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THE APHORISMS
OF
THE MĪMĀNSĀ.
SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.
PART I.
THE GIFT OF

GEORGE W. WALES,

OF BOSTON,

27 June, 1875.
THE APHORISMS
OF THE
MIMÁNSÁ PHILOSOPHY
BY
JAIMINI.

WITH

EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.
Pt. I.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.
Translated by
James Robert Ballantyne.

Printed for the use of the Benares College,
by order of Govt., N. W. P.

C ALLAHABAD:
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS.
1851.
The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brāhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
31st July, 1851.
THE MÁNSÁ APHORISMS.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to the feet of the venerable preceptor !

b. Veneration unceasingly be to Jaimini, who removes the defect of vision of the simple by the collyrium-needle of his Institutes which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture,†

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not Jaimini ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,—and the primâ facie solution of the doubt being as follows,—viz.—such a work of disquisition ought not to be undertaken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven (nagara) is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the Veda without regard to its sense], Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called viśvajit [—mentioned in the 4th canto of the Raghava—], it being to be expected that there is some fruit attached

* जी गुहच्छरे भयो नमः ॥
† वेदाध्यायवश्च्छनुप्रयोक्ताप्रमणयशाक्या। मूढशयनस्ते नमो जैमिनीक्षो नियमाय।
THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

to the perusal enjoined in the direction 'The Veda is to be per-
used' [—and Heaven being most probably the fruit when no
other fruit is specified;—well, this *prima facie* solution of the
doubt having presented itself,) he declares the established tenet*
[in regard to the point, as follows].

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.

Of Duty.

*The subject pro-
posed.*

_Aph. 1._—Next, therefore, [O student that hast
attained thus far] a desire to know Duty (*dharma*)
is to be entertained by thee.

a. 'Next':—i. e., after perusing the scriptures whilst residing
with the family of a preceptor.†

b. 'Therefore':—i. e., because the fruit of the perusal of the
scripture is the knowledge of the sense [of its several passages,

† अथ गार्ग्यप्रकाश्य सत्यमयाध्यायां विषयानिः हृदयं एव दुर्ग्राम
सेवनं पूर्णं चिदानन्दसः।

† अथ गार्ग्यप्रकाश्य सत्यमयाध्यायां विषयानिः हृदयं
एव दुर्ग्राम सेवनं पूर्णं चिदानन्दसः।
BOOK I. SECTION 1.

without comprehensive apprehension of the import of its teachings—see Lecture on the Vedánta [§6]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in Apâ. 2.], "a desire to know"—i.e., an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge—is to be made;—such is the remainder* [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

c. The state of the case is this, that assuredly the work of disquisition ought to be undertaken, because such a work of disquisition is just subserved by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the sense [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof], and because it is fit that what is effected by a perusal thereof should be a correct understanding of the sense thereof [—instead of Heaven’s being attained thereby, as supposed by the speculator in Intro. c.] seeing that it is improper to imagine an unseen reward [of this or that action] when a visible reward is possible;† [—and the understanding of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its perusal, whilst the attainment of Heaven by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the senses].

d. As the question will occur—"What is the Duty spoken of, in the expression 'a desire to know Duty', in the proceeding

* अतः। यतो वेदान्तपालनवहनम्। यतो धर्मस कष्टमात्रचालनस्य निन्दास।। शास्त्राद्वादशो विद्यार्थी।।

कर्मस्य त्योहः।।

† अथवावः। सम्ताविते हर्षादेवं द्विपञ्जनमार्गयमनुष्ठितस्तत्तुस्मथने तन्द्रयनिष्क्येयस्मात्वेदार्थयमनस्य विचारशालिनिलाइर्विचाराद्वलमवध्यमस्मार्स्मिति।।
aphorism?—in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows."

चेदनार्थं च जीवं भले: II २ II

A matter that is a Duty is recognised by the instigatory character [of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. 'Instigatory character' [of the passage]:—this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] one† [to do so and so].

b. 'Is recognised'—i. e. is known thereby;—as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though unseen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise]; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [in the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.‡

c. And what constitutes any thing such a matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

* पूर्वर्ख्ये अभिज्ञानशब्द को धर्म दर्श जिज्ञासार्थ अभिज्ञाननाथ सच्चानाथ।
† चेदनन्दिक प्रवर्तकवक्ष्ण।
‡ चेदनां चावते चावनेति दसवं। व्यास भूलोपविन्द्रः चेदनां दर्श दक्षिणार्थ सच्चानाथ:। तदनु चेदनाने चसवं चेदना। पत्रवध चेदनीय चसवं करवं यस्।
scripture as a Duty] is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure* [—i.e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain†].

d. And by this [mention, Aph. 2., of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is moreover suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the instigatory character‡ [of a passage in scripture].

e. But now [some one may ask], “Since, according to [the lexicon called] the Medini Kośa, ‘The word dharmma should be masculine when it means merit, but when it means sacrifices, &c., it is held to be neuter,’ how is the word dharmma masculine in the aphorism where it means the Agnihotra sacrifice and others [which are recognised as matters of Duty by the instigating promises attached to their performance]?”—if you ask this,—then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [Jaimini] is a great sanctified sage§ [—and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. Conf. the Vaiśësika Aphorisms No. 7, 8].

f. In the foregoing aphorism [§2.] it was intimated that the cause of [our correctly recognising] a Duty was simply an insti-

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* अर्थात् सुखानिकृता: खाजनकलम् †
† This definition of dharmma may be compared with the Benthamite definition of the Useful.
‡ एतेन चोदितानिर्खितांशृधिग्रंथावें धर्मस्य नेतृपि सतिविनम् ‡
§ नून। चढ्यन पुनः घर्णः खानि श्रीवे बागाळिहि मत इति मेधिनीकोषात्। अर्थोलावलितावधानावचर्यश्लास्त्रूष्टि द्रवी पुंश्च। कथितिम सैन्याणीन्ति चेतार्थालेव श्रीजतिनि ग्रहण।
gation (in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out a reward for its performance), but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c. Since it is impossible that the doubt, as to whether other evidences do enter into the case or not, should be removed without examination, he proposes the examination thereof as follows.

**Tathā nīlośyarūḥ: Ṛ ī**

_The definition of Duty discussed._

Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our recognising] it [—vis. Duty,— is to be made.]

a. ‘Of it’—i.e. of a knowledge of the truth—the object [in respect of which that knowledge is wanted] being Duty. ‘The cause’—i.e. the means. ‘An examination’ thereof,—i.e. a disquisition, a discussion, through decisive confutations [of the opposite opinion—see the Nyāya Aphorisms No. 39—] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down:—such an examination] is to be made:—such is the remainder [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

b. [In the following aphorism] he explains the assertion that he made [in Aph. 2].

*भृद्रि चेरन्तन्म निलितं गतु प्रत्यक्षार्थे तदर्मान्यानीति पुष्पब्रजेश्वाराहार्हितं। पुष्पब्रजेश्वारणि तब प्रत्यक्षार्थे नवेति श्लेष्य्या परीक्षामन्तरा निरुच्यसक्यावात् तत्त्वरीच्या प्रति-जानिते।

† त्योजित। तथा भृद्रिस्वरकत्त्रशान्नेच। निलितं। कर्षय। तथा परीचित। परीच्या। युक्तक्षेपेनक्षाढारणं। विचार। कर्षयोजति येष।
Aph. 4. When a man’s organs of sense are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge, which then takes place, is Perception,—[and this Perception is] not the cause [of our recognising Duty—see § 8—] because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is [then and there] existent [—which an act of Duty is not.]

a. ‘When rightly applied to something extant’ &c. [That is to say]—when a man’s organs of sense are ‘rightly applied to’, or brought into contact with, ‘something extant’, i.e. some object [then and there] existing, what ‘birth of knowledge’, or of intellection, takes place, is [what we call] Perception:—and such Perception is ‘not the cause’, i.e. not the producer, of a knowledge of Duty:—that is to say—the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do not [of themselves] enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.

b. Of this [—vis. that the senses are not the means of our discerning Duty—] he mentions the reason [—when he says—in § 4—] ‘because the apprehension of what is existent’; that is to
say—because, by means of the organs of sense there is the apprehension of 'what is existent', i.e. of some thing [then and there] present;—and since Duty [—in the shape, suppose, of the performance of sacrifice—] is not present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,—] it is not adapted to the organs of sense.*

Not being an object of sense-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by inference from such perception.

c. From its being disproved that the senses are the cause thereof [i.e. of our discerning Duty—] it is to be understood as also disproved that Inference, or Analogy, or Conjecture [see Wilson's Sādākhya Kārikā p. 21.—] which owes their birth thereto—having their root in Perception—can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [—or that whereby we are to recognise it— as declared in Apā. 2.—] is the instigation† [of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being calculated to lead to such and such consequences].

The doubt whether the evidence in favour of a Duty may not be fallacious as to that of the senses.

d. But then, an objector may urge,—"after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by man—consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised,—therefore, as sense knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother o’

* तन् चेतुतात्। विद्वानोपवज्ञात्। विद्वानव्य।
वर्गानांर्ज्ञेषु वसु।।
भावेऽस्माते अववेष्यावज्ञानवक्षेति भवेः।।
† दप्त्रियायांनिषिदलितास्यस्य तत्त्वात्मकसूक्तिः
आप्रियायाःक्षारोपिताः। निरवजलमवस्य।
ज्ञते|
pearl or the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], so since language, as it is dependent on man inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, the insinuating nature [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misunderstood] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty—well, this prima facie view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the established doctrine as follows.*

Aph. 5.—But the natural connection of a word with its sense is [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, [i.e. of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] unerring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of BâdÎrâyâna [the author of the Vedânta Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise Duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence—such as that of sense].

a. 'Of a word,'—i.e. of an expression that is a constituent
part of the everlasting Veda;—such as—"He that aspires to Paradise should solemnise the Agnihotra sacrifice," &c.*

b. 'With its sense'—i.e. with the meaning which is to be conveyed by this or that† [word].

c. 'Connection'—in the shape of power‡ [or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning].

d. 'Natural'—i.e. inherent,—in short, eternal.§

e. Thence [i.e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] is the knowledge 'thereof'—i.e. of Duty. Here [i.e. in the word 'dharma'] the affix 'ra' conveys the force of the 'instrument',—so that the word signifies the instrument of knowledge or of right understanding.||

f. But then [some one may ask]—"since it is notorious in the world that, after hearing the expression 'It [i.e. e.g. a mountain] is fiery',—having seen, with the organ of sense, the fire [asserted to be, e.g. in the mountain], one then admits [—what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the senses]—that matter of testimony is [or may be] matter of right knowledge

* शद्ध्। नियमितं चक्रपदस्य। अभिशैथः गुणवाच्यः । बल प्रवाहः।
† धर्मेन। तथमात्मितपारेयं।
‡ बलम्। यस्तिन्द्रम्।
§ शृणुपिकः। अभाविकः। नित्य हृति वाचः।
|| बलवाचः। बलेन। बल करवे खुट।
प्रवेशायं प्रायास करवन्।
BOOK I. SECTION I.

—or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the senses—); since [we say] what is conveyed by Words [or Testimony] has need of other evidence, such as the senses, how can it be this to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty?

It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Aphorism, that the testimony is here the evidence] ‘in respect of something imperceivable’, meaning thereby [that Duty is] something not to be apprehended by means of the senses or any other evidence except from that specified in §2.

* Intimation—i. e. declaration of a fact.

A. Unerring—i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefrom; [i. e. from the fact].

i. ‘For it has no respect’—i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.

j. ‘This’—i. e. a sentence consisting of an injunction—is the evidence [on which rests our knowledge] of Duty;—such is the consentaneous opinion of Badyāyana. The drift [of what we

* नन्दन विष्णुसागिनिति यत्सन्तिविवाणसन्न विजये वसिः दृश्ये प्रभुद्वृक्का नृत्तियो वेदपि प्रविष्टि: प्रवचारीतरमालकोपाबंधकाव्यस्कार्यवर्षो व रचना धर्म प्रभु वर्णनन्दम पदि। धर्मप्राची। प्रवचारिकापेशवर्ते ुर्ये।

† उपदेशः। अर्थानितप्राप्तम्।
‡ अवतरिकः। अवभविषारी हस्तानुत्रत्।
§ अनपेशायात्। प्रवचारानपेशायात॥

The mention of the name of Badyāyana (or Vyāsa) in the Aphorism goes to prove that Jaimini’s work, the pārva-mānas, was not antecedent in time to Vyāsa the author of the uttara-mānas. Mr. Colebrooke’s rendering of the terms pārva and uttara by ‘prince’ and ‘later’ (—see Essays, vol. 1. pp. 227 and 295—) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that
THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when employed by a man who is defective [in some of his
groups of sense], wanders away from the fact [—for the moun-
tain may seem to such a one to be fiery when it really is not—];
therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whether
credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man];—but the
injunction "He that desires Paradise should solemnise the Ag-
ne>Login sacrifice" never at any time past present or future is lia-
bile thus to wander from the truth; therefore it is, independently
of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty.*

SECTION II.

ON THE ETERNITY OF SOUND.

k. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism [No. 5] that the connection between a word
and its sense is eternal [—see §5 d.] and
since this is dependent on the eternity of Sound [—seeing that if
Sound were not eternal, then words formed of sound could not

Jaimini's system was the earlier in point of time. He says, (at p. 376, vol.
IV. of his History of Philosophy,—Morrison's version—) that "according to
Colebrooks, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and
the later", and then he goes on to speak of "the older and genuine Vedanta"—but in fact the terms 'prior' and 'later' refer to the divisions of the
Veda which Jaimini and Vyāsa respectively exposed, the latter confining
himself to the Upanishads, or theological sections, which stand last in order.

* तात। विषिष्टितभवं। चतुः मनोवं नास्तवभवं। अहंकारः। परंतो विषिष्टित्वेषः
पद्यतुनानुयुक्तं बालं बालं आभिषेकत। चतुः मनोवं
निशजे मनवाधिकारधे। तथा ग्रिफोज्जुल्लोति
बालकमाष्ट्रपेयाः न आभिषेकत। चतुः दत्तविद्योग्यो
चतुः मनोवंति।
be eternal, nor consequently the relation of such to their significations—[he], seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the prima facie view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is not eternal.*

First objection to the eternity of Sound, that it is a product.

Aph. 6.—Some say that it [viz. Sound] is a product, for in the case of it we see [what constitutes it such].

a. 'Some say that it is a product, &c':— 'Some':—i.e. the followers of the Nyāya—say that Sound is a 'product',—i.e. something not eternal; 'for we see':—i.e. we see an effort made; 'in the case of it':—i.e. in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is not eternal which effort is concerned in [the existence of].†

b. Moreover [the Naiyāyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].‡

Second objection, that it is transitory.

Aph. 7.—Because of its transitoriness.

* पूर्वांऽवशं शब्दाय्यो साध्या निर्भवेऽ प्रत्येकाः। तथा यद्य निर्भवायायता तस्य शब्दाय्यो निर्भवायायताः शब्दान्वेषयायताः पूर्वायायायायताः।
† कर्मभिः। एक नैपद्यमिः। कर्म पञ्चविंश्त्य एक बारंभिः।
‡ तथा शब्दविषये। द्रष्टानां। प्रायान्द्रष्टानां। यद्विषय:। प्रायान:। चै। पञ्चविंश्त्य द्रष्टा अन्ये।
† बिच्छ।
THE MIMANŚA APHORISMS.

a. 'Because of its transitoriness'—i.e. because it is not permanent;—or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived.*

b. Moreover, [the Naiyāyikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].

Aph. 8.—Because [we employ, when speaking of Sound,] the expression 'making.'

a. That is to say—because we treat it as something not eternal, inasmuch as we talk of making a sound, just as we talk of making a jar.‡

b. And for the following reason also, he mentions, they hold it to be not eternal.§

Aph. 9.—From its simultaneousness in another person.

a. [To complete the sentence] it is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person':—so then, we observe 'simultaneousness', i.e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,—'in another being'—i.e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.§

* भाषानादवशीर्षवत्। भाषार्थनुपश्चादिर्दितं भाष।
† किस्म।
‡ यथा च वर्तमानतित्वाद शर्म्न करोतीवचनस्य चक्रार्थ।
§ पर्यायस्य प्रत्यय।
∥ भाषानाद द्रव्य। भेष्यान्ति प्रथापिपुर्खीय। भशा।
b. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the unity of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for shortness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mīmāṃsā,—supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus one [numerically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact —see Nyāya Aphorisms, No. 4—with the sense-organs of] those both near and far;—and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal;—therefore [the Naiyāyikas conclude] Sound is not eternal and it is plural.*

c. And for the following reason too [according to the Naiyāyikas] it is so [—that Sound is not eternal—], so the author mentions it†:

† प्रकर्तिविचित्रविश्लेषण: २०॥

Aph. 10.—And [the Naiyāyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant is this,—because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and in the example dādayatra [i. e. ‘milk—here’]

† इति पुष्प तथेहारं॥
where the original form was *dadhi ato*, there is a change in the shape of the letter *y* in the room of the original letter *l*.

Sext objection, that Sound becomes the greater when more are engaged in making it. 

*Apk. 11.*—And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

a. For this reason too, it [v. Sound] is not eternal, that an augmentation, i. e. an increase, of it, i. e. of Sound, is observed [to be caused], by a multitude of makers, i. e. by the numerousness of those who make it. On the other hand, if you assume that human effort is [not the maker but only] the manifestor of Sound, [—as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the manifestor of it—making cognisiable the jar which previously existed unperceived—then we reply, that,] what is manifested is not seen to be made greater even by a thousand manifesters, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound is made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Naiyáyikas] the alternative supposition of ‘manifestation’ [instead of production] will not answer:—such is the import.†

* तथा नेष्य तथि स्मृति शा́तिला राहृतिको भवति। बसः। प्रकाशितार्को उनित्य रति आग्रेषिति भावः।।

† बर्धभूषणः कर्तवारूपेऽः ्बसः। लब्धसः। दृष्टः। नाथं हस्तादृशं चातो भविष्यः। पुरुषप्रवीचः व्रद्धानन्धः

क्रमपचो व्यासस्वेष्यापि वामसः हरिः हस्तादृशं। बसः हः वेदस्वेष्यापि धर्मः। चातो व्यासस्वेष्यापि लुमकः रति भावः।।
Aph. 13.—Of this [Sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time (than that when the sound is perceived) arises from the non-arrival of the manifestor at the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' &c. 'While it really exists,'—i.e. which is at all times extant (whether perceived or not);—'at another time,' i.e. at a time before or after; 'the non-perception,' i.e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival of the efficient manifestor at 'the object,' i.e. at the Sound.*

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, [as we are constrained to admit] by force of the recognition that 'This is that same letter K' [—viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or fifty years ago,—, and I recognise it as I might recognise a peak of the perennial Himalaya which I do not suppose to cease to exist when I turn away my eyes from it—], and in virtue of the law of parsimony [one of the fundamental laws of philosophising acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it].

* In opposition to the Mímásásakas, the Naiyáyikas contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same kind,—just as is the case with the ex-
BOOK I. SECTION 2.

19

c. The conjunctions and disjunctions [—or undulations—] of the air issuing from the mouth [of him who speaks or shouts] remove the still air* which was the obstacle to the perception of Sound, and thence it becomes perceptible:—such is the reply to the objection [recorded in Aph. 7] of its 'transitoriness.'†

d. He next replies to the objection [recorded in Aph. 8] that we use the expression 'making' [in regard to Sound].‡

अभ्यासः परस् || १ ॥

Aph. 14.—This [expression 'making'] means [merely] employing.

a. In regard to Sound, when we speak of 'making,' the word 'making' means, or imports, 'employing,' i.e. uttering.§

- Pression 'He has taken the same medicine that I did.' See the Siddhānta Muktiyōli p. 103. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word 'Same,' quoted at p. 39 of our 'Introduction to the Inductive Philosophy.'

* Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jaimini admits that it is not perceived when there is no vibration; but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to exist, whether perceived or not.

† सुखोद्वद्वयाद्विगिर्विभागः शान्तमन्त्राचायतब्ध्विभ्रमीभि

तक्षितमत्वाध्याद्वीकर्षति। ततः प्रत्यामिति ब्रह्मानादि

व्योराति ||

‡ कोरातिशाहसित्योग्यार्थः ||

§ प्रतिमहूऽ करोतीवच करोतिपदं अभ्यासः उत्पत्ति

रक्षा। परं। तत्पर्यक्षम् ||
6. He next replies to the objection [recorded in \textit{Aph. 9} that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals.]

\textit{\textbf{वाशिष्ठवाचः।}} \textbf{१४४।} \textit{\textbf{Aph. 15.}}—The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun.

a. ‘As in the case of the sun’—that is to say, as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute one† [such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.]

6. He next replies to the objection [recorded in \textit{Aph. 10} respecting the original and altered forms of sounds.‡

\textit{\textbf{वर्षानारसिकाद।}} \textbf{१४५।}

\textit{Letters are exchanged, not transmitted.} \textit{\textbf{Aph. 16.—This [via. the letter} y—referred to in \textit{Aph. 10.—when it comes in the room of the letter i} is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].

a. ‘Another letter’ &c. That is to say,—in the room of the letter i is another letter—another sound—a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter i as a mat is a modification of the straws [out of which it is formed]. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw, the man that employs the letter y would be under the necessity of taking the letter i‡ [to make the y out
of;—which is not the case, for one can use the letter \( y \) without any reference to the letter \( i \).

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in \( Aph. \ 11 \)] that there is an augmentation* [of the sound when the makers of it are numerous].

\[ \text{हादोड़ि: परा र ९७} \]

Increase of noise not in- increase of sound.  \( Aph. \ 17. \)—It is the increase of noise [not of sound] that is [in that case] augmented.

a. ‘It is of noise,’ &c. It is an error to say [as in \( Aph. \ 11 \)] that it is an increase of sound that is ‘augmented’—i.e. rendered greater.†

b. ‘Increase of noise.’ From many beaters of drums, or pronouncers of articulate sounds, it is recognised [by the hearers] that ‘There is a great sound.’ In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Naiyäyikas] to say that portions of sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of sound, like a bulk of cotton [formed out of portions of cotton aggregated], because Sound, according to these opponents, inasmuch as it is a quality, has no parts† [or portions].

\[ \text{अन्यायशऽ इति यावत्। न इकारः विकारशृङ्खलाः कठ इत। तथा सति कठवर्ता नियमेन धृतस्थापितवत्,} \]
\[ \text{यकारः प्रयुक्तव्रिक्षस्मेनेकाराभ्याद्वादितिभाव:।} \]

* ृत्तवायस्योरतमशः।
† नादेविति। परा। अतिशयति। शारद्विद्वितिः सम-विषया।
‡ नादत्त्वः। वर्धिमेतीध्रिः। वर्षाकार्णमसुचारः।
c. Therefore,—as there is no arriving [at an explanation otherwise],—when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without intermission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] seems to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in Aph. 17] by 'noise' is these conjunctions and disjunctions, and it is just of these that an augmentation takes place* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory.†

गित्यतु श्राह्येन्त्र श्राह्येन्त्र। १८।

Aph. 18.—But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available—which it else would not be—] for the sake of another.

वाक्षेन भवतु श्राह्य द्वापुरकान्ते। तत्र परस्ते प्राप्तिपुर्वं शब्दावभाषा तस्मात्स्फालन। तौष्ट्यो तत्सत्साधिन्यस्तें सच्चतं शब्दावभाषानीति वक्तूर्मध्ये। परस्ते शब्दक्ष गुणलेन निरस्तवभास्मात्।

* अतो वाक्या वर्णव्यवस्थानां वर्णमृत्तकानि व्यासः। संयोगविभागैः रसायनवद्यं श्रवणात्मकविश्वास्थानानास्निवववश्च: प्रतिमाते। संयोगविभागानां गायनेन बांधवोग्यावलेख श्रद्धार्ती भाषा।।

† एति परस्ततिपादित्यवशास्त्रहृदय खलने चाहरूर्वं चांतु प्रकाशते।
a. 'Eternal'—i.e. sound must be eternal. Its 'exhibition'—
i.e. its utterance—[here denoted by the term] darśana [from
dris 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest
thereby [i.e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of
another'—i.e. because it is [available] to the end that another
may understand one's meaning. If it were not eternal, then, as
it would not continue till the hearer had understood our mean-
ing [the perceived sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches
the ear—], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not
take place because of the absence of the cause—such is the im-
port.* [The understanding of what is uttered must follow—at
however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered;
and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no
longer in existence, it cannot be the cause of any thing. If, on
the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however
short, after ceasing to be perceived,—it is impossible to assign
any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discon-
tinuance of its existence,—whence its eternity is inferred.]

b. Moreover† [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it an-
tecedently—for]:—

बृवेच भृगुपथात्। १५।।

Sound is eternal, because hundreds simultaneously recognise a
sound, which cannot therefore be a new production.

*Aph. 19.—[Sound is proved to be
everal] by there being everywhere
simultaneousness [in the recognition
of it by ever so many hearers].

† किच्छ।
THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

a. 'Every where'—say in the word go, simply, [—a single example of a word here sufficing as the representative of any or every word—]. 'By there being simultaneousness'—i.e. because there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word go—"a cow"]—a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word go,] is that same letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions," is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by mistake hit the same object—]; such is the import.*

b. When the word go "cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word go has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form go have been pronounced!" and he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by this fact also.†

Sound is eternal, because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.

Ap. 20.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by the absence of Number.

a. 'Of Number':—i.e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind] does not belong to Sound [—for the word go, heard ten

* वर्तमाने गोयन्मानि धाराजात्। अवधिनिर्मिति- प्राप्त मुद्रायुगप्रदुषणे। स प्रयासः गक्षर दत्त युगप्रदुषणेऽवर्गमीम् कार्यस्य मज्जनेऽयुगप्रदुषणा भवतिति भावः।

† इत्यथालेण गोष्ठसौधारचे इत्यादामुद्रितो गोयन्म दवेष बदनि नगुरूर्व स रामायणा उपाधिरिता दत्ति। र्वते श्रिय यज्ञे नित्य रत्नवाच।
times over, is just the same word go,—as remarked under Apâ.
19. b.] This is plain.∗

b. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states:†—

Śānepaṃkhatā | २६ |

Sound is eternal because inescapible. Apâ. 21.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain:—as, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that—"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"—so, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of Sound, we conclude that it is eternal† [—on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its inescapibility].

b. But then [—some one may say] "Sound is a modification of the air, since [—as you admit under Apâ. 17.—] it

∗ शब्दे शब्दाभासात्। शोभन्।
† इत्यौपय मित्र द्विषाण।
‡ शब्दायायार्थसाकाशपारीक्षित। चथा पदलिङ्गः
रूपसाधनं पदोऽवतारोऽवृत्तोऽवग्रहयतुस्योऽजग्नायामातिनिः
तीति निषिन्ते तथा शब्दायायार्थनियोगः। शाश्वस्नं दृष्टि भाव॥

D
arises from the conjunctions thereof [with the organ of hearing];—and so too the Siksāḥ [—that appendage to the Vedas which treats of pronunciation—] tells us "Air arrives at the state of being Sound;"—and thus being a product of Air, it is not eternal." This doubt having presented itself, he declares* as follows:—

प्रक्षाभाव कथम् ||२॥

Aph. 22.—And the case is not as the doubter under Aph. 21. δ. suggests, because [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of Hearing] of any object appropriate to it.

a. 'Appropriate to it';—i. e. an object of the sensation that arises from the organ of Hearing—viz., Sound;—because there would be no perception;—i. e. by reason of our finding the absence of any perception;—because modifications of the Air are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognisance of,—Sound not being something tangible [as the Air is held by the Naiyāyikas to be, while Sound they admit has an altogether different substratum,—viz., the Ether—]; such is the import.†

* नन्दु यथे बायुविकारः। तद्यथस्येक्षपन्तवात्।
न्याय गीर्भा बायुरायते यथतात्त्वित बायुवायलायः
नित्य प्रक्षाभावाताः॥

† यथायस। स्वेच्छानिज्ञानवाचविविधसं। यथा।
प्रक्षाभावात्। प्रक्षाभावप्रवृत्ताः। बायुविकाराः स्वेच्छा
ख्याताश्चायाश्चाय। यथा।
प्रक्षाभावप्रवृत्ताः। प्रक्षाभावप्रवृत्ताः। बायुविकाराः स्वेच्छा
ख्याताश्चायाश्चाय। यथा।
BOOK I. SECTION 3.

Aph. 23.—And [Sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commentary here following].

a. That is to say;—because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text—viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal,"* &c.

b. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [—viz. the text just quoted—] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.†

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.‡

SECTION III.

On the nature of Sentences, &c.

d. Though thus Sound is eternal, as also the connection between Sound and sense, still, that an instigation in the shape

* बाच्छ विन्दुपनिय्यवेषित नृधे निववया वाच्येन विन्दुकप्रण—

† यथायद्धर्मसम्बपर वाक्यं तथापि वाच्येन निववलस्तुवेशित

‡ गन्धार्धः सम्प्रासः
the producer of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the sentence].

a. ‘Of those that are in it’;—i.e. of those several words that are extant in these [sentences]; ‘along with what signifies action’;—i.e., along with a term that expresses power [—in other words, along with a verb—]; ‘the mention’, i.e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the texts which enjoin] the Agnihotra sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence—[knowledge] which we had not before [hearing or reading it]—comes only from a collection of words which involves a verb:—‘because it is this that is the producer’,—i.e. because of the fact that ‘this’—viz. the knowledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer, or cause, thereof.*

b. To explain:—In the injunction “He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the Agnihotra sacrifice” [see Aph. 5. 3,], the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—viz., that it is by the sacrifice called the Agnihotra that one may secure Paradise,—does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words [—viz., the words Agnihotra and Paradise—]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, consistently, of the meanings

* तत्रुतानां तेषु कृष्णानां प्रयेकप्रियानां। किषादेन।
शर्तिवाचिना पदेन च। समाप्तः। पदमं। दस्यते।
चाकोबाचिन्यः। ततः। किषादाचययमवयजत्वदविश्रृष्टी।
शेषपूर्वका वाक्यवाच्यः। कर्षेस। वाक्यवाच्यानां। तत्रः।
संस्काराद्वः। ततः। पदार्थानां। चिन्तनं। कारणं वचन।
तत्रतः।
that arise before us from the words:—[so that it be agreed that the meaning of the separate words is not dependent on man’s contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words;—and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel].

Aph. 26.—Since, in [the secular language of] the world, there is a regular order,—[so in the Veda also] let there take place the employment [of language according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional instruction].

a. ‘In the world’;—i. e. in secular speech;—having discerned what is meant by the word,—or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word,—‘since there is a regular order’ i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,—men not devising phrases capriciously—so] in the Veda also, let there be—founded on knowledge derived from the traditional instruction of teachers,—the ‘occurrence’—i. e. the taking place—of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].†

* चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां

† लोके। चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां देवदेव चाकौलिक ज्ञात्यात्मकां
THE MIMANŚĀ APHORISMS.

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda] is no authority in regard to duty, because [forsooth] it is not eternal, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to err.*

वेदांकरे वर्षिकर्ष्य पुर्वाका: || २७ ||

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas. Aph. 27.—And the Vedas that they contain the names of men, some declare to be something recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. ‘The Veda,’ &c. :-i. e. since there are the names Kāthaka, and Kaśyapa, &c., therefore it is ‘recent’—a matter of now—that is to say having had a beginning. ‘The Veda’—i. e. the scriptures. ‘Some’—i. e. the followers of the Nyāya. These [followers of the Nyāya] have asserted this,—such is the remainder† [which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Aphorism].

ब्रम्हवामत् प्रयोगात्। वेदेुसिपु सुधर्मस्यर्या वनपूर्वक:।

प्रयोगाय वर्षिकते:। द्वितिः। खात।

* वेदवामिवालयत् पौत्रवेदायत्व ध्रुवम् न प्रमाणं पुर्ववेदः

देववधिवधिविदित पुनराविशिष्टः।

† वेदानिति यत्: पुर्वाका:। साउरन कौमनिति

गानानि। खात: वर्षिकाः। आधुनिकः। शास्त्रिनिवधे:।

वेदान्तः। ब्राह्मणावान्। एवे। नैयायिकः। ब्राह्मरिकिः

खेष:।
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b. And for the following reason also [—if we are to listen to such objectors as the Naiyāyikas—] it [the Veda] is un-eternal —as the author [ironically] states.*

Aph. 28.—Because of our seeing un-eternal persons [mentioned in the Vedas].

a. 'Un-eternal,' &c. Because, in such scriptures as "Babar, the son of Prahal, desired,"—"Kusurubinda, the son of Uddalaki, desired,"—we see mention of 'un-eternal persons,' i.e. of persons to whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the un-eternity and the human origin [of the Veda] is established by the fact that it had a beginning.†

a. The author now mentions the established tenet in regard to this.‡

Aph. 29.—But there has been declared [already] the priority of Sound [to any point in time].

* एतेऽव्यक्तिये ध्वनिः।
† अर्थिते। अर्थितानां। जनसरिष्टानां। बबर: प्राचिनकरकमन् कुशुधनिः। वैहालकिकरकमन्। प्रत्याहिनि वेदेशु दर्शनात्। तेत्रानन्दनानाधिकारिणि वाक्यानि नाष्पुनिः। साहित्यादिनियां प्राचीनवक्तच विहस्।
‡ चिह्नानमात्।
THE MIMANSA APHORISMS

a. 'But there has been declared,' &c. To supply the ellipsis,—the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism:—such is the meaning.*

श्राक्षा प्रवचनात्। २०।।

Aph. 30.—The name [—derived from that of some mortal—was given, to this or that section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'—i. e. the name of "the Kāḍha section," [see Aph. 27. a.], or the like, is suitable 'because of his reading' or studying it,—the 'Kāḍha section' being that which was pursued by Kātyāṇa.†

परन्तु सुतिक्षावामाण। २१।।

Aph. 31.—But the terms in the text [which seem to be names of men] are common [to other objects, and do not there designate men].

Although there is the name "Babara" or "Prāvahagni" [in the Veda,—see Aph. 28. a.], yet the text—the word 'Prāvahagni' or the like—is 'common',—i. e. is expressive also of some other

* चक्रागित। यद्य पूर्ववं गियतवं चारितं प्रामिति येषा। यद्य गियतवं विद्र वेदसुप गियतवं बुद्ध सप्तागि:।
† आक्ष। काठकारियफळ। प्रवचनात्। सध्यागान्। करणागीतं काठकारियुपपर।
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thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For example—[in the word Prañahyā] the prefix pra implies 'excess,'—the word vah signifies 'motion,'—the final i represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the Wind which moves very fast; and this is without beginning; and [moreover] the word "Babara" is a word imitative of the sound of the Wind,—so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency.*

Objection that the Vedas contain passages of sheer nonsense.

b. But then how can it be instrumental in producing right knowledge in regard to Duty, when the Veda contains such incoherent prattle as the following—; viz. "Jaradgava, in cloth slippers, standing at the door, is singing benedictions:—of him, a Brāhmaṇ-woman, desirous of a son, enquires,—'O Sir!—what is the meaning of this [which I hear you declaring] about intercourse on days of fasting?"—or the following;—viz. "The cows also attend this sacrifice"—? To this he replies as follows‡:—

* बहारि बबरि: प्रवचनिविवचि परस्त चूति: प्रवचनी प्राप्तिः खाद्यायनः सामायिः। अन्यायेष्वरियि वाचकः। तथाकि।
प्रङ्क्तिः जन्मायायिः। वदनान्तर्गतिः गतिः। प्रकारः काति।
तथारोकृष्णाप्रयाचिः। वासुपरप्पवाचारिः। बबरि चूति वायुः
शंकुलश्च शास्त्रान्तर्गतिः। नानुपपप्पणिहोऽपि।

† Or, according to another reading, "What is the meaning of garlic as regards the goddess Uma?"

‡ ननु जराज्ञवः कम्बलपादकाम्यं द्वारि खितो गायति
अण्डानि ते ब्राह्मणो युक्तिः पुष्पकामा राजस्मायं चभान्यः
क्षयं कृष्णयं दृति गावेऽ। एतत्रच ब्राह्मणेऽवांशोऽस्मवधः
प्रस्तापां वेदे सुचतः कथं शणेऽपि प्रभायादिवाचारः।
THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

Aph. 32.—It [—the expression just charged with being incoherent—] may have an application to the action, through its really standing in relation to the action [which it serves suggestively to inculcate as a duty].

e. 'To the action,' &c. —that is to say:—even such an expression as 'The cows also attend this sacrifice' [Aph. 31. &],— 'through its standing in relation'—i. e. through its really involving a mutual reference to—'the action'—i. e. the passage enjoining some action,—has 'an application'—viz. through the praise* [which it suggests as attending the performance of the action].

* The import of the argument is this, viz.—Did the very brutes—the cows—engage in the sacrifice, or ought wise men to engage in its performance?—the hinting of the doubt serves to commend [that duty which even things senseless would engage in if men neglected it;—as we say, "The very stones would cry out" if men were to keep silence when under an imperative obligation to speak out].

c. So much for the first section of the first Book of the commentary on the Aphorisms of Jaimini.†

* हर दृति। कर्मण्य: कर्म्यमयितपादःकारणाः। सब्ध-भात। परस्यायकनाबिनियमात्। गायो ब द्राघीनाः-नापि। हरे। कर्मण्य। कुतित्वराविनियमः।

† अध्यायः। गवाद्यो जन्तृ खापि कर्म्यानुवंशां वर्गः। विशुद्विद्या। जुतित्वरक्षिणयं विशय दृति जूत्ता ताप्यवें वर्षहिति।

‡ प्रति जैनितिुसही प्रथमाध्यायः प्रथमः पादः।