AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
WITH THE SANSKRIT TEXT,
OF THE TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ
(SĀNKHYA)
OF VÂCHASPATI MIŚRA,
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PREFACE.

For the little we know of Vâchaspâti Miśra the reader is referred to the Sanskrit Introduction; wherein it is shown that he was a Maithila Brâhmana and flourished somewhere about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanâchârya the author of the "Parisuddhi" on Vâchaspâti Miśra's "Tâtparya-Tikâ," flourished in the reign of king Lakshmana Sen of Bengal,—of whose era we have just commenced the 8th century; and at least a century must have elapsed before a work could deserve the honor of a commentary at the hands of Udayanâchârya.

I take this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govinda-dasa of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,—who has been chiefly instrumental in my undertaking and finishing—not only of the present translation, but also of the Kâvyapprakâsa and the Nyâya—Muktâvali, and some works on Mimânsâ. My thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq. of Bombay for his publication of the work, and also to the proprietors of the "Theosophist" of Madras for allowing a reprint of the translation which first appeared in the columns of that excellent journal.

RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA: GANGÂNĀTHA JHĀ.
1st July 1896.
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P. 26 Line 3 for "unction" (in rhetoric) read "taste"

" " " 12 " " " "
P. 56 to the left of line 18—read " (126),"
INTRODUCTION.

The lucid writing of Vāchaspāti Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sānkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sānkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither Productive—nor—Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattwas,—Prakriti or Nature being the productive, since the Sānkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive—and—Produced are the other Principles—Buddhi &c. These partake of the nature of both—thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Ahankāra and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakriti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five elements. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from them. The Purusha (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the three Gunas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these—and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful creative agent of the Sānkhyas or, more properly, the creative force of the Universe. Then first of all—how is this force constituted? It is naturally made up of the three
Gunas—Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas; and when the Pradhâna is in its natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in an equilibrium. When occasion presents itself i.e. when the Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Prâdhâna, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of creations. The diversity of created objects is thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattwa giving rise to the kind of creation in which that attribute predominates, and so forth. Without proceeding any further, we must stop to consider the nature and properties and the Modus operandi of these Gunas.

The three attributes—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and restraint; and are so constituted that the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were the Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguna which by its nature is dull and passive. The natures of the different objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the necessity of the three Attributes.

Here an objector comes forward and says—How can the attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe? The reply is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end—e.g. the wick
and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to brighten the fire. In the same manner, though the Gunas are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other’s deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in nature there are three distinct properties—of pleasure, pain and dulness. All other properties are reducible to these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, so we at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—the Pradhâna—must be endowed with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Gunas. We must now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakriti—the Keystone of the Sankhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakriti? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Baudhâ “Sensations”? Or does it correspond to the Vedantic “Mâyâ”? To all this we reply—It is all these, and It is neither of these. It resembles the Vedantic Mâyâ inasmuch as it is the one root of the Universe, which is asserted of Mâyâ also though, as of an illusory world. But the fact of its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Gunas. In short, Prakriti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective)—endowed with the three Gunas and evolv-
ing through these, every kind of existence—save of course, the Purnsha—Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakriti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root itself unmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and subjective existence? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here to briefly sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of Prakriti. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus then the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is nonentity can never be made an entity—that is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We always find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity; for certainly a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. Thus then this would lead to an absurdity.
Thirdly.—we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists.

Fourthly.—the effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it. Because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do the action of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e.g. a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be very well performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect is declared by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"when we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify? If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing . . . . .
There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the causes."

—Lectures on Metaphysics—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sâṅkhyaśs employ the fact in proving the existence of their Pradhâna. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence must have its unmanifested condition in its cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Self-Consciousness, which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on increasing the series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sâṅkhyaśs give the names “Pradhâna,” “Prakriti” or “Avyakta.”

Secondly we find that all the substances—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this is Pradhâna.

Having thus proved the Existence of Pradhana we must define its properties as well as those of its Effects; and see wherein lies the difference.

In order to do this we must first consider the properties of the Manifested Principles—the effects of Pradhâna. These are caused and as a necessary consequence of this—transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Pradhâna), made up of parts; these are the characteristics where the Pradhâna differs from the Manifested Principles, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Pradhâna is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal. And as all Universe is the result of Its
evolution, it must be all-pervading; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable i.e. cannot move, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-pervading it must be one. It is independent—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that the Pradhāna as well as the manifested principles are the resultants of the various actions of the three Gunas. Secondly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination is the result of intelligence. Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such common. This is technical and requires some explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently by different individuals, but are common objects of observation for all, and are common in that sense. Fifthly they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly they are prolific i.e. endowed with evolving energy. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between the Pradhāna on one hand and its effects on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the intelligence. For certainly Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi for it is material, being the effect of Prakriti which is essentially non-intelligent, and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the effect. So we must have a distinct Principle of Intelligence.

Secondly—we see in our every day life that all that is corporeal is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair &c. And we have seen before that all the principles from Prakriti
downwards are bodied. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakriti, Buddhi and Ahanâkra, yet we must not forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles is made up of the three Gunas—which are as material as anything. And such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is Purusha, the Spirit,—and as we have not yet had an Intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. And the Spirit must be unbodied because it is devoid of the three Attributes, for whatever is affected by the Gunas is found to be bodied.

Thirdly.—We have come across in daily life with the general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised over by something, and we have also seen that all the principles from the Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion; and so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself untouched by pleasure &c.; and as such must be something over and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment; and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer, who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be the intelligent principle. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c. Which can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. These latter being made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory actions—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. And so we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest. And this is Spirit.
Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of philosophy, and all the
great men of the past we find striving after final Release.
Now this is not possible of Prakriti or Buddhi. For these
latter are constitutently made up of pain and as such can never
be released from this. So the object of final Release must be
one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its con-
stituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct
principle in the shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this
Purusha?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?
—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain
final Release? We must take each of these questions one
by one.

(1) What is Purusha? It is not the thinking principle, since
thinking belongs to the mind. Nor is it the determining
principle since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character
of the Spirit is a very unique one. It is none of these,
still it is the necessary factor in all of these. It then is
the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as
organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without
it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness.
In short Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the
necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the
Spirit is constituted of intelligence pure and simple, and
is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated:
it is free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative
faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-produc-
tive. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of
the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be
possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attrib-
utes and as such can not possibly be separated from it.
And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And again if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain to the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become useless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain &c.,—which in reality do not affect him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Purusha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sâṅkhya philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self,—imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retries from metempsycosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given. From this Buddhi proceeds Ahankára or the principle of egoism. From this again emanate the eleven senses and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour
and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akāśa.

Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First in the scale comes *Buddhi*. This is defined as the principle of *adhyāvasāya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to will. But the Sankhya *Buddhi* is not mere *will*. It is *Will* and *Intellect* combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictator of intelligence." The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to their *Buddhi*. That Buddhī resembles *will*, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sankhyas. These properties are *Virtue*, *Wisdom*, *Dispassion* and *Power*. As we have said already *will* decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that *wisdom* is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddhī is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhī cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism. It is the principle to which all notions of the "I" are due. It corresponds with Kant's "apperception" and Hamilton's "self-consciousness;" that is to say the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "I have the consciousness," "I feel &c." As immediate effects of this principle of Egoism, we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the
five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eyes, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) —viz.:—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and that of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (mind). The five subtle elements are those of smell, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Ākāśa; and these have the subtle elements for their properties. Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind a sense at all? The answer is not far to seek. The Sankhyas define sense as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness; and this differentia we find in Manas as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider what are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas then is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle is technically called in Sankhya “reflection” or “thinking.” This is further explained—when we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are all indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विकल्प). This indefinite and vague impression is very soon rendered definite; and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the reflection (or thinking) of the Mind. This process follows so instantaneously that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.
It need not be repeated that the multifariousness of creations is due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the action of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own anxiety.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhi, Ahankāra and Manas, and the ten external—the ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of substances; and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—viz., the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment, finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.
Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and third fading and transient.

This "subtle body" of the Sankhyas resembles to a great extent, I believe, the "Astral Body" of Theosophical literature. It is born before the visible body and lasts till the Pralaya; and till then it presents the astral body of the Ego in all its reincarnations during that Kalpa. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not act upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation; and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substrate in the form of the "Linga-Sarira," equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarira imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And since this body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The Linga-Sarira thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. This Linga-Sarira again is the substrate of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a substratum.

Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. By "higher regions" here is of course meant a more highly spiritual life. Vice leads the other way. Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the
character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free of the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed intelligence. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Passion, then it is that it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of obstruction, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of obstruction alone.

So much for intellectual creation. The elemental or material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the attributes. Thus the attribute of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a
human body. Nature is described as a great benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scene like an actress who has played her part, and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all internal fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue &c.—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.
THE TATTWA-KAUMUDĪ.
[SĀNKHYA].

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

(1). Reverence to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many children; and also to the Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her, and renounce Her on having enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her.

To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Āsuri, as also to Panchasikha and Iswara-Krisna,—to these we bow in reverence.

(2). In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. Those, on the other hand, who expound undesired doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the final end of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to the final goal, therefore, the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter:

KĀRIKĀ I.

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain, (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account
of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

(3). The subject-matter of science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this world; or (2) if though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible,—such impossibility arising either from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4). Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. The three-fold division of pain.

With this view, it is declared: "There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain." The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." And these are: (1) The naturo-intrinsic (Adhyâtmika), (2) The naturo-extrinsic (Adhibhautika), and (3) The super-natural (Adhidaivika). Of these the naturo-intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the various humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their admitting of internal remedies. Pains submitting to external remedies are two-fold: extrinsic, and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones owe their existence to the evil influence of planets and the various class of elementals. Thus the fact that pain,—a specific modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment" (Abhighâta) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the
consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of pain residing in the internal organs. Thus then this idea of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained subsequently. Thus it is concluded that (enquiry is going to be made) "into the means of alleviating it" (the three kinds of pain). In "Tadapaghatake" the particle tat refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound). The means of alleviation, too, are only those derivable from science,—and none other.

(5). Objection: "On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous." That is to say:

Objection: Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means.

We grant the existence of the triad of pain, and also the desirability of its removal, as also the possibility thereof; we go farther, and grant that the means derivable from the Sāstras are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous; because we have easier obvious means for the removal of pain, and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the Sāstra—a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in the house, wherefore should he go to the mountains? So, when the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?'* Hundreds of easy remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for the mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, dress and the like. Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as acquaintance with moral and political

* Vide the Nyāya-latikā, in loco.
science, residence in safe places, &c. In the same manner, of
superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems
and charms, &c.

(6). Reply: Not so: "Because these are neither absolute
nor final." Absoluteness (of the means) consists in the certainty of its effect; and its
finality consists in the non-recurrence of the
pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is de-
oted by the expression "Ekántātyantobbhāvah." The universal
affix tasi has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole
is this: On account of not observing the unfailing cure of the
different kinds of pain, even on the employment in the pre-
scribed manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,—we
predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and
similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer
non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available,
the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal
of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not super-
fluous.

(7). Though the mention of the word pain in the very
beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the
extirpation means as leading to its removal
is auspicious; and as such quite appro-
priate at the commencement of a treatise.

(8). Objection: We grant the inadequacy of obvious
means; but we have others prescribed in the
Vedas—such as Jyotishtoma, &c.—which
last for a thousand years—a whole host of
these forming the Ritualistic portion of the
Vedas. And these means verily will remove the triad of pain
absolutely and finally. Declares the Sruti: "Desiring Heaven
one must perform sacrifices;" and Heaven is thus described in
the Bhattavārtika: "Pleasure, unmixed and uninterspersed
with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what is
expressed by the word *Heaven.*” Heaven thus consists in pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very existence extirpates all kinds of pain; nor is this pleasure short-lived,—for, declares the *Sruti*: “We drank the *Soma* and became immortal” [Athrācasīras III]. And if the celestial pleasure were short-lived, how could there be ‘immortality’? Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again becomes superfluous.

**Reply:**

**Kārikā II.**

The revealed is like the obvious; since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess. A method contrary to both is preferable,—consisting in discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing (Spirit).*

(9). “*Anusrava*” is that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher,—and not done (written). *Anusravika =* relating to *Anusrava* or *Veda*, that which is known therefrom. The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas is equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the triad of pain. Though the text uses the generic term “*Vedic*” (“*Anisravika*”), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic portion of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the *Sruti*: “The Spirit ought to be

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* This Kārikā embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila’s philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.
known and discriminated from Primordial Matter” (Brihadāranyaka 2-4-5); (by so doing) “the agent does not return, yea he does not return (into this world)” (Chhāṇḍogaya 8-15).

(10). Reason for the above assertion is given; “since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess.” The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma-sacrifice, &c., being accompanied by animal-slaughter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhāchārya: “It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, destructible and bearable.” The ‘slight mixture’ is that of the principal effect (Apurva, i.e. merit) of the Jyotishtoma, &c., with the minor apurva, the cause of evil, due to animal-slaughter. The epithet ‘destructible’ implies that the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites; but if some how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructification of the principal Karma (merit), the evil element (demerit, caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the epithet ‘bearable.’ Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of Heaven attained to by a host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals).

(11). It cannot be urged that the generic law—“Kill not any animal,” is set aside by the specific one, “Kill the animal for the Agnishtoma”—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law “Kill not, &c.,” only declares the capability of the slaughter to produce evil, and hence pain; but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of the sacrifice; and in the same manner, the following injunction, “Kill the animal, &c.,” declares the necessity of animal-
slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the completion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a sacrifice.

(12). The properties—*decay* (*non-permanence*) and *excess*—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This *Non-permanence* is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a *caused* entity. Further, *Jyotishtoma, &c.*, are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the *Vijapêya, &c.*, lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven. This is what constitutes the "*excess*" spoken of. The greatness of one's magnificence is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13). In the passage "Drinking *Soma*, we became immortal"—immortality implies long-durability,—as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is durability till the final dissolution of all elemental (or finite) existence." Hence the *Sruti*: "Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality" [Mahâ-nârâyana *Upanishad* X.—5]; and again "Swarga shines in a secluded valley at a distance, which the ascetics alone enter. By actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, get death. Therefore those other learned Rishis, who were above all action, got immortality."

(14). With all this in view, it is declared: "A method contrary to both is preferable—consisting in discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing." *Tasmât* refers to the Vedic means of removing pain. A method,—contrary to the impure *Soma-*
sacrifice, &c., bringing about excessive and short-lived results,—is pure, i.e., unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter, and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting, as is clear from the Sūrūti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence; because this holds only in the case of the effect being an entity; in the present case, however, the consequence—the removal of pain—is a negation, a non-entity. And such negation putting an end to causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kārikā LXVI.)

(15). The literal meaning of the Kārikā, however, is this: The means of removing pain, consisting in the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit, as apart from Matter, is different from the scriptural means, and hence is preferable. The Scriptural is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent. The discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good. Of these two, the latter is superior.

(16). Question: "Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise"? Answer: "From discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing." Knowledge of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus then we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the knowledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this: The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from discriminative knowledge—consisting in meditation...
and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in the Śruti and Purānas, and then established by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail in Kārikā LXIV.

(17). Having thus decided Philosophy to be needful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention of the enquirer.

KĀRIKĀ III.

"Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is not produced; the Great Principle (Mahat, i.e., Buddhi) and the rest are seven, being both producer and produced; sixteen are the produced; and the Spirit is neither the producer nor the produced."

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are four-fold. Some of them are merely productive, some merely products, others both productive and products, and others, neither the one nor the other.

(18). It being asked — What is the productive? The answer is — Nature or Primordial Matter is the root of the Universe, an aggregate of effects; of Matter itself there is no root, or else we would be landed in an unwarranted regressus ad infinitum.

(19). How many are the objects that are both productive and products, and which are these? The answer is — The Great Principle and the rest are both. As the Great Principle (Buddhi) being the cause of Self-consciousness (Aḥamkara) is the effect of Nature (Prakṛiti), so is Self-consciousness
the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmâtras) together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time, the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril* (Akâsa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Self-consciousness.

(20). How many are the productions, pure and simple, and what are they? It is said—"The productions are sixteen"—i.e., the five gross elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow, pot, trees, &c., are modifications of earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees, &c., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term 'Prakriti' stands; and further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their essence, since they have, in common, the properties, grossness and perceptibility.

(21). The form of that which is neither productive nor product, is now stated. "The spirit is neither a product nor productive." All this will be explained later on.

(22). In order to prove the above statements, the different kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor can there be a specific definition without a general one. Hence the definition of proof in general follows.

* Though this translation of the word Akâsa is sure to jar upon European ears, as borrowed from a work on fiction (Lytton's "The Coming Race"), yet I have put it in, since I could not find any other word in the English language expressive enough to denote all that is connoted by the Sanskrit word Akâsa. "Inane," "Astral Light," "Ether," "Space," &c., do not sufficiently represent the active character of the Sanskrit Akâsa.
"Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony are admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary; because they include all kinds of proof. It is by proof that a fact is ascertained."

(23). Here, first of all, we have to explain the word Pramāṇa, which explanation would form its definition. Proof defined. Proof, then, is defined as that by which right notion is determined; it thus becomes the cause or means of all correct cognition. This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown; this comprehension too belongs to the human agent, and the result thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right notion is Proof. Thus the term Proof is differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception, memory, and the like.

(24). The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of proofs: "Of three kinds," the three-foldness of proof.—that is—of proof there are three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular kinds of proofs.

(25). Now, it is asked, which are the three kinds of proof? The answer is—"Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony. The above is an exposition of what is popularly known as proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the people, since thereto is its province confined. The cognitions of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help those of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.
(26). Objection.—We grant that the number of proofs is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, as Analogy (Upamâna), &c. 

Reply—"Since these three include all kinds of proof." This will be further explained later on.

(27). Now an altogether different question is raised—Why should the philosophic system enquire into the nature and kinds of proof, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of explaining the Pramêya, i. e., the subject-matter of proof (i. e., correct cognition)? To this it is replied—"Since a fact is ascertained only by proofs."

[Siddhi= determination or ascertainmet.]

The order of Explanation.

(28). The explanation of the Kârikâ follows the sense, not the order of the words.

(29). Now on the occasion of the definition of the special kinds of proofs, the author of the Kârikâ, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes all other Proofs, Inference, &c., which, therefore, are dependent upon it; and further since there are no two opinions with regard to it.

Kârikâ V.

"'Perception' is definite sense-cognition (i. e., cognition of particular objects through the senses); 'Inference' is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded by (based upon) the knowledge of the major premiss [asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga (the Hetu, i. e., the characteristic mark, the middle term,) with the Lingi (the Vyâpaka or the Sâdhya, i. e., the major term, in which the characteristic inheres] and
the minor premiss [asserting the existence of the characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term] ; and 'Valid Testimony' is true revelation (S'ruti).

The mention of "Perception" is only the statement of the term to be defined; the remainder being the definition, by which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined) from things of the same class or species, as well as from those of other classes.

(30). The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception) may be thus broken up: objects (Vishaya) are those that bind or connect the subject (Vishayi) with their own forms, i.e., they mark out the subject; such are earth, pleasure, &c., belonging to us. The subtle Primary Elements are no objects (of sense) to us, though they are so to Yogis and the Gods. 'Prativishaya' is that which is applied to different objects, i.e., the organs of sense. Application here is close proximity, or direct communication,—Prativishaya, thus meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication with, the object (perceived); and the definite cognition based on this (proximity) is "Prativishayādhyāvasāyāh." This cognition or knowledge, which is the result of an exercise of the Intellectual Faculty (Buddhi), is defined as consisting in the preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness—following on the subjugation of that of Darkness—resulting from the proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception. This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition. This is a Proof; and right notion results from the apprehensions of the sentient faculty by means thereof.

(31). Intellect (Buddhi), being a modification of, reman-
ation from, Nature (Prakṛiti, Primordial Matter), is insentient; and so, therefore, are its cognitions, jar, &c. And similarly the different modifications or productions of the Intellect—pleasures, &c., are insentient. The Spirit
(Parusha), however, having no real relation with these pleasures, &c., is sentient. This Spirit, being reflected in the Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect—which latter, therefore, are said to favour an intelligent entity, the Spirit. Through this reflection in the intelligence of the Spirit, the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions appear endowed with intelligence. This will be further explained in Kârikâ XX.

(32). In the definition, the mention of 'definite cognition,' sets aside all doubtful knowledge, because the latter is not definitely comprehended or well-defined, and hence is uncertain. By saying "objects," their contraries, all non-entities, are excluded; as by saying 'prati'—and thereby implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects—are excluded "Inference," and "Trustworthy Assertion." Thus 'the definite cognition of particular objects' is a complete definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish it from all other things of the same, as well as of different classes. The definition of "Perception" given by other philosophical systems are neither impugned nor defended, for fear of being too prolix.

(33). How can one, denying Inference as a proof,—viz., the Materialist—be certain of the ignorance, doubt or erroneousness of another man? Since, these—ignorance, &c.—are not perceptible to our mortal eyes; nor can any other method of proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception) is accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance, &c., of others are inferred from such marks or characteristics, as difference of meaning or speech, &c. Thus, however unwilling...
(34). And Inference following directly from Perception, its definition must follow close upon that of Perception; there again, on account of the particular definition being based on the general one, the author gives the latter first—"It is preceded by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms;"—the middle term being the Vyāpya or pervaded, and the major term, the Vyāpaka or pervader. The pervaded (Vyāpya) is that which is brought to its own natural sphere, after the removal of all dubious and assumed conditions; and that by which the Vyāpya is thus brought in, is the pervader (Vyāpaka). The mention of "the mark and the marked," both of which must be objects, indicates objective or substantive cognition. Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the pervaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked). Lingi (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition, in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the relation of the minor term (the Paksha), with the middle term (Hetu)]. Thus the general definition of Inference comes to be thus:—"Inference is (a method of cognition) preceded by (i.e., based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major (Śādhyā), the minor (Paksha) and the middle (Hetu) terms with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the knowledge derived from the major and the minor premises].

The three kinds of Inference—(1) The a priori (Purvavat), (2) The a posteriori (Seshavat), and (3) The inference from the perception of species (Sāmānyatodṛśita.)

* Literally—"the mark and the marked."
(iii) *Inference from the perception of species or class* [Inference based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality from earthiness].

(36). First of all, Inference is of two kinds:—(1) The *Affirmative (Vita)* and (2) the *Negative (Avita).* That which is based on affirmative concomitance, is Vita; and that based on negative concomitance, the Avita.

(37). Of these, Avita is Seshavat (*a posteriori* or analytic). Sesha is that which remains; and the Inferential knowledge having this remainder for its object is called Seshavat. As is declared†:—“The cause in question being excluded, and (the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remaining (object) is Parisesha.” [*Vatsayana Bhāshya on the Nyāya Sutras.*] Examples of this Avita Inference, founded on negation, will be given later on Kārikā IX.

(38). The *Vita* is two-fold (1) Purvavat (*a priori* or synthetica) and (2) from the perception of species. Of these Purva is that whose object is such as has the characteristics of its species known; and the Inferential knowledge of which this forms the object is Purvavat; as from the existence of *smoke* is inferred the existence of an individual *fire* in the *mountain*,—the characteristics of the species 'fire' having been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The second kind of *Vita*—the Inference based on the perception of the species—is that which has its object, such as has

* The *Vita* has an A proposition for its major premiss; and the *Avita*, an A proposition, converted, *per accidens*.

† As for instance, in a proposed inference of the form—'sound has earth for its substrate, since it is a quality'—the possibility of sound being in earth being excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality specific of earth; and there being no possibility perceived, of sound residing elsewhere, we have the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (*AkAsd*) as Parisesha.
the characteristics of its species (previously) unknown; of this kind are all inferences with regard to the sense-organs; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence of the cause of the perception of colour (i.e. vision) is inferred from the fact of its being an effect (and as such necessarily caused). Though the characteristics of instrumental cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes, &c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such causes—the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as causing the perception of colour, &c.—are nowhere perceived. Nor are the individuals—the particular sense-organs—forming the class 'Sense,' perceptible to our mortal eyes; as are those of the class 'Fire.' In this lies the difference between the Purvacat (a priori) Inference and the Sāmānyatodrishta (Inference based on the perception of the species); though they resemble each other, inasmuch as both are Vīta (affirmative). Here (in Sāmānyatodrishta) drishta = darsāna, i.e., perception; and Sāmānyatah = of Sāmāya, i.e., species or class; to Sāmāya is added the universal affix Tasi.* Thus then the term means—'The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by the individual of a species whose general characteristics are not known.' All this has been fully explained by us in the "Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatika;" and is not repeated here for fear of being too prolix.

(39). Since the comprehension of the connection of words (in a sentence) is preceded by a process of inference with regard to the cause of action of the experienced youth directed, on hearing the words of the experienced director, and further, since the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the knowledge of its denotation,—therefore Valid Testimony, is preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having defined Inference, the author next defines Valid Testimony.

* Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.
The definition of Trustworthy Assertion, given in the Kārīkā, explained.

Valid Testimony is true revelation.' Here the mention of Valid Testimony is merely a statement of the term to be defined; the rest forming the definition. 'True' means 'proper,' hence 'true revelation' means 'proper revelation.' 'Sruti' is the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence by means of the sentence.

(40). This is self-evident. It is true; since all apparent discrepancies and doubts with regard to it are set aside by the fact of its proceeding from the Veda, which is superhuman. Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis, Purānas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.

(41). To the primeval Kapila, in the beginning of the Kalpa, we may attribute the reminiscence of the Sruti studied in his previous birth, as we recollect, after the night's sleep, the occurrences of the previous day. And so did the revered Jaigishavya, in his conversation with Avatta, speak of his reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as ten Mahākalpas: "By me, evolving through ten Mahākalpas, &c."

(42). By saying 'true revelation,' all pretended revelations such as those of Sākya, Bhikshu, &c.,—have been set aside. The invalidity of these systems is due to their making unreasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their making statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their being accepted only by Mlechchhas or other mean people.

(43). 'स' distinguishes "Valid Testimony" from Inference. The meaning of a sentence is the Prameya (the fact to be proved): 'sentence' or 'word' is not its property; and as such could not be its mark or predicate. Nor does a sentence, ex...
pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the connection of the mark and the marked which are the necessary conditions of Inference; since the sentence of a new poet, previously unknown, expresses the meaning of sentences touching unknown regions.*

(44). Having thus defined proofs, generically as well as specifically, the other kinds of proofs, Analogy and the rest, postulated by others, can be shown to be included in the above.

(45). Analogy (Upamánâ) is exemplified as 'The gavaya (a species of ruminants analogous to the deer) is like the cow.' But the knowledge produced by this statement is nothing more than that produced by our "Valid Testimony." The knowledge that the term 'gavaya' denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing more than Inference. The object with reference to which experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object (that could be so denoted), e.g., मोक्त्व (the class 'cow') is denoted by म. In the same manner experienced people having asserted that "the object denoted by the term, 'gavaya' resembles the cow," the term 'gavaya' comes to denote something resembling the cow;—and this knowledge is purely Inferential. The cognition of similarity of the perceived 'gavaya' with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence, the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the 'gavaya's' similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitude†

* Whereas Inference can belong only to objects previously known.
† This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his Mimansa-vyakramani, that the object of analogy is not either the gavaya or the cow, but the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be amenable to perception.
existing in the cow is different from that in the 'gavaya' since
the similarity of one species with another consists in both of
them having a common mode of the conjunction of their
various parts; and this common method of conjunction can be
one only; and this being perceived in the 'gavaya,' must be
the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left
to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage.
Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof.

(46). Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthāpatti) is
not a distinct Proof. For the case of the
assumption of the living Chaitra being
outside, when he is not found at home, is
cited as an instance of Apparent Inconsis-
tency. To us, Sānkhyas, this is nothing more than Inference.
A particular object being non-pervading or finite, when not
found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss—
in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be
in another—is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies.
Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing
object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being in the house;
and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra's existence
somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in
the house; and as such, non-existence in the house could, very
reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor
does the fact of his non-existence in the house cut off his exist-
ence altogether; and consequently his entity could be said to
retain itself outside. For Chaitra's non-existence in the house
contradicts either his existence in toto, or merely his existence
in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects
of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by
the general assertion—"he must be somewhere" (without any
definite place being mentioned), any particular place—even

* It is only when two statements are made, with regard to one and the
same subject, that they contradict each other; which is not the case in the
present instance.
the house—may be implied; and as such the non-existence in
the house becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity
between the two propositions noticed above, they would con-
tradict each other,—we reply: No: because the non-existence
in the house having been ascertained by evidence—of Percep-
tion in the present instance—cannot be set aside, on the ground
of uncertainty, by the doubtful fact of his existence therein. It
is not proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the
house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein,
would set aside his existence in toto and set aside all doubt
(of his existence in space). Because Chaîtra's existence in the
house, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein,
is overthrown by this latter; not so his existence in toto; since
this latter fact is altogether disconnected with the non-exist-
ence in the house. Thus it is very proper to say that the
external existence of an entity is inferred from its characteristic
of internal non-existence. Hence the assertion—that the
subject of Arthāpatti is the removal of contradiction after due
consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs—is
set aside; for there is no real contradiction between the partic-
ular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general
(that of mere existence). The other examples of Arthāpatti
may similarly be shown to be included in Inference. Hence
it is established that Apparent Inconsistency (Arthāpatti) is
not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.

(47). Negation (Abhāva) again is nothing more than
mere Perception. The Negation of a 'jar'
is nothing more than a particular modifica-
tion of the Earth characterised by (its)
absence. Since all existences, with the
single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence (Chit—Sakti),
are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are
perceptible to the senses; therefore there is no ground left un-
covered by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct
proof in the shape of Negation (Abhāva).
(48). "Probability" (Sambhava)—e. g., the knowledge of the existence of lesser weights in greater ones—is also an instance of Inference. The heavier weight is known as not capable of existing without the lesser ones; and this fact leads to the belief in the existence of the latter in the former.

(49). That is called "Rumour" (Aitihya), by the Saúkhyas, whose first speaker is unknown, and which is handed down by mere tradition—e. g., 'a Yaksha resides in the Vata tree.' This—Rumour—is not a proof; since it is doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown. "Valid Testimony," however, is that of which the speaker is known to be veracious. Thus the three-foldness of proofs is established.

(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing. Of these, the Manifested—earth, &c.,—are perceptible in their true form, even to the common ploughman. And similarly the a priori Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain, could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary character. Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary methods) should be explained by philosophy. Consequently the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.

KÁRIKÁ VI.

Knowledge of supersensuous objects is obtained through Inference—the Sámanyatodrishta. What is not proved by this is proved by revelation.
(51). The particle ष distinguishes the सामान्योद्धरिष्ठता from Perception and Inference a priori. Through the सामान्योद्धरिष्ठता Inference there arises knowledge of Pradhâna* (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit both of which transcend the senses,—and this knowledge is due to the operation of Buddhi reflected in Consciousness Chaitanya (belonging to Spirit). The above implies the application of the Seshavat (Negative) Inference also.

(52). Then, does the सामान्योद्धरिष्ठता Inference alone apply to all objects transcending the senses? If so, we shall have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat), &c., as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods in heaven, in the case of which the inference does not apply. Hence it is said —"By this, &c.," and as a simple "by this" would suffice to give the required meaning, the ‘ष’ must be taken as referring to Seshavat (Negative) Inference.†

(53). Objection— Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as ‘sky-flowers,’ &c., leads to their being accepted as non-entities; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature, and the rest (which are like sky-flowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why

* Henceforth Pradhâna, Prakriti or Avyakta will, for the sake of simplicity, be translated as ‘Nature.’
† There is a difference of opinion among Commentators as to the explanation of this Kârikâ, especially the first half of it. Vâchaspati Misra, as we have seen, explains it as—’we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects, through the सामान्योद्धरिष्ठता Inference.’ Gaudapada takes it the same way. But Nârâyana Tirtha explains thus—’In सामान्यतत्त्व, the affix ‘tas’ is substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all (generic) objects amenable to the senses, we have a knowledge from Perception, &c.’ This last is the sense accepted by Davies in his translation. But the former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies, in a foot-note in loco, says that ‘Sâmânyatodrishta,’ ‘does not mean, &c.’ But he loses sight of the fact that “Sâmânyatodrishta” is the technical name of a particular kind of Inference.
have recourse to the various kinds of Inference for the sake of these latter?

The reply is—

KĀRIKĀ VII.

"(Non-perception arises) from excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness), intervention (or the existence of some intermediate barrier), predominance (of other objects), and from intermixture with with other like objects."

(54). The "non-perception" of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the "looking (back) of the lion."

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived on account of extreme remoteness.

The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained.

‘Extreme’ (ati) must also be taken with ‘proximity’ (sāmipya)—e. g., the non-perception, through extreme nearness, of the collyrium (anjana) in the eye.

"Destruction of organs"—e. g., blindness, deafness, &c.

"From absence of mind"—As a person, under the influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not perceive objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the range of his senses.

"From Minuteness"—As for instance, however, much we may concentrate our mind (i. e., however attentively we may look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our very eyes.

"From Intervention"—e. g., one cannot see the Queen behind the walls.

* "The maxim of the lion’s (backward) glance, is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows." [Vide. The Nyaya-Latika in loco.]
"From subjugation or suppression"—e. g., the non-perception of the constellations, suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"From intermixture"—as one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(55). The \( \varpi \) in the Kārikā has a collective force, implying even those not here mentioned; such as 'non-production' is also among the causes of non-perception—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.

(56). The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of the principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. Thus, for instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this capability of being perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it is not proper for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception or imperceptibility.

Question—Which of the above—mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature, &c.? The reply is—

KĀRIKĀ VIII.

The non-apprehension of this (Nature) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.
(57). Why should we not, continues the objector, attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?

The Author replies.—“Not due to its non-existence.” Why? “Because it is apprehended through its effects.” It refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be mentioned later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence is ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object itself).† The seventh unction on the other hand, has not its existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity of perception cannot be urged in its case.

(58). Granted all this, but which are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature? The reply is—“The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects.”

This will be proved later on (Kārikā XXII.) Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is auxiliary to discriminative knowledge:—“Similar and dissimilar to Nature.”

This division will be further treated of in Kārikā XXIII et. seq.

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1). The Baudhā view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2). The Vedanta view of the whole series of effects being a mere

(59). From (the existence of) the effect is inferred (that of) the cause:—on this point there is diversity of opinion. Thus some philosophers (the Baudhās) assert the production of entity from non-entity. Others (the Vedantists) represent the whole

* On the part of perception.
† This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition “Every effect must have a cause.” The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible; these must have a cause, and this cause is Nature.
evolution from a single real entity. (3). The Nyaya and Vaiseshika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4). The Sânkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.

(60). Now, we cannot establish the existence of Nature, in accordance with the first three theories. The Universe consists essentially of sound, &c., which are different forms and modifications of pleasure, pain and delusion,—and as such bears testimony to the character of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness, passion and darkness. Such being the case, if we assert the production of entity from non-entity (the Banddha view) [we would land ourselves in an absurdity] viz., how could the cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound, and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For, certainly we cannot hold the identity of entity and non-entity (two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of entity from entity (the Sânkhya view) be upheld in accordance with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere evolutions from a single entity (the Vedânta view). Nor again could we attribute phenomenality (or changeability) to the single; in fact the notion of such phenomenality (changeableness) with regard to the unphomenonal (unchangeable) would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanâda and Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from entity, the existence of Nature cannot be proved; since, according to them, the cause is not identical with the effect, inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to each other.*

* According to the Nyâyikas the cause is an entity, the effect a non-entity; and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore the cause and the effect cannot be identical.
(61). Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature, the author first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior to causal operation).

KÂRIKÂ IX.

The effect is an entity; (1) because a non-entity can never be brought into existence; (2) because of a (determinate) relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because everything cannot be possible (by any and every means); (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only) that for which it is competent; and (5) lastly, because the effect is non-different from the cause.

(62). The effect is an entity—that is to say, it is so even prior to the operation of the cause. Against this theory, the Nayâyikas cannot urge the fault of the absurdity of the production of an already existing object. Because though the production of the sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the seed and the lump of clay respectively, yet causal energy can only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity]. Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity, this latter, being at any time available, would give rise to the (absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the Nyâyavârtikatâtparyatikâ.

(63). The belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.*

* This is urged against the Vedânta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.
(64). Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kanāda, with reference to which the author asserts—"The effect is an entity." In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced:—(1) "Since a non-entity can never be brought into existence." If the effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If you assert entity and non-entity to be mere properties belonging to the jar, then in that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non-existent, no property could belong to it; and as such the entity (property) remains in the same condition (i.e., cannot be attributed to the jar). Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be attributed to it. For, how can non-entity belong to the jar (as a property) when it is neither in any way related to it nor cognate to it? Hence as after the causal operation, so too before it, the effect subsists.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i.e., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something existing beforehand is a fact quite compatible with experience; as of the oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping, and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity; for a non-entity is never seen to be either manifested or produced.

(65). (2) For the following reason also does the effect subsist before the operation of the cause: "Because of a (determinate) relation of the cause with the effect." That is to say, the effect subsists because of the relation holding between itself and its material cause. That is, the cause produces the effect when in relation with it; and (we all know) that no relation with a non-existing effect is possible; hence the effect must be an entity.
(66). Granted all this; but, continues the objector wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected therewith? We reply, that under such circumstances, only non-entity would be produced. With this reply in view the author lays down:—

(3) "Since everything cannot be possible."—If the effect unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause), then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), there being no other limitation save that of unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected effect only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an unconnected effect by an unrelated one:—as say the Sânkhyas—"There is no relation of the cause, imbued with entity, with non-entity; those holding the production of an unconnected effect will land themselves in a regressus ad infinitum."

(67). Objection: Be it so: But an entity, though unrelated, will always produce the effect for which it is competent; and this competency too could be inferred from the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the regressus ad infinitum.

Reply: (4) "Since a competent cause does that for which it is competent."—Now then, asks our author, does this 'Capability or competency' belonging to the cause imbued with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those to which the cause is competent? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then the following question will arise—how does the energy apply to non-entity? On this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others; then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted energy of yours connected with the particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect must be an entity; in the latter, you have the same endless series of causes and effects. Hence it is reasonably declared
that (the effect is an entity) "because a competent cause can only produce an effect for which it is competent."

(68). (5) For the following reason too is the effect an entity: "Since the effect is connate (non-different) with the cause."—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is an entity; then how can the effect, non-different from this latter, be a non-entity?

(69). The proofs establishing the non-difference of cause and effect are the following: (a) The cloth (an effect) is not different from the threads (its material cause), since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter [i.e., since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it]. An object differing in its essence from another, can never inhere in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth is inherent in the threads; hence it is not different from it in its essence.

(b) Owing to the causal relation subsisting between the cloth and the thread, they differ not in essence; because the causal relation can never subsist between objects essentially different from one another—e.g., between jar and cloth. But between cloth and threads we do find the causal relation subsisting; hence they can never differ from one another, in essence. (c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between cloth and threads: because of the absence of junction and non-contiguity between the two. We see junction taking place between objects differing from one another, as between a pool and a tree; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as between the Himavān and the Vindhya. In the instance before us, however, there is neither junction nor non-contiguity, and as such, no difference in essence. (d) For the following reason too, cloth and thread do not differ in essence: because of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any (other) effect different in weight (from the cause). As a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—e.g. the lowering of
the balance caused by two *palas* is more than that caused by a single *pala*. But we find no such difference between the effects of the weight of the cloth and those of the weight of the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is non-different from the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference [*Avitānumāna*—see, *Kārikā V*] establishing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the threads combining themselves in various ways; and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. No essential difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory actions in themselves (i.e., the effects), (différence apprehended in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause and that of the effect).† Because these differences do not contradict each other, when we see that they are brought about by the appearance and disappearance of particular conditions—as for instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown, &c., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c., on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced; and

* A particular weight.
† *Self-contradictory actions in themselves.* When the cloth is reduced to threads, we say the cloth is destroyed, and the threads are produced; now destruction and production are diagonally opposed; and as such cannot be predicated of the same thing at one and the same time; but we do predicate production of the threads and destruction of the cloth at one and the same time. So they differ.

*Difference apprehended in language*—as when we use such sentences as—

"Cloth is made of threads."

*Difference in action*—Thus we see that cloth can cover an object which certainly the threads cannot. And objects differing in their action must differ in essence.

These three are the objections brought forward against the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect. Each of these is considered and refuted separately in the following lines.
on entering them again (i.e., being changed into clay, &c.,) they disappear and are said to be destroyed.

Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced or an entity destroyed; as says the revered Krishna-dvaipayana:—"There is neither an existence of non-entity, nor non-existence of entity" [Bhagavadgītā II—16]. As the tortoise is not different from its own contracting and expanding limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion "cloth is in (i.e., made of) threads," is as consistent as the assertion—"Tilaka trees in this forest."

(71.) Nor does difference of purpose and action establish difference in essence; since a single substance can have manifold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light. Nor is fixity of purpose and action a ground of difference among substances; for we see that this fixity varies in the substances themselves, taken singly or collectively; as a bearer, in company with other bearers, can carry the palanquin, which he can never do when alone. Similarly, the threads though unable to cover, when taken singly, yet do cover when conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested (i.e., having developed into cloth).

(72). Objection:—Granted all this. But, is the manifestation or appearance itself an entity or a non-entity, prior to the operation of the cause? If the latter, then you admit the production of non-entity. If, however, you hold to the former alternative, then have done with the causal agency altogether; for we do not see the necessity of

* As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the forest itself; and yet we speak of the "Tilaka trees in the forest," so with the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads.
the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be landed on a *regressus ad infinitum*. Hence the assertion, that 'the threads are made to have their existence as cloth manifested,' is invalid.

(73). To all this we make the following reply. Even on your own theory of the production of non-entity, we ask—what is this 'production'? An entity or a non-entity? If an entity, then have done with the agency of the cause; if, however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will have to postulate the production of that production and so on *ad infinitum*[and such being the case, the fault of *regressus ad infinitum* you urged against us, loses its force, since it is common to both of us; and consequently it is not fair to urge it against one].

(74). If, in order to avoid the *regressus ad infinitum*, you declare that the production is nothing more or less than the cloth itself;—then the notion of cloth would coincide with that of production; and as such, on saying cloth, one should not add *is produced* (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could he say the cloth *is destroyed*; because destruction and production (denoted by cloth) can never coexist.

(75). Consequently, we have only two alternatives: the production of the cloth must inhere either in its material cause (the threads), or in its mere existence (*Sattā*). In either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause is necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects. (If you urge against us the common saying—'causes do (produce) the forms of cloth'—then we reply that) the causes have no relation with the forms of cloth; because these forms are not actions, and it is only with actions that causes are related; or else they lose their character.

*This point has been discussed by S'ankarāchārya, in his Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sutras, under the aphorism "Swapakshadoshhachcha."
(76). Thus then it is proved that the effect is an entity.

(77). Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension of which appertains to discriminative knowledge; and this is done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose existence is to be proved.

KĀRIKĀ X.

The Manifested has a cause: it is neither eternal nor pervading (i.e., universal); it is active (i.e., mobile or modifiable), multiform, dependent, predicative (or characteristic), conjunct and subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse.

(78). "Hetumat"—i.e., having cause. The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).

(79). "Not Eternal"—i.e., destructible, revolving [returning to the condition of its material cause*].

(80). "Not pervading"—that is to say, the Manifested does not extend over all evolving or developing substances. The effect is pervaded by the cause but not vice versa, e.g., Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti), and as such is non-pervading.

(81). "Active"—i.e., mobile. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., have mobility insomuch as they renounce certain bodies they have hitherto occupied, and occupy others;

* Since the Sānkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.
as for the mobility of earth, &c., it is too well known to need an explanation.

(82). "Multiform"—Since Consciousness &c., differ in different individuals; earth, &c., too are multiform in the shape of jars, &c.

(83). "Dependent"—On its cause; though the effect is non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally accepted; as we say—"the Tilakas in the forest."

(84). "Characteristic or predicative"—i. e., of Nature. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are characteristics of Nature, which cannot be its own characteristic, though it can be so of the Spirit (Purusha).

(85). "Conjunct"—Bearing in itself the relation of whole and parts. Conjunction consists in approach preceded by (i. e., after) non-approach; and connection with such approach of the whole to the part is what is connoted by "conjunct;" as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since the two are connate (and as such there can be no non-approach); nor is there reciprocal conjunction among Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-approach among them [since they all conjointly inhere in Nature].

(86). "Subordinate"—Consciousness stands in need of the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of its effect, Self-consciousness (Ahankâra). Without this aid, being, by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in need of similar aids in the production of their several effects. Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand of Nature. Hence the Manifested, though efficient in the production of its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest in the scale).
"The Unmanifested is the reverse"—i.e., of the Manifested. That is to say—the Unmanifested is uncaused, eternal, pervading, and inactive (immobile)—though to Prakriti does belong the action of evolution (or development,) yet it can have no mobility—single, independent (self-sufficient), non-predicative, unconjunct, compact (i.e., not made up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).

Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:

Kārikā XI.

The Manifested has the three constituent Attributes (Gunas), it is indescriminative, objective, generic (or common), non-intelligent (or insentient) and productive. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

"Having the three constituent Attributes."—That is to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of pleasure, pain and dulness. By this assertion are set aside all the theories attributing pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

"Indescriminative"—i.e., as Nature is not discriminated from itself; so too the Great Principle (Mahat or Buddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be discriminated from it. Or indescriminativeness may mean merely co-operativeness: nothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause efficient for its effect; it can be so only when in company with others; and as such no effect is possible from any cause taken singly by itself.
(91). Some (the Vijnâna-Vâdi Banddhas) assert that it is Idea (Vijnâna) alone that is denoted by the words pleasure, pain and dulness; and that there exists nothing besides Vijnâna that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as its attributes.

In opposition to this view it is laid down that the Manifested is "objective" (=perceptible). That is to say—it is so outside (and as such over and above) Vijnâna, and as such it is "Common"—i. e., perceived (simultaneously) by many persons. If, however, these were nothing more or less than Vijnâna, then in that case, this latter being uncommon (or specifically belonging to particular individuals), all the Manifested elements would be so also; for the Vijnâna of one person can never be perceived by another, owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the agent's own. On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent fact, which it could not be if we were to reduce all existence to mere Idea or Vijnâna.

(92). "Non-intelligent or Insentient."—Nature (Prakriti); Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent. We do not, like the Vainâsikas (a scion of the Banddhas) attribute intelligence to Buddhi.

(93). "Productive or Prolific"—i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing or developing. The particular possessive affix (Matu) is used in order to denote the constant character of the property of productiveness with regard to the Manifested. That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their several emanations or developments, whether similar or dissimilar.

(94). "So also is Nature"—i. e., as the Manifested is, so is the Unmanifested Nature. That is to say, the properties of the Manifested, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.
(95). The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is stated—

"Reverse is the Spirit."

(96). Objection:—Granted all this: But how can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifested and the Unmanifested; when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifested—such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c.,—and also between the Spirit and the Manifested—such as plurality?

We reply: "Yet also"—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as uncausedness, &c., yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of non-possession of the triad of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.

(97). The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the author names and describes these three Constituent Attributes:

* This word Attribute requires some explanation. It stands for the Gunas of the Sāṅkhya—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;—as says Colebrooke—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies very rightly remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, the inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important word—Guna—by Mode. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, "a quality which it may have or not, without affecting its essence or existence." Now as we have seen the Guna of the Sāṅkhyas is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have perferred to translate Guna as Attribute—using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode: "By Attribute, I understand, that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence. By Mode, I understand, the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine).—G. J.
The Attributes are of the nature of love, aversion, and stupefaction. They are adapted to illumination, activity, and restraint; and they mutually subdue, and support, and produce each other and consort together (for one purpose).

(98). These are called Gunas (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kārikā. And according to the maxim of presight, common among writers, the "love, &c," of this Kārikā are to be taken in the same order (as "Goodness, &c," in the next).

(99). Thus then, "priti" (love) being (a form of) pleasure, the attribute of Goodness is of the nature of pleasure; "Apriti" (aversion) being (a form of) pain, the attribute of Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, "Vishādā" being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of Darkness is of the nature of stupefaction. The word 'Ātmā' is inserted in order to guard against the theory that pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain, and vice versa. Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another; on the contrary, they are entities independent of one another. Thus "aprityātma" means one whose existence (not non-existence) consists in love or pleasure; "vishādātma" and "aprityātma" may be similarly explained. The fact of pleasure and pain being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one another, is one of common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of the other.

(100). Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next lays down their several functions—"They are adapted to illumina-
tion, activity, and restraint." Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. Foulness (Rajas), in accordance with its active nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Goodness (Sattva) to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish Darkness (Tamas)—by which restraint it operates only at times; thus Darkness (Tamas) becomes a restraining agency.

(101). Having thus laid down their functions, the author lays down the method of their operation—

"Mutually subdue and support, and produce one another, and consort together." "Vritti" (action) is to be construed with each member of the compound. Now, to explain, "Mutually subduing—" The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some external cause, it subdues the other; e.g., Goodness attains to its peaceful state only after having subdued Foulness and Darkness. Similarly do Passion and Darkness, in their turn, attain to their respective terrible and stupid conditions after having subdued the other two.

"Mutually supporting"—[Anyonyârsâyavrîttayah].—Though this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of the container and the contained, yet by 'support' (Asraya) here is meant something on which depends the action of another—as for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respective properties of activity and restraint. [Or else Goodness by itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert, and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and restraint only when supported by the functions of the other two. "Producing each other." That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By production here is meant development or modification, which is always of the same character as the parent Attribute which latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of
anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause; nor are they transient since they are never resolved into an essentially different cause. "Consorting together." That is, to say they are mutual companions, not existing apart from one another. Which has a collective force. In support of the above, we have the following: "all (attributes) are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived."

(102). It has been said—“Adapted, to illumination activity, and restraint." Now it is explained what those are that are adapted, and wherefore are they so?

Kārika XIII.

Goodness is considered to be buoyant and illuminating; Foulness is exciting and versatile (mobile); Darkness, sluggish and enveloping. Their action, like a lamp, is for a (single) purpose.

(103). Goodness alone is considered, by the masters of Sāṅkhya philosophy, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy—as opposed to sluggishness—is the property to which the ascension of objects is due; it is to this property that the rising flame of fire is due. In some cases, this property also brings about lateral motion, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps its efficiency to its particular effects; sluggishness, on the other hand, would only dull the efficiency of the cause. The illuminative character of Goodness has already been explained (Kārika XII).
(104). Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves inactive, stand in need of a force, exciting their causal operation; this force is supplied by Foulness, which excites them and rouses them from their natural passivity, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be exciting. This exciting character of Foulness is next accounted for—"(it is also) versatile." This also proves the existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary for the sake of action.

(105). Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the "sluggish and enveloping" Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits the scope of its actions. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been said to be the restrainer—"Darkness is sluggish and enveloping." The particle Eva is to be construed—not only with "Darkness"—but with "Goodness" and "Foulness" also.

(106). The enquirer objects: Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endued as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would be no effect emanating from them). The author replies—"Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose." We have all observed how the wick and the oil,—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; and the various humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,
possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate
towards a single end— the purpose (emancipation) of the
Spirit. This will be further explained in Karikā XXXI.

(107). To return to our original subject—Pleasure, pain
and delusion, opposed to one another, lead
us to three different causes connate with
themselves respectively, (and as these
causes we have postulated the three Attri-
butes). These causes too must be multi-
form, since, by their very nature, they are mutually sup-
pressive. As an example of the multiform character of these
various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have
the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle
and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband, because
with regard to him she is born with her essence consisting in
pleasure. She pains her co-wives, because with regard to
them, she is born with her essence consisting in pain. And,
lastly, the same girl stupefies another man who is unable to
get at her, because with regard to him, she has her essence in
delusion. All the different forms—pleasure, &c., have been
explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case,
that which is the cause of pleasure, is the
Attribute of Goodness which is essentially
made up of pleasure; the cause of pain is
Foulness, consisting in pain; and, lastly,
the cause of delusion is Darkness, consisting of delusion. The
properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belong-
ing to Goodness) cannot be similarly said
to be mutually opposed, and thus incap-
able of co-existing in a single Attribute.
As a matter of fact, we find them actually
coeexisting. Hence, pleasure, illuminat-
tiveness, and buoyancy, being mutually
consistent, do not necessitate the assump-
tion of different causes (for each of them severally) as do
pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and
as such unable to co-exist in a single substratum). In the

Goodness the cause
of pleasure; Foulness
of pain, and Dark-
ness of delusion.

The properties of
each of the Attri-
butes are not con-
tradictory, and so
they do not neces-
sitate the assump-
tion of different
causes for each of
them.
same manner, pain, versatility, and activity (properties of Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness (properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of various causes. *Thus the triad of Attributes* is established.

(108). **Objection:**—Granted all this. As regards earth, &c., we actually perceive the properties of indiscourtesy, &c., as belonging to them. But the Attributes, Goodness, and the rest, can never come within the range of perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscourtesy, objectivity, &c., (enumerated above)?

To this objection we reply—

**Kârika XIV.**

Indiscourtesy and the rest are proved from the existence of the three Attributes, and from the absence of these (the three Attributes) in the reverse (of indiscourtesy, &c. i. e., Purusha). And the existence of the Unmanifested (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent on those of the cause.

(109). By “a vivóki” in the Kârika is to be understood “arivékítvā”, as ‘dvī’ and ‘éka’—in “dvékayordévachahanak-avachané” [Siddhântakaumudi I—iv—22]—denote ‘dvitva’ and ‘ekatva’ respectively; or else it would be (*) “dvékésu” (and not “dvékayoh”). It being asked—How do you prove these, indiscourtesy, &c.?—the reply is:—“*From the existence of the three Attributes.*” That is to say, we have found

* For if the compound were analysed into “dvī” and “éka,” the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making “dvī” and “éka” stand for “dvitva” and ékatva making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.
in common experience, with regard to the perceptible material existence, that, whatever consists of pleasure, &c., is qualified by indiscreetness, &c. The affirmative reasoning, being explicit enough, is not stated in the Kårikå, which only mentions the negative reasoning:—"From the absence of these in the reverse"—that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which is the reverse of indiscreetness, &c. Or again, we may have the Manifested and the Unmanifested (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"From the existence of the three Attributes"—as a purely negative inference* (Avità), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where we could have the agreement of the reason (Middle term—existence of the Attributes).

(110). An objection is again raised—We grant all this; but the existence of the properties—in-discreetness, &c.,—cannot be proved before the object possessing these properties (the Unmanifested) has been proved to exist.

To this we reply—"From the properties of the effect being due to the properties of the cause." The connection may be thus explained: All effects are seen to possess properties similar to those of their respective causes, as the cloth of the

* The syllogism has previously been explained as—"Whatever has pleasure, &c., is discreet, as the perceptible material substances:"—and here we had the agreement (Anwaya) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "All things having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the spirit (the Manifested and the Unmanifested) are discreet, since they possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not discreet does not possess the three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor term The Manifested and the Unmanifested which comprehend all cases where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have the three Attributes.
threads. Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the outcome of similar properties subsisting in their cause. [And this cause is no other than Nature.] And thus we have proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties of pleasure, pain, and delusion.*

(111). "I grant all this", says the enquirer; "but the followers of Kanâda (the Vaiseshikas) and Gautama (the Nayâyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the rest from the binary compound downward—from homogeneous atoms, which too are manifested. The various properties in the effects owe their existence to similar properties in the primary atoms.† And

* And consequently Nature too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).} \\
\text{Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect).} \\
\text{.: Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)}
\end{align*}
\]

And again:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c.} \\
\text{Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved).} \\
\text{.: Nature has indiscreetness, &c.}
\end{align*}
\]

† It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic theory of Kanâda and Gautama,—which may be thus summed up.—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Akâsa, &c., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of "Adrishta," the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanent. But, as far as I know, no Nayâyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to S'ankarachârya in his refutation of the atomic theory.—See S'tiriraka-Bôshya on the Brahma-Sutras II—ii—12/17.
thus finding the production of the Manifested from the
Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an
Unmanifested, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of
Nature)?"

We reply—

Kârikiâ XV.

From the finite nature of specific objects, from
homogeneity, from evolution being
due to active (causal) energy, from the
separation of cause and effect, and
from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole uni-
verse.

(112). Of specific objects, the primary cause is the Un-
manifested (Nature). Because (1) "There
is separation of cause and effect, and re-
solution of the whole Universe." It has
already been proved (in Kârikâ IX) that
the effect subsists (in its unmanifested
form) in the cause; as the limbs of the tortoise, coming out
of its body, are perceived as separate from the body, which
again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the
same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as
different from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of
these (i.e., are produced from them when they have their
existence, as the jar manifested out of the lump of clay,
wherein they have all along inhaled.) The same is the case
with earth, &c., as effects of the primary elements, with these
latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Ahankâra); with
this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with this
last again as the effect of the Unmanifested, which is the final
cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested),
of the various effects—either mediately (as with earth, &c.,)
or immediately (as with Consciousness)—related to it, is
what is meant by the separation of the cause and the effect. In the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of effects—(1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Self-consciousness and (4) Intellect—lose themselves in their respective immediate causes—(1) Primary Elements (2) Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a particular effect is concerned. Ascending in the same order as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing in their respective immediate causes—up to the Final Unmanifested—and thus rendering these latter imperceptible,—at least that form of the cause which concerns each of them severally. Of this unmanifested, however there is no further receptacle; and thus it becomes the receptacle—and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states—of all the effects. This is what is meant by the re-union (in the final Unmanifested) of the whole Universe. In Vaiswarupya, the affix प्रभृति has a reflexive sense.

(113). "Because Evolution is due to Energy."—It is a well-known fact that the Evolution of the effect is due to the active energy of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent energy in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy. The difference of sand from sesamum—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114). Objection: Granted all this:—But the above two reasons that you have urged might very well rest with the Will—what is the use of assuming a further Unmanifested Reality? We reply: (3) "From finiteness"—i.e., from the fact of the effects being, in their very nature
finite. (In support of his ground, the author puts forth a syllogism). The specific objects in question, Will and the rest have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (i.e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state), since, they are finite, as jar, &c. The finite objects, jar, &c., as commonly seen, have, for their cause, clay, &c., (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); since we have already shown that the cause is nothing more than the unmanifested condition of the effect. And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must be the Unmanifested which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

(115). "Because of homogeneity."—Homogeneity consists in the similarity of different objects. Intellect, and the rest—manifesting themselves as ascertainment, &c.—are seen to be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inhere), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it is decided that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.†

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the author next states the method of its operation—

* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as its effects, Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.

† Thus we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its Constituent Elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.
KÂRIKĀ XVI.

The Unmanifested is the cause; it operates through the three Attributes by blending and by modification, as water, on account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the Attributes, as they are variously distributed.

(116). “Operates, &c.”—At the time of cosmic dissolution, the three Attributes continue to be of similar modifications. Modified condition forms a part of the nature of the Attributes; and as such they can never, for a moment, remain inert. Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and Darkness*.

(117). Another method of operation is next stated— “By blending.”—This “blending” of the Attributes, however, is not possible without the relation of subserviency among them, and this subserviency again is due to a diversity among the Attributes—which diversity again is not possible without destructibility (i.e., unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another). Thus the second method of operation is through development into Will &c.†

(118). The enquirer objects—How can diverse methods of operation belong to an Attribute which have been declared to be of uniform nature? We reply—“By modification—as water”—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though

* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.

† The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations—Intellect and the rest.
naturally of itself, having one taste,* becomes sweet, bitter, sour, &c., according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth—such as cocoanut, wood-apple, &c. In the same manner, owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one, and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations. Hence it is laid down—"On account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the various Attributes."

(119). Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-consciousness, or the sense-organs, or (lastly) the elements.

KĀRIKĀ XVII.

Since all composite (or compound) objects are for another's use; since the reverse of (that which possesses) the three Attributes with other properties (must exist); since there must be super-intendence; since there must be one to enjoy (experience or feel); and since there is a tendency towards final beatitude (abstraction of the Spirit from material existence); therefore Spirit exists.

The spirit exists: Spirit exists, apart from Primordial Matter (Nature):—

(120). "Because all compound objects (objects made up of integral component parts) are for another's use."—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand

* 'Sweet'—according the Nayayikas.
thus—Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another’s use, because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these latter are all compound, inasmuch as they are made up of pleasure, pain and delusion.*

(121). But, says the objector, the compound objects chair, &c., are seen to exist for other objects which too are compound, such as men’s bodies and not for the sake of Spirit as apart from Matter (the body). And as such Nature, &c., being compounds, should only lead to the inference of another set of compound substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an Elementary Spirit (an “End-in-itself.”) We reply—"Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes and other properties must exist."

-That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., being for another’s use, we were to infer only another compound substance, then in that case we would have to assume such compounds ad infinitum; for even this latter compound must lead to another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on ad infinitum. And when we can escape this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a reasonable resting ground, it is certainly, not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of compounds ad infinitum). Nor can it be urged that multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by proofs; for in the above inference the application of the instance ought to be extended only so far as “existing for another’s use” is concerned; it can be extended no further. And we have explained in the Nyāyavārtika-

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.
that if the complete identification of every phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the subject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference. Thus then, in order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, if we accept the non-compound nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of "being without the three Attributes," "discreetness," "non-objectivity" (subjectivity), "uncommonality" (i.e., specific character), "intelligence" and "unprolificness" (inability to produce). For, these properties are invariably accompanied by that of compoundness, which latter being absent in spirit, must lead to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be a Katha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author—when he laid down that "the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes, &c., must exist"—implied that this something which would be "the reverse, &c." must be an independent Elementary Entity—an "End-in-itself." And this is Spirit.

(122). For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: Because there must be superintendence." That is to say, because the objects constituted by the three

* This is a commentary on the Nyāyavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras of Gautama) of Udyotakara by Vāchaspati Misra. This work with the Parisuddhi of Udayanacharya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyāya,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Gangesa Upādhyaya, in his Tattwa-Chintāmanī.

† Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature, which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyayikas—"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c., &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.
Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superintendent. For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, is seen to be superintended over by something else—e.g. the chariot by the charioteer; and Intellect and the rest have been proved to consist in pleasure, pain and delusion; therefore, they must have a supervisor,—and this supervisor must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent, an “End-in-itself”—and this is Spirit.

(123). Again the Spirit exists “because there must be one to experience (or feel)” —That is to say, every one of us has an idea of pleasure and pain as something to be felt—as agreeable or the reverse; and as such there must be some substance, beyond the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-contradictory actions, inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.† Thus, then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be the agent who feels—and this is Spirit.

(124). Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kârikâ thus: Bhogya (enjoyable) means visible; and the visibility of Buddhi and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond, Intellect, &c.,—and this is Spirit. The visibility of

* Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c., which again will necessitate its superintendence by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.

† That is to say—Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and vice versâ, which is absurd.
Intellect and the rest can be inferred from the fact of their being made up of pleasure, &c., as earth, &c.

(125). Lastly, Spirit exists—"because there is a tendency towards action for final beatitude."—The final beatitude, treated of in all the systems of philosophy, and mentioned by the great sages of divine insight—as the absolute and final alleviation of the three kinds of pain—can never apply to Intellect, &c.; for, these have by their very nature, pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved; since a substance cannot be absolved of something forming its constituting element. Thus then, there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., wherefrom pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude, therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and hence) Intellect and the rest—and this is Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this spirit one (*) (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

KĀRIKĀ XVIII.

From allotment of birth, death, and the organs; (2) from the non-simultaneity of actions (with different individuals); and (3) from the different modifications of the Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

"The plurality of Spirits is established"—How?

* As the Vedantin asserts.
From allotment of birth, death and the organs.

Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation with the body the sense-organs, Self-consciousness, Will and Feeling* (vedana) —all these latter forming into an aggregate of a particular character. This is what is meant by birth—which does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). And death too consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "organs" are thirteen, beginning with the Will. The (diversified) "allotment" of these—births, &c.—is not explicable on the hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if the Spirit were one (in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one individual would lead to exactly the same effects in others. The several allotment, however, becomes quite consistent with the theory of the plurality of Spirits. Nor can the Monist explain the above difference by attributing it to the Spirit, as conditioned by contact with different bodies, &c. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing birth or death in accordance with the different parts of the body!—which can never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by the mere development or derangement of certain portions of her body.

For the following reason also, the Spirit is different with different individuals: "Since activity is not simultaneous." Action, in the form of endeavour, is a function of the internal organs; still it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men; and thus the motion of one would

* "Vedana" might be taken severally with "body," &c. In that case the passage would be translated thus—"bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and intellectual cognitions"; but the translation given above is preferable: for certainly, there can be no cognition through body, &c., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone, without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind, &c., and so on with the rest.
lead to that of all others—a palpable absurdity, which is explained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of plurality.

(129). Again, the Spirits are many—"because the modifications of the Attributes are different"—Some persons abounding in the attribute of Goodness, represent aggregates of that attribute—e. g. the gods and saints. Others abound in Foulness—such are men. The rest abound in Darkness—and these are the beasts. This diversity in the distribution of Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it quite explicable.

(130). Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states their properties—a knowledge of which is conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom):

KĀRIKĀ XIX.

And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows that the Spirit is witness, and has final The properties of emancipation, neutrality, and is perceiving and inactive.

"And" connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

(131). If it were said—"And from this contrast," then it would refer to the various distribution of the three Attributes, of the last Kārikā. In order to avoid this, it is said—"and from that, &c." A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun this; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by that; hence the that here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132). Thus, then, the contrast of "having the three Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-
objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive. Now, the properties of being a \textit{witness} and \textit{perceptive} are necessary accompaniments of intelligence and non-objectivity. Since an intelligent being alone can be a spectator, and one can be a witness only when the objects have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various objects and reasons to the witness; similarly does the Pra-kriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the \textit{witness}. And again no object can be shown to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the \textit{witness}. For the same reasons, the Spirit is \textit{perceiving}.

(133). Further, the absence of the three Attributes leads to \textit{final emancipation}—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of pain; and this property, as belonging to the spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being naturally without the three Attributes, and hence without pleasure, pain or dulness.

(134). From the absence of Attributes, again, follows \textit{neutrality}; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who can be called \textit{neutral}—also called \textit{Udāsina} (indifferent). Lastly, the property of \textit{inactivity} is a necessary outcome of the properties of non-productiveness and discriminativeness (wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit is inferred from its wisdom and non-productive character.

(135). \textit{Objection:}—We grant all this: but in our daily life we first decide our duty and then we think in the following strain—‘I, who am an intelligent being, wish to act.’ Thus, then, we find intelligence and activity co-

Objection—Intelligence and activity always found co-existent.
existent. And this goes against the Sankhya tenets which make intelligence devoid of activity and vice versa.

We reply:—

KāRIKĀ XX.

Thus, from this union the unintelligent Linga (Buddhi, &c.) appears as intelligent; and from the activity of the Attributes, the indifferent Spirit appears as an (active) agent.

(136). Since intelligence and activity have been proved to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word Linga includes everything from the Mahat down to the primary elements— to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the union or proximity of the Spirit with the Linga. (Buddhi and the rest).

The rest is clear enough.

(137). Objection:—You say that the feeling is due to union, &c. But no union is possible without some need which, again, is not possible without the relation of the helper and the helped. How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Linga?

In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need—

KĀRIKĀ XXI.

For the Spirit’s contemplation of Prakriti, and its final Emancipation, the union of both takes place, like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds creation.

(138). In “Pradhānasya,” the genitive affix has the objective force, the meaning being—“for the contemplation by Spirit of Nature,”—thus implying the fact of Nature being
an object—something to be enjoyed. But this enjoyability is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes necessary, for that of Nature.

(139). The author next lays down the ground of the Spirit's need—"For the Emancipation of the Spirit"—The Spirit, while in connection with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this self-imposed bond he seeks liberation—which can result only from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three Attributes—which wisdom thus becomes impossible without the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his emancipation. Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the relation was for enjoyment only.

(140). Granted all this relation—But whence the creation of Buddhi, &c.?

We reply—"From this union proceeds creation." The relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for enjoyment or emancipation, if there were no Buddhi and the rest; under the circumstances the union itself brings about the creation, for the sake—primarily—of enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation.

The process of creation is now described—

KĀRIKĀ XXII.

From Prakriti issues Mahat (or Buddhi); from this Mahat again issues Self-consciousness (Ahankāra), from which proceeds the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, proceed the five gross elements.

(141). From Prakriti, &c.—Prakriti is a name of the Unmanifested Principle; Mahat and Ahankāra will be
described later on, as also the set of sixteen, made up of the eleven sense-organs and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five gross ones—Akāsa, Earth, &c.

(142). Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds Akāsa, having sound as its characteristic property; similarly from the mixture of the primary elements of touch and sound, proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; again, from the mixture of the primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound, touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, from the mixture of the primary element of smell with that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all the five for its characteristic properties.

(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in general terms in Karikā X, and specifically in Karikā XIII; the Manifested also has been generally defined in Karikā X; now the author defines a particular Manifested Principle—the Buddhi—

KĀRIKĀ XXIII.

Buddhi is the determining Principle. (Will)*; Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power constitute its form (when affected by Goodness), and the reverse of these when affected by Darkness.

* Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyānasāya means 'determining,' and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man. Henceforth Buddhi will be translated as Will, and the reader is requested to mark the same change in the foregoing pages.
(144). "Buddhi is determination"—Since there is no difference between the action and the active agent (effect and cause). Everyone, when he comes across something to be done, thinks that he is deputed to the work and, finally, determines that it is his duty, and thus acts towards its accomplishment. This determination of the duty is the characteristic property of Buddhi—which appears as if endowed with intelligence by contact with the intelligence of the Spirit. Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.

(145). Having thus defined Buddhi, the author next states its properties, in order to help the attainment of true wisdom—"Virtue," &c., Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as well as to Super-physical bliss,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eight-fold practice of Yoga leading to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of passion.

(146). *This Dispassion is of four kinds—Yatamána-Sanjná Vyatireka-Sanjná, Ekendriyá-Sanjná and Vasikára-Sanjná. The passion—naturally impure—residing in the mind, lead the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop to this action of the senses is named Yatamána-Sanjná (literally, effort). When this process of resistance is once begun, some passions will have been suppressed before others; then the discrimination of these from those still operating is called Vyatireka-Sanjná. When the senses have been disabled, then the passions that have been suppressed reside in the mind in

* Cf. Bhashya on Yogasutra 1—15.
the form of mere anxiety—and this is known as Ekendriyā-Sanjnā. The suppression of even this anxiety towards all perceptible objects,—the ordinary ones as well as those mentioned in the Veda,—is called Vasikara-Sanjnā—and is superior to the first three; this has been thus described by the revered Patanjali: “The dispassion named Vasikara-Sanjnāyā belongs to one who has no desire for either visible or Vedic objects.” [Yoga-Sūtra I. 15].

(147). This is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi. Power also is a property of Buddhi; an it is to this that the perfections Attenuation and the rest (Animā, &c.) are due.* Of these (1) Animā (Lit Atomic character) the is the property by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) Laghimā (Buoyancy) is that to which is due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the sun’s rays. (3) Garimā (Gravity) leads to heaviness; and (4) Mahimā (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) Approach is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) Fulfilment of desires is such as can enable one to dip into the earth as in water. (7) Vasitwa leads to the subordination of all objects to the devotee. Supremacy brings about mastery over all objects. (8) Infallibility of purpose is such that all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.

(148). These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking of the attribute of Goodness. Those partaking of the attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these—viz.: Sin Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.

* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine; but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken Vasitwa and Isitwa as one.
The author next defines Egoism or Self-consciousness (Añkāra).

**KĀRIKĀ XXIV.**

Egoism is self-consciousness; thence proceeds a two-fold creation,—the set of eleven and the five primary elements.

(149). "Egoism is self-consciousness"—and this Self-consciousness is perceptible in such ideas as—"The object I have observed and known," "none but myself has power over this and that," "I exist," &c. All this is the characteristic action of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for its determinative function in such decisions as "this is to be done by me."

(150). The different products of this effect are next stated—"Thence proceeds a two-fold creation." The forms of these creations are stated—"The set of eleven and the five primary elements"—only these two creations proceed from the principle of Egoism. The 'eva' excludes all other possible suppositions.

**Objection:** How can two diverse kinds of creation proceed from a uniform Egoism?

We reply—

**KĀRIKĀ XXV.**

The set of eleven proceeds from the modified principle of Egoism, and partakes of the attribute of Goodness. The primary elements are due to the Attribute of Darkness; from Foulness proceed both.

(151). The eleven senses, being light and enlightening, are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,
by Darkness, proceed the set of the primary elements. How so? Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness. That is to say—Though the principle of Egoism is one and uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters.

(152). This is objected to—When all the necessary effects are brought about by the action of the attributes of Goodness and Darkness only, we done with the purposeless attribute of Foulness.

We reply—

"From Foulness proceed both"—i.e., the set of eleven as well as the primary elements. Though there is nothing to be done exclusively by Foulness, yet it is a necessary factor, since the attributes of Goodness and Darkness are both, by their very nature, inert; and as such could not do their own work unless urged to action by the active and mobile Rajas. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness. And thus we see that it is not altogether purposeless.

In order to describe the set of eleven—the effects of Goodness—the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

Kārikā XXVI.

The intellectual organs are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those of action are, speech, hand, feet, the excretory organs, and the organ of generation.

(153). Sense is defined as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by the attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold—intellectual, and those of action. Both these are called
Indriyas (senses) because they are characteristics of the Spirit (Indra). The senses are named: "The eye, &c."—Of these the eye is the sense for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving smell, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for experiencing touch. These are the intellectual sense-organs. The action of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārikā XXVII.)

The eleventh sense-organs is next described—

Kārikā XXVII.

Of these (sense-organs) Mind (Manas) partakes of the nature of both (intellectual as well as those of action): it is the reflecting (or thinking) principle, and is called a sense-organ since it has cognate properties. Its multifariousness, as well as its external forms, are due to the various specific modifications of the Attributes.

(154). "Partakes, &c."—Among the eleven organs, Mind partakes of the nature of both—i.e., it is an intellectual organ of sensation, as well as one of action, since the eye and speech, &c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the principle of Manas.

(155). The author next gives the specific definition of Manas—"It is the reflecting principle"—That is to say, Mind is defined by reflection (or thought). It is the principle which supplies forms and qualifications to the abstract cognition of a certain object, which invariably precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge thereof. As is laid down by an ancient writer—"At first, one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latterly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain
class and having certain properties.” It is a well-known fact that on first seeing an object, the first cognition that one has of it, resembles to a great degree the cognition of a child—indefinite and unqualified. Soon after this one learns to connect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c. This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a function characteristic of Manas (Mind), and as such serves to distinguish it from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus serves as its definition.

(156). Objection:—Granted all this: But we have seen that Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct functions of their own are not classed among sense-organs; in the same manner, we shall not class Manas among them either.

The author replies—“It is a sense-organ”—Why? “Because of its having cognate properties.” This property mainly is the fact of its being the immediate effect of Egoism as affected by Goodness, and not that of being a characteristic of the Spirit; for this latter property belongs to Egoism also; and as such this latter would also have to be classed among sense-organs. Thus then “being the characteristic of the Spirit is only an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya; it cannot be said to form its denotation.

(157). It is asked—Whence such multifarious effects from the single principle of Egoism as affected by Goodness? We reply—“It is due to the specific modifications of the Attributes”—The difference in the effects is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the form of the operative principles of sound, &c.

(158). Destiny (adrishta) is also a modification of the Attributes. We have the qualifying term “External” as presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the sen-
tence being—As the external forms are the effects of the modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and imperceptible ones.

(159). Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next stated.—

KĀRIKĀ XXVIII.

The function of the five senses, in respect to colour, &c., is mere observation or feeling; speech, handling, walking, excretion and gratification are (the functions of) the other five.

By "observation" here is meant the primary abstract perception (Nirvikalpa) through the intellectual senses. "Speech &c., are of the other five," i. e., of the organs of action. The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose function is speech. The functions of the cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*

The functions of the three internal organs are next stated.

KĀRIKĀ XXIX.

Of the three (the internal organs) the functions are constituted by their respective characteristics; these are peculiar to each.

* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions. e. g. the ear is defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.
The function common to the organs consists in the five vital airs—Prâna and the rest.

(160). "The functions of the three are constituted by their respective characteristics." That is to say, the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus, determination of Buddhi, self-consciousness of Ahankâra and reflection of Manas.

(161). The double character of the functions based on the fact of their being specific or common is next stated—"These are peculiar," &c. "The five vital airs, constitute the common function." The function of the three internal organs is the substance (of life, and hence) of the five vital airs; since the latter exist when the former do and cease to exist when these are absent. Of these the air called Prâna (Breath or Life) resides in the heart, the navel and the toes; that called Apâna resides at the back, &c., Samâna in the heart, the navel and the joints; Udâna in the throat, heart, &c.; and lastly, Vyâna resides in the skin. These are the five airs.

The author now states the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three internal organs).

Kârika XXX.

With regard to visible objects, the functions of the four are said to be instantaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to invisible objects, the functions of the three
(internal organs) are preceded by that (i. e. the cognition of some visible object.)

(162). "Instantaneous"—"with regard to visible objects," e. g., when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his observation, reflection and determination are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163). "Gradual," e. g., in dim light, a person has at first only a faint cognition of a certain object; then he looks at it more steadily and ascertains that it is a thief with his bow and arrow levelled at him; then the consciousness follows "the thief is advancing against me"; and he finally decides to run away from the place.

(164). With regard to invisible objects, on the other hand, the internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"The function of the three is preceded by that," i. e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and the other methods of proof operate only when they have for their back ground some sort of external perception.

(165). Objection: Granted all this: But the functions either of the four or of the three (organs) cannot depend on themselves alone; for in that case (these organs) must be either permanent or transient; if permanent, then their funcions also would be permanent; if transient, then the various functions would combine most absurdly, there being no restrictive agency.
Kārikā XXXI.

We reply:—They* (the organs) operate towards the performation of their respective functions, due to mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit supplies the motive; by nothing (else) is an organ caused to act.

The subject of the first sentence is "organs."

(166). A number of persons wielding different weapons, unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards the fulfilment of another's purpose, which tends to help its own. And since this movement towards action is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the functions.

(167). Another objection—The lancers, &c., being sentient beings, can comprehend each other's motives and can act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their end and urge them to action accordingly.

We reply:—"The Spirit's purpose is the motive, by nothing (else) can the organs be brought to act."

Since the purpose of the Spirit is to urge the organs to action, what is the need of postulating a supervisor ab extra? This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

* Davies restricts this to the internal organs; but there is no reason why the Kārikā should not apply to organs in general—as the Kaumudi takes it.
(168). It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ brought to act." The author next states the division of these organs:

KÂRIKÄ XXXII.

Organs are of thirteen kinds; they have variously the functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting. The objects of these are tenfold, that which is to be seized, retained or manifested.

(169). The thirteen organs consist of the eleven sense-organs, Ahankâra and Buddhi. An organ is a particular kind of agent, and no agency is possible without a function; hence the author next states the various functions. "They have the functions, &c." The senses of action have the function of seizing; that is to say, they extend their action to their respective objects. Buddhi, Ahankâra and Manas retain impressions by their respective functions—the life-breath, &c. (mentioned before); and lastly, the intellectual (perceptive) organs manifest their respective objects.

(170). Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next stated—"That which is to be seized," &c. The objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, retained and manifested. By seizure here is meant pervasion (or extension). The five senses of action extend over speech and the rest; and each of these being both human and superhuman these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is fivefold being an aggregate of the five great elements, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both human and superhuman, these objects also become...
tenfold. Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses are five—sound, touch, colour, taste and odour; and each of these being both human and superhuman, the objects also become tenfold.

(171). The sub-divisions of the thirteen organs are next stated:

KĀRIKĀ XXXIII.

Internal organs are three; and the external ten, making objects known to the former three. The external organs act at time present; and the internal at the three divisions of time.

(172). The internal organs are three: Manas, Ahankāra and Buddhi, called internal because located inside the body.

(173). The external organs are ten: the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs, i.e., they supply the means for reflection, consciousness and determination of objects—the intellectual senses functioning by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of their respective functions.

(174). The author next states a further point of difference between organs internal and external—"The external organs act at time present." By "present" is meant here the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; thus then, speech* also belongs to the present. "The internal organs at the three divisions of time." e.g., the idea that "there has been rain," since the river has risen—(for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"—(for the

* The special qualification is necessary for the case of speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the time present if by this word were meant the present moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.
present); and lastly, "we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"—(for the future).

(175). Time, according to the Vaisēshikas, being one, cannot allow such divisions as past, present and future. Hence we must have for the various units, the various conditions or specifications to which we give the names, past, present and future. So the Sānkhyas do not admit of a distinct principle in the shape of Time.

(176). The author next considers the objects of the external senses operating at time present—

KĀRIKĀ XXXIV.

Of these, the five intellectual senses (those of sensation) concern objects specific as well as non-specific (collective); speech concerns sound; the rest regard the five objects (of sense).

(177). Of the ten external senses, the five intellectual ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects:—by specific here is meant gross—and such objects are sound and the rest (the Tanmātras), manifesting themselves as Earth, &c.,—(the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbulence and dulness. The non-specific objects are the primary elements. The particle Mātra, in the word Tanmātra, serves to distinguish these from the gross objects. The senses of Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross states, whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound, &c., in their gross forms only.

(178). Similarly of the senses of action (the Motor Senses). Speech concerns sound, in its gross form, because speech is the cause of sound. Speech, however, can not be the cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct effect of Self-consciousness (Aḥankāra); and as such has the same cause as speech itself (which also being one of senses, proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.
"The rest," i.e., the four other senses of action—the excretory organs, &c., "concern five objects," because the different objects, e.g. jar &c., which are the objects of these senses, are all made up of the five primary elements of sound, colour, &c.

Among the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to others, reasons for which are given:

KĀRIKĀ XXXV.

Since Buddhī with the other internal organs adverts to (comprehends) all objects (of sense), these three are said to be the warders (principal ones), and the others the gates (secondary).

(179). Warders, i.e., chief ones.

Gates i.e., such as are the external organs.

Since Buddhī, with Ahankāra and Manas, apprehends (i.e., determines) all objects exhibited by the external organs, these latter are said to be gates (secondary organs), and Buddhī, with the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).

Buddhī is the chief, not only in comparison with the external organs, but also with regard to the other external organs, Manas and Ahankāra. To this effect it is said:

KĀRIKĀ XXXVI.

These (the external organs together with Manas and Ahankāra), characteristically differing from one another and being different modifications of Attributes resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first enlightened the Spirit's purpose, present it in its entirety to Buddhī.
(180). As the village officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the treasurer, who again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having operated on (observed) an object, present the observation to Manas, which reflects on it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting these qualified observations in turn to Ahankāra, which takes specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal cognition to the head-officer, Buddhi. Hence it is said: "These having enlightened the Spirit's purpose present it to Buddhi."

(181). The external organs together with Manas and Ahankāra, are various affections of Attributes, i.e., modifications of Goodness, Foulness and Dulness, which though essentially opposed to one another, are yet brought to co-operate for the supreme purpose of the Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire, though variously opposed to the action of one another, yet join, under the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the Attributes; such is the connection.

An objection is raised. Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to Buddhi?—Why should not we make it quite the other way: Buddhi subordinate to Ahankāra?

We reply:—

Reply: The superiority of Buddhi is accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul's purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter.

KĀRIKĀ XXXVII.

Since it is Buddhi that accomplishes the Spirit's enjoyment, and again it is Buddhi that exposes the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit.
(182). Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is Buddhi alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is supreme over other officials. Buddhi assumes the form of the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either of pleasure or pain, resides in Buddhi, which is (reflected) in the Spirit and thus leads to its enjoyment. As the observation, reflection and consciousness of objects are transferred to Buddhi through their various modifications; in the same manner, the functions of the senses also coalesce with the functional determination of Buddhi, as the forces of the subordinate officials do with that of the master.

(183). The objector asks: If Buddhi only serves to accomplish the Spirit’s enjoyment, then no emancipation is possible.* We reply:—"It afterwards exposes the difference between Spirit and Nature."—By exposition here is meant ‘bringing about’; the construction of Antaram Visinashti, being similar to that of Odanapākam pachati.†

The objector retorts: the difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to your own saying, a caused one, must have an end in time; and thus (the Spirit could never attain to eternal Beatitude).

* For Buddhi would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

† Visinashti itself has been explained as—"expresses the difference," then the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.
We reply:—The difference has been everlasting; and the function of Buddhi lies only in exhibiting the difference to the full view of the Spirit who then recognises the fact that he himself is something distinct from the constitutionally mobile and modifiable Nature. (The distinction is not caused by Buddhi; it is as eternal as the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this it is also implied that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle and hard to be perceived.

The organs having been described, the author next describes objects, specific and non-specific:

KĀRIKĀ XXXVIII.

The five primary elements are non-specific; from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be specific (because) they are calm (soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding.

(184). The Tanmātras—sound and the rest—are subtle; and the character of calmness, &c., do not belong to these. The word Mātra denotes the capability of these elements of being enjoyed.

(185). Having thus stated the non-specific, the specific objects are described: "From these &c." From the five Tanmātras, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākāsa, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth.

(186). Objection: we grant that these are thus produced; but what about their specific character? We reply: "These are said to be specific"—Why? because "they are calm, turbulent and deluding." The first has a causal and the second a collective signification.
Among the gross elements, A'kâsa, &c., some have the attribute of Goodness predominating in them; and these accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant; others predominate in Foulness, and are turbulent, painful and fickle; the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and sluggish. These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are specific i.e., gross. The primary elements on the contrary cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be non-specific, i.e., subtle.

The sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated:

Kârika XXXIX.

Subtle (astral) bodies and such as are produced of parents, together with the gross elements, form the three sorts of specific objects. Of these the subtle bodies are everlasting, and those produced of parents are perishable.

(187). "The specific objects are of three sorts"; these three sorts are mentioned: (1) Subtle bodies (which are not visible, but are only postulated in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the sixfold Sheaths (Kôsas). Among these latter, hair, blood and flesh are produced from the mother; and the veins, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six Kôsas. Thus then we have seen that the subtle bodies form the first kind of specific objects; bodies produced of parents, the second; and the gross elements the third,—objects like the jar, &c., being included in the last.

(188). The difference between a subtle body and a body produced of parents is stated—"Subtle bodies are permanent and those produced of parents perishable," that is to say ending in (dissolving into) either liquid, ash or dirt.
The Astral body is described.

**KĀRIKĀ XL.**

The Astral Body is unconfined permanently, and migrating, invested with dispositions.

(189). When the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, for each Spirit individually, was the Astral Body. This body is unconfined, inasmuch as it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is again "permanent;"* since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final dissolution.

The Astral Body is "composed of Buddhi and the rest, down to the primary elements." That is to say, it is an aggregate—of Buddhi, Ahankāra, the eleven senses and the five primary elements; and as such it is specific, being endowed with the properties of calmness, restlessness and dullness.

(190). Objection: Let this astral body be the only body the seat of enjoyment for the Spirit:—What is the need of the gross physical body comprised of the six sheaths?

* The word niyata is differently interpreted by Nārāyana Tirtha (in his Sāṅkhya-Chandrīkā). He takes it in the sense of "restricted," i. e., an astral body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there are distinct astral bodies to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumudi. There does not seem to be any special ground for preferring either of the two, though I am more inclined to the interpretation of the Kaumudi.
We reply:—"It migrates," i. e., the astral body invariably deserts the body it has lately occupied, and again occupies another. (If it be asked) why does it do so? (we reply)—(because it is) "without enjoyment," that is to say, because the astral body by itself—without a corresponding gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoyments,—would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it migrates.

(191). Objection:—Transmigration is due to merit and demerit; and these have no connection with the Astral Body (referring as they do primarily to Buddhi, and then by reflection, to the Spirit) then how can this latter migrate?

We reply:—(because) "it is invested with dispositions:"
The dispositions are merit and demerit, wisdom and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness; endowed with these primarily is the Buddhi, with which latter again the Astral Body is connected; and as such the Astral Body becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions, just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with champaka flowers. Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should migrate.

(192). (If it is asked) why should not the Astral Body—like Nature—last even after the final dissolution? We reply (because it is) "mergent," that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature its immediate cause). The mergent character of the Astral Body is to be inferred from the fact of its being caused, (i. e., being caused, and, as such, having a beginning in time, it must have an end also).
Objection: We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to Buddhi, Ahankāra and the senses? Have done with the unwarranted postulation of an Astral Body.

We reply:

KĀRIKĀ XLI.

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, so neither does the Linga (Buddhi, &c,) subsist supportless, without a specific (body).

(193). Buddhi, &c., are called Lingā, because they are the means of cognition (Linganāt, Jnāpakāt, lingam).* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism:—between the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are aggregates of the five primary elements; like their prototypes in the ordinary physical body.

"Without specific bodies," i.e., without subtle (astral) bodies. Testifying to this assertion, we have the following (from the Mahābhārata): "Then Yama extracted from Satyavân's body, the thumb-sized body, which he had entrapped and thus subjugated." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Astral Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit could have been extracted. By Purusha in the above extract, is meant the Astral Body,—explaining the word derivatively as—that which sleeps (lies—sētē) in the body (puri).

Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration:

* Cf. The Panchikaranā-vidarana—Tattvachandrika,—where a similar explanation of the word is given.
Kārika XLII.

Formed for the sake of the Spirit’s purpose the Astral Body plays its parts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of means and consequences, and by union with the predominant power of Nature.

(194). Formed for the sake of the Spirit’s purpose the Astral Body plays like a dramatic actor by connection with the means—merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds of gross bodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a dramatic actor, occupying different stages, plays severally the parts of Parasurāma, Yuddhishtīra, Vatsarāja so does the astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of man, brute or plant.

(195). (If it is asked) Whence this capability of the Astral Body? We reply, “by union with the predominant power of Nature.” As is declared by the Puranas: “The various strange developments are due to Nature’s omnipotence.”

It has just been said, “by connection with means and consequences;” the author therefore next describes these means and consequences:

Kārika XLIII.

The essential dispositions are innate; the incidental ones, such as merit, &c., are seen (considered) to be appurtenant to the organs; the uterine germ, &c., belong to the effect.*

* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārika. In the first place, he renders Sām-siddhikāh by “transcendental”, the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly he renders Karanāsvayināh by “including cause”, though in reality the compound means “located in organs”—as explained by the Kaumudi as well as the Chandrikā.
I. Incidental dispositions.

"Essential dispositions are innate," e.g., it is declared that at the beginning of the creation the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom, dispassion and power. Incidental dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by personal effort; such merit, &c., are those belonging to Vālmiki and other Great Rishis.

The opposites of Dharma, &c., similarly explained.

II. Essential innate.

The same is to be understood with regard to demerit, ignorance, passion and weakness.

(197). The aggregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh, blood, &c., of the child in the mother's womb, is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; as are also the childhood, youth, &c., of the born man.

(198). The means and the consequences have been explained; now the respective consequences of the various means are described.

KĀRIKĀ XLIV.

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes; by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom (results) beatitude; and bondage from the reverse.

(199). "By virtue, &c.,” i.e., to the various starry spheres (the Brāhma, the Prājāpatya and so forth.)
Vice to lower.

"By vice, &c.," i.e., to the lower planes known as sutala, &c.

"From wisdom, beatitude." Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long as discriminative wisdom is not attained; when, however, this is attained, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit fulfilled, and accordingly retires from him. As is declared, "The workings of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." "From the reverse, &c.," i.e., from false knowledge, results bondage.

(200). This bondage is also of three kinds: Natural, Incidental and Personal. The natural bondage is that of those Materialists who contemplate on Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, it is laid down in the Puranas: "The contemplators of the unmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the end of which they attain to true wisdom]. The incidental bondage is of those who contemplate on the various products of Nature as Spirit,—the elements, the senses, Ahankâra and Buddhî. With regard to these it is laid down: "The contemplators of the senses continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras; those of Ahankâra, till a thousand; and lastly, those of the Buddhî having done away with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under the incidental bondage are (conventionally called) Videhas."

The personal bondage is due to Ishtâpûrta (actions done with selfish motives, such as the digging of tanks, &c., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.
From dispassion results absorption* into Prakriti; from passionate attachment, transmigration; from power, non-impediment (of desires;) and from the reverse, the contrary.

(201). "From dispassion results absorption into Prakriti."

I. Absorption into Prakriti from dispassion.

Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are absorbed into Nature. By Prakriti here are meant Prakriti, Buddhī, Akankāra, the Elements, and the senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed into these (i. e. those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202). "From passionate attachment results migration."

II. Transmigration from passionate attachment.

The epithet "passionate" implies the painful character of metempsychosis; because (as has been previously described) passion is the source of pain.

(203). "From power, non-impediment," i. e., the non-obstruction of desires. "A powerful man (Iswara) is one who can do whatever he wishes."

* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, here, and remarks: "It (the Sāṅkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free.........Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quite true; but I don't see how this affects the position of the Hindu commentators, who, at least Vāchaspāti Misra among them, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the astral body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that this resting is what, in theosophic parlance, is called "the peaceful rest enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachan."
IV. Obstruction of desires from weakness.

"From the reverse," i.e. form weakness—
"the contrary"—i.e., the frequent obstruction of desires.

With a view to describe collectively as well as individually, the eight properties of Buddhi—virtue, vice, &c., in order to show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquished, by those desiring emancipation—the author first describes them collectively:

KĀRIKĀ XLVI.

This is an intellectual creation, distinguished by Error, Disability, Contentment and Perfection. By the hostile influence of the inequalities of attributes, the different forms of this creation become fifty.

(204). Pratyaya = That by which anything is known, i.e., Buddhi. "Error," i.e., ignorance, is a property of Buddhi; so is also "disability" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs. Contentment and Perfection also are properties of Buddhi as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—error, disability and contentment,—include Virtue and the other six intellectual properties; leaving aside Wisdom which is included in Perfection.

(205). These properties are next considered individually.

The forms of these are fifty." If it is asked: Whence these fifty forms? We reply "from the hostile influence of the inequalities of the attributes." The inequality may consist either in the individual strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third. This inequality is assumed to be more or less in accordance with the requirements of particular cases; and it leads to the
suppression of Attributes by one another—thus giving rise to the fifty forms of intellectual creation.

The fifty forms are next enumerated:

Kāriκā XLVII.

There are five forms of Error; twenty-eight of Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Perfection eight.

(206). The forms* of Error are ignorance, egotism, passion, hatred and attachment to the body: respectively called, obscenity (Tamas), delusion (Moha), extreme delusion (Mahamoha), gloom (Tamisra), and utter darkness (Andhatamisra). Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error; though, as a matter of fact, they are its products. A certain object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism and the rest, partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become attached to it. It is for this reason that the revered Vārsha-ganya (Vyāsa?) declares Ignorance to be made up of the five component parts.

(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the five forms of error:—

Kāriκā XLVIII.

Of Error there are eight forms, as also of Delusion; extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also utter Darkness.

Of Ignorance— eight forms. (208). "Of Error," i.e., of Ignorance, "there are eight forms."

*Abhiniveśa—is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy. It is defined by Patanjali (Yoga Sutra 11-9) as the "tenacity of life—an attachment to the body which relates the residue of one's former life."
Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking non-spiritual Nature, *Buddhi, Ahankāra* and the subtle elements, for Spirit; and these non-spiritual things are eight in number, Error is said to be eight-fold.

(209). The " requires the eight forms to Delusion. The gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider themselves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this has the eight *Siddhis* for its object, it is said to be eight-fold.

(210). "*Extreme Delusion is ten-fold.*" By *Extreme Delusion* is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being either divine or otherwise; and hence having these for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten-fold.

(211). "*Gloom,* i.e., Hatred, " is eighteen-fold." The objects of sense, sound, &c., are ten by themselves; the eight occult powers however are not objects of sense by themselves, but only as means to the attainment of the various sensuous objects. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, their means—the Powers—too are retarded. The Powers, together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen-fold.

(212). "*So is Utter Darkness*"—[Utter *Darkness* = Attachment to life]. The word "*tathā*" refers *eighteen-fold-ness* to Utter Darkness. The gods having attained the eight occult powers and enjoying their consequences—the ten sensuous objects—live in continual fear of these being wrested from them by the Rakshasas; and this fear constitutes *Abhinivesa* or attachment; and this latter having for its object the aforesaid eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be eighteen-fold.
(213). Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divisions become sixty-two.

(214). Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability:

Kārika XLIX.

The injuries of the eleven organs, together with those of Buddhi, are pronounced to be twenty-eight forms of Disability; the injuries of Buddhi (itself) are seventeen—brought about by the reversion of contentment and perfection.

(215). The injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes of so many injuries of Buddhi, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—"Deafness, leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness, dumbness, ajighratā (failure of the sensibility of the olfactory nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and idiocy,"—consequent on the failure of the various sense-organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these are mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect.

(216). Having thus described the disabilities of Buddhi, arising from those of the sense-organs, the disabilities of Buddhi itself are next stated—"With the injuries of Buddhi." If it be asked—how many are these?—we reply, "seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi." Wherefore? "by the reversion of contentment and perfection." Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold also; and similarly perfection being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,—thus making the seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.
The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:

**Kārika L.**

Nine forms of Contentment are set forth: four internal, relating severally to nature, means, time and luck; and five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.

(218). The five internal forms of Contentment belong to those who have ascertained that Spirit is a different form Nature, but still being ill-advised, do not make further attempts in the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of discriminative wisdom; and these forms are called *internal*, because they pre-suppose the difference of Ātman and *Prakriti*. It being asked—which are these?—the reply is "relating severally to nature, means, time and luck," i.e., whose names are nature &c.

(219). The contentment called "*prakriti" consists in the satisfaction of the disciple on being told that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Prakriti and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of hankering after it by meditation, &c., and this contentment is also called Ambha.

(220). The second form of contentment arises from the following instruction: wisdom could not be attained in the ordinary course of nature; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom, because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects all individuals equally. Such wisdom could only be attained through asceticism; and so thou must follow an ascetic life and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from the above instruction is called Salila.
The third form, called "Time," or *Ogha*, is the satisfaction arising from the instruction that asceticism too cannot bring about Emancipation; for all means await the proper *Time* for bringing about their various consequences, and so when the *Time* has arrived, one's ends will be gained without undergoing the troubles of asceticism.

The fourth form called "*Luck,*, or *Vrishti*, is the satisfaction arising from the following:

"Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism, &c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck. Thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madālasā when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their mother's instructions and thereby attained beatitude.

The external forms of Contentment are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, &c.—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but take the non-spirits—Nature, &c., to be Spirit. These forms are called *external*, because they pre-suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and these come after freedom from attachment. The causes of this non-attachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be five-fold. Abstinence too is due to the preception of discrepancies in the process of sensuous enjoyment—consisting mainly of earning, saving, wasting, enjoying, killing lives and so on.

To explain:—The means of acquiring wealth, service, &c., are invariably the sources of pain to the servants—as is declared in the following:—"Who would ever be attracted towards service, considering the pain caused by the insults to be suffered at the hands of the wardens of a vain monarch?"—the content-
ment resulting from abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called Pāra.

(225). And then, the wealth being obtained, brings with it the further trouble of protecting it from the king, thieves, floods and fire—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second called Supāra.

(226). Thirdly, the wealth having been obtained and safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its being spent—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment, called Pārapāra.

(227). Fourthly, when one becomes accustomed to sensuous objects, his desires increase; the non-fulfilment of these brings about the fourth, called Anuttamāmbha.

(228). Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment (either in this world or the other), without the cruel process of killing animals, and contentment due to the abstinence arising from the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth called Uttamāmbha.

Thus the four external forms of contentment, together with the five internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229). The author next describes the primary and secondary divisions of Power:

KĀRIKĀ LI.

The eight Powers (i.e., means of acquiring them) are reasoning, oral instruction, study, three-fold suppression of pain, acquisition of friends, and purity. The three before mentioned (Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).
The chief among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain—three-fold on account of the three-foldness of the pains to be suppressed.

The other means mentioned, being means to power only through the three-fold suppression of pain, are called secondary. And these five are both causes and effects. Of these study is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression of pain) being only effects; the rest are both cause and effect.

The first, study, named Tāra, consists in comprehending the sense of the psychological sciences by listening to the teachings of a qualified teacher.

The effect of this last, oral instruction, implies the comprehension of the meaning of instructions, it being a useful habit with writers, to imply the effect by the cause; this constitutes the second Siddhi called Sutāra.

Reasoning consists in the investigation of the meaning of scripture by a process of dialectics not contrary to the scriptures themselves. This investigation consists in strengthening the portion of the scripture by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it; this process is also called meditation by writers on the Vedas, and the Power due to this is called Tārātāra.

The fourth is the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at truth by the right process of reasoning yet he has no faith in his conclusions until he has talked them over with his teacher and follow-students. Hence the acquisition of a qualified teacher and follow-students is said to be the fourth Siddhi called Rāmyaka.

By dāna here is meant purity (of discriminative wisdom)—deriving the word from the root Daip* = to purify. As is declared by the

* Davies remarks that the root is "coined for the occasion." But I may refer the reader to the Siddhānta-Kaumudi, under the Sutra Vānyasya Sānyogadēḥ (VI/4/68).
revered Patanjali: "An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain." (Yoga-Sutra II.1-26). By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, 'after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires'. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom attained). Thus the word dāna includes (as a means to power) Practice also. This is the fifth, called Sadā-Mudita.

(236). The three primary means to Power are called, Pramoda Mudita and Modamana. And these three with the last five are the eight (means to) Power.

(237). Others explain the distich thus: The perception of truth without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of instructions received in past births is what is meant by áha. And that which is obtained by listening to the tenets of the Sāńkhya Philosophy as learnt by others, is the second called Sābda, because it follows merely from the study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher's, in the company of follow-students, it is said to be the third, known as study, because it is brought about by study. The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, generosity is said to be a means to wisdom, because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāńkhya Philosophy.

(238). The Disabilities of Buddhi arising from the reversion of Contentment and Power thus become seventeen in number. Of the different portions of intellectual creation, it is well-known that Power is most desired by all. So the author next mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments
to Power: "The aforesaid three are checks to Power." The aforesaid three refers to Error, Disability and Contentment. And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power, because they retard their progress; and thus being opposed to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable.

(239). Objection:—Granted all this. But it has been laid down that the creation is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the intellectual creation alone; or by the elemental alone. Why have both?

The reply is:—

**KÂRIKÂ LII.**

Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there would be no development of dispositions. Wherefore proceeds a two-fold creation, the personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and intellectual.

(240). Linga denotes the creation composed of the primary elements; and disposition, the intellectual.

The meaning of the Kârikâ is that the elemental creation cannot manifest itself for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, without the intellectual creation; nor conversely is the latter capable of having its complete manifestation without the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation.

Again experience, the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible in the absence of the two bodies and the object of sense. Hence the necessity of the elemental creation. And conversely the means of experience—the sense-organs—could never be complete without the three internal organs—Manas Ahankâra and Buddhi. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative
wisdom—the only means to emancipation, would not be possible without the above two kinds of creation. Whence the necessity of the double creation.

(241). The possible objection of reciprocal causality is explained away as being similar to that of the seed and the sprout, due to the fact of the creation having had no beginning in time (being eternal), and the creation of bodies and dispositions at the beginning of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.

(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation having been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the elemental creation:

KĀRIKĀ LIII.

The divine class has eight varieties, the lower animals, five; mankind is single in its class; thus briefly is the world of living beings.

(243). The eight divine varieties are the Brāhma, the Pājāpatya, the Aindra, the Paitra, the Gāndharva, Yāksha, the Rākshasa and the Paisâcha.

(244): The five varieties of lower animals are quadrupeds five of the lower animals. (other than deer), deer, birds, creeping things and the immovable (trees, &c.)

(245). Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions—Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily formation is the same in all classes of men.
(246). The author next lays down the three-foldness of the elemental creation based on the excess or otherwise of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle and the lower:

KÂRIKÂ LIV.

Among the beings of the higher plane Goodness predominates: among those of the lower predominates Dulness; in the middle reside those predominating in Foulness—these constituting the whole Universe, from Brahmâ to the tuft of grass.

(247). The Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Swah, Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya—predominate in Goodness. Those consisting of the lower animals and trees, &c., are characterised by Dulness. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvipas (or continents) and Oceans—predominate in Foulness, inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions, righteous or otherwise.

The whole of the Universe is summed up in the phrase "from Brahmâ to the tuft of grass."

(248). Having thus described the creation, the author next describes its productiveness of pain, that would lead to dispassion, one of the means to Emancipation:

KÂRIKÂ LV.

There (in the world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its person (until the dissolution of the astral body); wherefore pain is natural.
Among corporeal beings there are many varieties of experience interspersed with pleasure and pain; yet the pain of decay and death is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—"may I not cease to be; may I continue to be" &c.—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect, and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

(249). Objection:—Pleasure and pain are the properties of Buddhi; and as such how can these be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply:—(the name) "Purusha," literally meaning "One who sleeps in the astral body"; and this latter being connected with Buddhi and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them.

(250). Question:—How can pain related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

"Reply:—"Due to the non-discrimination of Spirit from the body." The Spirit, not alive to its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. The आ in आविनिल्लेन: may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pain—the meaning being, "Until the body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain."

(251). The author next decides the question of the Maker of the Universe:

KĀRIKĀ LVI.

This creation from Buddhi down to the specific elements, is brought about by the modifications of Prakriti. The work is done for the emancipation of each

* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain, it is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.
Spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

(252). The creation is brought about by Nature; it is neither produced by a God, nor is it an evolution from Brahman; nor can it be said to be Uncaused; since, in this latter case, the Universe would be either an eternal entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity). It cannot be said to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedânta view), for there can be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahman, as postulated by Vedânta. Nor, again can creation be said to be brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God; for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to manipulate his tools.

(253). Objection:—Granted that the creation is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active and, as such, her operations should never cease; and hence there would be no emancipation of any Spirit.

Reply:—"The creation appearing as if it were for Nature's own sake, is really for the sake of another." A cook, having finished the cooking, retires from the work; similarly Nature being urged to action for the emancipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation; and thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible).

(254). Objection:—Granted all this. But it is only something sentient that can act towards the fulfilment of its own or of another's purpose; and Nature being insentient cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient supervisor (over her blind force);
the Spirit residing in the body cannot be such a supervisor, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other sentient agent, superintending \textit{ab extra} the operations of Nature—and to this we give the name \textit{God}.

\textit{We reply:—}

\underline{K\textsc{\textregistered}ri\textsc{\textregistered}k\textsc{\textregistered}a LVII.}

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature operate towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

\textit{(255).} It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends, \textit{e.g.}, the action of milk towards the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

\textit{(255a).} It would not be right to urge that the production of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action cannot afford a case parallel to the action of insentient Nature;—because all actions of an intelligent agent are due either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which, therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of an intelligent agent. For God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such, without pain, for the removal of which God's compassion would be moved. And if the pain subsequent to creation were said to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality: the creation due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none
but happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then what is the necessity of postulating a supervisor? And if you urge the incapability of mere Karma—an unintelligent agent—without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply, that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being produced by Karma, we may very easily say the same with regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &c., will have to be attributed to God also).

(256). The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due neither to selfishness nor to mere pity; and thus in this case, none of the above faults are applicable. The only motive of Nature is the purpose of the Spirit. Thus therefore the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

(257). It has been said—"as if for its own purpose." The author explains this:

KĀRIKĀ LVIII.

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does the Unmanifested Principle (Nature) act for the emancipation of the Spirit. Desire is satisfied on the attainment of the desired object which is the purpose of the agent; because an end of action is only that which is desired.

The similarity is pointed out: "So does the Unmanifested Principle act for the Emancipation of Spirit."

(258). Objection:—We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive to the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?

We reply:
KARIKA LIX.

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit.

The word "stage,"—the place—implies the spectators,—the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself i. e., her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from the Spirit.

(259). Objection:—We grant the action of Nature for the Spirit's purpose. But she is sure to get some compensation for her pains from the Spirit—just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the motive of Nature cannot be said to be purely altruistic.

We reply:—

KARIKA LX.

Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established.

(260). Objection:—We grant all this: But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it
again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to Spirit.

We reply:

KĀRIKĀ LXI.

Nothing is more modest than Nature: such is my opinion. Once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

By modesty here is meant delicacy (of manners), the inability to suffer exposure to the Purusha's view. As a well-bred lady unvisible to the Sun, with her eyes cast down, having her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show herself again.

(261). Objection:—Let this be so. But Purusha, being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipation possible? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible to the unmodifying Purusha. And as the Purusha is devoid of action it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for death. Hence it is a meaningless assertion that the creation is for the purpose of Purusha.

The author meets the above objection by accepting it:

KĀRIKĀ LXII.

Verily no Spirit is bound, or is emancipated, or migrates; it is Nature alone which has many receptacles, that is bound, or is released, or migrates.

(262). No Spirit is bound; not any migrates; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily...
forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers; because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—gain or loss—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and release, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection above urged loses all its force.

(263). Objection:—We understand that bondage, migration and release, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature?

We reply:

KĀRIKĀ LXIII.

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit, by means of one form.

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms" (i.e. dispositions) all the properties of Buddhi, save discriminative wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by herself, by means of one form, viz., discriminative wisdom. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of the same Spirit.

Objection:—We grant all this. What then?

KĀRIKĀ LXIV.

Thus it is that by the practice of truth, wisdom is attained, which is complete, incontrovertible, (and hence) pure, and absolute: (by means of which the idea is obtained that) "I am not, naught is mine, and I do not exist."
(264). The word "truth" indicates the knowledge thereof.

By means of practice of truth, in the manner described above, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition thereof. It is for this reason of its leading to truth that the knowledge is called pure.

(265). Why pure? Because "incontrovertible" (or unmistakable). Doubt and error are the two impurities of knowledge; and the above knowledge being free from these is said to be pure. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be undecided; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by saying, "hence incontrovertible" the absence of both doubt and contradiction is implied; this absence being due also to the fact of the exercise belonging to truth.

(266). Objection:—We grant all this, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of metempsychosis, of which thus there would be no end.

In reply to the above, it is declared "Absolute," i.e., unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of removal by means of true wisdom, though this has a beginning in time. For partiality towards truth is natural to Buddhī, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas): "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge of) the character of objects, for such is the partiality of Buddhi."

(267). The form of the cognition is stated:—I am not, naught is mine, and I do not exist. 'I am not' merely precludes the possibility of action from the Spirit. As is declared
(by grammarians), "The root As together with Bhu and Kri signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal, determination, self-consciousness, reflection, observation, &c., are all precluded from the Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that "I am not." "I" here implies agency, such as in "I give," "I eat," &c.; and no such agency can belong to the Spirit, who is without any action. And from this follows the idea that "naught is mine." For it is only an agent that can have any possession; and hence the preclusion of action implies that of possession as well.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I do not exist," means that "I am the Spirit, not productive;" and because non-productive "I have no action" —‘I am not’; and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

(268). Objection:—Even after such a knowledge, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to re-birth.

We reply:—"It is complete," i.e., there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above. Hence there is no re-birth.

(269). Question:—What is accomplished by this knowledge of truth?

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXV.

Possessed of this knowledge, Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at leisure and at ease, beholds Nature, which has now reverted from the seven forms (to her primitive state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the force of true wisdom.

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun action were experience and the perception of truth; and
when these two have been accomplished there is nothing left to be done, and hence Nature ceases from prolific activity.

"Under the force (of true wisdom)." The seven forms—Virtue, &c.—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispersion, too, of those who have it through mere contentment, is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its contradictory—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects, the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these Nature desists.

"At ease," i.e., Inactive; "Pure" i.e., Unmixed with the impurities of Buddhī, due to the Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the Attribute of Goodness; or else no (perception, and hence no) wisdom would be possible.

(270). Objection:—Let this be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature desisting from productions. But the production has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Matter); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and objectivity of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; and you cannot urge that they cease, because there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is possible).

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXVI.

"She has been seen by me," says the one and so retires; "I have been seen," says the other, and ceases to act. Hence though there is still their conjunction, it affords no motive towards further creation.
(271). So long as nature has not manifested truth, she may bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. For experience is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense—the modifications of Nature—to belong to himself. And discriminative wisdom also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken by the Spirit to belong to himself. When however such wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot accept any purpose as his own. And further, experience and emancipation being the purpose of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the Spirit, they cease to be motives also. With this view it is declared—"There is no motive, &c." A motive is that which moves Nature to act towards creation; and this is not possible, when there is no purpose of the Spirit.

(272). Objection:—We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of Karma—then we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (i.e., by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation. And hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Spirit"

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.
becomes meaningless. And the hope too—that emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of \textit{Karma}, by means of experience extending to a limitless period of time—is too sanguine ever to be realised.

To this we reply:

\textbf{K\textit{\text{\textsc{a}}}R\textit{\text{\textsc{k}a}} LXVII.}

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with body, as a potter's wheel continues to revolve by the force of the impulse previously imparted to it.

(273). The unlimited residua of \textit{Karma} also having their prolificness destroyed by the force of true knowledge, they do not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce sprouts only on the ground of \textit{Buddhi}, damp with the waters of pain. The ground, however, becomes barren by having its dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom, and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experience. With this view it is said—"\textit{Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy.}"

Even when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse; just as even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, the impulse having exhausted itself it stops. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced, as is declared by \textit{S}ruti—"Other (actions) having been destroyed by itself experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [\textit{Chh\text{\text{\textsc{a}}}ndogya} VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or impression) is a peculiar one, in which all illusion has been destroyed; and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body.
(274). Question:—Let this be so: if the Spirit remains invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his final release?

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXVIII.

When the separation of the informed Spirit from his corporeal frame at length takes place, and Nature ceases to act in respect to it, then is final and absolute emancipation accomplished.

The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute and eternal cessation of the triad of pain.

(275). Though the doctrine has been proved by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Rishi is stated:

KĀRIKĀ LXIX.

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the emancipation of the Spirit, wherein the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Rishi.

"Abstruse," i. e., hard to be grasped by dull-brained people.

"By the great Rishi" i. e., by Kapila.

The feeling of reverence thus roused is strengthened by basing the doctrines on the Veda: "Wherein are considered, &c.," i. e., in which knowledge (i. e., for the sake of which knowledge).* These, origin &c., are also considered in the Veda.

* As in Charmani dvipinam hanti.
(276). Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great Rishi (Kapila); wherefore should we pay attention to the assertions made by Isvārakrishna?

We reply:

KĀRIKĀ 'LXX—LXXI.

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted to Āsuri, who taught it to Panchasikha, by whom the science was extensively propagated.

Handed down by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Āryā metre by the noble-minded Isvārakrishna who has thoroughly investigated the truth.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all sins, the cause of the triad of pain.

'Supreme, i. e., chief among all purifying doctrines.

(277). "Ārya = that which has arrived at truth; one whose intellect is such is called Āryamati."

(278). This science is a whole in itself,—not a mere section—because it treats of all branches of knowledge:

KĀRIKĀ LXXII.

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete science comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversies.

The sixty topics are thus laid down in the Rāja-Vārtika:
1. The existence of Prakṛti (Kārikā XIV);
2. Its singleness (XIV);
3. Objectiveness (XI);
4. Distinctiveness (of Spirit from Matter) (XI);
5. Subserviency (of Matter to Spirit) (XVII);
6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit, from Matter in the end) (XX); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Relation of subserviency (of Matter with Spirit) (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX); these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of error (XLVII), nine of contentment (L), and twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX); these, together with the eight sorts of power (LI), make up the sixty "topics." All these sixty topics are treated of in the above seventy distiches, which therefore form a complete science and cannot be said to be only a portion thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories), singleness, objectivity, and subordination relate to Nature; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit; and existence, disjunction, and conjunction to both; and existence of the relation of subserviency relates to gross bodies also.

May this work of Vâchaspâti Miśra, the Tattva-Kaumûdi (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men!

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumûdi of Vâchaspâti Miśra.
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श्री:
तत्त्वकोमुदी
( साधृङ्गः )

निलिपत्तपरतन्त्रपति-द्रामशदर्शनदिककाकु-
मैथिलवर्ये-श्रीमद्राचार्यपत्मसूत्रता

काचैतकटिपणसहिता

मिलितसम्बन्धनभूतपरिवर्यक्षोपनामकश्रीमतीथीनाथशर्मनतूवजनमना
मध्यमन "मास्टर आफु आर्ट्स" इत्युपाध्याये दरभंगा-
राजकीयसरकारसदनाध्यक्षणे झूपनामकेन श्रीमद्र-
गजनाथशर्मना मैथिलेन संसङ्कल्पता।

मुम्बईनगरनिवासी-विधासिकक-
श्रीमचकरामरता-त्याद्विशेषेन प्रकाशिता

तत्त्वकथ "तत्त्वविचक" नाथे मुद्रणयंत्रात्ये मुद्रिता च।

१८९६।
মূমিকা

মিক্ষিতন্ত্রাপরবিদিত্তমশ: শ্রীমান্ব বচ্ছস্তিমিত্র: কথা কনেশপারবতায় রতি সম্প্রয়োজ্যস্তবৃত্তশ: শক্তিতে। কিন্তু নিবিধপ্রায়নি সম্বল্প্রবিদ্ম যদ্যং বিহিত-প্রণীত: বিলাঙ্গীরসহস্রমর্মচতুর্দশ: প্রবেশ মিলিয়শকন্তামুহলাচ্ছিবমার্গীত: যতোষ্মৃ তাল্লোকীত্যািতি পরিপ্রবর্তনাত্মক ব্যায়া শ্রীমদুর্দৃষ্টচর্যকাগুল্যচারীতি বীরপিতী। অন্যিন্ত্র প্রকাশকে প্রকাশকালাক্ষিণরূপে ভাষীথাগত গোবিন্দারাজকৃতের শিক্ষানিবিশেষভিত্তিতে। যতু “ক্ষণনর্মরাধিকানুত: শ্রীহর্ষ-দ্রুয়ম্বীচীনি” ইতি তারানাথনাথকারীচর্যযতযতমধিতিস্তিতি। ততু: ক্ষণননৈর্জারুদ্যনক্তকারিকানাথানী চিন্তামণ্ডকৃতকৃত্তাননী ক্ষণন্ত হখাত: ক্ষুদ্রমস্ত। ইতি নাতি চ বাচ্যস্তিগৃহস্থঃ দীক্ষা বিনামতি গৃহীতে, গৃহেশ্বরপি দীক্ষাকার। ইতি যত্বিতে প্রাপ্ততি আত্মানুসারে বহুন্ত মাত্রবহুল যেনতানুসারে মাত্রবহুল করীতায়। তত্বাচর্য প্রাপ্তনীতানুসারে বহুন্ত মাত্রবহুল আত্মানুসারে মাত্রবহুল করীতায়।

যদযুগ মহান্ত মেধিতাবাদান ইতি নিবিষ্টতমায়। অথষুপি মেধিতাযায় মামা” (মামাই) নানা নগরী, তত্ত্ব চ মামিনীমাঠ: পুরাতনো নরমায় বৰ্তিত। ইত্যাদিকোনিনিকাষ্টিত্রশকাচর্যকালীনমেধিতামুহলাচ্ছিবমার্গীতানিবিশেষভিত্তিতে। নেপালপ্রাক্তন আসানিদ্রি প্রাচীনপ্রাক্তনাধিকারের মিহিতমুভাগ্নীতে। কৃত্তিত্য নন্দৰাহন ইতি সুস্তিস্বেদো। ততুঃ। “শ্রীমণ্ডলকারিত্য যথানিয়ম নিবন্ধ” ইতি মাত্রাপ্রশস্তারোকারি ইতি চলেছে। অপর্যাপ্ত হতাপ্ত মেধিতে স্বাক্তা নুর্মূলাকারি গৌতমো মেধিত: ন্যায়বাচকারী উদ্ধারকারীয়েরা মেধিত:। বার্ততারাপরিপূর্ণিন্ত্রাকারী উদ্ধারো মেধিত:। অতস্তথ্যসাহস্তায় কর্তা দেশান্তরী-যোজনকুটুম্বীত ইতি সংযোগপ্রশস্তারোকারী ন শক্তিত। ইতি পশ্চিমানুষাবালাহাতত্ত্বেন। মমীটি নিবিষ্টতঃ সুপ্রস্তাপের স্বদৃষ্টী। অপর্যাপ্ত—

‘শুভ্রাদচারীপ্লো সাহরী শুভ্রাদশীস্বাগ্নি এত।’

ক্ষুধাপ্রতিপাধীরুদ্রোভিত্ত: পুন: কাপি ইতি মেধিতায় স্বভীষিতিবিদ্যান- সম্ভোগনী গৌরবোক্তিতর বাচ্যপুরন্যাযতত্ত্বার্থনায়কৃতী প্রকাশমাহি।

“ তথা চ মেধিতাযায় সিমোনরাকিংতমানুসারে গতবাস্তুতিদায়ায় শ্রীকঃ কঃ মুদুবিশিষ্টবিবর্তন্ত্রনুসারে চন্দ্রনাথদায়ায় সত্যদেশিয়ের সিদ্ধান্তে সুনিশ্চিত বিষয়মাত্র। স্নাতকোত্তর সত্য উপাসনায় করিয়াছিলে শ্রীনাম- ন্যায়োপদেশের নিয়মে বাস্তুম।”
वर्तमानंत्रापि साहित्यप्रवचनमात्र—साहित्यचन्द्रिका—साहित्यसाराधिकृत्वा नाना-विवाहसाहित्यशास्त्रके कौशिके पठनपाठनाधिकृ पत्रकौशिकीय रेतेआदीये विहेद्यरित्व सुम-चितमेव। यतं शब्दार्थ गामिनीपंक्त्योत्कस्तव रमणीयतयात्वच वाच परस्परकार-स्वर्णशास्त्रकेचतुनाममधिमेवभूतम्। अतो बहुतो मुद्रितेचतरिने ग्रन्थ-रतन नेवः परितुष्य महाशया इति पुनरः मुद्रितेचतुरुधुका सुभाषंगरस्तुकराम-तात्यामहाशया: काशीस्थिरिविविधायसरस्वातृभूमिम्योचनतिदसासमहायाद्वारा मन्ये-व संस्कृतयानेवभारादप्रत्वतन्। तदाधिकारि न मया तिर्कानी मुद्रितानी च पुढळने। किन्तु नयन्स्य प्रवचनसाहित्यलक्ष्मीय पाठमेणे नेवोपवेत्। यथापि तत्त्वार्थार्थी मेधावीति अपूर्ववाचस्यादिनेति वाचस्यादिष्टी मयादिक वेव अवस्थाने। किन्तु ग्रन्थायाद्वारे धनकार्याचिनितैर्योग्यनादिकृत, यथामात्र प्रदर्शितम्, अयथा च समुचिततेषु भास्करया विदुर्य हुदेव म्रभागम्, इत्यतो च पालितेन॥

अयथा च महायोगी तथा: स्वयंमेव विद्वान् सामाय उपसागरोष्ट्रिके—

“यथायकाणिका। (१)—तत्त्वसम्भवा। (२)—तत्त्वनिद्धिभि। (३)—यथायाम। (४)—साहित्य। (५)—योगाचर्या। (६)—वेदान्तानां। (७)—विध्वद्धाने।”

इत्यादिना॥ तत्र (१) यायकाणिकानी मण्डलभागकृतिविधिविवक्षयोग्यानुसार संबंधिते सत्मामित्यातिथियाशयनाभावे मुद्रितम्॥ (२) तत्त्व-सम्भवा नैवास्मद्धिगीतरीकृत। (३) तत्त्वनिद्धि—मुद्रितोपयुक्तो विषय रसिकांजोऽविवर्तक-कार्यमित्याय-नामकृत्यात्यायप्रभावितम्। (४) नयानवतितलयक-प्रदायी, उपयोगकर्तिनयायाविक्षययावहयोमुद्रितपक्वरोद्योगम् काशाचार्य-विन्यासारस्त्रलय्ययसंस्कृतविंतोलाके: स्त्रीपुत्र—वेनिसाम्राहयाय:॥ (५) साहित्यविद्वान्तकौमुदी॥ (६) तत्त्वदाशार्थी, योगाचर्याकार्यापि बहुतो मुद्रिताः॥ (७) मातमै: शाश्वतार्थीलक्ष्याकर्मिका—मुद्रितेमेश्यातिसाहसराय-स्थिभवमाजेन॥

काशीश्चिरिविविधानवथापितसंस्कृतविविधायायायायकप्रसिद्धिभर्मधुरधितिश्चतुज्ञानम्। अन्यन्तरम् द्विभूषणादिपु तद्विन्द्वकारारमबममेव। तथा च शीघ्राचार्य प्रमुद्दमिवेण्य आयुकार्याचरणवित्तेन ब्रूहृपक्तिशिष्य। (८) उपस्थितयो मुद्रिताने स्वचकाय विद्वान् विचिन्ताय वष्णुसुप्रविधये: भास्करीचार्याने, सम-भवनु च न: निर्मद्य मुक्तानिश्चिप्रेणादि मुद्रार्थेषये॥

दर्माराजकीयः

मित्रायुमण्डनसूपतितत्त्विवर्य

सरस्वतीसुदे।

श्रीपणामकसीमामतीर्यात्यासंस्कृतम् मध्यमः

१ जुलाई १८९६।

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तत्त्वकोमुदी.
(साहित्य)

(१) महाभारतम्
भजामेकां चोहितशुक्रक्षणां वहिः प्रजा: सूज्मानां नमाम: ।
अजा ये तां जुप्माणां मञ्जने जहैनेन मुक्तमोगां नुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥
कपिलाय महामुनये मुनयेश्वरायात्त्व सांस्कृतिक् ।
पञ्चशिक्षाय तेनश्रवक्षणायेतानामस्मां: ॥ २ ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपितसिद्धः प्रतिपदनु प्रतिपादाधिता सवर्धेयवचनो
भवति प्रेक्षावत्तम्। अप्रतिपितसिद्धः तु प्रतिप- ।
पदनु ‘नावं लोकिको नापि परीक्षक’ इति
प्रेक्षाविद्रु-मतवदुपक्षेत्र। स चैव दिने प्रतिपि- ।
सिद्धि कठो यो ज्ञात: सनं परमपुरुषार्थं कल्पते। इति प्रारंभित- ।
ताश्रविष्ययबासाय परमपुरुषार्थसाधनेनुवालतु तद्वियाश्रासामव- ।

dुःखन्यासिद्धाताज्ञासाय तदपि दत्तके हेतु ।
हेत्ये सा सपार्थि चेतीकान्तास्यन्तो स्मारणान्ते ॥ १ ॥

“दुःख-” इति। एवं हि शाश्वविषयो न जिज्ञासेत, यदि दुःख नाम
जगति न स्थात, सदा न जिज्ञासितम, जिज्ञा- ।
(३) शाश्वविष्यकवि (खण्डः आवश्यकतवस्थेन्)

dुःख देभा, दुःख निजवाल, दुःखदेहो- ।
पायापरिज्ञानादा)। शाश्वसमुचचिद्वेदवापी च शाश्वविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यनुपा- ।
यमूतवादा, सुकर्मोपायस्वतस्य सदावादा ॥
तत्त्र न तावेहःखास्ति नायनिजहासितिमित्तुत्कम्—“दुःखत्रयामिवचारात्” इति। दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम्। दुःखुतुल्लग्नयामानं, तदस्तिल्लग्नहाणं च॥।

तत्राध्यामिकम् दिविचयम्, शारीरिं भानसं च।
शारीरं वातपित्वेश्यां वेष्यानिर्मितम्, मानसं कामकोध्वलोभमोहवैष्णवीय-विपादविपातिशेषोपार्थसर्वत्रनितन्त्रितम्। सर्वत्थोतित्वदारोपायास्यवल्लादाध्यामिकं दुःखम्। वाहोपायसयुं दृश्यं देशा, वायाधीनितकम्, वायाधीविकहः।

तत्राधिभौतिकं मानवपशुमूण्डपपवस्त्रार्चवनिनितत्तम्। आयातीविकं तु यक्षराविविन्यनक्रहवातेवविनितन्त्रितम्।

तदेतत् प्रायात्मेवदनीयं दुःख्यं रजः परणाममेऽदो न शक्यते प्रायात्म्यादुम्। तदनेन दुःखत्रयं नान्तिका चतनात: प्रतिकृतवेदनियतया सभिसम्बन्धो बिमिधात इति।

एति च स त्रिन्तिरूपेः दुःखम्, तथापि तदमिभव: शक्य: कर्तुमन्त्रपरिशाशुपदाप्रयत्न्ये।

तस्मादुपप्पम्, “तदपवतःकेहेतु” इति। तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अपवातकः तदपवातः: उर्फांस्नेन्त्रापि बुद्ध्या सतीभवत्स्य ‘तेदा’ परमर्षे।

अपवातकक्ष हेतु: शार्धाप्रतिपादो, नायन इथायशः॥।

अत्र श्रद्धृतं—“ह्येत सा उपाध्येच्छतु” इति। अयमस्य:। अस्तु ताति॥।

(५) दुःखत्रयस्य उपाध्ययस्य सच सुचि शार्धविलयक-जिग्रास्या वैण्यायपितं॥।

दुःखत्रयम्, जिग्रासितन्ति च तदर्भुव, मर्वतु च तच्छक्षाहनम्, सहतं च शार्धगम्य उपायस्यमु-चेतुतुम्।

तथा दुःखत्रयान्त: जिग्रासा न युक्ता,

दुःखत्रयान्त: सुक्रस्य विद्यामानवात, तत्वज्ञानस्य तु अनेकामाण्याण्यासप्तायासात् सतिनूक्षरतवात्।

तथा च खोङका-नामामाणकः।

‘अः चेनम्मु विनित किमत्थव परवते त्रेजैतु।’

इद्द्वार्थस्य संस्कृत्को चिदानु यत्नात्मचेरेऽ।’ इति।

सपासलोकवक्षत्र॥। सपास्तथत्वदेन॥।
शास्त्रिनिश्चायाः शतश: शारीरिकार्योपकरण स्वप्नां वैर- 
रुपदिः। मानस्यापि सन्तापस्य प्रतिकाराय मनोज्ञानोपायमे 
विनिपेत्या। ज्ञानविद्यालेखनादिविश्वस्मातरिपुराणारुप: सुकरं। एवविद्वातार्थिक्षापि 
ध्वस्त्य नैतिशार्याच्छायासकृतिकार्यस्यस्यार्थायुवायस्यानादिद: प्रतिकारेहे-
तुचिकरकं। तथा श्रीदेविकर्ष्टापि मणिमन्त्रोपकर्ष्यायुपयोग: सुकरं। 
प्रतिकारोपय इति।

निराकरेऽति — "न" इति। कृत्? "एकान्तायन्ततो सभाबादु"।

(६) वैध्यापतिप्रतिनिधि- 
कारणम्-परिवर्तितोपयेऽ- 
भ्य आत्मात्मिकानिक- 
ध्वस्त्य नैतिशार्याच्छायासकृति 
कार्यस्यालेखनात्मकं। निवृत- 
निरपूर्वापि पुनरूपकार्यमेतः अनात्मिकानिकम्। निवृत- 
निरृपव्यायायाहं कार्यस्यालेखनात्मकं। इति सुकरोर्धिपि एकान्त- 
कार्यस्यालेखनानुकार्येऽधु उपाय इति ना उपार्यी जिन्तासैः 
एततुथा शिक्षणम्। यथाविधिप्रस्तावनातिकानिकनीतिशार्याच्छायास 
स्वस्यालेखनादेऽकारणं। निवृत्तायायायायाहं कार्यस्यालेखनात्मकम्। निवृत- 
निरपूर्वापि पुनरूपकार्यमेतः अनात्मिकानिकम्। इति 
वच्चिरे धुममकृत्याम्। तथा धुममक्ते तपरिहारायण- 
विभए तद्वायानो महज्ज्वेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ 
तत्कार्यसंभविति।

(७) धुममकृत्यात्मिकानिक- 
निरपूर्वापि पुनरूपकार्यमेतः अनात्मिकानिकम्। इति 
वच्चिरे धुममकृत्याम्। तथा धुममक्ते तपरिहारायण- 
विभए तद्वायानो महज्ज्वेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ 
तत्कार्यसंभविति।

स्थायादेतुः। मा सूक्ष्म उपयोः। वैदिकस्तु क्योऽतिरिहोधिपि: संक्ष- 
पर्यन्त: कर्मकालप्रतिप्रथमकार्यस्यालेखनात्मकम्। 

(८) वैदिकस्तु धुममकृत्यात्मिकानिक- 
निरपूर्वापि पुनरूपकार्यमेतः अनात्मिकानिकम्। 
निवृत्तायायायाहं कार्यस्यालेखनात्मकम्। इति 
वच्चिरे। "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इति। 

स्वर्गीयी —

१ एतत् (व्यक्ष्यमायुः शाहक्षिकम्) स्वतः — इति प्रथ्याप्यति। अथवा, परंतु (भव- 
लोकम्) स्वतः (भवत्), सौकुट्तरममानिर्मिति शास्त्रादौ। उम्यथा। इति व्यतिते। विभी- 
वस्त्र साधवाय।
"यत्र दुःखेन समभिं न च प्रस्तमनन्तरस्।
अभिलापोपनीतं च ततू सुकं स्वःपदास्तमि।" इति।

[ तन्त्रवार्तिकम्]
दुःखेन तमोसु तुर्कोपालमयः सर्गः। स च त्राशक्या समूत्तात्मपहिति
दुःखम्। न चैषप क्षयि। तथा हि श्रूयते—“अपाम सोमसमृता अमूम्”
इति [ अथर्वशिरस् १।] तत्स्थे कुतो द्यामृतवस्मवः। तस्मात्स्निदिक्ष्योपायस्य
तापनयप्रतीकारहतेौधुर्दैयमधारात्रासास्यवसन्तवर्तवर्तीयस्यानेकः
जन्मपूर्णियासास्यपदानीति। विवेकनादतुः इत्यकमत्वना पुनरपि व्याख्या
जित्सा स इत्यादिकाहः—

हर्षवदासायकः, स ईविगुद्गुर्यात्वातितिशयुकः।
तत्तिपरित: ायानु, व्यक्तायकशिवानात्। ॥ २ ॥

“दृष्ट्”—इति। गुरुपाठादुप्प्रूयते इत्यनुद्रो वेदः। पदुदों भवति—“श्रूयत
एव परं न केनापि किषत’ इति। तत्र भव अनु-साधनां द्वीकशिष्यसह तुल्य-
स्यम्।। (१) बादिकानामपुपायानां द्वीकपिशसह तुल्य-
श्रविकः, तत्र प्रायो ग्राम इति यावट। अनुश्रविको
षपि कर्मक्षणां धृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकानितकाराने
स्तिकदु:सत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायस्यायत्वार तुल्यत्वारान्। यथापि च “अनु-
श्रविक” इति सामान्याभिषायार, तथापि कर्मक्षणाराम्येन दृष्टमुम्,
विवेकनात्मश्चिष्यात्मश्रविक्वारान्। तथा च श्रूयते—“आलम्बा वा वे
ज्ञातव्य: प्रकृततो विवेकनं’’ [ बृहदारण्यकः], “न स पुनरावर्तते न
स पुनरावर्तते” [ छान्दोम्य] इति।।

अस्यं प्रतिविधायां हैतुमाह—“स ईविगुद्गुर्यात्वातितियुकः” इति। “अवि-
शुद्धि” सोमादियागास्य श्रुभीजातिवससाधनानां।
यथा स्श दस मम भगवानु पथ्यशिष्माचार्यः—“श्च
युकलः तुल्यस्।। (१०) द्वीकादिकयोरूपं
योः ओबिगुद्गुर्यात्वात्सा
यथा स्श सम भगवानु पश्याशिष्माचार्यः—“श्च
लपसकुरः सत्यापितः सद्यवस्यम्” इति। “स्व-
लपसकुरः” ज्योतिषोपदानमणः प्राध्यापूर्वे स्वल्पन श्रुधिसादिजनना
उन्नयनित्वाद स्पर्शस कर्त: | 'सपरिहार:' किया दस प्रायःस्थिति परियुस्तः प्रश्नः | अथ च प्रमाणः प्रायःस्थिति मापि नामरिः, प्रधानकमोपास्यस्य स पड़ेते | तथा दस युक्तद्वारनर्थ सृजने तातुः प्रलेपमणि (सवहीत्वाय) सह वर्तत इति "सवप्रमणर्वः:" | मृणा हि पुरुषस्मारारोपनीलस्तवंकुर्ममहादावगाहिनः; कुशां: पाप-मानोपसारितां दु:खमेकर्षणिकम्।

न च—"मा हिस्यात् सर्वो भूतानि" इति सामान्यःशास्त्रं विशेषः।
(11) यात्रिककहिताया शास्त्रेण "अधिकोमयिं पशुमालमेत्" इत्यनेन अप्यन्येहेतुतस्वादनम्। वाच्यः—इति युक्तः, विरोधाभावः। विरोधः हि वलियसा दर्बर्तः वाच्यः। न चेहार्ति कश्चिद्रिहः, भिन्नविपयवतः। तथा हि—"मा हिस्यात्" इति निपेघेन हिसाया अनर्थ-हेतुमानो ग्राप्येते, न तवक्ष्यत्वमापि, "अधिकोमयिं पशुमालमेत्" इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिसायः। कव्यत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थेतुवाभावः, तथा सति वाक्येमेदप्रसारः। न चानर्थेतुवाभश्वमतः। च वाक्येन च पशुहिसायः। कश्चिद्रिहः।
सिहि हि पुरुषस्य दोषमापक्यवति, कैतसोपकारिध्यवति।

क्ष्यातिस्यो च फलगतात्वपुरावे उपचरितो। क्षरितं च स्वरूपः।
(12) वैदिकायास्य साहित्यचतुर्मानम्। सतिः सति कार्यवादतुमितम्। योजितश्रीराजः।
स्वगा मात्रात्यसाधनम्, बाजपेयाद्यस्तु स्वरा-अयस्ये्यतिश्रुपुकलम्। परस्मपुड़कर्णो हि हरिनसम्पदं पुरुषं दु:खारोहति।

"अपाम समममृत्यवा धमूम" इति चामृतत्वाविभाषानम्। चिरस्येमानम्।

(13) अवरूपस्य श्रुतिमतेरोध्यराहाः। अभूतस्यस्य तामस्यमर्तवं हि माध्यते। इति।
"अमृतसम्मूलं स्थानमस्मृतवं हि माध्यते" इति।
अतेक च। "न कर्मवा न प्रज्ञा। धनेन त्यागेनेकनेमृतव्यवमानः। परेण नां।

1 विनियमायते।
शाखविषयज्ञानस्य श्रेयसम्।

भिन्नः गुहां विष्णूः यद्यते विशालतः” इति [महानारायण।१०१]

तथा “कर्मणा मृत्युमृष्यो निषेधुः प्रजायतो द्विभवीमोऽहारः।

तथा पौर्न ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्म्यो गुरुत्वमाणसुः” इति च।

तेदेत् सर्वभिमभिर्या “तद्विपरीतः श्रेयानन्, व्यतायनतज्ञविज्ञानात्।

(१४) लोकोक्ताणानि-पोषणः शाखविषयज्ञानस्य श्रेयसस्य ।

फलात् विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिसादितकुड़ामावात।

विविधानिर्दिष्टाययः, अस्तुल पुनःरुत्तिवतः न च कार्यंवेदनानिविद्या फलस्य

युक्ता, भाववप्पे कार्यस्य तथाभावात। दुःखप्रवशस्य तु कार्यस्य यथापि

वस्तुलितायात्। न च दुःखान्तोऽयाद्। कारणंप्रकृतै कार्यस्यानुत्तरात्।

विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यंतवाच कारणंप्रकृते। ऐतत्त्वपौर्णातपूर्द्धपित्यन्ते।

अकस्मात्-कर्मणं (आनुश्रव्वितात् दुःखान्तकात् हेतु)। विपरीतः

(१५) “तद्विपरीतः श्रेयानन्। (सत्तपुरुषाणन्ताप्रयः साक्षरकारोऽयान्)।

दुःखान्तकात् हेतुः विक्रममात्। आनुश्रव्वितात् हि वेदविनिर्दितवात्।

भाववप्पे दुःखान्तत्वाच प्रश्नाः। सत्तपुरुषाणन्ताप्रयोऽपि प्रश्नाः।

तदनयः प्रश्नायोऽपि सत्तपुरुषाणन्ताप्रयः। श्रेयानन्।

कुलः पुनरस्योपतिरित्य आह “व्यतायनतज्ञविज्ञानात्।” इति।

(१६) शाखविषयस्य

दुःखान्तकस्य तत्त्वः विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्। व्यतायनतज्ञ

शाखविषयान्तपूर्णक्षमात्तीकस्य तत्त्वार्थस्य

ज्ञानम्। भावतं—श्रुतिस्मृतिहितापरारोपणेयः व्यतायनतज्ञविवेकेन श्रुतम्।

१ अतिशयात्। २ अधवङ्गन्तात्। ३ (६६) कार्किकामासाः। ४ व्यतायनभावो

परार्थायनम्। व्यतायने परार्थेन कार्किक्यविषयाध्यायं वर्तते स च चेतन आत्मेश्वरिकम्।
का. २ ]
शाख्रसंस्केत: |

शाख्रुत्याः च व्यवस्थायः, दीर्घकाब्जादेवनिर्माणस्तत्तथार्थस्तकासर्वनिदेशः 
भाषानां स विद्यानादिति || तथा च वक्ष्यति—

“एवं तत्चाम्यासातात्सासस्मि न मे नाहिमित्यपरिशेषः।
अविभावयात्सिद्धरुषु वेधमुस्तं ज्ञानम्” इति [कारिका. ६ ४]।।२।।

(१६) शाख्रास्तसंस्केतः—
तदेवं प्रेक्षावदप्रेक्षात्तथावेण शाख्रामभम्
प्रकृति-प्रकृतिविचित्रति-समाधाय शाख्रामारम्भमाण: 
विक्रमयनुमयभूप—श्रोतवद्विद्विषमतवानाय
क्रेमण। ||

तद्धसंस्पेत: प्रतिजानीति—

मूलप्रकृतियाविचित्रतिमहदा: याः प्रकृतिविचित्रतः सत:।
प्रोक्षक्षकस्तु विकारे, न प्रकृतिने विचित्रति: पुरुष: || ३ ||

“मूल” इति। संस्पेतो हि शाख्रार्थ्य सचतो विधा:। काशिभिर्दः
प्रकृतिरेव, काशिर्दों विक्रियारेव, काशिप्रकृतिविचित्रति:। काशिदिनुमयभूप:।

तत्र का प्रकृतिरियुक्तम्—“मूलप्रकृतिविचित्रति:” इति। प्रकृरोतीति
(१७) प्रकृतिक्रियमम। प्रकृति: प्रथानम्, सर्वजस्तमासां सामयवस्था,
सा अविचिति:। प्रकृतितत्त्वेयः। कुत इति—“मूलनिः” मूल्या
सो प्रकृतिहेतुः मूलप्रकृति:। विभवस्य कार्यसंगमात्स्य सा मूलम्, न वस्या
मूलन्तरसमस्ति, अनववस्थाप्रभावः। न चाणवस्याया प्रमाणमस्तिति भावः।।

cतमा: पुनः प्रकृतिविचित्रत:। कित्वन्यक्षेत्रः उत्तमम्।—“महदा:।
(१८) प्रकृतिविचित्रतः— प्रकृतिविचित्रतः सत्।” इति। प्रकृतयस्य विचित्र
क्रियमम। || यथा ता इति।“प्रकृतिविचित्रतः।” सत। || तथा
हि। महतत्तम अद्वृतस्य प्रकृति:। विचित्रित्वस्य मूलप्रकृति:।
एवद्वृतत्त्वां तन्मात्रामात्रात्त्वां च प्रकृति:। विचित्रित्वस्य महत्।।एवं पञ्चतत्त्वानागि
तस्वान भूतानामाकारादीनां प्रकृत्यो विचित्रयावतः।॥
एक विकृतिरेव, कियती चेतत उत्कृष्टम्—“पोडशक्तस्तु विकारः”

इति। पोडशसंस्थापेक्षितं गण: पोडशकः।

(२०) विकृतिकन्तुम्।

‘तु’ शब्दच वधवारे भिक्षुकाम्—पश्चालमहा-
भूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणीति पोडशको गणो विकारं एव, न विकृतिर्मित।
यदयः पुष्पिन्यादीनां गोविंदवुष्ठादयो विकारः, एवतद्विकारे भेदान्तो पोडे-
वीजादीनां द्रव्यकुड़ादयं, तथापि गविंदो वीजादो वा व पुष्पिन्य‌
मद्यस्तत्त्वन्तरम्। तत्त्वांतोपादानन्तत् च प्रकृतित्वमहिमाहिमेषतम्, इति
न दोषः। सर्वां गोविंदादीनां स्वरूपान्त्रियाभाष्टत च समति न
तत्त्वांतरम्।

अनुभवपरमह—“न प्रकृतिन विकृति: परुषः”’ इति। एतत्।

(२१) अनुभवकन्तुम्। सर्वमार्गापद्यादिभवे।। ३।।

—

tममत् प्रामाणिकं कर्तुभिमिन्ता: प्रामाण्येदं कक्षणीयः। न च

(२२) प्रामाणसामाय- सामान्यक्षणक्षणातं सक्तयेत विशेषक्षणम्

ण्यक्षणम्। कर्तुम्। इति प्रामाणसामायं तत्त्वक्षणि—

हेमपुनमानमतवचः च, सर्वप्रामाण्यसिद्धवात्।

त्रिविधप्रामाण्यिकं, प्रमेयसिद्धं: प्रामाण्यादि।। ४।।

“प्रामाण्यमिदम्” इति। अत्र—च ‘प्रामाण्यो’ इति समाध्या कक्ष-

पद्मस्। तत्त्ववचनं च कक्षोऽ। प्रमुखः उने-

(२३) प्रामाणपद्धा

नेति तत्त्ववचनं प्रमाण प्रति कारणवस्मोलय्येते।

तत्त्वादिक्षितार्पिनाति विद्यतिस्य चिन्तावृतः।

वैभव्यं पौरुषेऽः फलम् प्रमाण, तत्त्वान्तः प्रामाण्यमिति। एतत् संस्कारपर्यं

यस्मिन्तिष्ठायमेव प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः।।

१ नेवायिकानामाः महाभारात्—घटताने“घटमहे जानमीति”—पुराणम्।
फौ. ९ त्रिविधम्

संबन्धितप्रति निराकरोति—“त्रिविधम्” इति। तिस्रो विषया
(२४) प्रमाणसंबन्धा। यथा प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनस्य,
नाप्यधिकार्यः। विशेषप्रक्षणान्तर्केतुपपादिपथ्याः।

कतमः: पुनःसत्रातिसो विषया इत्यत आह—“दृष्टभुनानामानात्वचनम्”
(२५) प्रमाणचर्या। इति। पुनः कार्यक्रियप्रमाणाभिप्रायम्, कोकरिगुर्णम्।
व्युत्पादनार्थवाच्याभासः, तस्यैवताराधिकारात्।
भावेत तु विज्ञानं योगिनामूर्ध्वस्थलोतां न कोक्कूलस्नादनायकमिति सदापि
नाभिशिल्म, अन्तिकारत्।।

स्वादेतत्—मा मूख्यम्, अथकं तु कस्मात् भवति? सद्यन्ते
(२६) प्रमाणसंबन्धा। वाच्यक्यशा, तत्वरिहि-रथ।।
हि प्रतिवादिनः उपमानादीन्यायि प्रमाणानि,
इत्यत आह—“सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धवात्” इति।
एवेक दृष्टान्तमानात्वचनं तर्त्यं प्रमाणानां
सिद्धवात्, अन्तत्मादिरिष्यं।। एतत्रोपपादिपक्ष इत्युक्तम्।।

अथ प्रमेयनुपपादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात्
(२७) प्रमेयवर्णनात् प्रामेयविधिप्रमाणनिर्बन्धस्तथाकालस्य।।
प्रमाण सामान्यस्यो विशेषपत्तमुः क्षयति? इत्यत
आह—“प्रमेयसिद्धि: प्रमाणादिवि” इति।
सिद्धः प्रतीतिः।।

सायमार्या दर्शकमानुरोपन पाठकमानादिवैं
व्याख्याता।। ४।।

सुप्रति प्रमाणविशेषप्रक्षणावसे प्रलक्ष्यस्य सर्वप्रमाणेः वज्त्यवत
(२८) प्रमाणानि विशेषप्रक्षणस्य।।
तद्धीनत्वात् मानादीनायः सर्ववादिनामिप्रतिपत्तेऽष्ट, तदेष्ट तावदक्षयति—
प्रातिविषयाध्यवसायो हद्ध, जिविधमनुमानमाध्यायतमः।
ताहि जहीलिक्षपूर्वकम्, आत्मातितारतत्वचन्तं तु ॥ ५ ॥

"प्रातिविषयाध्यवसा" इति। अत्र "हद्धस" इति वक्षयनि-
देशः परिशिर्यं तु वक्षणस्। समानसमानजातीयन्यन्यचेतन्येऽ वक्षणायः।|

अवयवार्थस्तु-विषण्वनितं, विषणिणमनुवाक्षनि, थेन रूपण निर्न-
(३०) प्रस्तारकणा- पणीयं कुर्वेतीति यावतूरु"विषयः," पृथि-
वयवार्थः। भ्यादयः सुखाद्याध्यासमाददानाम् अविषयः।
तन्मात्रलक्षणः। योगिनामूह्स्केतसां च विषयः। विषयं विषयं प्रति वांते
इति प्रातिविषयम्-हद्धिर्मयः। वृत्तिक्ष सतिकर्षः। अथसतिक्षिनिद्रियमि-
लर्थः। तत्समुन अध्यवसायः। तदाधिक्त इतियः। अध्यवसायः बुढ़ि-
व्यापारो ज्ञानम्। उपात्तिविषयाणमिदियाणां वृत्तो सतताम्, बुढ़िस्वतो-
सभिमी सति यः सततसमुद्रतः: सो अध्यवसाय इति। वृत्तिरिति ज्ञान-
कहितस्वत् चाह्यवाप्ते। इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, अनेन वक्षतनाशकेतनुष्ठतस्वतः
प्रमाणोः।|

बुढ़ितस्य हि प्रात्तवाद्यचेतनम्, इति तद्यो अध्यवसायो अध्यिच्छोः।
(३१) ज्ञानानामचे- चालदिशत। एवं बुढ़ितवात् सुखादयो अपि
तत्कलम्। परिणामेऽदा अचेतना:। पुरुषस्तु सुखावनु-
पाणी चेतन:। सो अध्यवसायत्वतित्वा ज्ञानपुष्पादतना तृत्तीतिविनिर्भितस्वता-
च्याप्यत्य ज्ञानसुखादशमानित्वान्ति-चेतनो चणुग्रहिते। चितिच्या-
प्याप्य अभिनन्दनान्य अपि बुढ़ितवाद्यवसायो अध्यवसायचेतनेन
व्यवस्थायति। तथा च वक्षति—

"तत्त्वात्त्वात्त्वायाणासमाधे प्रेमनाविन्दित चिन्हः।
गुणकरूपे अपि तथा कर्त्तव्य भवेत्युदासीनः।" इति [कारिका। २०]
अत्राध्यवसायाप्रहणे संशयं न्यविच्छन्नाति, संशयस्याप्रस्थितप्रहणाः।
(३२) प्रवत्सलक्षणा-न्तरगतां श्रद्धानि व्याख्या-तिति। नियाच्यो सब्यसाय हृति चौर्यो निजंतंसमस्म कार्यहर्षिणं चासवृर्तियं चिप-र्यमापाक्याति। प्रतियहर्षिणं चैनिद्राक्षरस्वातिकर्षी-सूचनानुमन्त्रनिद्राध्वः पराक्ष्या भवति।

तदेव समानासमानजातीयव्यवनिदेशक्वातु “प्रतिविचयाद्वासाय”
(३३) प्रवत्सलपर्यन्ती इति दृष्ट्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम्। तन्त्रान्तरं पुनः सिंते लक्षणम्। क्षणान्तराणि तैर्यकाः न भूषितानि न दृष्टितानि, विस्तरे स्वार्थिति।

नानुमानप्रमाणाभिवे बद्वता ले कायतेकिनानाप्रतिपत्त: सन्द्रेगो विपर्येष्टो वा पुरुषः कार्यं प्रतिपचेत? न च प्रमाणविसारनम्। पुरुषान्तरगता अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्यय: शक्या अध्यालेक्षणां प्रतिपवम्। नापि प्रमाणान्तरेऽ अनमयप्रमाणाश्च। अनवर्तात्मानसंस्थानविपर्ययस्तु यं कुंडल पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानो उनक्षेप-वचनस्या प्रेश्चाक्रिलुक्तवकुलुकुलक्षेपतेऽति। तदनेत्रानाद्यं परपुरुषस्वार्धिनो दिप्प्रायमेदाद्यतंसब्धेदाद्य। किंक्राकानुमात्ववः। इत्यकायेनात्मनानान्तमाणान-मयाभियुक्तम्।

तत्र प्रवत्सलार्यक्तवात्र अनुमानं प्रवत्सलान्तरं क्लष्यार्यम्। तत्रापि (३५) अनुमानसमा सामान्यलक्षणपूवर्वकर्वार्योपक्ष्यानुग्रहान्तरमाणानात्मकार्यम्। सामान्यान्तराणि तात्त्त्वक्यात्ति। “तत्तु किंक्राकार्यक्यम्” इति। किंक्राकार्याध्यमः। किंक्राकार्यक्यम। शक्तीसमारोपितापीविनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिवाकर्वार्याध्यम, येन प्रतिवं तद्भापकम्। किंक्राकार्यप्रतिवाचिना विपर्यीयन प्रयामुपक्ष्याति। धूमादिव्यो वदान्याध्वित्यापि कार्यं य: प्रवत्सलापुर्वक्यम्। किंक्राकार्यप्राच चार्ततनियमम्। तेन च किंक्राकार्यस्वात्तिक्ष पक्षावभद्रानापापि दर्शितप्रभवति। तद्भापप्रकाशप्रकाशपक्षावभद्रानापुर्वककमनानमित्यनुमानसामानायं लक्ष्य्तम।
अनुमाननिवेशानु तन्त्रान्तरकल्पितान्त्र अभिमितानु स्मारयति—“त्रिविनिविदयम्
(१६) अनुमानस्य विनेत्र-धम्मनुमानमार्ग्यताम्” इति इति सांभान्यतो
परिश्रमणू वैविद्यम् पूर्वचेत्तसमान्यस्तमात्तश्च भेदात।
सामान्यतो दृष्ट्वेचिति।

तत्र प्रथमं तावं दृष्टविद्यम्-वीतिमितीं च। अन्वयमुखे प्रवर्त्तमानं
(१७) वीतिविनिवेशानु विद्ययं कविमू व्यतिरेकमुखे प्रवर्त्तमानं
न्यामान्यं दृष्टिविद्यम्। निवेदकमितीं।

तत्राविनं शेषं। शिष्यं परिश्रमणे इति शेषं। स एव विषयतया
(१८) अवैतिनिविदयम्
“प्रसंस्कारित्वे, अन्त्यात्प्रसंस्कृत्वे शिष्यमाणे
सम्प्रयय: परिश्रमे” इति [वार्त्यतः-न्यायभाष्य]। अस्य चावीतमस्य
व्यतिरेकिणं उदाहरणमये। भिरचरिते।

वीतिं दृष्टि—पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टि च। तत्रकमु दृष्ट्वस्वस्वक्षणशा
(१९) वीतिनिविदयम्
“मान्यविषयं तत्तपूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसंसं, दृष्ट्वं
तदृष्टिविद्यम्।” स्वक्षणसामान्यभिमिति यावं, तदस्य विद्य
येनात्तुमानस्तमान्यस्ते पूर्ववत्। यथा धौमात्रिभिः सामान्यविशेषः
पवेति अनन्तरीये, तस्य विश्वसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वक्षणं विहित
विशेषो दृष्टि रसायत। अपरं च वीति सामान्यतो दृष्ट्वश्वस्वस्वक्षणसामान्यविषयम्।
येन्द्रियविषयमुनमानम्। अत्र हि बुद्धिविद्यानां क्रियालेन
करणवत्क्षणमुमि। यदापि करणवत्क्षणसामान्यं छिद्रादौ वास्यदिवस्त्वस्वक्षणा

१ अनुमानम् प्रथमं दृष्टिविद्यमिति विव:। २ अत्राद्रृ राजायान्तरस्यी:—“सता सम्मत्त्वाहि
यथार्थिति-मुग्धतात्र शिवि:भयं: श्रवय: स्मारिति विकस्य श्रद्धास्य न प्रथित्वेविगुणणम्;
द्योक्तिविद्यमिति-मुग्धतात्र तदृष्टि गुज्ञभानु च सहवित्वात। एवं निषेधी कुन्ते आकाश-शालुक्य: सूभाषस्य 
शालुक्यम् वृद्धायस्तन्मस्त्रुत्तः, शिष्यमाणे आकाशो एव शब्दस्य गुज्ञभानु सम्मर्थायः”
—इति।
कौ. ९ ]
शब्दप्रमाणन्त्रक्षणम्

मुपन्यत्वम्, तथा संपि जयातीयं कृपादिश्यामे करणविमनुमायते तजाती-
यस्य करणस्य न दुःस्वरक्षणं प्रथ्यक्षणं। इन्द्रियावतार्यं हि तत्कर-
णम्, चेतवनिर्वानान्त्यं स्वरक्षणं जीर्णः, प्रथ्यक्षगोचरो महादामाम्, यथा च हि विद्विद्वानान्त्यं स्वरक्षणं वाहः। सो तयं पूर्वसः सामान्यतो रहस्त्र सत्यपी वीतवेन तुल्येवे विग्रेषं। अतः च दुःस्वरक्षणं सामान्यतु इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वजनिकस्यसिद्धि। अच्छोद्वरक्षणस्य सामान्यत्रिभुवो दुःस्वरक्षणमम् सामान्यतो दुःस्वरक्षणमैलयतः। सर्वे चेतदस्मा-
भिन्नोपभिन्नो वाचार्यावाचार्यापरीतापरीतायां व्यत्वार्द्धितमाति नेहेऽकों विष्ठाभावत्।

प्रयोजककृत्तद्विन्दुस्वरक्षणसमन्नतं प्रथोयशुद्धक्रिहितुश्चानानुमानपूर्वकः
(४०) शब्दप्रमाणः

वाचार्याध्यर्धसम्बन्धप्रमहंस्य, स्वर्यस्माथ्याध्यायसन-
क्षणम्॥

हक्कारणः शब्दस्वर्यकायिकात्मकानुपूर्वकत्वमिथ्यानन्तरं शब्दं वक्ष्यति—‘‘आत्मातिरितवचनं तु’’ इति।
आत्मवचनमिति वक्ष्यनिदेशः, परिशिष्टं वक्षणम्। आत्मा प्राती मुक्तेति
स्वात्वः साती श्रुतिक्षेति ‘‘आत्मातिरितवचनं ’’। श्रुति: वाक्यजनितं
वाक्यार्थानानम्।

तस्य स्त्र: प्रमाणम्। अपौषपेंद्रवक्यानिततेन सकलोपायास्यविश्वासी
(४१) तस्य स्त्र: प्राणवक्यानितमात्रान्यानं युतं भवति।

आदिविविद्वध कपिलस्य कल्याणी कल्यानकां गतुँत्रितेत्तब्बितसम्प्रणम्म्।
(४२)कपिलस्य पूर्वं

मूतप्रवुद्धाय पूर्वेऽपरगतान्तरार्थनामपरेभुः। तथा चावे जैगिकैथसादेभगवानुः जैगिको
द्राममहाकल्यातिजनमस्मर्णमातम मृतव 'द्वांतु महाकल्पेयु विपिरवित्त-
मालैयं मया’’। इवादिना प्रथ्यसद्भीमं।

आत्मप्रकारणायुक्तः: शाक्यभिषुवन्यक्तसांसारिकानामावमाबासा:
(४३) अग्रामातपरिहारो भवनि | अबुयत्वैं चेतनं विग्नानतु

विचित्रमूलत्वां प्रामाणविरुद्धार्थिमिभावाचार

कैसिदेव क्षेत्राधिभि: पुरुषापसेन: पुषुपायें: परिप्राहाद्रकविन्योः

‘तु’ शब्दनानुमानानाईति। वाक्याङ्गों हि प्रेमेयो, न तु

(४४) आतोभुस्नुमानाभावचिदेव | तदमें वाक्यम्, येन तत्र छिन्नो भेदसुः।

न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं बोधयत् सम्बन्धप्रमाणपेतंते,

अभिनवकाविरचितस्य चाक्ष्यस्या द्वूरत्स्यानुसूचनभवचर्याविधिका

दिति।

एवं प्रामाणसामायन्यन्येपु तद्विस्थितकरणेपु

(४५) साश्वानातरो-क्षमामानानामुक्तेश्वर-नमीचः।

व च सत्य, यामि प्रामाण्यात्मानाधीनिन्मस्वादिष्टायमेये तानुकरणंनेव प्रमाण-गण्वत्त्वादिति।

तथा हि-उपमानं तात्त्वको गृहथथा गवय इति वाक्यम्। तज्जनिता

(४६) उपमानस्य धीरागम एव। यो स्पष्टं गवयशब्दों गोस-श्रेयं सुनुमाने चातत्मकः।

दशभाव वाचक इति प्रयासः। सो स्पष्टमानमेव।

यो हि शाब्दीं यत्र वृद्धं प्रयुक्ते, सो उत्तरत्वेति, तस्य वाचकः।

यथा गोपाद्वो गोव्यस्य। प्रयुक्तंचैं गवयशब्दं गोसहरे, इति तस्येव।

अत्राद्वैतलीयर्यादः—“कथं ‘तु’ शब्दनानुमानाभावचिदेव आक्षण्यस्येव आहात

‘वाक्याक्षों’ इति। नयस्त तात्त्विकार्यं प्रमेयस्यम, यथा नामां कामानुमानाभावचिदेव यात्रः

जात्वस्य तत्त्वार्थस्य, यथा युतेन विक्षमुनुन नित्यः विकसितते तथा वाक्येन विक्षमुनुन समझातिति

ज्ञातुभावं तत्त्वार्थस्य अः अः सत्यं बलसुक्‌। न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थपरमस्यः। येन तत्वमुनुन वाक्यं वाचिति यावत्।

नतु यथापि धीरागतिः वाक्याव्ययं अर्थधिर्माहिताव्याप्ति नासकिः, तथा इति यथा युतेन विक्षमुनुन समझात्वात्

सम्बन्धप्रमाणपेतं एव उस्तंकरं। तत् वाक्यमापि अर्थेन सम्बन्धप्रमाणपेतं भवेत; तत्त्वार्थकामिति तद्वित्तुकामितेव भावत्, इति

चेतानां।”  न च।” इति वैत्तिकस्य नैमिनिना शब्दाभ्यास्योन्यस्यस्यनिनासिते इति शब्दाभ्यास वज्ञप्रवाहारतः

सम्बन्धप्रमाणावस्योत्त्वोत्त्वोक्तरः, पदार्थालंकारं वाक्याव्ययं साधेनेन

भवते सम्बन्धप्रमाणपेतं नासित। विशिष्टादपतिस्यहो वाक्यार्थं।” इति।
को. ५ ] अर्थापितेनुमाणे स्तम्भवः । १६

बाचक, इति तत् ज्ञानमतुमाणकेव। यतु गवयस्य चक्षु: सुवक्षिप्त: सोका-द्वारेण ततु प्रयल्यकेव। अत एव स्मरयमणायां गच्छ, गवयस्य्यमाण्या न च प्रयल्यकेव। न तद्वन्द्वितीय यथार्थमण्या गच्छं। भूमा-वनवसामाण्या योगो न ज्यात्नुसारली ज्यालिते साध्यमुच्यते। समामाण्योंगैंषः। स च चेत्त-'वे प्रत्ययो, गवयिः तथोऽनो चोपमाण्या प्रयल्यान्तर्मध्यिः। यत्र प्रमाणात्तर-गुप्तान्मणेः म्हेन्तूः, इति न प्रमाणात्तरसुपमाण्या।

एकमध्यायां। इति न प्रमाणात्तरस्त । तथा हि-चैत्यकाम्यस योगाभि-(४७) अर्थापितेनु-बद्धार्णेन बांधित्स्यस्यायस्य कल्पनामण्यापितिव-माणे स्तम्भवः ।। भिमाला बृजदामायु । सा स्थपतुमाणकेव। यदा खलनायकः स्मुचै नासंतः तदा स्तम्भातिः। यदा स्तायकः एकातिः तदा स्तम्भास्य नासातिः तुकः स्वस्तिः व्यास्तिः। तथा च स्तयः योगाभि-भावदशीनेन धर्मेन बांधित्स्यस्यायस्यमाणकेव। न च चेत्त-स्यकार्तितवेशे योगाभि: धार्यः स्बहवार, येनसिद्धो योगाभि: बांधित्स्या न हेतु; स्वस्तिः। न च योगाभि: वा स्वस्तिः येन स्वस्तिः स्वस्तिः। न च योगाभि: वा स्वस्तिः। तथा हि-चेत्तस्य योगाभि: स्वस्तिः स्वस्तिः विर-येत, योगाभि: वा! न तावद्यत कल्पन स्वस्तिः स्वस्तिः विरोधे, योगाभि: भिमालिष्यावातूः। "देशामाण्रेन गृहविशेषाण्योऽषिः च पाध्यक इति

१। "देशामाण्यायाभिः गृहविशेषां प्राथात्मादयाः। समाविषयकयाः विविधं इति बज्ञूः। इति राज-वासनाः। तत्तथा हि गृहविशेषां वाच्यात्मायाः समाविषयकाः विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। अत्यत: गृहस्वेदेन बिरोधं इति हयमुः।

"देशामाणरेनेनेचिनराष्ट्रणामेव तथात्मायचिनराष्ट्रणाय तत्तथा योगाभि: स्वस्तिः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः। भावितस्यात्मायाः कवनेन गृहविशेषां विविधां इति बज्ञूः।
एवमाभो वृपि प्रलक्षमेव । न हि भूतलस्म परिणामविशेषतापूर्वकः कैवल्यः
(४७) अभावस्म प्रक्षेषे क्षणाद्यो चाटाभाभो नाम । प्रतिक्षणप्रस्तुतमेवः ॥
रिणामिनो हि सर्व एव भावः, श्रेष्ठे चिति-शक्ते । स क परिणामस्वेद एण्ड्रैपक इति नासित प्रत्यक्षानवर्द्धे
विषयो स्याभावाहृत्र प्रमाणान्तरसम्प्रदेशते ॥

सम्बन्धतु, यथा-खार्य द्रोणादक्षप्रस्थात्वकवमभः । स चानुमानमेव ।
(४८) सम्बन्धायुः-खारिलं हि द्रोणाद्यविनामास्तु प्रतीतम् खार्यां
माने स्तत्तमेवः ॥ द्रोणादिनिमुनात्मवमायति ॥

यथा निर्दिक्षप्रक्षेपकृतं प्रवादपरस्मयमानाम-‘इति इत्यते’
( ५० ) एतिभास्य प्रस्तुतम्, यथा ‘इह वेद व्यक्त प्रतिनिधित्वसाति’ इति,
प्रामाण्याभावः ॥ न तत् प्रमाणान्तम्, अनिर्दिक्षप्रक्षेपकृतं
सांस्कृतिकलाद् । आत्मकृत्निनिर्द्यये लागम् एव । इत्यपप्तम् “चित्रि-
धप्रमाणम्” इति ॥ ५ ॥
अतिनिद्रियाणामनुमानात् प्रतिति: ॥ १७ ॥

eवं तावध्रुतात्मकज्ञिनेन्द्रक्षणप्रमेयसिद्धांर्थाम प्रामाणिनि दक्षिणाति ।

तत्र ('१२) प्रमाणान्तः श्रवण: प्रथित्ययादि स्वरूपः पांडुलिपदको हाकिकिनिः।

eवं तत्र प्रतिपदेते पूर्वात्त च चाँचानेन धृतानां धर्मान वहयादीनि चेति, तद्युक्तादनाय मन्दप्रयोजने शाल्मू इति दुरीधिगममने न्युत्पादम् ।

तत्र यत्र प्रमाणं यत्र शतमू तदुक्षल्लक्षणेन्याते प्रमाणो निष्कृत्य दर्शयति—

सामान्यत्त्स्तु द्रष्टा अतिनिद्रियाणामप्रतीतितुतुमानात् ।

tसमाधापि चासिद्वे परेक्षामासागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

"सामान्यत्" इति। 'तु' शब्देन प्रत्यक्षपूर्वबद्र्यां विशिष्टिः।

(५२) अतिनिद्रियाणाः सामान्यतः द्यादुरुमानादतीनिद्रियाणाः प्रथानपु-सामान्यतः द्रष्टादुरुमानात् प्रतिति:—चित्रित्यायापरिवर्त्यें एव ध्यायवसाय इत्यथः। उपक्षणं चेतृतं, शेषविद्यापि द्यादुरुमात् ॥

तस्क तत्त्वात्तीनिद्रियेण सामान्यतोह्येमच प्रारंभं तत्र? ।

(५३) सामान्यत: द्यादुरुमानादसिद्धानामासागमात् सिद्धि:।

tतत्र महादायार्थभास्मेन स्वरूपपूर्वैवतदायो ।

तत्र तेषांमभाव: प्राप्त इत्यत्त आह— "तस्मादपि" इति।

tसमादित्वेतात्वैव सिद्धे 'च' कारण शेषविद्यापि समुक्षितम् ॥ ६ ॥

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स्यादेतत्, यथा गणकुसुमकृतमोगमार्गाविक्षणादिपुरुषक्षमप्रवर्त्तेतान्मात्

(५४) प्रथामावात् तदभाववत्त्मरायति, एवं प्रधानादिप्यापि।

तत्र च सामान्यतो ह्यादित्य: सिद्धिरियत आह—

अतिदूरप्रथमादिपुरुषक्षमिद्विधायतात्तमनोवदवस्तानात्।

सोह्यादित्यावहानात् अभिमात् सामान्यिधारापच् ॥ ७ ॥

१ धृतिप्रसरवचनं हलवाही, प्रामणाः इति पाबूः।
"अतिदृशत" इति | अनुपलिंबितति वक्ष्माणि सिद्धावलोकितनवाय्ये

(५५) तत्वावरणः | अतिदृशतातिसाधिपिष्टिज्यात्
नानुपवत्तं नादित्यसत्या नक्षत्रं। यथा उदयतन वियती पत्रवी
सामायिकताः तत्सत्यं नाक्षत्रः। यथा लोचनः
स्वमातिसाधिपिष्टिज्यात्। इति नवविधिनः
"मनोदेशानुवात" यथा कामाणुपष्टनमाः
स्पीतादेशकायार्थानमिद्याप्निर्मित्तुकस्तर्यं न पश्यति
"सौष्ठवात"।
यथार्थर्थतिमिद्धृष्टम परमाणवाचि प्रणितिहतनमा अपि न पश्यति
"व्यवधानात्"।
यथा कुद्यायद्विवाहितं राजदारामि न पश्यति
"अभिव्रात्"।
यथा उहिन्स सोरिवभिर्मिद्िभिमूं प्रहन्दक्रामणं न पश्यति
"समानाभिहारात्"। यथा तीययदिविकुटिदनविद्वन्नजाये न पश्यति
"चः कारो सनकसुखायांः। तेनानुविद्यो
(५६) अनुविद्योऽधिथिः इत्यं संस्कृती। तथा स्निराच्यायां द्विवाच्यायायायाय न्यायः पश्यति
एतदशुं मभवति | न प्रत्यक्षविनिवृत्तिमार्थार्थमावेः मभवति, अति-
(५७) प्रत्यक्षविनिवृत्ति- प्रतिपादः। तथा तै गृहादिनिगति गृहनिमयं-
रेव नामावस्था कारणो अ पितु योग्यप्रत्यक्षविनिवृत्ति।
तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षविनिवृत्तिनिर्मितमावायायायाय विनिद्विनिर्नीति।

न च प्राधानपुपुष्णादनामस्तिक प्रत्यक्षयोगम्। इति न तत्त्वविनिवृत्तिमार्थार्थमावायायायायायाय तुःः प्राप्रामणिकानामोः। इति।
(५८) प्रधाननुपद - कस्मात भवतीत्व आह - "नामावात्" इति।
ब्यो सौभाग्यमा कारणम्। कुतः ? "कार्यस्ततदपलब्धे:। 'तत्' इति प्रधानः प्रमाणशालि। पुरुषोपब्धि तु प्रमाण वक्ष्यति, "साङ्क्यपरार्थ-लात्" ( कारिका १७ ) इति। दूष्टप्रमाणवाचारिते हि प्रयक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यतालाच प्रवर्तिते इति कल्पयते। सतमस्स मरो न प्रमाणनावधारत इति न तत्र प्रयक्ष्या योग्यता शक्या यथवसिद्धिमिलमिलिष्येत्।

किन्तु पुनस्तकाय यत्र: प्रधाननुपालनमिलत आह - "महादैव तच कार्यस्" इति। एतच यथा गमकम् तथोपरिधः- दुपपादिश्यते। तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकानात्-पियोगीति साधुपवैवृष्ये आह - "प्रक्तिसरसूप विख्यात च" इति। एते तुपरिष्ठात्रिभजिनीये इति II ।

कार्यतत् कारणमांगमेव। सतित चात्र वादिना विप्रतिपत्य:।

(५९) कार्यकारणस- म्येव वादिभिष्याति पति:। 'कस्मात् सत्तृ जायते' इति, 'कस्मात् सत्तृ जायते' इति, 'सत्तृ: सत्तृ जायते' इति वृद्धा।।

तत्र पौर्वसिनु कल्पन्येय प्रधानं न सिध्यति। सुखुदुष्कोमहेंद्रस्वरूप- (६१) सकार्यपकः- परिणामशब्दाचार्यतं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधान- एव प्रधाननुपालनसांसाधक:। नस्य प्रधानंस सत्त्ववस्थायम् भवतमयात्।

यदि पुनरूप: सजायत असंज्ञापार्यं कारण सुखादृष्टिशब्दाचार्यतं कर्यं स्यात्, सदसतोस्तादात्मानुपपत्ते:। अयोक्ष्य सतो विवर्त: शारदाचिपः:।

तथा द्विस्त: सजायत इति न स्यात्। न चायादायस्य प्रपञ्चातिलकम्य, आपि तस्यस्य प्रपञ्चामकत्वाय प्रतीतिश्रमम् एव। येतास्य प्रमुखानन्तरानात् सत एव कारणः सतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकवानुपपत्तेन कार्यन्त्यकमं कारणमिति न तम्मेते प्रधानसिद्धः।।


(६२) सत्कार्यपत्रस्निधानपक्षणां निरास: || [ सां. त.]

असदकरणाडुपादानमहाणात् सचेरसंभवाभावात्।
शास्त्रस्य शास्त्रकरणात्, कारणभावाच सत् कार्यम् || ९ ||

“असदकरणात्” इति “सत् कार्यम्”—कारणन्यायापारात् प्रागपीति

(६३) वैद्यसचानां शेष:। तथा च न सिद्धार्थान्यं नैयायिकतनयं—
महावीरनीयम्। यथापि बीजमूलिकादिप्रभृतिसानेन
नायकद्वाराप्रभृतिपरम्परायेत्, तथा यथा न प्रभृतिसंस्करणतम, अधि
तु मायावेदी वीजाध्वरभवव अनुवदलितः भावातु मायावेदी, तस्य सर्वेन सुमवर
श्च, सर्वदा सर्वकायांपरस्परस्प्यो इत्यादि न्यायवाचारिकतात्पर्वतोकायां
स्माभि: प्रतिपादितम्॥

(६४) वेदान्तमयम् || प्रभृतिप्रस्तयांशस्वतो वाचके न शक्यो मित्येति
निरास: || वातिनुम इति ||

कणभाषाश्च शरणपितपितमवशिष्येन। तद्देव प्रतिहारम्, “सत् कार्यम्”

(६५) न्यायम्यनिरास:। असत: कणायोग्यतान्त्र शत: कार्यमिति प्रथमी
हेतु: (१)॥

सहलेणापि पीतं करु कश्यपैत्। ‘सदस्त्र० घटस्य
वर्तमान’ इति चेत, तथा उप्यति धृष्टिनि न तस्य धर्मे इति तस्यं तदवस्य
भव। तथा च नास्ताच्छ, असम्बन्धेनातदमला चारतच्छ्व कथ्यमस्त
ढं? ततस्मातु कारणन्यायापाराधिष्ठितं तत: प्रागपी पदेव कार्यमिति।

१. धृष्टिनि (घटे). नास्ताच्छ (घटस्य)। “असत: घटे संबद्धे तदादि। भगवते
न वा? अवधारकाभस्य घटस्य असत: धर्मे न वा। सम्बन्धकाय तदवस्य घटस्य
प्रक्षालेत् सचे स्थातु घटस्य तस्यं तदवस्यभव। द्वितीयी प्रायः—“असम्बन्धे” इति
तत्स्पष्टचे स्पष्टायें मयेन्त्रस्य प्राप्ति निःस्य स्पष्टायें मयेन्त्रस्य प्राप्ति भारतीयायायः॥
कार्यसत्त्वाधानानि।

कारणाचार्य सतोभिंविषक्षेत्रविशिष्ट्ये | सतथाभिंविषक्षेत्रपप्पणा, यथा
पीड़ने। तिलेपु तैलस्यावघातेन धार्येषु। तपस्या दोषाय घातेन सौरभेष्टिपु
पयसः। भस्तः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किलिविदति। न दुर्लभिंविषायमां
चोत्यमां ज्रा काचिदर्धवम्।

इत्यं कारणावयापारात् प्राकृ देवत कार्यम्—“उपादानग्रहणात्।”

(६६) कार्यकारण—
उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्यं
समस्तवाच सत्याधिकित विशेष। उपादानः कार्यस्य समस्तव्याधिकित,
द्वितीयो हेतु: (२)॥ यावत्। एतदुर्लभविभावतं—कार्यं समस्तो देव
समस्तो जनकमु देवस्य जनकमु, समस्त-समस्त कार्यस्योत्सवो न समस्वति,
तस्मादित्या॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्ब्रद्वेभ कार्य कारणं कस्मान जन्यते? तथा चास।
(६७) कार्यकारण—
देवोदवत्स्तं इत्रत आह—“सर्वसम्भवामावात्”
इति। असम्ब्रदवस्य जन्यवेत् असम्ब्रद्वेशाविशेषे
श्रेष्ठ सर्वं जन्यानं सर्वसम्भवावेदू। न चैत्यदिति।
तस्माभासम्ब्रद्वेशावेदू। जन्यते अपि तु समस्तं
सत्त्वावेदू जन्यत इति। यथाह्: सार्यवृक्षा—

“असके नास्ति सम्भवं: कारण: सत्त्वान्धिमिः।
असम्ब्रद्वस्य चोत्याधिकित्नो न व्यस्मितिः” इति॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्ब्रद्वेभिपु सतू तदेव करोति यत्र यतो कारण शतकम्।
(६८) कारणशङ्के—
शक्तिश्च कार्यद्वित्त्वादाधिकेत। तेन नायवस्यधे
कार्यपरस्त्वाच सत्याधिकम् ल्यत आह—“शक्तिस्य शाक्यकरणात्” इति। सा
(३)॥ शक्ति: शक्तकारणावयवस्य सवेत्र व वर्षान, शक्ते
प्राय: सवेत्र चेतानवेद्वेषयाव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेतु, “कथमसति” शक्ये

१ पश्चादित्या।
कार्यकारणाभेदसाधनम् । । सां: त।
तत्र, इति वक्राद्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एताद्वृशो यत्: कित्विद्धेव कार्य
जन्येतु न सर्वेणित चेतु, हृत भो: शक्तिविशेष: कार्यसम्बन्धो वा उदासम-
बन्धो वा ? समवेत्रात्वा नासता सम्बन्धः इति सतू कार्यम् । असमवेत्वाते सैवा-
न्यस्था, इति सुपूर्वं शक्तस्य शक्तिकरणत्” इति ॥

(६२) कार्यान्तरक- 
मातु कार्यस्य सत कार्यम् कार्यस्य कार्यान्तरकामतात् । न नित्त कार्यालङ्कर्
(४)॥ कार्यम्, कारणं च सतः, इति कर्ष तदभिं कार्यमस्तु भवेत् ॥

cार्यस्य कार्यान्तरकेल्लावनायि च प्रमाणार्नि—(१) न पदस्त-
(७०) कार्यकारणार- 
न्तुष्यो भिखारो, तन्तुरभिखारावत् । इह यत् यतो 
भिघुनेत ततु तस्य भर्मी । भवर्ति, यथा गोर- 
ध्याय पदस्तुनां, तस्मानायार्न्तमः । (२) उपादानोपादूर्भा 
यान्त्रिकतानां तन्तुष्यो: । ययोर्यान्त्रिकतान म ययोरुपादानोपादूर्भा-
मात्, यथा घरष्यो: । उपादानोपादूर्भानावध तन्तुष्यो: । तस्मानाय-
यान्त्रिकतान । (३) इतु नायान्त्रिकसं तन्तुष्यो: । संयोऽगायान्त्रिकयान- 
वात् । अर्यान्तिक्के हि संयोऽग्रे दृष्टी यथा कुण्डकदि: । अप्राप्तिर्व यथा 
हिमवान्तिक्यो: । न चेत संयोऽगासी, तस्मानायार्न्तरत्वभिमिति । (४)
इतु नायान्त्रिकसं तन्तुष्यो: न भिखारो, गुर्वान्तरकायान्त्रिकात् । इह यत् यस्मात- 
ध्यामसम्म, तत्व तस्मात् तस्य गुर्वान्तरां कार्यं गुट्ट्य, यथेकपविक्षयमस्मि 
स्वातिकायो गुर्वान्तिविशेषस्मानावधिपक्षकायो गुर्वान्तिकायो 
स्वातिकायो स्वातिकायो स्वातिकायो स्वातिकायो स्वातिकायो स्वातिकायो: 
। न च तथा तन्तुगुर्वान्तराः पदतुगुर्वान्तराः दृष्टयो: । तस्मादभिमतसन्तुम्यः पद इति । तान्येतान्येतान्येतसम् 
नायान्त्रिकयान्तिकात् ।

एवमेवं सिद्धः तत्वज एव तेन तेन संस्थापेतेन परिणामः पदोऽन
(७१) कार्यकारण-गोमेधदोषनिराकरणम्

तन्तुभयो दर्ष्यन्तरं पतः। स्वात्मानि क्रियाविरोध-सवन्धनुदिश्यपदेशार्थक्रियामेधाद्वः नैकालिकंक मेधेष्वर मेद एव कार्यम्। तत्तमें मेदः साधारितमहिन्ति, एकसम्पर्क तत्तद्वेशापि-विरोधादिदिरेष्वरः। \\

भूतपथोभावाभ्यामेद्वानिराशिततो, यथा हि कूमस्याञ्जनि कूमशरीरेऽनिविशालानि निरोभवनि, निःसर्गित चाविभूतिः। न तु कूमस्यस्तद्भृन्युपयो त्रह्यस्तत् वा। \\

एवमेकस्या सूर्याचयस्य शारो मुक्तालद्वयो विशेषः। निःसर्ग आविभूति उत्पूनं इत्यस्तूनि, निविशानानिरोभबनि विनयन्तीस्युनि नु। न पुनर-सतामुखः सतना निरोधः। यथाह मगवानु कृष्णद्वपायः।

“नास्तो विचयं भावो नाभावो विचयं सतः” इति। (भगव-\\n
प्रकटः २१३६)

यथा कृमः स्वाभवब्रम्य : स्वाभविवका किमयो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुक्ताद्वयो आपि मृत्तुर्वणादिमयो न भिन्नः। एवेते हि स्तुपो इति ज्योतिषो, येवेते वो तिथिका इत्युपप्रयः। न चार्यक्रियामेदेऽदपि भेदमारामणि, एक-स्थापि नानार्थक्रियायदेशानात्। येथे एव गुम्तेहं पूएक्षः: प्राच्चः: प्रकाशक-र्वेषिः। \\

नाथप्रातिविवक्षयविवः कतेश्वत्रदेशे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्यायक्षणयक्रियाय-\\n
व्यवस्थाधेरूनात्। यथा प्रयोगों विषयं कवमद्रीसनलक्षणामय्क्रियां कुर्विति, न तु शिविकावनहमः, मिलात स्थितम शिविकामुद्रणम, एवं तन्तवः \\

प्रयोक्त्र प्रवरणमकुर्वौ आपि मिलिता आविभूतपरमावः: प्राव-\\n
रितिः॥

स्यादेवति—आविभूतिः: पटस्य कारणयापारातु प्राकृत सन्तर असन।

१ स्वाभविक उत्पाधिविवकाः क्षणविविधक्रिया, इह तन्तुभयो इति ज्योतिषः; प्रार्थनायक्रियामेदेः। 

२ तिलकद्वृक्षमयावर्तकी यथा “इहवेति तिथिका” इति सन्तत्तुचते तथा तन्तुभयो-पदेश्वरिति।
(७२) कार्यस्य कारण्यायांच्याविशेषते कारण्याप्रमाणप्रयोजनक- त्त्वमनवस्तीतिः॥

(७३) कारण्यायांच्याविशेषते कारण्याप्रमाणप्रयोजनक- त्त्वमनवस्तीतिः॥

'ब्याकुले' भवति 'पट' इति ततवाकृति अस्तिती तत्त्वम्॥

तैमादियं पटोपसिः स्वकारणसमावयो वा, स्वसत्ता समावयो वा,
(६५) पदोपततो सध्यामपि कारणव्यापारः वेश्वरसु।
उभयथा श्रीन नौवध्यिते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणव्यापारः वेश्वरसु।
एवं संत एव पादेशार्किनवाय वाय कारणापेक्षायेवपपरम्।
नै च पदस्तेपि कारणानां सृजनां संभवन्तः, तद्दृष्टानिकात्तवातु, क्रियासमविन्धिवाच कारणानामः।
अन्यथा कारणव्यापारात्।

(६६) कारिकोपसंहरः।
तस्मात् सतू कार्यमिति पुष्कल्मू।

लदेन्त्र प्रधानसाधवनानुगुणं सतू कार्यमुपपात्यादशः तदृशः प्रधानं साध- (६७) व्यक्ताव्यक्त- नियमं तदर्थार्दशैवितुं विवेकक्षानोपयोगिनी साधूवैश्वेह्ये॥
व्यक्ताव्यक्तसाधूवैश्वेह्ये तातदयाह- हेतुमदनित्यमवनापि सक्रियमैकक्षानकृतिति किञ्ञम।
साधवयं परतत्र व्यक्तं, विपरीतव्यक्तमू।

(६८) व्यक्तानां साधू- व्यक्तमू। तत्र हेतुमच्यम्।
कारणमु, तदृशं, यथं च यो हेतुः तमुपरिपो- दृष्टयते॥

(६९) अनित्यत- "अनित्यम्," विनायिः, तिरोभाविति यावत्।

"अन्यापि", सर्व परिणामिनं न व्याशीति। कारणेन हि कार्यम- (७०) अन्यापिव- विद्यम, न कार्यन कारणम्। न च बुद्धायादयः।
(७१) प्रधानं वेदिपंतीव्यव्यापकाः॥

"सक्रियम्", परिपुन्दवतः। यथा हि बुद्धायादयः उपांतुमपांच देहें

१ नै अतःपदोपतती द्विभाषार्थं कारणानि कुर्विति इति सुकितस्तत्वाकारिका" इति
चेतु, तत्रात् "न च" इति।
(२१) सत्कियत्वम्

(२) व्यजनितः देहान्तरं चोपाददतः, इति तेषां परिस्तन्दः। शरीरपृथिवियादीनां च परिस्तन्दः। प्रसिद्ध एव।

(२२) अनेकत्वम्

“अनेकम्”, प्रतिपुरूषं बुद्धादीनां मेधातः। पृथिवियार्प्पणं शरीरघटादिमेदनानैकमेव।

“आधित्यम्”, स्वकारणमाधित्यम्। बुद्धयादिकारणाममेदे द्रष्टं कथा- (२३) आधित्यम्। बिदेहद्विवक्षया SSश्रयायासिरेव। यथेह वने स्वस्म्। (६) तितल्का इत्युक्तम्।

“विक्रमः”, प्रधानस्य। यथा चैते बुद्धवाद्यः प्रधानस्य विक्रमः।

(२४) विक्रमः। तथोपरिश्रावृत्तिः। प्रधानां तु न प्रधानस्य विक्रमः।

(५) साक्यवस्म्। अवयववाचविवंतंयोगसंयोगः। अथवा अवयववस्म् अवयवः।

(२५) साक्यवस्मं। अवयववाचवाचविवंतंयोगसंयोगः। अथवा अवयववाचवाचविवंतंयोगसंयोगः।

(८) अल्पगमम्। संयोगेः इति यावत्। अप्रतिपूर्विका प्रांत्यः संयोगः। तेन सह कर्त्तं इति साखवस्म। तथाहि पृथिविव्यादय: परसरं संपुस्वयते, एवस्य द्रष्टं। न तु प्रधानस्य बुद्धयादिमि: संयोगः। तादाल्यात्। नापि सत्वरंस्तिमसति परसरं संयोगः। अप्रतिपूर्विका प्रांत्यः

“परत्नुम्” बुद्धादि। बुद्धा वकार्यं सहकारो जनायितवं प्रक्रिया।

(२६) परत्नुम्। पूर्वे स्पष्टवेते, अनुभवं क्षीणा सति नालकारां। (९) परत्रेत्वं प्रक्रियात्मकं प्रतिवेद्यां नानाकार्यस्य अप्रतिपूर्विका प्रक्रियात्मकां जनायितवं परत्रेत्वं व्यक्तम्।

१ अवयवः + अनद्।
वदिरौतमव्यक्तम् — व्यक्तात् अहेतुमानिन्य व्यापि निकृष्यम्।
(८७) अध्यक्ष्य वै— [ यथप्यव्यक्तस्यास्तिः परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया परीतम्।
तथा श्री परिसृप्तः नास्ति॥ ] एकमनाधितः मलिन्नज्ञमांकुयम् स्वत्तन्त्रव्यक्तम्॥ १०॥

(८८) व्यक्तायत्त— स्योस्तधामव्यायः पुष्पांच सम्प्रति तयः: साध्यमेव, पुरुषांच वेध्यमेव,
आह—

तदनेन प्रबन्धेन यक्तायत्तायेंद्रध्यमुक्तम्।
तथातः साध्यमेव, तदिरौतमस्तथा च पुमान्॥ ११॥

"त्रिगुणम्" इति। त्रयो गुणः: सुखः:खमोहः अस्मेऽति त्रिगुणः।
(८७) त्रिगुणत्वम् तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम् पराधामात्मप्राधामसाध्यम्॥(१) क्तम्।

"अविवेकः"। यथा प्रधानः न स्वतो विविध्यः, एवमहदादायो धरि
(८०) अविवेकित्व— न प्रधानातुं विविध्यः, तदात्माभावः। अथ
मुद्वितस्य। (२) वा सम्पूर्णकारितां त्रिगुणित्वकिता। न हि किंतु
देक्क पर्यायम् स्वकारः, आपि तु समूहः। तत्र नैकसुस्तम् यस्य कस्यस्मित
केनितस्मितव इति।

येः लावः— "विज्ञानमेव हर्पविस्मादोहः दाटवायमकम्, न पुनारितो अन्य—
(११) विच्यत्वम् स्तद्म्। इति—तानू प्रथाह— "विषय” इति।
सामान्यः च तृतीयः च। 'विषयो' प्राप्तः, विज्ञानादृढविदित्वावचतुः।
दुः(२)(४) अत एव "सामान्यम्” साधारणम्, अनेकः
पुरुषेृग्नीतस्मिष्ठा। विज्ञानकारणव तु, असाधारण्याविज्ञानानां वृत्तिृष्टः—

१ नैयायिकायाभिमतम्। २ विज्ञानवादीं बौद्धः।
व्यक्ताव्यक्तको पुरुषाकार्यम् ॥ ॥ [सां. त।

पाण्डुः, ते उप्यादानां सुवः। तथा च नरकीष्टकातं एकभिन्न बहूनां प्रतिसम्पत्यां युक्तम्। अन्यं तथा स्यात् इति भवः।॥

"अचेतनम्"। सर्वेऽ एव प्रधानबुद्धिवादयो।

(६२) अचेतनकम् शचेतनाः, न तु बैनाशिकवत्। चैतन्यबुद्धे।

रित्यथा।॥

"प्रस्वर्धमिः"। प्रस्वर्धो धार्मी यः सो अस्यासीति प्रस्वर्धमिः।

(६३) प्रस्वर्धमितः। [प्रस्वर्धमिति वक्तव्यं मवक्तव्यं:। प्रस्वर्धमिति मुद्दम्।] नित्यायोगमाहायतम्।] सहस्रविरुपपरिणाममायां

न कदाचिदिनप्रियुक्तयृत्यथा।॥

व्यक्तकृत्तस्वते जितदिशाति। "थथा

(६४) दक्षिणक्तथ-माणामितः। जितदिशा।॥

प्रजानम्। इति। यथा। व्यक्तत्थ क्षति-

मिट्टयः।॥

(६५) व्यक्ताव्यक्त-ताम्या वैधत्थ पुरुषसाशससे।" तद्विप्रितः।

योः पुस्तकृतैवधर्मम्। पुमानु।" इति॥

स्विदेशस्तैः-अहेतुमच्चाविन्यविदं धार्मानसाधार्यमिति पुरुषस्य, एवमेकं व्यक्तसाधार्यम्। तत्कालमुत्ते। 'तद्विप्रितरीत: पुमानु।। इति। अत आह।" तथा च। इति। चकारो कर्मवधे।। येदानि अहेतुमच्चाविन्यविदं साधार्यम्। तथायथैगुणादि

वैदिकस्तुमयेविधे।॥ ११॥

(६६) गुणनिहुपण-भिगुणामित्युक्तमू, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः।

म॥। किं च तदुपक्षाणिमित्य आह--

१ विभाषने रोपण न गुढः ते पर्युक्तेन प्राप्तवानसुतृतिमाियमानावान्वपि पाठो मूल्यमुत्ते पुस्तको त्याने, किं तु स्त्रियाषासनिति वैरधि। टिपुपागतमेव मूलविद्वासिति। मन्यामेव।।

अत्य भर्ष्मीनमिन विधवान्विन स्नायम्। २ तेनि विभाषनाकारते। ३ भिगुणावा-

दिलाकस्तु व्यक्तार्थाविषयेनमित्रुतात्। ४ चैनान्ति।।
प्रीत्यप्रश्नतिविपादायमकः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थः |
अन्योन्याभिमवाह्र्यज्ञननमिधुनवृत्तयथा गुणः || १२ ||

“गुणः” [परार्धः] “सत्रेष्ठ लघु प्रकाशम्” [कारिका १.२] इत्यत्र निर्देशः ||
तदनाग्नतवे वहिनां तत्तत्त्वं वा प्रीत्यादीनां
यथासंहतः वेदितयम् ||

एतदुर्लभ्य सत्रेष्ठ—प्रश्नतिः लघुमः, प्रीत्यालमः सत्रेष्ठगुणः; अप्रश्नतिः—
(१३) उद्देश्यकः लघुमः, अप्रीयात्मकः रजोगुणः; विषादः मोहः;
मन्यतः ||
विषादःस्तोगुणः इत्यतः; ये तु मन्यते “न प्रीत्यालः वादातितिर्दवेश्वसे, एवं हुन्मपि न प्रीत्यावादाद्विदित,”
तानृ 
प्रति “आत्म”—प्रश्नम्। नेतरतादावा: सुखद्वयः, अपि तु भावा;
आत्मसर्वस्य भावचलन्नवात्। प्रति: आत्मा भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यालमाः।
प्रश्नताः व्याख्येिमा:, भाववृत्ताः वैप्रायुक्तवधिलिङ्गम्यज्ञसिद्धिः। परस्परावाही—
मन्यते तु परस्परार्थायान्तरेक्यायायासिद्धिः सम्बन्धितः भावः ||

स्वप्नमेयमुक्तवा प्रयोजनमाहे “प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थः” इति।
(१००) गुणानं प्रयोजनम्—यथासत्रेष्ठप्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमम् ||
अत्रापि यथासंहत्यमेव। रजः प्रश्नकलातः सर्वेन
लघु सत्रेष्ठ प्रश्नतेऽयुः, यदि तमसः गुणा न
नियम्येित। तमोन्निर्ज्ञयेित कर्तियेव प्रश्नतेऽतीति
भवति तस्मां नियमतमाः ||

प्रयोजनमुक्तवा कियामाहे “अन्योन्याभिमवाह्र्यज्ञननमिधुनवृत्तयथा”
(१०१) गुणानं कियः याः: अन्योन्याभिमवाह्र्यज्ञननमिधुनवृत्तयथा अन्योन्याभिमवाह्र्यज्ञननमिधुनवृत्तयथा ||
इति। वृत्ति: किया, सा च प्रश्नकलातः
ध्ययेि | ‘अन्योन्याभिमवाह्र्यज्ञननमिधुनवृत्तयथा’ | एवान्नयते
मेयमुक्तवा: अध्यायान्तरेक्यायायासिद्धिः। तथा हि सत्रेष्ठ
रजस्तस्माः अभिभूत वादातितिर्दवेश्वस्यो वृत्ति प्रश्नती
क्षमते, एवं रजः सत्रेष्ठस्माः आभिभूत चोराः, एवं तमः सत्रेष्ठस्माः
गुणत्रयनिर्देशपञ्चमूः । [ सां. त.]

आभिमूय मृटामिति। 'अन्योन्यान्यावृत्ततः।' यथायाधाराधेयभावेन
नायमणि घाते, तथा अर्प यदपेक्षा यथै क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः। तथा हि,
सत्य प्राचूड्यितियमाृचित्रित्र रजस्तमस: प्रकाशेशोपकरोऽति, रजः प्रकाश-
नियमाविष्टित्त्र प्रवृङ्ख्येततर्यः। तमः प्रकाशप्रवृङ्ख्य आश्रित नियमेनेतरस्यो-
रिति। 'अन्योन्यान्यान्यावृत्ततः।' अन्यतं दन्ततमपेक्षा जनयति। जननं
च परिणामः। स च गुणानां सदश्रृङ्गः। अत एव न हेतुसमवृः तत्तता-
नतरस्य हेतुसरसमभवात्। नायन्यितसमृ, तत्तवाते क्यामावात्। 'अन्यो-
न्यमित्रुन्तृततः।' अन्योन्यसहचरः। अविनामावयृत्त इति यावत्। 'चः।'
समुचये। भवति चात्रागमः–

"अन्योन्यमित्रुनाः। सर्वं सर्वं सर्वत्रागमिनः।
रजसो मिथुनं सत्य सत्य मिथुनं रजः। इति।
तमसोद्वपि मिथुने ते सत्तवरसी उभे।
उभयोः सत्तार्जोमिथुनं तम उच्ये।
नैपामादि: सम्यायोगो वियोगो वोपध्ये।"

इति देवी-
भागवत–३१८।। १२।।

( १०२ ) गुणत्रयनिन्द-पञ्चमूः। तेषां शृङ्ख्यः-भावः।
के ते इत्यमूला: कुलश्रेष्ठत आह–

सत्यं जंघु प्रकाशकमित्रुपममदमखं चरङ्खं च रजः।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः। प्रदीपवचारस्तो वृत्ति। ॥ १३ ॥

"सत्यम् इति। सत्यमेव जंघु प्रकाशकमित्रु-सांह्याचार्यः।
ततः कार्योऽभमेन हेतुत्तमी लाचारमू गौर्यप्रतिद्
यतो। उपेत्तुवृजगले भवति, तेद्व लाचारमू कस्प-
कलम्। इति। चतुर्गामणे हेतुभवति, तथा वायोः। एवं
करणां वृत्तिपूःते हेतुवृजगले। गुरुः हि मन्नानि स्वरिति सत्यस्य प्रकाश-
शालकालमुक्तमू॥

(१०३) सत्यगुणमू: 
भावः—ताधवमू, प्रकाश-
कलम्।।
सत्तमसी स्वयम्कियत्या स्वकार्यप्राप्तिः प्रत्यवधीदतिी रजसोपस्तः

(104) रजोगुणव-स्वभावः-उपयोगकल्पमुः, प्रयत्नं कार्येतुः मत्तदमुक्तमुः-“उपयोगकल्प रजः” इति। कस्मादित्यत उद्दमुः-“चलमुः” इति।

tदनेन रजसः प्रवृत्यथं दार्शितमुः

रजस्तु चलत्या परित्येक्षुः सत्तमसी गुरुणा SSSवृष्टि च तमसा

(105) तयोगुणवश भावः-सुखस्वर्दि आवर्धकल्पमुः

“गुरु वरणकेमेव तमः” इति। एवकारः प्रेयेरे क्षणिष्ठः: सम्बध्येते, सत्तमेव, रज्ज्य एवं, तम पूर्वेति,

ननु एते परस्परविरोधशीलागुणा: सुन्दरसुन्दरवत्व परस्परं वर्षस्ति

(106) परस्परविलिनामधूः गुणानामध्यब्धश वर्षस्ति

इति आह-“प्रदीपवचार्यो वृत्तिः” इति। यदा विरोधिते उद्दलिनी, अथ मिलिते सहायतेन रूपप्रकाशशक्षणः कार्य कुरस्तः। तथा व वातपितुक्षेमणः: परस्परविरोधिनः: शरीरवारणशक्षणार्यारिणः। एवं सत्तमस्तमांसि भिन्नविविधान्वयुक्त्स्पीति स्वकार्य कार्यितुपि च। “अर्थापि”

इति पुर्वार्थेन इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यात्—

“पुर्वार्थं एव हेतुमुः केनचितुः कार्येतु कारणमुः” इति।[कारिका ३ १]

अत्र च सुखुदःविमोहा परस्परविरोधिनः सवस्तानुपापणि सुखुदः

(107) सुखुदः

मोहागुणवभावः निमित्तानि कल्पनितः। तेषां मोहागुणवपरस्परशिवंतवातशेषं: निमित्तानि गुण-स्वरूपः SSSवृष्टिकल्पमुः

तथा। एवेक श्री रूपोवनकुलशिल्लसम्पन्ना स्वामिः

1 दूरा एव। का कथा परस्परविरोधशक्तिविहारीकारिताया इति भावः। 2 सत्तव-रजस्तमारुपणि।
गुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाधनानि । ॥ [ सां. त.]

मिन सुखाकरोति; तत्कस्य हेतोः। स्वामिनं प्रति तत्स्य: सुखृपपमु- 
इव ख्री सप्तनिर्देशकरोति; तत्कस्य हेतोः। तत्र प्रति तत्स्य: 
दु:खृपपमुइववातूः। एवं पुरुषवत्तरं तामविद्वमानं सेवं मोहयति; ततः कस्य 
हेतोः। तमप्रति तत्स्य: मोहृपपमुइववातूः। अनया च चेत्या सर्वं भावा 
न्याग्निता:। तत्र यत सुखेतुः तत्र सुखात्मकम सत्तं, यतू दु:खेतुः 
ततुः क्षात्मकं रजः; यन्मोहेतुस्तन्मोहाद्यांकं तस्मां। सुखप्रक्षाशाळ- 
शारणां लेकालिनुः युगकुदूर्द्वांविशिष्योः सहदर्शनात्। तस्मात् सुखुः- 
मोहीविव विरोधिमिः। अविरोधितोभक्गुणवृद्धिमिः। सुखप्रक्षाशाळावर्तीर 
निष्ठितमेदा उद्धीयनते। एवं दु:खोपपमक्तब्रह्मवर्तकवे; एवं मोहसे 
त्वा तलावे:—हृदि सिद्ध स्त्रेगुणयस्य नम। ॥ १३ ॥

स्यादेवतुः—नन्नभुयानमनुपुः पृथवित्याविद्वतु: सनायिनसिद्धता:। भवन्त्वविवेकित्वा 
(१०८) नन्नभुयानसिद्धता: 
द्यः। ये पुनः सत्तायो नानुमवपपमथ्यहिः 
हस्ति तेषां कुतस्यविवेकित्वम, विधिकमचे। 
तन्त्रस्य प्रसवस्थमितं च? इत्यत आह—
अविवेकादे: सिद्धिकृत्तु: सुधिकृत्तु: सुधिकृत्तु: सुधिकृत्तु: 
कारणगुणात्मकवत्ताक्षर्यस्यकवमध्यः सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“अविवेकादे:” हृदि। अविवेकित्वविवेकित्वथा। यथा ब्रौक्कोऽदेशिको: 
(१०९) तत्तंसे:—
गुणप्रक्षाविवेकित्वसाधसे: 
नान्नविवेकादे॥

कुतः पुनर्विवेकादे: सिद्धिरियत आह—
“स्त्रेगुणयत्” हृदि। यथैः सुखुःक्षात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वबीदि-

१ सत्तवज्जस्तथातीक दुःखुःक्षात्मकं, सुखप्रक्षाशाळावर्ती सिद्धि निर्मित्तिनामी 
कर्मांनानोकर्मानीयायामुदयान—“सुखेतुः”। २ यथैः सुखुःक्षात्मक: परान्तविवेकः। भिन्निनामी 
सिद्धिनामी कर्मांनानोकर्मानीयायामुदयान—न तथा सुखुःक्षात्मकवर्तीत्याजित: कर्मान्तोकर्मानी निर्मित्तिनामी 
कर्मांनानोकर्मानीयायामुदयान—“सुखेतुः”। यथैः सिद्धिनामी कर्मान्तोकर्मानीयायामुदयान—“सुखेतुः”।

अविरोधितायमिः। बिन्निनामी 
मित्रकल्पना साधस्यपि।
योगे यथेदनमूल्यमानेः "यक्तम्"-हि सुपर्यादोक्षो नोकः। ब्यः रेकामहे- "तत्त्वपपयामावाहात्" हि। अधिविक्यादिविप्रथे पुरै त्रेणु- 
प्रयामावात्। अथ वा यक्तमायं पक्षोऽक्षत्वायामावेशार्थेऽ एव हेतुजे- 
गुप्यार्दित बक्तयः॥

स्यादेततु-अयक्तसिद्धां सत्याविवेकित्वादिः धर्माः: सिद्धान्तः।

(११०) अयक्ताः- अयक्तमेव लघुपिणि न सिद्धति, तत्त्वाविवेक- 
धनम्॥ किलादिबिसिद्धिर आह-"कारणगुणात्क- 
वातू" हि। अयमाभिन्नः:-कार्य हि कारणगुणामकं इत्रम्, यथा 
तत्त्वादिगुणामकं पदार्थ। तथा महदादिलक्षणार्थि कार्येऽ भृकुटम् 
स्वकारणगतस्वकुटिः:खोमहात्मना मथित्वम्। तथा च तत्त्वार्च 
स्वभुतंखोमहात्मकं प्रथा:नम्वा सम्पूर्त: भवति॥ १४॥

स्यादेततु-"व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुपयते" हि। कणकाक्षिकाचरणणयाः।

(१११) व्यक्तात् वार्ताकारणाधिकारीपरे- 
रघुत्कारणकल्पनावेग- 
वन्याधिकारी॥

चरणवाटकेन्द्रयत आह-— 
मेदानां परिमाणातू समभयातू कार्यत: प्रक्रियाः। 
कारणक्षारकामागद्विमागाधिरूपस्य॥ १५॥

"मेदानाम्" हि। मेदानाम विशेषां महदादिनां मूतानां का- 
(११२) तत्त्वादिहः। अयक्तकारणाधिनां।

तदे कारणक्षारकामाग- 
दिकामागाधिरसिद्धि- 
रित्रित प्रथमस् (१)॥

"कारणक्षारकामागद्विमागाधिरूपस्य"। 
कारणेऽ सतू कार्यसिद्धिसिद्धिः। तथा च यथा 
कूष्ठार्थो नस्येवाज्ञानी निम्नरूपी विज्ञाने—

१ वन्याधिकारी।
'इंद्र कूर्णेशरीरं, प्रतान्येतस्याञ्जानि'—इति; एवं निनिविचारानांति तस्मान अर्थकीर्मिति। एवं कारणामृत्तिपििड़मार्हपिण्डध्वारा कार्यानि घनपुष्कर-दीनि सन्येश्वारिष्टिनि विभयन्ति। सन्येव पूर्वीष्वादीनि कार्यावतानमाम- त्रादविष्टिनि विभयन्ति, सन्येव च तत्त्वावर्णन्यह्यक्तातू कार्यात्, सन्येव वाक्यक ह साक्षात्। सन्येव च महानुपरमायतात्। सो सयं कार- णातू परमायतात् साक्षात् पारस्यवितस्य विभस्य कार्यसं विभागः। प्रतिसंगो तु सूर्यपिण्ड वा घनपुष्करिक्षो विशिष्टो उद्योगी- भविष्नि। तत् कारणामृत्तिमिनिभविभयं कार्यमूलपुष्करियतं भविष्नि। एवं पूर्वी- वादवस्तुत्तमायानि विभिन्तः स्वापेश्वय तत्त्वावर्णन्यह्यक्ताति, एवं तत्त्वावर्णन्यह्यक्ताति विशिष्नुल्लयक्ताति, एवमहाद्वारो महानत्तमाविश्वात्मन महान- न्त्वक्ताति, महानु प्रक्ति स्वकारण विशिष्टु प्रक्तिमुख्यक्ताति। प्रक्ति- प्रक्ति न कचिचिचित्व कति सा सर्वकार्यायामयसंभवः। सो धनमिविभागः प्रक्ति वेरखसं प्रक्ति नानाकार्यसं कार्यं [स्वार्थक: ध्याजः]। तस्मात् कारणे कार्यसं सत एवं विभागाविभागाशयसं कार्यमिति।

इत्थायतमृत्तिमस्य आहे—"शक्तिः प्रमुखते" इति। कारण-शक्तिः कार्यं प्रर्वतत्त्व इति सिद्धम्, अशक्तात् कारणां शक्तिसतस्मिनं कार्यसा- व्यवस्थित्वा विशिष्टिन्नित्वं च द्वितीयम् (२)।

(११३) कारणसः शक्तिसतस्मिनं कार्यसः व्यवस्थित्वा विशिष्टिन्नित्वं च द्वितीयम् (२)।

कार्यसः व्यवस्थितात्त्व गव्यसं शक्तिः विशिष्टिन्नित।

अयस्माहि शक्तिसत्तां तेलेपादानाः भेदो वदेवरेव तेलेउपादानाः भेद-मस्त्यनागातस्य न सिकतासिवित।

स्यादेतुं—शक्तिः प्रमतिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागो च महत एव।

१. अनन्तस्मायाति। २. वेशकर्मसंदध। ३. कारणे कार्यशाक्ति-विभेन विन्निविरेव तस्य (कारण) शक्तिसतिः भावः।
अन्यत्र, साधित्वा अस्य प्रश्नचिन्तामाह—
कारणमस्तिवकर्म, प्रवर्तते निगुणतः समुद्रयाच।
परिणामतः सतिलवतू प्रतिश्रविगुणायाध्यैति। १६।
“प्रवर्तते निगुणतः” इति । प्रतिसारगवस्थायं सच्च रजस्तम्भ
(१६६) प्रकर्षते-श्रवायमाननैः भवनि । परिणामस्तिवभवा
गुणः प्रश्नः प्रयामः (१)। हि मुग्ना नापरिणाममथ्य क्षणमस्तिविन्ननी। ततःपतू सच्च सच्चविपत्तथा रजो रजोपपत्तथा ततस्मिनरूपपत्तथा प्रतिसारगा-
वस्थायामापि प्रवर्तने | तद्विदः नमाः “निगुणतः:” इति।
प्रवर्तनस्तरामाह—“समुद्रयाच,” इति। समेत स्वयं; ‘समुद्रायः’ सम-

१ अनवस्थ्यपातां ।
(१९७) प्रक्तत्समपु: वायः। समुदयथ गुणानामू न गुणप्रधानभावाय: प्रश्‌त्रितिलित्या। (२) मपतंगम सम्बन्धति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैपूर्य विना, न च वैष्णवनमुमदेयपरमदर्कमाग्न:। इति महदादिभावेन प्रश्‌त्रितिलित्या।

स्यादेतद्—कथ्येनक्रुपाः गुणानामेनक्रुपाः प्रश्‌त्रितिलित्यत् आह—“परिनामत: सहिन्द्रचात्” इति। यथा हि बारिदपरिनामति नानाप्रकारः। विचिन्तमुदकर्मसमपि तत्त्वाविकारानासुधा नारिकेलात्मकार्वित्रिताचर्वितानेनुकामकक्कप्राचीनामतः ककक्कपितक्षत्कत्त्वया परिगमनमधुराभवण्तितकप्रायकपदः।

(१९८) प्रक्तत्: प्रश्‌त्रित: परिणामो नानाप्रकारः। विचिन्तमुदककर्मसमपि तत्त्वाविकारानासुधा नारिकेलात्मकार्वित्रिताचर्वितानेनुकामकक्कप्राचीनामतः ककक्कपितक्षत्कत्त्वया परिगमनमधुराभवण्तितकप्रायकपदः।

(१९९) पुरुषा स्त्री मोक्षा–कालकूल्याय: प्रमुच्छे।

संघातपरार्थत्वात् विगुणादितिपर्ययायाद्विधिप्राप्तात्। पुरुषो दस्ति भूतानि वि दशमानमभिमन्यमानसात्येशोपासोति तानू प्रयाह—

“संघातपरार्थत्वात्” इति। पुरुषो दस्ति, अव्यक्तादेश्यतिरिक्त:। कुत: “संघातपरार्थत्वात्”। अव्यक्तमहद्द्वाराष्ट्र: परार्थ:। संघातवात्, शयनानामा–

(१२०) संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१)। संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१)। संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१). संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१). संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१). संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१). संघातानं परार्थत्वाद्विद्वित्र प्रथम साध्नः (१).

स्यादेतद्—शयनाननादतः संघाता: संहतशरीरार्थ: द्या:। न त्वामा—
(१२१) संघातानां संघातान्तररूपे सन्नास्था त्रिगुणादिविपरीत्य- यथा।

नमन्यत्कायतिरिती प्रति परार्धः। तस्मात् संघातान्तरभेष्यं परं गमयेयः, न वसंहतात्मानम्
इयत आह्व—"त्रिगुणादिविपरीत्यात्" इति।

अयमभिप्रायः—संघातान्तररूपे हि तरापि सं-
घातवात् तेनापि संघातान्तररूपे भसिस्त्वम्; एवं तेन तेनेन्द्रनवस्या
स्यात्। न च व्यवस्थायं सायमनवस्था युक्ता, कल्यनागीर्वस्सक्तात्।
न च 'प्रमाणवृत्तेन कल्यनागीर्वस्समपि मृण्यत्' इति युक्तम्, संहतावस्य
पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्यात्। द्वादशंतस्सर्वसंस्कृतमांर्धनेद्ये वन्तुमानमिच्छति: सर्वो-
मानोन्नेश्त्रस्त्रः इधुपुपावित्वा न्यायविकाकीविक्ष्रेत्रायिकामानविभिन्तः।
तस्मादन्वस्सस्याभिभया सर्वाःसंघातलवमिच्छताः। 'त्रिगुणादिविपरीत्वस्मविपरी-
त्वसायनांचं चेतनत्वस्सस्ववस्मविभिन्त्रायिकामानायिकम्। त्रिगुणावादेः हि धर्मः।
संहतेन व्यङ्खः। तस्मात्वतमिच्छिन्तो परे व्यावर्त्यां त्रिगुणाद्विद्यावर्त्ये-
यति, भ्रात्त्वाविभवाव व्यावर्त्यां कठवादिकम्। तस्मादाचार्येण 'त्रिगु-
णादिविपरीत्यात्' इति बदता ससंहतं: परौ: विकार्थः। स चालमेति
स्विद्यम्।

इत्यत: परः: पूर्णः सृष्टिः—"अविक्रमात्", त्रिगुणात्मकानामामिदिय-
(१२२) त्रिगुणात्म- कानामामिदियाभिन्द्राधिरि,
यत:सुखदः:हृदोहतमकं तस्वरं परेरण- विधियानां द्वित, यथा वर्त्यात्मियार्धिमिभिः।
सुखदः:हृदोहतमकं चदें बुद्धादिष्ठः, तस्मादेद्वदपि
परेरणाविधात्वम्। स च परस्पृहादाय आत्मितः।

इत्यतास्वतः पूर्णः—"भौतवातात्।" भौतवातः भौमेये सुखदःते
(१२३) भौतवात- व्यक्त्याति। भौमेये हि दुखदःते अनुकूलप्र-
वादित्तोतियात् (२)।।
तिकृत्वावदनीये प्रत्यात्मममिच्छिन्ते। तेनायोरानु-
कूलमानेन प्रतिकूलमान्तीये च केनचित्तविेन्ये मिभिन्तव्यम्। न चानुकूल-
नीयतः प्रतिकृतिकल्पो वा वुद्धङ्गायः, तेषां सुखुः-स्खालात्मकलेण स्वामिनं वृत्तिविरोधात्। तस्मात् यो दसुखालात्मा से दसनूकेंद्रिीं: प्रतिकृतिकल्पो वा, स चा 55मेति॥

अन्येऽलाहुः—मोग्या दस्या वुद्धङ्गायः। न ज्ञ दश्यङ्गस्तंतरेण दश्यताः
(१२४) मोक्षमाभावात् दिल्लिदक्षरावाहिकों तिरित्कः। स चा 55मेति। मोक्षमाघात्तो द्रष्ट्र-भावात्। द्वैयेन द्रष्ट्राभासादिविध्यं। दश्यः च वुद्धङ्गादीनां सुखालात्मकतय पृथ्वियाद्विविदनबन्धनम॥

इत्याविष्ट पुरुष इत्याः—"कैव्यत्वं प्रवृत्तिः" इति। शाख्यानां महर्णिणां दिव्यद्विचारानां च कैव्यमात्यानितक- (१२५) शाख्यानां कैव्यः प्रवृत्तितिरित्कः। दुखङ्गयप्रसारालक्षणं न वुद्धादीनां सम्भवितः।
ते हि दुखालात्मकः कर्यं स्वामिनाजियोज- पितुं शक्यने। तदनितिकस्य त्वतदर्शनस्तो विषयः: शक्यसम्पादः। तस्मात् कैव्यार्थे प्रवृत्तेनीर्मात्यानां महाधिहिण्यां चारित वुद्धानितितिरिक आत्मेति सुदम्मल॥ १७॥

तदेव पुरुषान्तिवलं प्रतिपादः। स कि सब्जेयार्थेचः किमेषकः प्रति-
(१२६) पुरुषवहु- क्षेत्रमिति सम्ये। तस्य प्रतिकृतिप्रमेयस्तुमुम्पाल- लसाध्यानि॥

जननमर्यक्षरानां प्रतिनियमाद्युगपत्यब्राह्मणेशः।
पुरुषवहुन् सिद्धं प्रेयणः पिष्ट्याविष्ट्याविचेचः॥ १६॥

जननेयादिना। "पुरुषवहुं सिद्धम्।" कस्मात्। "जननमर- णकरणाम् प्रतिनियमात्।" निकायविदिश्वा-
(१२७) जननमरण- भिरपूर्वस्मिनीतिरिप्रियमनोशुक्लाशुकलिपेदनतिमिम्। पुर- प्रतिनियमादिति प्रव- रुपस्याभिमुख्यो जनम, न तु पुरुषस्य परि-
पुरुषबहुल्वसाधनम्

नामः तत्यापरिणामिलतृत्वः तेपमित्र च देहादीनामुपातानां परिलागो मरणौ, नत्तात्मो विनाशः तस्य कूटस्थानिल्यताः करणालि वुद्ध्वा-दौल्नि अग्रेजशः। तेषां जन्ममणणकरणानां प्रतिनीतिमें व्यवस्था। सा खलियं सर्वशास्रि-रिहेक्षासिन्न पुरुषः नोपपयते। तदा श्वेतेक्षासिन्न पुरुषः जायमाने सर्वे जायंसु, प्रयमाणे च निर्येषनू, अन्यादौ चैक्षासिन्न सर्वे एव अन्यादयो, निर्तिष्टे चैक्षासिन्न सर्वे एव निर्तिष्ट:। सुरीतियं व्यवस्था। स्यात्। प्रतिक्षेत्रु तु पुरुषमेदे भवति न्यवस्था। न च ईश्वापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादानमेद्रागवस्था। इति पुरुषम्। पाणिनस्तनाबुधादिमेदे-नापि जन्ममणणादिव्यवस्थाप्रस्थाने। न हि पाणो वृक्षे जाते वा स्त-नादौ महत्त्वयेव युगात्मिता जाता वा भवतिति।

इत्यह प्रतिक्षेत्र इत्यहः “अयुगपतवृत्तेश्व” इति। प्रवृत्ति:

(१२८) पुरुषार्माणम्- युगपतवृत्तेश्वरति द्विती-युम् (२)॥

प्रयत्नलक्षण यथायनरः करणात्मिनी, तथा धिपुरुषे उपचयते। तथा च चातुर्मात्रः शरीरी प्रय-तमाने, स एव सर्वशास्रि-रिहेक्षा इति सर्वेऽ प्रयतेत्, तत्त्वशास्रि-पर्याय शरीराणि युगपचाल्यत्। नानाचे तु नार्ये दोप्र इति।

इत्यह पुरुषमेद् इत्यहः “त्रेगुणा-विपर्यायाश्च” इति। एवकारे

(१२९) त्रेगुणार्किप- यथायदित्वतीयम् (३)॥

सर्वस्मृतसिद्धम्। ‘सिद्धम्’ इत्याचारनरः द्रष्ट्वः, सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम्। त्रयो गुणाश्रेष्ठेणु, तस्मा तिर्ययो सन्नात्तमू। केचित्कलू सत्त्वनित्या: सत्त्वहुः; यथावेषो-लक्ष्यः; केचित्रकोष्ठः, यथा मनुष्यः; केचित्रमोक्षः; तथा तिर्य-ग्योनः। सो स्यामोइश्वरश्रेष्ठगुणार्कि-पर्ययो सन्नात्मावलश्च सत्त्वनित्यां न मेवतु यथेऽः पुरुषः स्यात्। पुरुषमेदे त्यमदौ प्रस्थात्। इति। १८॥

(१२०) पुरुषमेदः॥ एवं पुरुषवहुः प्रस्थात्व, विद्वेक्षणानुपयो-गितया तस्य धर्मानात्—
एतथापि विषयार्थिस्यां वाचकत्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैलायमाध्यमस्य सर्वैः प्रवृत्तमहत्स्याभासः ॥ १९ ॥

"तस्माच" दृष्टः । 'च' शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुवेदेन सह धर्मान्तराणि
( १३१ ) तस्मातः समुचिनोति । 'विषयसाद्धस्तैः' इत्युक्ते त्रेगु-भय सम्बन्ध्यार्थश्च ॥ यथाविपर्ययविविधात्वकं सम्बन्धेतः; अतस्त- बिस्माय 'तस्मात्' इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोऽऽि हि सतिवानवादिस्यो विषयोऽि विप्रकटः च तदःः, इति विप्रकटः त्रेगुगममविविधायादि सम्बन्धेतः ॥

tस्मात्तिक्षत्रुणादेवो विषयाः स पुरुषस्यात्मिक्षत्रुणात्मविविधावत- मसाधारावलं चेतनल्प्राप्तिविभिन्न । ततः
( १३२ ) अस्त्रिक्षत्रुणावे: पुरुषस्य साधित्वम् चेतनवेतानविविधायलेन च साधित्वादृङ्गुः दर्शिते।
चेतनो हि द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो मभवति; यथै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके
संप्रदायन्तैः विषयात्साधित्वम् साधिते दर्शितः; एवं प्रकारितः सचारितः।
विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शितविषयं पुरुषम् साक्षी, न चाचेतनो विषयो वा शक्यो
विषयं दर्शितविषयं, इति चेतनायाविविधायाच भावति साक्षी। अत एव
द्रष्टा धीः भवति ॥

अस्त्रिक्षत्रुणाय कैलायम्। आत्मानितो दुःखात्माभावः कैलायम्।
( १३३ ) कैलायम्। तथ तस्य स्वाभाविकाद्वित्रेगुणात् सुखुः सखुः
मोहहिद्वालितिक्षतम् ॥

अतः एव्यागुणाराण्यठ्ठमस्य । सुकी हि सुलोच्य तृप्यन्तु दुःखी हि
( १३४) मध्यस्य, दुःखं द्विपन्त मध्यस्योऽि न भवति । तद्भयार- अर्थां च ॥
हितस्तु मध्यस्य इत्युदासीन इति चाध्याये।
विषवक्षदप्रस्तवधिबिभिष्माभावाकारतेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्वादेत्तूः-प्रमाणेन कर्त्त्वसम्यवचगम्य ' चेतनो सँहे चिकित्से कारोमि'
(१३५) चेतनाकर्तर्व-प्रवद्धि : सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभववस- दमू; तदेतसिमनमे नावकलप्यते, चेतनायाकर्तर्व- लाभातु कर्तुश्च चेतनायातु इत्यत आह—
तस्मात तत्संयोगाद चेतनां चेतनाविदिव चिन्मृ।
गुणकालत्वेच तथा कर्तेन भवन्युद्रासीनः। २०।।

"तस्मातु" इति। यत्ख्यातनकर्तर्वेच भिन्नाधिकरणे चुक्तत्व: सिद्धे,
(१३६) इत्यार्थित:।
तस्मातु भाविनिर्यायमित्यर्थ:। "चिन्मृ" मह- दारिदसुकुमर्यंतं सक्षित:। भाविनिर्यायमेतसं- योग: तस्मिनिधानम। अतिरोहितार्थमन्यतः। २०।।

'तस्मातः' इति। यत: भिन्नाधिकरणे चुक्तत्वे सिद्धे,
(१३७) पुरुषप्रथान:।
चेतनायाकर्तर्वः। विशिष्टकायोपायाकर्मकामांविनिधपक्षाहेतुमण।
कारसाह—
पुरुषस्य दशोनाल्य वैवाक्यार्थ तथा प्राधान्यः।
पञ्चनेत्रहुमयोरां तत्संयोगस्ततः। सागर:। २१।।

"पुरुषस्य" इति। प्राधान्यस्यति कर्मचरण: पश्ची। प्राधान्य सर्वकारः।
(१३८) प्राधान्यः।
यदर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्श्यम्। तदनेन भोग्यता 
पुरुषपक्षाः-भोक्तपक्षाः। प्राधान्यः दशिनता। तदर्श भोग्यं प्रधानम् भोक्त- 
रमन्तरणं न सम्बन्धतीति युक्ता उपयोग्यमोक्तपक्षा।
पुरुषपक्षाः दशिन्तिः। "पुरुषस्य क्रियाकार्थम्" इति। तथा हि भोग्येन 
(१३९) क्रियाकारः।
प्रधाने प्रसम्बितः। पुरुषपक्षां दुःखत्रयं स्वात्र- 
पुरुषस्य प्राधान्याः। न्यायिन्यमान:। क्रियाकाराः प्रार्थिते। तद् सत्यपु- 
हायतायात्यात्यात्यिनिर्ममु:। न च सत्यपुरुषायात्यात्यिन्ति: प्राधान्यमन्तरे—
गेति कैवल्यार्थम् पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते । अनादित्वाव ययोगपरस्परंया
भोगाय संयुक्ते तयी कैवल्याय पुनः संयुक्तात् इति युक्तम् ॥

ननु भवतनेऽम्: सयोगो, महद्यदिकस्रित्तु कुत् इत्यत आह्—“तत्कतः
सर्गः” इति। सयोगो हि न महद्यदिकस्रित्तमर्तेन
भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्यात् इति सयोग एव
भोगपर्कविधी सर्गः करोतीस्यवः: ॥ २१ ॥

सर्गमाह—

प्रश्चतेःहांस्ततो शहद्वास्तस्माद्वादश्च गोदशकः ।
तस्मादपि पोदशकापरश्च: पश्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

“प्रश्चते:” इति। प्रश्चतिव्यक्तम्। महद्यद्वित्रो वर्धमाणलक्षणो ।

(१४१) प्रश्चतेःहांस्तो—
एकादशोमिनियाचि व्ययमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च
नित्यादि सर्गकम्: ॥ पश्चः सौ उपोदशसंहयापरिमितो गानः: पोद-शकः
तस्मादपि पोदशकादपकृष्टेम्: पश्चम्यस्तमात्रेम्: पश्च भूतान्या-
काशादीनि ॥

तत् शब्दत्वमात्रादाकारं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दमात्रासहितित्वं सुर्यनमात्र-
(१४२) तन्मात्रायेऽस्रोतारुः: शब्दसर्वपरसुः, शब्दसर्वशार्यत्वमात्र-
सुर्यनमकेन मूलसर्गः: ॥ हितावृषत्तमात्राशेऽस्रोतारुः: शब्दसर्वपरसुः, शब्द-
सर्वशार्यत्वमात्रासहितादशत्वमात्रादाकारप: शब्दसर्वशार्यत्वपरसुः, शब्द-
सर्वशार्यत्वमात्रासहितादशत्वमात्राधुःच्छब्दसर्वशार्यत्वपरसुःगुणवः
पृथ्वी, जानम इत्यथः: ॥ २२ ॥

अन्यथां सामान्यतो दक्षितम् “तद्यिन्तव्यक्तम्” (कारिका १०)

(१४३) भविष्यक्षण:—
इत्यनेन; विशेषवस्तु “सर्व चल्व प्रकाशाम्”
प्रस्तावः ॥

(कारिका १३) इत्यनेन। व्यक्तमापि सामाय-
न्यतो लक्षितम् "हेतुमतः" (कारिका १०) इत्यादिना। समप्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगित्या व्यत्तिविशेषं बुद्धि क्षणयति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मः ब्राह्म विराग एक्षःप्र्यम्।
सात्त्विकमेतद्धृप्तं तामससमसाधिपर्यस्तम्॥ २३॥

"अध्यवसाय" इति। 'अध्यवसायो बुद्धि:' क्रियाक्रियावशेषेन।
(१४४) बुद्धिर्धर्मम् कित्वा। सबी न्यवहिता तत्त्वात्मा तत्त्वात्मा
अध्यवसाय इति॥ नारायणकर्त्तवो इत्यभिन्नो कर्त्तवो इत्यभिन्नो
ततथ प्रवृत्त इति लोकसिद्धम्। तत्र यो तत्त्वविद्या विनिर्द्याधिकति
सतिधानादापविचारायं बुद्धे: सो तत्त्वात्माः, बुद्धरसाधारो न्यायारः;
तदमेवा बुद्धि:। स च बुद्धिर्धर्मम् समानासमाधानातियन्यावेद्दक्षात्॥

तदेवं बुद्धि क्षणयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितस्तस्तम् धर्मीनमात्त्विकताम्
(१४५) बुद्धे: सात्त्विकाः धर्मः। धर्मज्ञानविकारित्यमिवानाः। तत्र
धर्मज्ञानविकारित्यमिवानाः निरुप्यम्॥ तत्र
निद्रानां ब्रह्माण् निद्रानां
सादृश्यस्तहः। तत्र यागानानातिन्याः
धर्मज्ञानविकारित्यमिवानाः निद्रानां
गुणपुष्पात्मात्मायात्तिरितानिम्। विरागो वैराग्यम्
रागामाभः॥

तस्य—यत्मानसंज्ञा
(१४६) विराग्ययतमानसंज्ञात्मानादितिकेतिकेतिकेतिकेति
त्तायतिकेतिकेति। निरुप्यमिव निरुप्यमिव।
संज्ञा:। इति चतुस्तरं। ज्ञानयत:। ज्ञानयत:। ज्ञानयत:।
तत्र प्रवृत्तितीत घरहृविनिद्रायाणितीत तत्तवप्रतिपतमानारः। परिवृत्ते च यस्ते अपेक्षितायां
परिवृत्ते च केचित्, तत्रैवं पूर्वपरिमोक्षिता सति पद्माकारोऽन्यम्: कपाय:—
पकायं न्यायित्क्रियाकारः न्यायित्क्रियां। इत्तद्रणस्मर्यम्
संज्ञा:। इति
पकानामौल सुक्रमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेके निद्रियसंज्जा। ऑतुक्यामात्र-स्यापि विगुंतितपरिस्थित्यापि द्रश्यानुस्राविकविषयेषु, त्य संज्ञानेषु पाराचीनासा वशीकारसंज्जा। यामत्रभवानु पतञाभिर्वायृद्ध्वाकार—"द्रश्यानुस्राविक-विषपिरित्यणय वशीकारसंज्जा रैराग्यम्" इति [योगसूत्रः १.१९]।
सो दूषयुद्धमेण विराग इति।

"श्रव्यमय पुद्धिधम्, यतो दणिमादिप्रादुर्भवः। (१) अन्त्राणिमा अत्र"。

(१४७) अथर्यनिः—शुभाभो, यतं दिशामय प्रविषाति। (२) लघुमय णेन अधितिश्वरिन्धुपणम्।
लघुभावः, यतं सूर्यमरीचिनालम्य सूर्योऽेकं याति। (३) गरिमा गुरुमात्र, यतो गुरुस्तवत। (४) महिमा मद्योऽ भावः,
यतो महानू महति। (५) प्रार्थन, यतो नक्त्यग्रेण सुप्रृति चन्द्रमय।
(६) प्राकामयमिच्छुन्धनचिवाति यतो, मूमातुमांजति निमाजति च यथोऽद्य।
(७) विशलमु, यतो भूतमौतिकं वसीभवविषयम्। इशिलमु, यतो भूतमौति-
कान्यां प्रभवस्थितिमैष्ट्य। (८) यज कामावसायिलमु सा सत्यसुक्लस्वत्ता, येन
यथास्य सहुल्लपो महति मृते तवेव मूलन महति। अन्येपां मन्त्याणां
निश्चयः निश्चेत्यमनविविधियते, योगहसून निश्चेतब्यः। पदार्थाः: निश्चयम।
इति चत्वार: सातिका बुद्धिधम्।

(१४८) बुद्धस्तमासा
तामसस्तु तदद्विरोहसा बुद्धिधम्। अथर्ये-धर्शमः अथर्यमैः
नावैराग्यनेत्रविमिनयमाणाश्च। इत्यथ:। २३।।

अह्स्त्रास्य नक्षणमाह—
अभिमानोऽह्स्त्र: तस्माति विधा: प्रवत्तते सत्ये:।
एकादशक्ष: गणस्तमात्रश्चैकक्ष्यः। २४।।

"अभिमान" इति। ‘अभिमानोऽह्स्त्रः।’ यतः चत्वारेणिविधियते
(१४९) अह्स्त्रास्य च तत्र ‘अहमिषिन्तः,’ ‘शान्तः खल्ल्हमयः’
नक्षणम।।
‘मद्याः एवानी विषयः,’ ‘मच्छो नान्यो यत्र--
को. २४-२५ ] अहंकारस्य कार्यभेदः।।

विध्वं: कार्यदातः, 'अतो शहस्त्रम' इति यो समिन्दः सो साधा-
ण्यापार्लादहारः।। तमुपजीव न्हि वुद्विरयवस्यते-'कर्त्त्वे-मेत्-मया'
इति निन्द्यं करोति।।

तस्य कार्यभेदमः—''तस्माद्-वद्विद्विवध: प्रवर्तते सगोः' इति।। प्रका-
(१५०) अहंकारस्य रचयमः—''एकादशक्ष गणः'' इन्द्रियाहः।।
कार्यभेदः।।

तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्रेण।। विनिमित्वा तद् सगोः अहंकारात्
न लब्धि इति 'एव'-कारणावध्याश्यति।।२४।।

स्पदेततु—अहंकारादेवपञ्चकारणादि जडः-प्रकाशकोऽगणो विल-
क्षणी भवति इत्यत आह—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैः-प्रहारहारात्।।
भूतादेशस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तेजसादुभयमः।।२५।।

"सात्त्विक" इति।। प्रकाशसङ्गाब्यामेकादशकः इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विकोऽ
वैः-प्रहारहाराप्रवर्तते।। भूतादेशवहाराहाराचारसात्त्विकोऽ
तन्मात्रोऽगणः प्रवर्तते।। कस्मात्? यत् 'सात्त्विक':
(१५१) एकादशस्य-
विद्विद्विवधः गुणमेदात्री—
कार्यभेदः—सत्त्वादिन्द्रिय-गणः, तमसातत्त्वान्तः।।

नन्तु यदि सत्त्वमेवमेव सर्वे कार्यं जन्यते तदा इत्तत्त्वकिष्किरे
(१५२) सत्त्ववस:—
प्रवर्तत्वतः गणः सार्थ-कतः।।

रजसेत्यत आह—“तेजसादुभयमः” इति।। तेज-
सात्त्विकसादुभयमेव गणद्रव्यं भवति।। यथापि रहसोऽ
न कार्यान्तरसिद्धि तथा सि सत्त्ववसी स्वय-
मनिषवें समर्थे आपि न स्वस्तिकलयं कुलत्।। रजसु चर्चतया ते सदा चाल-यति तदा स्वस्तिकलयं कुलत इति।। तुम्हियमयमिषिद्धि कार्यं सत्त्वसमी
जियोऽदनमारणान्तिका गणः: कारणाचार्याति न वयः रज इति।।२५।।
शास्तिकमेकादसमालयां शाश्वेतियस्तकं तावदाह—
बुद्धिन्द्रयाणि चःश्रोतहिराणरसनत्वगाणयानि
वाक्पणाहिपपायुपस्थानि कर्मिन्द्रयाणयाहुः। ॥ २६॥

"बुद्धिन्द्रयाणि" इति। शास्तिकामहामहापादानात्मभिन्द्रयाम।
तथा।

(१५३) शाश्वेतिय-धर्मं इन्द्रगुलकस्मा पतिन्द्रस्यात्मनशिवहिराणिणिणुपर्यते।
तानि च

स्वर्णाभिन्द्राराजदिस्तुकिर्ति।

तत्र रूपप्रहण-रिणं चः। शन्यथ्रपाणिणं श्रोत्रम्। गन्धप्रहणाविं द्राणम्।
रसप्रहण-रिणं रसम्। शर्मप्रहणाविं त्वकः। इति जानेनियाणां संबा।

एवं वागादीनां काब्यति (कारिका २८)। ॥ २६॥

एकादसमिन्द्रयमाह—

उभयामकमः मनः। सकृपकमिन्द्रयं च साध्यमौषदः।

शुण्यपरिणामविरोपणाचालात्वं बाह्यनेदारः। ॥ २७॥

"उभयामकमः" इति। एकादशमिन्द्रयेषु मध्ये मन उभयामकमः।

(१५४) मनसो वुकिक-मोमियात्मकलमस्तु।

च मनोधितितानामेव स्वप्नवियेषु प्रवृत्ते। ॥

तदसाधारणेऽवेः रूपेण वक्ष्यति—"सकृपकमः मनः।" इति।

सकृपेन(१५५) मनसो दक्ष-ञ्जम-सकृपकस्तमु दक्ष-समनवर्धम।

इति सम्प्रकल्पयति विशेषदिविशेषभावनेन विवे-

चयतीति यावत्। यदाद्—

समुगमं वसुमात्रं तु ग्रहान्वयनविकालितम्।

तत् सामान्यविशेषायं कल्पतिति मनोपिणः। ॥ इति ॥

तथा हि, अर्थान हालोचित्त्रान्त्र प्रथमंनिर्भिकल्पकमु बाल्मूकाधिवि-
(१५६) मनस इन्द्रियवसाधनम्-इन्द्रियः।
साधिताहकाशायोऽदानवसाधनायां।
मनो उपसाधारण्यापरिवर्त्योऽनेनिन्द्रियः भवितूः।
महत्त्वत आहं-“इन्द्रियं च” इति। कुतः? इत्र
“साधिताहायोऽदानवसाधनायां।
इन्द्रियान्तः साधिताहकाशायोऽदानवसाधनायां।
पादानवं च साधिताम् नलिन्द्रियः। महादहस्।
दहस् योऽदानवसाधनायांप्रदानवसाधनायां।
तस्मादवयतिमात्रनिद्रितं च इति।
न तु प्रवृत्तिनिर्मितम्।

अथ कथं साधिताहकाशायोऽदानवसाधनायांद्रियान्तः आहं-“गुण-
परिवर्त्योऽदानवसाधनायांद्रियान्।
शाददानवसाधनायांद्रियान्।
“बाह्यमेदादशं” इति। द्यान्तार्थम्-यथा बाह्य-
मेदादातंदीपितायः। २७।।

(१५७) देशनिद्रित्व-तदेशनिद्रित्वानि प्रसर्पम उक्त्वा दशानबहुतुष्टमानमात्रामिनित्ये।
नामामन्त्रानिगुणवृत्तिरापह—
शादद्विभुप मध्यानामात्राहोमात्रमात्रामिनित्ये।
“बचनादनविहरणोत्सर्गवन्ददशं प्रत्यायम्” २८।।
“बुधविनिद्रियां समाभवसद्वर्गानमात्राहोमात्रमात्रामिनित्ये।
कष्टप्रायानित्रियां च वाकू, तथा शृंगावच्छन, वाशिनिद्रियां वृत्त्यः स्पष्टः।। २८।।
अन्तःकरणवृत्ति: | [सौ. तृ.

अन्तःकरणप्रयंत वृत्तिमाहः

स्वाभाविक वृत्तिसः सेवा भव्यसामान्यः।
सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणाय वायवः पश्चः २९।।

"स्वाभाविकम्" इति। स्वाभाविक वृत्तिसः। स्मसाधारणः कक्षणः

(१६०) अन्तःकरण

येषा तानि स्वाभाविकानि महद्वीषारमणांसि, तेषा
भावः स्वाभाविकम्। तच स्वाभाविकानि कक्षणः-

न्येव। तद्यथा-महतो स्थविसायो सहस्पात्या-
भिमानः। त्वपि मनसो वृत्तिशार्यपारः।।

वृत्तिशार्यपारिः साधारणसाधारणवाच्यामाहः-"सेवा भव्यसामान्यः"

(१६१) पञ्चबुद्धिः असाधारणी। "सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणायाः
साधारणी वृत्ति:। वायव: पश्चः।। सामान्याः काशी करणवृत्तिश्रेष्ठिः।

त्रयावाणापि करणानां पश्चः वायवो जीवनं वृत्ति:, तद्रवे भावातृ तद्रःको
चामावातृ। तत्र प्राणो नासास्त्राध्यामिपादान्तुक्त्वृत्ति:, अपान: इकाटि-
कामप्रमाणायुपस्थपार्श्ववृत्ति:, समानो हृदाभिसेर्वसहिवृत्ति:, उदानो
इकाटेनासास्त्रुभूमिवृत्ति:, व्यासत्वम्पुर्वितिरित पश्चः वायवः।। २९।।

चतुर्विधकरणस्यासाधारणीचु वृत्तिपु क्रममात्रि स्मसाधारावाहः

युगपञ्चतलवस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशः तत्सवय निरंदिया।
हेतृपु तथा जन्यदेये व्रयस्य तत्पुर्विका वृत्तिः।। ३०।।

"युगपञ्च" इति, छत्रे यथा—यदा सन्तसान्यायो विद्यसम्पादमा-

(१६२) चतुर्विधकरणस्यासाधारणेण महान्याग्रमभंमकेरस्विनितिनिनिति वा

युगपञ्चायोजनस्यासाधारणाध्यवसायम्। युग-

पदेव प्राधमेरे, यत्सातृ उत्तुष्म तत्साधारेक्षकेत अपराति।।

"क्रमशः" यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमसन्ताविद्वृतां सम्मुखतमालोचयति,

(१६३) क्रमशः।। अथ प्राधितमात्र: कणीताक्ष्णस्यासाध्यनन्दी-
स्यादेत।—पूर्णैं त्रयाणां या व्रतमिहू न ताबमात्राधीनः, तेषां सदातनः।
(१६२) करणानं यथैनं दिण्यायद्राह्म्यम, आकामिकवे तु तन्तवे हीणः। वृत्तिसघनप्रसङ्ख्ये नियममेतोरामाविद्यत आहे—
स्वां स्वां प्रतिपदनं पर्वपराकृतेहतुकं व्रतिम।
पुरुषार्थे पव हेतुनं केनचित्कायते करणम्। ३०।।

"स्वाम्" इति। करणानीति शेषः। यथा हि वहनः पुरुषः।
(१६३) तथि रान्तः—परस्परप्रतिप्रणयेश्वारणात् यथोऽत्, तत्त्रान्यतमस्याकृतमवच्छं—
स्यान्यतमः प्रवर्त्ये, प्रवर्त्यांभासां शक्ति: शक्ति:—
मेवादिर्वयुत यद्वादिकम्, एवं याथिको धिप यष्टिमेव, न यश्यादिकम्।
तथा उन्त्यतस्य करणस्याकृततां सकार्यकरणाभिमुख्यदन्ततं करणं
प्रवर्ति। तत्प्रवृष्ठ्ये हेतुवाच सूक्ष्रप्रसङ्ख्यं इत्यत्म—"स्वां स्वां प्रति-
पदनं" इति।

स्यादेत्—याथीकादयस्थेतपनवं परस्पराकृतमवच्छं प्रवर्त्ये।
(167) करणानां युक्तम्। करणानि लचेतनानि, तस्मातेव प्रव- चेतनावै गुप्तार्थस्ये। तेनेनामधिव्योग्यता करणानं स्वरूप- पसामाथ्योपयोगाभिनेन भवित्वविनैर्य आहेत्।
“पुरुषार्थ संन्य संदर्भाते; न केनचिक्खते करणस्य।” इति। भोगपर्यावरोऽणे। क्षम: पुरुषार्थ एवं व्याख्यातावस्थ:। प्रवर्त्ययति करणानि, क्लतंत्र तत्स्वरूपाभिनेन कर्ताः। एतत् “वसविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” (कारकिका ६७) इत्यतःपयो:-

(168) करणविने। “न केनाचित् कार्यकः करणस्य।” इत्युक्तम्।
भाग:। तत्र करणं विमुखते—
करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तद्विद्वारणविअकाशकर्मन्।
कार्यं च तस्य दशाया, हार्यं धार्यं प्रविधः च। ३२।।
“करणं त्रयोदशविधम्” इति। इत्यिन्निथ्योकाश बुद्धिविकाशे।
(169) त्रयोदशकार्यकरणः। त्रयोदशप्रकाशकरणः| कारकाविशेषः करणस्य।
विकर्णपरिवर्जनम्। न च व्यापारोऽसं विना कारकविशेषं व्यापारिषेषमाहस:—
“तद्विद्वारणविअकाशकर्मन्” इति। यथायथम्। तत्र केमन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्याहर्त्यति, यथास्मुपाददते, स्वाध्यायर्ष व्यापारिषेषमाहसः यावत्।
बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयति।

आद्यगर्भानिधिकियाणां सकार्ककतयत यं कर्म कालिविं चेष्टात्
(170) करणवियाः। आहार्यत्व अत्याहार्य। कार्यं च तस्य्।
दशविधस्य करणस्य दशाया, आद्यगर्भानिधिकियाणां च।
आद्यगर्भयोक्तां। केमन्द्रियाणि वचनादानविहारणोऽपि।
नन्दाः धैर्यावर्त्तम्; तेन च यथायथं विवाहादिविजयं दशं—इति।

१ यथाक्रममित्ययः।
दशावा। एवं धार्मिक:पत्न: करण:त्रयस्य प्राण:दिलेक्षणया वृत्त्या शरीरस्,
तत: पार्थिवादिपाश्चत्मोतिक्मोऽश्वाद्विनां पश्चातां समूहः प्रश्निवी, ते च
पश्च दिन्यादिन्यत्वता दशेति धार्मिक: पद्धारा। एवं बुद्धीनिद्रायणाः
श्वादिन्यत्वात् यथायथं व्याप्तः; ते च यथायथं दिन्यादिन्यत्वा
दशेति प्रकृत्यापि दशेते॥ ३२॥

(१७१) त्रयोधशिविशकरणः स्वान्तरविभागः करोति—
बाध्यान्तरेनेदात्॥

अन्तःकरण त्रिविधं दशाय बाध्य त्रयस्य विषयायथम्।
सामप्रतकालां बाध्यं त्रिकालमाध्यन्तरं करणम्॥ ३३॥

(१७२) अन्तःकरण—
रैवीधम्॥

"अन्तःकरणम्" इति। अन्तःकरण त्रिविधम्
‘बुद्धिनिद्रायणं मनं’ इति; शरीराम्यन्तरः
तिलवातःकरणम्॥

"दशात्" बाध्यकरणम् “त्रयस्य” अन्तःकरणस्य “विषयायथम्”॥

(१७३) बाध्यकरण—
विषयायथात् विषयस्युप्स्याभिमानाध्वस्यायेशु
कर्त्तयेशु द्वाराधिकति। ततः बुद्धीनिद्रायणां
चनेन, केमनिद्रायणं तु यथायथं व्याप्तं॥

बाध्यान्तरम्: करणयोंचेषोन्तरसमाह—“सामप्रतकालम्” इति। वर्त—

(१७४) बाध्यान्तर—
करणोपेत:—बाध्यकरण—
नां वर्तमानकालांतः, अन्तःकरणां त्रिकाली—
नस्यम्॥

बाध्यान्तरम्| करणयोंचेषोन्तरसमाह—“सामप्रतकालम्” इति। वर्त—
मानकालं बाध्यमिर्ययम्। वर्तमानसमीपनमनागत—
मतीमनि वर्तमान: मूं; अतो वाग्यि वर्तमानकालः
विषया भवति। “त्रिकालमाध्यन्तरं करणम्”
इति। तथाया—नदीपुरेनेदाशूद्धिः; अस्ति।
काल्पनिक\(\text{अति}^{12}\) वैश्विककामित\(\text{अति}^{13}\) एको न अनगातादित्यवहारमें प्रवर्तित्युत-(135) साध्यमें महत्ति तस्मादयौ वैश्विकधिमेंद्रसाचारादित्यमें काल्पनिक न तस्मान्तर्वर्तमें।

प्राप्तिपते संतु पर एतोपयादा; क्योः नागातादित्यवहारे हरेतवसः छतमचार्तरंगादन चाक्षेमेन साध्याचारि; तस्माच्छ काल्पनिक पतचार्त्रामुपगम इति ॥ १३ ॥

(136) वासुनिधिय- सामप्रतकालानां बाह्येनिथ्रयाणा विषय विवेक- 

विषयविवेचनम् ॥

हयति च

वुद्दीनिथ्रयाणारे पत्र पञ्चविशेषार्थियविषयाणि।

वाम्माति शान्त्विषया शैवाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि। ॥ ३४ ॥

"वुद्दीनिथ्रयाणि" इति। "वुद्दीनिथ्रयाणि" "तपा" दशाना।

(137) वुद्दीनिथ्रयाणा मिन्द्राणांमभे "पञ्चा"। "विशेषार्थियविषया: स्नृतसूर्तसम्बहुः। पञ्चाणि" विशेषा: स्मृत्रा शब्दाद्य: शान्त्वो- 

रमदारुपः पृथिविधिरुपः; अविशेषार्थिन्मानारुपः सुक्ष्मा: शब्दाद्य:।

मात्रप्रहणन स्नृतसूर्तमपाकर्तित। विशेषावश अविशेषावश विशेषाविषयाः; त एव बिषया येषा वुद्दीनिथ्रयाणा तानि तथोत्यक्ति। तत्रोद्योखेतमाषो 

योगिनाधि श्रोत्रं शब्दत्माकिर्मियं स्नृतसूर्तशब्दियं च, अस्मादाद्यान्तु 

स्नृतसूर्तशब्दविषयं । एववषेतां तस्मात्र्व्यक्तसूर्तशर्मिशिक्षा, अस्मादाद्यान्तु 

स्नृतसूर्तशर्मिशिक्षा । एववषेताऽध्यायो सपि तेषामास्मादाद्यान्तु च सूंदर्दिपुरा 

सूंदर्दिपुरा दृष्ट्यम्। ॥ 

एवं कमेंद्रियेपु मध्ये "वाम्माति शान्त्विषया" स्नृतसूर्तशब्दियय, तद्दे -

1. तंमान्त्रयिदे । 2. 'भूतभाविनिवाव्यम्कर्तिर' इति पाथान्तरसः।
(१५८) कर्मानिद्रायणं दत्तात्। न तु शबद्यमानस्य देहतस्माहः-विषयः।
रिक्तवेन वागिन्द्रियेण सहेककारावकालत्।
“शेषाणि तु” चतुर्विपूर्णस्यापिपाणिपादवस्मानिः “प्रक्षयनिष्याणि” पाण्याः-
धारायणां पटादीनां पञ्चशदाधायांत्वा विषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

साम्प्रत: त्रयोदशस्तुकरणेणुपेक्षाध्यायांनत्वकरमात्—
सान्त:करणा वुद्धि: सर्वं विश्वमचगाहते यस्मात्।
तस्मात:तत्त्विविधं करणं द्वारिः, धाराणि शेषाणि। ॥ ३५ ॥

“सान्त:करणा” इति। “द्वारिः” प्रक्षानम्। “धाराणि” करणानि, बाहुद्विद्रायणिः द्वाराणि। 
तत्त्वैतिष्ठ सर्वं विश्वम समानोऽहोऽरङ्गावशिष्या वुद्धि: 
यस्मादवगाहते स्वयमसत्त: 
औषध्ययो तस्मात:धाराद्विद्रायणिः द्वाराणि, द्वार- 
वंति च सान्त:करणा बुद्धिरिति। ॥ ३५ ॥

न केवला बाहुद्विद्रायणिः यन्त्रां बुद्धि:, अपि तु ये द्विधाकारः-
मनसी द्वारिणी ते अंपेरक्षा बुद्धि: प्रधानपतियाह्—
पते प्रदीपकलपः: परस्परविन्दुक्षणा गुणविशेषाः।
车辆्यें पुरुषस्यार्थे प्रकाशय बुद्धी प्रयच्छिन्ति। ॥ ३६ ॥

“पते” इति। यथा हि प्रामाध्यकः: कौटिक्येशः: कर्मादाय 
(१५९) अन्तःकर-  
विश्वाशः प्रवचिन्ति, विश्वाशः सर्वाः- 
धारापि बुद्धि: प्रधानान्यम्। 
ध्याश्च, त च भूपतेव; तथा बाहुद्विद्रायणिः अक्षुरः 
समस्यणिः, मनस्य सक्तयुहारङ्गाय, अहक्षुरः 
मूलायम्,—तद्विन्दुक्षम्—“पुरुषस्थः प्रकाशय बुद्धी प्रयच्छिन्ति” इति। 
बाहुद्विद्रायमनोऽहोऽरङ्गारः “गुणविशेषा”: गुणानां सत्त्रजस्तमसां
सर्वभयो बुद्धः प्राधान्यम्। [ सां । त।

विकारः, ते तु परस्परभिरोधशीला अपि पुरुषस्य भोगापरग्रहणं वेगज्ञात:। यथा वर्तिते-क्वहयः सत्त्वसापनं रूपप्रकाशय मिलिताः। प्रदीपः, एवमेवे गुणाविशेषः। इति योजना॥३६॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रयर्ज्ञित: न तु बुद्धीचिल्लाराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेतत आह—

सर्व प्रत्युपमोर्ग यस्मात् पुरुषस् साधयति बुद्धः।
सैव च विशिष्टति पुनः प्रधानपुरुषस्तत्र सूक्ष्मम्॥ ३७॥

"सर्वम्" इति। पुरुषस्य प्रयोजकल्पतु तस्य यस्मात्साहस्यन्ति ततः

(१८२) बुद्धः प्रधान-नाशान्तसम्य-साधविभ-धीरसाधनांतवात्॥

साधनत्या प्राधानिनाते तु प्रामाण्यादयस्त-भ्रति गुणभूता:। बुद्धिः पुरुषस्यस्निधानातु तत्तत्त्वायापत्या तद्वपूर्व सर्व-विषयोपयोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति। सुखद: खानुमावः हि भोगः। स च बुद्धः। बुद्धिः पुरुषस्यवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपोजयाति। यथा तर्कात्मक-निस्फुट्पारामानाश्च तत्तः परपरणामेन बुद्धाविश्वास्तः। तथेतद्विग्यायापरा अपि बुद्धिः स्वस्वारेरुपाध्वसायेन सहीक्यापराधिवान्ति, यथा स्वस्वेन्येन सह प्रामाण्याधिके सर्ववाच्यश्च भवति। "सर्वं" शब्दादिं "भ्रतिः" य च "उपमोः"। "पुरुषस्य" तं साधयति॥

नन् पुरुषस्य सर्वविष्योपयोगादिकाय यदि बुद्धः तद्विन्दिकः

(१८३) पुरुषविध्यान-परग्रहं इतिविद्यानिव्य-नित्यसंसारं-रज्ज्वाधिकात्॥

इत्य आह—पश्चात् "प्रधानपुरुषस्य" विशेषं "विशिष्टति" करोति यथोदनपाक पचतिति, करणं च प्रतिपादनम्। नन् प्रधान-पुरुषोपत्तस्य क्षतकलादनित्यतम्, तत्कत्तय
मोक्षस्यानित्यं स्पादितय आह—“बिशिनंत्रि”—प्रधानं सविकार—
मन्यदहम् यतं वियमानमेवान्तरसविवेकेनाविचाराद्भावविव, बुद्धि-वृत्तयति,
न तु करोति, येनानित्यलिमित्यः। अनेनपर्वें: पुरुः राज्यां दायित्वः।
“सूक्ष्मम्” दुरुख्यां तदन्तरमित्यः। ३७।।

तदेवं करणानि विभय विशेषः विशेषानि विभजते—
तन्मात्राणयविशेषः; तेभ्यो भूतानि पश्च पश्चभयः।
पते स्मृतां विशेषः; शान्ता घोरार्थ सूत्राध इ। ३८।।

“तन्मात्राणि” इति। शब्दार्दिदतन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि। न चेवा।
(१८४) अविशेष—
(वृक्ष) कथनम्।
मात्राधार्थः।

अविशेषानुवका विशेषान्विततृतिपतिमाशः—“तेभ्यो भूतानि” इति।
(१८५) विशेष (स्मृत—
(कथनम्-तद्युपपतित—
हरिन्युपक्रमम्।
वृक्षस्तम्मात्रेवं यथासंबंधेवक्तिद्वितिचन्तु: पश्चभयः
“पश्च” भूतां-याकाशानवयालिविविविवापणां।
“पश्च” तन्मात्रेम्।

अस्वेत् तपायुपति, विशेषस्य किमान्यातत्मत्यत आह—“पते स्मृतां
(१८६) भूतानां स्मृता विशेषाः।” इति। कुत:—“शान्ता घोरार्थ सूत्राध।”
चकार एको हेतो द्वितीय: समुच्छये। यस्मादाकाशादिपु स्त्रोतेपु सत्तप्राधानंया केरीमा। चांदान: सुखः,
कृषिद्विलणः प्रधानं योऽहोऽहुः अनपर्ष्ठतः, केरीमा: प्रधानं च तथा विविवणां गुरुः।
ते च समी परस्पर्यावृत्या चनुमूयानार्थि किमान्याताः।
“विशेषाः” इति च “स्मृता या”। इति चोप्यन्ते। तन्मात्राणि यस्मादाकि: परस्पर्यावृत्यां तात्त्विना नानन्दूम्यन्ते, इति विशेषः। सूक्ष्मा इति चोप्यन्ते। ३८।।
विशेषाणमवान्तरविशेषमाह—
सूक्ष्मा मातापितुजा: सहस्रभूतीष्ठिथा विशेष: स्यू: !
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितुजा निर्धारिते || ||
“सूक्ष्मा” इति || “त्रिया विशेष: स्यू:” इति, तानू विशेषन्यप्रकारानाह—
(१८७) अयातं—
“सूक्ष्मा:” सूक्ष्मदेहाः परिकल्प्यताः, “माता-
विशेषकथानम्-सूक्ष्माद्
पितृजा:” पाटकौशिका: || तत्र मातृतो कोम-
कृत्यत्वसाय, पितृतस्तु साध्यस्यभाषणम् इति
एकादशोः || प्रक्षणये महानति भुतानि “प्रभूतानि”—तेसाह || सूक्ष्मम
शरीरमेको विशेष:, मातापितुजो द्वितीय:, महाभूतानि तृतीय:, महा�-
मूलभम् च घटादीनां विनेत्राय इति ||

सूक्ष्ममातापितुजोहेयोधेयोंिशेषमाह—“सूक्ष्मा-
(१८८) सूक्ष्ममाता-
पितुजोदेयोंहेयोंलिखनांनियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतानियतात
नवउत्ति न शरीरों भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, क्रतं द्रस्यमानेन पाद्रोकौ-शिकेन शरीरेन्द्र्यत आह—“संसरति” इति।
(१९०) (१) संसरत-णम् निरुपमोगतं च तत्र पाद्रोकौशिकशरीर-सावश्यकतम्॥
उपाचारपारं पाद्रोकौशिकं शरीरं जहाति हायं हायं चोपादते—कस्मात् इति “निरुपमोगम्”
यतः; पाद्रोकौशिकं शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं
शरीरं निरुपवेशं यस्मात्समात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति॥

ननु धमोधर्ममिनिचतं संसारं; न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्याति तथोगः;
(१९१) धर्माधर्मा-दिम्भवाैष्यवािसिततमूल् के तत्संसरणम्॥
तत्कथं संसरतीयत आह—“भौवरिविवािसितम्”
इति। धर्माधर्माैनानानवरोहियंवरोहेैथवर्यनैैथ-थाणीण मावः; तदनिविता बुद्धः; तदनिवितः
सूक्ष्मं शरीरामिति तदापि भावप्रवित्तिमू, यथा सुरविष्मपकुसुमसम-कादिः तदापदवित्तिमभवति। तस्मात्वैवेशादविवािसितवासंसरति॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिच्य महाप्रलये धपि
(१९२) महाप्रलये तथय च मित्तलालित-लम्॥
तस्य च गच्छतिप्रस्तो भिषमू—हेतुमलेन चाच्य भिषम-वामिति मावः॥ ४०॥

स्यादेतस्—बुद्ध्रेभ साहज्ञारेत्रियां कस्मात् संसरति? क्रतं सूक्ष्मशरी-रेणाप्रामाणार्णकेनेवत आह—
चिर्चं यथानुष्मुङ्खे स्थाणवािविभ्यो विना यथा चेताया।
तदाद्विना विनिरोधनं तितिति निराथम्य भिषम्॥ ४१॥

“चित्रम्” इति। भिषकात् ज्ञानरत् बुन्धाद्वैयो ‘भिषम्’, ततः
(१९३) सूक्ष्मशरीर-स्वाच्छवक्त्रसङ्ग्रहनम्॥
अनाध्यरं तिति। जनमांशनांतरं बुन्ध्या-दयं: प्रत्युपनःसरीराध्या;—प्रत्युपनपूर्वतनार्णाद्—
सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणप्रकारः

वच्चे सति बुद्धयादिवात्-द्ययमण्यशरीरश्चतिवृद्धयादिवत्। “विना विशेषेः” इति, सूक्खेः शरीररूपिणयः। आगमधात्रजः भवति—

“तत् सुयवचः कायात् पाशयवद्वं यशस्ततम्।”

अहुंकृष्मात्रे पुरुषं निधानकरं बलायम्।” (सहभारत वनपर्वं-अध्याय २९६) इत्यज्ञातमण्ये सूक्ष्मशरीरकं मुख रचयति। आत्मो निधानकर्षणम्

वात् सूक्ष्मेच्छ शरीरसु ‘पुरुषः’, तद्यथा पुरी शुल्कशरीरे जेतेष्टि। इति। ॥ ४१ ॥

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरार्थस्य मुपपाना यथा संसरति, एनेहतुना च—तद्भयमान—

पुरुषार्थेहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंज्ञेन।

प्रक्षेत्रेविमुख्ययोगायज्ञविवात्तुष्टे निर्बन्धम्। ॥ ४२ ॥

“पुरुषार्थेहेतुकमु” इति। पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम्। “निमित्तम्।

(१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीर- धर्मविमादि, “नैमित्तिकम्” तेदु तेदु निकानसंसरणप्रकारः।

येदु यथायथं पार्थकशिरशरीरप्रहः, सहि धर्मादिनिमित्तप्रमुचं। निमित्तसं नैमित्तिककथे—तथा यः प्रसङ्गः प्रसारक्षतया “नन्दवग्वतिछेति निर्बन्धम्।” सूक्ष्मशरीरसु। वयथि हि नतस्तं तां सूक्खहितं विघाय

परासात्रामी वा बजातत्त्वयुवा बस्तराजो वा भवति, एनवत्तृत्तद्भविषोपसाधिहः

द्वे जनो या पशुण्यो वा मनुष्यो या पशुर्वा वनस्थितिवा भवति सूक्खम् सहिरभिमयः।।

(१९५) सूक्ष्मशरीर- कुतस्यः पुनरस्थिरं महिमेः ज्ञात—

संसरणे हेतु-प्रक्षेतरं—

सूक्खम्। ॥

“प्रक्षेत्रेविमुख्ययोगात्” इति। तथा च पुरणम्—

“वैधुष्यस्त्र प्रधानस्य परिणामो स्यमहूत” इति। ॥ ४२ ॥

“निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंज्ञेन” हयुक्तम्-तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिकके विभजये—

सांसिद्धिकास्य भवायो: प्राकृतिका चाँगेविकास्य धर्मयमः। इति।

रूपं करणाभ्रायणं कार्यार्थयण्यं कलावलयः। ॥ ४३ ॥

“सांसिद्धिकास्य” इति। “चाँगेविका:” नैमित्तिकाः, पुरुषस्य जातस्यो-


(१९६) निमित्तते—भिन्नकालिनभागः—यथार्थति—
हृदयनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिक—
वेषातिकारककरणम्, तथा
कर्मचर्यायत्वायनम्।

(१९७) शरीरगतह्रे—
निमित्तस्य कार्याविषय—
त्वकरणम्।

(१९८) निमित्तविखे—
पाणां कार्यविशेषभिषप—
प्रम्।

अवगतानि निमित्तनेमित्तकानि। कतमस्य
तु निमित्तस्य कतमनेमित्तिकामित्य आह—

धर्मण गमनमूर्ध्यः, गमनमध्यस्तास्रव्यधर्मणः
ञानेन चापवर्गः, विपर्ययादिविधते बन्धः।

"धर्मण गमनमूर्ध्यः" दुप्रम्फुतु लोकेपु। "गमनमध्यस्तास्रव्य-
धर्मणः" दुप्रम्फुतु लोकेपु। "ञानेन चाप-
वर्गः।" तान्देव प्रकृतिके गमार्थः त याव—
द्वितिकायतित्य करोणि; अय विवेकव्यातौ सवां
क्षत्रित्तव्य विवेकायतित्मन्तप्रुपम्प्रति निवर—
ते। यथाहः—

"विवेकायतित्यायतित्यायतित्यायतित्यायतित्यायति \\
इति।

"विपर्ययालौ" अतचञ्जानत् "इति वन्धः।"
प्राकृतिकार्थिकान्तरयम्। [ सां. त.

स च त्रिविध:-प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको द्राक्षी-
(200) वन्याच्यिवि-
ध्यानिष्ठतम् प्राकृतिक-
वैकृतिक-द्राक्षीणकर्मम्।

‘पूर्ण शतसहस्रो हि तिल्पण्युक्तचिन्तका:’ इति।
वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विभारविवेचन मूलनिर्दिष्टान्तारुखुः। पूर्पधियो-
पास्ते, तानु प्रतीदस्यते॥

‘दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिल्पणीद्रवि-चिन्तका:।
मृतिकृत्सु शाख्योपूर्ण, सहस्तत्वाभिमानिका:।
वैस्त्र दश सहस्त्राणि तिल्पणि विगतज्ञसा:।
ते खल्लमी विदेही येष पुरस्तिको बन्ध:’ इति॥

इतीपूर्वें द्राक्षीणक:। पुरुपत्वानहितो हिदापूर्वेन्त्रकारी कामो-
पहतमाना वर्त्येऽपि इति॥ ४४॥

बैराग्यातु प्रकृतिलयः। संसारो महवति राजसारागात।
ऐवियोद्विघातो विनर्याचूतुचित्रर्यः॥ ४५॥

‘बैराग्यातु प्रकृतिलयः’ इति-पुरुपत्वानेवषय बैराग्यमन्त्रातुः
(201) बैराग्यातु प्रकृतिलयः। प्रकृतिप्रमूणेन प्रकृतिमहद्धकारसू-
प्रकृतिलयः॥ तेनित्रियाणि गृहस्तेऽते, तेज्यामुक्त्योपास्यमानेनृ
ल्यः। कालान्तरेऽेछ च पुनर्परिभ्वतिः॥

१ ‘भौतिका’-ये भूताच्यै पुरुषधियोपसाते। ‘आभिमानिका’-ये अहाबर्मेव पुरुषधियो-
योपसाते। ‘बौधा’-ये बुद्धिनेव पुरुषधियोपसाते। २ बिरेदा-वैकृतिकविभवं संज्ञानसंपर्कम्,
पारिबाधितम्। ३ वायुक्तसङ्ग्रामदिदे वैकृतिकविभवं संज्ञानसंपर्कम्।
जगत्रमानसंपर्मानमः। पूर्णात्मको च य देवतात्त्वत्ततानि च। अभगगुणासः
विभवं। पूर्णात्मको च य देवतात्त्वत्ततानि च। अभगगुणासः। अन्स्त्रेणाऽ० च यहानसितगुणगुणाः
मिश्रते। ४ ये प्रकृतिदिय गृहस्तेऽते।
(२०२) राजसात्रा
गात संसार: ||

"संसारो भवति राजसामागात्" इति ||
‘राजसात्रात्’ इथनेन रजसो दुःखेतुत्वात् संसार-रस्य दुःखेतुता सूचिता ||

"ऐक्षराद्विगात्" इति-इच्छाया: || ऐक्षरो हि यदेनेच्छति तदेव करोति || “विपर्ययात्”
अनेक्षरात् “तद्विपर्यः” सर्वेच्छाविगात्
इत्यथ: || ४६ ||

(२०३) ऐक्षराद्विगात्; अनेक्षराद्विगात्: ||

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनश्च भवानू समासव्यासायः मुसुकृत्या ह्योपदेशायां दशंसिद्वानु प्रथमन्त्वावत् समासमाह—
पण प्रत्ययसंगी विपर्ययावार्तितुदितिसिद्धार्थः: ||
गुणवेयपविचारात्, तस्य च मेदास्तु पठाशारद् || ४६ ||

“पणः” इति || प्रत्ययेति बनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धि:; तस्य सर्गः: || तत्र
(२०४) विपर्ययाविदि-
बुद्धिधर्मसंस्कृत समासन कथ- ||

“विपर्ययः” अद्यनमविधा, सा अपि बुद्धिधर्मः;
“आशक्तः” अपि करणवीकल्पेतुवकु बुद्धिधर्मम
नम्: ||
एव: || “तुशिषिदी” अपि वशयात्सलक्षणे
बुद्धिधर्मन्येव, तत्र विपर्ययावार्तितुदितिसु यथायोगं सतानाध्य धर्मादीनाः ज्ञान-वर्जनमन्त्वाम्:; सिद्दी च ज्ञानेति: ||

व्यासमाह—“तस्य च मेदास्तु पठाशारद्” इति || कस्मातूः “गुणवे-
(२०५) तत्साव व्या-
पविचारात्” इति || गुणानां वेयपवेयक्षासात्
ग्रहावताः द्योराद्वयोरः, एककस्य न्यूनवलता
मूषन्तेऽर्त्योर्व, तत् न्यूनाग्नधि मन्दमव्याधिधिक्षात्तया यथाकारभूतायथेति: ||
तत्तं गुणानां वेयपवे तेनापमर्:; एककस्य न्यूनस्य द्योर्व उभिव: ||
तस्मात्तत्त्वया भेदः: पठाशारदिति || ४६ ||
पत्र सर्गप्रबंधककथनम् || [ सं. न.]

तानेव पश्चात् मृदानू गणिति—

पश्च विपर्ययमेदा स्वस्त्यक्षिप्त करणवैकल्यताः
अधिवर्ततिमेदा तुधितनथा प्रथा सिद्धः || ४७ ||

“पश्च” इति || अविदासितताराग्ध्वामिनिवेशा यथासंख्य तमो-
(२०६) विपर्ययादी—
मोदमहामोहसार्वस्त्यक्षिप्तसंज्ञायः पश्च विप-
वां पश्चात्ज्ञातिन्यायम् || यथविशेषः—
विपर्ययप्रभवानामपि सिद्धांतादीनां
विपर्ययस्वभावतात् || गदा—परदियाह विपर्ययोवाचार्यते वस्तु, असित-
तादयस्तल्समाहः सनतततदभिनिविशाते || अत एव पश्चपरवाचार्याः
भगवान् वार्तपणः || ४७ ||

(२०७) विपर्ययार्थिनां
प्रलेकवानामवान्तरमेदा
सम्प्रति पश्चाना विपर्ययमेदानामवानात्मेदा
मह—

मेदस्तमसो ग्राविधो मोहस्य च, दशाविधो महामोहः; ||
तामिलो ग्रावाधमाहः, तथा स्वस्त्यक्षिप्तमिनः || ४८ ||

“मेदः” इति || मेदस्तमसो ग्राविधा अप्राविधः || अप्रावय-
(२०८) अविदाहार
परिप्रेष्यस्याप्रविधानम् || तमः, अप्राविधविप्रविधानस्याप्रविधानम् ||

“मोहस्य च” इति, अप्राविधानो भेदेतारणानुजये || देवा छाहे—
(२०९) असितमहाराणस्याप्रविधानम् || विद्धमेधर्थमार्गायुतवाचार्यानि
स्निमादि-
कमालस्य शास्त्रिकमिनिविशाते, स्मरकिमता
मोहो स्प्राविधास्याप्रविधानम् ||

“दशाविधो महामोहः” इति || शाल्लादितु पश्चसु तियादिविक्यत दश—
(२०१) गांगविधानस्य
परिप्रेष्य स्निविधानम् ||

च दशाविधास्याप्रविधानम् ||
कौ. ४८-४९] अष्टाविश्वासकारकादशतयः।

“तामिलो” द्वारे “स्थादशामा”। शब्दादयो दशविषया रजनीयः।
(२११) द्वारपारियः प्रसूपतः। ऐश्वर्यन्त्वात्मिकियतेऽप्रसूपतो रज्जैरोप्यायोदातिशताम्।
नीयमैं किं तु रजनीयशब्दादशामा। ते च शब्दादय उपस्थितः परस्परेऽपपन्नमानस्तुपायाधाराणियामः।
प्रसूपते वेद प्रकाशिताः भवन्तीति शब्दादिमिर्दशभि। सहायिन्यभास्तकमदशादशेषोऽति। तत्त्रप्रयो द्वेषस्तामिलसो स्थादशायपवात्तुदात्रशेषेति।

“तथा भवन्यन्यतामिलः”। अभिनिवेषयो स्म्यतामिलः। तथेयत्यनेनादशशेषेऽप्पुष्यते।
(२१२) अभिनिवेष्येन रुपविपयायोदातिशताम्।
देवा: कल्लिमात्रिकमात्रियमेधयमासाद दशशब्दादीन् विषयान्।
भुजानाः।‘शब्दादयो भोगपुष्टतुपायाधाराणियामयो सस्माकमसुरादिमिर्दिमोऽप्पवानिष्ट।’ इति। विभिन्नति। तदति भव्यभिनिवेषेऽस्म्यतामिलसो स्थादशायपवात्तुदात्रशेषेति।

(२१३) विप्रयायार्नमेहमिरीभगोसंहया द्वारे मेदामाणस्तिरिथिः।
सो द्वय पश्चविपलयो विकल्प्यो विपर्ययो स्वान्तर-भान्यपापितरिथिः।

(२१४) अष्टाविश्वास-प्रकारकादशकितथम्।

dामादमाह—
एकादशोन्द्रिष्यवधः: सह बुद्धिवेदिरशक्तिविद्विधा।
सत्यद्रश वधा बुद्धिविपयायचुतिसिद्धीनाम्।

(२१५) एकादशोन्द्रिष्यवधः: इति। [ इन्द्रिष्यवधस्य ग्रहो

“एकादशोन्द्रिष्यवधः”—

बाधित्य मूको तेनिन जेता संज्ञितातात्या।

{मूको कौण्यप्रेक्षा कैथयोदातिशमन्त्राताः।}
नवविधास्तुप्रयः || [ सां. त.

यथासंस्थं श्रेष्ठादीनामिनिनिवारयां वधः || एतावस्तेन तु तदङ्कुञ्जः बुद्धेरसक्षिप् स्वव्यापरेऽभवति || तथा चैतकशोहेतुतुमकश्रावदकादरशी बुद्धे-रसक्षिप्तोऽभविते || हेतुहुज्तुमोऽजस्विद्विच्या च सामानाधिकरणप्यम् ॥

तदेवामिनिनिवद्वारेण बुद्धेरसक्षिप्तमुक्त्वा स्वहुप्तो शक्तीराहे—"सह (२१६) बुद्धे: साध्याः बुद्धीबैं" इति। काति बुद्धे: स्वहुप्तो बधा इत्यत दशकिः सतदशविधा ॥ आह—"सतदशी बधा बुद्धे:" कुत्? "विपर्य-यातुङ्गिसिद्धीनाम्।" तुष्ट्यो नववेधीं तद्विपर्ययात्स्तिरित्वें साध्वादिः भवनिति, एवं सिद्धा न्याभाविति तद्विपर्ययात्स्तिरित्वें साध्वादिः भवनिति ॥ ४९ ॥

(२१७) नववित्वु-धिकठनम्, तत्: परिगणयति—

आध्यात्मिकाध्यत्तमः प्रक्तुपदानकालम्बायन्यांः 
वाह्य विषयोपरमात् पशुः; नव तुष्ट्योऽभिमाता: ॥ ५० ॥

"आध्यात्मिकः:” इति। आध्यात्मिकाः—‘प्रक्तित्वितिरित्व आत्मा (२१८) चतुर्विधाः

darati" इति प्रतिपध, ततो दस्य श्रवणमनना-धातिकुतिप्तिकथनम् ॥

दिना विवेकसाखालकाय वास्तुपदेशुप्ताः यो न प्रयत्ने तस्याध्यात्मिकाधत्तुस्तुप्ताः भवनिति, प्रक्तित्वितिरित्वाक्तिमातमानमधि-क्रय यस्मात्स्तुपदेशुप्तस्तादाध्यात्मिकाः: कास्ता इति आह—"प्रक्तुप- 

dानकालम्बायन्याः", प्रक्त्यास्तर्याः यासां पास्तःकाः: ॥

तत्र प्रक्तशायना तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—‘विवेकसाखालकाय न्यि

(२१९) आध्यात- 

तःन्यातामाम्बेसं, तस्मादेवमेच्यास्तु वलः",—इति।

सैयुपदेशश्चन्तु तुष्ट्यः प्रक्ती, सा तुष्ट्यः प्रक्त- 

त्वार्यां अभ्यं ॥

सैयुपदेशश्चन्तु तुष्ट्यः प्रक्ती, सा तुष्ट्यः प्रक्त- 

त्वार्यां अभ्यं ॥
बा. ९० ]
नपुतिष्ठार्णनम् ॥

या तु,—‘प्रौढऽपि विनेकक्षयातिनेन, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्रव्यति, मांभूतः—
(२२०) तत्त्वीया वैश्य सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वनूः प्रज्ञविषेश्यातुः;
प्रज्ञयायास्तु सा भवति, तुमातुः प्रज्ञयामु- पादमेयः, क्रतन्ते ध्यानाभासेनान्युर्मन’—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टः
सोपादानान्या ‘सत्त्वम्’ उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘प्रञ्जया उपि न सचीर्ग्रीणोदेति सैव कालपरिपक्कमपेश्य
(२२१) दत्तीया का-
ञ्जायरा अभि: ॥

या तु,—‘न प्रञ्जन्ते कालान्युपादानाध्विकक्षयाति: आयि तु मायाय-
(२२२) चतुर्थि माउ-
ञ्जायरा उत्ति: ॥ अत एव मदाक्षसाप्तदायितवांचानि माय-
हर्ष्यदेशादेन विक्कल्क्क्तातिमिन शुचि निनीः,
तस्मादार्यमेव हेतुन्यम्यति—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टः सा मायायरा ‘बृजः’
उच्यते ॥

बाहा दर्शयति—“बाहा:” तुष्यः “विषयोपप्रसातु, पशः” । या:
(२२३) पञ्चविष:-
खल्लामयन: प्रकृतिमहद्द्वा दानादानामक्षमिनं-
कालबुद्धिकक्मनम् ॥ मानक्य वैग्राह्ये सति तुष्यगता बाहा:, आत्मजा-
नामवे सयनार्कमानंनमश्च वृत्ताचन्ति। तद्ध वैग्राह्ये सति तुष्य इति
वैग्राह्येतुपक्षल्लेखितिन्यायपि भस्ते, तत्पचव्यातुः तुष्य: पश्चेति। उपस्थते
कन्तनेशुपरमो वैग्राह्यस्य, विषयादुपर्मो विषयोपपर्म: । विषयाः भाग्यः
शंदादयः पश्चा, उपस्तमा आपि पश्चे ॥

, तथा हि—अर्जनरक्षकायमोगादिक्शादिपदर्शनहेतुन्यमान: पश्चोपर्मा

१ प्रकृत्यासिद्धात । २ प्रकृतिमात्राध्विकक्षयाती सत्यां प्रञ्जन: सति तुष्यमविशेषतवाद
सहस्यनस्त्व विक्कल्क्क्तात श्वार्थित इति । ३ ’मेघः’ इति वाङ्गम्यसः।
नवतुष्टिवर्णनम् । । [ सां. त.

(२२४) बांधुतुष्टिः भवन्ति । तथा हि-सेवाद्यो धनार्जनोपायः,
प्रथम, पारम् ॥ ते च सेवकादिनः दुःखाकुन्वति,

"द्वारादीर्घर्त्रः स्यादिर्निर्भार्तचन्द्रजान् ।
बैदनां भावने प्राशः कः सेवास्वत्तुलजते" ॥

एवमन्ये धनार्जनोपायः दुःखा इति विषयोपसे या तुष्टि: सेषः 'पारम्'
उच्यते ॥

तथा सुभितन्वनम् राजेकोणार्कर्णिकाच्योक्ष्यादिभ्यो विनिकृष्टितित तद्र-
(२२५) द्वितीयाः, सु- क्षणे महदृष्टिः भावयतो विषयोपसे या
पारम् ॥ तुष्टि: सा द्वितीया 'सुपारस्' उच्यते ॥

तथा महतः अस्यासेनाजितन्वनं भूयमानं क्षीते इति तद्रक्षय-
(२२६) द्वितीयाः, प्रांभावयो प्राथमोपसे या तुष्टि: सा तृतीया
पारापारम्" उच्यते ॥

एवं शाब्दादिभोगाध्यायात् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः; ते च विषयाप्रांतैः कामिनं
(२२७) चतुर्थौ, अनु- दुःखाकुन्वति महादोपमम् भावयतो विषयोपसे
तत्तमम् ॥ या तुष्टि: सा चतुर्थि 'अनुत्तमम्' उच्यते ॥

एवनानुपपत्त्य भूतानि विषयोपमोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोपदशेना-
(२२८) पञ्चमी, उत्त- द्विप्रयोगसे या तुष्टि: सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमम्'
मामम् ॥ उच्यते ॥

एवमाध्यायार्कथावनितस्मि: बाधामिवश पञ्चमी: 'नव तुष्टयो
सभिषताः' ॥ ९० ॥

(२२९)सिद्धिमेकं
गोपनुऩयेदे: सिद्धीराह—

१ प्रकाशारिक:-चैरः
११ "मनमय्य भ्रमनमेवा मुहत्त्वाभिन्नम्। इति ब्रिजीय मनमय्य महत्त्वाभिन्निष्ठिति" रूपम् पालनस्तरम्।
(२३५) हानि धरमे ३१८७] इत्यसादातोर्द्धापदन्युपर्योऽः । सहामुरितः ॥ यथाह भगवान पतञकः—“विवेकध्यानातिनिति—
पुरो दुःखरूपः ह्यातोऽयः”। इति [ योगसूत्र २३२६ ]। ‘अविष्कृतः’
शुद्धि, सा च सबांसनसंशयविपयोऽस्यानं परिहरेन विवेकः साधारणस्य
स्वभावायहे ज्ञानानमुः। सा च ने विना SSस्यहान्तर्यादिनात्मकः से—
ताब्यासपरिपाणात्मेन्तीत दानेन (विवेककल्याणः कार्यं) सोः सपि
संगृहीतः । सेवप्यम्बामितिद्विदितः युष्ट: ॥

(२३६) हुःक्षिप्पा—
तित्साय मुखः: सिद्धव्यायाय: प्रमोदमुदितमोइ—
प्रमोदमुदितमोइमानाः ॥ इत्यो इत्यानी सिद्धव्यायः: ॥
अन्ये व्याकरणे—विनोप्यदेशादिना प्रामाण्यविधायायात्तत्त्वस्य स्वय—
मूहनं यथू सा सिद्धरूपः:। यस्य सांख्यशा—
कृपाधर्मणं तर्कारह्मणं द्वाराप्राणामायणं तत्त्वज्ञानमुपचते सा
व्यायामः ॥ सिद्धि: शब्दः, शब्दपारम्पर्यनन्तरादित्वस्य। यस्य
शिष्याचार्ययथाध्यात्म: सांख्यशास्त्रं प्रथमोऽधिकतं Sथत्त्वाधीनत्व स्नानमुपचते सा
Sध्ययनसः तित्साय मुियायः। सुद्धुप्रतिरिति यस्यधिगतत्वऽ सुद्धुः
प्राणः ज्ञानमुपचते सा ज्ञानक्षणः सिद्धस्वत्स्य सुद्धुप्रतिरिति: । दानेन
सिद्धिदेवः, घनादिनेनार्धिते ज्ञानी ज्ञानप्रेयश्च तिति.[ “सिद्ध: कठान्य भवते तत्त्वज्ञाने न: सिद्धान्तत्त्वायायः
अत्यन्तस्तुच्छलाशिः। अत्र प्रत्यय—
(२३७) प्रत्ययार्गये सर्वे सिद्धरःस्यदेशे तिति प्रसिद्ध: । तत्त्ववाचन्ते—
परंतु प्रत्ययाकाशागतितैः सिद्धि: शब्दाकर्षणम, तत्त्वः तस्य
स्यायः शब्दाकर्षणसमाय: ॥

सिद्धुदितिविपययोऽशायक्तुचित्तुद्विदितसत्त्वशाला दृष्ट्य:। अत्र प्रत्यय—
(२३८) प्रत्ययार्गये सर्वे सिद्धरःस्यदेशे तिति प्रसिद्ध: । तत्त्ववाचन्ते—
गद्वितैः सिद्धिविपययोऽशायक्तुचित्तुद्विदितसत्त्वशाला दृष्ट्य:। अत्र प्रत्यय—
(२३८) प्रत्ययार्गये सर्वे सिद्धरःस्यदेशे तिति प्रसिद्ध: । तत्त्ववाचन्ते—
गद्वितैः सिद्धिविपययोऽशायक्तुचित्तुद्विदितसत्त्वशाला दृष्ट्य:। अत्र प्रत्यय—
को. ९१-९२-९३] प्रयतन्त्रानोभयसंगविश्वकर्मूः ॥ ६९ ॥

ियाशकित्तुष्टी: परामृशति | ता: सिद्धिकारिणीनामहुः, निवारकर्तवूः।
अत: सिद्धिपरिप्रस्थिति विपर्यायशकित्तुष्टायो हेया इत्यर्थः।॥ ९१ ॥

स्यादेवतू-पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता सुषितः। स च पुरुषार्थः प्रत्ययसगीता
(२३१) उभयसंगव- तन्मात्रासगीता सिद्धितीति कृतमुभयसगीतेऽवत्
वस्यकलश्च।॥ आह—

न बिना भावेषितः, न बिना तिल्लेन भावनिरूपितः।
तिल्लाभ्यो भावायत्सस्मात्माद्रिविधः प्रचत्तेते सर्गः।॥ ५२ ॥

"न बिना" इति। "लिङ्गः" इति तन्मात्रसगीतमल्लक्षयति, "भावेचः।"
(२४०) उभयविधः इति च प्रत्ययसगीतम्। एतदुस्त्यभवतित-तन्मात्र-सगीत्वक्त्वप्रदश्नम्॥
गर्तू पुरुषार्थाधानतम् स्वाधूपस्य न प्रत्ययसगी-
दिना भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसगीत्व स्वाधूं पुरुषार्थाधानत्वः न तन्मात्र-सगी-
दिने, इत्यभवत्या सर्गप्रस्तृतिः। भोग: पुरुषायों न भोगायनो शब्दादीनो
भोगायतनं शारीरिक्यांतरेण सम्भवतीत्यपपपस्तन्मात्रसगी|। एवं स एव
भोगायाननानिद्रियाण्यः करणानि चांतरेण न सम्भवति। न
च तानि धर्मादीनो भावानु बिना सम्भवति। न चापवर्गहेतुविवेक-नतिहम्सयस्य विना, इत्यपपच उभयविधिः सर्गः॥

अनातिरिक्त ब्रजेकृरकवान्योविश्वकर्मोद्योपमाः
वहितति, कल्पादावपि प्राचीनकल्पोपकल्पमाहाविश्वः
संस्कारवाहाभाविज्ञ्योक्त्वतिर्नृपतितस्ते सर्वे-
मवदातमः॥ ५२ ॥

(२४२) भूतसंगविः
भागः॥

विभक्तः प्रत्ययसगीः। मूलातिसगी विभाजने—
अष्टविकल्पों दैवस्तैर्यगणनां पक्षाण भवति।
मानुषशैक्षिकविचारं, समासतो भौतिकं गर्गं। ॥ ५३ ॥

(२४३) तत्काल।
एदानौ, पैतृक, गान्धर्वो, वायस्कु, राक्षसं, पेषाचर, 
प्राणामुखविद्विदैव। गर्गं। ॥

(२४४) तत्तत्
"तैर्यग्योनखं पक्षाण भवति, " पद्मभूमिपुरस्तरीम्।
स्कस्मस्वত्वरावरण। ॥

मानुषशैक्षिकविचारं। इति, ब्राह्मणस्वाभावानं जातिः 
महात्मेदाधिवर्त्यं, संस्कृतं।
(२४५) तत्र ॥
मात्र नस्य चतुर्विषयो विवेचनं वेषानुभावत्। इति ।
समासतं। ॥ संस्कृतं ॥ "भौतिकं गर्गं। " घटादय- 
स्वत्रारले द्वि स्थवरं एकैति। ॥ ६२ ॥

(२४६) मौलिकलग्नं भौतिकस्यस्य सर्गस्य चैतन्योत्कर्षनिकर्ष- 
गुणमेकवृद्धिधीम्यमव- 
कर्मभन्न। ॥

उद्धी सत्यक्षास्राधस्य अभिक्षाश्च मूलत: सच्चे।
मध्ये रजोभिशाल्ये, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपरस्ततः। ॥ ६४ ॥

उद्धी सत्यक्षाशः। इति। युप्रभूमितत्वायनं लोकं सत्तवहुल।
(२४७) उध्वत सत्त- 
"भोभिशाल्यमुखत: गर्गं। " पश्चादस्य- 
प्रानं-मध्ये रजः प्रानं—अन्त: प्रानं। ॥
सतीद्रिपमुद्रहानिवेषो। मध्ये रजोविशाल्ये। धर्मोपयादिनमुदाधिवर्त्य। खब्रमुल्लवच्छ। 
तत्तमा लोकसंस्कृत। संक्षेपित संस्क्षिपति
"ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपरस्ततः। " संस्क्रमणं विद्याया। संग्रहीता। ॥ ६४ ॥

(२४८) सर्गस्य दृष्ट: 
तदेव सर्गं दशैयित्वा तस्यापरस्तगाधनवैरा- 
हृतता। ॥ ग्योपयोगिनी दुःखोहेतुतामह्—
कौ. ७९-७६ [ सर्गस्य दुःखहेतुता प्रक्षतिकार्यवशक् । ] ७९

तत्त्व जरामरणं क्षु:खमामोति चेतन: पुरुषः।
किंक्रसाचिनितक्षेतस्तस्माहुःख समाप्तेन ॥ ५५ ॥

"तत्त्" इति। 'तत्त्' शरीरस्तो। यदापि विनिष्ठा विचित्रानन्दमो-गमागिन: प्राणभूहे:। तथा धाति सर्वं जरामरणं क्षु:खमामिश्वः।
सर्वस्य खलु क्रृमरापि मरणार्थो—'मा न भूमू' 'भूमासू' इत्येवमाल्को
इति। दुःखं च मयहेतुरिति दुःखमामेः॥

स्वादेत्तू—दुःखाद्यः प्राक्तता वुद्धिगुणाः। तत्कथोमेते चेतनसम्ब-निनो प्रभवतिषयत आह—"पुरुष" इति।
पुरी किंक्रे क्षेत्रे इति पुरुषः। किंक्रे तत्सम्ब-न्नाहारी चेतनो धाति तत्सम्बन्धी भवतिषयः॥

कुः तु: पुराश्चनमबन्धितु: क्षु:खपुरुषस्य चेतनस्येत्यत आह—"किंक्रसाचिनितक्"—पुरुषाद्रेदाप्रहातिक्षु:घर्मानात्मन्य- ध्वस्तयतु: पुरुषः। अथवादु:खप्रासावशिवाधिराजः
कथ्ये किंक्रे यावच निवर्तिते ताव-दिति॥ ६७ ॥

(१५१) स्वाधिकारण- विप्रतिपतितनिराकारणम्॥
उत्तमस्य सर्गस्य कारणचित्रप्रतिनिहिताकरोति—

इत्येव प्रक्षतिक्रमो महद्यदिविशेषभूमतपर्यंतः।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः।॥ ५६ ॥

"इत्येव" इति। आरम्भे इति "आरम्भः" सर्गे: महद्यदिमूलः प्रक्षत्वैः
(१५२) चार्यक्रमे। इत्यो नेत्रहरेण, न ब्रह्मोपादनो, नाथ्यकारणः।
हात्नयायम् धर्मापुरुषम्॥ अकरणेे जात्यतामाभो स्वयंतमाभो ब्राह्मस्य।
न ब्रह्मपूर्द्धः, चित्रत्वरक्षरिणामात्। नेदराधिपिनप्रक्तविनिर्मातोऽन्निब्य-पालस्याधिपितृत्वास्मात्। न हि निब्यपालस्यावाच रास्याधिपितिः॥

ननु प्रक्तविनिर्माते, तत्स्व निम्यायः प्रृत्तिमुष्क्याय अनुपानात् सदैव ( २५५१ ) नित्यप्र्तुति-(तिशीलप्रक्तविनिर्मितुतिस्विपक्षेपसंय संघीतनित्याधिपितिमोक्षस्य स्य च प्रक्तविनिश्चि- ति-राशिः॥

यथोद्वकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्: ओदनायस्वदैः निरंतिः,--एवं प्रलेखपहुँचाय मोचितप्रवृत्ताः प्रक्तविन्ययुप्स्वितम् तम्यप्रति पुनः प्रवृत्तिः--तदिदमाह-। 'स्वार्थः हि,'
स्वार्थः यथा तथा परायं आरम्भ इत्यः॥ ९६॥

स्यादेततृः। 'स्वार्थः परायं वा चेतन: प्रवृत्तिः। न च प्रक्तविनिर्मातः (२५५८) अचेतनप्रथा-भवितमहत्तत्मसद्यं प्रक्तविनिर्माताः चेतनः। न च स्यादेतत्त्वत: अपि प्रक्तविनिर्मातां तस्मात्स्यादेतत्त्वतः प्रक्तविनिर्माताः। स्यादेतत्त्वतः इत्यत आह—

वसतिविद्धिनिमित्तं शीर्षर्य यथा प्रबृत्तिरर्गस्य।
पुरूषविद्धिनिमित्तं तथा प्रबृत्तिः प्रधानसः॥ ५७॥

"वसतिविद्धिनिमित्तम" इति। दशमछतनमपि प्रयोज्यप्रवर्तमानमुष्क्य: चेतनात्। यस्य वसतिवृद्धियो शीर्षर्यक्रमेतत: प्रवृत्तिः॥

एवप्रक्तविनिर्माता सपि पुरूषविद्धिनिमित्तं प्रवृत्तिः॥

न च-। 'शीर्षप्रक्ततप्रवृत्तिर्रधिपितिमानन्तनेऽन्त् साध्यताति साध्यताति। (२५५८) इतिप्रागिन्ती चारं।'-िति। सामप्रत्यप्रश्नावतः प्रवृत्: स्वार्थः-तपायस्वाधीनः दीशः॥

tे च जगरसंग्रहावरः-।
कृत्र. १७-२८ ] पुरुषविमोक्षार्थप्रधानस्य प्रकाशितः |

तैमाने प्रेक्षावतप्रप्रतिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्यावर्त्तं न ब्राह्मणकलेखसितस्य भगवतो न जगत् सृजतः विश्वसितम् मन्यतेत्। नापि कारुण्यादस्य सर्गो प्रमृत्तिः प्राक्त्सर्गो जीवाणां नित्य-शरीरविभाषानुपूर्व-च द्वाराभवन कस्य प्रहाणे ग्रहणम्! सर्गो तत्र कारुण्यमय-गमे दुःखरमीलराध्रवणव-नृपणम्--कारणेन सृज्ञान स्वाभवेः च कारुण्य- स्मिति। अपि च करण्या प्रेषितः ईश्वरः सुखिन एवं जन्तुन्न सूजेन विचित्रां। कर्म-चेतिविश्वाहारिज्ञम्। इति चेतु-कर्तमस्य प्रेक्षावतः कर्म- चित्तविहाने। तदनिर्धारणस्वतदिशेचेतनस्यापि कर्मणि। प्रृश्चयनपपपंस्तत- कार्यशरीर-निर्दयाविभाषानुपूर्व- चुखानुप्रतेति पुकरवावत्॥

प्रक्रीतोस्वचेतनाया। प्रक्रीते न स्वार्थानुप्रहो न वा कारुण्यप्रयोजकमिति। (२५६) प्रक्रीति इति। नैकक्षोपस्यस्मिनोपातः। पारस्त्रशास्त्रानुपसन्नोपात:। प्रयोजन-रक्षोपातः। ततो च भक्ति। तत्सारण तु सूक्ष्मम्-चतुष्टिविश्वमित्तम्। इति। २७॥

(२५७) मृगशिवस्य इति। स्वार्थ इति। इति दश्यान्ति। कारिका। शार्मस्य प्रधानस्य प्रकाशितः। || १६॥ तत्रसबते—

उद्युक्तविनिविधयस्य यथा कियासु प्रवर्तते योक।। पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थक्य प्रवर्तते तत्तद्वित्यमथम्। || ५२॥

“उद्युक्तस्य—” इति। उद्युक्तविनिविध्या, सा खलिकाभ्रान्तार्थिनिव- ते। इत्यादिभ्यस्य:। इत्यङ्कान्तावत फलसु।। दार्शानिक्यो योग- यतिः।। पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थप्रवर्तते तत्तद्वित्यमथम्।। इति। ५८॥

(२५८) विवेककथा- लालनंतरमु प्रधाननिबुद्धिः। ननु भवतु पुरुषस्य। प्रवर्ते: प्रवर्तक:। निव- तितस्य कृतस्य प्रकारे?। इति। आह॥

10
प्रधाननियुक्तप्रकारः

रक्षस्य दशौरा त्यित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नुवात्।
पुरुषस्य तथा सत्तमाण प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रक्षत: || ५९ ||

"रक्षस्" इति, स्थानेन स्थानिन: परिपदानुपलक्ष्यति। आत्मानमः
शब्दायातमना पुरुषार्द्धदेव च प्रकाश्येयसर्थः || ५९ ||

स्यादेतत्—प्रवर्ततयमप्रक्षति: पुरुषार्थम्। पुरुषादुपकार्त्रितितिईर्ये
(२५९) गुणवत्या; कविज्ञप्तमामस्म, आज्ञासम्पादनारायणितादिवाजानी
प्रक्षते: प्रत्युपकारं चिनेव पायितुम्मुग्धीया। तथा च न पराधोऽस्या
पुरुषोपकारः। आरम्भः।—इस्यत आह—

नानाचिर्वैरवियपूर्वकारिण्यानुपकारिणः पुनः।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सत्तस्यांतमपार्थेक्ष्मारति || ६० ||

"नाना—" इति। यथा गुणवानुपकारिणिपि भूमौ: निर्द्दिते सत्तानुपकारि
णिणि स्वामिनि निष्फलाराधन:। एवाभिमानकृत्तस्तपस्त्तिः गुणवत्यपकारि
णानुपकारिणि पुरूषे व्यर्थपरिश्रेष्ठति पुरुषार्थमेव यत्ते न स्वार्थमिति
सिद्धम्। || ६० ||

स्यादेतत्—नर्तकी नृत्यमरिप्रस्त्र: दशौरित्वा निवृत्ता अपि पुरुस्तत्तृत्तः
(२६०) भिवकस्यात् कौतूहलात् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रक्षतिरपि पुरु
स्यानन्तरम् प्राचार्यायात्मम दशौरित्वा निवृत्ता अपि: पुनः प्रवर्तयमि
त्ययति।—इत्यत आह—

प्रक्षते: सुकुमार्तर्थक कविज्ञानस्तिति में प्रतिमूच्यात्।
या द्यति स्वमौति पुनरे दशौनमुप्रेति पुरुषस्य || ६१ ||

"प्रक्षते:।" इति। सुकुमार्तर्थक सत्तेश्च, परपुरुषदशानासहि
र्णुनित्वति यायेत्। असूर्यपस्या हि कुकुम्बूर्तिमदानान्तमः प्रमादादिगः
लितस्यचयाश्च वेत्तादोपत्ते परपुरुषेण, तदा अस्ते यथा प्रयत्ते,
अप्रमाणं वचेनां परपुस्पृष्टस्त्राणे न पुनं: पश्यन्ति,-एवं प्रकृतिरिपु कुले- बधौ तथ्यिका द्या विशेषेन न पुनःश्रृवस्तं इत्यथः: || ६१ ||

स्यादेतस्-“पुरुषस्येरुगुणो अपरिणामी, कथमत्य ऋषिकं? सुचेर्वि-न्यन्-

(२६१)निगुणपुष्पमो- विषेषपारंशवातु, सवासन्तुवेशकर्माशयानाशं कथर- शंसारात्मकाय्यमंभवते || नस्माद्यानां पुरुषे अपरिणामन्यसम्भवते। अत- एवाय च पुरुपस्य न संसार:- प्रेत्यामावपरदमारस्तिः, नित्यित्यवातूः।

tसमात् ‘पुरुषोविद्योक्तम्’ इति रितते बचः’-इतिमाः शाण्डामुपसंदार्य- नेनाम्युपर्चन्त्याकारोऽत ||

tसमात्व बध्यते शक्त न मुख्यते नापि संसारति कायित: ।

संसारति बध्यते मुख्यते च नानाध्रया प्रकृति: || ६२ ||

“समात्” इति। अद्य न कायित: पुरुषो बध्यते, न कायित: संस- 

(२६२)तत्तपरात:- प्रकृतिगतान्नं संसारादिनां सती बध्यते संसारति मुख्यते चेति || कथमोऽह- पुरुषे उपचारः ||

संसाराः पुरुषपुर्वसुचर्यते। यथा जयपराज्यः भृगुगतावापि स्वामिन्न्यपचर्यते, तदाध्रये मृणावनन्त्यागिवालू, तत्कस्य च शोकलमादिः: स्वामिन सम्भवात्। भोगावर्गःः प्रकृतिगताः- 

रिपि विवेकाभ्रातू पुरुषसम्भव उपसादित इति सर्वपुष्पकल्लुः || ६२ ||

(२६३) प्रकृत्यां धर्मोः नवनस्तंम् ‘प्रकृतिगतां वन्यसंसारापवर्गः: 

पुरुषे उपचर्यते’ इति। किसादनः: पुनःरेते प्रकृते:। इत्यत आह—

। इति। सरसिंरव तु वशायतामानामानामा प्रकृति:।

सैव च पुरुषार्थस्प्रवि विमोचचत्वेकस्सुः || ६३ ||

“सैवः” इति। तत्त्वात्वार्ताय वशाति धर्मान्तिसिस्तस्तति। हृदेन्वि- 

रिति। “पुरुषार्थस्प्रवि” भोगावर्गस्प्रवि। “आत्मनाः Sचसमानूः” एक-
अवगतमीदशं तवमु, तत् क्रिमियत आह—

एवंतवाभ्यासाम्रासिन्म न मे नाद्यभिमयपरिदेशम्।
अविपर्ययालिणः केवलमुख्यते बामम्। ६४।।

"एवम्" इति। तत्चेन विपर्ययेन तत्त्वानुप्रवक्षयति। उक्तः प्रगः

( २६४ ) अभ्यासा- कारतवपियज्ञानाभ्यासादिवैनर्त्यदृष्टीकर्ता-
तत्त्वालोपणिः।। सेवितातु सत्त्वमुष्यान्यतातसाक्षात्कारिक्षानुप-वते।यद्रिपाभ्यासस्तद्धितिकृतकमेव साक्षात्कारसुपम्यन्यति,—तत्त्वपियाभ्याम्
इति तत्त्वाकक्सारं जनयति। अत उक्तम्—"विशुद्धम्" इति।।

कुतो विशुद्धमित्य आह—"अविपर्ययातू। इति। संशयविपर्ययो हि

( २६५ ) तत्त्वानुस्य ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धिः। द्विरत्मके विशुद्धमुदद्धमुं—
विशुद्धिहेतु: अविपर्यय- इति। नियमानितावत्ता
ग्रन्थू संशयो एष विपर्ययः, तेन "अविपर्ययातू।
इति संशयविपर्ययाभ्यासो दश्चति।। तत्त्वपियाभाच संशयविपर्ययाभावः।।

स्यादेत्— "उपयुतामीदशाभ्यासात् तत्त्वानुस्य, तथा इद्यनादिना

( २६६ ) अनादेत्— मिथ्याज्ञानसस्तकारण धिम्यानां जन्यतिवादम्,
धिम्यानसस्तकारणादि-
मता तत्त्वानुस्सरकारणां 
तथा व मतनास्य संसारस्यानुमुख्यमुखम्
मुखम्।। इति उक्तम्—"केवलम्" इति=विपर्ययेनायास्थमभभम।। यद्र्यभानिदिपर्ययवासना तथा एष तत्त्वानुसारस्य तत्त्वपियाभाचकाराद्वादवत्या ॥२॥ इति स्थितम्।। एष शक्या समुच्छेतुम्।। तत्त्वपियपातो
हि धिम्यं स्मारणः, यदाहूसः।। अपि—
“निशप्तकर्मवृत्तार्थविश्वास्य विषये: ||

न बायो दयतवचे दस्य वुद्रेत्तप्परतात:” इति ||

ज्ञानस्वरूपसुतम्—“नासिम, न मे, नाहम्” इति। ‘नासिम’ इया-

(२६७) तत्वज्ञान-

स्वरूपप्रदायीनम्—सर्वविनीती-

धार्मारिण्यति। तथा चायत्वसात्तमिनिमस्थायायाज्यानाचन्द्र-राणि वायास्ता सर्व व्यापार आदिन्त्र प्रतिव्याहार वोद्र्श्चारी।

यत्तथात्तमिन्त व्यापारेश्वो नास्त्यतो ‘नाहम्’। अवहितति कल्पिपद्,

‘अहआनाम्याहं जुहोम्यहदेन’ इति। सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामासित्।

नितिकिले च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाचाव:। ततः सुश्रुतम्—“नाहम्” इति।

अत एव “न मे”। कर्ति हि स्वामिता चमते, तस्मात् कुत: स्वामिताक्री।

स्वामितेष्यं। अथवा “नासिम” इति। “पुरुषो दसिम, न प्रसवधवर्”।

अप्रसवविधावाचाकर्तृविदाह—“नाहम्” इति। अकर्तृत्वाच न स्वामि-

तेष्यत आहं—“न मे” इति।

ननु ‘एतावतसु श्रीमतिष्वि कर्तितु कदाचिद्व्यादो विषयो दसित, तद-

(२६८) तत्वज्ञान-

ज्ञानज्ञतूनु वन्याशिष्यति’ इत्यत आह—“अप-

स्यापरिश्चिलस्म्। नासिम चिन्मिदस्मिन् परिशिल-

स्मृत्तम् ज्ञानम् यदेश्व वन्याशिष्यतीलय: || ६४ ||

(२६९) तत्वसात्त

कि पुनर्दर्शन तत्वसात्तकारण सद्धिती-

रक्तफलम्। त्यत आह—

तेन निमुच्छस्वामर्धवाचात्वम् सत्तवधिनिचचत्वाम्।

प्रकर्ष्टितम् पद्याति पुरुष: प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्च: || ६५ ||

“तेन” इति। भोगविवेकसात्तकारण हि प्रकर्ष्टेऽ प्रकर्ष्टथय:। तौ

१ “हुस्य” इति पादाष्टरम्।
स्यादेतत्त्—‘निरृत्तप्रसाविनिति न मृत्यामेह। संयोगङ्गलो हि सर्गे इत्य- (२७०) एकाविषयः। कम्, योग्यता च संयोगः। भोज्यतायोग्यता च मपेश्य निबुत्तत्वान्ति अपि पुरुषस्य चेतनयम्, भोग्यतायोग्यता च प्रकृत- लितश्चा। ज्ञेतत्वम् विषयवश्च। न च चेतयोपस्थति निवृत्ति। न च कार्यीयाभावाविरूपः, तज्जातिस्यमयस्य कारणीयायात् पुनः पुनः शब्दायुपस्वाभावशः—इति आह—

इति करोतु नाम पौणे पुनेश्च शब्दायुप्प्रमाणतिष्ठया (२७१) तत्त्वारः। विवेकाएवातिनित्य कक्ता, कृत्विवेकाकायत्तिष्ठू प्रद्युद्युप्पोगाच जनयति। आविवेकाकायतिनिवक्ष्यनो हि तदुप्पोगो, निवक्ष्यनामावे न तद्विवुषुमहति, अकुर इव वीजामवे। प्राक्ततान् हि सुखाव्यु- मोहालम्: शब्दार्हीतस्तदविवक्तम् ‘भमेकत्’ इव्यमनयंमना आत्मा भूषित इव विवेकाकायतिमपि प्राक्तीमविवेकादिवाला ‘मद्यस्यम्’ इति मन्यते।
उपन्याशिक्षात्मकतिस्तु तदरसग्धीचवदादीत्रोपमोकुमहिंदो नापी विचारिकः 
ह्यातिप्राकृतिमापि कर्तुम्। ततो विचारिन आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमन्तु- 
हिंदो। पुरुषाः च मोक्षदातोऽक्रमयान्योक्षाविकतिपुरुषाः सन्तो 
न प्रकटत प्रयोजयत। तदिदमुक्तं-“प्रयोजनवचारि सर्गस्य” हरि। 
अथ प्रयुक्ते संगे प्रकटिश्रेष्ठेऽति प्रयोजनमु, तदपुरुषाः नास्ती- 
यथः।। ६६।।

स्यादेतत्-“उपनन्तसाक्षात्ख्यक्षेपितद्वन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देह- 
पातः स्यादिति कथःदेहः प्रकटिमप्यायेत। अथ 
(२७२) विविधक्ष्य- 
सदाध्यात्मारस्य देहपातात्मकसतिदर्श- 
तत्त्वाः श्रीपि न मुख्यते कर्मणामप्रकृतीशालातु।? 
नास्तमभवशाश्वल।। तेषां कुन्तः प्रक्षयः? ‘मोक्षार्’ हरि चेतुः, हत 
मोक्षस्त्रज्ञानम गोक्षसाध्यात्मक-हरि ‘व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञानानम तत्त्वाः 
प्रकाशयः।’ हरि रिक्षम्बचः।। ‘मोक्षन चापरिष्ठेयेत् कर्माशयप्रचयो सनिय- 
तविपक्षकालः क्षेत्रवः, तत्त्वापवर्गप्राप्तः।’ इसपि मनोरथप्राप्तमु।’ 
इत्यत आहं

सम्बन्धानाधिकमात्र धर्मांदीनामकारणप्राप्ताः। 
तिदिति संस्कारवशातू, चक्षुभ्रमिद्वृत्तारीर्।। ६७।।

“सम्बन्ध” हरि। तत्वसाधकारपितद्विवादादीर्मियानियतविपक- 
(२७३) तविरसः विविधक्ष्याः संस्कार- 
न जालयामोऽग्लक्षणाय फलमय कल्पते। क्रेश- 
शाच्छपरिशालणमु।। संहितावसिष्टाः हि वुद्धिभूमि कर्मवीजाम्भूर्वकर 
प्रसुवर्ति। तत्त्वाः निदर्शनिदर्शनविपकलक्षेत्राशिकायामुपररायः कुतः कर्म- 
वीजाधानमकुपवरसवः। तदिदमुक्तम्-“धर्मांदीनामकारणप्राप्ताः” हरि। अकार- 
णलप्राप्ताविश्वर्यः। उपनन्तसात्त्वाः श्रीपि च संस्कारक्षणात्तु तिदिति, यथो-

१ उपन्याशिक्षात्मकः।
(२७४) शरीरनाशे ऐकानितकायन्तिकृ मुक्ति:॥ [ सां. त।
परंतु दृष्टि कुलाल्पद्वापरे चर्चा वेगायासंस्कारशातृ भमत् तिरिष्टि।
कालयंपाकवशातृकर्षि संस्कारो विभिन्नम्बिति। शरीरसिथि च प्रार-
व्यपिकायो धार्मिक, संस्कारो। तथा चाटूरुकृति—“मोगोते लिते क्षण-
पित्वा सम्पन्न्ये” इति “तस्य तावदेव चिरं याबन्व विमोक्षेये स्वरुपम्”
इति। [ छान्दोग्य-३।१४।२ ]। प्रक्षेपणांविवाहसंस्कारे
वेशप्रसारि संस्कारसतसारांति तत्साध्यात्मि धृतशारीरसिधिति॥ ६७॥

(२७५) शरीरनाशे ऐकानितकायन्तिकृ मुक्ति:॥ स्यादेतये—“यदि संस्कारशेषपदि धृतशारी-
कायन्तिकायन्तिकृ मुक्ति:॥ रस्या दृष्टि कदा स्यू मोक्षो मनिष्यति।”
इत्यत आह—
प्रांते शरीरसिथि चरितार्थत्वात् प्रथानविनिवृत्ताः।
ऐकानितकमात्यन्तिकृ मुक्ति: कैवल्यमामोऽपि॥ ६८॥
“प्रांते” इति। अनार्थविपाकानान्तावतृ कर्माशयानः तत्त्वात्मा
प्रश्ना बीमश्वैि देखि। प्रक्षेपणांविवाहसंस्कारूपोगेन क्षणे सति, “प्रांते
शरीरसिथि” इति=निराशि—“चरितार्थत्वात्” इति=कृतप्रयोजनात्।
प्रधानसय तपस्युपरम्प्रति विनिवृत्ती—“ऐकानितकृ”=अवथितमावि “आया-
न्तिकृ”=अविनाशि=इत्युभन् “कैवल्यम्” दुःखनयिगमम्मामोऽपि
पुरुष:॥ ६८॥

(२७५) सांख्यशास्त्र- प्रमाणोपपादिते सध्यान्तर्द्वैवादनाय
स्य परमांक्ष्याति तत्त्वभासोपपाति॥ परस्मिनिपूर्वकत्वमाह—
पुरुषार्थवशास्त्रिकिं गुहायपरमाणी समास्यायत्तम्।
स्थित्युपत्तिप्रत्ययाधिक्षित्यन्ते यथ भूतानाम्॥ ६९॥
“पुरुष” इति। “गुहाम्” गुहानिवासि, स्वृत्तिया दुःखमिते
यावत्। “परमाण” कारित्वेन, तथेऽत्र अभ्राांमाधिक्षिते इत्त्वा—
“स्थित्युपत्तिप्रत्ययाधिक्षित्यन्ते यथ भूतानाम्” इति। ‘यथा’ ज्ञाने=यद्यथेषु,—
यथा 'चर्मिणि द्वीपिनं हृति' इति। “मूतानाम्”=प्राणिनां “सिथियु-पतिष्ठित्” अगमे: “चिन्तयते” ॥ ६९ ॥

(२७६) सांख्यशास्त्र स्यादेतत्—“यत् परमाणुणा साक्षाकथितम् चतुर्द्वीपमि, यत्पुनरेश्वरक्रणेण कथितम् तत्र कुलः श्रद्धाः”—इत्यत आह—
पत्तू पवित्रमथ्य मुनिरास्वरेणनुकम्यया प्रदर्शे।
आसुरिरिपि पञ्चाधिशाय, तेन च बहुधा क्रत्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

“एतत्” इति। “एतत् पवित्रमथ्य”=पावनम्—दुःखतिेतो: पापम: पुनातिति—“अयम्”—सर्वभ: पवित्रमथ्यो सुध्यम्, “मुनि:” कपिल: आसुरिरिपि पञ्चाधिशाय, तेन च बहुधा क्रत्ततं तन्त्रम्” ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरमपरः द्वागतमिश्वरक्रणेष्व चेतदार्यांशः।
संक्षिप्ततात्मात्मिना सम्यनिश्चय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७७) ईश्वरक्रण: गुरुपवित्रमथ्य परमपरः।
“शिष्य” इति। आरातु याता तत्तवोऽध्यायो, आर्यसत्तस्य सो द्यम् “आर्यसति:”
इति ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७८) सतानिकारोऽथ शाश्वम्, सकलाशाश्वर्षृचकलवात्
काणो शाश्वलम्।
न तु प्रकारणमिलाह—
सत्यां भिन्न ये स्थानस्य स्थानं: कत्वस्य पढातन्त्रस्य।
आयायिकाचारितिनात: परावास्विवाहजिताधापि ॥ ७२ ॥

“सतलाम्” इति। तथा च राजवाचनकम्।

“प्रधानानिषिद्धमेकत्तमघन्यव्यवस्थात्मान्यता।
पाराध्ये च तथा द्वेकयं वियोगो योग एव च॥
ग्रन्थोपसंहारः

शेषप्रतिरक्तर्वं मैथिकायोः स्मृता देशः

विपर्ययः पञ्चविष्टशोक्ता नव तुष्णः

करणानामसुर्येश्वशानिष्टित्रथितं भासम्

इत्यति पिष्ठि पदार्धनामश्चित्ति सह सिद्धिमिः”)

२

सैयं पाण्डुः 

कथितति सक्तशास्त्रार्थकथा राजस्मप्रकरणमापि 

शास्त्रमेवदिति सिद्धम्। एकलवर्त्तम्यम् पाराध्वरहः प्रथानमभिलयोऽक्तम्।

अन्यत्रकर्त्तव्रम् वहुधश्रेष्ठति पुरुषमधिक्य || अस्तीवम् वियोगे योगश्च- 

त्वयमधिक्य || वृत्ति: स्थितिरिति स्थूलनृस्मधिक्य || ७२ ||

मनासि कुमुदमानीव बोधयति सतसं वदा

श्रीचाचार्यपतिमिश्राणां कःति: स्तावः तत्र्चक्कौमुदी

इसक्षिण्डतन्त्रकारतन्त्रपतिमिश्रादशर्नेंटिकाक्चर्च्री-

पद्याचार्यपतिमिश्र्यता सार्ध्यतचक्कौमुदी

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