādhyandinas; their reading is: "Na tasānāt prāṇā utkramanti, (from him. the prāṇas do not depart)". Nor is there the fault of denying what there is no possibility of; for, there is the possibility of the prāṇas leaving the enlightened soul, even at the very moment (of death), because of texts which speak of the attainment of Brahman even here, as in "He attains Brahman here" (Bṛh. IV, 4, 7) and the rest. The departure even of the enlightened one through the (101st) artery in the head has also the support of Smṛti; "Of those, there is one (artery) that goes up splitting the solar orb; by that (artery) passing beyond the world of Brahman, one reaches one's Supreme destination" (Yājñavalkya Smṛti). Thus is this section set out in the six sūtras (IV, 2, 8 to 13), "Tadāpiṣṭeh samsāra vyapadeśat (since the state of bondage is taught, until the attainment of that)", "Śukūram pramāṇataś ca tathopalabdheḥ (of subtle form, that being seen)", "Nopam mardenātaḥ (hence, not at destruction)", "Asyaivacopapatterūṣmā (heat is consistent only with that)", "Pratīṣṭadāriti cenna sārīrāt spasto hyekeśām (if it be objected on the ground of denial, no, from the embodied one; it is indeed clear in the reading of some)", "Simaryateca (this is also supported by Smṛti)."

By having thus established departure and going in the case of those who meditate on Brahman, the attainment of Brahman here, by those who know Brahman without attributes, may be
taken to have been denied; it is to remove this doubt, that the
opinion mentioned at the close of the aniyama section
(III, 3, 32), is mentioned again at the close of the present section
also, in the words, "Some say that for devotees of what is Non-
related, there is liberation here, even with the falling off of the
(gross) body, passing along the path of light etc., not being
obligatory (on all)" (IV, 2, 18).

This is the opinion of the śānyā who holds the above view: the statement "of him, the vital airs," etc., is made after finish-
ing with the unenlightened one in the words "So much for him
who desires" and undertaking to say something different about
the enlightened one, in the words "Now, as for him who does
not desire" and so on; it would appear that in consistency with
the implication of that undertaking to declare something special
about the enlightened one, that sentence should deny the depart-
ture of the vital airs from the very apādāna from which they are
declared to depart previously in the case of the unenlightened one.
The departure of the vital airs of the unenlightened one has been
declared previously, as (taking place) only from the body; "that
departing, the vital air departs therewith; the vital air departing,
the senses depart therewith" (Bṛh.IV, 4, 2). The departure of
the vital airs and the senses is said to occur from the very place
whence the finite self is said to depart; thus ends the description of
departure along with the finite self. There is no dispute about the
departure of the finite self being said to be from the body alone.
Since, thus, the text "of him, the vital airs" etc., is most suitably
understood as denying departure from the body as apādāna, for what
reason should this be abandoned? It cannot be said that while in
conformity with the principles (of interpretation), the finite self
alone which is mentioned in connection with the vital airs may be
understood as the apādāna, the postulation of some other apādāna, not present to the mind, is unwarranted; for, of the body mentioned in the prior context as the apādāna, there is presence (to the mind). "Prajāpati gave a horse, to (the god) Varuṇa; he then obtained that deity (i.e., he caught the disease of that name); he suffered much; he thought of a sacrifice to Varuṇa, on four potsherds; he performed that sacrifice; thereby, he was relieved of the suffering caused by the bonds of Varuṇa (the disease)."

From the drift of this introductory passage, it would appear to one that the performance of a sacrifice to Varuṇa on four potsherds is about to be enjoined on him who makes a gift of a horse. What follows, however, is "He who accepts a horse, catches hold of the disease.—Varuṇa; as many horses as he accepts, so many sacrifices should he offer to Varuṇa on four potsherds (for each sacrifice)." In this injunctive text, directly prescribing the sacrificer, though there is the expression "he who accepts a horse," it is not thought that the duty to sacrifice belongs to him who accepts. What more should be said to show that here, in the absence (even) of a text mentioning the finite self as the apādāna, the postulation of that as the basis, merely on principles (of interpretation) is not to be thought of? Nor (is the postulation necessary) in view of the later context. For, what we hear later is only this much: "Being but Brahman he attains Brahman. On this there is the verse: when all the desires that entered the heart are resolved, then, the mortal becomes immortal; (even) here he attains Brahman"; "Just as the slough of a serpent lies dead and cast-off on the ant-hill, so also the body lies. Then, this bodiless immortal spirit is nothing but Brahman Himself, nothing but light" (Bṛdh. IV, 4, 6 & 7).

Since the first of these texts teaches the manifestation of the
ever present Brahman's being in the enlightened one, since, (consequently) there is no need of his going (along a path) in order to reach a special place, the departure of the vital air, helpful in such going, is not needed; hence, the adoption only of that interpretation denying its departure from the body as apādāna is satisfactory, not the acceptance of the meaning of the non-separation of the senses from the finite self. Nor may it be said that since the text "He attains Brahman," teaches distinction between Brahman and the enlightened one, as between what is attained and him who attains, the text cannot mean manifestation of Brahman; that, therefore, the particle ar (meaning alone) should be construed in the sense of ira (meaning like), and that this is the sense to be taken—that (the enlightened one) by the expansion of knowledge, becoming like Brahman, reaches Brahman. (For), of the word "apyeti" the sense is not reaching, but merger. Merger is but the manifestation of the identity in the pure subtle form, after abandoning the gross form qualified by vital air, the senses and the mind. Even where there may be the sense of attainment, what is meant thereby turns out to be but the manifestation of identity. In the Brhadāraṇyaka itself, after the following hymns are given out, "Lead me from the unreal to the real: lead me from the darkness to light: lead me from death to immortality:" there is this Brāhmaṇa commenting on the three hymns: "When he says, 'lead me from the real to the unreal, the unreal verily is death, the real is immortality; 'lead me from death to immortality, make me immortal' is verily what he says; (when he says) 'lead me from darkness to light', darkness verily is death, light is immortality, 'lead me from death to immortality, make me immortal,' is verily what he says; (when he says) 'lead me from death to immortality', there
\[\text{is nothing in it, hidden as it were} \] (Bṛh, I, 3, 27). In this commentary, the word \textit{gāmaya} (lead) signifying attainment, is interpreted in the sense of the attainment of identity. It is determined therefrom that words signifying attainment in texts of similar import connote the manifestation of identity.

Similarly, it is quite clear \textit{that the second text too in the form of a verse} is best understood as negating that departure which has the body as the apādāna. Nor, on the principle that the present tense may be used in the close proximity of what is to happen, may the word \textit{"here" in \textbf{"he attains Brahman here"}} be interpreted as merely eulogistic, indicating the early attainment of Brahman; for the acceptance of the primary sense alone is preferable. The understanding of the same sense is favoured by the third text too which compares the body abandoned by the enlightened one to the slough on the ant-hill; cast off by the serpent that has not left the ant-hill. The fourth text which predicates of the enlightened liberated one who has abandoned the body, the nature of Brahman, the cause of all life, and to show its suitability, declares (of him) the form of pure knowledge, in the words \textit{"nothing but light," is favourable only to that sense. Hence, it is not proper to give up the natural sense of the text \textbf{"of him, the vital airs do not depart"}, even in conformity with the rest of the context.}

Now, in the Mādhyandina recension, in the place of the text cited, the reading \textit{"from him the prānas do not depart"} is seen. Hence, in conformity therewith, it is reasonable to construe the genitive \textit{"of him" in the Kāṇva reading, which expresses relationship in general, as terminating in a special relationship of the form of ablation. Thus, though in the first text, there is not gained for the enlightened one, on the death of the}
(gross) body, the mention of anything special, as compared with the unenlightened one, yet by the later declaration of the attainment of Brahman, there is obtained the mention of a special feature; hence, the promise to declare something distinctive must be understood to relate only to this. If this be urged, not so (we reply), for, after the text "from him the prānas do not depart", it is said of them, in the word, "they remain even here" that they are merged even here, so as to accord with the sense of the verse "he attains Brahman here": in conformity with this, the expression "from him" should be construed as referring to the body, figuratively on account of the non-difference of the body and the embodied. Hence it is that in the questions of Ārtabhāga, to the question "when the person dies, do the vital airs depart from him or not?", there is the reply, "‘No’, said Yājñavalkya, ‘they remain even here. He swells, he is filled with wind; being filled with the wind, he lies dead,’” (Bṛh. III, 2, 11); it is seen there that of the apādāna of the vital airs, there is mention of the physical characteristic of being bloated like a pair of bellows distended with air.

Now, Āratabhāga's question and the answer (thereunto) do not relate to the enlightened one, since that would conflict with the (tenour of the) later context. In that context, indeed, to this fresh question of Āratabhāga’s, “when of the dead person, speech merges in fire, the vital air in air, the eyes in the Sun, the ears in the cardinal directions, the body in the earth, the soul in the ether, the hairs on the body in medicinal herbs, the hairs on the head in the trees, blood and semen in water, where then is the person?” through the secret discourse of Āratabhāga and Yājñavalkya, it is declared that Karma, of the nature of merit and demerit, is determined on as the abode (of the person), as the later
text itself proclaims to that effect. It is there declared: "They two going out discussed it. What they said, it is but Karma that they said. What they praised, it is but Karma that they praised. By meritorious deeds one becomes meritorious, sinful by sinful deeds". Nor may it be said that in earlier statements "he in turn conquers death" (Bṛh. III, 2, 10), the crossing of samsāra (bondage) is declared, and that therefrom it is ascertained that the denial of departure applies to the enlightened one. For, it is after the mention, in the words "fire, verily, is death, that is the food of the waters", of the meditation on fire as the food of the waters, that it is declared as the fruit thereof "(he) in turn wards off untimely death". Hence, as a consequence of (the meditation on) the conquest of fire, there is the conquest of untimely death, not the crossing of bondage. Hence, since of that text too the subject is the unenlightened one, and since for the unenlightened one, the departure of the vital airs from the body must necessarily happen, the denial of departure from the finite self alone should be understood as the sense of that (text). For this reason too, it is so: in the earlier text "when this person dies", by the general name "person" the finite self alone is referred to as that from which the vital airs depart. Nor may it be objected that the reference of the term "person" is to the body; for, in the later portion (beginning with) "when of this person speech merges in fire" and so on, there is a separate mention of the body, as related to the person of the context, in the words "the body (merges) in the earth" (Bṛh. III, 1, 13). Nor may it be said that the self too is separately mentioned, in the words "the self (merges) in the ether"; for, there, as in "Ānanda ātma, Bliss is the central portion" (Taitt. II, 5), there is scope for the expression "ātma", to refer to the heart, as the central organ.
Thus, if it be said that by figurative use, (based on) non-difference of the body and the embodied, the third personal pronoun in “He swells” should be construed as referring to the body, not so; for, because of the lack of occasion for the separation of prāṇas from the finite self, in the case of the unenlightened one, the denial there becomes improper; it must (hence) be necessarily said that the question and answer relate to the enlightened one.

Now, since from the earlier and later questions and answers referring to the unenlightened one, it must necessarily be said that similar questions and answers also refer to the unenlightened one, the occasion for the separation of the prāṇas from the finite self must somehow be understood; if (this) be said, no (we reply), since by the mere proximity of question and answer relating to the unenlightened one, it is not possible to counteract the characteristic marks (indicating) the subject (to be) the enlightened one. In the series of Ārtabhāga’s questions, the first question is “What is graha? What is atigraha?” The second is “It is a fact that all this is food to Death; which is the deity whose food is Death?” “When this person dies, do his prāṇas depart from him, or do they not?” is the third. “When this person dies, what is it that does not leave him?” is the fourth. The fifth is “When of this dead person, speech merges in fire” and so on. These questions not relating to the same topic, there does not result any unity of context. Even so, since the questions from the third onwards have one topic, as ranging round the history of the dead person, of the third question too, as of the fourth and fifth, because of the strength of their proximity, it may validly be said that the topic is the unenlightened one. If this be said, it is answered (thus): by Aśvala and others, filled with envy and engaging in a disputation with Yājñavalkya with a desire to defeat
him, veiled questions are put, for the most part, with a view to humble him, as not sufficiently quick-witted. For instance, the first question put by Ārthabhāga “What is graha? What is atigraha?” seems to relate to a sacrificial matter; since it occurs however, in the midst of a discussion concerning the soul, the reply, taking cognisance of the crookedness of the questioner, states that the breath, speech, the tongue, the eye, the ear, the mind, the arms and the skin are grahas; and that the down-going vital air (spāna), name, taste, form, sound, desire, action and touch are atigrahas. Similarly by Lāhyāyani is put the question “Where did the Pārikiṣṭas go?”, making use of the little understood word “Pārikiṣṭa”. The reply given by Yājñavalkya, “where the horse-sacrificers went”, is but explicative of the sense of that word. So too, envy is plainly expressed in the very tone of these words of Gārgī, “Just as a warrior of the Kāśis or the Vaidehas may stand, having strung his unstrung bow, and with two foc-terrifying shafts in hand, even so do I present myself before thee with two questions; do thou answer them” (Bṛh. III, 8, 2). Thus, the proximity of the third question to the fourth and fifth which treat of the unenlightened one, being capable of explanation as serving to generate the confusion that all three relate to the same topic, cannot serve to conclude the sense (of the question); much less (can it so serve), since a different construction may be set up (for the third) in the light of the first and second questions, which refer to entirely different topics, viz., graha, and atigraha, and the deity who feeds on Death; least of all (is this possible) in view of (the proximity) being over-ruled by the characteristic mark (liṅga) in the third question, indicative of the topic referring to the enlightened one; this is the line (of criticism). Hence, travelling on the path of light etc., preceded by departure, established only
the mode of meditation, not the path of light etc., alone.

3.132 Now for the siddhānta: it is well known that the path of light etc., is common to all modes of meditation. (It is said) in the Chāndogya "Those who know thus, and those who in the forest meditate with faith and austerity" (Ch., V, 10, 1); so too in the Brhadāraṇyaka, "And they who in the forest meditate with faith and truth" (Brh. VI, 2, 15).

3.133 Now, it may be said that the reference to devotees here, as "those who meditate," may relate to those modes of meditation, where no path whatever is mentioned. This would be so, if the identity of the paths could not be established; but that can be shown. That which is described in the Vyāhṛti Vidyā as rising above the halves of the skull, the region of the root of the hair, passing up through the nipple-shaped organ, the seat of Indra,—who is either the finite self or Paramādeva—that is but departure through the artery in the head. What are referred to later as Fire etc., "in Fire, as Bhūḥ, he rests, in Air, as Bhuvah, in the Sun as Suvaḥ," are but the stages on the path of light etc. The statement of resting in Fire and so on, is in the view that there is rest in (each of) these for some time. In the Vyāhṛti Vidyā, since there is meditation of the three vyāhṛtis, Agni and the rest, as of the fourth (vyāhṛti) Brahman, called Mahāḥ, the statement of rest in their worlds, on the strength of this, is proper.

3.134 In the statement, "He is led up by the sāman verses to the Brahma world" (Praśna. V, 5), it is proclaimed of the sāman verses constituting the third of the three moments of the threefold prāṇāya, an accessory to meditation, that as accessories to meditation they possess the capacity to lead up to Brahman, not as constituting a path; for, meditation with the prāṇāya of three moments is prescribed in the words, "Again, he who meditates on
this syllable *AUM* of three moments, on the Highest person etc.,”
(Praśna. V, 5), after the mention of the meditation effected with
Praṇava of one and two moments; and the three moments are
taught to be of the nature of the Ṛk, Yajus and Sāman.

The exclusion, in the statement “Then, by the very same rays” etc., mentions the exclusion of the non-conjunction of
attainment with that for (the attainment of) which the rays are
prescribed (as paths), not the exclusion of light etc., for, of the
same sentence, there cannot be the sense both of leading up by
the rays, and the exclusion of all other (paths).

The statement (indicative) of speed which is justifiable, in com-
parison with the (long and tortuous) path of the Fathers, does
not exclude the earlier stages. Nor is there intended any other
path for the enlightened ones, having this (the Sun) as the final
stage. Thus from the exposition of the one-ness of all paths, it
follows that it is not proper to over-ride the general statement of
the Pañcāgni Vidyā, which is supported by the principle of
parsimony.

In order to remove the doubt that because of this demonstra-
tion of the path of light etc., being applicable to all meditations of
Brahman, there may follow the denial of the attainment of Brah-
man, even for those who know Brahman without attributes, the
contrary opinion is expressed even at the close of the present
section, in the words, “Some (say) that for the devotees of the
Non-related there is no (path of) light etc.,” (IV, 8, 1). On this
view, because of the expression, “well-known,” in the sūtra “On
the path of light etc., because it is well-known”, the sūtra has to
be understood (as expressing) a sense valid generally. It must
necessarily be admitted by all that the sense (of the sūtra) is
(valid) only generally; for, the path of light etc., does not apply to
those deities up to Hiranyagarbha, who are released even from
the respective worlds they are in. Nor may it be said that the
prescription of this as the only path is intended (to apply) exclu-
sively to human beings, who are released through the practice of
meditation on the earth; for, in the case of those released after
attaining the status of Vasu, Rudra, Aditya, and Marut hosts, (a
status) which belongs to the devotees of Madhu Vidyā, there must
necessarily be another path comprising the status of Vasus etc., as
the earlier stages: this is the view of the ācārya. Thus, in whatever
section rising or departure is established of the knower of Brahman,
in all those places, this opinion is expressed, in order to remove
the doubt about the applicability of the respective sections to all
knowers of Brahman; further, in the aniyamādhikaraṇa, that
(opinion) is justified by (the author) himself; from these follows
the excellence of the ācārya’s view. Nor may non-acceptability be
suspected from the introduction of the word “some” in every case.
These may be explained away for the purpose of showing that
he himself here takes his stand on meditation of Brahman
with attributes, not on the knowledge of Brahman with-
out attributes, (but) thereby it will not be possible to conceal the
excellence of his view, as understood from his exposition through
demonstration and repetition. In the ānanda-māyādikaraṇa, the
body of the section is interpreted in this way: the (Self) of Bliss
is the Supreme Brahman; the Brahman that is the tail, the sup-
port thereof is the Word—Brahman, called prāṇava, which denotes
that (other). Then is introduced, as a different view, with the
words “Some say”, the position that the Self of Bliss is the In-
telligence-Energy (Cit-Sakti), while Brahman that is the tail, the
support is the Supreme Brahman; (this position) is expounded
as his own in the words of the janmādi śūtra (1, 1, 2): “The
indeed, which, being praised in the words, 'within that is the Self composed of Bliss,' is demonstrated to be characteristic of the Supreme Brahman in the words 'that is one Bliss of Brahman,' because of the unsurpassable supremacy resulting from the repetition beginning with 'this is the inquiry into Bliss,' that itself, because of abundance, is spoken of figuratively as Brahman, in the words 'Bliss is Brahman.' Revelling in the enjoyment of such Bliss is said to be the eternal contentment of Brahman'; thereby is shown the ācārya's method of introducing a view acceptable to him, with the word "some".

Again, the acceptance of non-difference in meditation between Brahman and the finite self, which is favourable to the recognition of the knowledge of Brahman without attributes is seen in the section "Prāṇastathānugamāt" (I, 1, 29, et seq). There, it is determined that the vital air which is taught by Indra to be the object of meditation for release, in the words "I am the vital air, meditate on me as the Intelligent Self, as Life, as the Immortal" (Kauṭāyikī III, 2), is the Supreme Self, not Indra. The sūtra "Śāstradrṣṭyātupadeso Vāmadevavat (the teaching is due to scriptural insight, as in the case of Vāmadeva)" (I, 1, 31) which has for its object the removal of the doubt "how then does Indra say 'I am the vital air, meditate on me'?" is then explained in one way: the teaching of Indra "I am the vital air" is due to the realisation of the internal rulership of the Supreme Self because of the texts, "He who stands within the Self" etc., and of the fact that the denotation of words like "I" extends up to the Supreme Self, the internal ruler, because of the texts "That manifested names and forms" etc. Then another interpretation—(viz.,) that the teaching is due, in the alternative, to insight arising from such texts as "That thou art," which have for their object the non-
difference of the Supreme Self from one’s own Self—is given, in the following words: “Or else, it is determined that Indra’s statement is of the same nature as the declaration about being Manu and the Sun, made in the realisation of his own all-pervasiveness by Vāmadeva, who by insight into Vedāntic lore, by meditation on the harmony of Brahman and the Self, had attained the nature of Brahman, got rid of the contraction (of intellect) due to self-consciousness centering round human and other bodies and sense-objects, and obtained Supreme Self-consciousness of the form of the whole Universe.”

3.15 Then comes the section “Ātmetyaḥ upagacchanta grahāyatīka (But as the Self, they understand and teach)” (IV, 1, 3), which, raising the doubt whether the contemplation of non-difference occurring in knowledge of the attributeless, (yet) does not occur in meditation with attributes, because of the difference between Parameśvara with qualities and the finite self, due to their connection with contrary qualities, such as all-knowingness and little-knowing-ness, seeks to show that, though there is empirical difference, yet their non-difference is to be contemplated, through insight into their essential non-difference.

3.151 This is how (it proceeds): in the doubt as to whether Brahman is to be contemplated as different from one’s own self, or as non-different therefrom, this is the prima facie view. The meditation on Brahman should be performed as different from one’s self, because of the demonstration of the Lord (Pati), the Supreme Brahman, as an entity other than the inner self, the bound soul (Pādu), the finite self, in texts and sūtras, such as “Rudra, the Supreme Sage, transcending the Universe” (Svet. III, 4), and “But higher, because of the mention of difference” (II, 1, 22), and further, because of the irreconcilability of the nature of Brah-
man with (that of) the finite self in respect of such qualities as omniscience and so on.

But (this is) the siddhānta. Though the Supreme Brahman called Śiva is certainly higher than the finite self, yet the devotee meditates thereon, in the form “I am Brahman”; for contemplators of old, have understood that as but their Self, in the words “I am verily Thou, O Lord, O Divinity, Thou verily art I” (Jābāla Śruti).

Nor is this co-ordinate with the relationship of the body and the embodied. In that case, the statement “Thou, verily, art I” would alone be appropriate, since in respect of Paramēśvara, designated by the word “Thou” there is the applicability of the word “I” limited in denotation to His own body. But the statement “I am, verily, Thou” is not appropriate; for, it does not stand to reason that the word “Thou” denoting Paramēśvara should apply to one’s own self which is of the nature of the body of Paramēśvara (and is) designated by the word “I”. It is indeed of words denoting the body that a capacity to extend to the embodied (also) results, not capacity to signify the body in the case of those (words) denoting the embodied. Nor may it be said that both sentences have the same kind of sense, the words “Thou” in both sentences denoting Paramēśvara as qualified by the attributes mentioned, while the words “I” signify the same Being qualified by the presence in one’s body. In that case, there results the futility of the difference between the two statements, constituted by the use of the pronouns of the First and Second Person—“I” and “Thou”—placed earlier and later, along with the corresponding verbal forms, “asmi (am)” and “asi (art)” in “Tvam vāham asmi, ahām vai tvam asi, (I am, verily, Thou; Thou, verily, art I)”. Since, even through one statement, the non-
difference of the internal ruler of one-self from Paramēśvara results, there also follows the futility of the other (statement). Nor do the two sentences serve the purpose of confirming the cognition of non-difference; for, there being no erroneous notion of difference between the internal ruler and Paramēśvara, as (there is) between the finite self and Paramēśvara, there is no need for bringing about that confirmation. Hence, it is concluded that (the meditation) is enjoined here for the purpose of confirming the (sense of) non-difference by removing the doubt as to difference or non-difference, through the interchange of objects (of contemplation), i.e., of the non difference of Paramēśvara from one-self, and the non-difference of one-self from Paramēśvara. Similarly of the Aitareya text also “What is I, that is He, what is He, that is I.”

3.154 To the devotees who understand thus, the Supreme Brahman though different from them, bestows His grace by granting His own form. “They in turn, teach their pupils, through (texts like) ‘That Thou art,’ that, though different, (Brahman is) of their own form.” Of the text “That Thou art”, the co-ordinate relation is not that of the body and the embodied. From the use of the word “art”, it follows that therein is taught the non-difference of Paramēśvara designated by the word “That”, and previously described and defined as the cause of the world and so on, from what is designated by the word “Thou”; The word “Thou” refers but to the finite Self that is addressed, and does not extend to the internal ruler thereof; for, reference to one’s internal ruler, as what is addressed, not being so well-known from one’s own experience or the teaching of the ancients, as the reference to one’s self, the term (Thou) is not capable of denoting that (the internal ruler). As for establishing that Paramēśvara, the Sat of
the present context, has been taught earlier to be somehow one's own internal ruler, there arising no doubt as to their difference, the repeated teaching of that (their non-difference) is not needed.

Nor may it be objected that what is acceptable to the commentary in the meditation of non-difference with Brahman is not real non-difference, but only imagined non-difference, as in the contemplation of non-difference with Guroja, that being cited as an illustration of the meditation of non-difference with Brahman, in the commentary on the prakrtatavattva adhikarana (III, 2, 21 et seq). For, the reality of non-difference is understood from the (following) statement in the Sastradraha sutra (I, 1, 31) "Of him who had attained Brahman-hood by the contemplation of the harmony of Brahman and the finite self", and the statement in the atmeti tapanacchanti section: "Though the being contemplated is a different entity (from the devotees, yet) the Supreme Brahman bestows His grace on the devotee conferring on them His own form" (IV, 1, 8). If non-difference were not real, the declaration of an actual attainment thereof would not be appropriate. The clause "though the being contemplated is a different entity" means "though empirical difference does exist"; nor is there any contradiction in taking it to have the purpose of refuting even a possible ground of objection. Hence, it is that in the following words of the commentary on the vikaravarti sutra (IV, 4, 19), it has been proclaimed that the contemplation of one-self as Siva continues even in him who, in the world of Parama-Siva has attained union with Him, after the complete extinction of merit and demerit, the cause of all delusion etc. "Wandering about freely in the worlds of the (celestial) rulers from Sadashiva up to Brahma, eating what he desires, taking on what forms he desires, rid of the desire of for human and other bodies, functioning with
the three energies (icchā, jāna and kriyā) uncontracted, (he) enjoys the splendour of perfect self-consciousness, immersed in the world, which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman, the harmony of Śiva with Śakti, which abounds in Supreme Bliss, light and power. Thus it is that his perfect self-consciousness, as ensouling the entire world of enjoyer and enjoyment, is derived from the text 'I am the food, I am the food, I am the food, I am the eater of the food, I am the eater of the food, I am the eater of the food' (Taitt. III, 10)." (It may be said that) identification in consciousness with the Supreme Being which, as present in all bodies, directs all enjoyment and enjoyers as (His) body, may come about of itself without standing in need of the contemplation of non-difference with Śiva; for, by the expansion of the Intelligence of him who has attained union with Śiva, the capacity to direct the world, present in the Being that pervades the Universe, is not aroused; (further), in the commentary on "Asantateścāvyatirekaḥ (And non-difference because of non-pervasiveness)" (II, 3, 48) and other sūtras, there is shown in him the existence only of this kind of perfect self-consciousness. Though (this be so), yet it is not what is intended in the commentary on (this) sūtra; the perfect self-consciousness is rather of Brahman alone, as determined by the force of the qualification applied to that self-consciousness, viz., "immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of the Supreme Brahman." What is stated there of the world is but its inclusion in the nature of Brahman, not its being His body. Of the liberated one, confirmed in the contemplation of identity with Śiva, the continuance of that (consciousness) is declared till the falling off of the body; even at the time when he sings as he pleases, (I am the food, I am the food, etc.).
The non-difference of Brahman from the finite self thus shown to be acceptable to him, through the commentaries which elucidate the contemplation of non-difference, is also shown in a somewhat indirect way in the commentary on the sūtra “Vadāṭiti cenna, prājñō hi prakaraṇat (if it be said that it is declared, no; for the topic verily is of the Self)” (I, 4, 3), occurring in the ānunānikādikarana (I, 4, 1—7). The prima facie view in that section is that the unmanifest mentioned in the Kathavalli text “The Unmanifest is higher than the great one, the Person is higher than the Unmanifest” (Kāṇṭha III, 11) being the pradhāna acceptable to the Sāmkhya, the Sāmkhya system is based on the text cited. In “Jneyatvāvacanācca (and on account of non-mention of being known)” (I, 4, 4), which is the secondary sūtra directed to the refutation (of the above view), there is a further reason given in support of the final view. If this same text were the basis of the Sāmkhya doctrine, then the property of being a necessary object of knowledge to him who seeks release should have been declared of the pradhāna, which is acceptable to the Sāmkhya, which declares release to result from discriminative knowledge of the Self, (Puruṣa), from Primordial Matter (Prakṛti). That is not here stated. Hence, it is to be noted that the Sāmkhya doctrine is not based on that (text). For, it is not reasonable that in that which is the basis of a branch of knowledge, there should be no mention of what is described in that branch of knowledge.

Now, it does not happen that there is no mention of the property of having to be known; for the Kāṇṭha Vallī Śrutī, verily, in the hymn “Soundless, touchless, formless, etc.” (Kāṇṭha, III, 15) declares of the Unmanifest (Avyakta) which is higher than the category of the Great One (Mahat) devoid of sound etc., that it is to be known: The sūtra “Vadāṭiti cenna,” etc., (I, 4, 5) refers to
this fresh Sāmkhya doubt and serves to refute it. In that hymn (Kaṭha, II, 15) Parameśvara is declared, not the pradhāna, the context being of Parameśvara alone. In the commentary, where, to show the mode of refutation, based on the context relating to Parameśvara a text from the context relating to Parameśvara should be cited, there is cited the hymn: “The wise one should suppress speech in the mind, sink that into sentient intellect; sentence he should suppress in the Great Self and that (again) in the peaceful Self” (Kaṭha, III, 13). This is how the commentary on that sūtra (proceeds); “If it be said that being known is declared in the later hymn ‘Soundless, touchless, formless, undecaying, tasteless, eternal, odourless, beginningless, endless, higher than the Great One, and constant, realising that, one escapes the jaws of Death’ (Kaṭha, III, 15), no, (we reply), since the earlier discourse is about the Prājña alone, as seen from ‘Yacced vāng manasaḥ prājña, the wise one should suppress speech in the mind etc.’ (Kaṭha, III, 13)”. From the use of the word “Prājña” in that sūtra, it appears as the natural sense of the words of the commentary that the present context relates to him who is referred to by the word “Prājña” in that hymn. The finite self desirous of release is referred to in that hymn by the word “Prājña”, for, the injunctions as to the control of speech, mind, etc., are purportful only in regard to him. The context may also relate to the Supreme Self, since that is what is principally intended to be indicated in (the hymn) “The Unmanifest is greater than the Great One, the Person is greater than the Unmanifest; than the Person there is nothing higher. He is the goal. He (is) the final destination” (Kaṭha, III, 11). This being the case, if the commentator had not at heart the non-difference of the finite self and Parameśvara, his citation of a word indicating the finite self, where a word
belonging to the context (and) referring to the Supreme Self ought to have been cited, would be certainly unsuitable.

Now, even thus, how can there be absence of unsuitability, when even by those who accept the non-difference of the finite self from Paramēśvara, there is accepted, because of the empirical distinction between the two, a division among the Vedānta texts into those which concern the finite self and those which concern the Supreme Self? If (such an objection) be raised, it is met (as follows).

In the Kaṭha Vālī, to the question put by Naciketas about the departed finite self,—in the words, "There is this doubt, of a man, who is dead, some (saying) he is, others he is not; this, I would know, being taught by thee. Let this be the third of the boons" (Kaṭha, I, 20),—a reply relating to the Supreme Self is given by Vaivasvata, in the words, "Realising through self-contemplation that resplendent Being, difficult to see, deeply hidden, located in the cave (of the heart), dwelling in the abyss, that ancient one, the wise one abandons joy and grief" (Kaṭha, II, 12). It is quite certain that the question relates to the departed finite self, that being the conventional sense of the word "preta". That the question relates to the departed finite self is also made clear by the words of Vaivasvata "These damsels with their chariots and their lutes—such ones are not obtained by mortals. Be waited on by these, given by me. Do not question about death, O Naciketas" (Kaṭha, I, 25). (There are also the following grounds to support that conclusion): Naciketas in the words "In respect of which there is this doubt, tell us what that is in the great hereafter" (Kaṭha, I, 29), again asks for the answer to the very question of his, which had been condemned by Vaivasvata as insuspicious, because of its relating to death; subsequently,
Vaivasvata begins his teaching only after criticising the position of "some (who say) he is not (after death)", in the words "The other world appears not to the puerile fool, dazed by the delusion of the wealth; believing that there is no world other than this, he repeatedly falls into my clutches" (Kaṭha, II, 6); and later on is seen a reply relating to the incidents directly connected with the departed finite self, in the verse: "Behold! I teach thee, O, Gautama, the mysterious Brahman, the constant one, as also what becomes of the self after death. According to their deeds and according to their knowledge, some enter into wombs and are embodied, (while) others become immovable objects" (Kaṭha, V, 6 and 7).

Similarly, it is also certain that the reply beginning with, "That, difficult to behold" etc., relates to the Supreme Self; for, after the question, it is said by Vaivasvata in the words "Even the gods have had doubts about this, of yore; subtle is this topic, not easy to know. Choose some other boon, O Naciketas, press me not, (but) set me free (from granting this boon)" (Kaṭha, I, 21), that the reply to the question relates to a very difficult matter, such as cannot easily be stated. Thereupon Naciketas prays that only what he asked for should be explained to him, (saying), "O! Lord of Death, thou sayest that even the gods, verily, have had doubts about this, and that it is not easy to know. Another teacher of it cannot be found equal to thee; nor is there any other boon equal to this" (Kaṭha, I, 22). Desiring to test the firmness of his capacity (for the knowledge prayed for), Vaivasvata, in the words beginning with "Choose sons and grandsons, who will live to be a hundred, plenty of cattle, elephants, gold and horses; ask for a wide extent of earth, and live thyself as long as thou desirest", and ending with "O! Naciketas, question not about Death"
declares the gain of sons etc., to be objects of human desire worthier than what was questioned about. In spite of this, Naciketas, in words beginning with "Fleeting (are these), O! Lord of Death, they wear out the vigour of the senses of man. All life is but brief. Thine alone be the chariots, thine the song and the dance", (Kaṭha I, 26) and ending with "Understanding the pleasure of song and love (to be thus ephemeral), who would delight to live long?" (Kaṭha, I, 28), condemns these pleasures as of doubtful (permanence), though praised by (Yama) himself, and as leading to the diminution of the vigour of the senses, under-rates the life of all beings even from long-lived Brahmā down to a small insect, as (lasting) but for a brief period, and prays that what was questioned about should be expounded. Seeing the firmness of his capacity (for the inquiry), Vāvasvata distinguishes the two kinds of fruit attaching to the goal of human endeavour, viz., beatitude and the accomplishment of desired objects, as the good and the pleasant; then, discriminating between those two and saying that the wise one chooses the good, the fool the pleasant, and so on, he praises the boon chosen by Naciketas; he (further) praises Naciketas, in respect of the desire for knowledge and the strength of renunciation helpful thereto, in the words "I hold Naciketas to be desirous of knowledge; desires manifold could not shake thee" (Kaṭha, II, 4); then, after refuting the doctrine that the body is the self, through the words "No hereafter" etc., he declares the difficulty of realizing the Self that is to be taught, in the words "Him even to hear of whom is not gained by many, Him, whom many, even though they heat, know not, he who teaches (Him) is a marvel; he who attains Him is skilful; he who knows (Him, when) instructed by the-able, is (also) a wonder" (Kaṭha, II, 7). Then follow the words "That, difficult to behold?" and so on. (The above analysis pro-
vides a further ground for holding that the reply relates to the Supreme Self. Thus, it being seen that to a question about the finite self, a reply is given about the Supreme Self, it is inferred that the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman is the view of the Śruti, as otherwise, there would result lack of congruity between question and answer.

Now, let it be that the reply relates to the Supreme Self. It does not stand to reason that the question relates to the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self; for, Naciketas has already faith in its existence. Otherwise, his query “Father, to whom wilt thou give me?” prompted by the object of remedying the fault of deficiency in the father’s sacrifice, his departure of his own will to the world of Yama, in order to prevent the evil of falsehood from attaching to his father, who had said “I give thee unto the Lord of Death”, his own words “like cereals the mortal decays, like cereals he is born again,” (Kaṭha, I, 6), his asking as a boon for the knowledge of the fires whose fruit is heaven, these do not harmonise. Further, even if there be really non-difference between the finite and the Supreme Self, to the question about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, the reply should confine itself to that,—the teaching about the Supreme Self and the means of attaining Him being irrelevant; for, it is admitted even in the systems of those who maintain the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme Self, that, to the questions relating to the incidents connected with the finite self, which occur in the question of Ārthabāga, the Pāncāgni Vidyā, and so on, the answers (too) relate only to that topic. Therefore abandoning the illegitimate desire to establish the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, because of the principle of congruity of question and answer, the question and answer should be understood to relate to the exis-
tence or non-existence of the released soul; for, the word "pretya" is seen to be used of the released one in the text "na pretya samjñāsti, when he is liberated, there is no more consciousness" (Bṛh, II, 4, 12); further, the word "preta" may well have the force of "the released one", i.e., he, who by being drawn away from here (prakārṣena itaḥ) has attained the destination from which there is no return. Thus, liberation being of the nature of the attainment of the world of the Supreme Self, called the Supreme Abode, the demonstration of the Supreme Self, of the attainment of His Supreme Abode, in the words, "he attains the end of the paths, that is the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" (Kaṭha III, 9), and of the means for (that attainment) all these fit in with that object (of liberation).

If this be urged, not so, (we reply); for, even if the question be imagined to relate to the incidents connected with the liberated one, the unsuitability of asking for a knowledge of the fires, helpful in procuring heaven, (remains) common (to both of us). What is meant there by the word "heaven" is but the world which is attained through the path of light etc., on the extinction of merit and demerit, and which is said to be the Supreme Abode attained by the released one, (whose existence is) in doubt. For, the glories of the heavenly world are thus described: "In the heavenly world, there is no fear whatever; Thou art not there; nor does one fear old age. Rising above both hunger and thirst, transcending sorrow, one enjoys in heaven" (Kaṭha I, 12); then the teaching of the knowledge of the fires, helpful in attaining (that world) is prayed for thus: "And Thou knowest Agni, the means to heaven, O Lord of Death; teach that to me full of faith. (The Knowledge whereby) those whose abode will be heaven, attain immortality, that I ask as my second boon" (Kaṭha I, 18);
and Vaivasvata at the close of the teaching, in describing and praising the fruit (thereof), specifies the fruit—the attainment of heaven—as coming after the cessation of all the bonds of samsāra (the migratory cycle): "He having first thrown off the shackles of Death, rising above Sorrow, enjoys in Heaven" (Kaṭha I, 18). If a justification of the question (about the existence of the released soul) be attempted, on the ground that its object is to strengthen the faith in the existence of released souls, originally gained through the words of well-wishers, and to know further details (about them), then, even so may the question about the existence of the departed soul be justified; hence, it is not right to abandon the reference to the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, this being arrived at both by the conventional sense of the word "pratā" and the natural sense of (the words) "question not about death", which occur later. Even here, (in our experience) are seen persons who, settled in the observance of duties pertaining to the (attainment of the) other world, because of their faith in the words of well-wishers, still inquire as to what is the basis for the view that the self is but the body, and how it is to be refuted. In the Sāstras studied by those who perform Vedic rites, after a due study of the Vedas, there is seen the view of the self being but the body as also the basis of its refutation. If it be said that, even so, the question being about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, the existence thereof alone should be stated in the reply, and that the demonstration of the nature of the Supreme Self and of the means of attaining Him, do not fit in, no (we reply), for, if the question be about the existence or non-existence of the released one, his existence alone, should be mentioned; the irrelevance of the demonstration (of the Supreme Self) is common, therefore, even to the other view; (for
there is not, indeed, seen in the description of the path of the Fathers and so on, relating to incidents connected with the departed finite self, any description of the Moon attained thereby, or the means of attaining thereto. If, on the ground of there being, in the answer, a description of the Supreme Self and the means of attaining to Him, it be postulated that the significance of the question about the existence or non-existence of the released one, extends up to that (attainment), then since, in the answer is seen the demonstration of the non-difference of the finite and the Supreme Self, it may be postulated, in conformity with the natural sense of the word "preta," that the significance of the question about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self extends up to that non-difference. There is, indeed, the demonstration of that non-difference in such places as the following: "What is here, the same is there, what is there, the same is here. From death to death he goes, who sees any difference here" (Kaṭha. IV, 10). Nor can it be said that difference is denied only as between Parameśvara as known here in the body and as known there in the solar orb etc., and not as between the finite self known in the body and Parameśvara that exists in the solar orb etc., for, there is no occasion for difference in Parameśvara, on the ground of difference in place. So also after teaching the identity of the finite self and Brahman, through the hymn "The person of the size of the thumb" etc., (Kaṭha. IV, 13), the error of the doubt "how can there be identity of those possessed of contrary attributes?" is declared by the hymn "As certainly as water rained down on a lofty place flows down the slopes, even so does one who sees things as distinct run after them alone" (Kaṭha. IV, 14); to those who perceive that there are in the finite self and Brahman distinct attributes opposed to their non-difference, samsāra, characterised
by that same distinctness, continues. Thus, though a word belonging to the context and referring to the Supreme Self should have been cited in order to indicate in the above manner that the context is one which relates to the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme (Self), not one relating to the finite self alone or to the Supreme (Self) alone, (and) though the citation of other hymns hearing on the (present) topic is possible, the hymn containing the word Prājña, in conformity with the words of the sūtra "Prājñō hi prakaranāt (the Self because of the topic)" (I. 4, 5) is cited by the commentator, in the belief that the composer of the sūtras, though he ought to have illustrated the subject of the topic by a word referring to the Supreme Self, has (actually) illustrated it by means of a word referring to that from which the subject of the context is to be desired to be expounded as non-different. The acceptability of the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme (Self) is thus shown by an indirect statement, at the close of the explanation of what is acceptable to the text and the sūtra.

So, too, in the first adhikāraṇa (it is said as follows). The text "This Self is Brahman" (Brh. II. 5, 19), through the particle "this" teaches the very self, which is known to perception, to be Brahman. Therefore, where is the doubt here? This is the prima facie view as to the non-commencement (of the study) of the science, set up through showing the absence of any doubt in respect of Brahman, which is accepted as the object of the Śāstra. In the refutation (of this view), instead of establishing the difference between the finite self and Brahman, like other commentators intent on the difference between the two, he (thus) explains the doubt as finding an object in the doubt as to the significance of the texts (which declare the existence) of difference and of non-difference: "When the text 'This Self is Brahman' and so on
declares this same migratory being bound in self consciousness to be Brahman, even from that, (there arises) the doubt. Brahmanhood, verily, is the possession, in excess, of the grandeur of unexcelled knowledge. Bliss and Power, free from all disturbance by any evil; while finite self-hood is the condition of putting up with boundless suffering, in bondage to the function of entering and leaving various bodies suitable to the enjoyment of the fruit of the variegated Karma, which, resting on the impressions of beginningless ignorance, has (since) expanded. Why should there not be this doubt. ‘How do the texts declare one-ness of those two entities with mutually repellent characteristics?’. Thereby is manifested his intention not to deny the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman.

Why elaborate? In the commentary, it is loudly proclaimed in almost all places, that the Cit-Sakti of Brahman is non-different from the worlds, being of the form of all the worlds. So, too, the non-difference of Cit-Sakti from Brahman, is loudly proclaimed everywhere. How is it possible to avoid the final conclusion thus resulting, as to the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman?

Let this be so. What is said of Cit-Sakti being of the form of all the worlds, that is favourable only to qualified non-dualism; for, through that is reached the truth of the non-difference therefrom even of the non-intelligent world of ether etc., as of the intelligent world. If being of the nature of all the worlds were declared to be of the nature of non-difference from Cit-Sakti, in the case of intelligent beings, and illusory appearance thereof in the case of non-intelligent beings, then, indeed, would pure non-dualism result. It has not been so declared. Its being of the form of all the worlds has been established in the Prakṛtyadhi-karana (I, 4, 28, et seq.), etc., only as transforming itself into the
world  Nor is there declared the non-difference of Cit-Śakti from Brahman, even if stated anywhere, it is (only) figurative. Hence it is that in the janmādi section (I, 1, 2), it is said, (in the following words), that the co-ordination of Bliss and Brahman in the Bhūgu Valli is figurative. "That, indeed, which being praised in the words 'within that is the Self composed of Bliss', is demonstrated to be characteristic of Supreme Brahman, in the words, 'that is one Bliss of Brahman', because of the unsurpassable supremacy resulting from the repetition beginning with 'this is the inquiry into Bliss';—that itself, because of abundance, is spoken of figuratively as Brahman, in the words 'Bliss is Brahman'." As for the difference between Brahman and Cit-Śakti, that is exhibited in many places. For instance, in the akṣara section (I, 3, 9), in commenting on the inferential ground provided by the sūtra, viz., supporting (everything) up to (and inclusive of) ākāśa, difference as between support and what is supported is shown (to exist) between Brahman and Cit-Śakti, this (latter) being referred to by the word ākāśa in the words of the Gārgi Brāhmaṇa, "In this akṣara, O Gārgī, ākāśa is woven as warp and woof" (Bṛh. III, 8, 11). In the dāhara section (I, 3, 13, et seq.) in the words "the ether within that is small; what is within that is to be sought" (Ch. VIII, 1, 1), the difference between Cit-Śakti and the Supreme Brahman—which are spoken of as the small ether and what resides therein,—is exhibited by their being designated as the seat and what is seated. Though in the section "Ākāśa arthāntaratvādi vyapadeśat (Ākāśa is Brahman, on account of the mention as another entity and so on)" (I, 3, 42, et seq.), it is not made clear that the term ākāśa occurring in the Chāndogya text "What is called ākāśa, verily, is the sustainer of name and form; what is within that is Brahman, the Immortal,
the Self” (Ch. VIII, 14, 1), refers to Cit-Śakti, yet that reference is made clear by the following sentence (occurring) in the janmādī sūtra (I, 1, 2), while commenting on the text “Brahman embodied in ākāśa” (Taitt. I, 3): “The Supreme material causality of the resplendent expanse of Intelligence (Cidākāśa) results from such texts as ‘all these beings verily originate from the ākāśa alone’ (Ch. I, 9, 1), ‘what is called ākāśa verily, is the sustainer of name and form’ (Ch. VIII, 14, 1) and so on”. There, the difference between Cit-Śakti and the Supreme Brahman,—referred to by the words ākāśa and Brahman—is manifested by the mention of the (different) qualities of sustaining name and form, and being untainted by them. In the prakṛtyadhirakṣa also (I, 4, 23 et seq.), while commenting on the sūtra “Pariṇāmāt (because of transformation)” (I, 4, 27) introduced to answer the doubt “how can the Supreme Śiva, undisturbed by even a trace of any evil, the boundless ocean of auspicious qualities, endowed with powers uncontracted and ever-realised, transcending the world, function as the material cause of the world, which is to be condemned as the abode of ignorance and change?”, he exhibits as follows the literal sense of that sentence in the sūtra which mentions the inferential ground. “The taking on of the form of the world, as its material cause, is consistent in the case of Paraṁśvara, the efficient cause, though He is possessed of eternally pure Bliss and an unsurpassable auspicious nature; for He transforms Himself into the form of what is intelligent and non-intelligent”; he then raises the doubt “Alas! transformation, verily, is of the nature of a causal change; the abandonment of a prior form and the obtaining of another constitute transformation. If it be asked how Paraṁśvara is reserved from this detrimental characteristic etc.,” and gives the mysterious reply “transformation takes
place in such a way that there is no taint of change in the efficient cause, though (functioning as) the material cause " thereby again creating the desire (thus expressed): "What is this wonderful transformation? We are eager to hear of it; pray expound "; then, after promising the reply with the words " Listen, we shall expound ", and explaining the " Yadā tama " hymn (Śvet. IV, 18), he makes out that the transformation of the Supreme Brahman being opposed to (His) immutability takes place though His Cit-Śakti of the form of Prajnā, and not in his own nature; by the distinction thereby established between transformability and non-transformability, their difference is exhibited. If their non-difference be recognised, the changeability accepted in the case of Cit-Śakti, should be acknowledged even of Brahman; hence an incurable contradiction of the conclusion about his unchangeability. Therefore, the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman does not result from the mention everywhere of Cit-Śakti (taking on) the form of the world. To say that that results because of some few characteristic marks cited in the aniyama and other sections is but (evidence of) an illegitimate desire. For, it is not possible in the case of an interpretation condemned with the authority of the, śūtras in many places, to support (it) merely by showing a few characteristic marks. If it be thus objected, it is said (in reply, as follows).

3.182 If, by the acceptance of the doctrine of the attributeless Brahman mentioned in the aniyama and other sections, there resulted contradiction of the proof of the doctrine of transformation, then, indeed, would the former have to be discarded, by some such postulate as that it refers to an opinion other than his own. But there is no such contradiction (results) thereby. Indeed, the establishment of transformation is but helpful to the doctrine
of illusion. Only from connecting the world with Brahman as the
transformation of the latter and from the denial of that (i.e. the
transformation) does it follow that it (the world) is an illusory
manifestation of Brahman. Hence it is that in the text "That
desired 'may I become many'", there is first shown the evolution
of the world from Brahman. In Śaṅkara's commentary too, after
first showing in the bhoktrāpatti section (II, 1, 13; Ṣ) that the
world is a transformation of Brahman, by the denial (thereof) in
the later ārambhāṇa section (II, 1, 14 et seq; Ṣ), its being an illusory
manifestation of Brahman is taught. Again, in the upasamhāra
(II, 1, 24; Ṣ) and the kṛtana prasakti (II, 1, 26; Ṣ) sections, he
brings about intellectual assent to the doctrine only of the world
being a transformation of Brahman, by answering the objections
that occur (thereeto). In the following verses of the Śaṅkara
Śārīraka too, in conformity with the commentary (of Śaṅkara), it
is elaborately shown of the doctrine of transformation that it is
helpful to the doctrine of illusion. "The disputants argue, basing
themselves only on the doctrine of origination (Tārkiṇa), collocation (Buddhist), transformation and illusion. Refuting the views
of origination and collocation, the Great Sage takes up the two
(other) views as acceptable. Of these, taking up, at first, the
doctrine of transformation, introducing the bhoktrāpatti sūtra
(II, 1, 12; Ṣ) in order to answer the objections thereto, he proceeds
to preserve the empirical world, in as much as it is (a necessary)
 auxiliary to the injunctions ranging about duty and the rest.
(Then) arriving at the doctrine of illusion which is directly accept-
able to him, he holds to it, (but only) with an eye to the former
doctrine). The doctrine of illusion may be based on texts like
'vācārambhāṇam etc., (Ch, VI, 1, 4) only when the doctrine of
transformation first arises (from them); only by getting up on the
first step is it possible to rise to a higher one; so too, the Śāstra, in respect of the notion of cause and effect. Having first declared transformation, now it denies that, to secure the unreality of change. In the Vedānta, the prior ground of the doctrine of illusion is the doctrine of transformation. (While) resting thus on the doctrine of transformation, the doctrine of illusion arrives of itself. Just as people having acquired the means, obtain what the means lead to (i.e., what they desire), so, too, do the Great Sage and the texts declare the doctrine of transformation, in order to reach to the doctrine of illusion" (Samkēpa Sārāṅkha, Chapter II, verses 57—62)”. “Having declared (the doctrine of) transformation, through texts like ‘may I be many, may I grow forth’ (Ch. VI, 2, 3), the Śruti then leads on to the doctrine of illusion, in order to declare the unreality of change.” (Ibid, Ch. II, verse 67). In the commentary of the Ācārya (Śrīkanṭha) too, of the perception “the pot exists” etc., it is shown through the exclusion of the reality of the world as its basis, that it has another basis of the nature of identity with the material cause; (this is) for the purpose of reminding (one) of the fact that the elaboration of the doctrine of transformation is in order to help towards the acceptance of the doctrine of illusion. Hence, it is but proper (to hold) that the proof of transformation is undertaken only as an aid to the acceptance of the doctrine of illusion.

As for what is said of the non-declaration of the non-difference of Cit-Śakti from Brahman, that does not follow; for, the statement thereof is seen in many places. Thus, indeed, in the ākāśa-tattvāvat section (I, 1, 23), after mentioning the text “What is the essence of this word? He said ākāśa” (and so on) the conclusion is established that ākāśa is not elemental ether, but Paramēśvara; then is raised the doubt as to what is the object of
using the word “elemental”, in his own statement about “elemental ether”, and the purpose of that (word) is stated thus: “since creatorship of all beings is true of the Supreme ākāśa, the supreme material cause, (the use of the word ‘elemental’ in the other case) is purposeful”; then, the further doubt being raised as to how, if creatorship of all beings could hold even of the Supreme ākāśa, this ākāśa could be determined to be Paramēśvara, the reply is given “because (it) is non-different from that (Paramēśvara)”. In the dāhara section (I, 3, 13, et seq), after proof of the conclusion that the small ether—mentioned in the Chāndogya text, “Therein is the small ākāśa; what is within that is to be sought after” (Ch. VIII, 1, 1)—is Paramēśvara, this doubt is raised: “according to another text ‘He who rests within this ākāśa in the heart, controller of all, lord of all’ (Bṛh. IV, 4, 22) and so on, (only) He who is to be meditated on as within the small ākāśa, can be Paramēśvara. How then can the small ākāśa, be said to be Paramēśvara?”; and the solution is given thus: “even here, (in the case of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text) Paramēśvara, He who resides in the middle of the small ākāśa is to be contemplated; further, since of the qualities of Paramēśvara, such as freedom from sin etc., connection with the small ākāśa is declared, even the small ākāśa (is to be contemplated), as His form of the effulgent expanse of Intelligence (Cidambara)” (I, 3, 16). In the section “Sarvatraprasiddhopadesāt” (I, 2, 1) while explaining Brahmaṇ’s (property of) being signified by all terms, the properties of being of the essence of Brahmaṇ and being His attribute as of the form of all His qualities are declared of Cit-Śakti, in the following words: “It follows from the authority of Šrutī, Smṛti, Itiḥāsas, Purāṇas and the maxims of the learned that the self-contained Supreme Energy, of the form of Supreme Power in all
the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, possessing existence of
the form of supreme wisdom and bliss, devoid of the limitations
of space and time, becomes both the essence and the attribute of
Śiva, the Supreme Brahmā. Apart from that, there does not
come about for Brahman the possession of the properties of om-
niscience, omnipotence, originating all, controlling all; being
contemplated by all, bestowing grace on all, and being the cause
of the (attainment of the) spiritual goal by all. Further, even the
property of being designated by names indicative of supremacy
such as, Mahēśvara, Śiva, Mahādeva, Rudra and so on does not
come about.” Similarly in the ādhyātāmikaraṇa (III, 3, 14) too,
there is established the non-difference of Īśā-Śakti from Brahman
in essence. So too, in the section “Ānandādayāḥ prābhānaṣya
(Bliss and so on, as belonging to the subject, have to be under-
stood everywhere)” (III, 3, 11), it is made clear: (1) that the host
of qualities such as unexcelled knowledge, bliss and the rest; and
the possession of a distinctive form qualified by blue-throatedness
etc., (which constitute) the essential differentia of Brahman, are
all of them to be understood in every meditation on Brahman,
in spite of difference of topic, (2) that thereby Brahman; distinct
from all others such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu etc., enters into experience,
as if grasped by the horns, like the lunar orb which is different
from all other planets, asterisms and stars by its superior bright-
ness; and that consequently, like the continuance of that luminous
brightness in all perception of the Moon, the continuance of
qualities like knowledge, bliss and the rest of the distinctive
form is (but) proper in all meditations of Brahman. After
this, in the section “Priyaśirastvādyātoyāptirupacayāypacayaḥ” in
Māede, having joy for its head and so on are not established,
because of increase and decrease consequent on difference (III, 3,
12),” the doubt is raised whether in the understanding of the unsurpassable knowledge well-known to be characteristic of Brahman, from such texts as “along with the Intelligent Brahman” (Tatt. II, 1,) and “He who knows all, he who understands all” (Mu. II, 2, 7), there should be understood the secondary qualities of having joy for the head etc., (which are) well-known from the text “within that there is another Self, the Self of Bliss; joy is its head and so on” (Tatt. II, 5), in the same way as there is understanding of the secondary qualities of having purposes which come true and so on; and it is made clear (1) that though joy etc. are specific modes of Bliss, their being the head etc. is (but) imagined in the meditation for faculty of comprehension of the unsurpassability of Brahman’s Bliss, and is not real, (2) that if Brahman’s Bliss really possessed a head and so on, then to His form of Bliss, there would result increase and decrease (of the nature of) occasional stoutness and occasional thinness, (3) that if such modes of existence as support and what is supported were real, difference would result, and (4) that consequently, those characteristics of knowledge and bliss, like omniscience, having purposes which come true, having desires which are satisfied etc., which, through (their) imperishability are equal to Brahman’s nature, and are also of the form of the fruit obtained by released ones, as possessing forms equal to Brahman, those alone should be understood in all meditation on Brahman, not the property of having joy for the head and so on.

After that, in the section “Ādhyāṇya pravajñābhāvat (for 3:1831 meditation, there being no other purpose)” (III, 2, 14), the prima facie view is stated that though in the understanding of the unsurpassable Bliss characteristic of Brahman, in all meditations of the Supreme, as stated in the expression “the Self of Bliss,” its
having joy as the head etc., is not understood, being (but) imagined for the comprehension of its unsupassability, yet, being within the four other sheaths consisting of food etc., should certainly be understood, (they being not imaginary).

3.1832 This is refuted thus. The sheaths of food etc., are not to be understood, there being no purpose (served). They are not useful for liberation, that being secured by meditation on Śiva, after abandoning all else. What is the object, then, of the mention of the sheaths of food etc.? For the purpose of meditation (ādhyāna); ādhyāna is direct, reverent meditation, and reverence comes from comprehension of superiority to all; the mention of the sheaths of food etc., is for the comprehension of that (superiority). Hence, for the purpose of comprehending superiority to all (which is) helpful in attaining excess of devotion, the sheaths of food etc., should be thought of as the determinants of superiority, even prior to the practice of meditation, (which) should follow the excess of firm devotion.

3.1833 Now, the sheaths of food etc., being spoken of as the 'caves, are to be thought of not as the determinants merely of superiority, but also as the determinants of the quality of being within, which is thought of at the time of meditation. If it be said, therefore, that like the meditation of the Brahman-city and the heart-lotus in the Dahara vidyā for the purpose of meditating on Brahman as within the heart-lotus situated in the middle of the Brahman-city (i.e., the body), the thought of the sheath of food etc. is (also) constant on all occasions of meditation, no (we reply), because of the mention of the word “self” in the words “another self within” in every one of those hymns. If the sheaths of food etc. were non-intelligent entities of the nature of the body, the vital air, the mind and the intellect, then would they have to be thought of, like the Brahma-
man-city etc., at the time of meditation; that, however, is not so; they, verily, are presiding (deities) of food etc., differentiations of intelligence and are of the nature of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Īśvara, the beings who, in the words of the Atharvaśākhā "Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Indra, originate from Him" are declared to have been created by Śiva; they, again, are those who,—because of (the words), which, after enjoining meditation on Śiva thus, "The cause is to be meditated upon, the Being endowed with all lordly powers, the Lord of all, Śambu, in the middle of the ākāśa," say "Śiva alone, the doer of what is auspicious, is to be meditated on, abandoning all else", are said to be excluded, because they have to be left out of the meditation, in the nature of an uninterrupted flow of thought about Śiva, which is to be performed by him who desires release. Whence (this conclusion)? From the (use of the) word "Self" "in another self within" in every hymn, and from the teaching in texts like "he reaches this self consisting of food" and so on, about the special deities attained to, stage by stage, prior to the attainment of Brahma. Thus, in order to reach the contemplation of the presence in the cave mentioned in the text "he who knows the one hidden in the cave" (Taitt. II, 1), and for the comprehension of the superiority resulting from the description of the cave, and what is within that (cave), their contemplation is necessary; for that reason alone, in texts like "this self consisting of food" etc., it is declared of those who attain the fruit mentioned in the text "he who knows Brahma attains the highest", that, as the fruit of meditation on them (Brahmā etc.,) there is attainment of them (Brahmā etc.,); though this be so, the superiority resulting from the description of the cave and what is within the cave, like the superiority resulting

1 The Sanskrit expression "guhā tādva bhāva varṣanam"
from stories of the destruction of the Tripura and so on, should be understood only prior to the commencement of the meditation. Though the contemplation of these, which are helpful in the contemplation of the presence within the cave, should be performed every day, yet that contemplation should be performed even prior to the commencement of the contemplation of Śiva, each earlier stage being abandoned step by step in the order of its attainment; (this is so) because of the injunction to abandon in "abandoning all else", because the absorption of each earlier stage step by step in the later one is well-known in the Saiva Āgamas, and because in the chapter on meditation in the Yoga Yājñavalkya, after prescribing meditation step by step on Brahmā and the rest, it is said in the same tenour, "O Gārgi, this is said by the excellent ones among those who know Brahman; absorbing the various effected forms such as Brahmā and the rest in their respective causes, with mind concentrated, the self is to be united to Paramēśvara." Thus, at the time of commencement of the meditation on Śiva, only that has been translated as "the description of the cave and what is within the cave". The expression tadvat, i.e., guhāvat, may mean either what possesses the cave, i.e., what is within it (as here understood) or what is like the cave; in the latter case the reference would be to the sheaths of food, breath, mind, and knowledge which are the cave as it were, within which is the supreme ēkākā, the seat of Brahman; on the former interpretation the reference would be to the Supreme Being. The reason for preferring this interpretation is the comparison of the description of the cave etc., to the story of the destruction of Tripura. Here Tripura samharaṇam is comparable to the guhā; the samharaṇam is the Supreme Being; a similar interpretation for guhāvat seems, therefore, more suitable.
meditation is to be performed (which is) of the form of a stream of consciousness having Śiva alone for its object; this should be preceded by meditation step by step on what are described as of the form of the cave and are referred to as the sheaths of food, vital air, mind, knowledge, i.e., Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Iśvara [or Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Iśvara and Sadāśiva, interpreting what is understood by the term “sheath of knowledge” and the term “Indra” of the Atharvaśīkā passage “Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Indra,” etc., as referring to two—Iśvara and Sadāśiva—in conformity with the Śiva Āgamas, the Yoga Yājñavalkya etc.]; and there should have been contemplation of the absorption of each earlier one in the later, and of Sadāśiva in the Supreme akāśa, (which is) of the nature of the seat of Śiva. At the time of meditation on Śiva, His being in the sheath of food etc., is not to be meditated on.

Now, if this be so, even the companionship of Umā may not be on, that being opposed to the injunction to abandon all else. In the text, “abandoning all else”, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra of the context being understood even by the expression “else”, the superfluous word “all” has the significance resulting in the abandonment of all deities (whatsoever) except Śiva. Nor may it be said that because of the non-difference from Śiva of Umā, (who is) of the nature of Cit-Śakti referred to by the expression “Self of Bliss”, there can be no possibility of that being the object of the injunction as to abandonment. For, from the expression “self” heard in the case of the sheath of food etc., being common even to the Self of Bliss, it is preferable to understand finite self-hood of the Self of Bliss, as of those (others).

If (such an objection) be urged, not so. The “self” understood in the Self of Bliss refers to the Supreme Self, not to the...
finite self as in the self of food etc., for, from the non-mention later of something else to be attained by him who has attained the Self of Bliss, as (there is) in the case of him who has attained the self of food etc., it follows that the attainment (of the Self of Bliss) is liberation. So, too, of the word "self" which is taught to be common to the finite self and the Supreme (self), in the words "Self' (is used in the sense of) the finite self, strength, the body, nature and the Supreme Self", it is proper to adopt whatever sense is suitable (to the context). Nor may it be thought, that since in the Ānandavaiśā the word "self" is invariably seen to refer to the finite self, the sense of the context (should prevail here too). The reference to the finite self being incompatible with the reference to the cause of the world in "from the self, ether originates" (Taitt. II, 1), a reference to the Supreme Self has necessarily to be declared; in the case of the Self of Bliss too, a similar reference to the Supreme Self is intelligible, there being no difference (between the two), in respect of the characteristic marks or the contradiction of the sense of the context. Hence, Umā being non different from Śiva, the contemplation of the former is not contradicted, at the time of the meditation of the latter.

3:1833 Now, if Šakti, referred to by the expression, "Self of Bliss", and admitted to be of the form of all the world—Intelligent and Non-intelligent—be non-different from Śiva, then of all Intelligent beings non-distinct from that (Energy), non-difference from Śiva being inevitable, of Brahmā and the others too, referred to by the words "self of food" etc., non-difference from Śiva should be declared, because of their connection with the word "self"; which in the previous and succeeding sentences has been determined to refer to the Supreme Self: of them too, as of Umā, contemplation
at the time of the meditation of Śiva should not be contradicted.

If this be said, no (we reply), because in (the text), "Śiva alone is to be meditated on, the door of what is auspicious, abandoning all else" (Atharvaśīkhā), the property of being contemplated is limited to Śiva alone. If Brahmā and others are not the objects of that exclusion, what can be its object? Not the Non-intelligent world, nor the Intelligent world other than Brahmā etc., under reference, because of the natural denotative power of the general name "else (anyā)". (For, the term) refers to other Intelligent beings, like Śiva, the correlate (of the exclusion), just as in the statement "in the rest there is similarity to the Śyena rite" which is made after prescribing certain special rites as the elements of the Iṣṭi sacrifice, the reference of the expression "the rest" is to the (other) special rites because of similarity to the Iṣṭu special rites which are the correlates (of that expression); (hence), there must necessarily be a reference to Brahmā etc., the other intelligent beings who are thus in our thoughts. Though, in consonance with proximity to the term "all," (the term "else") is common to the other intelligent beings as well, the reference to Brahmā and other intelligent beings that have entered our thoughts cannot be got rid of; further, even in the case of other intelligent beings, the inappropriateness of (the exclusion) referring to them is common, they too being non-different from Śiva, like Brahmā and the rest. Therefore, the abandonment of what is really different from Śiva is not here enjoined, but of what appears to be different from Śiva. Hence, too, one's own self, (which); in meditation on Brahma, (is contemplated) as non-different from Śiva, in the form "I am Śiva", is not to be abandoned; (and) because of the appearance of the difference of the selves of food etc., both from Śiva and among themselves, (as
seen) from the declaration "another self within" in each hymn, their exclusion cannot be helped. As for Umā, though spoken of in the relationship of abode and what abides, as the Supreme ākāsa, and in the relationship of Attribute and Substance, in (the text) "It is one Bliss of Brahman", yet difference is mentioned (only) of the form of abode and of the form of unsurpassed Bliss, not of the intelligent Being of the nature of Ambikā; of that form, non-difference alone is declared. For, (in) the ānandā-dhukarāya (III, 3, 11) is established the understanding of the "Person, dark and tawny," in all meditation; from the expression "dark and tawny" (there are declared) of Śiva alone dark colour in respect of the form of Ambikā, and tawny colour in respect of the male form; thereby (the section) is pregnant with the non-difference of Śiva and Śakti. Hence, (it follows) that the selves of food etc., are not to be contemplated in the same manner as Umā, at the time of the meditation on Śiva. Thus (is) this section set out in the four sūtras "Ādiyānāya pravojanābhavat (for meditation, there being no other purpose)", "Ātmāsabdāccca (because of the expression 'self')", "Ātmagṛhitatattavaduttāt (the understanding of 'self', as in other places, because of what follows)", and "Anvayādita cet syādavadhāraṇāt (if it be said 'on account of connection', it may be so, on account of ascertainment)", (III, 8, 14—17).

8.18335 It is shown in the commentary inquiring into the sense of the third of these sūtras, that Cit-Śakti, of the form of the Self of Bliss, is but Śiva, the Supreme Self, and not different therefrom. Nor may it be said that the commentary seeks to establish the Supreme Self-hood of the Self of Bliss—following the first of the positions set out in the ānandamāya section (viz.) that the Self of Bliss is Śiva, the Supreme Self, and not, indeed, to establish the
non-difference of Cit Śakti from the Supreme Self, basing (itself) on the second interpretation set out in that section, viz., that the Self of Bliss is Cit-Śakti. For, on the basis of the first position, since it follows even from the ānandamaya section that the Self of Bliss is is the Supreme Self, the establishment of that (view) here is unnecessary; and it is also understood clearly from the ānāmādi sūtra (I, 1, 2) that it is only the second of the positions set out in the ānandamaya section that is acceptable to the commentator. Hence, it is quite consistent (to hold) that the non-difference of Śakti from Śiva is made clear by the commentator in the Ādhyāna section (III, 3, 14-17).

Similarly, its non-difference from Śiva is described in the section “Īkṣati karma vyapadeśati saḥ (He, being designated as the object of sight)” (I, 3, 12). There, while saying in reply to the question of Satvakāma, “The syllable AUM is verily the higher and the lower Brahman” (Praśna, V, 2), after mentioning the fruit of the meditation on the praṇava with one moment, viz., the attainment of the world of human beings reached by the Ṛk verses, which are of the nature of the first moment, and the fruit of the meditation on the praṇava of two moments, viz., the attainment of the middle space reached by the Yajus verses, which are of the nature of the second moment, it is said, “He, again, who meditates on this Supreme Self with the syllable ‘AUM’ of three moments, being relieved of sins, even as the serpent of its slough, is led up by the Sāman verses, to the world of Brahma; he perceives there the Supreme Person, the dweller in the city, who is higher (even) than the collective form of all these living beings” (Praśna, V, 5). The position that is acceptable finally is that “the world of Brahma” there is the world of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, and the person seen in that (world) is Śiva.
To that end is set forth the (following) \textit{prima facie} view: "The world of Brahma is the world of Viṣṇu, for, in the later hymn 'by Ṛks this world, by Yajus the middle space, by the Sāmans that which the enlightened ones know' (Prajña, V, 7), which summarizes the sense declared (earlier), one is reminded, in connection with the world of Brahma, of the property of being experienced by enlightened ones, which (in another context) is understood of the world of Viṣṇu, through the hymn 'the enlightened ones constantly perceive that Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu' (T. S J, 3, 2a). Hence, the person seen therein is but Viṣṇu."

3.1835 This is how that (\textit{prima facie} view) is refuted in the conclusion, through the explanation of that (text): "As for the reference to the 'Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu', there is no contradiction in (holding) that that which is other than the form of the world, of the nature of Bliss unexcelled, of the form of the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu, that itself is the Supreme Brahmā, called Śiva, for the reason that between Viṣṇu and Śiva, there is no essential difference other than a difference of state, as between the material and efficient cause''.

3.1836 Here, in order to reconcile with Śivaloka the sense recalled by the hymn "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" etc., it should be shown of that hymn only that it refers to Śivaloka, not that it refers to Śiva. Hence it is that in the commentary on the section "Kāryam Bādarīr asya gatyupapatteh (To the caused, opines Bādara, going being appropriate in that case)" (IV, 3, 6, \textit{et seq}), the Kāśa Vālī hymn "he reaches the end of the path, that is the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" (Katha III, 9) is shown to refer to the world of Śiva. It is not possible to show that the hymn "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" etc., refers to Śiva, holding to the present commentary (on I. 8, 12). It is not indeed the commen-
tator's conclusion that Śiva is directly of the nature of Viṣṇu who is of the form of the universe. It is shown, rather, in the commentary on the prakṛtyadhirakaraṇa (I, 1, 28 et seq) and elsewhere, that he is but a mode of Śiva Śakti, Supreme Bliss of the form of Śiva Śakti, being his essential nature.

Hence, the sense of that commentary should be understood in the following way, by the words "that which is other than the form of the world, of the nature of Bliss unexcelled, of the form of the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu," Cit-Śakti: the material cause of the mode Viṣṇu, who transforms himself into the form of the world, is referred to, it is that that functions even as the world of Parama Śiva; in this way is shown the reference of the hymn about "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" to the world of Śiva. By the words "That itself is the Supreme Brahman called Śiva" is declared the non-difference of that (Cit-Śakti) from the nature of Śiva. Now, in order to exhibit the absence of conflict with what is re-called, it should be said of the hymn about "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu", only that it refers to Cit-Śakti, which takes on the form of the world of Śiva; the statement of the non-difference of Cit-Śakti from the nature of Śiva does not there fit in. There being this objection, in order to show the utility of that statement, by removing the objection, there is the sentence beginning with "for the reason that between Viṣṇu and Śiva" etc. This is the objection that arises here: it cannot be that the supreme form of Viṣṇu is Śiva-Śakti, Viṣṇu being spoken of repeatedly in Purāṇas and Itihāsas, as non-different only from Śiva. The reply is indicated through the following statements. For the very reason that there is no difference of nature of Viṣṇu from Śiva, even of Śakti: that is of the form of the material cause of the mode Viṣṇu, there is non-difference of nature from Śiva; further, the
identity of Śiva's Sakti and Viṣṇu is taught in the Kūrma Purāṇa and elsewhere.

3.18363 Or else, this is the sense of the statement in the commentary, "That itself is the Supreme Brahman, called Śiva". Here and there in Purāṇas and Itihāsas, the Supreme Brahman taught by the entire Vedānta, the cause of all, He who is attained by the released ones, is designated as but the form of Viṣṇu, the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu and the Supreme Abode called Viṣṇu, as is seen from the (following) narrative of Nārada in the Mokṣa Dharma Parva of the Mahābhārata (ch. 20... having seen, on the slopes of the Himālayas, a certain virgin, and the persons with limbs studded with gems, with forms like that of the Sun, wearing jewels on their heads, who coming out of her mouth when she yawned, circumambulated her and re-entered her, Nārada prostrated and asked her reverently "Who art Thou? Who are those three persons? What are the gems in their bodies? What is the radiance on their heads?" Being told (by her) "I am Śāvitrī; those three persons are the Vedas; the gems are of the form of sacrifices and their fruit, the sense of the Vedas; the radiance on the heads, the Great Shining Splendour taught by the Vedānta, that is not knowable even by me"; he worshipped the Lord Viṣṇu for a hundred years to find out what the radiance was. Then looking at the Lord, who, pleased, appeared in front of him, and prostrating before Him with gratification, he asked Him "O Lord of the world, explain to me what is known by thee, O Acyuta; show me that Grace, Hṛṣikeśa; I desire to hear that, O Hari". He was then instructed by the Lord, thus: "What thou sawest on the heads of the Vedas, that is my form. Ascetics free from dualities and egotism, endowed with pure vision, they perceive me constantly. Ask them what thou desirest". There, by the words
“my form”, the form of Śiva alone is mentioned, in the realisation of non-difference. Hence it is that though it is declared to be “my form”, it is also said “ask them” in the view that there is some element of mystery (yet) to be questioned about. Therefore it is that of the form shown by the Lord as His own, the qualification of belonging to the Lord is mentioned even by himself, in the words of the Gītā, “Look at my union with the Lord”, and “the Supreme form of the Lord” (Bh. G. XI, 8 and 9). Thus, the declarations in the Bhārata of “the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu” and “the Supreme Abode called Viṣṇu”, which proceed on the realisation of the non-difference of Viṣṇu and Śiva, are also seen to refer to Śiva. On this view, the non-difference of Cit-Sakti from Śiva must be taken to be described by the statements in the Iksatyaḥākaraṇa; for, Viṣṇu, a special mode of Cit-Sakti, being non-different from Śiva, the difference of Cit-Sakti therewith is irreconcilable (therewith).

The existence of the Cit-Sakti of Paramēśvara in this wise, its non-difference from Paramēśvara, its being even then His attribute, all these are established even in the Śāstras which are primarily non-dualistic (in their conclusion). Thus, indeed, in the Saṁskṛopa Śāṅkara, (it is said as follows): The true stainless energy of Paramēśvara is called Cit-Sakti; the other inert energy is called Nescience (Avidyā). The world originates from the mutual intercourse of these two energies of the Lord. The Lord’s Cit-Sakti, is transformed (as it were) by the unreal changing energy. Thus say some. Others, again, with some faith (in the Scriptural declaration of creation) say that this is acceptable to enlightened ones, in one sphere, but is not acknowledged in another. In the sphere of injunctions as to action and meditation, as enjoining them, it is acceptable; it is not recognised in the
sphere of the Attributeless Real or in the consideration of Vedic texts relating thereto" (Chapter III, verses 228 and 229). The same sense is indicated in the Pañcapādiśa by the statement "Bliss, Experience of Things, and Eternity are attributes Though non-different from intelligence, they appear as if different" (Vizianagaram Samskṛt Series Edition, page 4).

Thus, because of the existence in Cit-Śakti of the property of being an attribute, from the empirical point of view, though (it is) non-different in essence, the teaching of difference as between Substance and Attribute and so on in the Gārgi Brāhmaṇa, Dahara Vidyā etc., is quite consistent. As for the statement in the jan-madi-sūtra (I, 1, 2) “That is itself figuratively spoken of as Brahman, because of abundance”, that is in the view that in a context pertaining to the statement of its being an attribute from the empirical point of view—as seen from its being referred to as Attribute in the adjacent texts of the Ānandavali, “that is one Bliss of Brahman”—the relation of co-ordination should be interpreted figuratively, not in the view that there is difference from all points of view. Even thus should be understood the statement made as to the figurative application of the word denoting knowledge—as an attribute to the Substance (itself), in the sūtra “Tadguna sāratvattu tadvyapadesaḥ prājñavat (But the self is so designated because of that being its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent Self)” (II, 3, 2:)

Thus, the four-fold result,—viz., Brahman’s Cit-Śakti being of the form of all the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, its being of itself of the essential nature of Brahman, its being of the form of the host of qualities pertaining to Him, and the unchanging nature of Brahman—is acceptable to the Śākya (Śrīkaṇṭha). That result does firmly indicate his ultimate view to be that
Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-different from the finite self, and of the nature of pure non duality. If, verily, Cit-Sakti is non-different from Brahman, and that is itself of the nature of all His attributes, there are not any attributes of Brahman different from Him. It is rather He Himself that appears as attribute, because of an imagined difference. It thus follows that Brahman is in reality attributeless. The genuine relationship of Attribute and Substance is not indeed consistent with non-difference. Nor can it be said that like non-difference, difference also such as is consistent with genuine relationship of Attribute and Substance, is accepted by the ācārya (Śrikanṭha); for, in the commentary on the ātmatva section (II, 1, 15, et seq.) he discards the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bheda-bheda), as self-contradictory.

Nor is there in the system of the ācārya, as in that of Śadā, the acceptance of Viśeṣa (specificity), which, though there is no difference between Attribute and Substance, takes the place of Difference. Nor even thereby can the relationship of Attribute and Substance be maintained to be genuine; for, since even by Madhvas it is admitted only as discharging the functions of Difference, there follows of it (Viśeṣa) only (the properties of) appearing and being spoken of as Difference. If Viśeṣa could do everything that Difference does, then, under the name Viśeṣa, Difference alone would have been acknowledged (in the system). Hence, it is that in a work of Madhva's, known as Anuvyākhya; in the words “In destruction, there is difference also,” 1 (it is) conceded (that) in the real threads, there is of the destructible cloth, etc., difference from the threads. In the commentary thereon, the Nyaya Sudha, the following doubt is raised: “Just as the diffé-

1 Anuvyākhya, p. 25, Sārvamūla Edition.
rences which enter into our discourse and which would help (to establish the reality of) Difference, are said to be otherwise derived from the ground of Viśeṣa, even so it may be possible to bring about through Viśeṣa, non-existence in what exists; why then should difference and non-difference be admitted (in that case)?' and it is answered thus: "Through the capacity of Viśeṣa to create empirical distinctions alone, it is not possible to bring about non-existence; if it did everything which Difference does, Viśeṣa would be Difference itself, not its deputy." Hence it is confirmed that in respect of Attributes, only the position of the Pañcapādikā, that "though non-different from Intelligence, they appear as if different" is acceptable (to the commentator).

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So, too, through the acceptance of non-difference from Brahma of Cit-Śakti which is of the form of the entire universe, it follows of the world of ether etc., that it is an illusory manifestation of that (Cit-Śakti). Or else, if it be admitted of the fleeting (world of) ether etc., that it is a transformation (of Cit-Śakti), there would result a contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahma, who is non-different therefrom (i.e., from Cit-Śakti).

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Now, though Cit-Śakti and Brahma are really non-different, yet to support the relationship of Attribute and Substance, abode and that which abides, obtained from the Gārgi Brāhmaṇa, Dahara Vidyā, Ānanda Valli, etc., empirical difference should necessarily be admitted; only then is there consistency of the distinction which is made between Brahma and Cit-Śakti as non-changing and changing, in spite of the property of transformation admitted of Cit-Śakti. Though the finite self and Brahma are non-different, there is distinction between agency, enjoyment, etc., and the absence thereof. If it be said that so, too, (a distinction must be

admitted here, (we reply) even thus, in the stage of final release through the cessation of empirical difference, the cessation must be declared of the world of ether etc., as of the agency, enjoyment etc., of the finite self; (hence), the conclusion that it is an illusory manifestation of Brahman cannot be helped. Therefore, in the manner stated in the Sāmkṣepa Śāṅkara, the holding on to the doctrine of transformation in the commentary is in order to support action, meditation, etc., from the empirical view-point, and in order to provide an occasion for refuting it, that refutation being needed from the view-point of truth; hence, it is firmly established that only the view of Brahman's being unconnected with the world is acceptable (to Śrīkanṭha).

Though Īś-Śakti is said to be of the form of the entire world of Intelligence, as of the form of the whole Non-intelligent world, it does not follow of the world of Intelligence that it is an illusory manifestation like ether etc., for, if that were so, that (world) ceasing through realisation of the truth, there would result non-existence of the experience of the fruit of release; further, from the non-difference of that eternal (world) from Brahman, there would result a contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahman.1

1 The text here is rather obscure. Following the not-too-clear text of Ananda Lahori, the present text reads: "nityasya tasya Brahmapbhedā Bhūrma nirvikāraśtvā virodha prasaṅgācca;" but at least two texts (A and O) read "virodhāprasaṅgācca". On this reading, the sense would be "since from the non-difference of that eternal world from Brahman, there would not result any contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahman". Prima facie, it is clear that from identity with what is eternal, there cannot result any conflict of the kind suggested. Identity in the case of material
Now, the sūtra "Parināmāt (because of transformation)" in the prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (I, 4, 23, et seq.) is explained to mean "because of transformation into the form of the Intelligent and the Non-intelligent". It is also said that from the statement of the doctrine of transformation, the doctrine of illusion follows of itself. This is true. But yet the mention of Brahman's transformation in respect of the element of Intelligence either refers only to the eternal existence of Intelligent Beings as modes of Brahman's Cit-Sakti or is made in the view that even in respect of Intelligent beings, through the medium of their own Cit-Sakti, there is transformation in the form of contraction and expansion of knowledge and happiness. The eternity of Intelligent beings in their own nature has been established in the section "Nātmā śrutēḥ, nityatvāceca tābhyahi (the Self is not originative, on account of the statement of Śruti, and the eternity resulting therefrom)" (II, 3, 18). It is therefore firmly established that it is acceptable to the Ācārya (Śrīkaraṇṭha) that Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-different from the finite self, and of the form of pure non-duality.

Now, if, both from the empirical standpoint and that of release, there be no distinction of the Ācārya's system from the doctrine of him who upholds (pure) non-dualism, why should a separate commentary be undertaken? If (this question) is asked, creation cannot be taken literally, just because of the non-eternal character of that world. There is no such difficulty in the case of the eternal world of Intelligence. Hence, there is no need here to explain identity as that of illusory manifestations with their substrate. This interpretation and the text suited thereto, seem more logical. The reading adopted in the text is less easily intelligible.
it is answered (as follows). The attainment of the nature of Brahman results, verily, from the intuition of the non-specific Brahman. That intuition is gained by the meditation thereon. By those who have not gained the firmness of intellect enabling them to meditate on that extremely subtle being, intellectual firmness is gained through the grace of that Being who is worshipped with firm devotion uninterruptedly for a long time, and who is endowed with endless auspicious qualities and a shining form; for, Sūtra says "let him unite our intellects with auspicious Sūrti (i.e. Knowledge)" (Vēt. III, 1, 4) and Sūrti declares "seek knowledge of Īśvara". Hence it is that the Khandanakāra (Śrī Harṣa) says: "This desire for (knowledge of) non-duality which rescues one from the mighty fear (of migration) arises in two or three men, if at all, only by the grace of the Lord" (Khandana-Khanda-Khāḍya, para 163, verse 25) The grace of God is obtained by meditation on Him, (as seen) from the Paurāṇic statement: "Just as a man is pleased with women through intimate service, so through intimate meditation is Mahēśvara pleased". Hence, in order to attain the excess of devotion requisite for concentration on Him for a long time, (it has to be taught) that He alone is the Supreme Brahman, and that there is no true form of His, other than this; a fresh commentary is undertaken by the Śārya who teaches this, in order to exhibit that reconciliation of the Vedānta texts and the Brahma Sūtras which is suitable thereto.

Now, in order to secure excess of devotion thereto, it would be proper only to proclaim His distinctive glory, as understood from Sūtra, Sūrti, and Purānas, and not to condemn His other form, which is real and has to be expounded as the sense of the Vedānta conforming to Logic, in order to attain what is acceptable (even) to himself as the supreme good of the soul. If (this objection...
tion) be stated, it is answered thus: this method (of exposition) is seen even in ancient sages. In order to secure strength of capacity for those prior observances by the practice of which fitness for a later stage is attained, there is confirmation (secured) in those observances, through exhibiting the condemnation of that (later stage) as contrary to texts and reason,—though (such condemnation) is really unacceptable,—and through restraining persons from primarily engaging therein.

In this way, in the Kalpa Sūtra, confirmation in that state (of the house-holder) is secured through condemning renunciation by showing its opposition to Śruti and Smṛti, through restraining people from taking to it in the first instance, and through praising the state of the house-holder, wherein are observed sacrifices and other such rites for the purpose of obtaining purity of the internal organ,—(a quality) auxiliary to the excess of devotion characteristic of those fitted for renunciation. Thus, indeed, is it said by the Śārya, Āpastamba: "Then they quote (the following) two verses from a Purāṇa. 'Those eighty-thousand sages who desired offspring passed along the southern course of the Sun and reached the cremation ground. Those eighty-thousand sages who did not desire offspring passed along the northern course of the Sun and obtained immortality.' Thus are praised those who keep the vow of chastity. Then they become also capable of realising their desires by the mere wish; for instance, (the production of) rain, the bestowal of children, vision of objects at a (considerable) distance, transporting oneself with the speed of thought, and other (powers) of this description. Therefore, on account of the texts and on account of the visible results, some declare these orders (of ascetics to be) the most excellent. But, it is the firm opinion of those who are well-versed in the three-fold learning that the
Vedas are of (supreme) authority. They consider that what are there ordered to be performed with rice, barley, animals, ghee, potsherds, (in the company of) a wife, (to the accompaniment of) loud or muttered (hymns) should be performed and that any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative. As for what is said of the cremation-ground, it ordains (as the fitting \textit{finale}) at the end of many sacrifices, the sacrificial offering of the body.\textsuperscript{1} It is declared that thereupon (results) a reward without end, designated as ‘heaven’.

Further, of him, the Veda declares the offspring to be immortality; ‘in thy offspring thou art born again; that indeed is thy immortality, O! mortal’. Further, he (the father) himself is perceived by the senses, to be reproduced here, (as a) distinct (being); the likeness (between the two) can be even seen, the bodies alone (being) different. Those (sons) who observe the duties enjoined increase the fame and (enjoyment of) heaven of the ancestors in the other world. In this manner, each succeeding (generation increases the fame and enjoyment of heaven) of the preceding one. They (the ancestors) live in heaven, until the destruction of the (primal) elements. In the \textit{Bhavisya\textit{t Pur\=a}} (it is said) that, at the new creation, they become disseminators of seed. Then, too, (there is) the saying of Praj\=apati, ‘those dwell with us who practise these—the study of the three Vedas, the (duties of the) student’s career, the creation of progeny, faith, austerities, sacrifices and the bestowal of gifts. He who praises other (orders of life) becomes dust and perishes’. Of those (sons), those who commit sin, they alone perish, as of a tree, the leaf

\textsuperscript{1} As the commentator, Haradatta, explains, it does not mean that dead house-holders become demons and haunt cremation-grounds.
(attacked by worms, falls itself alone, not affecting the branch or the tree). They do not injure others. (As) in this world, no connection is known of him (the ancestor) with the acts (of his sons), so too in the next (no connection exists) with the fruit of the acts. (The truth of) that may be known from the following (reason): This creation is the work of Prajāpati and the sages. The bodies of those (sages) who have done what is meritorious, appear in heaven with superior resplendence (as of the constellation of the seven Rṣis, i.e., the Great Bear). Even if it be that some (ascetic) by a residue of works or by austerities attains heaven while embodied, or realises his desires with the mere wish, that can be no ground for the superiority of one order over another. Thus, (1) through showing by (the statement of) the first and final views, the unauthoritativeness of renunciation, as being opposed to all Scriptures which enjoin the performance of sacrifices etc., (2) through refuting with texts and reasoning the condemnation of the householder's state, as leading to the cremation-ground, as not bringing about immortality, and (consequently) inferior, (3) through condemning in toto other orders of life, by the citation of the saying of Prajāpati, (4) through removing by argument the doubt that if good deeds done by sons, grandsons etc., constitute heaven for the ancestors, the evil deeds of the former may constitute a hell for the latter, (5) through demolishing the superiority claimed for the other order (of renunciation) on the ground of special attainments, by showing that the power of realising one's desires by the mere wish and so on are achieve-

1. The words in brackets constitute Haradatta's explanation.
2. Āpastamba Dharmā Sūtras, 11, 9, Khaṇḍas 28 and 24. Dr. Buhler's translation in the Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 2; has been followed for the most part.
able through deeds and austerities and may be acquired by any one whether in the house-holder’s or in any other order (of life), and (6) through the praise of the house-holder’s order, (which is) connected with the observance of sacrifices and other rites, there is brought about with great effort, for the man of low capacity, whose non-attachment is unsteady, confirmation in the house-holder’s order, in order that through purification of the internal organ there may be gradual attainment of steadiness of non-attachment. In the sūtras, athāpi means and also; amṛtatvam hi kalpate means they become immortal. In anantyam svargyam, the additional letter ‘y’ is metrical. Dehatvaneva anyat means the bodies alone being different. Te svargajītaḥ punassarge bijārthā bhavanti means that dwelling in heaven till the deluge, as a result of the other-worldly good deeds performed by sons, grandsons etc., they, at the commencement of a fresh creation, become Prajāpatis concerned with the creation of the world. Tarītāsasmāḥ, with them alone do we dwell; it means that only for those possessed of the wealth of the the three Vedas etc., is there attainment of our world. In Nāṣyāsmin loke, the singular asya (his) is used in the plural significance; it means that for those ancestors there is no connection in the other world with the evil deeds committed by their sons etc., in this world, and with their results. ¹

Here, the statement “any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative,” denying the basic authority for the order of renunciation, is not valid, that (authority) being obtained directly from the Jābāla Śruti,² and other (texts). The existence of other

¹. This commentary, is, for the most part, taken by our author from Haradatta’s Ujjvala.

². The declaration of that Śruti is “yadahareva virajet tadahareva pravrajet”, “The day on which there is non-attachment
orders of life is acknowledged by the ācārya, Āpastamba himself, earlier, in the words, "There are four orders of life—that of the house-holder, of dwelling with the teacher, of silence, and of forest-dwelling; practising these steadily, whichever of these is suitable, according to the teaching, one attains welfare" (Dharma Sūtras, II, 9, 21, 1 & 2). By the statement "according to the teaching", the basis for all (orders) is acknowledged. Since four-foldness results even by the enumeration of the house-holder’s order and so on, the statement "there are four" is for refuting the view that there is (but) one order (which counts). Thus, to say that "any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative" is to contradict his own statement. As for the statement "It is declared that thereupon (results) a reward without end, designated as 'heaven'"; that is to lean on a reed. If there are such revealed texts, they are but eulogistic, like "the merit of those who have performed the four-monthly sacrifice, is, verily, inexhaustible." The other texts cited such as "in thy offspring thou art born again" are also thus explained. The argument and example based on the identity of father and son are very puerile. The similarity of two bodies is not, indeed, invariably connected with non-difference of soul. So, too, the statement as to the non-attainment of hell by the ancestors through the evil deeds of sons etc., is questionable, because of opposition to such texts as that "They (the evil-doers) perish along with their ancestors". As for the argument "(creation is of) Prajāpati and the sages" etc., that is shown to be worthless, by the ācārya Āpastamba himself, earlier, in the words, "Because of their distinctive splendour, there is known of them no sin" (Dharma Sūtra, II, 6, 18, 8). All this has been said by Āpastamba neither in ignorance nor in error; but dull

(established), renounce even on that day" (Jābala, 4).
witted people, who, pleased merely at hearing the fruits of renunciation, by suddenly starting on it, though there is not (in them) the strength of non-attachment suitable thereto, might fall, not being able to keep up that life; it is, rather, in order to show grace to such people, in the desire that they should not so fall, that the sense of the (following) text is elaborated (by Āpastamba) in the realisation of its drift: "Of what (good) is the impure (intercourse of the house-holder's state)? The deer-skin, the unshaven whiskers, austerities, of what (good are they)? O! Brāhmīns. desire a son; he, verily, is the blameless source of enjoyment."

So too, in the Śānti Parva of the Mahābhārata, to Yudhiṣṭhira 3.218 who contemplates renunciation and prays for permission to renounce, in the words "Or, living alone and observing the vow of silence, with my head shaven clean, I shall support my body begging each day of only one tree" (Chapter, IX, Verse 12), there is addressed at length by Kṛṣṇa, both in his own words and through

1. *Aitareya Brahmana*, Ch. 33, i, 7a (Ānandāśrama Edn., Vol. II, p. 886). The translation follows the commentary of Śāṅkara, particularly in the interpretation of the expressions, impurity, goat-skin etc. Prof. Keith considers the commentator's interpretations groundless, in the present case, and prefers to translate thus:

"What is the use of dirt, what of the goat-skin?
What of long hair, and what of fervour?
Seek a son, O! Brahmin!
'This is the world's advice'"


Unfortunately, Prof. Keith does not tell us what other interpretation is suitable, or how the literal sense he adopts fits into the context.
sages and others, a condemnation of renunciation; (this is done) because through the prayer to the brothers for permission to renounce, lack of steadiness of non-attachment is understood (by Kṛṣṇa), (and, it is, therefore) desired to engage him (Yudhishṭhira) in sacrifices etc., to purify the internal organ for the purpose of (securing) that firmness. Again, through the qualification “purifying” (applied to the path) in the verse “Having abandoned the purifying path Janaka shaved off his head; his dear wife saw him penniless, practising the life of mendicancy” (Sānti, XVIII, 4h 5a—edition used by M. N. Dutt) which occurs in the tale of Janaka,—it is shown that it is not proper to abandon the path of duty auxiliary to the (securing of) steady purity of the internal organ, and take suddenly to the order of renunciation.

So, in the Manusmṛti too, only with reference to those persons not steady in their non-attachment is it said that “One should direct one’s mind to renunciation after discharging the three debts; he, who, without discharging them, practises renunciation, goes below” (Manuṣmṛti, VI. 5) as if in disregard and suppression of the sense of the explicit texts, “The day on which there is non-attachment (established), renounce even on that day, whether from the house (holder’s state) or the forest (dweller’s)”, and “renounce even from the order of student-ship” (Jājñālopaniṣad, 4).

It is only thus that the reconciliation of Vedānta texts with the doctrine of (Brahman) with attributes has been shown by the Ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha) in order to bestow grace on the dull-witted person by turning him away from the pursuit of what is attributeless, and making him pursue with firm devotion the meditation (of Brahman) with attributes lest, (the fool), pleased with the mere hearing of the excellent fruit, namely, the attainment of the pure Brahman, but devoid of the mental concentration that can
bring about the meditation and intuition necessary for that attainment, should abandon the pursuit of meditation on Brahman with attributes, take forcibly to the pursuit of hearing, reflection and meditation pertaining to Brahman without attributes, and, not reaching to the concentration of mind necessary therefor, fall between both. Nor does the exhibition of this synthesis amount to showing that to be intended which was never intended, like the demonstration in the Kalpa Sūtra "In thy son thou art born again", that immortality for the house-holder is the pro-creation of sons. For, of such texts as "By the command of the Imperishable One, O Gārgi, the Sun and the Moon are held apart" (Bṛh. III. 8, 9)". "He is the controller of all, ruler of all, the master of all" (Bṛh. IV, 4, 22) and so on, though occurring in topics relating to (Brahman) without attributes, there is an intermediate sense relating to (Brahman) with attributes, understood as a means to the comprehension of the attributeless (one). As for the statement that there is no other pure reality higher than that, the concealment thereof (i.e., of the higher real), like that of renunciation in the Kalpa Sūtra, is for the purpose of (creating) faith in that kind of dull-witted inquirer, through teaching him thus by arguments comprehensible by his intellect.

Now, if the construction of a separate system be necessary for dull-witted inquirers, that work should be done independently, and not based on the Brahma Śūtras, as the Brahma Śūtras have the object of inquiring into Pure Brahman; for, if it be admitted that the Pure Brahman is recognised by the ācārya (Śrīkanṭha), it should also be acknowledged that that (the Pure Brahman) is the object of inquiry (of the Śūtras), as shown by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. If this be urged, true (we reply); but by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda himself it has been shown in the case of the Śūtras that
they have Brahman with attributes as an object of inquiry, on the ground that many-sidedness is an ornament that follows from the definition of a sūtra. Thus, in the commentary even on the first sūtra (it is said) "Brahman does exist, of the nature of eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, omniscient and endowed with all powers. The properties of eternal purity etc., are, indeed, predicated, in view of the etymology of the word Brahman" (Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, M. Ed p. 8); thus, by showing the etymological significance of Brahman (as holding good) of both the Pure Brahman and Brahman with attributes, it is indicated that the word Brahman, about which there is inquiry, refers to both of them. Thereby is manifested his intention that like the Pure Brahman, Brahman with attributes too is to be inquired into, along with the source of knowledge, the form, the means and the fruit. As helpful thereto, in the janmādi sūtra (I, 1, 2: Ś), the nature (of Brahman) has been determined through the definition of both (Brahmans) in the view that the property of being the cause of the world, both as efficient and material cause, non-different from the world, is characteristic of Brahman with attributes, as proprium, and of the Pure Brahman, as an accident. One interpretation having been given of the sāstra yoni sūtra (I, 1, 3; Ś), as confirming the possession of omniscience involved in the Saguṇa Brahman's creatorship of the world, there is shown another interpretation for the purpose of establishing that the Sāstra is the source of knowledge of Brahman in general, Saguṇa as well as Nirguṇa. In the samanvaya sūtra (I, 1, 4: Ś) in order to show the authoritativeness of the Sāstra in respect of Brahman mentioned in the prior sūtra, the connection of that which is of the form of the Vedānta with the reference thereto (i.e., to Brahman) is exhibited only as common to (both) Saguṇa and Nirguṇa (forms). And that
results in distinguishing between the synthesis of all Vedānta texts with Nirguṇa (form) as their supreme significance, and with the Saguna (form) as their intermediate significance, in the manner indicated by the (following) words of the Samksepa Śātraka:

"The synthesis of texts declaring attributes with the attributeless substance is always possible; it is not as if the synthesis of what is with attributes cannot bear synthesis with the attributeless substance. The form of Saguna Brahman is (a combination of) truth and falsehood; the meditation (thereon) is also so; the Vedic texts referring thereto are like that; hence, the intermediate sense of these Vedic texts is of a different kind (i.e., other than the final one); the other attributeless Substance, the true object (of the Śāstra) is proclaimed to be different" (Samksepa Śātraka, I, 463 & 464). Even of the texts, read in the topic relating to the Nirguṇa form, an intermediate reference to a Saguna form qualified by the attributes, resulting from the significance of words occurring in such texts, is quite legitimate.

In the Ikṣatyadhikarana (I, 1, 5, et seq; Ś) refuting the reference of the Vedānta to the causality of the pradhāna acceptable to the Sāmkhyas, the reference to the causality of Brahman is made clear, only in common to (both) the Saguna and Nirguṇa forms. Hence it is that up to the sūtra "Śvāpyayāt (because of attainment of Self in sleep)" (I, 1, 9; Ś), texts are cited from topics connected with the Nirguṇa form, such as the Sad Vidya and so on, and in the commentary on the sūtra "Gati sāmānyāt (because of identity of purport (I, 1, 10; Ś)" there is exhibited the harmonious declaration of all Vedānta texts in respect of the causality of Intelligence, as common to the Saguna and Nirguṇa forms; but in the commentary on the sūtra "Śrutāvāca (and because of its being declared)" (I, 1, 11; Ś) there is cited the fol-
lowing hymn read in the Śvetāsvatara Upanishad which sets out to demonstrate the glory of Para-śevāra, the Saguna (Brahman): “There is of Him, in the world, no Lord nor controller nor any characteristic mark. He is the cause, the master of the masters of the senses; of Him there is neither Creator nor Master” (Śvet. VI, 9). In introducing the Śandunayya section that follows (thereon), the whole of the rest of the chapter is shown to arise as referring to both the Saguna and the Nirguna (forms), in the words beginning with “Two forms, indeed, are understood of Brahman, (one) with the limitations of name, form and change, and (another) different therefrom, devoid of all limitations” and ending with “Thus, Brahman, though one is taught in the Vedānta as connected with limitations and devoid of limitations, as an object to be meditated on and an object to be known; hence is commenced the rest of the work”. Later, through the sūtras “The Self consisting of Bliss is the highest Self, on account of repetition (I, 1, 13; Ś)”, “The bhūman is Brahman, as the instruction about it is additional to that about sleep (I, 8, 8; Ś)”, “The Imperishable is Brahman, as it supports everything up to ākāśa (I, 8, 10; Ś)”, “That which possesses the attributes of invisibility etc., is Brahman, because of the declaration of attributes (I, 2, 21; Ś)”, “The person of the measure of a thumb is Brahmā, on account of the very term used (Īśāna) (I, 3, 24; Ś)”, “On account of the mention of the highest Self as different in the states of deep sleep and departure (I, 8, 42; Ś)”, the synthesis of Vedānta texts is shown with Brahman that is of the nature of Truth, Knowledge, Infinite Imperishable Bliss, devoid of all attributes like grossness etc., and is non-different from the inner Self. Similarly their synthesis in a suitable manner with even (that form of) Brahman which is ex-
dowed with attributes, united to a resplendent auspicious form for the purpose bestowing grace on devotees, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities like having desires which come true, purposes which come true, etc., is exhibited, in the sūtras, "The one within is Brahman on account of His qualities being declared (I, 1, 20; ध)"; "That which consists of mind is Brahman, because what is known everywhere is taught (I, 2, 1. ध)"; "The small अकाल is Brahman, because of what is said later, (I, 3, 14: ध)", and so on. In the chapter devoted to showing absence of contradiction (in the Vedānta doctrine, i.e., the second chapter of the Sūtras), just as there is shown the refutation of objections to the synthesis with the attributeless (Brahman) in the sūtra "Their non-difference results from such terms as origin and the like (II, 1, 14: ध)", (the same refutation is shown) even in the case of Brahman with attributes, possessed of the properties of being the material cause of the world, creating the world, bestowing grace on all beings etc., through the (following) sūtras; "Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, because of difference of nature; this difference is known from Scripture (II, 1, 4: ध)", "Brahman is not the Creator of the world, as beings engaging in action have a motive (II, 1, 82: ध)", "There is no inequality or cruelty in the Lord, on account of his regarding merit or demerit; for, so Scripture declares (II, 1, 34: ध)"; and the rest. In the (third) chapter teaching the means of attainment, the understanding of qualities like the possession of desires which come true is described for the purpose of meditation in the case of Brahman with attributes, in many sūtras, like "Possession of true desires and so on have to be understood here and there, on account of abode and so on (III, 3, 80: ध)"; (this is done) in the same way as the qualities of Bliss etc., non-grossness etc., (are described) for the comprehension of Brah-
'man without attributes, in the sūtras “Bliss and so on, as belonging to the subject, have to be understood everywhere (III, 3, 11: Ś)”; and “But the negative conceptions concerning the Imperishable are to be understood in all meditations, because of the equality, and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained (III, 3, 33: Ś)”. In the (fourth) chapter about the fruit, in the first pāda, in the sūtras “Repetition is required, because of the text instructing more than once (IV, 1, 1: Ś)”; “But, as the Self, Śrutī acknowledges and makes us understand Brahman (IV, 1, 3: Ś)”; “Sitting (a man is to meditate) on account of possibility (IV, 1, 7: Ś)”; “Where there is concentration, there meditation may be performed, there being no difference (IV, 1, 11: Ś)”; “On the attainment of this, there is non-clinging and destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared (IV, 1, 13: Ś),—the repetition to be performed of hearing etc., in the case of the Nirguṇa (form), and of meditation etc., in the case of the Sagūṇa form and some such other matters are shown by double interpretation¹ to govern both the Sagūṇa and Nirguṇa forms. In the second pāda are described the mode of departure of the enlightened one for the purpose of attaining the fruit of meditation on the Sagūṇa (form) and the absence of necessity for departure for the attainment of the fruit of Knowledge of the Nirguṇa (form). In the third pāda, it is shown that the path of light etc., is followed by those who know the Saguṇa Brahman, that what is attained by means of that path is the Saguṇa Brahman. In the fourth pāda are determined the nature of the fruit attained by the knower of Nirguṇa Brahman, in three

¹. *Tantra* is a mode of interpreting a sūtra in more than one way, for different purposes; according to the dictionary, it is “a means which leads to two or more results” (Monier-Williams).
sections beginning with "Having entered the highest light, there is manifestation of his own nature, as seen from the word 'own' (IV, 4, 1: S)", and also the nature of the fruit attained by him who meditates on the Saguna (form), in the sections beginning with "But by the mere wish, the released effect their desires, that being declared (IV, 4, 8: S).").

Now, if, in the manner stated, even by the acarya Sankara himself, who showed that for the Sutras there is also a sense inquiring into the Saguna Brahman, there had been an inquiry into the nature, source of knowledge, means and the fruit in the case of Saguna Brahman too, for what purpose was another commentary written by the acarya Srikanta with reference to the Saguna (form)? If it be said that it was for the purpose of securing excess of devotion to the Saguna (form) by interpreting the Sutras, in their entirety, as referring to the Saguna (form), why did not the acarya Sankara interpret them as referring in entirety to the Nirguna (form), in order to secure increased faith in the Nirguna. If this be asked, we reply here (as follows). Only the existence of the Saguna Brahman was established by Sankara acarya; He was not demonstrated to be Parama Siva, by the removal of doubts about His being any other deity like Visnu.

In the dahradhikarana, (I, 3, 14: S), after making an initial statement of the conclusion that Parameshvara alone can be the small akasa, not the elemental ether or the finite self, there is introduced the answer to the following objection: "In the prior sentence 'that which in this Brahma City' etc., the finite self is referred to by the word Brahma; since that is the Lord of the city in the form of the body; hence, he alone, who was mentioned earlier, can be the small akasa"; therein, occur the words "Or
else, it is in connection with the body of the finite self alone that there is taught the proximity of Brahman, like the proximity of Viṣṇu in the sālāgrama”, which mentions between Viṣṇu and Sagunā Brahman that is to be determined to be the small ākāśa, a relationship as of object of comparison with the subject; hence, it is indicated that the Sagunā Brahman here to be demonstrated is not of the form of Viṣṇu. For, in the dharanādhikaraṇa itself, both before and after (the present context) occur the words “though elemental ether is the conventional sense of the word ākāśa, yet the comparison of that with itself is not proper,” and “though the word ākāśa is well-known to signify elemental ether, that is not to be understood, because of the absence of the relationship as between object and subject of comparison”; thereby is established the difference of the small ākāśa from the elemental ether, because of the two being designated as subject and object of comparison, in the words “As big as is this ether, so big is that ākāśa within the heart” (Cn. VIII, 1, 3). The application of this principle is unbroken even in the case of what occurs in the middle (between those two statements of the commentary).

3.232 So, in the commentary of yāvadadhihikāra section (III, 8, 82; 8) (it is said), “An ancient sage, a teacher of the Vedas, Apāntara-pas by name, at the direction of Viṣṇu, was born on the earth as Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, at the time of the conjunction of the Kali and Dwāpara Yugas. Sanatkumāra also, a son of Brahma’s mind, was born as Skanda, because of the boon granted by himself to Rudra”. By this indirect statement it is indicated through the argument a fortiori that Sambhāra Rudra (the Lord of Destruction, one of the three forms of the Deity) thus shown to be inferior even to Viṣṇu can much less be Sagunā Brahman, (whose nature is) to be ascertained. It is well-known from the Purāṇas that
Samadhāra Rudra, verily, praying to Brahmā (thus) "I desire thee alone as a son or one like to thee, O Pervasive One" was granted the boon, and the consequent birth is the subject of the story of the birth of Kumāra. That Sagunā Brahman thus indicated to be different from Viṣṇu and Rudra is Parama Śiva, higher than the three forms of the Deity, is shown by the use of the expression Paramēśvara, generally signifying Parama Śiva, in the case of the Sagunā Brahman, (whose identity is) desired to be determined in the sections about (the being) within the Sun (I, 1, 20 :Ś), and so on.

Vācaspati Miśra, who knew what the Bhagavatpāda had at heart, says at the commencement of his work (Bhāmati) "To the eternal being endowed with six limbs and manifold members, to the Veda and to Bhava, we bow". Here by the terms "Veda" and "Bhava" are suitably understood what are related as source and object of knowledge, and designated as worthy of adoration; it is (thus) indicated that Sagunā Brahman, (whose nature is) ascertained in that work, is but Parama Śiva, (who is) well-known to be denoted by the word "Bhava", and qualified by a host of auspicious attributes in the form of six limbs and ten members.

Though (there are such indications in Śaṁkara's system), yet this is not established by refuting in the case of the relevant texts in each section, (their possible) reference to other deities. Extremely subtle suggestions cannot of themselves be evidence appealing to the hearts of the hearers; hence, for that purpose, a separate commentary is begun by the Śārya (Śrikanṭha) in order to demonstrate the harmony of the Vedānta texts with the position that the Sagunā Brahman taught in this Šāstra is but Parama Śiva, that He alone is to be meditated on as conjoined with Umā, in accordance with the injunctions in the Dāhara, Śādhyā, Upa-
kośala, Vaiśvānara and other Vidyās, and that the abode attained through the path of light etc., by the devotees of the Saguna (form) is but His resplendent world.

The advantage of demonstrating that (i.e., Saguna Brahman) is thus declared in the following verse of the Kalpataru: "The demonstration (of Brahman) as with attributes is out of compassion for those dull-witted ones who have not the capacity to intuite the Supreme Brahman without attributes; having thereby directed their minds to the pursuit of the Saguna Brahman, it (Nirguna Brahman), devoid of all figments of duality, directly manifests itself" (Kalpataru, p. 192). Now, if, for gaining this advantage, another commentary (like that of Śrīkanṭha) has necessarily to be undertaken, the demonstration of Saguna Bhrahman in Śaṅkara's commentary is in vain. If this be said, listen to (our account of) the purposefulness even of that. The commentary is begun by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda only with the object of demonstrating Nirguna Brahman. That demonstration has to be effected in each section by refuting the doubts and prima facie views arising out of the possible reference of the relevant texts in each section to what is other (than Brahman), such as the finite self and so on. That refutation has to be effected by means of such characteristics as the properties of creating all, protecting all, controlling all, destroying all, and so on. There is room for this doubt: of Brahman that is demonstrated here, of which all attributes are denied, (and) which is of the nature of Intelligence alone, whence these attributes by the acceptance of which as characteristic of Brahman, the prima facie references to the finite self, etc., are refuted? This is the statement of the answer: though really devoid of attributes, yet from the empirical stand-

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point there are of Brahman many characteristics of the nature of auspicious qualities. As endowed with these, that same Brahman without attributes, is also figuratively called Brahman with attributes.\(^1\) The attributes of that qualified (Brahman) meditated on in the Dahara, Śāṇḍilya, Vaiśānavara and other modes of contemplation are also taught in the topic concerning the non-qualified (Brahman), as a means of comprehending it and for the purpose of remembering it; by these are refuted the prima facie references to the finite self and so on; in order that they may be comprehended as useful for that purpose (of refutation), they have to be demonstrated by citation of the texts relating thereto.

The demonstration is also needed for the comprehension of the fruit. This is how it is needed: though from the viewpoint of truth, the first fruit of the knowledge of the truth is the attainment of Brahman’s Being, yet the same non-qualified Brahman, takes on and continues in the form ofĪśvara with attributes, until the (final) liberation of all; hence, from the empirical viewpoint, the fruit (of knowledge) turns out to be of the form of the attainment of the nature of Paramēśvara, characterised by the possession of desires which come true and so on. Hence it is that in the first chapter, in the section relating to the small ākāśa, it is (first) made clear through the qualities like possession of desires which come true, etc., mentioned in the residual sentences, that the small ākāśa is Paramēśvara; then is raised the doubt that these are not characteristic of Paramēśvara, since the qualities are mentioned of the finite self too, in the words “That self free from sin old age, death, sorrow, hunger, and thirst, possessing desires which come true”, occurring in the Prajāpati Vidyā (Ch. VIII, 7, 1); in

\(^1\) The reading upacarayate seems to be more significant than neyate, and consequently preferable.
the śūtra "Uttarācāsaśāvirbhūta svarūpapastu (if it be said that as seen from a later context, the finite self is meant, there is that reference to the finite self only in so far as its true nature has become manifest)" (1, 3, 19: 9), which sets out to remove that objection, it is said (in the following words) that the manifestation of qualities, like the possession of desires which come true, in the released soul is only on the attainment of the nature of Paramēśvara, not in the state of difference therefrom, and that there is thus no inappropriateness in their being characteristic of Brahman: "Hence, that non-ultimate form of the finite self established in ignorance, sullied by the faults of agency and enjoyment, attachment and aversion and the rest, united to manifold evil, by the dissolution of that (form), what is opposed thereto, viz., the true nature of Paramēśvara, possessed of the qualities of freedom from sin etc., is attained through knowledge" (Ś Bh. M. Ed. p. 175).

Even in the first chapter, in the jagadāvācitva section (I, 4, 16, et seq: 9) while leading up to the establishment of the reference to the Supreme Brahman by the introductory and the concluding portions of the discussions between Bālaśī and Ajātaśatru, it is said "the reference even of the concluding portion to Brahman is seen from the statement of unsurpassed fruit in the text 'keeping off all sin, he who knows thus attains pre-eminence over all beings, independence, and mastery'; thereby, it is shown that the fruit of release is of the form of attainment of the nature of Īśvara with attributes; for, mastery of all beings does not exist elsewhere than in Paramēśvara.

In the second chapter too, in the anāśādhikaraṇa (II, 8, 48 et seq: 9), the attainment of the nature of Paramēśvara by the released one is made clear by the following statement of objection,
"If the finite self be admitted to be an element of Isvara, then from his experience of the sorrows of bondage, there would be experience of misery for Isvara also; just as in ordinary experience, by the pain occurring in the hand, foot or some other part, there is experience of pain for Devadatta, of whom that is a part. And hence, those who attain that will attain greater misery. Therefore, the prior state of bondage would itself be superior; hence, perfect knowledge would be fraught with evil" (Ś. Bh., M. Ed. p. 480-481).

It is also (made clear) by the reply (which is) based on the non-confusion effected by the well-known relationship of original and reflected image. Nor may the word Isvara be interpreted in some way so as to signify pure Intelligence; for, in the prior section "Parāt tu tascruteḥ (from the Supreme, that being declared)" (II, 3, 40 and 42: Ś) it is (first) made clear that the agency of the finite self is dependent on the Lord; then is introduced the secondary sūtra of that section "(The Lord acts) having regard to the effort made, for the sake of the non-futility of injunctions and prohibitions (II, 8, 42: Ś) " in order to answer the objection, "if, now, there be causal agency in the Lord, there should also be (in Him) inequality and cruelty"; that section thus relates to the Saguna Lord; therefore, the amās section, which follows it (also) relates to the same-topic. The identity of topic with the preceding section is (also) made plain by the (following) introductory passage of the present section setting out the prima facie view: "The relationship of the helper and the helped has been declared as between the Lord and the finite self: The relationship is observed in experience, as between master and servant or as between fire and sparks. Hence, the relationship of the helper and the helped being admitted as between the Lord and the finite self, in the enquiry whether it is to be said to be like the relationship"
of master and servant or like that of fire and sparks, (the prima facie view is) that it is either undetermined or that it is the relationship of master and servant, that variety being well-known to be the relation of the ruler and the ruled". (Ś. Bh., M. Ed. p. 478).

3.2354 In the third chapter, in the section on dreams (III, 2, 1 et seq. Ś), the sūtra "But by meditation on the Supreme that which is hidden is made manifest; from Him, indeed, proceed bondage and its opposite (III, 2, 5: Ś)" is introduced in order to answer the objection that the creation of the imaginary chariot etc., in dreams comes about through the lordly powers of the finite self, who is non-different from the Lord. In explaining that sūtra, (it is said) "Though the finite self and the Lord be related as element and that of which it is an element, the difference in characteristics between the finite self and the Lord is certainly patent. Is there then no community of characteristics between the finite self and the Lord? Not that there is none; but though existent, it is hidden by the veil of ignorance and so on. That, again, which is hidden, is manifested to some persons, who, having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous meditation on Paramārtara that is Existence, attain perfection by the grace of the Lord—just as the power of clear vision is recovered by the potency of medicine on the removal of the obscuring film" (Ś. Bh., M. Ed. p. 568). In this context is exhibited the attainment of the nature of Saguna (Brahman) by the released one; for, on the attainment of the form of pure Intelligence, there cannot be the manifestation of the qualities, such as possession of purposes which come true and so on.

3.2355 In the fourth chapter, (this is made still more clear in the following way): being desirous to know in what form is described.
the manifestation (of the soul) referred to in the texts "in its own nature (the soul) manifests itself (Ch. VIII, 12, 3)", we are told by the sūtra "By the form of Brahman, (thinks) Jaimini, because of the reference and the rest (IV, 4, 5; Ś)", that manifestation is in that form of Brahman (the description of which) begins with freedom from sin, ends with the possession of purposes which come true, and includes omniscience and lordship over all: (this is seen) from the reference (in the text) "That Self free from sin etc.," (Ch. VIII, 1, 5), and the passage "He moves about there, laughing, playing, rejoicing, with women or vehicles" (Ch. VIII, 12, 3), which makes known the possession of lordly powers; so thinks Jaimini. In the next sūtra "By the nature of Intelligence alone, that being the nature of the Self; thus thinks Auḍulomi (IV, 4, 6; Ś)", a different opinion is introduced, that, the true nature of the self being understood to be bare Intelligence, from the text "Thus this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is only a mass of Intelligence" (Bṛh. IV, 5, 13), the manifestation is by that alone. The next sūtra "Though it be thus, because of the reference to and the existence of the qualities mentioned earlier there is absence of contradiction; so Bādarāyaṇa thinks (IV, 4, 7; Ś)", which states the conclusion, is thus explained: "Even though the ultimate nature (of the Self) as Pure Intelligence is admitted, (yet) since there is no denial of the lordly power of Brahman understood from earlier references and so on, from the empirical viewpoint, Bādarāyaṇacārya holds that there is "no contradiction" (Ś. Bh.; M. Ed. p. 850): thereby it is made still more clear that the released one attains the nature of Saguṇa Śiva, possessed of unexcelled lordly power. Since it has to be said in the doctrine of Nirguṇa Brahman, that the attainment thereof is release, how can it be said that the attainment of the
nature of Saguna Ṣiva is release? This doubt too is answered, thereby. Though from the view-point of truth, the released one is but bare intelligence, (yet) from the empirical view-point of the bound soul, till the (final) release of all, there will attach to the soul that has attained the nature of Paramēśvara, that is the original image (as contrasted with the individual who is the reflected image), as well as to Paramēśvara Himself, unsurpassed lordly power and the entire host of other attributes well-known to belong to Paramēśvara. Thus, the commentary of the Bhagavatpāda undertakes to exhibit all the suspicious qualities of Paramēśvara mentioned at length in all meditations on the Saguna form; for, (these qualities) are useful in exhibiting the characteristics of Brahman for the purpose of demonstrating the characterless (Brahman), and are further helpful in elaborating the glory of the Saguna Lord, who is of the form of the fruit attained by true knowledge; what has to be expounded being thus extensive, in (that commentary), though primarily setting out to demonstrate Nirguna Brahman, talk of the Saguna form is seen to bulk largely, while the inquiry into the Nirguna form, owing to non-extensiveness of what is to be expounded, takes up little space. Just as in the four Vedas, all setting out only with the identical object of teaching the supreme spiritual good,—(which is) of the nature of the attainment of Brahman,—for the purpose of showing grace to all creatures, the exposition of action alone, which generates purity of the internal organ, as helpful thereto (i.e., the attainment of Brahman) is elaborated at length; the Vedānta portion, which has for its object the exposition of Brahman, is small, because of non-extensiveness of what is to be expounded.

3:2358. Now, if thus, the inquiry into the Saguna form is for the purpose of inquiry into the Nirguna form, the former follows by
arthāpatti, even from the promissory statement as to the latter inquiry, as something (necessarily) to be undertaken, like the inquiry into the means and fruit; (but) by the statement in the commentary "Brahman does exist etc.," it is declared that the term "Brahman" referring to what is to be inquired into is common to the Saguṇa form, in order to secure the conclusion that the inquiry into the Saguṇa form too is promised. Why should this be done? If (you) ask this, know then, that is declared as helpful to the promise in respect of that (inquiry), in order to indicate that for the Brahma Śūtras, in their entirety, there is another interpretation as referring to the Saguṇa (form). (The other interpretation is arrived at) by recourse to differences in the combination (of words) and so on. It is only to show (this), at least to some extent, to those eager (to understand) how the other interpretation (is arrived at), that, on the analogy of the single rice from the pot, two varṇakas are set out in the śāstrayoni sūtra (I, 1, 3: Ś). It is only to show that the commentator has followed the maxim of the single rice from the pot, in setting out these two interpretations of the śāstrayoni sūtra, referring to both the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa forms, that the author of the Kalpataru himself makes clear the indication of a reference to both the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa forms, in the commentary (bhāṣya) on the sūtra "But Agnihotra and the like tend to the same effect, that being shown by Scripture (IV, 1, 16: Ś)."

By him, indeed, an interpretation is offered of the sūtra "agnihotra and the like etc.," (IV, 1, 16: Ś), relating it to the attributeless (form), (in the following way): agnihotra and the rest have an effect of the nature of that direct knowledge of the attributeless Brahman, which is praised by the words "on the attainment of that" in the sūtra, "on the attainment of that, later and earlier sins etc., (IV, 1,
13: 8);" this is shown by the text "they desire to know, by sacrifice etc., (Bṛh. IV. 4, 22)." Though opposed to the genus Karma, as burning down the whole host of Karma, yet the origination of that knowledge by specific acts such as permanently obligatory sacrificial rites, is not inconsistent; for, though the burning is of the entire forest, the burning of the forest is seen to be the work of the bamboos etc., in the forest. Then is shown another interpretation relating to the Saguṇa form: agnibhotra and the rest have the effect of the attainment of Saguṇa Brahman, the observance of sacrifices etc., being seen in Kekaya and others who knew Saguṇa Brahman. There is not, as in the case of the fruit of knowledge of the attributeless, any inconsistency in the fruit of devotion to the Saguṇa being affected by Karma, since that (fruit), which is of the form of enjoyment in Brahma-loka, is seen to admit of degrees. Thus, another interpretation for all the Brahma Sūtras, referring them to the Saguṇa (form), has been but indicated by Śaṅkarācārya, by showing that the term "Brahman" which is the object of inquiry in the jijnāsa sūtra (I, 1, 1) is common to the Saguṇa form too, and by showing, in some cases, two interpretations referring to both the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa (forms); it is to make this manifest for the purpose of showing grace to devotees that (the other interpretation) is undertaken by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya.

Now, this mode of demonstrating Saguṇa Brahman, being unopposed to the recognition of Nirguṇa Brahman, is acceptable to Śaṅkarācārya; if this same be what is shown by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya, then in his system, only those Vedānta texts which are admitted to refer to Saguṇa Brahman should be cited in the (respective) sections, and their sense determined to refer to the Saguṇa Lord acceptable to him, after refuting their reference etc., to other
deities. (But) those very Vedānta texts, such as the Sad Vidyā (Ch. VI, 2, et seq.), Ānanda Valli (Tatt. II), the story of Pratardinā (Kauś. III, 1), Kaṭha Valli, the Antaryāmi Brahmaṇa (Bṛh III, 7), the Mundaka, Bhūma Vidyā (Ch. VII, 23 & 24), and so on, which are determined in the respective sections to relate to the attributeless (Brahman), are seen to be determined by him in those very sections, to refer to the Saguna (Brahman). If they too relate to the Saguna (Brahman), on what authority are we to hold that the recognition of Nirguna Brahman is based? Hence, it is clear that the present commentary is set out only in opposition to the doctrine of Nirguna Brahman. If this be said, it is answered (as follows).

Śrikanṭhācārya admits as his own final position, these conclusions of Non-dualism, (which are) helpful in reaching to pure-non-dualism, viz., that the entire world, intelligent and non-intelligent is of the form of Brahman's Cit-Śakti, that it is of the nature of Brahman, non-different from Him, and of the form of all His auspicious qualities, that Brahman is really non-changing, that the perception "the pot exists" etc., relates to the existentiality of Brahman, that the perception "the pot appears" relates to the manifestation of Brahman, and that the perception "I am happy" relates to a fragment of the Bliss of Brahman; he expresses the opinion "there is liberation even here for the devotees of the Non-related," wherever there is occasion for the contrary opinion, and he establishes that (opinion), (speaking) in his own person; hence it is not possible to deny that in his ultimate conclusion Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-distinct from all finite selves, and of the nature of pure-non-duality. For, if this were denied, there would result conflict with many of his conclusions. So, in acknowledging pure-Brahman, only the Sad Vidyā
and other Vedânta texts determined by Śaṅkaraśārīra to relate thereto are the basic authority. The demonstration of the harmony of their sense with the Saguna (form) is not in the view that they have no reference to the Nirguna (form), but rather in the view that there is significance in respect of the Saguna also. Of texts which set out to introduce qualities, though occurring in topics related to Nirguna, such as the Sad Vidyâ and so on, there is, indeed, an intermediate significance in respect of the Saguna, as qualified by the respective attributes, (a significance) by holding to which Brahmâna’s characteristics are explained even in the Śaṅkara Bhâṣya. Thus, verily, in the Ṛksatyoahikaraṇa (I, 1, 5, et seq: Ś), the initial seeing (i.e., desiring) is the characteristic; in the ānandamaya section, creatorship of all which is mentioned in the sūtra “And because of its being declared to be the cause (I, 1, 14: Ś)” and declared in the text “He created all this etc., whatever is here (Taitt. II, 6)” is the characteristic; in the section “Prâna is Brahmân, that being understood from a connected consideration of the passages (I, 1, 28, et seq.: Ś),” controllership, mentioned in such texts as “He is the Lord of the world, He is the protector of the world” (Kaṭh. III, 8), which embrace the grounds for the understanding (referred to in the sūtra), constitutes the characteristic; in the section “The eater (is Brahmân) since whatever is movable and immovable is mentioned” (I, 2, 9, et seq.: Ś), the characteristic is the property of destroying the world indicated by the words Brähmin and Kṣatriya, mentioned in the text under reference “He of whom both Brähmin and Kṣatriya become the food (Kaṭha. II, 25),” which states the ground (mentioned) in the sūtra; in the section “The internal ruler of the devas (is Brahmân). His qualities being designated” (I, 2, 18 et seq.: Ś), the characteristic is internal rulership of all, as mentioned
in the text “He who directs the earth from within” which establishes the ground (mentioned) in the sūtra; in the section “That which possesses the attributes of invisibility etc., is Brahman, because of the declaration of attributes” (I, 2, 21 et seq: S), the characteristic mark is omniscience etc., mentioned in the text “He who knows all, he who understands all” establishing the ground (mentioned) in the sūtra; in the bhūmādhikarana (I, 8, 8 & 9: S) the characteristic mark is being the cause of all, as stated in texts, like “from the self, the prānas (Ch. VII, 26, 1)” etc., which establish the second sūtra (of the section) “And on account of agreement of the attributes (I, 3, 9: S); in the section about the Imperishable (I, 3, 10. et seq: S), the property of directing is the characteristic mark, as mentioned in texts like “By the direction of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, Sun and Moon stand apart (Bṛh. III, 8, 9)”, which establish the second sūtra “This supporting can be the work only of Brahman, because of the direction, declared of the Imperishable (I, 3, 11: S)”; in the section about deep sleep and departure (I, 3, 42 & 43: S), the characteristic mark is the mastery of all and the rest, mentioned in texts like “Controller of all, Lord of all, Master of all (Bṛh. IV, 4, 22),” which establish the second sūtra “And on account of such words as Lord etc., (I, 3, 43: S)” in the jagadvācitva section, (I, 4, 18, et seq: S), the characteristic mark is the creatorship of the whole world, mentioned in the text “He, O ! Bālāki, who is the creator of all these persons, He of whom they are the creations, He, verily, is to be known (Kauṣ. IV, 19)”, which is included in the ground (mentioned) in the sūtra; and in the section vākyānvayāt (I, 4, 19: S), the creatorship of the entire world of name, form, and work, as mentioned in texts like “What we have as the Rig Veda, Yajur Veda etc., has been breathed forth from this mighty Being
(Brh. II, 4, 10)”, (is the characteristic mark as) that is embraced by the word “connected meaning” (in the sūtra, “on account of the connected meaning of the texts”). There is thus found mention of the form and characteristics qualifying gāṇa Brahman in sections relating to the Nīrgūṇa. By that it is necessarily understood that though these texts mentioning the respective attributes occur in topics concerning the Nīrgūṇa, there is of them an intermediate significance in respect of the gāṇa form qualified by the respective attributes. On this is based Śrīkaṭhācārya’s declaration of the synthesis of the topical text in each section with gāṇa Paramēśvara. The non-declaration of the synthesis with the Nīrgūṇa, the object of ultimate significance, is for the purpose of increasing devotion to the gāṇa, by concealing the (other) and is, hence, legitimate.

Now, the non-declaration of synthesis with the Nīrgūṇa may, in the manner indicated, not be opposed (to the recognition of pure-non-dualism). (But) the texts relating directly to the Nīrgūṇa, by identity of construction wherewith, those gāṇa texts occurring in Nīrgūṇa contexts have to be shown to refer, in the end, to Nīrgūṇa (Brahman), as their ultimate significance, even of these a gāṇa interpretation is seen (to be offered) with (much) effort; as, for instance, of the text “one only without a second” in the Ikṣaṭyaśāñkaraṇa (I, 1, 5, et seq) or of the text “where nothing else is seen etc,” in the Bhūmāśāñkaraṇa (I, 3, 7 & 8) or of the text “just as, dear one, by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, all modification being a name based on words, the truth being clay alone”, in the Śrāmbhāṣa section (II, 1, 15, et seq). The gāṇa interpretation offered of the first of these texts is cited even in (our exposition of) the prima facie view, (in this work). Of the third, the following
13; 8);" this is shown by the text "they desire to know, by sacrifice etc., (Bṛh. IV, 4, 22)". Though opposed to the genus Karma, as burning down the whole host of Karma, yet the origination of that knowledge by specific acts such as permanently obligatory sacrificial rites, is not inconsistent; for, though the burning is of the entire forest, the burning of the forest is seen to be the work of the bamboos etc., in the forest. Then is shown another interpretation relating to the Saguna form: agnihotra and the rest have the effect of the attainment of Saguna Brahman, the observance of sacrifices etc., being seen in Kakaya and others who knew Saguna Brahman. There is not, as in the case of the fruit of knowledge of the attributeless, any inconsistency in the fruit of devotion to the Saguna being effected by Karma, since that fruit, which is of the form of enjoyment in Brahmaloka, is seen to admit of degrees. Thus, another interpretation for all the Brahma Sūtras, referring them to the Saguna (form), has been but indicated by Śaṅkaraśārya, by showing that the term "Brahman" which is the object of inquiry in the jīvaśāṣṭra (I, 1, 1) is common to the Saguna form too, and by showing, in some cases, two interpretations referring to both the Saguna and Nirguna (forms); it is to make this manifest for the purpose of showing grace to devotees that (the other interpretation) is undertaken by Śrīkaṇṭhasārya.

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Now, this mode of demonstrating Saguna Brahman, being unopposed to the recognition of Nirguna Brahman, is acceptable to Śaṅkaraśārya; if this same be what is shown by Śrīkaṇṭhasārya, then in his system, only those Vedānta texts, which are admitted to refer to Saguna Brahman should be cited in the (respective) sections, and their sense determined to refer to the Saguna Lord acceptable to him, after refuting their reference etc., to other
cause, viz., pitcher and lump of clay.

This is the sense of his first interpretation. Modification means the property of being a pitcher, i.e., having a large rounded belly and so on; name means a word like pitcher etc., whose functioning is conditioned by that; both these are vācārāmbhaṇa. "Vācā" is speech, discourse, such as "bring the pitcher"; thereby is indicated also the utility arising therefrom. "Ārāmbhaṇam" means begun, originated thereby, i.e., cause. The cause of speech; that is, modification and name are respectively the causes of utility and designation. The word ārāmbhaṇam applied to both vikārāḥ (in the masculine) and nāmadheyaṁ (in the neuter) is in the neuter gender and sigular number, because of the rule, "A neuter noun, which has the same form, only differing in affix, is optionally retained, and the other dropped, and it is like a singular number (Pāṇini, I, 2, 89)."¹ This is what is said thereby. Of the lump of clay and its modifications, though identical in substance, there is difference (in respect) of utility and designation, due to difference of form such as lumpiness and the possession of a large round belly, as also to the difference of name, whose functioning is conditioned thereby.

Now, because of the doubt, "why is there not the same difference (here) as between different substances like the cow and the buffalo?", it is said that the clayiness alone is true; of the pitcher, basin etc., clayiness alone is (veritable), it being proved by the recognition "that very lump of clay is now of the form of the pitcher," and the test of the absence of difference, between them in respect of heaviness. Having thus established their proved identity, it is proper to postulate of the differences involved in discourse and (practical) utility that they are of

¹. The translation is that of The Sacred Books of the Hindus.
the nature of the limiting adjuncts of name and form; this is what is meant.

As for the second interpretation, this is its sense. Modification originates in speech; the modification—pitcher, basin, etc., is an object only of the judgment "This is a pitcher", and not a substance other than clay.

Now, (there is) the doubt, if it is not a substance other than clay, how do the names pitcher, basin, etc., not applicable in the stage of the lump of clay, come to be applied later on? (In reply to this doubt) it is said, the name is true only in respect of the clay; even the names pitcher, basin etc., apply to an existent veritable substance, only considered as that substance clay, not considered as another substance; for, another substance is unprovable, being opposed to recognition and so on. On this view, because of the Smṛti text "the word Sat (is used of) the true and the fitting", to the word Sat which is a synonym of Surya signifying a veritable being, is added the suffix ya signifying what is applicable thereto. The word "śrambhāṇa" has to be construed as ultimately meaning the condition of being what the word denotes, since it means here not the originator (but) the condition of being the originator. Though it is predicated of what is in the masculine gender, it is mentioned in the neuter, which is used to describe what is of common gender, as in the Sūtra of Pāṇini, "Dvigureka vadanam, the compound Dvigna is singular in number (where the subject Dvigna is in the masculine and the predicate chavacanam is in the neuter)" (Pāṇini, Sūtra II, 4, 1) ¹ This is the peculiarity (of the interpretation).

In the same way, in the sections "na atmanata (III, 2; 11, 3.24213 et seq.)" and the rest, the texts referring to absence of attributes.

¹ The translation is that of the Sacred Books of the Hindus.
and form in Brahman, and to non-connection with the world are interpreted to signify the absence of objectionable qualities and (the existence of) connection with the world. Further, the supreme declarations "That thou art" etc., which are at the very head of the authorities for non-difference of the finite self from Brahman, are stated in support of the prima facie view as to the non-difference of the finite self from Brahman in the sūtras II, 1, 21 and III, 4, 2, which are the sūtras setting out the prima facie view occurring in the ārambhana section (II, 1, 15, et seq) and the puru-sārtha section (III, 4, 1, et seq); then there is the commentary on the two sūtras stating the conclusion (in each section), viz., "But more, because of the designation of difference (II, 1, 22)" and "But because of the teaching of the different one, Bādarāyaṇa's view is valid, this being seen (III, 4, 8)"; there is also the commentary on the two secondary sūtras of the ākāśa section in the third pāda (of chapter I), viz., "Because of difference in sleep and at departure (I, 8, 43)" and "Because of expressions like Lord and so on (I, 8, 44)", which are introduced as a reply to the objection that there is no Paramēśvara other than the inner self, because of the teaching in such texts as "That thou art"; in all these, that (prima facie view) is refuted, since those (texts) do not refer to non-difference, as shown by the citation of manifold texts establishing difference.

In the section beginning with "(The jīva is) a part (of Brahman) etc." (II, 8, 42, et seq), in setting out to refute the prima facie view that Brahman Himself, because of limiting adjuncts, attains the nature of the finite self, the supreme declarations (of non-difference) are directly interpreted (as follows), as signifying something other (than non-difference): from the teaching of such texts as "That thou art", "This Self is Brahman" etc., there is absence
of otherness between Brahman and the finite self, as between pervader and what is pervaded; just as between the bodies pervaded by the Yogan and the Yogan who pervades them, there is inseparability and absence of otherness, so too as between the finite selves and Brahman. All this is certainly opposed to the acceptance of pure-non-dualism.

If (the above) be said, all that is (presently) explained in such a manner as is not inconsistent (with the acceptance of pure-non-dualism). The sûtra “But more, because of the designation of difference (II, 1, 2.1)” is one which establishes not that the finite self is different from Brahman, but rather that, because of the mention of difference in respect of little knowingness and omniscience and so on, Brahman is higher than the finite self in respect of the qualities of omniscience etc., and that hence the bonds of agency, enjoyment etc., in the finite self are illusory. There is not for Him as for the finite self the erroneous notion that the creation of the world which is the ground thereof (i.e., of agency and enjoyment) is the doing of what is undesirable; therefore, that (creation) is only for His sport, according to the maxim, “(just as) a person plays with (his) reflection seeing the effect of straightness, crookedness etc., occurring therein, so does Brahman (play) with the modifications of the finite self”; this is what the sûtra is directed to establish. Otherwise, the defect of not effecting what is agreeable,—which is suspected (in Brahman) on the basis of the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman,—being removed even by the exhibition of their difference, the statement in the sûtra about (Brahman) being “more” will become useless. (Now) the next sûtra is “And as in stones etc., that is inappropriate (II, 1, 23)”, and the commentary thereon (is to the effect) that since it is declared of the finite selves too,
as of a stone, a stick, a clod or a wisp of straw that in virtue of their ignorance etc., they belong to a class entirely different from Īśvara, who is associated with omniscience etc., the identity of the two is inappropriate; it appears from this that by refuting the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, their difference is established. Though (this be so), yet its (real) significance is in the refutation of the non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman, by the *a fortiori* argument, on the ground that when non-difference does not hold even of the finite self which to some extent at least belongs to the same class (as Brahman), what then of the Non-intelligent, which is entirely of a different class? Hence, the immediately following portion of the commentary, "thus, even of the intelligent, there is non-appropriateness of the being of Īśvara, because of their difference in respect of excess of attributes; what then of the Non-intelligent, which is essentially of a different character? This is the sense." Nor may it be said that, when because of the creation of the world, the defect of not effecting what is agreeable is suspected on the basis of the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, the refutation of that should proceed by the establishment either of their difference or their being related as higher and lower, though non-different, and that the refutation of the non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman serves no purpose here. For, though not useful here, it is useful in establishing that the non-otherwise mentioned in the *sūtra* II, 1, 16 (Tadanyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādibhyāḥ) is not of the form of non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman. Hence it is that these three *sūtras* II, 1, 21 to 23 beginning with "Itaravyapadesā śāti etc.," are not interpreted in this commentary as constituting a separate section, as (they are)
in other commentaries. Similarly, even the adhikopadeśa sūtra (III, 4, 8) occurring in the section about the sumnum bonum seeks only to show that Paramēśvara, (who is) higher than the finite self, does exist, by refuting the prima facie view that there is no being whatsoever of the name of Paramēśvara, and that the Upaniṣadic knowledge of the self is only knowledge relating to the finite self. So too, the two sūtras beginning with that about deep sleep and departure (I, 3, 43 and 44) refer only to the existence of Paramēśvara who is higher than the finite self, not to the establishment of difference (between the two). Hence it is that in the commentaries on the sūtras, there is no interpretation offered favouring (the view of) difference, of the texts like “That thou art”, which are mentioned in the statement of the prima facie view, as supporting that (view).

Though in the commentary on the aṁśa section (II, 3, 42, 3-24222 et seq) there is an interpretation of them as favouring difference, yet, that (interpretation) being negatived by the commentary on the sūtra “But as the Self, Śruti acknowledges and makes us understand Brahman (IV, 1, 3)” is not capable of expressing their inherent meaning. There, verily, the commentary expounding the final position, which sets about to refute the prima facie view—that meditation on Brahman by those desirous of release should be performed only as on what is different from one-self as on one’s ēṣāṁ (i.e., the principal to which one is accessory) and not as identical with one-self—(proceeds thus): “though the Supreme Brahman known as Śiva is certainly higher than the finite self,

1. If they constituted a separate section, II, 1, 23 would not relate back to II, 1, 16, as Appayya Dīkṣitā wants to make out. It is worth noting that according to the Mysore Edition, II, 1, 21—23 constitute a fresh adhikaraṇa.
yet the devotee meditates on that as ‘I am Brahman’, for the reason that devotees of yore have understood that as but the Self (saying) ‘I am, verily, Thou. O Lord, O Divinity, Thou, verily, art I’; though the Being meditated on is a being different from the devotees, the Supreme Being (yet) bestows grace on them by conferring his own form. They, in turn, teach that as the Self to other disciples, through (texts like) ‘That thou art’. It is but clear that by the exhibition here of the non-dualistic sense of texts like “That thou art”, the sense of inseparability declared earlier, on the basis of the relationship of body and the embodied, is negatived. It is only in order to show this that the Jābāla text “I am, verily, Thou” is cited. This sense has been elaborated earlier, in order to show that if the co-ordination were limited to the relationship of the body and the embodied, the words “I am, verily, Thou” would be inappropriate. That the natural sense of the text “That thou art” is but non-difference has also been elaborated already.

3.242221 It cannot be that what is said in the āmāsa section (II, 8, 42 et seq) is negatived by this; for, it is not proper that what is established in an earlier section, on the strength of śūtras, should be later negatived by one-self. The commentator’s opinion should, rather, be taken to be this: Brahman is to be meditated on either as embodied in one’s self, in the Dahara and other meditations, in the manner stated in the āmāsa section (II, 8, 42 et seq), or as non-different from one-self in the manner stated in the abhāmagraha section (IV, 1, 8). And thus, of the sentence “They in turn teach that as the Self to other disciples, through texts like ‘That thou art’”, the sense must be taken to be that texts like “That thou art” refer to the meditation of non-difference, and not to real non-difference; for, difference and non-difference
are opposed.

This objection too is refuted (thus): it is improper to postulate the acceptance by the commentator of the sense of the text "That thou art", as declared in the amśa section, (II, 3, 42, et seq), for, that is opposed (1) to the legitimate sense of the Jābala text and the expression "Thou art" (in "That thou art"), (2) to the commentary on the āhāgraṇa section (IV, 1, 3) which is intended to establish—in the (following) words, "The attainment of Śiva's nature which is abundance of limitless supreme Bliss is release; the attainment of Śiva's nature cannot come about except by the cessation of the state of the bound creature; the cessation of that state of bondage cannot be except by the meditation of that (Śivatva). Hence, the devotee from whom the state of bondage is gone, by the destruction of the bonds in the torrent of ceaseless contemplation 'I am Brahman', becomes Śiva Himself"—that there is no release except by the meditation of non-difference from Brahman, and (3) to the commentary on the ādhyāna section (III, 3, 11), which establishes the abandonment of all that is understood to be different from Śiva, in the meditation on Śiva, for the purpose of release; further, it is not proper to hold that that the sense of difference declared in the amśa section (II, 3, 42 et seq) being accepted, another sense of the nature of non-difference in meditation is also accepted by the commentator, since the two senses of the one text "That thou art" are contradictory, like difference and non-difference of the finite self from Brahman.¹

If now it be said "Let not its sense be that of the relation of

¹ In the latter case, the two alternatives have been recognised to be contradictory by the commentator himself, in II, 1, 22.
the body and the embodied; there is only one sense, that of the nature of the meditation of unimagined non-difference", no, (we reply); for, it cannot be held that the contemplation of non-difference has but an imagined object, since the knowledge of non-difference with Brahman is declared to persist even in released ones, in the (following) words of the commentary on the vikāravākiṣṭha-sūtra (IV, 4, 19), relating to what happens to the liberated one, "he enjoys the splendour of perfect self-consciousness, immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman—the harmony of Śiva with Śakti—which abounds in Supreme Bliss, Light and Power", as also in the words of the commentary on the sāmghana section (IV, 1, 3) "For, it is the sense of all revealed texts that release is the attainment of supreme self-hood, which is free from the state of the bound creature, characterised by love of bodily conditions such as that of Brāhmaṇa, etc., which is full of essential unsurpassable bliss, and is of the form of Śiva, the self-luminous witness"; there is the further reason that the non-difference of finite selves from Brahman, through Cit-Śakti, cannot be avoided.

3-242224 Now, how can it be said that the interpretation, of the nature of the relationship of the body and the embodied, (which is) exhibited by him to support the sense declared in the aṃśa section (II, 3, 42 et seq) is negatived by himself elsewhere? It cannot be said either that only the possibility of the relationship of body and the embodied—being pregnant with real difference is denied by the exhibition of the sense of non-difference, not that sense (itself), which is of the relationship of body and the embodied; for, of one sentence referring to non-difference, it is not proper to postulate another significance, also in respect of the relationship of body and the embodied, which is unreal. Nor can it be said that to
make persons of inferior capacity engage in meditation on the Saguṇa Lord, and in order to create increased devotion thereto, the interpretation relating to what is not the (real) sense is set out on the principle of the sugar coated capsule, to induce that (devotion) by concealing the truth about the attributeless (Brahman): for, even the meditation on the Saguṇa (Lord), has to be performed, verily, through non-difference, in the form “I am Brahman”. Hence, it must be shown here, of sentences teaching non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, that the sense is just that (i.e., non-difference literally) or of the form of non-difference in meditation; the setting forth of a sense which is of disservice to meditation does not stand to reason. If this be said, it is answered (thus).

There is not, even among those who, understanding release to be the summum bonum, are desirous of attaining to it, full development of competency, because of deficiency in the agent; (this is) of the capacity required in practice or laid down in the Śīstras in respect of either the contemplation of the Non-qualified, following on the hearing of and reflection on that sense, which imparting truth is helpful directly to release, or in the meditation on the Qualified, in the form of the meditation of the small (ether, dhāraṇa, vidyā) and so on, which is helpful in securing concentration of mind etc., thereon. The path of service well-known in Purāṇas, Jñāna and Āgamas is intended for such persons. Though this (path) is, on the tathārthaṇāya, capable of bringing about the attainment (only) of the status of Śiva on the Himalayas or on Kailāsa, in the capacity of Lord of the Hosts and so on, yet on the attainment of that status, it brings about release, through the stages of meditation etc., even from there. Hence it is that it is said in the Kānika: “Those spiritual teachers in the world
who wear My marks, meditate on Me and seek refuge in Me alone, in them is the fitness (to partake of what has been offered to Me), not in any other creatures. What is eatable, tasteable, drinkable and whatever else is offered to Sambhu, that may be eaten by those who consider themselves as servants. Those who, established in Siva Pashupata and seeking release, have reached to the path of service, by them alone is (thus) to be drunk or eaten or smelt". In (thus) distinguishing competency and the lack of it to partake of the remnants of food offered to Siva, the qualification "one who seeks release" is applied to those who have reached to the path of service. Thus, in the view that grace should be shown to those of gross understanding unfitted for meditation etc., by starting them on the path of service, in order to create for them a taste therein, (it is said) that the path of service alone is the purpose of all the treatises on release. Being of the opinion that what is so declared in them should be indicated (here) in some measure, another mode of interpretation of texts like "That thou art", in the sense of the relationship between oneself and one's master, (which is) of the nature of that between the body and the embodied, is made out by the acarya in the apra section; thus there is no inconsistency.

As for the postulation of a different interpretation for the AAMBHA śruti (in II, 1, 16), that is helpful for the purpose of strengthening faith in the Saguṇa topic, and is, hence only a figurative explanation. This too has been explained in what has been cited before from the commentary on the sūtra "AŚMĀ-divacca tadanupatīti (And as in stones etc., that is inappropriate; II, 1, 28)". By that commentary indeed, it is declared that the non-etherness of the inert world from Brahmā cannot be of the nature of non-difference therewith. Thereby, the non-
otherness declared of it in the tadananyatva sūtra (II. 1, 15) ends only in its being incapable of being spoken of apart from Brahman; for, non-difference from Brahman being absent, there cannot be non-difference from Cit-Sakti either, which is non-distinct from Brahman, and hence, the declaration of its (this inert world’s) being a transformation of Cit-Sakti ends only in (its being) an illusion. Therefore, it is the opinion of the commentator, as it is the view of the Śūtrakāra, that the sense of the vācārambhaṇa śruti is only that modifications are fictitiously imposed on the ground (thereof).

This view of the Śūtrakāra is made clear in his own work, the Mahābhārata, through the narrative of Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu, set out in the Mokṣa Dharma (parva). This is how it is related there. Suvarcalā, the daughter of Devala knew from birth the truth about Brahman, having acquired it in previous births, and was looking for a husband equal to herself (in knowledge). Having come to understand Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka, to be one such, the father bestowed her of the holy vows on him. That couple who understood the truth about Brahman continued in the house-holder’s life, which is associated with the performance of sacrifices and other such duties auxiliary to that (Brahma-knowledge). Therein is described the following dialogue between them concerning Brahman.

On one occasion, Suvarcalā asked her husband Śvetaketu "Who art Thou? Tell me, O best of the twice-born". The lordly one skilled in discourse replied to her "That is known by thee, without a doubt; I am the best of the twice-born, O lovely one, one who practises the vow of truth". She said to him "I ask about the self that rests in the heart". Hearing that, he replied "That (Self) does not speak, O beautiful lady: If thou thinkest
what is united to mind to be the Self, that is illusory. Where there is a name, there is (also) the bondage of the body. The thought "I am this" is present in you also. "I am even thou, I am myself, I am all"; this alone holds (true). That which thou askest of me, that Being higher than thyself is not here".

Here, in order to find out how Śvetaketu,—who has been repeatedly taught by his father "That thou art" in the Sad Vidyā,—understood the Self, the first question "Who art thou, O best of the twice-born?" is put (to him) by Suvarcalā. Though understanding the object of the question, yet in the belief that she should be taught the sense (of the Self) by stages, this reply is given by Śvetaketu: "by thee who addressest me as best of the twice-born, I am certainly known to be a Brāhmin; why then is this questioned?" Then it is said by Suvarcalā "I do not ask about the Brāhminhood that is perceptible and is imagined in the Self, as limited by bodily conditions; rather do I ask about that Self, which thou dost designate by the word 'I' in the statement 'I am the best of the twice-born', as different from the body and as residing in the heart". To her is this reply given: "The word 'I' applies to that aspect of the Self which is associated with the mind; that however, is of an illusory character; terms like Brāhmin etc., which are postulated in connection with the bodies of Brāhmns and so on, born of Brāhmin families and so on, apply only to that (illusory form). Hence, since 'I-ness' also, like Brāhminhood, refers to what is imagined, it is not fit to be questioned about by those who seek to know the nature of the Self. This 'I-ness' is common to thee and me, and to all beings including lower orders of creation; hence, by thee, who seekest knowledge of the nature of the Self, this question, which does not refer to the transcendental reality, is not fit to be put." Then (there is) the
question "If thou dost understand the 'I' which is associated with the properties of being agent and enjoyer to be fictitious, then, understanding thus, how dost thou engage in the observance of action which is opposed thereto?" To that is the reply given: "I engage in them for the benefit of the world, though they are not helpful to one-self". Then, a question is asked about the connection between sound and significance, with a view to (find out) how this word "I" applied by all to refer to the Self can fail to signify that. To that the reply is given that between them there is not the relation of conjunction and the like, but the relationship of statement and what is stated. Then follows this series of questions and answers between the couple:

Suvarcalā: This word (I) signifying egoity is clearly always applied to to the Self; (hence) the statement that speech does not apply thereto becomes fictitious.

Śvetaketu: The word 'I', O one of holy vows, apphes to egoity, not to the nature of the Self; speech which is characteristic of the qualified does not apply to the Supreme, Imponderable One.

Suvarcalā: If this be so, O best of Sages, tell me then what is egoity and also what is the nature of the Self.

Śvetaketu: Like the appearance of a pitcher in what is verily, (but) a mass of clay, even so is egoity recognised here in the Supreme, Imponderable (One); the nature of the Self is Great and Supreme. Hence, there is no inconsistency in the statement that speech turns back therefrom.

Here, the question is asked how, if sound and sense be related as what signifies and what is signified, the word "I" could fail to signify the Self: to this is given the reply that the word "I" is applied, primarily, not to the Self, but to egoity. Then the ques-
tion being asked "What is that Self other than egoity?", the two are distinguished, in that egoity is illusorily posited in the Self, like the form of pitcher etc., in clay; and it is concluded that the word which sets out as applying to the illusorily posited form cannot reach up to the pure substrate, as the word "silver" does not extend to the form of the pure mother-of-pearl. Therefore, it is concluded that since the word which signifies the ego, qualified by agency and other attributes is said to turn back even from the neighbourhood of the Pure Self, there is no contradiction whatever. Then on the assumption that, Brahman, the abode of the whole world, is nothing but the Self, which is fully discriminated from what is designated by "I", Svetaketu teaches that just as, though the world is seen to be in ether, yet there is not for the ether any clinging to the world, so too there is no clinging for for Brahman. Then this fresh question and answer:

Suvarcalā: The ether is constantly perceived to be unchangeable, supersensible, impartible and omnipresent; (but) the Self is not so perceived.

Svetaketu: One feels by contact again and again the air that is in the ether; one smells the smell present therein; one similarly sees with the eyes light, darkness, the host of solar rays, the assemblage of clouds, rain and the constellations, but does not see the ether. That which is the nature of Existence is determined to be the Ether even of the ether. This (ether) is imagined in the Existential Substance; that is the true, and (that is) but Viṣṇu. Names which signify the qualified apply to the Supreme Self figuratively. The Supreme all-pervasive one is not (known) by the eyes or by the mind or by any other means; it is thought by the subtle intellect; it cannot be described by speech. All this wide world is established therein alone.
The question is "Why is Brahman, the abode of the Universe, not perceptible like the ether?" This is the reply given thereto: there is experience only of air etc., as present in the ether, not of the ether as distinct (from them); if that be the case with ether, though an object of experience, what more need be said of Brahman, of the form of Existence, who is far more subtle than ether? Therefore, everything is imagined in the Existential Substance; that alone is true and pervasive, and all words applicable to what is limited by qualities do not apply in their primary sense to that which is distinguished from the qualities, and is understood by means of knowledge which makes known the real. In this series of questions and answers it is quite clear that by the citation of the example of the appearance of pot, in what is, verily, clay, by the declaration—in the words "That which is of the nature of Existence is determined" etc.—that the finite self of the context is of the form of Existence, and by the statement "This is imagined in the Existential Substance; that is true, (that is) but Viśnu", the sense of the vācārambhāśa text (Ch. VI. 1. 4) and of the texts "That Thou art" and "In that has all this its Self, that is the true, that is the Self" (Ch. VI, 9, 4) are shown to favour the conclusion that Brahman is unrelated to the world, non-distinct from the finite self, and free from qualifications.

Further, in another context in the Mokṣa Dharma itself, non-

difference is set forth in these words: "I desire, O Divinity, Thy Supreme Abode; let there be identity of me with Thee; let there be for me no re-birth; when a man sees different things as non-different, then he is free from taint, becomes none other than the Supreme Self"; "The collocation of the assemblage of elements is not the body of the Supreme Self; that Viṣṇu who is embodied as it were, is the delusive Hari"; in such words is (the) formless-
ness (of Brahman) set forth. In the Viṣṇupurāṇa and the like, also, the nature of Brahman, as Pure Intelligence, free from all difference, and devoid of qualifications, is declared thus: "That Knowledge, wherein all differences have disappeared, which is of the bare nature of existence, which is unattainable by speech, and is self-realised, that is known as Brahman". Thus, pure-non-dualism alone is what is accepted by the Sūtrakāra; since the commentator (Śrīkaṇṭha) elaborates pure-non-dualism here and there, after his (the Sūtrakāra's) own heart, the object of the setting forth of qualified-non-dualism in other places must be explained only in conformity therewith, in the manner declared by us.

As for the demonstration of qualified-non-dualism in the commentary of others and of pure-non-dualism in the commentary of yet others, that is in the view of the falsity of that (pure non-dualism). Of these, it is not possible to make out, as in the case of Śrīkaṇṭhacārya's (commentary), an interpretation conformable to pure non-dualism; for, nowhere has there been shown by them as by Śrīkaṇṭhacārya, any indication of pure-non-dualism in the sense above set forth. Further, those who succeeded either of the commentators up to this day, have been ready only to condemn pure-non-dualism. Therefore, the only commentary that may be accepted by those who have regard for the means of correct knowledge is that of Śrīkaṇṭhacārya, which alone is set out (1) for the purpose of the true comprehension of the Non-qualified Supreme Brahman, (2) for the purpose of the meditation of non-difference, to be performed by him of middling capacity, in respect of the Being who has taken on the form of the Qualified, to show grace to His devotees, and is characterised by the entire host of auspicious qualities, and a resplendent auspicious form, and (3), for the
purpose of the meditation of the relationship of one-self and one's master, to be carried on by him of least capacity,—all these being appropriately distinguished: thus everything is consistent.

Here ends the work called "ŚIVĀDVAITA NIRṆAYA" composed through the grace of the Supreme Śiva,—the Highest Real, the fore-head-eyed,—by the direct descendant (of the Lord), known to fame as Appayya, the son of Ranga Rāja, best of sacrificers, the performer of the Viśvajit Sacrifice, and the great preceptor of the Advaita School of Thought, (who shone as) the gem in the Ocean of the family of Bhāradvāja.

Appa Dikṣāta, whose intellect is fixed on the lotus-feet of Sadāśiva, has here condensed the essence of the entire system of Śrikāṭha.

1. The couplet of which this is the translation, occurs only in Manuscript "O", and that too after the colophon; it is possibly by other hands than Appayya's.
NOTES.

[The references in square brackets are to paragraphs].

NOTE 1.

'Vyaktyaśrtajāstayas tu padārthaḥ' (Nyāya Sūtra, II, 2, 65; II, 2, 63, according to the edition used by Dr. Jha). [P. 2*22]

The translation of the Sūtra and Vātsyāyana's bhāsya thereon are here set forth: "In Reality the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality—(All three) constitute the Denotation of the word—(Sū. 63). The term 'tu', in reality, serves the purposes of emphasis. 'What is it that is emphasised?' What is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which one is the predominant and which the subordinate factor. For instance, when there is (on the part of the person pronouncing the word) a desire to lay stress upon the difference (of a thing from others)—and when the cognition brought about is also one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing—there the 'Individual' forms the predominant factor (in the denotation of that word) and the 'Generality and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors; when, on the other hand, the difference is not meant to be emphasised,—and the resultant cognition also pertains to the commonalties,—then the 'Generality' is the predominant factor, and the 'Individual' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors. Many instances (of such varying predominance and subservience) may be found in
actual usages. An example of the predominance of 'Configuration' may also be found" (Dr. Jha's translation of the Nyāya Sūtras Vol. II, pp. 448-449).

Dr. Jha's use of the word "denotation" in place of the more general term "significance" tends to introduce a slight confusion. Jāti and ākṛti would more naturally constitute part of the connotation rather than the denotation of the word; the latter is more properly the vyakti. The Nyāyāyika's insistence on all three constituting the significance is parallel to the western logician's doctrine that every term possesses both connotation and denotation, though, with different classes of terms, either aspect may dominate over the other. The important point is that they all together constitute one sense, not different senses of the word. Disjunction of the three is not meant, as seen by the use of the singular number in padārthāḥ. The Buddhist who holds terms to have no possessive significance, but only to perform the function of excluding (Aphoha) the significance of other words, makes the mistake of separating these three aspects, and then failing to understand how a word can function usefully as referring to any one of them alone. His position is set out and refuted elaborately in the "Nyāya-Vārttika." See also Keith's Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 159. It is unfortunate that this author too uses the word "denotes", where "signifies" is distinctly preferable. Professor Radhakrishnan's exposition of the topic seems clear and less open to objection. "The word" he says "suggests the form, denotes the individual and connotes the genus" (Indian Philosophy, II, p. 107).
NOTE 2.

Tviṣ prathamāṁ anvāha tivruttamāṁ [p. 2:324].

The Darśa Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice is the model for several other sacrifices. The former is the prakṛti rite and the latter vikṛtis. In the prakṛti rite, eleven ṛks are prescribed to be chanted in the matter of getting the fire to blaze in the first instance (agni samindhana). These ṛks are known as sāmidheni. The injunction is that fifteen sāmidhenis are to be chanted (pañcadaśa sāmidhenīranvāha), while, however, only eleven ṛks are mentioned. The number fifteen is made up, therefore, by chanting the first and the last ṛks thrice, instead of once. Now, though the sāmidheni ṛks are the same both for the prakṛti and all the vikṛti rites, their order is not always the same. Thus in the Darśa Pūrṇamāsa, the first ṛk is Pravo Vājā etc., and the last Ájuhota etc. But in other rites, any other ṛk of the eleven may be first, as determined by the nature of the rite, the deity sacrificed to, and so on. The question here is whether the injunction to repeat thrice applies to what may happen to be the first and last ṛk in each rite, or what is known to be the first and last ṛk in the prakṛti rite, in connection with which arises the injunction to three-fold incantation. The final view is that the first and last ṛks of each particular rite have to be chanted thrice, not those of the prakṛti rite, the reason being that words "first" and "last" signify position primarily, not what occupies the position in a particular context. With marking the place they become functus officio, and may not be called upon to discharge any other function.
NOTE 8.

Sodasigrahaṇagrahaṇanyāya. [P. 2:332].

The following is taken from Jacob’s Laukika Nyāyaṇjali, Part III. “The rule as to the use or omission of the Sodashāstotra (at the Atirātra sacrifice). In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling’s translation of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, we learn that ‘the distinctive feature of the Atirātra-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an overnight performance of chants and recitation....At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma liquor and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousel’. Then as to the Ṣodāsin, he says (page xviii)—‘As regards the ceremonies preceding the night performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the Sodashāstotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirātra. Āśvalāyana (5, 11, 1) refers incidentally to the Ṣodāsin, as part of the Atirātra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sūtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice.’ There can be little doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyāya, regard the use of the stotra as optional”. (pp. 187-188). It is, however, rather doubtful whether the reference is primarily to the stotra. What is more likely is that the use of the Ṣodāsin cup (the sixteenth cup) is intended. The question, then, would be whether the cup and the accompanying stotra and śastra are necessary elements of the Atirātra sacrifice, the answer being that they are optional, in view of contrary injunctions in respect thereof. See, Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, pp. 335-336.
NOTE 4.

The Padāhavanīya nyāya. [p. 2'49],

The general injunction is that all sacrifice should be performed in the śāhavanīya fire. In the Aśvamedha sacrifice, however, it is enjoined that offerings are to be made in the hoof-marks of the horse. This injunction would be entirely purportless, if the general rule were considered to over-ride it; if however, its validity for the particular sacrifice be admitted, the rule "yadāhavanīye juhoti", would be only limited in its application, not nullified. Both injunctions would thus be purportful. The injunction "pade juhoti" would be an exception to the general rule "yadāhavanīye juhoti"; the general applicability of the latter should be construed in the light of this exception.

NOTE 5.

Andho bhavatyapi roditīva etc., [P. 2'52].

The quotation here would appear to be a jumble of words from Chāndogya, VIII, 10 and 11. Indra, acquiring knowledge of the Self from Prajāpati is told that the dream-self is the Supreme Self. On reflection, Indra finds that that will not do, since, though not affected by bodily defects and impurities, the dream self has its own trials and tribulations: it is wounded, as it were; it cries as it were. He, therefore, goes back to the preceptor, and is told that the self in deep sleep is the Supreme Self. That knowledge too is not free from doubts, for that self reaches annihilation, as it were. If eva here (vināśameva) were understood as alone, there would be no liberation, no manifestation of the Self in its own form and so on. Hence, vināśameva has to be understood on the analogy of roditīva in Ch. VIII, 10, 2 and 4.
NOTE 6.

Pañcagni Vidyā. [P. 3:182].

This is the instruction imparted to Gautama by Pravāhāṇa Jaivali concerning that knowledge, the teaching of which belonged only to the Kṣatriyas and was made available first to Gautama among the Brāhmīns. It relates to the five fires which are the Heavenly region, rain, the earth, man, and woman. In the fifth libation, water comes to be called "man". Man lives up to the full span of life, and then dies; at his death, he is carried to the fire wherefrom he originated. Those who know this and those who in the forest meditate upon faith and austerity, they depart on the path of the Gods. Those who do not know this, but spend their lives in works of charity and public utility, they depart on the path of the Fathers, and ultimately return to this world, after their stock of merit is exhausted by enjoyment. The reference is to Chāndogya, Chapter V, Khaṇḍas, 3—10 (both inclusive).

NOTE 7.

Madhu Vidyā. [P. 3:187].

The Sun, it is said, is verily the honey of the devas. Its rays spreading east, south, west, north and upwards constitute the honey-cells in each of these directions. The honey-producers in each case are the Rks, the Yajus verses, the Sāmans, Atharväṅgi-rasa, and the secret instruction (guhya śādāh). The waters in each case (i.e., the Soma juice, butter, milk, etc., poured into the fire) are the nectar. He who knows the first kind of nectar becomes a Vasu, and retains his status so long as the Sun rises in the east and sets out in the west. He who knows the second nectar becomes a Rudra, for as long as the Sun rises to the south and sets to the north. He who knows the third nectar becomes an Āditya, for as long as the Sun rises in the west and sets to the
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The Dārśā Pūrṇamāsā sacrifice is the model for several other sacrifices. The former is the prakṛti rite and the latter viktīs. In the prakṛti rite, eleven ṛks are prescribed to be chanted in the matter of getting the fire to blaze in the first instance (agni samindhāna). These ṛks are known as sāmidheni. The injunction is that fifteen sāmidhenis are to be chanted (pañcadasaśa samidhenīrānvāha), while, however, only eleven ṛks are mentioned. The number fifteen is made up; therefore, by chanting the first and the last ṛk thrice, instead of once. Now, though the sāmidheni ṛks are the same both for the prakṛti and all the viktī rites, their order is not always the same. Thus in the Dārśā Pūrṇamāsā, the first ṛk is Pravā Vāja etc., and the last Ajuhota etc. But in other rites, any other ṛk of the eleven may be first, as determined by the nature of the rite, the deity sacrificed to, and so on. The question here is whether the injunction to repeat thrice applies to what may happen to be the first and last ṛk in each rite, or what is known to be the first and last ṛk in the prakṛti rite, in connection with which arises the injunction to three-fold incantation. The final view is that the first and last ṛks of each particular rite have to be chanted thrice, not those of the prakṛti rite, the reason being that words "first" and "last" signify position primarily, not what occupies the position in a particular context. With marking the place they become punctus offitu, and may not be called upon to discharge any other function.
NOTE 3.

 Sodaśīgrahāṇāgraḥaṇanyāya. [P. 2:332].

The following is taken from Jacob's Laukika Nyāyānjali, Part III. "The rule as to the use or omission of the Sodaśīstotra (at the Atirātra sacrifice). In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, we learn that 'the distinctive feature of the Atirātra-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an overnight performance of chants and recitation. ...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma liquor and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousel'. Then as to the Sodaśīn, he says (page xviii)—'As regards the ceremonies preceding the night performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the Sodaśīstotra is or is not a necessary element of the Atirātra. Āśvalāyana (5, 11, 1) refers incidentally to the Sodaśīn, as part of the Atirātra, though it is not quite clear from the text of the sūtra whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice.' There can be little doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the nyāya, regard the use of the stotra as optional". (pp. 187-188). It is, however, rather doubtful whether the reference is primarily to the stotra. What is more likely is that the use of the Sodaśīn cup (the sixteenth cup) is intended. The question, then, would be whether the cup and the accompanying stotra and śastra are necessary elements of the Atirātra sacrifice, the answer being that they are optional, in view of contrary injunctions in respect thereof. See, Keith, Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, pp. 335-336.
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The quotation here would appear to be a jumble of words from Chāndogya, VIII, 10 and 11. Indra, acquiring knowledge of the Self from Prajāpati is told that the dream-self is the Supreme Self. On reflection, Indra finds that that will not do, since, though not affected by bodily defects and impurities, the dream self has its own trials and tribulations: it is wounded, as it were; it cries as it were. He, therefore, goes back to the preceptor, and is told that the self in deep sleep is the Supreme Self. That knowledge too is not free from doubts, for that self reaches annihilation, as it were. If ēva here (vināśāmeva) were understood as alone, there would be no liberation, no manifestation of the Self in its own form and so on. Hence, vināśāmeva has to be understood on the analogy of roditva in Ch. VIII, 10, 2 and 4.
NOTE 6.

Pancagni Vidyā. [P. 3:132].

This is the instruction imparted to Gautama by Pravāhaka Jaiyali concerning that knowledge, the teaching of which belonged only to the Kṣatriyas and was made available first to Gautama among the Brāhmans. It relates to the five fires which are the Heavenly region, rain, the earth, man, and woman. In the fifth libration, water comes to be called “man”. Man lives up to the full span of life, and then dies; at his death, he is carried to the fire wherefrom he originated. Those who know this and those who in the forest meditate upon faith and austerity, they depart on the path of the Gods. Those who do not know this, but spend their lives in works of charity and public utility, they depart on the path of the Fathers, and ultimately return to this world, after their stock of merit is exhausted by enjoyment. The reference is to Chāndogya, Chapter V, Khandas, 3—10 (both inclusive).

NOTE 7.

Madhu Vidyā. [P. 3:137].

The Sun, it is said, is verily the honey of the devas. Its rays spreading east, south, west, north and upwards constitute the honey-cells in each of these directions. The honey-producers in each case are the Bks, the Yajus verses, the Sāmanas, Atharvāngi- rases, and the secret instruction (gṛhya ādesah). The waters in each case (i.e., the Soma juice, butter, milk, etc., poured into the fire) are the nectar. He who knows the first kind of nectar becomes a Vasu, and retains his status so long as the Sun rises in the east and sets out in the west. He who knows the second nectar becomes a Rudra, for as long as the Sun rises to the south and sets to the north. He who knows the third nectar becomes an Āditya, for as long as the Sun rises in the west and sets to the
east. He who knows the fourth nectar becomes a Marut for as long as the Sun rises in the north and sets in the south. He who knows the fifth nectar becomes a Sādhya for as long as the Sun rises over-head and sets down below. Thus are described the various forms of meditation on the Sun as honey, and the fruit thereof. The fruit is limited through admitting of different degrees of duration. Not so, however, is the fruit of Brahma-knowledge, the realisation of that Supreme Being which neither rises nor sets. The Bliss attained thereby is illimitable, indestructible. Hence, even those who by the practice of Madhu Vidyā have attained the comparatively happy status of Vasus etc., have to seek Brahma Vidyā, their status being but transient. But, in the case of these, departure along the path of the gods is evidently unsuitable, that path having been prescribed for beings on the lower, human plane of existence. The reference is to Chāndogya, Chapter III, Khaṇḍas 1 to 11 (both inclusive). The question of the fitness of devatas for Brahma knowledge is discussed in Vedānta Sūtras, I, 3, 25-32.

NOTE 8.

Samānam itarat śyenānā, [P. 3 18334].

The jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice serves as the model (prakṛti) for several other rites (vikṛtis). Two of these are the Iṣu and the Śyena. In prescribing the conduct of the Iṣu, certain distinctive elements are first mentioned and it is then said that in the rest there is agreement with the Śyena. It is contended by some that the distinctive features having been already mentioned, the general clause refers only to those elements which the Iṣu derives from jyotiṣṭoma, which serves as the model. The mention of the Śyena has no special significance, that rite being cited only as another
instance of a rite modelled on the jyotisṭoma. The final view is that the similarity is in respect not of the general features common to the prakṛti and vikṛti rites, but of the distinctive rites of the Śyena. Thus, the Ṛtviks in the Śyena rite should wear red turbans; the Ṛtviks in the Iṣu should do like-wise. The reason for this conclusion is that otherwise the statement ‘samānam itarataḥ śyenenaḥ’ becomes merely repetitive, thus losing its force and authority. No Scriptural passage may be interpreted in such a way as to make it lose its authoritativeness, unless there is no help for it. In the present case, no such necessity arises. The word ‘itarat’ means what is other and goes beyond not merely the distinctive Iṣu rites already mentioned, but also those elements known to be common to the jyotisṭoma and the Iṣu on the ground of their being related as prakṛti and vikṛti. The similarity intended and enjoined can be only in respect of the distinctive elements of the Śyena. Thus, the mention of the word Śyena also becomes purportful. The part of the discussion which is relevant to Appayya’s purpose is this: where resemblance is mentioned after the citation of certain distinctive elements, that resemblance must be in respect of other elements which are also distinctive, not those common to the prakṛti and all other vikṛtis thereof. For a full discussion of the topic, see Purva Mīmāṃsā, VII, 13–16 and Sabaravāmin’s commentary thereon. In legal terminology, the principle is that of eujudem generis.
NOTE 9.

Ṣaḍaṅga and Daśa-avyaya. [P. 3.238].

The obeisance to Veda and Bhava is the third of the invocations occurring in Bhāmati (see page 4 of Anantakṛṣṇa Sāstrin’s edition). As applied to the Veda the six limbs are Śikṣa, Chandas, Nirukta, Vyākaraṇa, Jyotiṣa and Kalpa; the avyayas (indeclinables) are innumerable, like the particle “ca” meaning “and”. The six limbs of Bhava are Omniscience, Contentment, Eternal Wisdom, Independence, Eternal Illimitable Resources, and Unimaginable Power; the ten members are Knowledge, Non-attachment, Lordly power, Austerity, Truth, Mercy, Firmness, Creatorship, Self-knowledge, and Controllership. The enumeration is that of the author of the Kalpataru who bases himself on Purānic authority (see p. 4 of Anantakṛṣṇa Sāstrin’s edition).

NOTE 10.

The Advaitin’s conception of Mukti. [P. 8.285—3.2855].

Appayya Dikṣita shows with considerable skill and trouble that even for him in whom nescience has ceased, liberation takes the form of the attainment not of Brahman, but of Īśvara, endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities and so on. Identity with Brahman is possible only when all finite selves are liberated. So long as there is a residue of Karma even for one finite self, the liberated one can attain only the nature of Īśvara. For, on the hypothesis that there are many finite selves and that each finite self is Īśvara, as reflected in māyā, with the cessation of māyā for one finite self, all that results is the merger of that reflection with the original that was reflected, that is, in other words, the merger of that jīva with Īśvara. But so long as there are other jīvas, Īśvara continues
still to be an image, a being possessed of the quality of being reflected; and the being that has got merged with Īśvara can claim nothing higher. When all finite selves are liberated, māyā as a whole vanishes, Īśvara is no longer a bimba, a being capable of being reflected; both He and the finite selves realise their identity in Brahman that is Pure Intelligence.

The doctrine is attractive in many ways. The prospect of merger in Nirguna Brahman does not appeal either to the intellects or to the emotions of most. It seems difficult to realise how one being can become the Absolute while others are left to wallow in ignorance; and the ideal even if possible, seems undesirable, being clearly anti-social. The difficulty in accepting this doctrine is due to the fact that the hypothesis of a plurality of finite selves is not the only possible one for the advaitin. There are the ekajīvādins, for whom clearly enlightenment should lead directly to identification with Brahman. There are also those who consider that Īśvara Himself is a reflection (a pratibimba not a bimba), that Īśvara is Brahman as reflected in māyā, and jīva is Brahman as reflected in avidyā. On this hypothesis too, irrespective of the unity or plurality of souls, release would necessarily have to be identification with Brahman; for the merger of a reflection in the original is intelligible, not its merger in another reflection, like Īśvara; if the latter were possible, then one jīva might as well become another jīva, and the so-called release would be no release at all.

Appaśya, has, therefore, to show that his own hypothesis of the plurality of souls and the bimbatva of the Lord is the only tenable one. This he does in the 'Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha,' by showing, as in the present work, that his own view of mukti is the orthodox advaita view, being that of the Bhagavatpāda him-
self. The argument is developed at some length with reference to each chapter of the Sūtras, and is substantially identical with that of the present work. There is a slight elaboration in respect of one or two points, which may tend to indicate that the Samgraha is the later work. Thus, demonstrating through statements from the bhāṣyakāra’s mouth that release consists in the attainment of the being of Īśvara, Appayya argues back and says that the ekajīvavāda and the Īśvara-pratibimbavāda are untenable, as they are inconsistent with the orthodox view of mukti. The only advaita work which he explicitly condemns as hostile to his view is the Samkṣepa Sāṅkraka.

The doubt naturally arises as to how this mukti is different from that attained by the devotees of Saguna Brahman. The difference is in that the latter, seeking the Lord through devotion, never attain to an intuition of the Impartible Absolute, and that, therefore, they continue still to be enveloped in ignorance. Theirs is not the full measure of the being or the bliss of Saguna Brahman. They are equal to Him, but only in respect of enjoyment; theirs is not the unsurpassable lordship of Īśvara Himself, the power to create, sustain and destroy the universe. He who becomes Īśvara by realisation of non-duality becomes Īśvara with no reservations.

On the whole subject, see further ‘Siddhānta-leśa-sangraha,’ pp. 447 to end, and the dāharādhikaraṇa of the Nyāya Rakṣāmaṇi; Dharmarājādhvarin’s Vedānta Paribhāṣā may also be consulted; see, particularly, Prof. S. Radhakrishnan’s Introduction to the edition brought out by the University of Calcutta.
NOTE 11.

Sthālipulāka nyāya [P. 3·2856].

The following is from Apte's Sanskrit-English Dictionary:

"In a cooking-pot all the grains being equally moistened by the heated water, when one grain is found to be well-cooked, the same way may be inferred with regard to the other grains. So the maxim is used when the condition of the whole class is inferred from that of a part".

NOTE 12.

Gudajihvikā nyāya. [P. 3·212224].

Jacob (Laukika Nyāyānjali, I, 24) explains this as "the maxim of the tongue (smeared) with treacle (in order to disguise an unpalatable draught)". He also quotes a passage from the Viśaspatya, which says that just as a parent makes his child, who is afraid of the bitterness of the essence of neem, drink the essence after first coating his tongue with treacle, even so do the eulogistic passages serve to engage human beings in the performance of rites requiring the expenditure of great energy and labour, by extolling the fruit of those rites as everlasting heavenly bliss and so on. In the present translation, the phrase "maxim of the sugar-coated capsule" has been used, as serving to convey the same sense in a manner more familiar to most present-day readers.
NOTE 13.

Tat-kratu-nyāya. [P. 8'242225].

This is the maxim “What a man meditates on, that he becomes”. The Scriptural authority for this is a Chāndogya passage, which, after prescribing calm meditation on Brahman as that in which all this begins, ends and continues, goes on to say to show the need for it saying, “Yathā kratursmin loke puruso bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati, according as his will is in this world, so will the man be after he has departed hence” (Ch. III, 14, 1; the translation is Dr. Jha’s). The following is from Śāṅkara’s commentary on the same: “According as a man’s will or determination is, in this world, during his present life,—so does he become when he has departed from this body;—that is to say, his condition is in keeping with the result in accordance with his will. This fact we come to know from the Scriptures: ‘Thinking over whatever disposition, one renounces the body in the end etc.,’ (Bhagavad Gītā). And inasmuch as such sequence is maintained by the Scriptures, one who knows this, should have this will,—i.e., the will or determination that we are going to explain” (Dr. Jha’s translation, p. 181).

NOTE 14.

Pareṇāṁ bhāṣye viśiṣṭādvaita nirūpaṇam, anyeṇāṁ bhāṣye śuddhādvaita nirūpaṇam. [P. 5.]

The reference seems to be to Rāmānuja and Madhva, these two being explicitly mentioned in the corresponding portions of the Ānanda Laharī. This is a rough translation of verse 58 of that work: “The declaration of the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman, by the released ones, as in this (bhāṣya), contradicts the (doctrine of) difference between Brahman and the finite self; there are other similar indications in other bhāṣyas; but these
come in, somehow, in the failure to realise their self-contradictory nature, not as prompted by the realisation of essential non-difference; for, they are confirmed haters of pure Brahman, as also of Saguna Śiva, suffering as they do from the curse of Dādiśeī and others."

The other indications mentioned in the verse are explained in the introduction to the verse, with reference to the system of Madhva. The bonds of the jīva are, in that system, unreal; there are no attributes differentiating the jīva from Brahman, except dharma; Brahman who is known by him who seeks release is not an object of meditation; the jīva is a reflection of Brahman; avidyā (nescience) is removable by knowledge, and so on. But these are not genuine indications of the acceptance of non-difference as final. For, though at release the finite self is said to enjoy the bliss of Brahman, yet other selves are recognised who, failing to obtain true knowledge of Brahman, attain asan-mukti, fall into the three hells, and suffer everlastingly. This is incompatible with non-difference. Further, neither Rāmānuja nor Madhva rises to the conception of release as the attainment of the state of the Attributeless Brahman. As for the indications in Madhva's system, he himself interprets his doctrines in such a way as to lend no colour even to a suspicion of acceptance of nondualism. Thus, though the bonds are fictitious in relation to the jīva, they are real enough in relation to the internal organ (the antah-karaṇa); though the jīva is a reflection of Brahman, they are yet distinct, like the face and its reflection; though avidyā is removable by knowledge, the former has yet a true existence; and so on. Though their admissions cut at their own positions, they make these not in the recognition of advaita, but in the failure to realise that they are helplessly falling into the pit of
self-contradiction. They suffer to this day from the curses of Gautama, Dadhici, Upamanyu, Nandikesvara and others. Their minds are tainted by the hatred of the superiority of Suddhadvaita and Parama Śiva. Imagining themselves to be Vaiśṇavas, they shower multifarious abuse both on the doctrine of the pure-nonduality of the attributeless Brahman and on Parama Śiva.

The concluding words of the ‘Ānanda Lahart’ contain a fine tribute to Śrīkapūṭha, which is worth noting here. Though in the commentary there cannot be seen any out-spoken criticism or upholding of his position by the abuse of that of others, yet the bhāṣya written by the great lord seated on the throne of the empire of knowledge (vidyā sāmrājya) leaves all this to be done by the commentators thereon, merely giving an indication thereto, just as a great lord, in order to protect his dominions from the inroads of robbers, signals to his servants to look to that business, merely by knitting his eye-brows.
ERRATA (TEXT).

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Pandit re-print of Śrīkāṭha's Bhāṣya).
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