AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WITH THE SANSKRIT TEXT, OF THE TATTVAYA-KAUMUDI (SÂNKHYA) OF VÂCHASPATHI MIŚRA, BY GANGÂNÂTHA JHÂ, M.A.; F.T.S.

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PREFACE.

For the little we know of Vâchaspâti Miśra the reader is referred to the Sanskrit Introduction; wherein it is shown that he was a Maithila Brâhmaṇa and flourished somewhere about the 9th Century A. D. For Udayanâchârya the author of the "Parisuddi" on Vâchaspâti Miśra's "Tâtparya-Tikâ," flourished in the reign of king Lakshmana Sen of Bengal,—of whose era we have just commenced the 8th century; and at least a century must have elapsed before a work could deserve the honor of a commentary at the hands of Udayanâchârya.

I take this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govindadasa of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,—who has been chiefly instrumental in my undertaking and finishing—not only of the present translation, but also of the Kâvyaprákâsa and the Nyâya—Muktâvali, and some works on Mimânsâ. My thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq. of Bombay for his publication of the work, and also to the proprietors of the "Theosophist" of Madras for allowing a reprint of the translation which first appeared in the columns of that excellent journal.

RAJ LIBRARY, DARBHANGA: GANGÂNÂTHA JHÂ.

1st July 1896.
INTRODUCTION.

The lucid writing of Vāchāspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this resume would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sāṅkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither Productive—nor—Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattwas,—Prakriti or Nature being the productive, since the Sāṅkhyaśas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive—and—Produced are the other Principles—Buddhi &c. These partake of the nature of both—thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Ahankāra and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakriti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five elements. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from them. The Purusha (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the three Gunas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these—and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful creative agent of the Sāṅkhyaśas or, more properly, the creative force of the Universe. Then first of all—how is this force constituted? It is naturally made up of the three
Gunas—Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas; and when the Pradhâna is in its natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in an equilibrium. When occasion presents itself i.e. when the Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Prâdhana, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of creations. The diversity of created objects is thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattwa giving rise to the kind of creation in which that attribute predominates, and so forth. Without proceeding any further, we must stop to consider the nature and properties and the Modus operandi of these Gunas.

The three attributes—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and restraint; and are so constituted that the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were the Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguna which by its nature is dull and passive. The natures of the different objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the necessity of the three Attributes.

Here an objector comes forward and says—How can the attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe? The reply is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end—e.g. the wick
and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to brighten the fire. In the same manner, though the Gunas are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in nature there are three distinct properties—of pleasure, pain and dulness. All other properties are reducible to these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, so we at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—the Pradhâna—must be endowed with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Gunas. We must now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakriti—the Keystone of the Sankhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakriti? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Buddhist "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedantic "Mâyâ"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and It is neither of these. It resembles the Vedantic Mâyâ inasmuch as it is the one root of the Universe, which is asserted of Mâyâ also though, as of an illusory world. But the fact of its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Gunas. In short, Prakriti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective)—endowed with the three Gunas and evolv-
ing through these, every kind of existence—save of course, the Purnsha—Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakriti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root itself unmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and subjective existence? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here to briefly sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of Prakriti. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus then the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is nonentity can never be made an entity—that is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We always find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity; for certainly a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. Thus then this would lead to an absurdity.
.Thirdly.—we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists.

Fourthly.—the effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it. Because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do the action of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e.g. a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be very well performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect is declared by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"when we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify? If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something— or on the other something becoming nothing . . . . .
There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing—which was not contained in the causes.”

—Lectures on Metaphysics—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sâṅkhyaśs employ the fact in proving the existence of their Pradhâna. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence must have its unmanifested condition in its cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Self-Consciousness, which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on increasing the series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sâṅkhyaśs give the names “Pradhâna,” “Prakriti” or “Avyakta.”

Secondly we find that all the substances—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this is Pradhâna.

Having thus proved the Existence of Pradhâna we must define its properties as well as those of its Effects; and see wherein lies the difference.

In order to do this we must first consider the properties of the Manifested Principles—the effects of Pradhâna. These are caused and as a necessary consequence of this—transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Pradhâna), made up of parts; these are the characteristics where the Pradhâna differs from the Manifested Principles, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Pradhâna is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal. And as all Universe is the result of Its
evolution, it must be all-pervading; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable i.e. Cannot move, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is, all-pervading it must be one. It is independent—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

These are the points difference. Those of agreement are, that the Pradhāna as well as the manifested principles are the resultants of the various actions of the three Gunas. Secondly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination is the result of intelligence. Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such common. This is technical and requires some explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently by different individuals, but are common objects of observation for all, and are common in that sense. Fifthly they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly they are prolific i.e. endowed with evolving energy. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between the Pradhāna on one hand and its effects on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the intelligence. For certainly Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi for it is material, being the effect of Prakriti which is essentially non-intelligent, and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the effect. So we must have a distinct Principle of Intelligence.

Secondly,—we see in our every day life that all that is corporeal is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair &c. And we have seen before that all the principles from Prakriti
downwards are bodied. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakriti, Buddhī and Ahanākra, yet we must not forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles is made up of the three Gunas—which are as material as anything. And such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is Purusha, the Spirit,—and as we have not yet had an Intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. And the Spirit must be unbodied because it is devoid of the three Attributes, for whatever is affected by the Gunas is found to be bodied.

Thirdly.—We have come across in daily life with the general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised over by something, and we have also seen that all the principles from the Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion; and so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself untouched by pleasure &c. ; and as such must be something over and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment; and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer, who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be the intelligent principle. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c. Which can never be the case with Buddhī and the rest. These latter being made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory actions—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhī. And so we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest. And this is Spirit.
Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible of Prakriti or Buddhī. For these latter are constitutently made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct principle in the shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Purusha?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Purusha? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the mind. Nor is it the determining principle since that is allotted to Buddhī. The character of the Spirit is a very unique one. It is none of these, still it is the necessary factor in all of these. It then is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellectning and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated: it is free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such can not possibly be separated from it.
And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And again if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain to the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become useless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain &c.,—which in reality do not affect him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Purusha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sânkhya philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self,—imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retries from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given. From this Buddhi proceeds Ahankâra or the principle of egoism. From this again emanate the eleven senses and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour
and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akāśa.

Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First in the scale comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasāya*. This term literally means “ascertainment” and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that “this is to be done by me.” It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to will. But the Sankhya Buddhi is not mere will. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—“Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictator of intelligence.” The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to their Buddhi. That Buddhi resembles will, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sankhyas. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already will decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that wisdom is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with Intellect and Will combined.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism. It is the principle to which all notions of the “I” are due. It corresponds with Kant’s “apperception” and Hamilton’s “self-consciousness;” that is to say the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that “I have the consciousness,” “I feel &c.” As immediate effects of this principle of Egoism, we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the
five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eyes, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin—and the five of action (objective) —viz.:—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and that of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (mind). The five subtle elements are those of smell, touch taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Ākāśa; and these have the subtle elements for their properties. Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind a sense at all? The answer is not far to seek. The Sankhyas define sense as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness; and this differentia we find in Manas as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider what are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas then is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle is technically called in Sankhya “reflection” or “thinking.” This is further explained—when we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are all indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विकल्प). This indefinite and vague impression is very soon rendered definite; and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the reflection (or thinking) of the Mind. This process follows so instantaneously that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.
It need not be repeated that the multifariousness of creations is due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the action of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own anxiety.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhi, Ahankāra and Manas, and the ten external—the ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of substances; and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—viz., the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment, finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.
Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and third fading and transient.

This “subtle body” of the Sankhyas resembles to a great extent, I believe, the “Astral Body” of Theosophical literature. It is born before the visible body and lasts till the Pralaya; and till then it presents the astral body of the Ego in all its reincarnations during that Kalpa. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not act upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation; and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substrate in the form of the “Linga-Sarira,” equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarira imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And since this body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The Linga-Sarira thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. This Linga-Sarira again is the substrate of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a substratum.

Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. By “higher regions” here is of course meant a more highly spiritual life. Vice leads the other way. Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the
character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit’s perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free of the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed intelligence. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Passion, then it is that it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of obstruction, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of obstruction alone.

So much for intellectual creation. The elemental or material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the attributes. Thus the attribute of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit’s emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a
human body. Nature is described as a great benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retries from the scene like an actress who has played her part, and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all internal fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue &c.—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.
THE TATTWA-KAUMUDĪ.
[SÂNKHYA].

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

(1). Reverence to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many children; and also to the Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her, and renounce Her on having enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her.

To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Æsuri, as also to Panchasikha and Iswara-Krishna,—to these we bow in reverence.

(2). In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. Those, on the other hand, who expound undesired doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the final end of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to the final goal, therefore, the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter:—

KÂRIKÂ I.

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain, (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account
of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

(3). The subject-matter of science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this world; or (2) if though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible,—such impossibility arising either from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4). Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. With this view, it is declared: "There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain." The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." And these are: (1) The naturo-intrinsic (Adhyâtmika), (2) The naturo-extrinsic (Adhibhautika), and (3) The super-natural (Adhidaivika). Of these the naturo-intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the varioushumours, wind, bile, and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their admitting of internal remedies. Pains submitting to external remedies are two-fold: extrinsic, and super-human. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones owe their existence to the evil influence of planets and the various class of elementals. Thus the fact that pain,—a specific modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment" (Abhighâta) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the
consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of pain residing in the internal organs. Thus then this idea of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained subsequently. Thus it is concluded that (enquiry is going to be made) “into the means of alleviating it” (the three kinds of pain). In “Tadapaghatake” the particle tat refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound). The means of alleviation, too, are only those derivable from science,—and none other.

(5). Objection: “On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous.” That is to say:

we grant the existence of the triad of pain, and also the desirability of its removal, as also the possibility thereof;

we go farther, and grant that the means derivable from the Sāstras are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous ; because we have easier obvious means for the removal of pain, and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the Sāstra—a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: ‘When a man can find honey in the house, wherfore should he go to the mountains? So, when the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempts?’

Hundreds of easy remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for the mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, dress and the like. Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as acquaintance with moral and political

* Vide the Nyāya-latikā, in loco.
science, residence in safe places, &c. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems and charms, &c.

(6). Reply: Not so: "Because these are neither absolute nor final." Absoluteness (of the means) consists in the certainty of its effect; and its finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression "Ekântâtyantobhâvah." The universal affix tasi has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: On account of not observing the unfailing cure of the different kinds of pain, even on the employment in the prescribed manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,—we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

(7). Though the mention of the word pain in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

(8). Objection: We grant the inadequacy of obvious means; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—such as Jyotishtoma, &c.—which last for a thousand years—a whole host of these forming the Ritualistic portion of the Vedas. And these means verily will remove the triad of pain absolutely and finally. Declares the Sruti: "Desiring Heaven one must perform sacrifices." and Heaven is thus described in the Bhattavârtika: "Pleasure, unmixed and uninterspersed with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what is
expressed by the word *Heaven.*” Heaven thus consists in pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very existence extirpates all kinds of pain; nor is this pleasure short-lived,—for, declares the *Sūtra:* “We drank the *Soma* and became immortal” [*Atharvasirṣa* III]. And if the celestial pleasure were short-lived, how could there be ‘immortality’? Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again becomes superfluous.

Reply:  
KĀRIKĀ II.

The revealed is like the obvious; since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess. A method contrary to both is preferable,—consisting in discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing (Spirit).*

(9). “*Anusrava*” is that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher,—and not done (written). *Anusravika* = relating to *Anusrava* or *Veda,* that which is known therefrom. The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas is equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the *absolute* and *final* removal of the triad of pain. Though the text uses the generic term “*Vedic*” (“*Anisravika*”), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic portion of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the *Sūtra*: “The Spirit ought to be

* This Kārikā embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila’s philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.
known and discriminated from Primordial Matter” (Brihadāranyaka 2-4-5); (by so doing) “the agent does not return, yea he does not return (into this world)” (Chhāndogaya 8-15).

(10). Reason for the above assertion is given; “since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess.”

Because impure, decaying and excessive.

The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma-sacrifice, &c., being accompanied by animal-slaughter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhâchârya: “It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, destructible and bearable.” The ‘slight mixture’ is that of the principal effect (Apurva, i.e. merit) of the Jyotishtoma, &c., with the minor apurva, the cause of evil, due to animal-slaughter. The epithet ‘destructible’ implies that the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites; but if some how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructification of the principal Karma (merit), the evil element (demerit, caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the epithet ‘bearable.’ Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of Heaven attained to by a host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals).

(11). It cannot be urged that the generic law—"Kill not any animal," is set aside by the specific one, “Kill the animal for the Agnishtoma"—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law “Kill not, &c.,” only declares the capability of the slaughter to produce evil, and hence pain; but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of the sacrifice; and in the same manner, the following injunction, “Kill the animal, &c.,” declares the necessity of animal-
slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the completion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a sacrifice.

(12). The properties—decay (non-permanence) and excess—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This Non-permanence is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a caused entity. Further, Jyotishtoma, &c., are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the Vājapēya, &c., lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven. This is what constitutes the “excess” spoken of. The greatness of one’s magnificence is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13). In the passage “Drinking Soma, we became immortal”—immortality implies long-durability,—as is declared elsewhere: “Immortality is durability till the final dissolution of all elemental (or finite) existence.” Hence the Śruti: “Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality” [Mahānārāyana Upanishad X.—5]; and again “Swarga shines in a secluded valley at a distance, which the ascetics alone enter. By actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, get death. Therefore those other learned Rishis, who were above all action, got immortality.”

(14). With all this in view, it is declared: “A method contrary to both is preferable—consisting in discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing.” Tasmāt refers to the Vedic means of removing pain. A method,—contrary to the impure Soma-
sacrifice, &c., bringing about excessive and short-lived results,—is pure, i.e., unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter, and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting, as is clear from the Sruti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence; because this holds only in the case of the effect being an entity; in the present case, however, the consequence—the removal of pain—is a negation, a non-entity. And such negation putting an end to causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kārikā LXVI.)

(15). The literal meaning of the Kārikā, however, is this:

The means of removing pain, consisting in the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit, as apart from Matter, is different from the scriptural means, and hence is preferable. The Scriptural is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent. The discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good. Of these two, the latter is superior.

(16). Question: “Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise”? Answer: “From discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing.” Knowledge of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested) being for another’s purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus then we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the knowledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this: The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from discriminative knowledge—consisting in meditation.
and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in the *S̄ruti* and *Purāṇas*, and then established by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail in Kārikā LXIV.

(17). Having thus decided Philosophy to be needful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention of the enquirer.

**KĀRIKĀ III.**

“Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is not produced; the Great Principle (*Mahat*, i.e., *Buddhi*) and the rest are seven, being both producer and produced; sixteen are the produced; and the Spirit is neither the producer nor the produced.”

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are four-fold. Some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

(18). It being asked—What is the *productive*? The answer is—Nature or Primordial Matter is the root of the Universe, an aggregate of effects; of Matter itself there is no root, or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum*.

(19). How many are the objects that are *both productive and products*, and which are these? The answer is—The Great Principle and the rest are both. As the Great Principle (*Buddhi*) being the cause of Self-consciousness (*Ahankara*) is the effect of Nature (*Prakriti*), so is Self-consciousness
the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmâtrâs) together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time, the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril* (Akâsa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Self-consciousness.

(20). How many are the productions, pure and simple, and what are they? It is said—"The productions are sixteen"—i.e., the five gross elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow, pot, trees, &c., are modifications of earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees, &c., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term "Prakriti" stands; and further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their essence, since they have, in common, the properties, grossness and perceptibility.

(21). The form of that which is neither productive nor product, is now stated. "The spirit is neither a product nor productive." All this will be explained later on.

(22). In order to prove the above statements, the different kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor can there be a specific definition without a general one. Hence the definition of proof in general follows.

* Though this translation of the word Akâsa is sure to jar upon European ears, as borrowed from a work on fiction (Lytton's "The Coming Race"), yet I have put it in, since I could not find any other word in the English language expressive enough to denote all that is connoted by the Sanskrit word Akâsa. "Inane," "Astral Light," "Ether," "Space," &c., do not sufficiently represent the active character of the Sanskrit Akâsa.
"Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony are admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary; because they include all kinds of proof. It is by proof that a fact is ascertained."

(23). Here, first of all, we have to explain the word Pramàna, which explanation would form its definition. Proof defined. Proof, then, is defined as that by which right notion is determined; it thus becomes the cause or means of all correct cognition. This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown; this comprehension too belongs to the human agent, and the result thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right notion is Proof. Thus the term Proof is differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz., doubt, misconception, memory, and the like.

(24). The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of proofs: "Of three kinds,"—that is—of proof there are three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular kinds of proofs.

(25). Now, it is asked, which are the three kinds of proof? The answer is—"Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony. The above is an exposition of what is popularly known as proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the people, since thereto is its province confined. The cognitions of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help those of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.
Objection.—We grant that the number of proofs is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, as Analogy (Upamâna), &c. Reply—“Since these three include all kinds of proof.” This will be further explained later on.

Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof.

Now an altogether different question is raised—Why should the philosophic system enquire into the nature and kinds of proof, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of explaining the Pramêya, i. e., the subject-matter of proof (i. e., correct cognition)? To this it is replied—“Since a fact is ascertained only by proofs.”

[Siddhi = determination or ascertainmetn.]

The order of Explanation.

The specific definitions of the proofs.

Now on the occasion of the definition of the special kinds of proofs, the author of the Karikâ, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes all other Proofs, Inference, &c., which, therefore, are dependent upon it; and further since there are no two opinions with regard to it.

Karikâ V.

"'Perception' is definite sense-cognition (i. e., cognition of particular objects through the senses); 'Inference' is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded by (based upon) the knowledge of the major premiss [asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga (the Hetu, i. e., the characteristic mark, the middle term,) with the Lingi (the Vyâpaka or the Sâdhya, i. e., the major term, in which the characteristic inheres) and
the minor premiss [asserting the existence of the characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term]; and 'Valid Testimony' is true revelation (Sruti)."

The mention of "Perception" is only the statement of the term to be defined; the remainder being the definition, by which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined) from things of the same class or species, as well as from those of other classes.

(30). The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception) may be thus broken up: objects (Vishaya) are those that bind or connect the subject (Vishayi) with their own forms, i.e., they mark out the subject; such are earth, pleasure, &c., belonging to us. The subtle Primary Elements are no objects (of sense) to us, though they are so to Yogis and the Gods. 'Prativishaya' is that which is applied to different objects, i.e., the organs of sense. Application here is close proximity, or direct communication,—Prativishaya, thus meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication with, the object (perceived); and the definite cognition based on this (proximity) is "Prativishayādhyāvasāyāh." This cognition or knowledge, which is the result of an exercise of the Intellectual Faculty (Buddhi), is defined as consisting in the preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness—following on the subjugation of that of Darkness—resulting from the proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception. This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition. This is a Proof; and right notion results from the apprehensions of the sentient faculty by means thereof.

(31). Intellect (Buddhi), being a modification of, or emanation from, Nature (Prakriti, Primordial Matter), is insentient; and so, therefore, are its cognitions, jar, &c. And similarly the different modifications or productions of the Intellect—pleasures, &c., are insentient. The Spirit
(Purusha), however, having no real relation with these pleasures, &c., is sentient. This Spirit, being reflected in the Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect—which latter, therefore, are said to favour an intelligent entity, the Spirit. Through this reflection in the intelligence of the Spirit, the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions appear endowed with intelligence. This will be further explained in Kārikā XX.

(32). In the definition, the mention of 'definite cognition,' sets aside all doubtful knowledge, because the latter is not definitely comprehended or well-defined, and hence is uncertain. By saying "objects," their contraries, all non-entities, are excluded; as by saying 'prati'—and thereby implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects—are excluded "Inference," and "Trustworthy Assertion." Thus 'the definite cognition of particular objects' is a complete definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish it from all other things of the same, as well as of different classes. The definition of "Perception" given by other philosophical systems are neither impugned nor defended, for fear of being too prolix.

(33). How can one, denying Inference as a proof,—viz., the Materialist—be certain of the ignorance, doubt or erroneousness of another man? Since, these—ignorance, &c.—are not perceptible to our mortal eyes; nor can any other method of proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception) is accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance, &c., of others are inferred from such marks or characteristics, as difference of meaning or speech, &c. Thus, however unwilling
And Inference following directly from Perception, its definition must follow close upon that of Perception; there again, on account of the particular definition being based on the general one, the author gives the latter first—"It is preceded by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms;"—the middle term being the Vyāpya or pervaded, and the major term, the Vyāpaka or pervader. The pervaded (Vyāpya) is that which is brought to its own natural sphere, after the removal of all dubious and assumed conditions; and that by which the Vyāpya is thus brought in, is the pervader (Vyāpaka). The mention of "the mark and the marked," both of which must be objects, indicates objective or substantive cognition. Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the pervaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked). Lingi (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition, in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the relation of the minor term (the Paksha), with the middle term (Hetu)]. Thus the general definition of Inference comes to be thus:—"Inference is (a method of cognition) preceded by (i.e., based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major (Sādhya), the minor (Paksha) and the middle (Hetu) terms with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the knowledge derived from the major and the minor premises].

The three kinds of Inference—(1) The a priori (Purvavat), (2) The a posteriori (Seshavat), and (3) The inference from the perception of species (Sāmānyatodrishta.)

* Literally—"the mark and the marked."
(iii) Inference from the perception of species or class [Inference based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality from earthiness].

(36). First of all, Inference is of two kinds:—(1) The Affirmative (Vita) and (2) the Negative (Avita).* That which is based on affirmative concomitance, is Vita; and that based on negative concomitance, the Avita.

(37). Of these, Avita is Seshavat (a posteriori or analytic). The Negative—Sesha is that which remains; and the Inferential knowledge having this remainder for its object is called Seshavat. As is declared†:—"The cause in question being excluded, and (the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remaining (object) is Parisesha." [Vātsyāyana Bhāshya on the Nyāya Sutras.] Examples of this Avita Inference, founded on negation, will be given later on Kārikā IX.

(38). The Vita is two-fold (1) Purvavat (a priori or synthetica) and (2) from the perception of species. Of these Purva is that whose object is such as has the characteristics of its species known; and the Inferential knowledge of which this forms the object is Purvavat; as from the existence of smoke is inferred the existence of an individual fire in the mountain,—the characteristics of the species 'fire' having been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The second kind of Vita—the Inference based on the perception of the species—is that which has its object, such as has

* The Vita has an A proposition for its major premiss; and the Avita, an A proposition, converted, per accidens.

† As for instance, in a proposed inference of the form—'sound has earth for its substrate, since it is a quality'—the possibility of sound being in earth being excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality specific of earth; and there being no possibility perceived, of sound residing elsewhere, we have the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (Aksa) as Parisesha.
the characteristics of its species (previously) unknown; of this kind are all inferences with regard to the sense-organs; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence of the cause of the perception of colour (i.e. vision) is inferred from the fact of its being an effect (and as such necessarily caused). Though the characteristics of instrumental cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes, &c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such causes—the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as causing the perception of colour, &c.—are nowhere perceived. Nor are the individuals—the particular sense-organs—forming the class ‘Sense,’ perceptible to our mortal eyes; as are those of the class ‘Fire.’ In this lies the difference between the Purvacat (a priori) Inference and the Sāmānyatodrishta (Inference based on the perception of the species); though they resemble each other, inasmuch as both are Vīta (affirmative). Here (in Sāmānyatodrishta) dirishta=darsāna, i.e., perception; and Sāmānyatah=of Sāmānya, i.e., species or class; to Sāmānya is added the universal affix Tasi.* Thus then the term means—‘The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by the individual of a species whose general characteristics are not known.’ All this has been fully explained by us in the “Nyāyavārtti-tātparyatika;” and is not repeated here for fear of being too prolix.

(39). Since the comprehension of the connection of words (in a sentence) is preceded by a process of inference with regard to the cause of action of the experienced youth directed, on hearing the words of the experienced director, and further, since the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the knowledge of its denotation,—therefore Valid Testimony, is preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having defined Inference, the author next defines Valid Testimony.

* Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.
"Valid Testimony is true revelation." Here the mention of Valid Testimony is merely a statement of the term to be defined; the rest forming the definition. 'True' means 'proper'; hence 'true revelation' means 'proper revelation.' 'Sruti' is the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence by means of the sentence.

(40). This is self-evident. It is true; since all apparent discrepancies and doubts with regard to it are set aside by the fact of its proceeding from the Veda, which is superhuman. Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis, Puranas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.

(41). To the primeval Kapila, in the beginning of the Kalpa, we may attribute the reminiscence of the S'ruti studied in his previous birth, as we recollect, after the night's sleep, the occurrences of the previous day. And so did the revered Jaigishavya, in his conversation with Avatta, speak of his reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as ten Mahâkalpas: "By me, evolving through ten Mahâkalpas, &c."

(42). By saying 'true revelation,' all pretended revelations such as those of Sâkya, Bhikshu, &c.,—have been set aside. The invalidity of these systems is due to their making unreasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their making statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their being accepted only by Mlechchhas or other mean people.

(43). 'इ' distinguishes "Valid Testimony" from Inference. The meaning of a sentence is the Prameya (the fact to be proved): 'sentence' or 'word' is not its property; and as such could not be its mark or predicate. Nor does a sentence, ex
pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the
connection of the mark and the marked which are the neces-
sary conditions of Inference; since the sentence of a new poet,
previously unknown, expresses the meaning of sentences
touching unknown regions.*

(44). Having thus defined proofs, generically as well as specifically, the other
types of proofs, Analogy and the rest, postulated by others, can be shown to be
included in the above.

(45). Analogy (Upamāṇă) is exemplified as 'The gavaya
(a species of ruminants analogous to the
deer) is like the cow.' But the know-
ledge produced by this statement is nothing
more than that produced by our "Valid
Testimony." The knowledge that the term 'gavaya'
denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing
more than Inference. The object with reference to which
experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be
denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object
(that could be so denoted), e.g., गो (the class 'cow') is denot-
ed by गो. In the same manner experienced people having
asserted that "the object denoted by the term, 'gavaya' re-
sembles the cow," the term 'gavaya' comes to denote some-
thing resembling the cow;—and this knowledge is purely In-
ferential. The cognition of similarity of the perceived
'gavaya' with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence,
the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the
'gavaya's' similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and
simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitude†

* Whereas Inference can belong only to objects previously known.
† This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his Mimansa-
mykramani, that the object of analogy is not either the gavaya or the cow,
but the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be ame-
nable to perception.
existing in the cow is different from that in the 'gavaya,' since the similarity of one species with another consists in both of them having a common mode of the conjunction of their various parts; and this common method of conjunction can be one only; and this being perceived in the 'gavaya,' must be the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage. Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof.

(46). Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthâpatti) is not a distinct Proof. For the case of the assumption of the living Chaitra being outside, when he is not found at home, is cited as an instance of Apparent Inconsistency. To us, Sânkhyas, this is nothing more than Inference. A particular object being non-pervading or finite, when not found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss—in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be in another—is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies. Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being in the house; and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra's existence somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in the house; and as such, non-existence in the house could, very reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor does the fact of his non-existence in the house cut off his existence altogether; and consequently his entity could be said to retain itself outside. For Chaitra's non-existence in the house contradicts either his existence in toto, or merely his existence in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by the general assertion—"he must be somewhere" (without any definite place being mentioned), any particular place—even

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* It is only when two statements are made, with regard to one and the same subject, that they contradict each other; which is not the case in the present instance.
the house—may be implied; and as such the non-existence in the house becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity between the two propositions noticed above, they would contradict each other,—we reply: No: because the non-existence in the house having been ascertained by evidence—of Perception in the present instance—cannot be set aside, on the ground of uncertainty, by the doubtful fact of his existence therein. It is not proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein, would set aside his existence in toto and set aside all doubt (of his existence in space). Because Chaïtra’s existence in the house, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein, is overthrown by this latter; not so his existence in toto; since this latter fact is altogether disconnected with the non-existence in the house. Thus it is very proper to say that the external existence of an entity is inferred from its characteristic of internal non-existence. Hence the assertion—that the subject of Arthápatti is the removal of contradiction after due consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs—is set aside; for there is no real contradiction between the particular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general (that of mere existence). The other examples of Arthápatti may similarly be shown to be included in Inference. Hence it is established that Apparent Inconsistency (Arthápatti) is not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.

(47). Negation (Abhâva) again is nothing more than mere Perception. The Negation of a ‘jar’ is nothing more than a particular modification of the Earth characterised by (its) absence. Since all existences, with the single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence (Chit—Sakti), are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are perceptible to the senses; therefore there is no ground left uncovered by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct proof in the shape of Negation (Abhâva).
(48). "Probability" (Sambhava)—e.g., the knowledge of the existence of lesser weights in greater ones—is also an instance of Inference. The heavier weight is known as not capable of existing without the lesser ones; and this fact leads to the belief in the existence of the latter in the former.

(49). That is called "Rumour" (Aitihya), by the Saûkhyas, whose first speaker is unknown, and which is handed down by mere tradition—e.g., 'a Yaksha resides in the Vata tree.' This—Rumour—is not a proof; since it is doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown. "Valid Testimony," however, is that of which the speaker is known to be veracious. Thus the three-foldness of proofs is established.

(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing. Of these, the Manifested—earth, &c.,—are perceptible in their true form, even to the common ploughman. And similarly the a priori Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain, could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary character. Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary methods) should be explained by philosophy. Consequently the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.

KáriKA VI.

Knowledge of supersensuous objects is obtained through Inference—the Sàmanya-todrishta. What is not proved by this is proved by revelation.
(51). The particle त distinguishes the सामान्यातोद्रिष्ट from Perception and Inference a priori. Through the सामान्यातोद्रिष्टa Inference there arises knowledge of प्राध्यान्त* (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit both of which transcend the senses,—and this knowledge is due to the operation of बुध्दि reflected in चाईतन्य (belonging to Spirit). The above implies the application of the शेषवत (Negative) Inference also.

(52). Then, does the सामान्यातोद्रिष्टa Inference alone apply to all objects transcending the senses? If so, we shall have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat), &c., as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods in heaven, in the case of which the inference does not apply. Hence it is said —"By this, &c.," and as a simple "by this" would suffice to give the required meaning, the त must be taken as referring to शेषवत (Negative) Inference.

(53). Objection—Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers,' &c., leads to their being accepted as non-entities; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature, and the rest (which are like sky-flowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why

* Henceforth प्राध्यान्त, प्राकृति or अव्यक्तa will, for the sake of simplicity, be translated as 'Nature.'
† There is a difference of opinion among Commentators as to the explanation of this कार्काक, especially the first half of it. Vāchaspati Misra, as we have seen, explains it as—`we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects, through the सामान्यातोद्रिष्टa Inference.' Gaudapada takes it the same way. But नागण्यa तिर्थa explains thus—"In 'सामान्यातोह,' the affix 'tasi' is substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all (generic) objects amenable to the senses, we have a knowledge from Perception, &c." This last is the sense accepted by Davies in his translation. But the former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies, in a foot-note in loco, says that 'सामान्या,' "does not mean, &c." But he loses sight of the fact that "सामान्यातोद्रिष्टa" is the technical name of a particular kind of Inference.
have recourse to the various kinds of Inference for the sake of these latter?

The reply is—

KĀRIKĀ VII.

"(Non-perception arises) from excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness), intervention (or the existence of some intermediate barrier), predominance (of other objects), and from intermixture with with other like objects."

(54). The "non-perception" of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the "looking (back) of the lion."*

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived on account of extreme remoteness.

The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained. 'Extreme' (ati) must also be taken with 'proximity' (sāmipya)—e. g., the non-perception, through extreme nearness, of the collyrium (anjana) in the eye.

"Destruction of organs"—e. g., blindness, deafness, &c.

"From absence of mind"—As a person, under the influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not perceive objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the range of his senses.

"From Minuteness"—As for instance, however, much we may concentrate our mind (i. e., however attentively we may look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our very eyes.

"From Intervention"—e. g., one cannot see the Queen behind the walls.

* "The maxim of the lion's (backward) glance, is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows." [Vide. "The Nyaya-Latika in loco."]
"From subjugation or suppression"—e. g., the non-perception of the constellations, suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"From intermixture"—as one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(55). The अ in the Kārikā has a collective force, implying even those not here mentioned; such as ‘non-production’ is also among the causes of non-perception—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.

(56). The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of the principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. Thus, for instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this capability of being perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it is not proper for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception or imperceptibility.

Question—Which of the above—mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature, &c.? The reply is—

Kārikā VIII.

The non-apprehension of this (Nature) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.
Why should we not, continues the objector, attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?

The Author replies.—"Not due to its non-existence." Why?

"Because it is apprehended through its effects." It refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be mentioned later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence is ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object itself).† The seventh unction on the other hand, has not its existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity of perception cannot be urged in its case.

Granted all this, but which are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature? The reply is—"The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects."

This will be proved later on (Kārikā XXII.) Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is auxiliary to discriminative knowledge:—"Similar and dissimilar to Nature."

This division will be further treated of in Kārikā XXIII et. seq.

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect.

(1). The Baudhā view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2). The Vedanta view of the whole series of effects being a mere

* On the part of perception.

† This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible; these must have a cause, and this cause is Nature.
evolution from a single real entity. (3). The Nyaya and Vaiseshika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4). The Sānkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.

(60). Now, we cannot establish the existence of Nature, in accordance with the first three theories. The Universe consists essentially of sound, &c., which are different forms and modifications of pleasure, pain and delusion,—and as such bears testimony to the character of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness, passion and darkness. Such being the case, if we assert the production of entity from non-entity (the Banddha view) [we would land ourselves in an absurdity] viz., how could the cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound, and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For, certainly we cannot hold the identity of entity and non-entity (two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of entity from entity (the Sānkhya view) be upheld in accordance with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere evolutions from a single entity (the Vedānta view). Nor again could we attribute phenomenality (or changeability) to the single; in fact the notion of such phenomenality (changeableness) with regard to the unphenomenal (unchangeable) would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanāda and Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from entity, the existence of Nature cannot be proved; since, according to them, the cause is not identical with the effect, inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to each other.*

* According to the Nayāyikas the cause is an entity, the effect a non-entity; and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore the cause and the effect cannot be identical.
(61). Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature, the author first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior to causal operation).

**KĀRIKĀ IX.**

The effect is an entity; (1) because a non-entity can never be brought into existence; (2) because of a (determinate) relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because everything cannot be possible (by any and every means); (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only) that for which it is competent; and (5) lastly, because the effect is non-different from the cause.

(62). The effect is an entity—that is to say, it is so even prior to the operation of the cause. Against this theory, the Nayāyikas cannot urge the fault of the absurdity of the production of an already existing object. Because though the production of the sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the seed and the lump of clay respectively, yet causal energy can only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity]. Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity, this latter, being at any time available, would give rise to the (absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā.*

(63). The belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.*

*This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.*
(64). Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kanādā, with reference to which the author asserts—

"The effect is an entity." In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced:—(1) "Since a non-entity can never be brought into existence." If the effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If you assert entity and non-entity to be mere properties belonging to the jar, then in that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non-existent, no property could belong to it; and as such the entity the (property) remains in the same condition (i.e., cannot be attributed to the jar). Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be attributed to it. For, how can non-entity belong to the jar (as a property) when it is neither in any way related to it nor cognate to it? Hence as after the causal operation, so too before it, the effect subsists.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i.e., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something existing beforehand is a fact quite compatible with experience; as of the oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping, and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity; for a non-entity is never seen to be either manifested or produced.

(65). (2) For the following reason also does the effect subsist before the operation of the cause: "Because of a (determinate) relation of the cause with the effect." That is to say, the effect subsists because of the relation holding between itself and its material cause. That is, the cause produces the effect when in relation with it; and (we all know) that no relation with a non-existing effect is possible; hence the effect must be an entity.
Grant all this; but, continues the objector wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected therewith? We reply, that under such circumstances, only non-entity would be produced. With this reply in view the author lays down:

(3) "Since everything cannot be possible."—If the effect unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause), then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), there being no other limitation save that of unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected effect only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an unconnected effect by an unrelated one:—as say the Sânkhyas—"There is no relation of the cause, imbued with entity, with non-entity; those holding the production of an unconnected effect will land themselves in a regressus ad infinitum."

(67). Objection: Be it so: But an entity, though unrelated, will always produce the effect for which it is competent; and this competency too could be inferred from the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the regressus ad infinitum.

Reply: (4) "Since a competent cause does that for which it is competent."—Now then, asks our author, does this 'Capability or competency' belonging to the cause imbued with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those to which the cause is competent? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then the following question will arise—how does the energy apply to non-entity? On this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others; then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted energy of yours connected with the particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect must be an entity; in the latter, you have the same endless series of causes and effects. Hence it is reasonably declared
that (the effect is an entity) "because a competent cause can only produce an effect for which it is competent."

(68). (5) For the following reason too is the effect an entity: "Since the effect is connate (non-different) with the cause."—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is an entity; then how can the effect, non-different from this latter, be a non-entity?

(69). The proofs establishing the non-difference of cause and effect are the following: (a) The cloth (an effect) is not different from the threads (its material cause), since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter [i.e., since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it]. An object differing in its essence from another, can never inhere in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth is inherent in the threads; hence it is not different from it in its essence. (b) Owing to the causal relation subsisting between the cloth and the thread, they differ not in essence; because the causal relation can never subsist between objects essentially different from one another—e.g. between jar and cloth. But between cloth and threads we do find the causal relation subsisting; hence they can never differ from one another, in essence. (c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between cloth and threads: because of the absence of junction and non-contiguity between the two. We see junction taking place between objects differing from one another, as between a pool and a tree; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as between the Himaván and the Vindhya. In the instance before us, however, there is neither junction nor non-contiguity, and as such, no difference in essence. (d) For the following reason too, cloth and thread do not differ in essence: because of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any (other) effect different in weight (from the cause). As a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—e.g. the lowering of
the balance caused by two palas* is more than that caused by a single pala. But we find no such difference between the effects of the weight of the cloth and those of the weight of the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is non-different from the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference [Avítanumána—see, Káríká V] establishing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the threads combining themselves in various ways; and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. No essential difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory actions in themselves (i.e., the effects), (diference apprehended in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause and that of the effect).† Because these differences do not contradict each other, when we see that they are brought about by the appearance and disappearance of particular conditions—as for instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown, &c., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c., on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced; and

* A particular weight.
† Self-contradictory actions in themselves. When the cloth is reduced to threads, we say 'the cloth is destroyed, and the threads are produced;' now destruction and production are diagonally opposed; and as such cannot be predicated of the same thing at one and the same time; but we do predicate production of the threads and destruction of the cloth at one and the same time. So they differ.

Difference apprehended in language—as when we use such sentences as—

"Cloth is made of threads."

Difference in action—Thus we see that cloth can cover an object which certainly the threads cannot. And objects differing in their action must differ in essence.

These three are the objections brought forward against the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect. Each of these is considered and refuted separately in the following lines.
on entering them again (i. e., being changed into clay, &c.,) they disappear and are said to be destroyed.

Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced or an entity destroyed; as says the revered Krishna-dvaipayana:—“There is neither an existence of non-entity, nor non-existence of entity” [Bhagavadgītā II—16]. As the tortoise is not different from its own contracting and expanding limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion “cloth is in (i. e., made of) threads,” is as consistent as the assertion—“Tilaka trees in this forest.”

(71.) Nor does difference of purpose and action establish difference in essence; since a single substance can have manifold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light. Nor is fixity of purpose and action a ground of difference among substances; for we see that this fixity varies in the substances themselves, taken singly or collectively; as a bearer, in company with other bearers, can carry the palanquin, which he can never do when alone. Similarly, the threads though unable to cover, when taken singly, yet do cover when conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested (i. e., having developed into cloth).

(72). Objection:—Granted all this. But, is the manifestation or appearance itself an entity or a non-entity, prior to the operation of the cause? If the latter, then you admit the production of non-entity. If, however, you hold to the former alternative, then have done with the causal agency altogether; for we do not see the necessity of

* As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the forest itself; and yet we speak of the “Tilaka trees in the forest,” so with the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads.
the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be landed on a regressus ad infinitum. Hence the assertion, that 'the threads are made to have their existence as cloth manifested,' is invalid.

(73). To all this we make the following reply. Even on your own theory of the production of non-entity, we ask—what is this 'production'? An entity or a non-entity? If an entity, then have done with the agency of the cause; if, however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will have to postulate the production of that production and so on ad infinitum[and such being the case, the fault of regressus ad infinitum you urged against us, loses its force, since it is common to both of us; and consequently it is not fair to urge it against one].*

(74). If, in order to avoid the regressus ad infinitum, you declare that the production is nothing more or less than the cloth itself;—then the notion of cloth would coincide with that of production; and as such, on saying cloth, one should not add is produced (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could he say the cloth is destroyed; because destruction and production (denoted by cloth) can never coexist.

(75). Consequently, we have only two alternatives: the production of the cloth must inhere either in its material cause (the threads), or in its mere existence (Sattā). In either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause is necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects. (If you urge against us the common saying—'causes do (produce) the forms of cloth'—then we reply that) the causes have no relation with the forms of cloth; because these forms are not actions, and it is only with actions that causes are related; or else they lose their character.

* This point has been discussed by S'ankarāchārya, in his Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sutras, under the aphorism “Swapakshadoshśchacha.”
(76). Thus then it is proved that the effect is an entity.

(77). Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension of which appertains to discriminative knowledge; and this is done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose existence is to be proved.

KĀRIKĀ X.

The Manifested has a cause: it is neither eternal nor pervading (i. e., universal); it is active (i. e., mobile or modifiable), multiform, dependent, predicative (or characteristic), conjunct and subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse.

(78). "Hetumat"—i. e., having cause. The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).

(79). "Not Eternal"—i. e., destructible, revolving [returning to the condition of its material cause*].

(80). "Not pervading"—that is to say, the Manifested does not extend over all evolving or developing substances. The effect is pervaded by the cause but not vice versa, e. g., Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti), and as such is non-pervading.

(81). "Active"—i. e., mobile. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., have mobility inasmuch as they renounce certain bodies they have hitherto occupied, and occupy others;

* Since the Sānkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.
as for the mobility of earth, &c., it is too well known to need an explanation.

(82). "Multiform"—Since Consciousness &c., differ in different individuals; earth, &c., too are multiform in the shape of jars, &c.

(83). "Dependent"—On its cause; though the effect is non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally accepted; as we say—"the Tilakas in the forest."

(84). "Characteristic or predicative"—i.e., of Nature. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are characteristics of Nature, which cannot be its own characteristic, though it can be so of the Spirit (Purusha).

(85). "Conjunct"—Bearing in itself the relation of whole and parts. Conjunction consists in approach preceded by (i.e., after) non-approach; and connection with such approach of the whole to the part is what is connoted by "conjunct;" as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since the two are connate (and as such there can be no non-approach); nor is there reciprocal conjunction among Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-approach among them [since they all conjointly inhere in Nature].

(86). "Subordinate"—Consciousness stands in need of the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of its effect, Self-consciousness (Ahankâra). Without this aid, being by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in need of similar aids in the production of their several effects. Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand of Nature. Hence the Manifested, though efficient in the production of its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest in the scale).
(87). "The Unmanifested is the reverse"—i.e., of the Manifested. That is to say—the Unmanifested is uncaused, eternal, pervading, and inactive (immobile)—though to Prakriti does belong the action of evolution (or development,) yet it can have no mobility—single, independent (self-sufficient), non-predicative, unconjunct, compact (i.e., not made up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).

(88). Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:

Kārikā XI.

The Manifested has the three constituent Attributes (Gunas), it is indescriiminating, objective, generic (or common), non-intelligent (or insentient) and productive. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

(89). "Having the three constituent Attributes."—That is to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of pleasure, pain and dulness. By this assertion are set aside all the theories attributing pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90). "Indescriiminative"—i.e., as Nature is not discriminated from itself; so too the Great Principle (Mahat or Buddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be discriminated from it. Or indescriiminativeness may mean merely co-operativeness: nothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause efficient for its effect; it can be so only when in company with others; and as such no effect is possible from any cause taken singly by itself.
(91). Some (the Vijnâna-Vâdi Banddhas) assert that it is Idea (Vijnâna) alone that is denoted by the words pleasure, pain and dulness; and that there exists nothing besides Vijnâna that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as its attributes.

In opposition to this view it is laid down that the Manifested is "objective" (=perceptible). That is to say—it is so outside (and as such over and above) Vijnâna, and as such it is "Common"—i.e., perceived (simultaneously) by many persons. If, however, these were nothing more or less than Vijnâna, then in that case, this latter being uncommon (or specifically belonging to particular individuals), all the Manifested elements would be so also; for the Vijnâna of one person can never be perceived by another, owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the agent's own. On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent fact, which it could not be if we were to reduce all existence to mere Idea or Vijnâna.

(92). "Non-intelligent or Insentient."—Nature (Prakriti), Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent. We do not, like the Vainâsikas (a scion of the Banddhas) attribute intelligence to Buddhi.

(93). "Productive or Prolific"—i.e., possessed of the faculty of producing or developing. The particular possessive affix (Matu) is used in order to denote the constant character of the property of productiveness with regard to the Manifested. That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their several emanations or developments, whether similar or dissimilar.

(94). "So also is Nature"—i.e., as the Manifested is, so is the Unmanifested Nature. That is to say, the properties of the Manifested, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.
(95). The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is stated—
"Reverse is the Spirit."

(96). Objection:—Granted all this: But how can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifested and the Unmanifested; when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifested—such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c., and also between the Spirit and the Manifested—such as plurality?

We reply: "Yet also"—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as uncausedness, &c., yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of non-possession of the triad of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.

(97). The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been described as having ‘three Attributes’.* Now the author names and describes these three Constituent Attributes:

* This word Attribute requires some explanation. It stands for the Gunas of the Sâńkhya—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;—as says Colebrooke—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies very rightly remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Gunas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, the intert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important word—Guna—by Mode. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, "a quality which it may have or not, without affecting its essence or existence." Now as we have seen the Guna of the Sâńkhya is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate Guna as Attribute—using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode: "By Attribute, I understand, that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence. By Mode, I understand, the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine).—G. J.
The Attributes are of the nature of love, aversion, and stupefaction. They are adapted to illumination, activity, and restraint; and they mutually subdue, and support, and produce each other and consort together (for one purpose).

(98). These are called Gunas (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kārikā. And according to the maxim of presight, common among writers, the "love, &c.," of this Kārikā are to be taken in the same order (as "Goodness, &c.," in the next).

(99). Thus then, "priti" (love) being (a form of) pleasure, the attribute of Goodness is of the nature of pleasure; "Apriti" (aversion) being (a form of) pain, the attribute of Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, "Vishāda" being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of Darkness is of the nature of stupefaction. The word 'Ātmā' is inserted in order to guard against the theory that pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain, and vice versa. Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another; on the contrary, they are entities independent of one another. Thus "aprityātma" means one whose existence (not non-existence) consists in love or pleasure; "vishādātma" and "aprityātma" may be similarly explained. The fact of pleasure and pain being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one another, is one of common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of the other.

(100). Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next lays down their several functions—"They are adapted to illumina-
tion, activity, and restraint." Here, too, the three members of
the compound are to be construed in the same order as before.
Foulness (Rajas), in accordance with its active nature, would
always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Goodness
(Sattva) to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish
Darkness (Tamas)—by which restraint it operates only
at times; thus Darkness (Tamas) becomes a restraining
agency.

(101). Having thus laid down their functions, the author
lays down the method of their operation—

"Mutually subdue and support, and produce
one another, and consort together." "Vritti"
(action) is to be construed with each member of the compound.
Now, to explain, "Mutually subduing—" The Attributes are
so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some
external cause, it subdues the other; e.g., Goodness attains
to its peaceful state only after having subdued Foulness and
Darkness. Similarly do Passion and Darkness, in their turn,
attain to their respective terrible and stupid conditions after
having subdued the other two.

"Mutually supporting"—[Anyonyasrdyaavrattayah].—Though
this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of the con-
tainer and the contained, yet by 'support.' (Arsaya) here is
meant something on which depends the action of another—as
for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only
when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respec-
tive properties of activity and restraint. [Or else Goodness
by itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert,
and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do
Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and
restraint only when supported by the functions of the other
two. "Producing each other." That is to say, one can
produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By
production here is meant development or modification, which is
always of the same character as the parent Attribute which
latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of
anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause; nor are they transient since they are never resolved into an essentially different cause. "Consorting together." That is to say they are mutual companions, not existing apart from one another. च has a collective force. In support of the above, we have the following: "all (attributes) are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived."

(102). It has been said—"Adapted, to illumination activity, and restraint." Now it is explained what those are that are adapted, and wherefore are they so?

KĀRIKĀ XIII.

Goodness is considered to be buoyant and illuminating; Foulness is exciting and versatile (mobile); Darkness, sluggish and enveloping. Their action, like a lamp, is for a (single) purpose.

(103). Goodness alone is considered, by the masters of Sānkhya philosophy, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy—as opposed to sluggishness—is the property to which the ascension of objects is due; it is to this property that the rising flame of fire is due. In some cases, this property also brings about lateral motion, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps its efficiency to its particular effects; sluggishness, on the other hand, would only dull the efficiency of the cause. The illuminative character of Goodness has already been explained (Kārikā XII).
Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas)—activity and excitation.

Necessity of the properties of Darkness (Tamas)—sluggishness and envelopingness.

Necessity of the properties of Goodness (Sattwa)—activity and excitation.

(104). Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves inactive, stand in need of a force, exciting their causal operation; this force is supplied by Foulness, which excites them and rouses them from their natural passivity, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be exciting. This exciting character of Foulness is next accounted for—"(it is also) versatile." This also proves the existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary for the sake of action.

(105). Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the "sluggish and enveloping" Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits the scope of its actions. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been said to be the restrainer—"Darkness is sluggish and enveloping." The particle Eva is to be construed—not only with "Darkness"—but with "Goodness" and "Foulness" also.

(106). The enquirer objects: Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endowed as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would be no effect emanating from them). The author replies—"Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose." We have all observed how the wick and the oil,—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; and the various humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,
possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end— the purpose (emancipation) of the Spirit. This will be further explained in Kārikā XXXI.

(107). To return to our original subject—Pleasure, pain and delusion, opposed to one another, lead us to three different causes connate with themselves respectively, (and as these causes we have postulated the three Attributes). These causes too must be multi-form, since, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As an example of the multi-form character of these various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband, because with regard to him she is born with her essence consisting in pleasure. She pains her co-wives, because with regard to them, she is born with her essence consisting in pain. And, lastly, the same girl stupefies another man who is unable to get at her, because with regard to him, she has her essence in delusion. All the different forms—pleasure, &c., have been explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure, is the Attribute of Goodness which is essentially made up of pleasure; the cause of pain is Foulness, consisting in pain; and, lastly, the cause of delusion is Darkness, consisting of delusion. The properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belonging to Goodness) cannot be similarly said to be mutually opposed, and thus incapable of co-exisiting in a single Attribute. As a matter of fact, we find them actually co-existing. Hence, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy, being mutually consistent, do not necessitate the assumption of different causes (for each of them severally), as do pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and as such unable to co-exist in a single substratum). In the
same manner, pain, versatility, and activity (properties of Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness (properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of various causes. *Thus the triad of Attributes* is established.

(108). **Objection**:—Granted all this. As regards earth, &c., we actually perceive the properties of indiscreetness, &c., as belonging to them. But the Attributes, Goodness, and the rest, can never come within the range of perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscreetness, objectivity, &c., (enumerated above)?

To this objection we reply—

KĀRIKĀ XIV.

Indiscreetness and the rest are proved from the existence of the three Attributes, and from the absence of these (the three Attributes) in the reverse (of indiscreetness, &c. i. e., Purusha). And the existence of the Unmanifested (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent on those of the cause.

(109). By *“a vivēhi”* in the Kārikā is to be understood *“avivēkiteḥ”, as ‘deī’ and ‘èka’—in “deōkayordaivachanakavachanē” [Siddhāntakaumudi I—iv—22]—denote ‘deīteva’ and ‘ekatva’ respectively; or else it would be (*) “deōkēśhu” (and not “deōkayoh”):. It being asked—How do you prove these, indiscreetness, &c.?—the reply is:—“*From the existence of the three Attributes.*” That is to say, we have found

* For if the compound were analysed into “deī” and “èka,” the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making “deī” and “èka” stand for “deīteva” and èkatva making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.
First proof: From the existence of the three Attributes.

Second proof: From the absence of these in the reverse (Spirit).

in common experience, with regard to the perceptible material existence, that, whatever consists of pleasure, &c., is qualified by indiscreeetness, &c. The affirmative reasoning, being explicit enough, is not stated in the Kârikâ, which only mentions the negative reasoning:—"From the absence of these in the reverse"—that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which is the reverse of indiscreeetness, &c. Or again, we may have the Manifested and the Unmanifested (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"From the existence of the three Attributes"—as a purely negative inference* (Âvîta), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where we could have the agreement of the reason (Middle term—existence of the Attributes).

(110). An objection is again raised—We grant all this; but the existence of the properties—in-discreeetness, &c.,—cannot be proved before the object possessing these properties (the Unmanifested) has been proved to exist.

Question—How is Nature proved to exist?

To this we reply—"From the properties of the effect being due to the properties of the cause." The connection may be thus explained: All effects are seen to possess properties similar to those of their respective causes, as the cloth of the

* The syllogism has previously been explained as—"Whatever has pleasure, &c., is indiscreeet, as the perceptible material substances:"—and here we hand the agreement (Avvâya) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "All things having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the spirit (the Manifested and the Unmanifested) are indiscreeet, since they possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not indiscreeet does not possess the three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor term The Manifested and the Unmanifested which comprehend all cases where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have the three Attributes.
threads. Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the outcome of similar properties subsisting in their cause. [And this cause is no other than Nature.] And thus we have proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties of pleasure, pain, and delusion.*

(111). "I grant all this", says the enquirer; "but the followers of Kanáda (the Vaiseshikas) and Gautama (the Nayáyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the rest from the binary compound downward—from homogeneous atoms, which too are manifested. The various properties in the effects owe their existence to similar properties in the primary atoms.† And

Why not accept the atomic theory—which discards the necessity of an Unmanifested Entity?

* And consequently Nature too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms:

- Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).
  - Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect).
  - Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)

And again:

- Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c.
- Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved).
- Nature has indiscreetness, &c.

† It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic theory of Kanáda and Gautama,—which may be thus summed up.—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Akása, &c., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of "Adrishta," the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanent. But, as far as I know, no Nayáyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to S’ankarachárya in his refutation of the atomic theory.—See Shriraka-Bháshya on the Brahma-Sutras II—ii—12/17.
thus finding the production of the Manifested from the Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an Unmanifested, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature)?

We reply—

KĀRIKĀ XV.

From the finite nature of specific objects, from homogeneity, from evolution being due to active (causal) energy, from the separation of cause and effect, and from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole universe.

(112). Of specific objects, the primary cause is the Unmanifested (Nature). Because (1) "There is separation of cause and effect, and resolution of the whole Universe." It has already been proved (in Kārikā IX) that the effect subsists (in its unmanifested form) in the cause; as the limbs of the tortoise, coming out of its body, are perceived as separate from the body, which again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as different from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of these (i.e., are produced from them when they have their existence, as the jar manifested out of the lump of clay, wherein they have all along inhaled.) The same is the case with earth, &c., as effects of the primary elements, with these latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Aḥānkāra); with this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with this last again as the effect of the Unmanifested, which is the final cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested), of the various effects—either mediately (as with earth, &c.) or immediately (as with Consciousness)—related to it, is
what is meant by the separation of the cause and the effect. In the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of effects—(1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Self-consciousness and (4) Intellect—lose themselves in their respective immediate causes—(1) Primary Elements (2) Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a particular effect is concerned. Ascending in the same order as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing in their respective immediate causes—up to the Final Unmanifested—and thus rendering these latter imperceptible,—at least that form of the cause which concerns each of them severally. Of this unmanifested, however there is no further receptacle; and thus it becomes the receptacle—and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states—of all the effects. This is what is meant by the re-union (in the final Unmanifested) of the whole Universe. In Vaiswarupya, the affix तत्व has a reflexive sense.

(113). "Because Evolution is due to Energy."—It is a well-known fact that the Evolution of the effect is due to the active energy of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent energy in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy. The difference of sand from sesamum—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114). Objection: Granted all this:—But the above two reasons that you have urged might very well rest with the Will—what is the use of assuming a further Unmanifested Reality? We reply: (3) "From finiteness"—i.e., from the fact of the effects being, in their very nature
finite. (In support of his ground, the author puts forth a syllogism). The specific objects in question, Will and the rest have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (i.e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state), since, they are finite, as jar, &c. The finite objects, jar, &c., as commonly seen, have, for their cause, clay, &c., (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); since we have already shown that the cause is nothing more than the unmanifested condition of the effect. And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must be the Unmanifested which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

(115). "Because of homogeneity."—Homogeneity consists in the similarity of different objects. Intellect, and the rest—manifesting themselves as ascertainment, &c.—are seen to be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inhere), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it is decided that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.†

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the author next states the method of its operation—

* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as its effects, Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.

† Thus we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its Constituent Elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.
KĀRIKĀ XVI.

The Unmanifested is the cause; it operates through the three Attributes by blending and by modification, as water, on account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the Attributes, as they are variously distributed.

(116). "Operates, &c."—At the time of cosmic dissolution, the three Attributes continue to be of similar modifications. Modified condition forms a part of the nature of the Attributes; and as such they can never, for a moment, remain inert. Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and Darkness*

(117). Another method of operation is next stated—"By blending."—This "blending" of the Attributes, however, is not possible without the relation of subserviency among them, and this subserviency again is due to a diversity among the Attributes—which diversity again is not possible without destructibility (i.e., unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another). Thus the second method of operation is through development into Will &c.†

(118). The enquirer objects—How can diverse methods of operation belong to an Attribute which have been declared to be of uniform nature? We reply—"By modification—as water"—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though

* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.

† The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations—Intellect and the rest.
naturally of itself, having one taste,\(^*\) becomes sweet, bitter, sour, &c., according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth—such as cocoanut, wood-apple, &c.

In the same manner, owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one, and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations. Hence it is laid down—"On account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the various Attributes."

(119). Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-consciousness, or the sense-organs, or (lastly) the elements.

KĀRIKĀ XVII.

Since all composite (or compound) objects are for another's use; since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes with other properties (must exist); since there must be super-intendence; since there must be one to enjoy (experience or feel); and since there is a tendency towards final beatitude (abstraction of the Spirit from material existence); therefore Spirit exists.

The spirit exists; Spirit exists, apart from Primordial Matter (Nature):

(120). "Because all compound objects (objects made up of integral component parts) are for another's use."—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand

\(^*\) 'Sweet'—according the Nayayikas.
thus—Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another’s use, because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these latter are all compound, inasmuch as they are made up of pleasure, pain and delusion.*

(121). But, says the objector, the compound objects chair, &c., are seen to exist for other objects which too are compound, such as men’s bodies and not for the sake of Spirit as apart from Matter (the body). And as such Nature, &c., being compounds, should only lead to the inference of another set of compound substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an Elementary Non-compound Spirit (an “End-in-itself.”) We reply—“Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes and other properties must exist.”

Reply—Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes must exist.

The view of the objector would lead to compounds ad infinitum.

Objection: The above reasoning would only lead to another set of compounds not to an Elementary Spirit.

—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., being for another’s use, we were to infer only another compound substance, then in that case we would have to assume such compounds ad infinitum; for even this latter compound must lead to another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on ad infinitum. And when we can escape this regressus ad infinitum by postulating a reasonable resting ground, it is certainly, not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of compounds ad infinitum). Nor can it be urged that multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by proofs; for in the above inference the application of the instance ought to be extended only so far as “existing for another’s use” is concerned; it can be extended no further. And we have explained in the Nyāya-vārtika—

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.
tātparyatikā* that if the complete identification of every phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the subject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference.† Thus then, in order to escape the regressus ad infinitum, if we accept the non-compound nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of "being without the three Attributes," "discreetness," "non-objectivity" (subjectivity), "uncommonality" (i.e., specific character), "intelligence" and "unprolificness" (inability to produce). For, these properties are invariably accompanied by that of *compoundness*, which latter being absent in spirit, must lead to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be a Katha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author—when he laid down that "the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes, &c., must exist"—implied that this something which would be "the reverse, &c." must be an independent Elementary Entity—an "End-in-itself." And this is Spirit.

(122). For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: *Because there must be superintendence." That is to say, because the objects constituted by the three

* This is a commentary on the Nyāyavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras of Gautama) of Udyotakara by Vāchaspāti Misra. This work with the Parisuddhi of Udayanacharya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyāya,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Gangesā Upādhyaya, in his Tattwa-Chintāmāni.

† Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature, which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyāyika—"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c., &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.
Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superintendent. For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, is seen to be superintended over by something else—e.g. the chariot by the charioteer; and Intellect and the rest have been proved to consist in pleasure, pain and delusion; therefore, they must have a supervisor,—and this supervisor must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent, an "End-in-itself"—and this is Spirit.

(123). Again the Spirit exists "because there must be one to experience (or feel)"—That is to say, every one of us has an idea of pleasure and pain as something to be felt—as agreeable or the reverse; and as such there must be some substance, beyond the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-contradictory actions, inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.† Thus, then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be the agent who feels—and this is Spirit.

(124). Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kārikā thus: Bhogya (enjoyable) means visible; and the visibility of Buddhi and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond, Intellect, &c.,—and this is Spirit. The visibility of

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* Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c., which again will necessitate its superintendence by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.

† That is to say—Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.
Intellect and the rest can be inferred from the fact of their being made up of pleasure, &c., as earth, &c.

(125). Lastly, Spirit exists—"because there is a tendency towards action for final beatitude."—The final beatitude, treated of in all the systems of philosophy, and mentioned by the great sages of divine insight—as the absolute and final alleviation of the three kinds of pain—can never apply to Intellect, &c.; for, these have by their very nature, pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved; since a substance cannot be absolved of something forming its constituting element. Thus then, there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., wherefrom pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude, therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and hence) Intellect and the rest—and this is Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this spirit one (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

KĀRIKĀ XVIII.

From allotment of birth, death, and the organs; (2) from the non-simultaneity of actions (with different individuals); and (3) from the different modifications of the Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

"The plurality of Spirits is established"—How?

* As the Vedantin asserts.
(127). "From allotment of birth, death and the organs."—

Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation with the body the sense-organs, Self-consciousness, Will and Feeling* (vedana)—all these latter forming into an aggregate of a particular character. This is what is meant by birth—which does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). And death too consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "organs" are thirteen, beginning with the Will. The (diversified) "allotment" of these—births, &c.—is not explicable on the hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if the Spirit were one (in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one individual would lead to exactly the same effects in others. The several allotment, however, becomes quite consistent with the theory of the plurality of Spirits. Nor can the Monist explain the above difference by attributing it to the Spirit, as conditioned by contact with different bodies, &c. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing birth or death in accordance with the different parts of the body!—which can never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by the mere development or derangement of certain portions of her body.

(128). For the following reason also, the Spirit is different with different individuals: "Since activity is not simultaneous." Action, in the form of endeavour, is a function of the internal organs; still it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men; and thus the motion of one would

* "Vedana" might be taken severally with "body," &c. In that case the passage would be translated thus—"bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and intellectual cognitions"; but the translation given above is preferable: for certainly, there can be no cognition through body, &c., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone, without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind, &c., and so on with the rest.
lead to that of all others—a palpable absurdity, which is explained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of plurality.

(129). Again, the Spirits are many—"because the modifications of the Attributes are different"—Some persons abounding in the attribute of Goodness, represent aggregates of that attribute—e. g. the gods and saints. Others abound in Foulness—such are men. The rest abound in Darkness—and these are the beasts. This diversity in the distribution of Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it quite explicable.

(130). Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states their properties—a knowledge of which is conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom):—

KĀRIKĀ XIX.

And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows that the Spirit is witness, and has final emancipation, neutrality, and is perceiving and inactive.

"And" connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

(131). If it were said—"And from this contrast," then it would refer to the various distribution of the three Attributes, of the last Kārikā. In order to avoid this, it is said—"and from that, &c." A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun this; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by that; hence the that here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132). Thus, then, the contrast of "having the three Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit’s property of being without the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-
objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive. Now, the properties of being a witness and perceptive are necessary accompaniments of intelligence and non-objectivity. Since an intelligent being alone can be a spectator, and one can be a witness only when the objects have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various objects and reasons to the witness; similarly does the Pra-kriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the witness. And again no object can be shown to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the witness. For the same reasons, the Spirit is perceiving.

(133). Further, the absence of the three Attributes leads to final emancipation—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of pain; and this property, as belonging to the spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being naturally without the three Attributes, and hence without pleasure, pain or dulness.

(134). From the absence of Attributes, again, follows neutrality; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who can be called neutral—also called Udásina (indifferent). Lastly, the property of inactivity is a necessary outcome of the properties of non-productiveness and discriminativeness (wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit is inferred from its wisdom and non-productive character.

...(135). Objection:—We grant all this: but in our daily life we first decide our duty and then we think in the following strain—'I, who am an intelligent being, wish to act.' Thus, then, we find intelligence and activity co-
existent. And this goes against the Sankhya tenets which make intelligence devoid of activity and vice versa.

We reply:

**Kārika XX.**

Thus, from this union the unintelligent Linga (Buddhi, &c.) appears as intelligent; and from the activity of the Attributes, the indifferent Spirit appears as an (active) agent.

(136). Since intelligence and activity have been proved to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word Linga includes everything from the Mahat down to the primary elements—to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the union or proximity of the Spirit with the Linga (Buddhi and the rest).

The rest is clear enough.

(137). *Objection*—You say that the feeling is due to union, &c. But no union is possible without some need which, again, is not possible without the relation of the helper and the helped. How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Linga?

In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need—

**Kārika XXI.**

For the Spirit's contemplation of Prakriti, and its final Emancipation, the union of both takes place, like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds creation.

(138). In "Pradhānasya," the genitive affix has the objective force, the meaning being—"for the contemplation by Spirit of Nature,"—thus implying the fact of Nature being
an object—something to be enjoyed. But this enjoyability is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes necessary, for that of Nature.

(139). The author next lays down the ground of the Spirit's need—"For the Emancipation of the Spirit"—The Spirit, while in connection with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this self-imposed bond he seeks liberation—which can result only from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three Attributes—which wisdom thus becomes impossible without the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his emancipation. Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the relation was for enjoyment only.

(140). Granted all this relation—But whence the creation of Buddhi, &c.?

We reply—"From this union proceeds creation." The relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for enjoyment or emancipation, if there were no Buddhi and the rest; under the circumstances the union itself brings about the creation, for the sake—primarily—of enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation.

The process of creation is now described—

KĀRIKĀ XXII.

From Prakriti issues Mahat (or Buddhi); from this Mahat again issues Self-consciousness (Ahankāra), from which proceeds the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, proceed the five gross elements.

(141). From Prakriti, &c.—Prakriti is a name of the Unmanifested Principle; Mahat and Ahankāra will be
described later on, as also the set of sixteen, made up of the eleven sense-organs and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five gross ones—Akāsa, Earth, &c.

(142). Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds Akāsa, having sound as its characteristic property; similarly from the mixture of the primary elements of touch and sound, proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; again, from the mixture of the primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound, touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, from the mixture of the primary element of smell with that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all the five for its characteristic properties.

(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in general terms in Kārikā X, and specifically in Kārikā XIII; the Manifested also has been generally defined in Kārikā X; now the author defines a particular Manifested Principle—the Buddhi—

KĀRIKĀ XXIII.

Buddhi is the determining Principle. (Will)*; Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power constitute its form (when affected by Goodness), and the reverse of these when affected by Darkness.

* Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyanasaya means 'determining,' and of all the faculties will appears to be the only determining principle in Man. Henceforth Buddhi will be translated as Will, and the reader is requested to mark the same change in the foregoing pages.
(144). "Buddhi is determination"—Since there is no difference between the action and the active agent (effect and cause). Everyone, when he comes across something to be done, thinks that he is deputed to the work and, finally, determines that it is his duty, and thus acts towards its accomplishment. This determination of the duty is the characteristic property of Buddhi—which appears as if endued with intelligence by contact with the intelligence of the Spirit. Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.

The definition of Buddhi explained.

(145). Having thus defined Buddhi, the author next states its properties, in order to help the attainment of true wisdom—"Virtue," &c., Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as well as to Super-physical bliss,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eight-fold practice of Yoga leading to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of passion.

The properties of Buddhi—Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these.

(146). *This Dispassion is of four kinds—Yatamána-Sanjña Vyatireka-Sanjña, Ekendriyá-Sanjña and Vasikára-Sanjña. The passion—naturally impure—residing in the mind, lead the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop to this action of the senses is named Yatamána-Sanjña (literally, effort). When this process of resistance is once begun, some passions will have been suppressed before others; then the discrimination of these from those still operating is called Vyatireka-Sanjña. When the senses have been disabled, then the passions that have been suppressed reside in the mind in

* Cf. Bhashya on Yogasutra 1—15.
the form of mere anxiety—and this is known as Ekendriya-Sanjnā. The suppression of even this anxiety towards all perceptible objects,—the ordinary ones as well as those mentioned in the Veda,—is called Vasikara-Sanjnā—and is superior to the first three; this has been thus described by the revered Patanjali: “The dispassion named Vasikara-Sanjnyā belongs to one who has no desire for either visible or Vedic objects.” [Yoga-Sūtra I. 15].

(147). This is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi. Power also is a property of Buddhi; an it is to this that the perfections Attenuation and, the rest (Animā, &c.) are due.* Of these (1) Animā (Lit Atomic character) the is the property by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) Laghimā (Buoyancy) is that to which is due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the sun’s rays. (3) Garimā (Gravity) leads to heaviness; and (4) Mahimā (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) Approach is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) Fulfilment of desires is such as can enable one to dip into the earth as in water. (7) Vasitwa leads to the subordination of all objects to the devotee. Supremacy brings about mastery over all objects. (8) Infallibility of purpose is such that all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.

(148). These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking of the attribute of Goodness. Those partaking of the attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these—viz.: Sin Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.

* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine; but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken Vasitwa and Isitwa as one.
The author next defines Egoism or Self-consciousness (Ahaṃkāra).

Kāriṅkā XXIV.

Egoism is self-consciousness; thence proceeds a two-fold creation,—the set of eleven and the five primary elements.

(149). "Egoism is self-consciousness"—and this Self-consciousness is perceptible in such ideas as—"The object I have observed and known," "none but myself has power over this and that," "I exist," &c. All this is the characteristic action of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for its determinative function in such decisions as "this is to be done by me."

(150). The different products of this effect are next stated—"Thence proceeds a two-fold creation." The forms of these creations are stated—"The set of eleven and the five primary elements"—only these two creations proceed from the principle of Egoism. The 'eva' excludes all other possible suppositions.

Objection:—How can two diverse kinds of creation proceed from a uniform Egoism?

We reply—

Kāriṅkā XXV.

The set of eleven proceeds from the modified principle of Egoism, and partakes of the attribute of Goodness. The primary elements are due to the Attribute of Darkness; from Foulness proceed both.

(151). The eleven senses, being light and enlightening, are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,
by Darkness, proceed the set of the primary elements. How so? Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness. That is to say—Though the principle of Egoism is one and uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters.

(152). This is objected to—When all the necessary effects are brought about by the action of the attributes of Goodness and Darkness only, have done with the purposeless attribute of Foulness.

We reply—

"From Foulness proceed both"—i. e., the set of eleven as well as the primary elements. Though there is nothing to be done exclusively by Foulness, yet it is a necessary factor, since the attributes of Goodness and Darkness are both, by their very nature, inert; and as such could not do their own work unless urged to action by the active and mobile Rajas. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness. And thus we see that it is not altogether purposeless.

In order to describe the set of eleven—the effects of Goodness—the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

KĀRIKĀ XXVI.

The intellectual organs are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those of action are, speech, hand, feet, the excretory organs, and the organ of generation.

(153). Sense is defined as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by the attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold—intellectual, and those of action. Both these are called
Indriyas (senses) because they are characteristics of the Spirit (Indra). The senses are named: "The eye, &c."—Of these the eye is the sense for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving smell, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for experiencing touch. These are the intellectual sense-organs. The action of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārika XXVII.)

The eleventh sense-organs is next described—

KĀRIKĀ XXVII.

Of these (sense-organs) Mind (Manas) partakes of the nature of both (intellectual as well as those of action): it is the reflecting (or thinking) principle, and is called a sense-organ since it has cognate properties. Its multifariouslyness, as well as its external forms, are due to the various specific modifications of the Attributes.

(154). "Partakes, &c."—Among the eleven organs, Mind partakes of the nature of both—i.e., it is an intellectual organ of sensation, as well as one of action, since the eye and speech, &c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the principle of Manas.

(155). The author next gives the specific definition of Manas—"It is the reflecting principle"—That is to say, Mind is defined by reflection (or thought). It is the principle which supplies forms and qualifications to the abstract cognition of a certain object, which invariably precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge thereof. As is laid down by an ancient writer—"At first, one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latterly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain
class and having certain properties." It is a well-known fact that on first seeing an object, the first cognition that one has of it, resembles to a great degree the cognition of a child—indefinite and unqualified. Soon after this one learns to connect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c. This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a function characteristic of Manas (Mind), and as such serves to distinguish it from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus serves as its definition.

(156). Objection:—Granted all this: But we have seen that Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct functions of their own are not classed among sense-organs; in the same manner, we shall not class Manas among them either.

The author replies—"It is a sense-organ"—Why? "Because of its having cognate properties." This property mainly is the fact of its being an immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by Goodness—which is the definition of a sense.

Reply—It is a sense inasmuch as it is an immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by Goodness—which is the definition of a sense.

(157). It is asked—Whence such multifarious effects from the single principle of Egoism as affected by Goodness? We reply—"It is due to the specific modifications of the Attributes"—The difference in the effects is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the form of the operative principles of sound, &c.

(158). Destiny (adrishta) is also a modification of the Attributes. We have the qualifying term "External" as presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the sen-
tence being—As the external forms are the effects of the modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and imperceptible ones.

(159). Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next stated.—

KĀRIKĀ XXVIII.

The function of the five senses, in respect to colour, &c., is mere observation or feeling; speech, handling, walking, excretion and gratification are (the functions of) the other five.

By "observation" here is meant the primary abstract perception (Nirvikalpa) through the intellectual senses. "Speech &c., are of the other five," i. e., of the organs of action. The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose function is speech. The functions of the cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*

The functions of the three internal organs are next stated.

KĀRIKĀ XXIX.

Of the three (the internal organs) the functions are constituted by their respective characteristics; these are peculiar to each.

* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions e. g. the ear is defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.
The function common to the organs consists in the five vital airs—Prâna and the rest.

(160). "The functions of the three are constituted by their respective characteristics." That is to say, the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus, determination of Buddhi, self-consciousness of Ahankâra and reflection of Manas.

(161). The double character of the functions based on the fact of their being specific or common is next stated—"These are peculiar," &c. "The five vital airs, constitute the common function." The function of the three internal organs is the substance (of life, and hence) of the five vital airs; since the latter exist when the former do and cease to exist when these are absent. Of these the air called Prâna (Breath or Life) resides in the heart, the navel and the toes; that called Apâna resides at the back, &c., Samâna in the heart, the navel and the joints; Udâna in the throat, heart, &c.; and lastly, Vyâna resides in the skin. These are the five airs.

The author now states the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three internal organs).

Kârikâ XXX.

With regard to visible objects, the functions of the four are said to be instantaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to invisible objects, the functions of the three
(internal organs) are preceded by that (i.e., the cognition of some visible object.)

(162). "Instantaneous"—"with regard to visible objects," e.g., when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his observation, reflection and determination are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163). "Gradual," e.g., in dim light, a person has at first only a faint cognition of a certain object; then he looks at it more steadily and ascertains that it is a thief with his bow and arrow levelled at him; then the consciousness follows "the thief is advancing against me"; and he finally decides to run away from the place.

(164). With regard to invisible objects, on the other hand, the internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"The function of the three is preceded by that," i.e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and the other methods of proof operate only when they have for their background some sort of external perception.

(165). Objection: Granted all this: But the functions either of the four or of the three (organs) cannot depend on themselves alone; for in that case (these organs) must be either permanent or transient; if permanent, then their functions also would be permanent; if transient, then the various functions would combine most absurdly, there being no restrictive agency.
KĀRIKĀ XXXI.

We reply:—They* (the organs) operate towards the performance of their respective functions, due to mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit supplies the motive; by nothing (else) is an organ caused to act.

The subject of the first sentence is “organs.”

(166). A number of persons wielding different weapons, unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards the fulfilment of another’s purpose, which tends to help its own. And since this movement towards action is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the functions.

(167). Another objection—The lancers, &c., being sentient beings, can comprehend each other’s motives and can act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their end and urge them to action accordingly.

We reply:—“The Spirit’s purpose is the motive, by nothing (else) can the organs be brought to act.” Since the purpose of the Spirit is to urge the organs to action, what is the need of postulating a supervisor ab extra? This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

* Davies restricts this to the internal organs; but there is no reason why the Kārikā should not apply to organs in general—as the Kaumudi takes it.
It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ brought to act." The author next states the division of these organs:

Kârikâ XXXII.

Organs are of thirteen kinds; they have variously the functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting. The objects of these are tenfold, that which is to be seized, retained or manifested.

The thirteen organs consist of the eleven sense-organs, Ahankâra and Buddhi. An organ is a particular kind of agent, and no agency is possible without a function; hence the author next states the various functions. "They have the functions, &c." The senses of action have the function of seizing; that is to say, they extend their action to their respective objects. Buddhi, Ahankâra and Manas retain impressions by their respective functions—the life-breath, &c. (mentioned before); and lastly, the intellectual (perceptive) organs manifest their respective objects.

Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next stated—"That which is to be seized," &c. The objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, retained and manifested. By seizure here is meant pervasion (or extension). The five senses of action extend over speech and the rest; and each of these being both human and superhuman these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is fivefold being an aggregate of the five great elements, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both human and superhuman, these objects also become
tenfold. Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses are five—sound, touch, colour, taste and odour; and each of these being both human and superhuman, the objects also become tenfold.

(171). The sub-divisions of the thirteen organs are next stated:

KĀRIKĀ XXXIII.

Internal organs are three; and the external ten, making objects known to the former three. The external organs act at time present; and the internal at the three divisions of time.

(172). The internal organs are three: Manas, Ahankāra and Buddhī, called internal because located inside the body.

(173). The external organs are ten: the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs, i.e., they supply the means for reflection, consciousness and determination of objects—the intellectual senses functioning by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of their respective functions.

(174). The author next states a further point of difference between organs internal and external—"The external organs act at time present." By "present" is meant here the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; thus then, speech* also belongs to the present. "The internal organs at the three divisions of time." e.g., the idea that "there has been rain," since the river has risen—(for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"—(for the present moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.

* The special qualification is necessary for the case of speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the time present if by this word were meant the present moment only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.
(175). Time, according to the Vaisēshikas, being one, cannot allow such divisions as past, present and future. Hence we must have for the various units, the various conditions or specifications to which we give the names, past, present and future. So the Sānkhyas do not admit of a distinct principle in the shape of Time.

(176). The author next considers the objects of the external senses operating at time present—

KĀRIKĀ XXXIV.

Of these, the five intellectual senses (those of sensation) concern objects specific as well as non-specific (collective); speech concerns sound; the rest regard the five objects of sense.

(177). Of the ten external senses, the five intellectual ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects:—by specific here is meant gross—and such objects are sound and the rest (the Tanmātras), manifesting themselves as Earth, &c.,—(the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbulence and dulness. The non-specific objects are the primary elements. The particle Mātra, in the word Tanmātra, serves to distinguish these from the gross objects. The senses of Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross states, whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound, &c., in their gross forms only.

(178). Similarly of the senses of action (the Motor Senses). Speech concerns sound, in its gross form, because speech is the cause of sound. Speech, however, can not be the cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct effect of Self-consciousness (Ahaṅkāra); and as such has the same cause as speech itself (which also being one of senses, proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.)
"The rest," i.e., the four other senses of action—the excretory organs, &c., "concern five objects," because the different objects, e.g., jar &c., which are the objects of these senses, are all made up of the five primary elements of sound, colour, &c.

Among the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to others, reasons for which are given:

KĀRIKĀ XXXV.

Since Buddhī with the other internal organs advertsto (comprehends) all objects (of sense), these three are said to be the warders (principal ones), and the others the gates (secondary).

(179). Warders, i.e., chief ones.

Gates i.e., such as are the external organs.

Since Buddhī, with Ahankāra and Manas, apprehends (i.e., determines) all objects exhibited by the external organs, these latter are said to be gates (secondary organs), and Buddhī, with the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).

Buddhī is the chief, not only in comparison with the external organs, but also with regard to the other external organs, Manas and Ahankāra. To this effect it is said:

KĀRIKĀ XXXVI.

These (the external organs together with Manas and Ahankāra), characteristically differing from one another and being different modifications of Attributes resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first enlightened the Spirit’s purpose, present it in its entirety to Buddhī.
(180). As the village officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the treasurer, who again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having operated on (observed) an object, present the observation to Manas, which reflects on it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting these qualified observations in turn to Ahankāra, which takes specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal cognition to the head-officer, Buddhi. Hence it is said: "These having enlightened the Spirit’s purpose present it to Buddhi."

(181). The external organs together with Manas and Ahankāra, are various affections of Attributes, i.e., modifications of Goodness, Foulness and Dulness, which though essentially opposed to one another, are yet brought to co-operate for the supreme purpose of the Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire, though variously opposed to the action of one another, yet join, under the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the Attributes; such is the connection.

An objection is raised. Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to Buddhi?—Why should not we make it quite the other way: Buddhi subordinate to Ahankāra?

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ XXXVII.

Since it is Buddhi that accomplishes the Spirit’s enjoyment, and again it is Buddhi that exposes the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit.
(182). Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is Buddhi alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is supreme over other officials. Buddhi assumes the form of the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either of pleasure or pain, resides in Buddhi, which is (reflected) in the Spirit and thus leads to its enjoyment. As the observation, reflection and consciousness of objects are transferred to Buddhi through their various modifications; in the same manner, the functions of the senses also coalesce with the functional determination of Buddhi, as the forces of the subordinate officials do with that of the master.

(183). The objector asks: If Buddhi only serves to accomplish the Spirit's enjoyment, then no emancipation is possible.* We reply:—"It afterwards exposes the difference between Spirit and Nature."—By exposition here is meant 'bringing about'; the construction of Antaram Visinashti, being similar to that of Odanapâkam pachati.†

The objector retorts: the difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to your own saying, a caused one, must have an end in time; and thus (the Spirit could never attain to eternal Beatitude).

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* For Buddhi would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

† Visinashti itself has been explained as—"expresses the difference," then the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.
We reply:—The difference has been everlasting; and the function of Buddhi lies only in exhibiting the difference to the full view of the Spirit who then recognises the fact that he himself is something distinct from the constitutionally mobile and modifiable Nature. (The distinction is not caused by Buddhi; it is as eternal as the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this it is also implied that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle and hard to be perceived.

The organs having been described, the author next describes objects, specific and non-specific:

KĀRIKĀ XXXVIII.

The five primary elements are non-specific; from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be specific (because) they are calm (soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding.

(184). The Tanmātrasyound and the rest—are subtle; and the character of calmness, &c., do not belong to these. The word Mātra denotes the capability of these elements of being enjoyed.

(185). Having thus stated the non-specific, the specific objects are described: “From these &c.” From the five Tanmātras, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākāsa, Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

(186). Objection: we grant that these are thus produced; but what about their specific character?

Specific because soothing, terrific and deluding.

We reply: “These are said to be specific” Why? because “they are calm, turbulent and deluding.” The first has a causal and the second a collective signification.
Among the gross elements, Ākāsa, &c., some have the attribute of Goodness predominating in them; and these accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant; others predominate in Foulness, and are turbulent, painful and fickle; the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and sluggish. These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are specific i.e., gross. The primary elements on the contrary cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be non-specific, i.e., subtle.

The sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated:—

KĀRIKĀ XXXIX.

Subtle (astral) bodies and such as are produced of parents, together with the gross elements, form the three sorts of specific objects. Of these the subtle bodies are everlasting, and those produced of parents are perishable.

(187). “The specific objects are of three sorts”; these three sorts are mentioned: (1) Subtle bodies (which are not visible, but are only postulated in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the sixfold Sheaths (Koṣas). Among these latter, hair, blood and flesh are produced from the mother; and the veins, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six Koṣas. Thus then we have seen that the subtle bodies form the first kind of specific objects; bodies produced of parents, the second; and the gross elements the third,—objects like the jar, &c., being included in the last.

(188). The difference between a subtle body and a body produced of parents is stated—“Subtle bodies are permanent and those produced of parents perishable,” that is to say ending in (dissolving into) either liquid, ash or dirt.
The Astral body is described.

**KĀRIKĀ XL.**

The Astral Body is unconfined permanently, and migrating, invested with dispositions.

The Astral body,—formed primerally, unconfined, permanent, composed of Buddhi and the rest down to the primary elements,—migrates, is without enjoyment, and is invested with dispositions.

(189). When the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, for each Spirit individually, was the Astral Body. This body is unconfined, inasmuch as it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is again "permanent;"* since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final dissolution.

The Astral Body is "composed of Buddhi and the rest, down to the primary elements." That is to say, it is an aggregate—of Buddhi, Ahankāra, the eleven senses and the five primary elements; and as such it is specific, being endowed with the properties of calmness, restlessness and dulness.

(190). Objection: Let this astral body be the only body the seat of enjoyment for the Spirit:—What is the need of the gross physical body comprised of the six sheaths?

* The word *niyata* is differently interpreted by Nārāyana Tīrtha (in his *Śankhya-Chandrika*) He takes it in the sense of "restricted," i.e., an astral body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there are distinct astral bodies to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gauḍapāda closely resembles that of the *Kaumudi*. There does not seem to be any special ground for preferring either of the two, though I am more inclined to the interpretation of the *Kaumudi*. 
We reply:—"It migrates," i.e., the astral body invariably deserts the body it has lately occupied; and again occupies another. (If it be asked) why does it do so? (we reply)—(because it is) "without enjoyment," that is to say, because the astral body by itself—without a corresponding gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoyments,—would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it migrates.

(191). Objection:—Transmigration is due to merit and demerit, and these have no connection with the Astral Body (referring as they do primarily to Buddhi, and then by reflection, to the Spirit) then how can this latter migrate?

We reply:—(because) "it is invested with dispositions."

Reply:—It has dispositions?

The dispositions are merit and demerit, wisdom and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness; endowed with these primarily is the Buddhi, with which latter again the Astral Body is connected; and as such the Astral Body becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions, just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with champaka flowers. Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should migrate.

(192). (If it is asked) why should not the Astral Body—like Nature—last even after the final dissolution? We reply (because it is) "mergent," that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature its immediate cause). The mergent character of the Astral Body is to be inferred from the fact of its being caused, (i.e., being caused, and, as such, having a beginning in time, it must have an end also).
Objection: We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to Buddhi, Ahankâra and the senses? Have done with the unwarranted postulation of an Astral Body.

Objections:—Why not attribute migration to Buddhi, &c.?

We reply:—

KÂRIKÂ XLI.

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, so neither does the Linga (Buddhi, &c,) subsist supportless, without a specific (body).

(193). Buddhi, &c., are called Lingâ, because they are the means of cognition (Linganât, Jnāpakât, lingam).* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism:—between the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are aggregates of the five primary elements; like their prototypes in the ordinary physical body.

"Without specific bodies," i. e., without subtle (astral) bodies. Testifying to this assertion, we have the following (from the Mahâbhârata): “Then Yama extracted from Satyavân’s body, the thumb-sized body, which he had entrapped and thus subjugated.” Here the mention of the extracted body as “thumb-sized” implies the fact of its having been the Astral Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit could have been extracted. By Purusha in the above extract, is meant the Astral Body,—explaining the word derivatively as—that which sleeps (lies—sêté) in the body (puri).

Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration:

* Cf. The Panchikarana—vicarâna—Tattwachandrika,—where a similar explanation of the word is given.
KĀRIKĀ XLII.

Formed for the sake of the Spirit's purpose the Astral Body plays its parts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of means and consequences, and by union with the predominant power of Nature.

(194). Formed for the sake of the Spirit's purpose the Astral Body plays like a dramatic actor by connection with the means—merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds of gross bodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a dramatic actor, occupying different stages, plays severally the parts of Parāśurāma, Yudhishthira, Vatsalāja so does the astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of man, brute or plant.

(195). (If it is asked) Whence this capability of the Astral Body? We reply, "by union with the predominant power of Nature." As is declared by the Puranas: "The various strange developments are due to Nature's omnipotence."

It has just been said, "by connection with means and consequences;" the author therefore next describes these means and consequences:

KĀRIKĀ XLIII.

The essential dispositions are innate; the incidental ones, such as merit, &c., are seen (considered) to be appurtenant to the organs; the uterine germ, &c., belong to the effect.*

* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place, he renders Sām-siddhiḥkāh by "transcendental", the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly he renders Karanāśrayāṇāh by "including cause", though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the Kaumudi as well as the Chandrākā.
I. Incidental dispositions.

"Essential dispositions are innate," e.g., it is declared that at the beginning of the creation the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom, dispassion and power. Incidental dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by personal effort; such merit, &c., are those belonging to Valmiki and other Great Rishis.

The opposites of Dharma, &c., similarly explained.

II. Essential innate.

The same is to be understood with regard to demerit, ignorance, passion and weakness.

The aggregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh, blood, &c., of the child in the mother's womb, is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; as are also the childhood, youth, &c., of the born man.

(198). The means and the consequences have been explained; now the respective consequences of the various means are described.

KĀRIKĀ XLIV.

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes; by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom (results) beatitude; and bondage from the reverse.

(199). "By virtue, &c.," i.e., to the various starry spheres (the Brāhma, the Prājāpatya and so forth.)
Vice to lower.

"By vice, &c.," i.e., to the lower planes known as sutala, &c.

"From wisdom, beatitude." Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long as discriminative wisdom is not attained; when, however, this is attained, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit fulfilled, and accordingly retires from him. As is declared, "The workings of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." "From the reverse, &c.," i.e., from false knowledge, results bondage.

(200). This bondage is also of three kinds: Natural, Incidental and Personal. The natural bondage is that of those Materialists who contemplate on Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, it is laid down in the Puranas: "The contemplators of the unmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the end of which they attain to true wisdom]. The incidental bondage is of those who contemplate on the various products of Nature as Spirit,—the elements, the senses, Ahankāra and Buddhī. With regard to these it is laid down: "The contemplators of the senses continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras; those of Ahankāra, till a thousand; and lastly, those of the Buddhi having done away with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under the incidental bondage are (conventionally called) Videhas."

The personal bondage is due to Ishtāpūrta (actions done with selfish motives, such as the digging of tanks, &c., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.
KĀRIKĀ XLV.

From dispassion results absorption* into Prakritī; from passionate attachment, transmigration; from power, non-impediment (of desires;) and from the reverse, the contrary.

(201). "From dispassion results absorption into Prakritī."

I. Absorption into Prakritī from dispassion.

Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are absorbed into Nature. By Prakritī here are meant Prakritī, Buddhi, Ahamkāra, the Elements, and the senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed into these (i.e. those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202). "From passionate attachment results migration."

II. Transmigration from passionate attachment.

The epithet "passionate" implies the painful character of metempsychosis; because (as has been previously described) passion is the source of pain.

(203). "From power, non-impediment," i.e., the non-obstruction of desires. "A powerful man (Iswara) is one who can do whatever he wishes."

*Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, here, and remarks: "It (the Sānkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free........Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quite true; but I don't see how this affects the position of the Hindu commentators, who, at least Vāchaspatī Misra among them, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the astral body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that this resting is what, in theosophic parlance, is called "the peaceful rest enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachan."
IV. Obstruction of desires from weakness.

"From the reverse," i.e. form weakness—"the contrary"—i.e., the frequent obstruction of desires.

With a view to describe collectively as well as individually, the eight properties of Buddhi—virtue, vice, &c., in order to show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquished, by those desiring emancipation—the author first describes them collectively:

KĀRIKĀ XLVI.

This is an intellectual creation, distinguished by Error, Disability, Contentment and Perfection. By the hostile influence of the inequalities of attributes, the different forms of this creation become fifty.

(204). Pratyaya = That by which anything is known, i.e., Buddhi. "Error," i.e., ignorance, is a property of Buddhi; so is also "disability" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs. Contentment and Perfection also are properties of Buddhi as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—error, disability and contentment—include Virtue and the other six intellectual properties; leaving aside Wisdom which is included in Perfection.

(205). These properties are next considered individually. "The forms of these are fifty." If it is asked: Whence these fifty forms? We reply "from the hostile influence of the inequalities of the attributes." The inequality may consist either in the individual strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third. This inequality is assumed to be more or less in accordance with the requirements of particular cases; and it leads to the
suppression of Attributes by one another—thus giving rise to the fifty forms of intellectual creation.

The fifty forms are next enumerated:

KĀRIKĀ XLVII.

There are five forms of Error; twenty-eight of Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Perfection eight.

(206). The forms* of Error are ignorance, egotism, passion, hatred and attachment to the body: respectively called, obscurity (Tamas), delusion (Moha), extreme delusion (Mahamoha), gloom (Tamisra), and utter darkness (Andhatamisra). Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error; though, as a matter of fact, they are its products. A certain object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism and the rest, partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become attached to it. It is for this reason that the revered Vārshaganyā (Vyāsa?) declares Ignorance to be made up of the five component parts.

(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the five forms of error:—

KĀRIKĀ XLVIII.

Of Error there are eight forms, as also of Delusion; extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also utter Darkness.

(208). "Of Error," i. e., of Ignorance, "there are eight forms."

* Abhiniveśa—is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy. It is defined by Patanjali (Yoga Sutra 11-9) as the "tenacity of life—an attachment to the body which relates the residue of one's former life."
Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking non-spiritual nature, \textit{Buddhi}, \textit{Aghanakara}, and the subtle elements, for Spirit; and these non-spiritual things are eight in number. Error is said to be eight-fold.

(209). The \textit{y} refers the eight forms to Delusion. The gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider themselves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this has the eight \textit{Siddhis} for its object, it is said to be eight-fold.

(210). "\textit{Extreme Delusion is ten-fold.}" By \textit{Extreme Delusion} is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being either divine or otherwise; and hence having these for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten-fold.

(211). "\textit{Gloom, i.e., Hatred, is eighteen-fold.}" The objects of sense, sound, &c., are ten by themselves; the eight occult powers however are not objects of sense by themselves, but only as means to the attainment of the various sensuous objects. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, their means—the Powers—too are retarded. The Powers, together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen-fold.

(212). "\textit{So is Utter Darkness}—[\textit{Utter Darkness = Attachment to life}]. The word \textit{tathā} refers \textit{eighteen-fold-ness} to Utter Darkness. The gods having attained the eight occult powers and enjoying their consequences—the ten sensuous objects—live in continual fear of these being wrested from them by the Rakshasas; and this fear constitutes \textit{Abhinivesa} or attachment; and this latter having for its object the aforesaid eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be eighteen-fold.
Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divisions become sixty-two.

Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability:

The injuries of the eleven organs, together with those of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Disability; the injuries of Buddhi (itself) are seventeen—brought about by the reversion of contentment and perfection.

The injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes of so many injuries of Buddhi, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—"Deafness, leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness, dumbness, ajighratā (failure of the sensibility of the olfactory nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and idiocy,"—consequent on the failure of the various sense-organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these are mentioned together with those of Buddhi (itself) in accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect.

Having thus described the disabilities of Buddhi, arising from those of the sense-organs, the disabilities of Buddhi itself are next stated—"With the injuries of Buddhi." If it be asked—how many are these?—we reply, "seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi." Wherefore? "by the reversion of contentment and perfection." Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold also; and similarly perfection being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,—thus making the seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.
(217). The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:

**KĀRIKĀ L.**

Nine forms of Contentment are set forth: four internal, relating severally to nature, means, time and luck; and five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.

(218). The five internal forms of Contentment belong to those who have ascertained that Spirit is different form Nature, but still being ill-advised, do not make further attempts in the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of discriminative wisdom; and these forms are called internal, because they pre-suppose the difference of Ātman and Prakriti. It being asked—which are these?—the reply is "relating severally to nature, means, time and luck," i. e., whose names are nature &c.

(219). The contentment called "prakriti" consists in the satisfaction of the disciple on being told that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Prakriti and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of hankering after it by meditation, &c., and this contentment is also called Ambha.

(220). The second form of contentment arises from the following instruction: wisdom could not be attained in the ordinary course of nature; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom, because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects all individuals equally. Such wisdom could only be attained through asceticism; and so thou must follow an ascetic life and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from the above instruction is called Salila.
(221). The third form, called "Time," or Ogha, is the satisfaction arising from the instruction that asceticism too cannot bring about Emancipation; for all means await the proper Time for bringing about their various consequences, and so when the Time has arrived, one's ends will be gained without undergoing the troubles of asceticism.

(222). The fourth form called "Luck," or Vrishti, is the satisfaction arising from the following:

IV. Vrishti. "Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism, &c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck. Thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madālasa when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their mother's instructions and thereby attained beatitude.

(223). The external forms of Contentment are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, &c.—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but take the non-spirits—Nature, &c., to be Spirit. These forms are called external, because they pre-suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and these come after freedom from attachment. The causes of this non-attachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be five-fold. Abstinence too is due to the preception of discrepancies in the process of sensuous enjoyment—consisting mainly of earning, saving, wasting, enjoying, killing lives and so on.

(224). To explain:—The means of acquiring wealth, service, &c., are invariably the sources of pain to the servants—as is declared in the following:—"Who would ever be attracted towards service, considering the pain caused by the insults to be suffered at the hands of the wardens of a vain monarch?"—the content-
ment resulting from abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called Pāra.

(225). And then, the wealth being obtained, brings with it the further trouble of protecting it from the king, thieves, floods and fire—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second called Supāra.

(226). Thirdly, the wealth having been obtained and safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its being spent—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment, called Pārāpāra.

(227). Fourthly, when one becomes accustomed to sensuous objects, his desires increase; the non-fulfilment of these brings about the fourth, called Anuttamāmbha.

(228). Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment (either in this world or the other), without the cruel process of killing animals, and contentment due to the abstinence arising from the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth called Uttamāmbha.

Thus the four external forms of contentment, together with the five internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229). The author next describes the primary and secondary divisions of Power:

KĀRIKĀ LI.

The eight Powers (i.e., means of acquiring them) are reasoning, oral instruction, study, three-fold suppression of pain, acquisition of friends, and purity. The three before mentioned (Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).
The chief among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain—three-fold on account of the three-foldness of the pains to be suppressed.

The other means mentioned, being means to power only through the three-fold suppression of pain, are called secondary. And these five are both causes and effects. Of these study is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression of pain) being only effects; the rest are both cause and effect.

The first, study, named Tāra, consists in comprehending the sense of the psychological sciences by listening to the teachings of a qualified teacher.

The effect of this last, oral instruction, implies the comprehension of the meaning of instructions, it being a useful habit with writers, to imply the effect by the cause; this constitutes the second Siddhi called Sutāra.

Reasoning consists in the investigation of the meaning of scripture by a process of dialectics not contrary to the scriptures themselves. This investigation consists in strengthening the portion of the scripture by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it; this process is also called meditation by writers on the Vedas, and the Power due to this is called Tāratara.

The fourth is the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at truth by the right process of reasoning yet he has no faith in his conclusions until he has talked them over with his teacher and follow-students. Hence the acquisition of a qualified teacher and follow-students is said to be the fourth Siddhi called Ramyaka.

By dāna here is meant purity (of discriminative wisdom)—deriving the word from the root Daip* = to purify. As is declared by the

* Davies remarks that the root is "coined for the occasion." But I may refer the reader to the Siddhānta-Kumudā, under the Sutra Vānysya Sānyogadāh (VI/4/68).
revered Patanjali: "An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain." (Yoga-Sutra II.1—26). By unimpededness in the Sutra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, 'after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires]. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom attained). Thus the word dāna includes (as a means to power) Practice also. This is the fifth, called Sadā-Mudita.

(236). The three primary means to Power are called, Pra-modā Mudita and Modamāna. And these three with the last five are the eight (means to) Power.

(237). Others explain the distich thus: The perception of truth without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of instructions received in past births is what is meant by ākha. And that which is obtained by listening to the tenets of the Sāṇkhya Philosophy as learnt by others, is the second called Sābda, because it follows merely from the study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher's, in the company of fellow-students, it is said to be the third, known as study, because it is brought about by study. The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, generosity is said to be a means to wisdom, because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṇkhya Philosophy.

(238). The Disabilities of Buddhi arising from the reversion of Contentment and Power thus become seventeen in number. Of the different portions of intellectual creation, it is well-known that Power is most desired by all. So the author next mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments
to Power: "The aforesaid three are checks to Power." The aforesaid three refers to Error, Disability and Contentment. And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power, because they retard their progress; and thus being opposed to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable.

(239). Objection:—Granted all this. But it has been laid down that the creation is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the intellectual creation alone; or by the elemental alone. Why have both?

The reply is:—

Kârikâ LII.

Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there would be no development of dispositions. Wherefore proceeds a two-fold creation, the personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and intellectual.

(240). Linga denotes the creation composed of the primary elements; and disposition, the intellectual.

The meaning of the Kârikâ is that the elemental creation cannot manifest itself for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, without the intellectual creation; nor conversely is the latter capable of having its complete manifestation without the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation.

Again experience, the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible in the absence of the two bodies and the object of sense. Hence the necessity of the elemental creation. And conversely the means of experience—the sense-organs—could never be complete without the three internal organs—Manas Ahankâra and Buddhi. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative
wisdom—the only means to emancipation, would not be possible without the above two kinds of creation. Whence the necessity of the double creation.

(241). The possible objection of reciprocal causality is explained away as being similar to that of the seed and the sprout, due to the fact of the creation having had no beginning in time (being eternal), and the creation of bodies and dispositions at the beginning of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.

(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation having been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the elemental creation:

KĀRIKĀ LIII.

The divine class has eight varieties, the lower animals, five; mankind is single in its class; thus briefly is the world of living beings.

(243). The eight divine varieties are the Brāhma, the Pājāpatya, the Aindra, the Paitra, the Gāndharva, Yāksha, the Rākshasa and the Paisâcha.

(244). The five varieties of lower animals are quadrupeds five of the lower animals. (other than deer), deer, birds, creeping things and the immovable (trees, &c.)

(245). Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions—Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily formation is the same in all classes of men.
(246). The author next lays down the three-foldness of the elemental creation based on the excess or otherwise of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle and the lower:

**Kārikā LIV.**

Among the beings of the higher plane Goodness predominates: among those of the lower predominates Dulness; in the middle reside those predominating in Foulness—these constituting the whole Universe, from Brahmā to the tuft of grass.

(247). The Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Swah, Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya—predominate in Goodness. Those consisting of the lower animals and trees, &c., are characterised by Dulness. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvipas (or continents) and Oceans—predominate in Foulness, inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions, righteous or otherwise.

The whole of the Universe is summed up in the phrase "from Brahmā to the tuft of grass."

(248). Having thus described the creation, the author next describes its productiveness of pain, that would lead to dispassion, one of the means to Emancipation:

**Kārikā LV.**

There (in the world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its person (until the dissolution of the astral body); wherefore pain is natural.
Among corporeal beings there are many varieties of experience interspersed with pleasure and pain; yet the pain of decay and death is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—“may I not cease to be; may I continue to be”—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect, and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

(249). Objection:—Pleasure and pain are the properties of Buddhi; and as such how can these be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply:—(the name) "Purusha," literally meaning "One who sleeps in the astral body"; and this latter being connected with Buddhi and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them.

(250). Question:—How can pain related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

"Reply:—"Due to the non-discrimination of Spirit from the body." The Spirit, not alive to its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. The आ in आबिनिःक्ष्यः: may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pain—the meaning being, "Until the body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain."

(251). The author next decides the question of the Maker of the Universe:

KĀRIKĀ LVI.

This creation from Buddhi down to the specific elements, is brought about by the modifications of Prakriti. The work is done for the emancipation of each

* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.
Spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

(252). The creation is brought about by Nature; it is neither produced by a God, nor is it an evolution from Brahma; nor can it be said to be Uncaused; since, in this latter case, the Universe would be either an eternal entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity). It cannot be said to be evolved from Brahma (the Vedânta view), for there can be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahma, as postulated by Vedânta. Nor, again can creation be said to be brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God; for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to manipulate his tools.

(253). Objection:—Granted that the creation is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active and, as such, her operations should never cease; and hence there would be no emancipation of any Spirit.

Reply:—"The creation appearing as if it were for Nature's own sake, is really for the sake of another." A cook, having finished the cooking, retires from the work; similarly Nature being urged to action for the emancipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation; and thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible).

(254). Objection:—Granted all this. But it is only something sentient that can act towards the fulfilment of its own or of another's purpose; and Nature being insentient cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient supervisor (over her blind force);
the Spirit residing in the body cannot be such a supervisor, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other sentient agent, superintending \textit{ab extra} the operations of Nature—and to this we give the name \textit{God}.

\textit{We reply:—}

\textsc{Kârika LVII.}

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature operate towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

\textit{(255).} It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends, \textit{e.g.}, the action of milk towards the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

\textit{(255a).} It would not be right to urge that the production of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action cannot afford a case parallel to the action of insentient Nature;—because all actions of an intelligent agent are due either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which, therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of an intelligent agent. For God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such, without pain, for the removal of which God's compassion would be moved. And if the pain subsequent to creation were said to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality: the creation due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none
but happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then what is the necessity of postulating a supervisor? And if you urge the incapability of mere Karma—an unintelligent agent—without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply, that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being produced by Karma, we may very easily say the same with regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &c., will have to be attributed to God also).

(256). The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due neither to selfishness nor to mere pity; and thus in this case, none of the above faults are applicable. The only motive of Nature is the purpose of the Spirit. Thus therefore the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

(257). It has been said—"as if for its own purpose." The author explains this:

KĀRIKĀ LVIII.

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does the Unmanifested Principle (Nature) act for the emancipation of the Spirit.

Desire is satisfied on the attainment of the desired object which is the purpose of the agent; because an end of action is only that which is desired.

The similarity is pointed out: "So does the Unmanifested Principle act for the Emancipation of Spirit."

(258). Objection:—We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive to the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?

We reply:
KĀRIKĀ LIX.

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit.

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operations.

The word "stage,"—the place—implies the spectators,—the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself i. e., her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from the Spirit.

(259). Objection:—We grant the action of Nature for the Spirit's purpose. But she is sure to get some compensation for her pains from the Spirit—just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the motive of Nature cannot be said to be purely altruistic.

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LX.

Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established.

(260). Objection:—We grant all this: But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it
again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to Spirit.

We reply:—

KÂRIKÂ LXI.

Nothing is more modest than Nature: such is my opinion. Once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

By modesty here is meant delicacy (of manners), the inability to suffer exposure to the Purusha's view. As a well-bred lady invisible to the Sun, with her eyes cast down, having her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show herself again.

(261). Objection:—Let this be so. But Purusha, being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipation possible? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible to the unmodifying Purusha. And as the Purusha is devoid of action it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for death. Hence it is a meaningless assertion that the creation is for the purpose of Purusha.

The author meets the above objection by accepting it:

KÂRIKÂ LXII.

Verily no Spirit is bound, or is emancipated, or migrates; it is Nature alone which has many receptacles, that is bound, or is released, or migrates.

(262). No Spirit is bound; not any migrates; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily...
forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers; because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—gain or loss—aearue to the king. In the same manner, experience and release, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the nondiscrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection above urged loses all its force.

(263). Objection:—We understand that bondage, migration and release, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature?

We reply:—

Kârikâ LXIII.

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit, by means of one form.

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms" (i.e. dispositions) all the properties of Buddhi, save discriminative wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by herself, by means of one form, _viz._, discriminative wisdom. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of the same Spirit.

Objection:—We grant all this. What then?

Kârikâ LXIV.

Thus it is that by the practice of truth, wisdom is attained, which is complete, incontrovertible, (and hence) pure, and absolute: (by means of which the idea is obtained that) "I am not, naught is mine, and I do not exist."
(264). The word "truth" indicates the knowledge thereof. By means of practice of truth, in the manner described above, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition thereof. It is for this reason of its leading to truth that the knowledge is called pure.

(265). Why pure? Because "incontrovertible" (or unmistakable). Doubt and error are the two impurities of knowledge; and the above knowledge being free from these is said to be pure. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be undecided; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by saying, "hence incontrovertible" the absence of both doubt and contradiction is implied; this absence being due also to the fact of the exercise belonging to truth.

(266). Objection:—We grant all this, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of metempsychosis, of which thus there would be no end.

In reply to the above, it is declared "Absolute," i.e., unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of removal by means of true wisdom, though this has a beginning in time. For partiality towards truth is natural to Buddhi, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas): "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge of) the character of objects, for such is the partiality of Buddhi."

(267). The form of the cognition is stated:—"I am not, naught is mine, and I do not exist. 'I am not' merely precludes the possibility of action from the Spirit. As is declared
(by grammarians), "The root As together with Bhu and Kri signify action in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal, determination, self-consciousness, reflection, observation, &c., are all precluded from the Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that "I am not." "I" here implies agency, such as in "I give," "I eat," &c.; and no such agency can belong to the Spirit, who is without any action. And from this follows the idea that "naught is mine." For it is only an agent that can have any possession; and hence the preclusion of action implies that of possession as well.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I do not exist," means that "I am the Spirit, not productive;" and because non-productive "I have no action" —'I am not'; and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

(268). Objection:—Even after such a knowledge, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to rebirth.

We reply:—"It is complete," i.e., there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above. Hence there is no re-birth.

(269). Question:—What is accomplished by this knowledge of truth?

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXV.

Possessed of this knowledge, Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at leisure and at ease, beholds Nature, which has now reverted from the seven forms (to her primitive state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the force of true wisdom.

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun action were experience and the perception of truth; and
when these two have been accomplished there is nothing left to be done, and hence Nature ceases from prolific activity.

"Under the force (of true wisdom)." The seven forms—Virtue, &c.—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion, too, of those who have it through mere contentment, is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its contradictory—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects, the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these Nature desists.

"At ease," i.e., Inactive; "Pure" i.e., Unmixed with the impurities of Buddhi, due to the Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the Attribute of Goodness; or else no (perception, and hence no) wisdom would be possible.

(270). Objection:—Let this be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature desisting from productions. But the production has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Matter); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and objectivity of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; and you cannot urge that they cease, because there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is possible).

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXVI.

"She has been seen by me," says the one and so retires; "I have been seen," says the other, and ceases to act. Hence though there is still their conjunction, it affords no motive towards further creation.
(271). So long as nature has not manifested truth, she may bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. For experience is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense—the modifications of Nature—to belong to himself. And discriminative wisdom also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken by the Spirit to belong to himself. When however such wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot accept any purpose as his own. And further, experience and emancipation being the purpose of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the Spirit, they cease to be motives also. With this view it is declared—"There is no motive, &c." A motive is that which moves Nature to act towards creation; and this is not possible, when there is no purpose of the Spirit.

(272). Objection:—We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of *Karma*—then we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (i.e., by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation. And hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Spirit"

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.
becomes meaningless. And the hope too—that emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of *Karma*, by means of experience extending to a limitless period of time—is too sanguine ever to be realised.

To this we reply:—

**KĀRIKĀ LXVII.**

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with body, as a potter's wheel continues to revolve by the force of the impulse previously imparted to it.

(273). The unlimited residua of *Karma* also having their prolificness destroyed by the force of true knowledge, they do not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce sprouts only on the ground of *Buddhi*, damp with the waters of pain. The ground, however, becomes barren by having its dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom, and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experience. With this view it is said—"*Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy.*" Even when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse; just as even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, the impulse having exhausted itself it stops. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced, as is declared by *Sruti*—"Other (actions) having been destroyed by itself experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [*Chhāndogya* VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or impression) is a peculiar one, in which all illusion has been destroyed; and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body.
(274). Question:—Let this be so: if the Spirit remains invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his final release?

We reply:—

KĀRIKĀ LXVIII.

When the separation of the informed Spirit from his corporeal frame at length takes place, and Nature ceases to act in respect to it, then is final and absolute emancipation accomplished.

The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute and eternal cessation of the triad of pain.

(275). Though the doctrine has been proved by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Rishi is stated:

KĀRIKĀ LXIX.

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the emancipation of the Spirit, wherein the origin duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Rishi.

"Abstruse," i. e., hard to be grasped by dull-brained people.

"By the great Rishi" i. e., by Kapila.

The feeling of reverence thus roused is strengthened by basing the doctrines on the Veda: "Wherein are considered, &c.," i. e., in which knowledge (i. e., for the sake of which knowledge).* These, origin &c., are also considered in the Veda.

* As in Charmani dvipinam hanti.
(276). Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great Rishi (Kapila) ; wherefore should we pay attention to the assertions made by Íśvarakrishna?

We reply:

KĀRIKĀ ‘LXX—LXXI.

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted to Âsuri, who taught it to Panchasikha, by whom the science was extensively propagated.

Handed down by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Āryā metre by the noble-minded Íśvarakrishna who has thoroughly investigated the truth.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all sins, the cause of the triad of pain.

‘Supreme, i. e., chief among all purifying doctrines.

(277). “Ārya = that which has arrived at truth; one whose intellect is such is called Áryamati.”

(278). This science is a whole in itself,—not a mere section—because it treats of all branches of knowledge :

KĀRIKĀ LXXII.

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete science comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversies.

The sixty topics are thus laid down in the Rāja-Vārtika: 1 The existence of Prakriti (Kārika XIV); 2 its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (XI); 4 Distinctiveness (of Spirit from Matter) (XI); 5 Subserviency (of Matter to Spirit) (XVII);
6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII) ; 7 Disjunction (of Spirit, from Matter in the end) (XX) ; 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning) (XXI) ; 9 Relation of subserviency (of Matter with Spirit) (XIX) ; 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX) ; these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of error (XLVII), nine of contentment (L), and twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX) ; these, together with the eight sorts of power (LI), make up the sixty "topics." All these sixty topics are treated of in the above seventy distiches, which therefore form a complete science and cannot be said to be only a portion thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories), singleness, objectivity, and subordination relate to Nature; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit; and existence, disjunction, and conjunction to both; and existence of the relation of subserviency relates to gross bodies also.

May this work of Vâchaspâti Miśra, the Tattva-Kaumudi (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men!

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vâchaspâti Miśra.
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श्री:
तत्त्वकौमुदी
( साधृण्य। )

निलिप्तन्त्रापरतन्त्रमतिभ-द्रापुदर्शनंतीकाकः
नैचिन्यतथा-श्रीमद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकं

काचित्कस्तिपणसहिता

मिश्रितामुण्डनभूततपसिविवर्यक्षोपानामकश्रीमतीर्थिनाथशर्मतनूजनमना
मध्यमेन "मास्टर आफ़ आर्स" इत्युपाधिमाजा दरभंजा-
राजकीयसर्वतीसदनाध्यक्षण झोपानमेकन श्रीमद्-
गजनायकशर्मण नैचिन्येन संरक्षता।

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मुम्बईनगरनिवासि-विद्यार्थिकः
श्रीमतुकारारम्भतात्याभिमेघेन प्रकाशिता

तत्वग्रस्त "तत्त्वविवेचक" नाथी मुद्रणयंत्रालये मुद्रिता च।

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१८९६।
भूमिका.

निदित्त्वतमापत्तनप्रदेशः श्रीमान् वाचपतिप्रियः कदां कनदेशमधुकरको- 
रैसि सम्पूर्णितेशुलैवक शक्यते । किन्तु निदित्त्वप्राप्तेऽभाष्यते यदयं विद्वत- 
प्रणीः विद्यावरीयसहस्तमवर्षांशु प्राप्ते विशिष्टार्जनपदसोऽ मुद्यामासति । यतेस्यस्य 
तात्त्विकः त्रिधारकाः परिमुडळ्णानी व्यक्ते श्रीम्भुदिर्घाचार्यबहुताद्यापि वरीयते । 
अर्थात् इति वहाद्विपत्तिः तसंसूकमेव भासादिति गोवर्धनाचार्यकुलसाथ- 
तीतस्य च व्यक्तोपचिशिल्लाचारिणीति। यतुः "श्लोकवचक्यारुः: श्रीद्वारा- 
र्यमध्वचीन" इति तारानाथतर्कवेचीरसत्यसाध्यार्यितिसत्त्वम्। यतः श्लोकवचारे 
उदयनकुकिरकाणांत्य व चिन्तामणिकुक्तःश्लोकानी श्लोक बहुः कुतमसितः 
उदयने च वाचपतिप्रेमेषु ठीक निर्माणे, गळङ्गेनापि ‘टीकाकार’ इति 
व्यपदेशेऽप्रामाण्येणोपपस्तो वाचपति। तर्काचारूपांभासादितान्वित्वेऽ श्लोकोऽ- 
द्वारामकारणः, किंवती वत्तं बाचस्माचिनिचन्दननिमित्ताः परो वाचपतिप्रिय- 
विद्यावर्ध्यानाने-नगरविशाक्तिः इति। 

यदयम् महात्मा मैथिलभाषाः इति निदित्त्वप्राप्तेऽ अययपि मैथिलायामूः 
“भामा” (भामती) नाती नगरी, तत्र च भामतीनामाः पुरातनो जड़शयो 
वरीवाति। इश्वाताकारीविशेषंतमवशकादकाठिनयमैथिलायामूः।*न्यदेवप्रामु- 
तमैथिलायामूत्विशेषार्यिताधिकारिजमां नेपालप्रायं भासादिति प्राचीनप्राकार- 
केशादिमिनुण्ये। किरतात्त्व नरवाहन इति सुप्रसिद्धमेव। ततौ "श्रीमावें। 
कारी मया निवन्य” इति भामारुपहरावरीतिः सहिष्ठे। अययपि हेतुस्वत् 
किशोरले-न्यायसमुखारी गौतमो मैथिलः। न्यायावर्तकारा उवाहकारायामें मैथिलः। 
वार्तात्वपरिवर्तिकारः उदयो नैषमितः। अतस्निधगद्यावर्त्यकर्ता देशान्तरी- 
योद्धस्यकृतम् इति संविधानप्रथमतरुंडः न शक्यती । विवेक नक्षिणार्थमहादासी- 
द्वारे-(वियद्यायी परसुदयतपांगृहतुष्टतुष्टमुः)। श्रीरामे: प्रादुरभिषिकायनमेवत्र न्याय- 
शास्त्रस्य चार्यानि। नास्ति। वाचपत्तिः सुप्रसिद्धेऽविद्यामुः। अययपि-

‘ब्रह्मचार्यांश्च: सदृशी ब्रह्मचार्यांनी एव।’ 

पश्चात्तप्रियपक्षः विभूतिः युनः: कारी इति मैथिलानां स्वदेशोद्विद्धन- 
सम्बन्धनी गौतमोकर्ति वाचपत्तिमैथिलायामूः। प्रेमसमाधिः। 

* तथा च मैथिलादेशः - ‘सिमरानज़ी’ -गतवासुविज्ञानां श्रीकः-“नूतनविद्धविद्धु- 
समस्तसावधिकर्ष परसुद्वृध्यमेव निरतप्रेमसम्बन्धकारी। किवते मैथिलायामूः। स्वतीसम्बन्धे निर्धारिते श्रीनाः- 
नूतनविद्धविद्धुमैथिलायामूः। अन्तरान्वतिभविष्यति वाचपत्ति मैथिलायामूः।”
वर्तमानें्ध्रीपि साइक्लिक प्रवचनमाध्य-साइक्लिकचन्द्रिका-साइक्लिकाधिकृति नाना-निविदसाइक्लिकाधिकृति-सेव्यपप: पाठ्यापनाधिकृति तत्त्वशस्त्रपुस्तकालीनाहि रमणीयज्ञात्वाच वाच्य-परेक्षित-मुल्लाधिकृति-विधिनामथेत। अतो भैसः मृदिएँ।पाैतसमूहनु प्रथम-रसत्वने नव विश्लेषणमाध्यमात्रा इति पूर्णार्थ मुद्रितमुद्रयुक्तापि ज्योतिषग्रहस्तुकाराम-तात्यामाध्यमा: कारीगिरियावितायकाभियुवात्त्वंध्याएव ज्योतिषमहाशक्तिप्रदशमाध्यमान्त्रकपिवालसत्त्वम्यात्रादेव संस्रोष्णाशिकारिपालितपिन्ततः। सहक्षिणानि च मया विनिमित्ततिनि मृदितानि च पुनःस्थितान। किन्तु यात्र संस्करणश्रियण्विता। अनुपविद्या। मात्राप्रतिनिधि: अनुवादकवितानि अनुवादकवितानि भैसः अनुवादकवितानि। यदापर्विच सत्त्वमाण्यात्त्रा धुनिक्षिणाशिकारियेत्योजजनामाध्यमात्रक। यथास्थो प्रवर्तितमृदितानि संपुस्तकालीनायां। किन्तु अनुवादाश्च च अनुवादाश्च अनुवादाश्च। अनुवादाश्च अनुवादाश्च अनुवादाश्च। अनुवादाश्च अनुवादाश्च अनुवादाश्च।

अस्य च महादेवो इति: स्वयंमेव सब्जिता सामायमा उपस्थानार्थोकेपु—

“यथायावकाशिका। (१) -तत्त्वसन्धिका। (२) -तत्त्वविद्याम्: (३) -यथायाव। (४) -साइक्लिक। (५) -योगाला। (६) -बेदानां। (७) -निवर्णन।”

इत्यादिन। तत्र (१) यथायावकाशिकानाथो मण्डलमृदितखल्लिचित्विपक्ष-म्या। युनाकालीनस्त्रावर्त्तयत: सत्त्वमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदितमृदि...
तत्त्वकौमुद्य: सूचीप्रमृ.

कारिका १.

1. मद्याचरणम् ...
2. शाचविपयकज्ञासारवतरणम् ...
3. शाचविपयकज्ञासाय आवयकतश्रस्वा ...
4. हुःखशय्यावदनम् ...
5. शाचविपयकज्ञासायवैयथ्यपति: ...
6. उत्तापतिनिराकरणम् ...
7. हुःखापातककीतिनस्य महतमम् ...

कारिका २.

8. शाचविपयकज्ञासाय द्वितीयाश्वपति: ...
9. आपतिनिराकरणम्-वैदिक-हृद्यायोत्त्यलम...
10. वैदिकोपयय सत्यशिल्प-रसम ...
11. याज्ञवल्क्याय अनृथ्यन्त: ...
12. वैदिकोपयय सार्थशिल्प-प्रदर्शनम...
13. यथाचारसमवत्तस्य किर-स्थेरमोपलक्षकतम...
14. शाचविपयकज्ञासाय शैया-स्वम ...
15. कारिकाकार्यय: ...
16. तत्त्वान्योपवत्तिप्रदर्शनम् ...

कारिका ३.

17. शाचसंडे: ...
18. प्रकृतिक्षणम् ...
19. प्रकृतिवृत्तिसङ्क्षणम् ...
20. विकृतिक्षणम् ...
21. प्रकृतिवृत्तिलुभ्यवस्थ-कथनम...

कारिका ४.

22. प्रमाणदानायवान्यस्वरूपस्य ...
23. प्रमाणपदनिर्विचनम् ...
24. प्रमाणसंक्षया ...
25. प्रमाणतत्वपरिमितयुक्तस्य ...
26. प्रमाणसंक्षयाभिनिर्विचनस्यकर्मका, तत्त्विरविहार ... ...
27. प्रमेयत: प्राकृ-प्रमाणनिर्विचनस्य ... ...
28. कारिकाकार्यसफलपरिवर्त-नहेतु: ...

कारिका ५.

29. प्रमाणानातिविशेषश्चतस्य ...
30. प्रत्यक्षश्चतस्यववाचर्य ...
31. हानानामचेततनम ...
32. प्रत्यक्षश्चतस्यात्तत्त्ववन्यविवाचत: ...
33. प्रत्यक्षश्चतस्य पर्यवसितं हस्तशरी ...
34. अनुमानोस्माणयसाधनम ...
35. अनुमानसमान्यस्चतस्य ...
36. तत्त्वान्योपवत्तिप्रदर्शनम...
तत्त्वकोषायः सूचीपत्रम्

विषयः
पृष्ठाकृः

२६ अनुमानार्थशेषकल्पनम्
तत्त्वाविवर्धम् ।

२७ बीतात्वीतचेतानुमानस्य
द्विविधम् ।

२८ अतिनिश्चयम्

२९ बीतनिश्चयम्

tद्विविधम् ।

३० शब्दप्रलयकल्पनम्

३१ शब्दस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम्

३२ कपिलस्य पूर्बजनमाधिस्थुतिसंग्रहम्

३३ आगामाधिसनिश्चयम्

३४ अन्तःअन्तनामाधिश्रविशेषः

३५ शाध्वान्ततःप्रामाण्यतत्त्वारुप्तत्त्वावत्तपावः

३६ उपमानस्य शब्देद्दुनामेन चातन्तरवः:

३७ अर्थप्रतिनिधिनामेनद्वितिः

३८ अभावस्य प्रत्येकनांद्वितिः

३९ सम्प्रयुतनामेनद्वितिः

४० ऐतिहास्य प्रमाणतत्त्वाचावः

कारिका ६.

४१ प्रमाणवार्तिनिर्णयः

४२ अतीतद्वित्यां सामान्यतोऽध्यादिनामात्तत्तितः

४३ अनुमानान्यास्मात्त्वानामात्तत्तितः

सिद्धः

कारिका ७.

४४ प्रस्तावानां प्रवधानानां

भानमाधिश्चावः

४५ अतिदृष्टिहितविनिर्देशः

प्रत्यक्षम्

४६ कारिका ८.

५६ अनुजातापो प्रथमनिश्चयः

५७ योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिश्चयतिमात्रायेन हेतुः

कारिका ९.

६० कार्यकार्यस्मानवेदि

विश्वासविवर्तयः

६१ सत्कार्यक्रोऽध्यासाधनम्

६२ सत्कार्यस्यप्रत्येकस्य

६३ वैद्यनिश्चयतिनिर्माणः

६४ वेदान्तमन्त्रतिनिर्माणः

६५ न्यायमन्त्रतिनिर्माणः

कार्यस्य तत्त्वस्य द्वितीयो हेतु

६६ कार्यस्य तत्त्वस्य कार्यकारण

स्मितुप्यो द्वितीयो हेतु

६७ कार्यकारणोऽन्यायस्यमन्त्रवाधिश्रविशेषः

भावेन सर्वविश्वासः

६८ कारणविदः कार्यपरवलम्

द्वितीयो हेतुः

६९ कार्यस्य कारणायमकल्पम्

चतुर्विवर्तत्वानेति

७० कार्यकारणशेषसाधारानानि

७१ कार्यस्य कारणपरिणाम

भेदवलम्

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प्रयोजकायत्वश्चावः
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>¹०० अध्यात्माध्याद्यम्</td>
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तत्त्वकोमुदी.
( सार्थक )

(१) महाभारतकरण:॥
भजामुक्तं लोकान्तशुक्लनात्र विहीः प्रजाः सुप्रभानां नमः।
अजा ये तां जुध्मान्तं मजन्ते जह्नेनां भुक्तोगां नुमस्तानु॥ १ ॥
कपिलाय महासुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चाशुरेः।
पञ्चशिष्याय तथेऽवश्वकण्येषायानमस्याः॥ २ ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपित्रादतर्थं प्रतिपादयनु प्रतिपादविदं स्वकेष्यविनो
भवति प्रेक्षावतामु। अप्रतिपित्रादतर्थं तु प्रति-
(२) शास्त्रविधक-जिज्ञासावर्तमाणु॥
प्रेक्षाविविद्व-मन्तवदुपक्षेत। स चैषां प्रतिपित्रा
पितरये यो ज्ञातं सनं परमपुरुषार्थेन कल्पते। इति प्रारंभिते
तत्त्वविधानस्मान तथेऽवश्वपरार्थाय स्वपन्ने ज्ञातः । तदपि प्रजासामाव
tार्यति—

दुःखायाभिधाताजिज्ञासाः तदर्शातके हेतृ।
हेते सा ज्ञाती चेष्टाकान्तार्धतो सभवात्त। १ ॥

"दुःख" इति। एवं हि शास्त्रविपयो न जिज्ञासेत, यदि दुःख नाम
जगती न स्यात्, सदा न जिज्ञासितस्म, जिज्ञा-
(३) शास्त्रविपयक्षार-व्याया आवर्तकान्तशास्त्र॥
स्थता च द्वेशा, दुःखस निम्नवात्, तदुच्छेदो-
पायापतिर्ज्ञानादा। शास्त्रमुच्छेदलेखपी च शास्त्रविपयस्य ज्ञानस्तुपीपा
यमूलवादा, सुकप्रवोपात्यांतस्य स्त्रावादा॥
तत्त्व न तावहुः खनाशि नायनिहितसितमित्युत्कारः—“दुःखत्रयमिष्ठात्” इति। दुःखाना ग्रंथि दुःखत्रयमिष्ठ वित्तत्रस्वात्मकाः, आयथामूतकाः, आयथासिद्धान्त। तत्त्रायथासिद्धान्त, दिवियत्त, शारीरि भानसं च।

शारीरं वातिपिक्षेषणं वैषय्यनिमित्तम्, मानसं कामकोद्वाघोमोहाभेद्य्या-विपायविद्विपिक्षेपार्श्वनिमित्तम्। सर्वेऽतदन्तरिकोपायसाध्यावदायाविनिर्मित्कां दुःखम्। बायोपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा, आयथामूतकाः, आयथासिद्धान्त।

तरायथासिद्धान्तं मानुषप्रभुमाग्निस्तिसूर्यस्थानिमित्तम्, आयथासिद्धान्तं तु यथार्थसिद्धान्यात्रप्रहादावाविनिमित्तम्। तद्वेतत् प्रयात्मेवेदनीयं दुःखं रज्जस्तिरणामहको न शक्यते प्रयात्मात्। तदनेन दुःखत्रयान्त:-

करणचं चेतनायते। प्रतिकूलबंदनायतं सभिसबंद्धं सभिसबं इति।

एतत्वा प्रतिकूलबंदनायतं जिहासाहेतुताूः। यथापि न सशिवुश्चे दुःखं, तथापि तद्भिन्न: शक्यं: कुम्भितुपिपरशुद्धपीपादित्यते। तस्मादुपपनम्।

“पद्धपादको हेतु” इति। तस्य दुःखत्रयम्। अपाधातकः।

पद्धपादां। उपपैन्तैपि बुद्धा विनिक्रक्तम्। तद्वेता।

अथ शालुके—“देह सा उपाधारं चेदु” इति।

अयमार्। अस्तु तत्त्वः

(५) दुःखत्रयम्, जिहासितां च द्वस्तु, शंकूचितां च तद्वस्तु, मय्युता व शांकूचितां च तद्वस्तु, उपायस्वतः च एकस्य ज्ञातां भवस्वतं तत्त्वस्वतः जिहासितां नूता, दुःखत्रयम्। तथा उपपैन्तैपि चेतत्तुम्।

दुःखत्रयमयां सर्वोपिके विद्याधुच्यात्। तत्त्वानेकं ज्ञातां नूता अनेकम्यां विद्याधारणनेत्रा। सर्वेऽत्र हेतु। तथा वै कैके कानामामानकं;

‘अर्के चेनमु विकित्त विखर्षेत परिते व्रीतु।

इद्य्याः प्रस्लिण्डैः को विद्याधु गयमाबरे्तु।’ इति।

२ समासणावाच्यस्य। २ समासस्थमादेन।
शांतिनिकेतनसागरस्थि 

सन्ति चौपाया: शतश: शारीरिकसागरस्थि भिन्नजान वायु-रूपदिष्टः। मानसस्य विषशास्य प्रतीकारत् मनोज्ञानमोर्जन- 

निशिताकुलाश्रिथाकलिकस्माधिनिष्ठस्य: सुकर:। यवः भ्रमाधिकारस्य पुस्तख: नेतिष्ठानि श्राणस्यकुलाश्रितानि निष्ठानिष्ठानि यस्य निष्ठानिष्ठानि श्राणस्य निष्ठानिष्ठानि यस्य निष्ठानिष्ठानि यस्य निष्ठानिष्ठानि। तथा SSथितिकारस्य पुस्तख: मणिमन्नौ व्यापारिकपोऽर्थाय सुकर:। प्रतीकारेति रूपाय इति।

नियारोगी — "न" इति। कः? "एकान्तायन्तरो भावारतो।"

(६) वैयासीपरिमितिकतम् — परिरामणीयायेवः तथा अवतारिकातिकतम् — खनिरुत्तर्दशिनम्।

(७) यथा विधिरियानिवादिकारिनीनितियालक्ष्यायामसम्बन्धापयायोगे सिपी तस्य तस्य यानिकारेदुःखाय निरुत्तर्दशिनातूर्ता अनेकानीतिकतम्, निरुत्तर्दशिना न अत्यन्तिकितम्, इति सुकरोदिक्षः एकानीति- 

कालिकोत्तरः खनिरुत्तर्दशिने द्वी उपाय इति ना उपार्थी निजासेवायः।

(८) यथाप्राप्तातिकरीतिनमु महामहेवः।

(९) यथाप्राप्तातिकरीतिनमु महामहेवः।

(१०) वैदिकस्तु ज्योतिष्ट्रोमादि: संक्वसल- 

रयं: कर्मवेदाल्पवात्त्रवेदाल्पवेदाल्पवेदाल्प नामित्। युक्तिः, "स्वर्गकामो यजत" इति।

स्वर्गकामो यजत —

१ प्रभु (वश्यमाणु, भाषाकल्याणु) स्यात् — इति प्रकारायेक्ष:। अथवा, प्रभु (वश्यमाणु) स्यात् (भाषा), स्वर्गात्मकामात्मकामिते भाषा कुरुitted!। उपर्यथा प्रभु यज्ज्वले। प्रति—

यथो साधारणः।
“यत्र तु:खेन समभिन्न न स धर्मसमन्तरम्।
अभिलोकपनीतं च तदु खुं सः पदास्रयन्।” इति।
[तन्त्रवार्तिकम्]

dुःखिराधी सुखविशेषस्य सर्गः। स च स्वात्त्वम् समूल्यताभितं
dुःखम्। न चैष्ण क्षयिः। तथा हि श्रूयते—“अपाम सोमसमुत्ता अभूम्”
इति [अध्याय शिरसः १]। तत्र्ये कुलो स्वामुत्ततसम्भवः।
तस्माद्विद्धिक्षौ-पायस्य तपनयत्रत्वतिकारते。
विवेकज्ञानात्। ईष्टवक्षतवात् पुनरापि व्ययाः
जिन्न सा ईष्टवक्षतः

द्रष्ट्वदातुनिविकः। स हाविशुद्धिक्ष्यात्तथायथकः।
तद्विपरीतः। अयानुः। व्यक्तावन्तक्षविष्णानात्॥२॥

“दृष्ट्” इति।

gृजपाठादनुश्रुयते।
इत्युपन्धकोऽदेऽ।
एतदुःश्रवणाम्।
इति। तत्र भव अनुतापम्।
(१०) वैद्वदकाम्यपुपुपुपुपुपुरुषाः।
अनुश्रविकः। तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत्।
अनुश्रविकः।

धीर्मक्षयात्।
इति।

विवेकज्ञानस्य अनुश्रविकः।
इति।

तथा च श्रूयते—“आलम वा सेरे
शालयः।
प्रकृतितो विवेकम्।” [बृहदारण्यकः]

“न स पुनराविन्ते न
स पुनराविन्ते।” [छान्दोग्] इति॥

अस्या प्रतिज्ञाया हेतुमाह—“स हाविशुद्धिक्ष्यात्तथायथकः।” इति।
(१०) द्रष्ट्वददेशिकायोऽः।
भयो अभिभूतिनितिस्य यथा।
सोमादियागस्य पशुभीजादिवधसाधानः।
यथा।
संह समग्रान्तपशुभीजादिवधसाधानः।
हस्तक्षुरः। सपरिहारः। सप्राणमयः।” इति।

“स्व-हस्तक्षुरः” ज्वोत्तिणादिजिनम्।
प्राणापूर्वस्य स्वमेव पशुभीजादिजिनमना
कृ. २] वैदिकोपायसतीशुद्धिक्रमः सातिशयलं च |

उत्थेतुना उपोवेण सयुः | ‘सपरििरः’ कियता सपि प्रायः-

क्तितेने परिहृतः शक्यः | अथ च प्रमादत: प्रायःक्तितमापि नाचरितः,

प्रधानकम्पशिवासेषमेः स पच्यते | तथा सपि युवदसावनरः सूते

तावत: प्रक्यवमणेन ( सहिष्णुत्या ) सह वर्तत इति “सप्रलयवर्णः”।

मृष्यते हि पुष्पसम्भारोपनीतस्यगुहामहादादातागाहिनः: कुरुषा: पाप-

माणोपसारिताः दुःखविशिष्टकाणिकाम्।

न च—“मा हिस्यात् सर्वेऽ मूढानि” इति सामान्यशास्त्रं विशेष-

(११) वायुक्तिकाः साहोनो शाश्वेण “अश्रृष्टोधिय शुष्मालभेत” इत्यनेन

अध्यपणे तहृतसाधनम्। बायात्—इति युक्तम्, बिरोधादायात्। बिरोधे

हि वलीयसतं दुर्भिस बायात्। न चेहारसि काक्षिरोप:ं, मित्रविष-

पयतात्। तथा हि—“मा हिस्यात्” इति निपेदेिन हिसाया अनर्थें

हेतुमाओ भाष्येते, न लक्षियवर्गमापि, “अश्रृष्टोधिय शुष्मालभेत”

इत्यनेन वाक्येण च पश्चुहिसाया: काक्षियवर्गमुय्येते, नाथेतुःतुवामावः,

तथा सति वाक्यमेवप्रस्तावइत। न चानैषेतुतवकूपकारकत्वोऽः: काक्षििरोपो

सिः। हिसा हि पुरुषयो दौष्पायक्ष्रयति, क्रोणोपकरिष्ठ्यतैिनि।

क्षणितशायों च फलगताशुभयेः उपचारितेः। क्षणितं च स्वरूपः:

(१२) वैदिकोपायस्य

सति कार्यवादुगमितम्। ध्रुतिशिरोपाय: सति कार्यवादुगमितम्।

स्त्रीणामात्रस्य साधनम्, नाजपेयादायरस्य स्त्रीणामात्रस्य शाखाराधित्विपश्चृहुः

सन्दप्तुकर्मों हि हीनसम्पे पुरायि दुःखाकरोति।

“अपाम सोममर्मा असूम” इति चामृत् वाचिनिषपायम् चिंसेयमान-

(१३) अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-

रोषधारिः:—अथुसति श्रुतिवि-
शाश्वविपयज्ञानस्य श्रेयस्वम् ।

बिहितं गुहायं विभ्राजेते यद्यत्यो विशालिता ।
महानारायणं ।।

तथा कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेधुः प्रजाकर्तो द्विप्रियमीहनाति ।
तथा परे ऋषयो ये मनोपिणा परं कर्मं उभितमानन्युः ।

तदृत्त सर्वमिभिप्रेयाह ।

(१४) लोकक्वेदिको ।

तस्मात् ( आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातको-पायात् शाश्वविपयज्ञानस्य श्रेयस्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

फलात्) विपरीतः विश्रुद्ध: हिसानिस्कुप्राभमावात्,
नित्यनिरतिशय्यः ।

अस्फं तुपुनर्मिथितः ।

न च कार्येवेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता,
भावपस्य कार्यस्य तथामावात्,
दुःखप्रचंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तदृत्तैर्प्रियात् ।

(१५)तत्त्विपरीतः श्रेयः

सत्रपुष्पायस्याश्रयाः

मात्रया दुःखपापकल्पाय श्राक्ष्य: ।

सत्रपुष्पायस्याश्रयाः

न च तदनयोः

श्राक्ष्योऽभ्ये सत्रपुष्पायस्याश्रयाः

कुतः पुनर्योपतिष्ठितम् आह ।

व्यत्ताक्यमछिन्तनात्

व्यत्तात् अयत्तात् च इश्व व्यत्ताश्च: ।

दुःखपापकल्पाय तत्क्षानं

तेषां विज्ञानूर्विवेकेन ज्ञानं,

व्यत्ताश्च ज्ञानानविवेकदशान्ति

विज्ञानम् ।

व्यक्तित्वानुपर्युक्तस्वायत्ताय

श्राक्ष्यानुपर्युक्तस्वायत्ताय

सत्रपुष्पायस्याश्रयाः

तेषां पराधीनात्मा परे ज्ञायते,

इति ज्ञानक्षेत्रार्थपिण्योऽविवेकेन ज्ञात: ।

एतदृत्तम् भवति ।

(१६) शाश्वविपयवस्य

दुःखपापकल्पाय तत्क्षानं

तेषां विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्,

व्यत्ताश्च ज्ञानानविवेकदशान्ति

विज्ञानम् ।

व्यक्तित्वानुपर्युक्तस्वायत्ताय

श्राक्ष्यानुपर्युक्तस्वायत्ताय

सत्रपुष्पायस्याश्रयाः

तेषां पराधीनात्मा परे ज्ञायते,

इति ज्ञानक्षेत्रार्थपिण्योऽविवेकेन ज्ञात: ।

एतदृत्तम् भवति ।
का. २ ]  
शाख्सस्लेपः ।

शाख्यात्या च व्यवस्थाय्य, दीर्घकांडादिरवैरन्त्यसत्तकासस्विगतात् भाष- 
नामायािति। तथा च, वक्ष्यति—

"एवं तत्तत्वात्मत्तचासिम न ये नागमित्यपरिशेषम्। ।
अविपययादिः सुदुः केवलमुत्तवेत् ज्ञानम्” िति [कारिका. इ. ८]॥१॥

(१८)शाख्येस्लेपः।

तद्देव प्रेक्षावदपेक्षितार्थेऽवेव शाख्याम्बः ।
प्रकृतिः-प्रकृतिविकृतिः विकृत्यनुभयुः—
समावधयाः शाख्यासरसमाणः। श्रोतवस्तीकर्मनिकायः 
तदर्थं संक्षेपतः प्रतिज्ञातीते।

मूलप्रकृतिर्विकृतिर्महा द्वाय:। प्रकृतिविकृतयः सतः। ।
पोडशक्तस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिनं विकृति: पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

"मूलः।" िति। संस्कृपतो हि शाख्यार्थे चतस्तो विधा:। कश्चिदर्थः। ।
प्रकृतिरेष, कश्चिदशेऽ विकृतिरेष, कश्चिप्रकृतिविकृतिः, कश्चिदनुभयुः।

तत्र का प्रकृतिरिवपुकृतम्—“मूलप्रकृतिर्विकृतिः।” िति। प्रकृतिरीति ।
(१८) प्रकृतिकाशमूकम्। प्रकृतिः प्रवाहमूकम्, सचारजस्तसम् साम्यायस्य, 
सा अविकृतिः। प्रकृतिरेषु यथेष्ठः। कुत् इतीवकृतम्—“मूलः।” मूलः। 
सो प्रकृतिशेषेति मूलप्रकृति:। विकृतिः कार्यसंक्षात्त्स: सा मूलः, न लस्य 
मूलन्तसरस:। अनवस्थाप्रस्तवः। न चाववस्या:। प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः।।

कतमः: पुन: प्रकृतिविकृतयः। कियत्न्यश्शेषत उक्तम्—“महाद्वायः। ।
(१९) प्रकृतिविकृतिः। प्रकृतिविकृतयः सत:।” िति। प्रकृतिमयः विकृत- 
काशमूकम्। कुत: तत्र। िति।“प्रकृतिविकृतयः।” सत:। तथा 
हि। महाद्वायः अह्नुस्य प्रकृति:। विकृतिः मूलप्रकृतेति। एवमह्नुस्तथां 
तन्त्रायाबालिमिद्यायां च प्रकृति:। विकृतिः महत:। “एवं पुष्टवर्त्तमाना: 
तस्वाति भूतानामाकाशादीनां प्रकृतयो विकृतयः ह्यांस्र:।।
अथ का विक्रतिरूप, कियति चेतत उत्तमम्—“पोदशकस्तु विकारः”

इति। पोदशसंह्यापरिमितो गणः पोदशकः।

(20) विक्रतिकथनम्।

‘तु’ शब्दो उवधारणे भिन्नक्रमः—पश्चमाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणि दोषशको गणो विकार एव, न विक्रतिरूपः।

यथापि पृथिवियां गोपटवृक्षाद्यो विकारा, एवन्तदिकामेदानां पयोऽविजावानं दध्यकुसादयः, तथापि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्याविमयत्व स्तवत्त्वान्तरस्। तत्त्वात्रोपापानलं च प्रकृतिविमयाहिमिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः। सर्वं गोपटादिरन्य स्थुलतेनद्रियागाहता च समेतिः न तत्त्वान्तरस्।

अनुभवः ध्रुपमाह—“न प्रकृतिने विक्रतिः पुरुषः” इति। एतत्।

(21) अनुभवः कथनम्। सर्वमुपरिधानुपपादिप्रवेषते।

तत्समस्मधः प्रमाणिनं कस्तुमविवा: प्रमाणसंपदा क्लस्यायः। न च।

(22) प्रमाणसामान्यसम्मान्यमानसे शाकंते। विशेषक्लस्यानि

कार्यम्। इति। प्रमाणसामान्यमेव तावत्त्वात्वतः—

इदम् प्रमाणमात्ववचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणासिद्धत्वात्।

त्रिविधमेव प्रमाणाः, प्रमेयसिद्धः प्रमाणादिः।

“प्रमाणार्थम्” इति। अत्र—च ‘प्रमाणम्’ इति समाध्या क्लस्य पदम्।

तत्त्वानां च क्लस्यम्। प्रमदेवयो सन्नेत्र

(23) प्रमाणप्रथमः नेति निर्विन्यानात् प्रमां प्रति कल्यमवगमते।

तत्त्वान्ति द्रष्ठाविपरीतानां चित्रभूतः।

वैवध्वेष पौरुषः। फलम् प्रमा, तत्त्वानं प्रमाणां मिति। एतेन संस्कृयापर्यं

यस्मलितात्रैथप्रमाणश्चप्राप्तः।

१ ने० नितानामुव्यवस्त्य—घटजाने।“घटमद्द जानमाति”—पुत्रसदृशः।
कृ. 9]   प्रमाणसंध्यानिर्णयः।

संयमविप्रतिपत्ति निराकृतोत—“त्रिविद्धम्” इति। तिल्लो विषय
(२४) प्रमाणसंध्या। यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविद्धम्, न यूनम्,
नामिकाविश्वास्य:। विशेषक्षणानन्तरशैदुपापादित्यत्याम्।।

कत्मा: पुनस्तातित्तस्तो विषय इतय आह—“दृष्टमनुमानमातवचनम्”
(२५) प्रमाणबयर्त। इति। एतच कौशिकप्रमाणबोध्यप्रायम्, लोक-
रिगुनम्। व्युत्पादनार्थवाच्चाय्याय, तस्थवात्तताधिकारतृ।
आर्य तु विज्ञान योगिनामपूर्वगतोत्सा न लोकव्युत्पादनायावाक्षिति सदिप
नामिकाहितम्, अनमिकावात्।।

स्यादेतत्—मा मूक्यूनम्, अधिकं तु कार्यक्ष भवति। सिद्धिते
(२६) प्रमाणसंध्या-
उपविद्धि, तत्तपरिवर्ते।।
हि प्रतिवादिन: उपमानार्थमपि प्रमाणानि,
इतय आह—“सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धवात्” इति।
एवेव दृष्टान्तमानसात्वचनेन सर्वस्य प्रमाणानां
सिद्धवात्, अनतर्भावादित्यथ:। एतत्तोपपादित्यत्वं इतुकम्।।

अथ प्रमेयविपाकनयाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कार्यत
(२७) प्रमेयवर्तनातः
प्ररूपेत प्रमाणानिर्भचन-
स्यावास्यकपत्रम्।।

अथ प्रमेयविपाकनयाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कार्यत
(२८) कार्यकार्यार्थ:-
क्ष्रमपरिवर्तनेन्दृतः।।

सेयमायि सर्वकल्मानुरोपन पाठकमानन्दयैव
व्यास्यात्। ॥ ॥

सृष्टि प्रमाणविशेषक्षणार्थ स्त्रयक्ष्मय सर्वप्रमाणेपु ज्ञेष्ववातृ
(२९) प्रमाणानि विशेषक्षणम्।।

। ॥
प्रतितिप्रयाध्यवसायो द्वर्य, ज्ञिविभमनुमानमाध्यवायमः।
तत्रहिंक्लिक्षपूर्वकं, आस्तुकिरतिपावचनं तु॥५॥

"प्रतितिप्रयाध्यवसायो द्वर्यम्" इति। अत्र "द्वर्यम्" इति वक्ष्यनि-
देशः, परिशिष्ट तु वक्ष्यम्। समानसामनात्यन्यवचनेदेहः क्षणार्थः॥

अन्यपश्चात्-विषिणवति, विषिणणमुवाहिणि, स्वेत रूपमेव निहु-
(३०) प्रक्षणाः- पणियं कुष्णेतरति यावतु-"विषयः", पूर्द्ध-
वयवार्थः॥

व्याययः: सुखाद्वशसामादानाम् अविषेयः।
तन्मात्रलक्षणः: योगिनामृतस्तोत्रां च विषयः। विषयं विषयं प्रति वाति
इति प्रतितिप्रयाध्यवसायो इत्यर्थः। वृत्तिसाधनशः। अर्थसाधनेश्वरिमित्रियमि-
वर्थः। तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः। तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः। अध्यवसायः बुद्धि-
व्यापारो ज्ञानम्। उपातिविश्वायामामित्रियाणां वृत्तिसाधनशः, बुद्धेश्वरो—
सभामि सति यः सत्यसमुद्रकः सो अध्यवसाय इति। वृत्तिरिति ज्ञान-
भिति चाियाप्रेते। इदं तात् प्रमाणम्, अनेन वशेषेनाशकेतरमुवाहिणि
प्रमाबोधः॥

बुद्धितस्मि हि प्राक्षतवादार्यतेनम्, इति तद्यो स्थवरायो स्थवचेतनो
(३१) ज्ञानानामेव- चताधिय इति। इदं बुद्धितस्मि सुबहादयो स्पी
तन्त्रम्॥ परिष्यमेरा अचेतना। पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्वःनु-
पड़ी चेतनः। सो स्यं बुद्धितस्मि ज्ञानमुखादिना तत्वप्रतिभियस्त-
च्यायप्रयो ज्ञानमुखादिनान्याहिणि भवत्तिति—चेतनो सनुग्रहिते। चितिच्छा-
यप्रयो चेतना स्पी बुद्धितस्मि अध्यवसायो स्थवचेतनन्यवचेतनविकासिति
थथा च वक्ष्याति—

"तस्मातस्योगादार्यतेन चेतनाविद्य चित्ष्यम्।
गुणकपूर्वः स्पी तथा कर्तौ भवन्यादासिनः।" इति [कारिका. २०]
अत्तत्त्वसायान्या कृत्याचित्तां न नयायात् निनित्तात्, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणाः
(३२) प्रवश्चल्क्षणाः-
न्तितानां, शब्दानां व्या-
स्वत: ॥
निष्ठितुतपनवाती निष्ठयो सध्यवसाय इति
चाँचनथानतयमः। विपवाप्रहणे चासंहित्वयं विप-
यमपाकरती। प्रतिग्रहणे चैतित्रमार्गसिद्धिकर्वे-
सूचनादनुसर्यूस्मृयादयस्य परादता भवन्ति।

tदेवं समानासमानातिद्विधेऽद्वातु “प्रतिविपयक्ष्वः”
(३३) प्रवश्चल्क्षणः
परवके इति द्यत्त विवृत्ति वसाय मृत्यु ॥
तन्त्रान्तरिः
क्षणान्तिराणि तैरोधिकानां न भूर्दानि न दूर्दि-
तानि, विस्तरम्यायाति ॥

नानुमानप्रमाणातिविदा लोकायतितेनत्रापितम: सन्निधिजो
विपयस्तो बा पुरुषः कर्म प्रतिपचतेः? न च
प्रश्चल्क्षणातनामः ॥

(३४) अनुमानस्य
पुरुषान्तरता अधानसैदिविपर्ययः: शक्या
अविद्धाः प्रयोक्तेन प्रतिपचतुः ॥ नापि प्रमाणान्तरिः
अनमयस्यमात्। अनन्यृताधानसंसारिविपर्ययस्तु यं अनचन पुरुषं
प्रति वर्तमानो उत्तरायणां वचनतता येन विषा
उदयानसैदिविपर्ययेः ।

तदनेनाधानाद्यः: परपुरुषपार्थिनो
सम्प्रथगावेदाचानामेदादा अधीनामातव्यः। अयकावेदान्यनामानप्रमाण-
ममु पूर्वैर्मयः ॥

d प्रवश्चल्क्षणातः अनुमानः प्रवश्चल्क्षणातः क्षणीयम्।

(३५) अनुमानस्य सामायमहक्षणपूर्वतवाहिनीश्चक्षणस्यानुसारः
मायाम्य नानव्यक्तिः—“तत् किंकिक्षिप्पवृक्कम्”
इति। किंकवम व्याप्तम्। किंकिक्षिप्पवृक्कम्।
शक्तिनसर्वमृत्तिपितायांधिनिर्माणवानं च सवामा
प्रतिविपववाच्यम, येन प्रतिविन्द दुष्यपाक्षम्
किंकिक्षिप्पवृक्कम विपवाचिन्न विपविन्द व्याप्तपक्षयति
भूमाविद्या बहुप्रसिद्धिक इति यः प्रवश्चल्क्षणातः
किंकिक्षिप्रण चार्त्तवायः।

तेनवाच किंकिक्षिप्पवृक्षीती प्रक्षयमतः नाचारायणामान:.

d शास्त्राय समायमाट्यमानमित्यन्त्रानसामान्येन क्षितिः

१ तस्मानाधिकमेवति।
नृत्यार्थविशेषानुसार तद्नातः स्वाभाविकरूपमें अभिव्यक्तिभेदमें स्मारकता की-“तिरिकत ।
(०६) अनुमानस्वयम्भवायेश्वर ध्यान स्वामिनाराध्यायाम्” इति। तत्त्वसम्बन्धातो
प्रथमाकारण-विचारार्थमः पूर्वाण्वितमानं विशेषतत्त्वादिनं, पूर्वावधि-स्वपनत
सामान्यतो दृष्टिचरितम्।

तद्र प्रथममान्त द्वितीयामें तद्विद्यायनं सामान्यमुक्त निरूपणम्।
(०७) उपव्ययाविवरणस्य मानसस्य द्वितीयामें स्मारकता की-विपक्ष
निरूपणम्।

तत्र बालिन्त दशवम्। शिशुस्ते परिशिष्टी में दशवम्, स्वयं विशेषतः
(०८) अवैतिनिः स्वाभाविकरूपमाननुसाराध्यायाम्। यदाहि—
“प्रत्ययाप्रतिपध्येऽ, अन्यत्रस्वपनप्रज्ञान शिष्यमाणे
सम्प्रायायः परिशिष्ट” इति [वास्त्यायन-नायाभाष्य]। अस्य चार्टीतप
व्यतिरेकिन उदाहरणम्। स्मिरणयो![

वीतं द्वैधातः पूर्ववतः सामान्यतो दश्येन च। त्वत्रकम्य दद्धस्वरूपः
(०६) वीतनिःस्वयम् माण्यविषयं यत्तपूर्वत, पूर्वप्रसिद्धं, दद्धप्रांते
तद्देवद्वित्यामें। तद्वस्त स्वयं व्याक्तनिःस्वयमानस्यप्रज्ञाने
पूर्ववतु। यथा भूमाद्बहिन्नरमानविशेषः
विवेकान्ते दद्धप्रांते, तस्य वहिन्नसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वक्षणं
विवेकान्ते दद्धप्रांते रसायनम्। अपरं च वीतीन सामान्यतो दद्धद्वृत्तस्वरूपः
सामान्यविशेषम्। यथेते दद्धविशेषमुक्त स्मिरणम्। अतः हि
वृपद्विशेषनां क्रियालेन
करणवाचान्तमुक्तदै: वास्त्यायिनः स्वक्षणः—

१ अस्सनानम् प्रथम द्वितिः भावः। २ अर्धात् राज्यवान्तं तथा—“सत्य सम्मतिभवात्-
यथाहेतुसंस्कारान् त्व्यथितताः शास्त्रं। वैसंस्कार स्वपनस्य नुमिष्ठत्वाः।
स्मारकस्य नुमिष्ठत्वाः। तद्विचारण गम्य च सहायताः। एवं निशेषे भूष्मपत्येऽनाः
शास्त्रायुक्तस्वरूपस्य नुमिष्ठत्वाः। शिष्यमाणे अकाराः। एव शास्त्रस्य
गुणस्य सम्मतिभवात्”।—
इति।
मुपरन्ध्यम्, तथा रपि यजातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणात्मनुमीयोते तजाती-
यस्य करणाय न दृढ़ः स्वक्षणं प्रयत्ने। इन्द्रयजातीयं हि तत्कार-
णम्, चौचिद्रियवसामान्यस्य स्वक्षणाप्रदियविशेषः। प्रयत्नगोचरो
ऊवागसहायः। यथा वहितवसामान्यस्य स्वक्षणं बहि:। सो धृथं पूर्वतः
सामान्यतो दृष्टाः साध्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यमेव बिशेषः। अत्र च दृढ़ं दर्शनमुः,
सामान्यत इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वभिमानितकस्तसिद्धं। अद्यस्यस्वक्षणस्य
सामान्यविशेषस्य दर्शनमुः सामान्यतो दृष्टं मुनानामिनिः। सर्वं चेतदसमा-
भिम्यावैभवितकतत्पर्यत्तवायां न्युत्पादितिमिति नेवहेकं विस्तरभयात्।

प्रयोजकादश्वदश्ववणसम्नन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रक्षे-चिह्नानुमानपूर्वकः
(५०) शब्दप्रामंगः। वाणिज्यवार्धसम्बन्धव्रहणस्य, स्वार्थसम्बन्धानस-
िष्ठम् || हकारिणेन शब्दस्याधिकारकान्तेनानुमानपूर्वकः
कल्याणिनानन्तरं शब्दं क्षणितः। “आत्मब्रह्मात्वयेत् तु” इति।
आत्मवचनमिति क्षणिनदेशः। परिशिष्टः क्षणम्। आत्मा प्राता युक्तिः
यावत्। आत्मा चासो श्रुतिशेषेऽ ‘आत्माह्विः।’ श्रुति: वाक्यज्ञानतं
वाक्यस्यार्थानम्।

तत्र स्वतः: प्रामाण्यम्। अपूर्वपैथेदवाक्यज्ञानिततिवेचे सकल्पोपाश्राध्वि-
(४१) तत्त्व स्वतः। प्रामाण्यम्। स्वार्थसम्बन्धानसिष्ठम्। राणावाक्यज्ञानितमिति ज्ञानं पुरुषं भवति।

आदिविदुपश्च कपिलस्य कल्याद्री कल्यानन्तराधित्वसत्नित्समस्तमिभवः;
(४२)कपिलस्य पूर्वोऽस्त्रप्रथुस्य वृहोपरिक्षणार्थस्मार्थानपरेऽऽृः।
तथा चावदकैत्रिगीतिवंसभेदे भगवानः जेण्ट्रीव्यो
दशमाहाकल्यात्तिज्ञमस्तिरिंनसतमातमं उवाच “दशापु महाकल्पेपु विपरिवर्ते-
मानेन मया” इत्यादिना प्रथ्यसन्दर्भने।

आत्मत्रांकोभन्ता: शास्त्रभिन्नस्त्रापार्थसमासौत्तराधिनामागमामासः।
(43) अग्मानासंततिः परिहता भवन्ति। अयुक्तवं चैत्यां विगमानूतः निर्दर्पणम्।
बिनिमित्तमूलत्वाः प्रमाणविनिरुक्ताचारिनिवाच।
कैश्चिदेव क्षेत्तचादिभि: पुरुषाप्सर्वे: पशुप्राये: परिमहाद्रौद्दन्यम्।

‘तु’ शब्देनातुमानाद्ध्विष्ठिनि। वाक्यार्थों हि प्रमेयो, न तु।
(44) आत्रशुपेनुमानाध्विष्ठिनि। तदमेव वाक्यम्, येन तत्र चिन्द्रेश्वरेऽ। न च।
वाक्यम् वाक्यार्थों बोध्यतू सम्बन्धमहणिमेवकेतैः
अभिवधिकचितस्य वाक्यस्तात् पूर्वः वाक्यार्थात् वाक्यार्थोऽविकारः।
दितिः।

एवं प्रमाणसामभाषयमनुपूर्वमुद्वस्य
(45) शाब्दानार्थोऽसम्बन्धान्तरायणमुक्तं
नतमंव।

तथा हि—उपमानं तावद्यथा गौत्तथा गायत्री इति वाक्यम्। तज्जनिता।
(46) उपमानस्य धीरागम एव। ये स्थवरं गवयशाद्वदो गोस्त्रेदं नुमाने चानार्थं।
द्रश्याय वाचक इति प्रयत्; सो स्थवरमं
स्येव। ये हि शब्दे यत्र बृद्धं: प्रयुक्ते; सो सति कुऽन्तिते, तस्य वाचकः
यथा गोशाद्वदो गोस्त्रय। प्रयुक्ते चैवं गवयशाद्वदो गोस्त्रयों, इति तस्येव}

1 अनुभागीतसेतायदेः—“कथं ‘तु’ शब्देनातुमानाविष्ठिनि आलोकणसंपूर्णं आह—
‘वाक्यार्थों’ इति। नवस्ते तावद्यथाय यथं प्रामाणिकम्, एतात्वता कथनाद्विष्ठिनि। श्यात्,
शब्दम् तथ्यात्लाक्षणम्, यथा धूमस्य निर्देशिन चिंद्रेश्वरेऽविवेद्यते तथा वाक्येयन निर्देशिन शब्देश्वरेऽ
कष्टमाने भेदित्यायास्ता वर्णनं—‘न तु तदभेद’ इति। धूमस्य विवेद्यस्तात् तिरिक्तस्यमुः न तु
वाक्यस्य अर्थमश्च, चेतत्स्य अर्थात्य स्यादिति यावत्। नन्तु यथापि भूमिस्तरं वाक्यार्थार्थोऽर्थेऽस्तात् नासिके
तथा वधवते यथा पूर्वोऽद्वितीयोऽस्तात् सम्बन्धम्। सम्बन्धमहणेऽवेस्याः पदार्थार्थार्थोऽस्तात् नासिके।
यथा वाक्यस्य अर्थम् संस्कृतह्यात् चार्ष्यभूत्वैः च वाक्यस्य अर्थार्थोऽस्तात् नासिके।
चाचक, इति तत्त्वानुसारमानवेप्रयक्षेत्रमें यत्र प्रवयस्थ स्तनकिता गोसादमत्त्वानि ततु प्रयक्षेत्रमें अत एव स्वर्णां मानस्यानि गच्छ, स्वर्णार्द्धमानस्यानि धारे द्वारा साधस्यनिया साधस्यनियानि प्रयक्षेत्रमें न तन्त्राद्वितीया साधस्यनिया गवाये। भूम्यावसाधस्यानि तहसो तत्र प्रवयस्थ प्रमाणां तथा प्रमाणान्तर-पुनर्ममाने भक्ति इति न प्राप्तिनितरसमानमें।

एवमर्पितलिपि न प्रमाणान्तरसमानमें। तथा हि—व्यवस्थापन गृहाभावानि (४७) अर्थापतीमेन—वदर्शीनेन बाहिरभारस्वाध्यायकत्वनितर-माने न्यायिनि। भिगतत्वा गृहाभावानि। सा न्यायिनि। यदा खलनायकः चेतनः नासित तदर्शित न्यायिनि। यदा न्यायिनि एकत्रित्व तदर्शित नासिति तुकः। स्वर्णार्द्धमानस्य व्यायस्थापितः। तथा च सति गृहाभावानि वदर्शीनेन बाहिरभारस्वाध्यायकत्वनितर-माने न्यायिनि। न च चेतस्य बाहिरस्थलं गृहाभावानि। शास्त्राय स्फोटाय, नेवासिद्धो गृहाभावानि बाहिरभावानि न हेतुः। स्वातः। न च गृहाभावानि वा सच्चमहुर्त्तेऽवय, येन सत्यमाननुपपत्तामानस्य बाहिरस्थलं न बाहिरस्थलापयेऽवय। तथा हि—चेतस्य गृहाभावानि सत्यमानस्य विरुध्योऽध्यो गृहाभावानि, बिन्द्यावस्थानेतृ। "देशसामान्यानि गृहविशेषार्थिनयो रपि पार्थिक इति

1. "देशसामान्याप्रणितः गृहविशेषार्थिनया समानाविषमत्वा विरोध इति श्रीनिवास।" इति राधावानन्दः। सच्च हि गृहविशेषार्थिनि सामान्याप्रणितः विशेषगृहविशेषार्थिनि विरोधमिति श्रीनिवासः। कारकस्तिपि कथनेन स्वर्णार्द्धमानस्य विशेषार्थिनि गृहाभावानि विरोधमिति श्रीनिवासः। अतएव गृहस्थानविशेषार्थिक इति हद्द्यः।

"देशसामान्यानितिः" सामान्याप्रणितः वार्ताप्रणितः तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे तत्त्वानुसारमानवेत्रे

"प्रामाणित" प्रतियोगितायां किरदारिकं ब्रह्माकारिकं विशेषार्थिनया समानाविषमत्वा संदायस्य न विरोधितत्वार्थिणि। अखरात्युष्टः स्वदः।
अभावसम्मत्यां प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोगत्यांं [सांत.

समानविषयतया विरोधं इति चेतं न। प्रमाणविनिमित्तस्य गृहे दस्तावेजः पालिकात्या सांशयाक्षेत्र गृहसाधन विकृष्टस्य प्रतिकृष्टस्योपयोगता। नापि प्रमाणनिग्रिष्ठो गृहाभावः। पालिकामस्य गृहसङ्ग्राहसंपदा सांशयाक्षेत्र विकृष्टस्य प्रतिकृष्टस्य एवसूचना न अपनेतृ महत्त्वात् गृहसाधन वृत्तिः। नापि प्रमाणनिग्रिष्ठो गृहाभावः। पालिकामस्य गृहसङ्ग्राहसंपदा सांशयाक्षेत्र विकृष्टस्य प्रतिकृष्टस्य एवसूचना न अपनेतृ महत्त्वात् गृहसाधन वृत्तिः। नापि प्रमाणनिग्रिष्ठो गृहाभावः। पालिकामस्य गृहसङ्ग्राहसंपदा सांशयाक्षेत्र विकृष्टस्य प्रतिकृष्टस्य एवसूचना न अपनेतृ महत्त्वात् गृहसाधन वृत्तिः। नापि प्रमाणनिग्रिष्ठो गृहाभावः। पालिकामस्य गृहसङ्ग्राहसंपदा सांशयाक्षेत्र विकृष्टस्य प्रतिकृष्टस्य एवसूचना न अपनेतृ महत्त्वात् गृहसाधन वृत्तिः।
नो. ७ ] अतीन्द्रियाणामनुमानातू प्रतीति: ॥

एवं तांत्रिकः अतीन्द्रियाणात्मकं विश्लेषणं विश्लेषणं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र
(५१) प्रमाणान्न वर्णाल्पकालः प्रत्यं पुष्प्यादि स्वरूपः पांशुपादको हालका-
क्षिपितिनिः ॥ को सिप प्रयक्तः प्रतिपन्नः पूर्ववतः चानुमान
नेन धृतादिशानात् वह्यादीनि चेति, तद्युत्सनादनाय मद्द्रोजङ्गे शास्म
इति दुर्भिक्षणमनेन व्युत्पादम् । तत्र यत्रिपाणं यत्र शास्त्रम् तदुत्कल्पणेनेयः
प्रमाणेऽयो निष्क्रियः दर्शितात—

सामान्यतस्तु द्यादुर अतीन्द्रियाणामप्रतीतिनिवुधुमानात् ।
तस्मादृष्टि चासिद्वं परेश्वरमासविमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

"सामान्यत" कोभः । 'तु' शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकवधानां विशिष्ठिः ॥
(५२) अतीन्द्रियाणायः सामान्यतो द्यादुनमानादतीन्द्रियाणि प्राप्तानुपः-
सामान्यदृष्टि इति: –चित्रितः चायांपितुरुद्द्रगत्वं
साय इतरः । उपक्षणं चेतृ, शेषविद्यापि
द्विःमू ॥

तत्सिस्वेच्यति इद्यमपु सामान्यतेऽद्वियासः प्रवक्ते? । तथा च यत्र
(५३) सामान्यतो द्यादुनमानादसिद्धानामानाः
साधारण सिद्धि:॥

स्यादेतत्, यथा गणककुस्मकृपृरोषमण्डचित्रादिपु प्रवक्ष्मण्डप्रत्यक्षमानम्
(५४) प्रवक्ष्मण्डपात् तद्भवसत्त्वाति, एवं प्राधानादिश्यपि । तत्कथं
प्राधानादीनाममास्विशं ॥ तेन्तां सामान्यतो द्यादिः: सिद्धिरिषयं आह—
, अतिदूरात् सामीयात् इद्यव्यायतामन्त्वस्तुन्वस्त्रयात् ।
सौंभवायात् अभिभवात् सामानानिमाराच ॥ ७ ॥
“अतिदृशाः” इति | अनुपलिपयिति वक्ष्माणां सिंहावलोकनन्यायाः
(५५) तत्क्रिया: अ- तिदृशातिसामीपिनिद्धयु- 
तमनेनवधानानास्व- यवधानामभवसमाना- 
भिन्नोऽस्मश्च प्रत्यक्षाभाव:।

“मनोदनवधानाः” यथा कामाचयुपहतमाः
स्फीतालोकम्ययातिननमिन्द्रयस्कबिकाः
पूर्णितमाः प्रणाहतमाः आपि न पस्यति।
“सौङ्ग्याः”, 
यदेन्द्रियस्कबिकाः परमाणुवाद्य न पस्यति।
“व्यव- 
धानाः”, 
यथा कुद्यादिवशवाद्य राजदराय न पस्यति।
“अघिम- 
वाः”, 
यथा चहि सोहिमिशांभिधिमूत्य अग्नित्रकनम्भवः
न पस्यति।
“समानाभिहाराः”, 
यथा तोयदिवमुक्तादिबिन्नाः दज्जाये न पस्यति॥

च’कारो सुन्दरसमुचयाः। तेनानुज्रो
(५६) अनुज्ञादापि प्रत्यक्षाविवाहं

dिप संज्ञाति:। तथथा क्षीराचवस्यां दधाच- 
नुद्रावान पस्यात।

एतदुस्क्यं भवति:। न प्रत्यक्षाविवाहिता अर्थात
(५७) प्रत्यक्षाविवाहिता
	n प्रत्यक्षाविवाहिता:। तथा हि गृहदिनिगत्स: गृहजनम- 
रेव नामवर्गा कारणां अ 
विनिविष्णु:। न लेवम्। अपि 
तु योगप्रत्यक्षविवाहिता विविष्णु:।

न च प्रत्यक्षाविवाहितं प्रत्यक्षाविवाहं, 
इति न तातितितम्या- 
इति। ॥

कलमणुनरेतुपु कारण: प्रथानातीनानुपुलिप्याविष्कार आह—
सौङ्ग्याः च उपलिपिन्याविष्कारः, कार्यतस्तुदुपलख्यः।
महद्वादि तथा कार्य प्रत्यक्षसरूप विरूप: च। ॥

“सौङ्ग्याः” इति। अथाभावादेव सततसबद्देत्रधानुपक्षय:।

1 यथा सिङ्ग: पुरो गत्वा प्रशांत पति:। तथा समपदस्य यथा प्रागतादेव: सम्प्रभुस्त- 
स्वाभ: ब्याधिः प्रशुष: चौरिष्यादिकसमस्वदीम्यायाचिकायाः इद्भवः।
कौ. ९] प्रधानसाधनकार्यम् ।

(५८) प्रधाननुपदः

कस्मात् महत्त्वत् आह—"नामार्थस्" इति

कुतः ? "कार्यकालः

पुरुषोपपेल्वः तु प्रमाणं बह्यति, "सहायत्वादर्शतः"

(कारिका १७) इति। दृढ़तयाप्रणामाशीित सि प्रख्यक्षप्रवर्त्तमानमोर्गवत्वच् प्रवर्त्तते इति कल्पयो। सत्तमस्तु रतो न प्रमाणेनाशीित इति न तत्र प्रख्यक्षयेग्यता शाक्या ध्येयसितुमियभिप्रायः ||

कस्मात् पुनर्त्कालः यतः प्रधाननुपदमलयत आह—"महदादि तत्र कार्यमप्" इति। एतच यथा गणकमृ तथोपरिऀपुपीपदाधिष्ठयो।

(५९) प्रधानासिततत्वादायकारणसूत्तमहादि

धिकार्यम्।

कार्यात् कारण्यात् गमये। सनि चात्र वादिना विप्रतिपत्तयः।

(६०) कार्यकारणसू

मवये वादित्वाधिष्ठयतम्।।

'एकस्य सतो विषये: कार्यार्थतं न वस्तु सतु' इत्यते। अयोये तु 'सत: असतु जायते' इति। 'सत: सतु जायते' इति वृहदः।।

तत्र पूर्वसिन्न कल्पनेऽय प्रधानं न सिवपतिः। सुखुदः स्वाभूमिववयस्वप्नः ।

(६१) सत्कार्यपथ

परिणामशाक्त्वाकामत्त्व हि जगतु कारणस् प्रधान

एव प्रधानासितत्वाशङ्खः।।

तस्य प्रधानलं स्त्र्रजस्तत्वमस्तभावत्वम्बगमयति।

यदि पुनस्तत्तम: सजात्व असरिष्पायत् कार्यं सुखादिरूपः शब्दायात्त्वं कर्म स्वातः, सदस्तेिस्तादामृत्यानुपपत्ते?: अयेकस्य सतो विषये: शव्दादिरूपः,

तथा सपि सत: सजन्यत इति न स्यातः। न चायस्य प्रकाशात्त्वम्,

आपि त्वपक्षः प्रपश्चामकायताय प्रतिंढितः एव। वेदाधिपि कारणभक्ति

चरणादिनां सत एव कारणातसो ज्ञये वेदाधिपि सदस्तेिस्तादात्त्वानुपपत्तेि त्वाय तत्र कारणमिति न तम्ते प्रधानसिद्धः।।
(६२) सत्त्वकार्यप्रमित- अतः प्रथानिषिद्धवर्णी प्रथमं तावतसलकार्य प्रद्धमम् \| प्रतिज्ञानीते—

असदकरणाधुपादनाभ्रहमात् सवेसंभवामावात्।
शास्त्रस्य शास्त्रकरणात्, कारणभावार्थ सत् कार्यम् \| ९ \| “असदकरणात्” इति। “सत् कार्यम्”—कारणन्यापारातू प्रागपीति।

(६३) शैवः शंकः। तथा च न सिद्धसाधयं नैवायिकतनयः।
रुद्रावनीयम्। यदापि बीजमुखयं दादिप्रद्धसाधनं
न्तरमूलं धिदाकुयं भवति, तथा इति। न प्रायसः कारणतमम्, अपि
तु महाव्यये वीजायवयवः। अभावातू भावोयः, तस्य सर्वेत सुलभः
वातः, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योपाध्यासंस्कृत इत्यादिन्यायावितकात्तपायैकायम्
स्माभिः। प्रतिप्रतिदितम्।

(६४) बैद्यान्तम्- प्रपञ्चप्रायम्यकाष्ठतिव वाक्ये न शक्ये मिथ्येति
निरासः। वादितम्य इति।

कारणाक्षेत्रमन्तवम्बिश्यते। ततें प्रतिज्ञातम्। “सतू कार्यम्”

(६५) न्यायसत्तनरासः। असतः कारणायप्राप्तू पूर्ण कार्यम्, नास्ति
सत्य कर्म केनापि शक्यम्, नन्दे नीले शिष्ये
हेतुः। (१)। सहिष्णुपि यथाकर्म कर्माते। ‘सदसत्ये घटस्य
धर्मी’ इति पद्र, तथा स्पष्टति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्मी इति सत्या तद्विषधमे।
तथा च नास्तिह्य, असत्यादिनात्तदाधना चातावेन कायमसन
घटे। तस्मातू कारणायपाराद्विभिभत ततः प्रागपी सदेव कार्यमिति।

१। धर्मिणि (घटे)। नास्तिह्य (घटे)॥। “असत्ये घटे सूक्ष्णं तदादम्यं न्यायं दिति
व न व। अेबे असदात्मकः घटस्य असत्ये घटे महों मनो न स्यात्। समस्याभ्य मतादम्यं घटस्य
पेक्षावृत्तः सत्या घटस्य घटस्य तद्विषधमे। द्वितीयम्य ध्यासः—“असदात्मकः” इति।
सत्यास्ते पञ्चस्यनम् इतिप्रथमस्य: स्पष्टित्यम्यथा ५० व घटे घटस्यति भारतीयमाथं।॥
का. ९ ] कार्यसंचाधनानि । २१

कारणाचाय सतोसम्भवतिक्रियावशिष्यते | सतत्रामिब्धाकारिपपणा, यथा
पीडनेन तिलेपु तैैल्यावघातेन धारापु तण्डुलानां दीर्घनेन सौरभेपीपु
प्यस: | प्रसत: करणेन तु न निदर्शनेन किष्ठिदिति | न सूक्तविभव्यभयमानं
चोत्यमानं जान कालिदासहृद्यूम ॥

इत्यथा कारणव्यापारत् प्राकू सदेव कार्यम्—“उपादानग्रहणात्” ॥

(६६) कार्यकारण- 
उपादाननि कार्यनि, तेषां प्रहणं, कार्येण 
सम्बन्धाथ सत्कार्यमिति सम्बन्धः | उपादाने: कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति
द्वितियो हेतुः (२) ॥ यावत् | ऐतिहाक्तं भवति—कार्येण सम्बन्धं कार- 
णमू कार्यस्य जनकमु, सम्बन्धस्य कार्यस्यासतो न सम्बन्धिति, तस्मादिति ॥

स्यादेवतू—असम्बद्वेष ह कार्यं कारणेण: कस्मान जन्यते? तथा चात- 
(६७) कार्यकारण- 
देवेत् तदस्य इत्यत आहं—“सर्वसम्बन्धावात्”
योनिमत्तसम्बन्धाभि सव- 
कार्यकारणाभिविद्या-
पिति: ॥

इति | असम्बद्वस्य जन्यवेक्षः, असम्बद्वाविशेष- 
सर्वं कार्यानं सर्वसम्बद्वेतू | न चेतत्तसि, 
तस्मात्तस्यासंस्मेससम्बद्वेन जन्यते अपि तु सम्बद्व 
सम्बद्वेन जन्यति इति | यथाः: सार्ह्यदुः:—

“असर्व नासित सम्बन्धः कारणेण: सत्तादिहिमि:
असम्बद्वस्य चोत्यतिमित्तो न व्यवस्थिति: ” इति ॥

स्यादेवतू—असम्बद्वमपि सतू तदेव करोति यत्र यत्व् कारणं शतकमुः ॥

(६८) कारणशस्त्र: 
शतकमु कार्यशस्त्राणाशयग्यम्यते | तेन नायवस्ख- 
कार्यपराराध सत्कार्यमु लय आह—“शक्तस्य शाक्यकारणाः” इति | सा 
(१) ॥

शक्ति: शक्तकारणाप्रया सवेत्र वा स्वातः, शक्ये 
एव वा? सवेत्र चेतद्वक्ष्यात्ताव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत, ‘कथमसति’ शक्ये

１ पञ्चशिर्कादयः।
कार्यकारणामेदसाधनम् ।

संत ।

तत्र, इति वक्तव्यम् । शक्तिमेद एव एतादेऽयतः किविषिदेव कार्य जनयेतु न सर्वमिति चेतं, हस्तं भोः शक्तिविषेष: कार्यसम्बन्धो वा उसम्बन्धो वा? सम्बन्धः नासता सम्बन्धः इति सतु कार्यम् । अस्मिन्द्रेऽ सैवान्वेयवस्था, इति सुपूर्वम् "शक्तस्य शक्त्यकरणात्" इति ॥

(६९) कार्यकारणमेदसाधनानि "कार्यमाहाभ्"।

इतः सतृ कार्यमेदवाह्यानि । कार्यस्य कार्यकारणमेदसाधनात् । न दह कार्यान्वेषानि (४)।।

कार्यस्य कार्यकारणेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१) न पतस्त- नुमयो भिदरते, तत्तनुमयवल्त् । इह यत् यति मेदसाधनानि ॥।

(७०) कार्यकारणानिव । भिदरते तत्त तस्य भर्मी न भवति, यथा गौर- श्रस्य। धन्यश्च पतस्तत्वोऽ, तस्मात्यार्थन्तरम् । (२) उपादानोपादेयभावाच नार्थन्तरवं तत्तुपयोऽ। यथोर्थन्तरलम् न स्योऽरुपादानोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपयोऽ। उपादानोपादेयभाववं तत्तुपयोऽ। तस्मात्यार्थन्तरलम् । (३) इतः नार्थन्तरवं तत्तुपयोऽ; संयोगार्थन्तरम- वल्तात्। अर्थन्तरवै हि संयोगो द्विय यथा कुण्डबद्दश्यः, अप्राणिवर्य यथा हिमवादिन्योऽ। न पेळ संयोगार्थात्, तस्मात्यार्थन्तरलमिति। (४) इतः पतस्तत्तमोऽ न भिदरते, गुरुवार्थनार्थकरार्थन्तरम्। इह यतु यस्माद- द्रिष्टमार्थम्, ततु तस्मात्तस्य गुरुवार्थनार्थ कार्य गुह्यते, यथेकपस्य स्वाभिकाय यथोऽल्लोक्तायां स्वस्वनिवेशोपत्यस्माद्रिष्टमस्य स्वस्विकायम् गुरु- िैस्तायां स्वमनतिमेद्विधानियः स्विनिते । न च तथा तत्तुगुरुवार्थकार्यात् पत्तुगुरु- िैस्तायां द्वयोऽ। तस्मात्यार्थन्तरलमः पत इति । तान्यतान्यभौदेवसाधनान्यविविदानि ।

एवंमेद्ये चिदः, तन्तव एव तेन तेन संस्थानमेदेन परिणातः पदोऽ, न

१ व्यतिरिक्तानुपादनानि ।
कृष्णदेवाच्या "स्वाधीनता किंवा मानवीयता" या मुद्देची शिक्षा द्योतनासाठी या प्रवर्तकांनी त्यांच्या समाजातील जागरूकतेची आमंत्रण केलेली आहे.

"नासतो विचारे भावो नामावै चिंतात सत: " इति (भगवद्गीता. २१९६)

यथा कृष्ण: स्वाधीनता: सदृश चार्यासमग्राच्या न भिन्नः, एवं घटकुटादयो अपि मृतस्वरूपार्थ्यम न मिस्त्रः। एवेह तन्तुपद इति व्यपदेश, यथेकृ को हि तलेका इत्युपपतः। न चार्यक्रियामेलो अपि मेदभापायति, एकस्यापि नानाधिकारादरणात्। यथेकृ एवं विद्यानिधान: पाचक: प्राकाशक्षेरिती। नाप्तार्थिक्रियात्वकः वस्तुमेदो हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्रस्तानामार्थिक्रियात्वस्थादरणात्। यथा प्रयेक्ष विष्ट्यो वर्मदशेनलक्ष्मणार्थिक्रिया कुर्विन्ति, न तु शिवकावहनमु, भिगलस्तु शिविकामुद्रितित, एवं तततः प्राक्षः प्रावरणालक्ष्मणार्थिक्रिया कुर्विन्ति, अपि भिगलता आविर्भूपपत्तभाबः: प्राव-रिष्यिति

स्थादेशम्—आविष्कारः पटव कारणवापराताः प्राक्षः सन्त असन्।
(७२) कार्यस्य कारणविविधगतिः कारणविविधगतिः कारणविविधगतिः कारणविविधगतिः।

वा? असंपेत्र प्राप्त तरीततिपादनम्। अथ सन्, कृं तां तथः कारणविविधगतिः। नहि सति कार्यकारणविविधगतिः। परम्योऽधिकृतविविधगतिः। आदिभिः विविधगतिः। तस्मादाविविधगतिः। किंयति इति सिद्ध वचः।

सैवम्। अथातुद्परां इति मेते केयमसदुपतिः। सति, असति
(७२) तत्तपरिहारः। वा? सति चेतु, कृं तां तथः कार्यं। असति
विविधगतिः। चेतु, तस्या अयुपन्तनिर्मितिविविधगतिः।

ाधृते। उपदिः। भवति प्रायुक्तसः, अधी तु पद एवाः। तथा अधी
(७४) पदपद्धार्योऽभयं। भवति 'पद' इति ताबुक्तं भवति
क्षणसा। तत्तपरिहारः। “उपदिः” इति। तत्तवं। ‘पद’ इत्यथा,
‘उपदिः’ इति न वाच्यम्, पौनसंक्याः।। ‘विशिष्यति’ इत्यथा। न
वाच्यम्, उपदिविनादर्शयोऽऽपेतक्र विरोधाः।

तैस्मादियं पदोपतिः। स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्ता समवायो वा,

१ एवं च श्रवणक्तेः साधितो दोषः समान एव पक्षदृष्टे। तत्तथा नैचरेन्द्रक्तेः शास्त्रानी इति।
यथाभास्रस्तुः।—स्ववक्तेः।—२। भक्तविधानमा। शास्त्रानी विधिः। पारिष्ठश्चै। पारिष्ठश्चै। पारिष्ठश्चै।
तादृश प्रयोगशास्त्रविविधगतिः। परिवर्तनमात्रायेः। च०। च०।
पट्टालयोऽथा। स्वविविधगतिः। भक्तविधानमा। भक्तविधानमा।
श्वास्त्रानी। स्वविविधगतिः। स्वशास्त्रानी। स्वविविधगतिः। अवतुमषीत। अभयाभासः
तैस्मादियाः तैस्मादियाः। कारणविविधगतिः। अवतुमषीत।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। नवस्वासः। आनुमानिकं
बर्तं। अत्यधिकविविधगतिः। च चायुक्तसः। कारणविविधगतिः।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। आनुमानिकं।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। आनुमानिकं।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। आनुमानिकं।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। आनुमानिकं।
‘तस्मादिः’ इति। उत्तरयुक्तसः। आनुमानिकं।
(७५) पद्योत्तर स्थापित कारणयापारेष्या:॥
उभयथा दृष्टि नीलक्षेत्रे, अथ च तद्विनि कारणाति व्यापार्यन्ते।
एवं सत एव पटादेशाविर्मि-वाय कारणार्थेषुपपपरम्॥
नै च पद्धत्ये कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्विप्रयालियवादुः, क्रियासमक्षिलिवाच कारणानां, अन्यथा कारणात्वाभावात्॥

(७६) कारिकोपपं-हारः॥
तस्मात् सतू कार्यमिति पुष्कल्यम्॥

तदृशं प्रधानसाधनानुरुपूः सतू कार्यमुपपाव यादशो तत्र प्रधानं साध-
(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्त-नीयं तार्तरामङ्गिङ्गिं विवेकभानोपयोगिनि
सार्ववैलये॥ व्यक्ताशृष्टिसार्ववैलये ताबदादे–
हेतुमदन्तिमन्त्रापि सहितमनेकज्ञायिति हित्युः।
साहित्यव रपतत्र व्यक्तः, विपरीतमविश्वासः॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सार्थम्। तत्र हेतुमचः॥ कारणम्, तद्वन, यथ च यो हेतुः।
तमुपरिष्ठा-दृष्टि॥

(७९) अनित्ययं-“अनित्यम्,” विनाशि, तिरोभाविति यावत्॥

“अयापि,” सवर्ण परिणामिन्न न व्यापीति। कारणेन हि कार्यमः
(८०) अयापिव-विद्मृशम्, न कार्यण कारणम्। न च बुद्धशाय:॥

“सहितम्”, परिस्पररवात्। यथा हि बुद्धशाय: उपांचुमुपांच देखेः

$1$ नतूं ‘अस्मिन्वप्रदेशान्यापि कारणानि कर्येति इति सदृच्छव्याख्याविका’ इति चेतृः, तदाह “न च” इति।
(१) सन्नियत्वम्
लज्जित देहान्तरं चोपाददत्, इति तेसां परिपन्दः। शरीरपृष्ठिव्यादीनां च परिपन्दः। प्रसिद्ध एव।

(२) अनेकत्मम्
"अनेकम्", प्रतिपुरुषं बुध्वाधीनां मेघात।

(३) पृथियादापि शरीरात्पादिमेठेनानक्त्वेव।

"आन्तितम्", स्वकाराममाधितम्। बुध्वाधिकारणामभेदे धन्य कथा-बिविद्वैविक्षया SSश्रयाधारिभिः। यथेह वने।

(४) आन्तितम्
"हिञ्जू्", प्रधानाय। यथा चैते बुध्वाध।: प्रधानाय हिञ्जू्

(५) हिञ्जू्
तथोपरिश्राधक्षति। प्रधानं तु न प्रधानाय हिञ्जू् पुरुषस्य हिङ्गमभवद्वतिपि भव।

(६) सावयवम्
"अववायवविविस्योगसंयोगी। अथवा अववामम्म अव- यवः। अववायमायवविनां मिँयः। संयोगोऽम्।

(७) सावयवतम्
मिण्ड्णम्। संयोग इति यावः। अप्रातिपूर्विका रासिः। संयोगः। तेन सह वर्तित इति सावयवम्। तथाहि पूर्विका व्यादयः। परस्यं संयोगः। एवम्ये धन्या। न तु प्रधानाय हिञ्जू् बुध्वाधिमः। संयोगः। तदाल्प्यात। नापि सत्तवमात्समां परस्यं संयोगः। अप्रातिभवात।

(८) परतन्त्रम्
"बुध्वाधि।" बुध्वाध व्यक्तयं शह्भाः रे जनाधित्वेऽप्रकृत्यः।

(९) परतन्त्रम्
"पूर्वोऽस्पेस्यः। अन्यथा क्षोणा सती नालमह्द्वः।

(१०) परायणस्सूऽस्पेस्यः। एवम्येकारणाय जनाधित्वेऽप्रकृत्यः। तेन परायणाय नालमह्द्वः। इति सर्वेऽव्यक्तिपुरूषस्य पूर्वमिर्द्दते। तेन परायणाय नालमह्द्वः। इति सर्वेऽव्यक्तिपुरूषस्य पूर्वमिर्द्दते। तेन परायणाय नालमह्द्वः।

१ अववाय + अनद्।
"विपरीतमव्यक्तम्"—व्यक्तात्। अहेतुमार्गियं व्यापि निधियम्,
(८७) अवधारणये। [ यथपव्यक्तस्यारित परिणामावलि क्रिया
परितम्।। तथा धरि परिसर्वदो नातिल।।] एकमनाशित-
मित्तुमनस्वरूपम् स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम्।।१०।।

(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्त—
योसाधारणिणि पुष्पाचि सम्पति तयोऽपि वाचमां,
पुरुषाच वाचमांव्यक्तम्।। आह्—

तदनेन प्रवनेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोवधधथ्यमुस्तकम्।
व्यंकत्, तथा प्रथानम्, तदिपरीतस्वथा च पुमान्।।११।।

"चिरुणम्" इति। तयो गुणा: सुकुमः स्मोहो अस्थिते चिरुणम्।
(८९) चिरुणलम्।। तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मचिरुणलम् पराभिमभतमपा-
प्रथमसाधियम्॥ (१) क्रमम्।।

"अविषेकि"। यथा प्रधानम् न स्वतो विविध्यते, एवमहदादायो धपि
(९०) अविषेकितव—
न प्रधानातृ विविध्यते, तदात्मकातात्। अथ
स्वमितियम्॥ (२) वा सम्भुवकारिता उत्तराचित्वकि। न हि किवि-
देव व्यापस्मः स्वकारः, आपि तु सम्भू। तत्र नेक्षातात् यथा कस्यतिधि
केनचित्तसम्भव इति।।

येः लाङ्छः। विज्ञानेव हर्षविपादमोहशंदायायकम्, न पुनरितो स्वय-
(९१) विज्ञानयम् स्वतःमा इति। तानू प्रेयाह—"विषयस्य इति।
समान्यत्वं च तृतीयत्वं।। 'विषयम्' याहि:। विज्ञानाद्वाहिरितम् यावत्।।
(३) (४) अत एव। "समान्यम्" साधारणम्, अनेकः:
पुरुषे भुव्यहितमन्तस्य:। विज्ञानाकारान्ते तु, असाधारण्या हिन्दुजानानि वृत्तिः।।

१ नैयायिकायामितम्।। २ विज्ञानविद्वे। बौद्धः।।
न ज्ञानविनि निद्रेश्यते।

(९२) अचेतनसंवर्गसारः। नत्तू वैनाशिकवत्। अवात्मसंवर्गसायिनः। रित्यथः।

“प्रसन्धाम्।” प्रसन्धाम् धर्मं यस्य द्य दश्यासीति प्रसन्धाम।

(९३) प्रसन्धामितवसन्ध्याय: [प्रसन्धामिति वक्तव्यं मत्वर्यीयः। प्रसन्ध्यायेष प्रसन्ध्येः। मुक्तमृ।] सत्यपिरुपशर्यायायाम्यां

न कदाचिदिपि भियुस्यत इत्यथः।

प्रत्यक्षोपयमत्वसंस्कर्णितानि। “तथा।” प्रत्यक्षोपयमत्वसंस्कर्णिताः।

(९४) उच्यततसारः। प्राक्तम्। इति। यथा। प्रत्यक्षोपयमत्वसंस्कर्णिताः।

(९५) प्रत्यक्षोपयमत्वसंस्कर्णिताः। ताम्यं वैर्यं पुण्यसास्वह।“तद्विपितः।

यथा। पुरुषस्तां वैर्यस्तां। पुमानः।” इति।

प्रत्यक्षसमस्तनसमस्तसायिनः। प्राक्तमसायिनः। तथायेः।

(९६) साधस्य च। इति। पुमाने। “तद्विपितः।” इति। अत आह्। “तथा। च।”

इति। चकारो देशाः। यथाप्रयत्नसमस्तसायिनः। तथायेः।

(९७) गुणमिकर्षणं। भिगुणाभिकर्षणम्। तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणः।

किं च तदुपलक्ष्यं परिन्यात आह।

१ विजायने पोषण। न गुणः। चर्चामप्रकाशयानं। इत्यभिन्नयः। समयानाविप पात्तो। मुख्यम्।

प्रसन्धाम्। २ तेषां विजायनेऽरूपः। ३ भिगुणाभिकर्षणं। इत्यभिन्नस्मिरित्युपोद्दारं ॥ ४ च।
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तिविपन्नतत्तम्का: प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थः।
अन्योन्याभिमयारथ्यजननामित्युत्तरत्वियतः गुणाः॥ १२॥

“गुणा:” [परार्थः] “सत्त्व लघु प्रकाशकम्” [कारिका १ ६] इत्यत निर्देशन्ते इत्यतः
तदनागतत्वात्लिङ्केन तन्भुव्यतः वा प्रीयादीनां
यथास्थायं वैदित्यम्॥

एतदुःखभवति—प्रीति: दुःखम्, प्रीयत्मक: सत्त्वगुणः; अप्रीतिः—
(१९) उत्तस्तक्षण: लघुम्, अप्रीयत्मको रजोगुणः; विशाददो मोहः;
मनः॥ विशादविस्तरूणं गुणं: इत्यथः: ये तु मन्यते “न
प्रीतिः: लघुवावादितिरियते, एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीयवादन्यादिति,”
तानु प्रीति “आतम्”—गुणम्। नेतृतारभावः: सुखदयः, अपि तु भावः;
आतमश्वद्वस्य भाववचनवत्। प्रीति: आतम भावो येषां ते प्रीयमानः।
प्रत्यक्षस्मि व्याप्तेयम्। भाववृत्ता वेषणमुवधसिद्धः। परस्पराभावाः
कत्वेत तु परस्पराध्यापैतेरक्ष्यापि कस्मराध्यासिद्धिरिति भवः॥

स्वप्नमेंषामुक्तवा प्रयोजनमहाः—“प्रकाशवृत्तिनियमार्थः” इति।
(१००) गुणानं प्रयोजनम्—यथास्त्यं प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियममहपम्॥

अन्याय प्रयोगस्य स्वप्नं लघु सत्त्वः प्रत्ययतु, यदि तस्मा गुणो न
नियम्यतेऽति। तमाविनिततु काचिदेव प्रवृत्तिनियमार्थः
भवति तस्मा नियमार्थः॥

प्रयोजनमुक्तवा क्रियामहाः—“अन्योन्याभिमयारथ्यजननामित्युत्तरत्वियतः”
(१०१) गुणानम् क्रिया: अन्योन्याभिमवाभ्यजननामित्युत्तरत्वियतः। मृत्तिः
या: सा च प्रयोक्ति स्वप्नम्। ‘अन्योन्याभिमज्जुत्यतः’। एषामन्यते
मेनायुर्भादुर्मियतान्यदिमुष्टिताः। तथा हि सत्त्व
रजस्तस्मि अभिभूत शान्तामालयो वृत्ति प्रति
कमते, एवं रजः सत्र्तस्मि आभिभूत चोराम्, एवं तमः
सत्त्रस्मि
गुण्यतनिीप्यादमू। [ सां. त।

आभिमूय मूढामिति 'अन्योन्यायशयवृत्तयः' यत् यथाधारायभवति 

नायमायो घटते, तथा अपि यद्धेर्णाय यस्य क्रिया स तत्यायशः तथा हि, 

सत्यं प्रावृत्तिनियमान्याश्रयवृत्तसयोऽत्र: क्राकाशोपकरोित, रजः प्रकाश 

नियमान्याश्रयवृत्तसयोऽत्रवृत्तसयोऽत्रः, तमः प्रकाशसत्ती आश्रिति 

नियमेनेत थलयोऽरिति 'अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः' अन्यत्मो जननमपख्य पनयति 

जनाय च परिवामः। स च गुणानां सदसरूपः। अतं एव न हेतुमवमु, 

tतत्वात्तरस्य हेतृसम्बन्धः। नायनिष्ठसमु, तत्वान्ते क्रियामवातः। 'अन्यो 

न्यमिथुनवृत्तयः'। अन्योन्यसहचरः। अविनामवृत्तय इति यावतः। 'चः' 

समुखेये। भवति चात्रागमः।

"अन्योन्यनिथुः दस्यं सर्वं सर्वनाधियमिनः। 

रजसों मिथुनं सत्यं सत्यम मिथुनं रजः। 

तमसाधारपी मिथुने ते सत्यजसी उषे। 

उभयों सत्यजसोमिथुनं तम उच्यते। 

नेयामादिः सम्प्रयोगो वियोगो वोपधयते।" || इति देवी 

भागवतः||३१८ || १२ ||

(१०३) गुण्यतनिीप् 

पणमं तेषाम्। यथाप्रत्यक्षम 

वथः। 

सत्यचं छथु प्रकाशकपरमपणसंकष्ठ कोत्तं च 

रजः। 

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीस्वयथे च बुधि: || १३ ||

"सत्यम्॥ इति। 

सत्यमेव छथु प्रकाशकमपरमसंकष्ठसंस्याचार्यः। 

तत्र 

(१०३) सत्यमुः 

भावः। छथुमुः प्रकाशकपरमपणसंकष्ठम् || तत्र 

कार्याद्वैते हेतुअन्यो। लाभवमू गौर्यप्रतिद्विन्द्रतः || 

अद्वैताद्वैतकमसंकष्ठम्। चित्तिन्यगमने हेतुमवक्षः 

तथा वायोः। एवं करणाः वृद्धिपदः हेतुमवक्षः। गुरुः त हि मन्त्रानि 

स्युः रिति सत्यम प्रकाशक 

सामकत्वमुक्तम्॥
कौ. १२] गुणान्त: पृथक्-केत्तरस्तेसिनामावस्तकल्पन | ३१

सत्तमसी स्वयम्कत्यता स्वकार्यप्रवृत्ति प्रत्यक्षदस्ती रजसोपपति-
(१०४) रजोगुण:-
स्मावि:-उपयोगकल्पमू, प्रयत्न कायति| तददसुकमू -"उपयोगकर रजः"
चलत्मू। || इति। कस्मानितयत उकमू -"चल्मू" इति।
तदनेन रजस: प्रवृत्यार्थं दर्शितमू।||

रजस्तु चलन्त्या परितेज्युगं चार्येतू, गुरुणा उस्वृष्टत च तमसा
(१०५) तमोगुणस्त:
भाव:-गुरुस्त अवर-
कल्पमू। || इति ततस्ततो व्यावृत्या तमो नियमकमुकमू-
"गुरु वरणकेव तमः" इति। एवकारः प्रखे के भिवकम: सम्भये, सच्चमेव, रज एव, तम एष्टित।||

ननु 'ये परस्परविरोधशीला गुणा: सुन्दरसुल्खदव दस्तं दस्तं
(१०६) परस्परविध-
हारामापि गुणामार्थं- इति आह-"प्रादीपकार्यतो कृतिः" इति।
हस्तेविती, यथा वारितेके सन्मकाविरोधिनि, अथ मिशिते सहानेन रूपकारकर्षणं कार्य कृतः। तथा च वातपितको-
भाण: परस्परविरोधिन: शारीरारागरकर्षणथरकिरिण:। एवं सचरज-
स्तमांसि मिथ्योलिन्दावन्यथनुसीति स्वकार्य करिष्यति च। "अर्थं"
इति पुरुषसंचारत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

"पुरुषसंचारत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—
(१०७) महामकार्यवे परस्परविरोधिन: स्वाभावुन्माणि मुखुद: ख-
मोहामकार्यवे मिथ्यासाने कल्पयति। तेषां
मोहामां परस्परविहृतवा
सपि: मिथ्यासाने गुण-
नयस्या उस्वृष्टकल्पमू। ||
तथा एकेव वि रूप्योवनकुलशीलसफलता स्वातां

१ दूर एव। कः कथा परस्परविकारसकारिककारितया इतिभावः। २ सच्चि-
रजस्तमारूपणाः।
गुणनत्रयाविभेदकितसाधनानि । [ सांत ।

मिन सुखाकरौति । तत्काल हेतुः। स्वामिन्य विधि तस्यः सुख्रपमसु

जवािः। सौिह ब्रह्माणप्रोिवानि । तत्काल हेतुः। तः विधि तस्यः

दुःख्रपमसु जवािः। एवं पुरुषान्त तामविन्दमां सौिह मोहयातः।

तत्त्व काल हेतुः। तमप्रति तस्यः मोह्रपमसु जवािः। अनयथा च

गुणयातः। तत्र यतु सुखेहुः। ततु सुखाल्मकम् सृष्टम्। यतु दुःखेहुः

ततु दुःखांकं रजः। यन्मोहेहुत्समोहामांक तमः। उख्रपकहाशाला

धारणां लेकालिनुिू युपपुरुषात्तात्तातिरिधोः। सदहरेशातः।

तस्मातु सुखुः-मोहहिन्दिरित्वी विरोधिमिः। अविभोधिमिककूणवृत्तिमिः।

सुख्रपकाश्लाञ्चवनीम निष्ठितमेदा उद्भिेतः। एवं दुःखोपरक्वसत्वत्कल्यनकः।

पुष्पस्मकल्यतरङ्गि।—इति सिद्धं त्रेगुणयाति ॥ १३ ॥

स्यादेतद्—अनुभूयामानिशु पृथिवियादियुनमविविष्यः। भवन्तविभेदित्ता

(१०८) अनुभूयामविद्वापि

धर्मः। यें पुनः सत्त्रायाय नानामवपथमधिरोऽसं

हति तेषां कुतस्यमविभेदित्तम्। विपलयमचे

तत्त्वम् प्रस्तवमित्वं च प्रयत आह—

अविभेद्यादेः सिद्धिेखुणयाचक्षुपपशयाभावात्।

कारणगुणायत्तमकत्वाक्यस्य व्यञ्जकमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“अविभेद्यादेः” इति। अविभेदित्तमविभेदित्तम्—यथा ‘ह्रेणमोदित

(१०९) तस्मात्—

गुणनत्रयाविभेदकितसाधनानि

नानान्यत्तहारं कुतः। पुनःविभेदित्तवादेः सिद्धिरिस्यत आह—

“त्रेगुणयात्” इति। ‘यथाऽ सुखुः-मोहामांक तत्त्वविभेदित्तविधि

१ सत्त्रायायमानिशु सुखुः-मोहामांकु। सुख्रपकाश्लाखाल्मकमाधिकरिनि निष्ठिति। निष्ठित्वां कहानां

कालमालीकाणीयात्त्वां कहास्य—“सुखेहुः”। २ यथा सुखुः-मोहामांकु परस्यारूपाद्वंः भिन्नानि

निष्ठिति। सत्त्रायायमानिशु युपपुरुषात्तात्तातिरिधोः। सदहरेशातः न तथा सुख्रपकाश्लाखाल्मकमाधिकर

कुत्रेतां तत्र विभेदित्तमाधिकरिनि कहारं कहास्य—चे। चे भिन्नानि निष्ठिति। कल्पस्य इति भावः। अविभोधिनामपि निष्ठित

भिन्नानि।
योगि यथेष्टमुन्मूर्यमां व्यक्तम्—इति स्वतःस्वादनवयो नोकः। अति
रक्षमाहै तत् पर्ययाभावात्। इति। अधिकार्याणिविपथं पुरुषे त्रेुगु
ण्याभावात्। अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्त पश्चिमक्याण्याभावार्थित एव हेतुवें
गुणयार्थित व्यक्तयः॥

स्यादेवतु—अव्यक्तसिद्धी सत्याविवेकिनित्वादि धर्माः सिद्धिनाति।
(११०) अव्यक्ताभिनि—अव्यक्तमेव लघुपिपि न सिद्धिते, तत्करमातिवि
यन्मय॥ खितादितिसिद्धित आहै—कारणगुणालक्तवांू। इति। अयमार्थातिवि—
कार्थे हि कारणगुणालक्त इप्रम, यथा
तन्त्रालिगुणालक्त पदार्थि। तथा महदादिलक्तणानाया कार्त्यमु गुहुः
मोहलक्त स्वाकारणगतसुहुःखोहात्माना भवितत्वम्। तथा च तत्कारण
सुखुःखोहात्मानमस्थापनमविवयं सिद्धम् मर्यत।॥ १२॥

स्यादेवतु—‘व्यक्तावृ व्यक्तमुपयेते’ इति कारणमाध्यक्षिचरणतन्याः।
(१११) व्यक्तविव
स्वाकारणमाध्यक्षिचरणपरते
व्यक्तकारणकल्पनायेच्छेव॥
चरेणार्थकेटत्व आहै—
मेदानां परिमाणात् सम्बन्धात् कार्यत् प्रवचनेश्।
कारणकार्यविवाहगार्दविवाहगार्दवलुक्यस्॥ १३॥

“मेदानाम्” इति। मेदानाम विशेषाणां महदानाम महुतानां का
(११२) तत्कथितः। अव्यक्तकारणादनाति।
तदेह कारणकार्यविवाहगार्दविवाहगार्दवसिद्धि
रिति प्रथमम् (१)॥
कारण सत्तु कार्यमिति स्वितम्। तथा च यथा
कूस्तिरेयं सन्तत्वाविनाति निभारित्विभवन्ते—

१ पुष्पवादि।
'इंद्र कृपाशीरीं, एतान्येतस्याजानि'—इति; एवं निविषमाणानि तत्सम्व अशृष्टिविनयिति। एवं कारणाम्पीत्तिपिदाः श्राब्धिपिदाः कार्यांशि घटमुकुटादीनि सात्तेग्रामिनिभंत्र विभयनं ति, सन्त्वेष गृहिज्ञानिनि कारणात्तमात्रादाविनेत्रिति विभयनं, सन्त्वेष च तन्मात्रायण्यह्यकारात काशितः, सन्त्वेष च महान्त परमायकातः। सो यथा कार्णातू परमायकात नास्तात् परस्पर्योगाविनिश्चितिस्य विभक्तिः कार्यांशयं विभंगः। प्रतिनिधि तु पूर्वांशि सन्तवब्यक्तादियो विशंक्तो उव्यक्तिमञ्चिति। तत्कारणसाम्प्रेयनिमित्यां कार्यात्मकस्य अन्यस्यं मंजित। एवं पृथ्वीयादयस्तन्त्रायणिनि विशंक्तः स्वापेक्षा तन्मात्रायण्यक्तिनिति, एवं तन्मात्रायण्यह्यकारात्मकान्तिः, एवमात्रायण्यह्यकारात्मकान्तिः, एवमात्रायण्यह्यकारात्मकान्तिः, महान्त महान्तत्मात्रायण्यस्वापेक्षामेव। सो यथा विभिन्नः। प्रक्तातू वेधधार नानारुपस्य कार्यशयः। स्वार्थिकः ध्येयः। तस्मात् तः कार्यांशि सतू एव विभिन्नविभिन्नामन्यायस्य कारणमशिति॥

इतःधार्मिकमोक्षितत्व आहे—"शक्ति: प्रस्तुतेऽथि। कारणशक्तिः। कार्यांशि प्रवृत्तेऽथि सिद्धसि, अशक्तात्। 113 ( ) कारणासाशक्तिस्वस्तिनु कार्यांशि: ध्यक्तमयः स्थितिनिर्विरिति च द्वितीयम् ( 2 )॥

कार्यात्मकान्तिः नन्यस्यशास्त्रीति: नास्तिंक्रमाणमशिति।
अयेमहि सिक्ता धार्मिकसिद्धान्तानां तेतीयमादानां मेदो यदेतेष्वेव तेतीयमादानां न सिक्तान्तिः॥

स्थादेतेति—शक्ति: प्रस्तुति: कारणकार्याविभागाविभागोऽ च महत् एव।

1. अनवक्षत्वम्यात्। 2. वैश्वर्यम्यादे। 3. कारण: कार्यधार्मिकन्यक्तेऽथि सिद्धान्तयेव तस्य ( कारण ) शक्तिशास्ति भवे।
(114) महादिप्य-यन्त्रसं कार्यावत्सं परिमितवाचेंि तत्तत्यमू(३)॥
परमाणुकल्वं साधायिच्यं, तत्त तत्: परिणामवः
केलेनेत्त आह—“परिमाणात्” इति। परिमिततवातूः, अन्यापित्तादित्त यावत्। विवादाध्यासितह महादिप्येि अत्यंतकारणवन्त्, परिमितत्तवातूः, घटादिवित्त।
विवादाध्यासितह महादिप्येि अत्यंतकारणवन्त्, परिमितत्तवातूः, घटादिवित्त।
विवादाध्यासितह महादिप्येि अत्यंतकारणवन्त्, परिमितत्तवातूः, घटादिवित्त।

इतः विवादाध्यासितह भेदः: अत्यंतकारणवन्त्—“समन्वयात्”।

(115) समन्वयाः
भिबाः समानरूपता समन्वयं। सुख्दः खोमो-
चिि चतुर्यमु (४)॥
हसमििता हि वुद्रादिि अस्थवसायादिविस्तर्यक्ष्यनः
प्रतीयते। यानि च यद्रूपसमनुगतानि तानि तस्म्भावाव्यत्कारणानि,
यथा मृदुमापिण्डसमनुगताः घटमुकुरटादि मृदुमापिण्डाव्यत्कारणाका
इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तः भेदानामिति सिद्धम्॥ १९॥

अन्यकं साधायमि अस्त् प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—
कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते निगुणत: समुद्रयाच।
परिणामतः सहितववः प्रश्नपिगुणात् यविशेषात्॥ १६॥

“प्रवर्तते निगुणत:” इति। प्रतिसारवस्थायं सत्य रजस्तम्भ
(116) प्रकृतिकक्षि-
सदरपरिणामानि भवनि। परिणामसन्धावा
गुणह: प्रकृत: प्रयमा(१)॥
हि मुण्या नापरिणामम्य क्षणमम्यतिितः। त-
स्नात् सत्य सच्चप्रक्ष्य रजो रजोऽपर्यः प्रतिसार-
बश्यायामिपि प्रवर्तते। तदिदिखुकम् “निगुणत:” इति॥

प्रकृतिप्रकारमाह—“समुद्रयाच” इति। समौय उदयः। समुदयः सम-

१ अन्यक्ष: भाषां।
(117) प्रकृतेशसम्बूह्यात प्राप्तिविनिमयात्। समुद्रयथा गुणानामस् न गुणप्राधानवाब्यात् प्राप्तिविनिमयात्॥
सतेः प्रसम्भवति, न च गुणप्राधानवाब्योपैष्यमय विना, न च वैष्मयमदेहोपैष्यमयक्ष्यवाद्य। इति महादिदिघास्यै प्राप्ति विनिमयात्॥

स्यादेतस्य-कथमेक्रवणां गुणानामेक्रवणां प्राप्तिविनिमयात् आहस्—"परिमात: सलिलवत्" इति। यथा हि बारिदेपरिमाता नानाप्रकाराः॥
मिसुमुद्रक्रमेक्रसमयित तत्त्वविकारानासायानारिकातलातातीविन्दमित्रुमालक्क्ष्यानाधीनस्यकुसमाप्तिक्षरसरस्यतैः परिणमन्धरांविलसुगालिन्विनाक्यकृपायकामुक्तृत्वत्तैः विकल्पष्ये, एवंभेदकुपुसूनसुखात् प्रसाराणवुचैव इति। तदितीयकुसूनसुखात् प्रसाराणवुचैव इति। नित्यानामेदात् प्रत्यत्यायित्वे। तद्विद्यकुसूनसुखात् श्रीन्यैविज्ञापणाम् यो विशेषस्वस्वदीर्थं्॥ १६॥

ये तु लैलिकाः अन्यकों वा महान्त वा भूत्त्वां वा श्रापवां वा हत्त्वां वा इत्यद्वाणी वा
(118) पुरुषस्तेन्त्रस्य सेवानयानस्य भूतानि वा अनुमानस्यममुनानास्योपि दोषोपि दोषाय इति।

संघातपरार्थवात् विनिमयानिधिविनिमयाद्विधिनात्।
पुरुषो ःतिः भूमोक्तमावलक्ष्यारथ्य प्रत्युत्तेषाः॥ १७॥

"संघातपरार्थवात्" इति। पुरुषो ःतिः, अन्यकावदेवविनिमयेतिर्यक्।
कुत्त्। "संघातपरार्थवात्"। अन्यकावदेवविनिमयेतिर्यक्।
(119) संघातानां परार्थवात्तत्तु प्रथम साधना।

स्यादेतस्य-श्रापनासनादाय: संघाताः सहहतशीरार्थः दृष्टः, न लतामा-
(१२१) संघातानं संघातान्तररूपं सन्दर्शनं त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययं यथा।

(१२२) त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिषियमानं वत्ततत्वं परेरणा-धिषियमानं यथम, यथा र्यादित्यन्यादित्यं।

(१२२१) भोक्तरभावन भोग्य सुखदुःखे। भोग्य हि दुःखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रवादित वर्त्यमानं ३।

नीया: प्रतिकूलनीया या बुद्धवादय: तेषां सुखुः खाताभासंक्षेपं स्वामनि वृत्तिविरोधानि। तथात्यो द्वृशायास्मा से दलाकूलनीयो वा, स चा त्रितेनि॥

अन्ये लाहुः—भोगया दशया बुद्धवादयः। न च दृश्यारम्भन्तरेण दृशयाता

(१२४) मोक्षमावाहि दिल्यस्य दृश्यामार्थियों तिरित्वतं, स चा त्रितेनि। मोक्षमावाहि दृश्यानि

बाहारि, दृश्यानि दर्षुपुन्यानिदिल्यते। दृश्यानि

च बुद्धादरियां सुखायामस्तीत्या पृथियादिवदनुमितम्॥

इत्यासित पुरुष इत्याह—“कैव्यलय्य प्रवृत्तिस्य” इति। शाखाण्यां

(१२५) शाखाण्यां महर्षियां दिन्याधिकान्यां च कैव्यमािलायतिकादि

हुः दुःखायामार्थिन्यां च बुद्धादरियां नुं सांभवति।

(४)॥ ते हि दृश्यारम्भमा कर्म समाकाल्यायोजपितं शक्यस्य।

तद्विनिर्देश्य दृश्यारम्भन्तो विषय: शाखायामादी, तस्मात् कैव्यलय्य प्रद्रेषिनां महाधियां चालित बुद्धादिविवृतितरिक आलेष्टि सिद्धम्॥१७॥

तदेवं पुरुषािल्यं प्रतिपाद, स चं सर्वसिद्धिरेष्वेकं किमानेकं प्रति

(१२६) पुरुषावहवतसादानांकी क्षेत्रमिति संस्येत्, तस्य प्रतिशेषमात्रेनकत्वमुपालि

दृश्यितं—

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियामादुमुखपत्रवर्षके॥

पुरुषवहवान सिद्धं त्रिगुणविखिर्यावथित्वै।

(१२७) जननमरण

प्रतिनियामादि प्रय-मम् (१)॥

जननेकान्यानां। “पुरुषवहुयं सिद्धौ।” कस्मात्। “जननर

(१२५) जननमरण

प्रतिनियामादि प्रय-मम् (१)॥

जननेकान्यानां। “पुरुषवहुयं सिद्धौ।” कस्मात्। “जननर
पुरुषवसादनम्।

नामः तस्यापरिणामिल्यत् । तेषामिव के देहादीनामप्राप्तानां परिलागो मरणम् । नत्वादनो विनाशः । तस्य कृदसिद्धित्वत् । करणानि वुद्यादेशी भ्रमोदयः । तथां जन्मसरकारानां प्रतिमित्यमेह व्यस्तः । सा खलितम् सर्वस्थिररेखोलक्षिन् मूलस्ते नोपपर्यते । तदा खलितकाल्य पुरुषे नायमाणे सर्वे जायेनु । स्मयमाणे च स्मिरेनु । अन्नादृ चैक्षिन्न सर्वे एव अन्नादृ । ििन्त चैक्षिन्न सर्वे एव विचित्तः । स्म्यतः । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषमेवे भवति व्यस्तः । न च एक्षयापि पुरुषपर देहोपदातनभेदान्यस्था । इति युक्तम् । पाणिस्तनायुपाधिभेदे-नापि जन्मस्यादिद्यवस्थाप्रसज्ञानम् । न हि पाणि क्रुद्गे जाते वा स्त-नादो महत्त्ववये युद्धिमुखे जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतः प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषमेव इत्याह—“अयुगपत्यन्वृतेऽ” इति । प्रवृत्ति:

(१२८) पुरुषवाराणम्। गुप्तपत्रसृजिते द्वितीयम् (२)॥

लतन्त्क्षणां यथायन्तः करणावेणी, तथा सृजिते पुरुषाः उपचर्ये । तथा परस्परं तराकी शरीरां प्रयत्नाने, स एव सर्वस्थिररेखोलक्षिने इति सर्वेन प्रयत्तेत, ततो भवतण्यं शरीराणि युगपत्यालयते । नानावे तु नाये दोष इति ॥

इतः पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“गुणणविपर्यंत्याचैव” इति । एवकारे

(१२९) गुणणविपर्यंत्याचैव इत्याचैव तत्त्वम् (३)॥

भिन्नं ‘सिद्धम्’ इत्याचैव नानात्तं दृष्टिः। सिद्धमेव नामिनित्यम्। त्रेयो गुणणविपर्यंत्याचैव, तस्य चित्तविचित्तः सन्यासात्मम्। केचित्रमुख सत्तविकायः सच्चलुहसः; यथोऽवेत्ततः; केचित्रमोक्षुहः, यथा मनुष्यः; केचित्रमोक्षुहः, तथा तिर्य-गुणयोगः। सौ द्वयमिहान्गुणविपर्यंत्याचैव सन्यासान्यालय सत्तविकायः। न भेदं यथेकः पुरुषः स्मृत, पुरुषभेदे तत्वमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

(१३०) पुरुषवर्गः। एवं पुरुषवहुलं प्रसाधये, विचेकजानोपयो-गिताय तस्य धर्मानाह—
पुरुषधर्मकथणम् | [ सां. त.

tasmac caiparyastisaddhah साक्षितवयमस्य पुरुषस्य |
कैवल्यमाध्यमस्य द्रौपदमकर्त्तामावशः ॥ १९ ॥

"तस्माच्" इति। 'च' शब्द: पुरुषस्य बहुलेन सह धर्मान्तराणि |
( १३१ ) तस्मातः- समुचिनोति। 'विपर्यासादसमातू' इत्युक्ते त्रिगु-
स्य समांप्रसरेनम् ॥ ध्यात्वचिर्यादिवेद्यात्रोक्तं समस्येत; अति-
निरालय 'तस्मात्' इत्युक्तम्। अनन्तरः हि सतिधानातिदसो |
विपयो, विप्रकृत च तदः; इति विप्रकृत त्रिरुगमपथेविकायादि समस्येत।

तस्मात्यसदुपादेयम् किरिष्नाः: स पुरुषस्यानुगंधतवं विबिक्षितवविवशयत- |
( १३२ ) अत्रगुणया-
ध्यात् इत्युक्तेन विप्रकृत च तदः। इति विनिर्देत् तिरुगमपथेविकायादि समस्येत।
तथा तथा तथ। साक्षी च |
चेतनो हि द्रष्टा भवति, नारोदय:। साक्षी च |
दर्शितविषयो भवति; यथाः प्रदर्शयो विपय: स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके |
द्विधिप्रत्येकं विदारिकविषय साक्षिण दर्शित: एवं प्रकृतिपरिः स्वरूपति. |
विपयं पुरुषाय दर्शिताति न पुरुष: साक्षी, न च चारेनो विपयो वा शक्यो |
विपयं दर्शितातुम्, इति चेतनायादिविपयतवाच भवति साक्षी । अत एव |
द्रष्टा दृष्टा भवति।

अत्रगुणयाचायस कैवल्यम्। आत्मनितको दुःखंतवायामः: कैवल्यम्। |
( १३३ ) कैवल्यम् || तच तस्य स्वामिकविद्वात्रिगुणयात् सुखुः-कार
अप्रदिवतविद्वाम्।

अत एवत्रिगुणयाकर्मस्यम्। सुखी हि सुलेख तृप्तानु दुःखी हि |
( १३४ ) मध्यस्यमुः, दुःखं दिवस्ते मध्ययो न भवति। तदेत्यस्य- |
अवर्तवेन च || हिस्त्रु मध्यस्य इत्युदासीन इति चाहयायः। |
विबिक्षितवचनसरभिविवशयान्तिः सिद्धम्। ॥ १९ ॥

स्वादेत्तु—प्रमाणेन कर्त्तव्यमर्थमवस्य 'चेतनो नैचिकिष्ठनू करोमि'
(१२५) चैतन्यकर्तः
द्वारायामविकर्णापतिः
श्रद्धा॥

इति चैतन्यकर्तः सामानाधिकरणां भवसि-
द्वमुः। तदेतसमन्नते नाबकल्पते, चेतनस्यकर्तः
लागुः कर्तुः चैतन्यात् इत्यत आः

tसमात्तत्संयोगादि चेतनं चेतनाविदिर विष्मू।
गुणकर्तुः व तथा करेन भवतुः रासिनः॥ २०॥

"तस्मातु" इति। यतस्मात्तवतः स्मृतेः भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तेः: सिद्धे,
(१२६) इत्यपि:।
तस्मातु भावनिर्देशनम्। 'विष्मूः' महे
दारिद्रसूक्ष्मपरंतु भक्ष्यति। भावनीशं तस्मां
योगः: तत्सच्चिताम्। अतिशोहितार्थमन्यताः॥ २०॥

तस्मातुः इति। न च भिन्यः संयोगो द्वेष्कां विना, न
(१२७) पुरुषप्राशा-
योगः संयोगः श्रद्धा॥

पुरुषस्य दशोनाथभ्यो प्रवत्त्यः तथा प्रधानस्य।
पञ्चभयवुभोध्योरापि संयोगस्तत्तज्ज: सगः॥ २१॥

"पुरुषस्य" इति। प्रधानस्य त्वमीः। प्रधानस्य सर्वकः
(१२८) प्रधानस्य
यदिः पुरुषस्य तदर्थमुः। तदनेन भोग्यता
पुरुषायाम्-मोक्षप्रेषः॥ प्रधानस्य दर्शिता। ततथ भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्ता-
रत्न्तरेण न सम्भवतीति युक्ता उस्य मोक्षप्रेषः॥

पुरुषस्यायाम् दर्शिति-"पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम्" इति। तथा हि भोग्यन
(१२९) कैवल्यार्थभ्यो प्रधाननेन सम्भवः: पुरुषस्तद्रतं दुःखत्रं स्वातम-
पुरुषस्य प्रधानायाम्॥ न्यायत्त्वम्। कैवल्यमु भार्यते। तत्र सच्चपु-
हजार्यतायात्त्वनितिन्यन्नमुः। न च सच्चपुरुषायात्त्वतायाति: प्रधानः।

१ कारिकायः: पदार्थः: स्वद्य: प्रेषेऽर्थः।
गति कैवल्यार्थम् पुरुषः प्राधानम्पेश्ते । अनादित्वाब संयोगपरस्पराया
भोगय संपूर्वी दृष्टि कैवल्याय पुनः नयुक्तम् इति युक्तम् ॥

ननु भवतनशीः संयोगोऽ, महदादिर्गतिः कुत्त इत्यत आह—"तत्त्वतः
सर्गः" इति। संयोगोऽ हि न महदादिर्गतिं मन्तव्यं
भोगय कैवल्याय च पर्यात्त इति संयोग एव
भोगपवर्गीयं सर्गं करेतींवथिः ॥ २१ ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—
प्रकृतेमहास्ततो शक्त्यारस्तमात्रयण्ड वोदशकः ।
तस्मादृपि वोदशकाकायिकः पञ्च भृतानि ॥ २२ ॥

"प्रकृतेः" इति। प्रकृतिश्चिम्भसंयोगात्मकः।
(१४१) प्रकृतेमहायम्—
एकादशोनिद्रायणि वक्ष्यमाणानि तन्मात्राणि च
नित्यादि सर्गांम् ॥ पञ्चः सो दृष्टि वोदशसंयोगायापरिमितो गणः। वोद-
शकः। तस्मादृपि वोदशकाकायिकः पञ्चम्यस्तमात्रयम्: पञ्च भृतान्या-
काशादीनि ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादायाकाः शब्दगुणाम्, शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पृशयत्मान्
(१४२) तन्मात्रायु: शाखायु:। शब्दस्पर्शगुणाम्, शब्दस्पर्शस्तमात्रसा-
गुणांमेय स्तवभः ॥ हितादृश्यपत्मात्रातनेजः: शब्दस्पर्शृणुपर:। शब्द-
भर्ष शुभस्तमात्रसहिताद्वषतमात्रायु:। शब्दस्पर्शृणुपरस्तमात्रसहिताद्वषत-
तमात्रायु:। शब्दस्पर्शृणुपरस्तमात्रसहिताद्वषत-परस्तमात्रायु:। पृथ्वीयी,
जाति इत्यथः ॥ २२ ॥

अभ्यक्तं सामान्यतः शक्तितम् "तद्विरीरम्यक्षम्" (कारिका १०)
(१४३) वृद्धिक्षणः-इत्यनेन। विशेषतः "सत्च किवु प्रकाशकम्"
प्रस्तावः ॥ (कारिका १३) इत्यनेन। व्यक्तमपि सामा-
यत्यो यत्सदने "हे पत्रवाले" (करिका १०) इत्यादिना। समप्रति विशेषज्ञानपर्यविगतया यत्ताविशेषं बुद्धि क्षणपति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिधर्मी ज्ञानं विरागं पैठ्यर्थम्?
सात्त्विकमेतदूर्यं तात्समस्माधिपर्यस्तं ॥ २३ ॥

“अध्यवसाय” इति। ‘अध्यवसायो बुद्धि’ क्रियाक्रियावतारसेवं—
(१४५) बुद्धिर्निविक्षणम् विविधताय। सर्वो न्यवहतः सत्तालोक चल्यं अध्यवसाय इति ॥

तत् चिन्तित इत्यमित् कर्तव्यमेतस्माधिपर्यस्तं, तत्तथ प्रवर्तत इति। कोकसिद्धम्। तत्र यो यत्र कर्तव्यमिति विनिधयाक्षरिति—

सत्याधिनादापचैत्यायाबुद्धे: सो अध्यवसायं; बुद्धसाधारणो न्यायार; तदसेवा बुद्धि: स च बुद्धिर्निविक्षणम् समानासमानजातीयव्यवस्थकलात् ॥

तदेव बुद्धि क्षणियता विशेषज्ञानोपयोगितस्य स मनुष्याकालतात—
(१४५) बुद्धे: सात्त्विका धर्मं: यत्सदनाविशेषमेतस्माधिपर्यस्तम्” इति। धर्मं: सम्पुर्णानि: श्रेयसहेतु; तत्र यथार्थानादमुक्तजन्ति धर्मं: सम्पुर्णानहु; अप्राण्योगाधाननाते—

नित्य निश्चयसहु: | गणापुरुषान्यहत्यात्मांतिरसीनम्। विशारदेश वैराम्यं

रागामाव: ॥

तस्य—यत्मानसंस्का न्यतिरेकसंस्का एकेन्द्रियसंस्का वशीकारसंस्का—इति
(१४६) विरागस्य यत्मानान्यतिरिक्तेकेन्द्रियस्वीकारसंस्कारः संज्ञा: ॥

तत् प्रवर्तितं विपिनविचित्रित्याणिति तत्तपराचनाभासभ: प्रथमो यत्मानसंस्का | परिपाणे चानुष्ठायमाने केशिनिकाण: पक्षं; पक्षते च केशितु, ततैवं पूवपरित्वं सति पद्मावण्यं: कपाले: 

यत्तिरिक्षावधारण न्यतिरेकसंस्का | इन्द्रियप्रकृतिसर्वथपत्वा
पकानामोत्कुम्मात्रेण मनासि व्यवसथापनेकेनद्रियसंज्ञा। ओत्सुक्मात्रे-स्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेषापि द्वारानुश्रविकविपयेपु, या संज्ञात्वात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा। यामश्रमगावानं पत्तादेववर्त्याद्वाराहर। “द्वारानुश्रविक-विघ्नविनित्यात् वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्” इति [द्वारानुभूत-१११५]। सो द्वं बुद्धिमानो विराग इति।

एकृत्यमापि बुद्धिमानो, यतो विज्ञानकार्यादुर्दृष्टि। (१) अन्तरिमाणा
(१४७) एकृत्यमापि बुद्धिमानो, यत: विज्ञानकार्यः प्रविश्याति। (२) लघुमाणा
पणे अद्व्यतिद्विनिपुष्पम्। लघुमाणा: यत: सूर्यान्निर्बलमयैः सूर्यलोके
याति। (३) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुविश्याति। (४) महिमः धन्तो भावः,
यतो महानुभवति। (५) प्रातः, यतो सहुल्यग्रेण सुप्रीशति चन्द्रमपि
(६) प्राकाम्यमिन्निन्निपिवातो, शुभासुमनिज्ञिन्निमीज्यति च योहेरके
(७) वशिल्यम्, यतो भूमोतिकं वशीभवत्वस्यम्। ईशिल्यम्, यतो भूमोतिक-
कानां प्रभवस्थितिमितः। (८) यथिच जामाकायसिविल्यम् सा सत्यसब्रुक्तं, येन
यथाभव सहूल्यो भवति मूलेभु तेवषैः भूतानि भवन्ति। अन्येऽमां मनुष्याणां
निश्चयः निश्चयत्वमनुविरियन्ते, विगुनस्तु निश्चयत्वायः: पदार्थोः: निश्चयम्।
इति चत्वारि: सारिकेको बुद्धिमानो।
(१४८) बुद्धिमानसात्तात्त्वानुभवे तत्त्वानुभवे बुद्धिमानो। अन्तरिमाणा
प्रभ्य: अध्याम्य:। नाबधमानेत्त्वानुभवानानाभावात् इत्यथ:। २२।।

अहुष्काठ्य रक्षणमाहः
अभिमानो द्वारान: तस्माद्विधिध: प्रवर्तते सर्वे:।
एकादशक्ष्ण गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चक्षेत्र॥ २४॥
“अभिमान” इति। ‘अभिमानो द्वारान:। यत: खलब्लास्विचितम्मदं
(१४९) अहुष्काठ्य च तत्र ‘अहमविड़क्ष:’, ‘शक्त: खलब्लम्म:’,
रक्षणम्॥ “मद्या एवां विषयः’, ‘मत्तो नायो स्त्रा-
को. २४-२५ ] अहंकारस्य कार्यमेधा: || २५ ||

विह्वः कार्यविधीिे, 'अतो शहसिन' इति यो भिमान: सो दसाधारणव्यापारत्वादह्नारृि: || तमुपजीवव हि बुद्धिरथ्यवस्थिते--'कर्तव्यमेतनमया' इति निश्चयं करोिि।

तस्य कार्यमेधमाह—"तथामाध्यविधि: प्रवर्तते सभोः" इति || प्रका- (१५०) अहंकारस्य रद्धयामाह—"एकादशकथा गणः" इन्द्रियाहः, कार्यमेधा: || तन्मात्रपचककैर || द्विधिधिएव सभो अहंकरार्ग: न लब्ध्य इति 'एव'—कारणावधार्यति || २४ ||

स्मरनेत्र-अहंकारादेक्ष्यपाकारणाकथाय जड़प्रकाशको गणो विल-क्षणी भवत इत्यत आह—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते बैठतादह्नारात्।
भूतादृस्तन्त्रमाह: स तास्मसः, तैजसादुभयम्य || २५ ||

"सात्त्विक" इति || प्रकाशलाचवाम्यामेकादशक । इन्द्रियगणः: सात्त्विको
(१५१) एकादपस्य- यह्नारस्य गुणमेदार्थि—कार्यमेधा: सात्त्विक इन्द्रियगणः, तास्मात्तन्त्रान्त्रगण:||

नन्दल यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वे कार्यं जन्यते तथा इत्तत्त्रकितकरोऽजािः
(१५२) सत्त्वमाहः प्रवर्तकत्वा रजस: सार्थ- काला।

रजसेष्यत आह—"तैजसादुभयम्" इति || तैज- सात्राजसादुभयम् गणद्वयं भवति || यवपि रजसो न कार्यान्तरसिष्य तथा अपि सत्त्वमाहः स्वर्ग- मध्ये समयं आपि न स्वस्तकार्यं फूलत; रजसु चल्वयते ते यदा चाल- यपि तदा स्वकार्यं फूलत इति || तदुप्यमिनिपि कार्यं सत्त्वमाहः
क्रियोद्वादस्त्रोपिणसि रजस: कार्याविविधि न व्यर्थं रज इति || २९ ||
बाधौंद्रियदर्शकम्

सार्वसंज्ञकादमकार्यातुं बाधौंद्रियदर्शकं तावदाहः

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चतुःश्रोचद्राणरसनतवगावयानि।
चाक्षुषाणांपादपायोपस्थानिः कर्मिन्द्रियाण्याहुः।। २६।।

“बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि” इति। सार्वसंज्ञकादमकार्यातुं तावदाहः।

(१५३) बाधौंद्रिय-दशकम् इत्यत्रक्षणम् पद्धतिःविधिवा इत्यत्रक्षणम् च। उभयमये-

tदति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति त्तति

स्वमञ्चालित्वाधिकारित्वानि। तत्र रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि। रूपप्रहण-

किं च श्रुतिः श्रद्धा प्रारम्भाधिकारित्वानि।

एवं वागादीनां कार्य वक्त्यति (कारिका २८)।। २६।।

एकादसाधित्वानि——

उभयात्मकमस्य नन्तः सब्जितकमिन्द्रियं च साध्योत्तु।

नुष्णिपरिणामितिविशेषाचारायं बध्यानेदायं।। २७।।

“उभयात्मकम्” इति। एकादसाधित्वानि यथेऽये मन उभयात्मकम्,

(१५४) मनसो वुबिक्रमोऽपि बुद्धिन्द्रियं कर्मिन्द्रियं च। च श्रुतिः श्रद्धादीनां वागादीनां।

रूपेण रूपेण वक्त्यति—“सब्जितकमस्य मनः” इति। सब्जित

(१५५) मनसो रक्षणसि सब्जितकमस्य रक्षणसाधन सम्मयख। इति सम्मयख् इति इति

रूपेण मनो रूपेण। “अक्षोत्तित्वानि ष्टिबद्वम्” इति सम्मयख् इति इति

चत्तीति यथात्। यदाहुः—

“सम्मयख वससम्यम तु प्राग्मृतग्निविशेषोपनितस्य।

तत्तु सामान्यविशेषाभ्यं कल्पयति मनोविधान्।। इति।।

तथा हि, आत्म सायोंचित्रां ग्राम्मित्तिः कल्पकम काल्मूकादिवि-
(१५६) मनस इन्द्रियलम्—साधारण व्यापारोपिणी यथा महद्दर्शको नेन्द्रियम्, एव—
(१५७) एकस्याह्य—गुणपरिणामविशेषार्थात् नानालं बाध्यमेदादथा इति
(१५८) बाध्यमेदादथा इति द्यान्तार्थम्।
(१५९) इन्द्रियलम्—नामयसाधारणोर्नीतिराह्—
शालादिद्रुप पञ्चानामार्थो चोच्चक्षमात्रमिश्यते व्रतिः।
• वचनादनाविहर्णोलसगर्गानन्दाय पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥
• बुद्धिन्द्रियाणां समुपवसत्तुदर्शनार्थमालोचनमुक्तम्। “वचनादनाविहर्णोलसगर्गानन्दाय पञ्चानाम्” कमेन्द्रियाणाम्। कण्ठविकस्तानमिन्द्रिय वाकू, तत्स्या वृत्तिवेचनम्, इन्द्रियाणां वृत्त्यः स्पष्टः ॥ २८ ॥
अन्तःकरणगृह्य वृत्तिमाहः

स्वाल्क्षण्यं वृत्तिर्गृह्यस्य सैणा भवत्यसामान्या।
सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणाया वायवः पश्च ॥ २९ ॥

"स्वाल्क्षण्यम्" इति। स्वाल्क्षण्यं वृत्तिर्गृह्यस्य। स्वां सामायः लक्षणं
येस तानी स्वाल्क्षणानि महद्दक्ष्ठारमणांसि, तेषां
भावः स्वाल्क्षण्यम्, तथ स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणायः
न्येव। तद्धा-महतो अवासायो तस्क्त्यास्याम्।
भिमानः सुभद्रेऽ मनसो वृत्तिर्गृह्यपारः॥

वृत्तिगृह्यं साधारण्यासाधारण्यामाहः। "सैणा भवत्यसामान्या।"

(160) अन्तःकरणगृह्यस्य साधारणी असाधारणी दुःखः। सामायः चासः करण्डृतिविषेदः।
त्रयाणासपि करणां पश्च वायो जीवं दुःखः, तद्रेवे भावतु तद्रबे
चाभावतु। तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहाधनाभिमानाकुञ्जरृति: 
अपानः इकार-कार्पास्यायुपस्थपर्वश्रुति:, 
समानो इलाममित्रंसधिवृति:, उदानो
इकारणाचायुमृत्तमस्थवृति:, व्यास्तवस्त्रवृत्तिभिरितिः पश्च वायवः। ॥ २९ ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यासाधारणीपुरुषूरृतिष्ट्रूमायामी सप्रकारावाहः—
युगपद्धतीस्य सु दुःखः कमश्च तत्स्य निर्दिः।
ही तथा सप्तहृश्य त्रायस्य तत्पूर्णिका दुःखः। ॥ ३० ॥

"युगपद्" इति, हद्दे यथा—यदा सन्तसान्यको विषवस्यात्माः
(161) चतुर्विधकरणगृह्यस्य प्रसाहितिः पर्यायः तदाधामः
श्रावणाग्रहामुखयममितिविषेदः। श्रावणसिद्धांकर्मानाध्यस्य। युग-
पदेन प्राख्यजित्, यत्सत उत्सुक त्स्तवानादेवकथा अपसर्वः।

"कमश्च" यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमताल्पक्रमादस्त समुग्मानालोच्यति,
(162) कमश्च ॥ अथ प्रगृहितमना: कणीताक्षर्दीसारामित्यक्नी-
मण्डलक्रूरकोर्णपः प्रचण्डतः पाठचरो उपयोजति निष्क्रियंति, अथ च मामप्रेयतीसत्त्वसमन्यंते, अथायतस्यस्यपरामितं स्थानानदिति॥

परोलब्द्विरुपस्य बाह्यीन्द्रियवर्जैं वृत्तिरिलाहै—“अद्वैतं त्रायम्
(१६४) अन्तःकरणं
ज्ञानम् परोलब्द्विरुपम् युगपक्षः वृत्तिद्विलेवत्कितं। अनुमानांगम्—
तत्रस्य दर्शनपूर्वकः प्रवर्तते
नात्मकः। यथा द्वैतं तथा सद्वेत्तत्व
योजना॥ ३०॥

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स्यादेत्वम्—चतुर्णान् त्रयाणां भ्रमण्य न तावन्मात्राधीनः। तेषां सदातन्—
(१६५) करणांस्य—
र्लेन द्वैतानां सदाप्रदर्शनम्, आकस्मिकवेत्
तत्तत्वे होणा॥ वृत्तिसङ्कुर्पस्यं नियमदेतोर्मावादिश्यत आह—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्धति परस्पराकृतत्वेऽतुकां ब्रह्मिः।
पुरुषार्थय पव हेतुने केनाचित्तकायेि करणम्॥ ३१॥

"स्वामु" इति। करणानीति रेष।। यथा हि वहवः पुरुषः। (१६६) तत्तदारङ्कसमसमस्तर्षमपरस्परांप्रक्षाणेन्द्रयोक्त भ्रमणानि स्वस्वविलिः॥

स्यादेत्वम्—याध्याकादयशेतंतत्वात् परस्पराकृतत्वमवग्नम् प्रवर्तत्त् इति।
90 पुरुषार्थस्य प्रवर्तकलय्म, करणविभागः [ सां. त.]

(१६७) करणानामः पुरुषस्य करणा वै चेतनानि। तस्मातेऽन्य प्रवत्तन्ते विदितुमुदाहरते।
तेनेतिष्ठिता करणानां स्वरूपसमायोगाभिन्नेन भविष्यमित्य आहे।
“पुरुषार्थ्य एव हेतुः, न केनचित्तार्थो करणम्” इति। भोगार्थवर्गः
क्षणः पुरुषार्थ्येऽवनाग्नाति अस्थः प्रवत्तैति करणानि, इतमत्र तत्रवृक्षाभिन्नेन कर्मा।
एतच् “कलवीष्वविद्विनिमित्मूः” (कारिका १७) इत्यतस्य-
पपादिप्येत्।। ३१।।

(१६८) करणविचि- “न केनचित्तू कार्यार्थो करणम्” इत्यक्षम।
भागः।। तत्र करणं विभागः—
करणं च तत् योदशविधम्, तदर्शारंधरणप्रकाशकर्मम्।
कार्यं च तत्स्य दशान्ता, हार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्य च।। ३२।।
“करणं च तयोदशविधम्” इति। इत्रियाण्येकारासु बुद्धरसुद्धेवति
(१६९) तयोदशविधं- तयोदशप्रकारं करणम्। कारकविशेषः करणम्।
करणपरिणामिनम्।। न च व्यापारवेशं विना कारकतत्वमिति व्यापारवेशमाहे—
“तदर्शारंधरणप्रकाशकर्मम्” इति यथा यथम। तत्र कमेक्त्रयाणि
वागार्थान्याहर्षिन्ती, यथा सुमुकादीति, स्ववार्षेण व्यापारवेशमाहे
यावत्। बुद्धरसुद्धारसस्य तु स्वरूपा प्रणालिदलक्षणाय धार्यविन्त।
बुद्धरसुद्धाणि प्रकाशायनित।।
आहरणारंधरणादिकर्माणि संकर्मकत्वाच फि कर्म कर्त्तविशतिं चेतन
(१७०) करणव्या- आहे—“कार्यं च तत्स्यं” इति। कार्यं तद्देशं तयो-
परिणामम्।। दशविघ्रस्य करणस्य दशान्ता, आहार्यं धार्यं
प्रकाश्यं च। आहार्यं व्याश्च। कमेक्त्रयाणि वचनवादानविभवन्तोष्टाणि
नन्दाः भैष्यायं व्यापारं; च च यथावर्त्यं दिव्यार्थित्वम् दशं—इत्यहार्यं

1 यथाक्रममित्वाः।
(१७१) त्रयोदशाविधिकारणे स्वान्तरविभागः।

त्रयोदशाविधिकारणे स्वान्तरविभागः करोति—
बाह्यान्तरभेदात्॥

अन्तःकरण ज्ञिनिः दशाभा बाह्य त्रयस्य विषयान्तरम्।
साम्प्रत्कालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाल्यन्तरं करणम्॥ ३२॥

(१७२) अन्तःकरण—
धन्य शैविध्यम्॥

“अन्तःकरणम्” इति। अन्तःकरण ज्ञिनिः
धन्य—‘बुद्धिरुक्ति रात्रि मन’ इति; शारीराम्यन्तरः
तिलायान्तःकरणम्॥

“दशाभा” बाह्यकरणम् “त्रयस्य” अन्तःकरणस्य “विषयान्तरम्”॥

(१७३) विषयमाल्यान्तिः विषयसङ्कर्त्त्वामाल्यनााध्यवसायेः
कर्त्त्वेन्दुष्कुलयेव द्वारिभवित् । तत् बुद्धिरुक्त्वामाल्यांकोरे
चनेन, कौमन्दिरयांति सु यथासं व्यापरः॥

बाह्यान्तरयोः करणेविशेषान्तरसाह—“साम्प्रत्कालम्” इति। वर्तमानेऽ
मानकालं बाह्यमिन्द्रयम्। वर्तमानसमीपमनागतः
मतीमान्तिः वर्तमानम् । अतो वागस्यि वर्तमानकाले�ः
विषया भवति। “त्रिकालमाल्यन्तरं करणम्”
इति। तथये—नदीयुक्तमेऽदृश्यम्। अवतित
धूमादिणिरहित नगरिकज्ञ, असतुपाधातके पिपिलकाण्डसश्रणाध्विषयति  
वृत्तिरिति, तदनुपस्थत सदृश्यामिन्यामाध्यवस्थाया भवनिः।

कालश्व वैशेषिकामिनित एको न अनागतादिनिववाहारेष्ठं प्रवर्तितयु-(
(१६५) साद्धयाते महति | तस्मादयं वैशेषिकमेदित्रागतादित्रेष्ठं  
कालश्व न तत्त्वान्तर्ततम्।। प्रतिपयते सन्तु त एणोपायः; ये उनागतादिनिव- 
हार्देवः। हस्तमचार्यार्धं चाकृतेनि साध्याचार्यः। तस्मान कालश्व- 
पत्तचार्यामुष्कगम इति।। ३६।।

(१६६) बुद्धिवद्य- 
सांप्रतिकालानां बाधेनिद्रयाणि विषयं विवेक- 
विषयविवेचनम्।। चयति—

बुद्धिनिद्रयाणि तेषां पाद्य विशेषयाविवेचपिषयाणि। 
वाग्मवास्ति शब्दविषया श्रेष्ठाणि तु पाद्यसिद्धाणि।। ३४।।

"बुद्धिनिद्रयाणि" इति। "बुद्धिनिद्रयाणि" "तेषां" दशाना।

(१६७) बुद्धिनिद्रयाणि मिन्निद्रयाणामच्ये "पाद्य," "विशेषयाविवेचपिषयाणि: स्युद्धसूत्तमहुः। 
प्रयाणि" विशेषः सूत्त शब्दायं शान्तयो- 
रमुरुः, पृथिविदुहरुः, अविशेषत्वान्त्वात् सूक्ष्मा: शब्दायं; 
मौन्त्राणां स्युद्धभूमात्तपकरोति। विशेषात् अविशेषाश्रेष्ठविवेचपिषयाणि: 
त एव विषया येषां बुद्धिनिद्रयाणि तानि तथोत्तरानि। तत्त्रेवस्तोत्तरानि 
योगिनाश्रोत्रशब्दत्वान्त्वातिकं स्युद्धसूत्तमविषयं च, अस्मादानि तु 
स्युद्धसूत्तमसिद्धाणि। एवतेषां तकु स्युद्धसूक्ष्मसिद्धाणिः, अस्मादानि 
तु स्युद्धसूत्तमसिद्धाणि।। एवतापुवाद्यो सपि तेषामसास्तानि च रुपादिपु 
सूक्ष्मसूत्तमसिद्धाणि द्वेष्टीयः।।

एवं कमेंद्रियेयु मये"वाग्मवास्ति शब्दविषया" स्युद्धशब्दविषया, तद्दे—

१ तत्मात्रदेव। २ "भूतभाविनासाकारोति" इति पादान्तर्भ।
(१६८) कमेन्द्रियाणि तुच्छात् || नतु शाब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहकार-विषया: || रिकतेन वागिन्द्रियेण सहेक्कारञ्जनकालात् ||

“शेषाणि तु” चतवारिपायूपस्यपाणिपदाध्यायमि “पश्चिमाणि” पाण्यायः
वाहारणां पटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाचालमकालातिदितं ३४ ||

साध्रतं रोयोदश्मु करणेपु केषाधिक्ष्राणाभावं सहेतुकमाह—
सांत्करणं बुद्धि: सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात्।
तस्मात्रिविश्वेतं करणं द्वारोऽवारणं शेषाणि ३५ ||

“सांतकरणं” इति || “द्वारोऽवारणम्” “द्वारणं” करणानि,
बाहोन्द्रियाणि द्वारणि || तेस्तः नितं सर्वं
विषयं समनोहह्नारा बुद्धि: यस्मादवगाहते
तवत्स्वति तस्मात्राहेन्द्रियाणि द्वारणि, द्वारावती च सांतकरणं बुद्धिरिति ३५ ||

न केवलं बाहानीन्द्रियाण्यपेश्य प्रथानं बुद्धिः, अषि तु ये तथाह्नारमनसी द्वारणिः
ते अय्यपेश्य बुद्धि: प्राधानमित्यह—

पते प्रकरणकर: परस्परविद्वेत्ता गुणविशेषाः।
दृढ्यं पुरुषस्वायं प्रकाशं बुद्धं प्रयच्छिति ३६ ||

“पते” इति || यथा हि प्रामाण्यः कौशल्किते: करमादय
(१६०) अन्तजस्ति
विषयाध्याय प्रयच्छिति, विषयाध्याय सर्वथा-
वधपि बुद्धि: प्राधानयम् ||

ध्यायण, त च भूपतिम्; तथा बाहोन्द्रियाण्यालेख्य
मनसे समप्रयति, मनः सकुल्लााह्नाराय, अहंकारार्थाभिमत्य बुद्धी सर्वाध्यायोऽध्यायं,
तत्तदपुनस्मूऽ—“पुरुषस्वायं प्रकाशं बुद्धं प्रयच्छिति” इति ॥

बाहोन्द्रियमनोहह्नारायं “गुणविशेषा:” गुणानां सत्तस्वजन्तमसां
सर्वभ्यो बुद्धः प्राधान्यम् ॥ [सां. त।

विकारः तेन तु परस्परविषयोपशीताः अस्त प्रुपयधेन
भोगापरगरहितेषुकऽवृत्तात्मकानीताः यथा वर्तिते-
कह्यं सन्तवसाप्तवषेण रुपप्रकाशयं मिलिता:
प्रदीपः, एवमेते गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३१ ॥

कस्मात्तुनुभूद्वै प्रथ्यच्छान्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहस्त्रायाम द्वारिणे मनसे चेतत
आह—

सर्व प्रत्युपमोगं यस्मात्पुज्जस्य साध्यति बुद्धः ॥
सैव च विशिष्टिनिष्ट चुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सुभम् ॥ ३७ ॥

“सर्वभ्यो” इति। प्रुपयधेश्य प्रेयोजकव्यातः तस्य यतासावताधनं ततः

(१८२) बुद्धः प्रधानन्तरस्य साध्यताधनम्, तस्माते विचार प्रधानम्। यथा सर्वंक्यः साक्षात्सार्थायि
साधनत्यं प्रधानार्थिते तु प्रधानार्थायानां मेयुः।

(१८३) बुद्धः प्रधानार्थायानां साधारणाश्रेष्ठसाधनत्यं

नन्तु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपमोगसम्प्रदायिका यथि बुद्धः तस्मातिनिर्गोष्टि

(१८३) पुरुषार्थ्यस्य
पुज्जस्य कःतकात्यादिधिष्ठतानिलक्तम्-करणसारसे-नाधार्थवाति ॥
तदेवं करणानि विभवय विशेषाविशेषाय विभवते—

तन्मात्राणिरविशेषः, तेन्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
प्रते स्पृहा विशेषः, शान्ता घोरास्त्र शूद्रास्त्र ॥ ३७ ॥

“तन्मात्राणि” इति । शब्दादित्यतन्मात्राणि सुखमाणि । न चैत्यां
(१८४) अविशेष- शान्तत्वादिररसि उपमोग्येऽयो विशेष इति
(सूक्ष्म) कवनम् ॥ मात्रतवदार्थः: ॥

अविशेषारुक्तवा विशेषावरुक्तमुक्तिमनमाहः—“तेन्यो भूतानि” इति।
(१८५) विशेष स्यु- भूतानयाकाशानादसहस्रविनिकष्पाणि “पञ्च”
“पञ्चभ्यः” तन्मात्रेमयः ॥

अस्वेतेमापक्षां, विशेषं विमायात्मामयात आह—“प्रते स्पृहा
(१८६) भूतानि स्पृ- विशेषः” इति। कुट:—“शान्ता घोरास्त्र शूद्रास्त्र”
चकार एको हेतौ द्वितीय: समुच्चये । यस्मादाकाशादिदिशु स्युलेपु सत्यप्राप्यन्तया केचित्यान्तया: सुखः; प्रकाशा घमः;
केचिद्व:प्राप्यन्तया घोर: । अन्तः: भूतानयाकाशानादसहस्रविनिकष्पाणि
विशेषाणि गुरुः:। ते समी पर्यथ्यावृत्तया नन्दनूमयमाणा ‘विशेषः’
यसि च स्युः।” इति चोच्यन्ते। तन्मात्राणि तस्मादादिवं: पर्यथ्यावृत्तानि
नानूमयन्ते, इत्यविशेषः सूक्षमा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥
विशेषाधिकारवान्तरनिर्देशियोऽऽृत्वभिषेषमाह—
सूक्ष्ममातापितुजाः सहभ्रपृतीक्षिणया विशेषाः स्यूँ ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितुजा निर्घटते ॥ ३९ ॥

"सूक्ष्मा" इति। "चित्त्रा विशेषा: स्यूँ:।" इति, तानू विशेषप्रकारानाह—
(१८७) अवान्त-विशेषकरणम्-सूक्ष्ममात-पितुजः: पाटकोशिकाः। तत्र मातृतो कोम-पितामहेनं।
कृत्तिर्मालैः, पितृतस्तु साधविक्षेमजन इति
प्रक्ष्णिन महान्त मूतानि "प्रभूतानि"—तैसह। सूक्ष्मम्
शरीरमेको विशेषा; मातापितुजो निपने:; महाभूतानि तृतीयः; महा-
भूतानि च घटादीना निबेश इति।

सूक्ष्ममातापितुजयोऽऽत्योर्विषेषमाह—"सूक्ष्मा-
(१८८) सूक्ष्ममात-स्तेषाम्।" इति। विशेषाणम् मये ये ते
"निर्घटताः", "मातापितुजां निर्घटतने" इति,
सांना वा भस्मान्त वा भिन्नता वेदति।।६३।।

सूक्ष्मशास्रां विभजये—
पूर्वेऽपममस्तकस्तं नियतमहर्षाद्यमसूक्ष्मपर्यंतम् ।
संसरसं निर्घटोऽगं भावरिविचारितम् निर्घटम् ॥ ४४ ॥

'पूर्वेऽपमम्।' इति। "पूर्वेऽपमम्" प्रधानेनादिगम्यं प्रतिपुरुषमेकैः-
(१८९) सूक्ष्मशास्री-रूपविद्यमनः-तय: त्वक्राणि—(१) अस्तकम्—
(२) नित्यम् ॥। अस्तकम्। अव्याहतम्
शिलमयुनिविषति। "नित्यम्" आ चार्द-"सूक्ष्मम्-
सांगादा च महाप्रत्यावरणाये, "शुद्धान-
दिसूक्ष्मपर्यंतम्", महाहृद्यावर्धादिविश्रुण-
अत्मापर्यंतम्। एवं समुदायः सूक्ष्मम् शास्रस्त्र, शान्तचोरस्खीरिनिद्र-
नवस्वतेतदेन शरीरं भोग्यतं पुष्पस्य, कृतं दश्यमानेन पाट्कौ-शिकेन शरीरेणित्यात आह्—“संसततु” इति।

(१९०) (१) संसार-गुणम् निरुपमोगतं च तत्थ पाट्कौशिक प्रार्थिन्यतमः॥

उपात्सुपात्त पाट्कौशिकं शरीरं जहातं हार्यं हार्यं चोपादते—कस्मात् इति “निरुपमोगम्”

यतः; पाट्कौशिकं शरीरं भोग्यतं विना सूक्ष्म शरीरं निरुपमों यस्मात्सात्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति॥

ननु धर्माध्यक्षनिरूपनं संसारं; न च सूक्ष्मसात्मस्य प्रकटत्वः।

(१९१) धर्मोध्यन-दिशंब्रवामध्ययवासितवत्मूर्तौ के तत्संसरणं॥

तत्कथं संस्ततीत्यत आह्—“भावीर्विवासितम्”

इति। धर्माध्यम्वपाणां नांतवायवाग्यम्ये नाष्टं वार्ताणि भावः; तदलितम् विद्धि; तदनितत्त्वान

सूक्ष्म सात्मरमिति तदापि भावीर्विवासितम्, यथा सुभिपािस्तकुसुमसम्पेद्यारखं तदादोदवासितम्मचिति।

तस्मात्वनेरवाचविवासितवातसंसरति॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधाननिविव महाभाब्ये अपि

(१९२) महाभाब्ये तस्य क्षष्य गामतताद्विवत्माः

इति। कर्त्यं गच्छतोगति विष्णुमू—हेतुमले चायस्य विष्णु-वमिति मावः॥ ४०॥

स्यदेतत्—बुद्धिरेव साधुकारतेन्द्रिया कस्मात् संसरति? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीर-रेणाध्यूमेवकेनेवलं आह—

चिर्रं यथा नरमस्ते स्थापनादिन्यो बिना यथा चायया।

तदलिना विदर्शते नित्याति निराधारं विष्णुमू॥ ४१॥

“चिन्त्रम्” इति। चिन्त्रानु ज्ञापनानु सुक्ष्राद्यो चिन्त्रम्, तत्

(१९२) सूक्ष्मशरीर-स्यावधात्मकोपदशीनम्॥

अनाध्यनं तित्वं। जननमान्तरकं सुक्ष्रयाद्

दयं। प्रत्युप्तचारण्यं—प्रत्युप्तकालविदश्मान्—


\[ \text{सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणप्रकारः} \]

वत्थे सति बुद्धवादिवात्-द्वयमानशरीरश्चिविवधादिवत्। “विना विषेषेः” इति, सूक्ष्मेऽ शरीरसिद्धियं| आगमश्रृं भवति—

“ततः स्यवरः कायाभु पशवश्व बशशः०००। अङ्गुङ्गमायुं पुरुषं निष्कर्षस्म बलायम्।” (सहायता वनपर्व—ध्रुवय २९६०) \[ \text{इत्युपरायन} \] सूक्ष्मशरीरलवमपशुस्त्वायं। आत्मसंख्योंसम्बन्धश्व शरीरसु 'पुरुषः।' तदापि पुरी स्तुत्यशरीरे नाहेते इति || ४१ ||

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीराचिट्टमपुपात्य यथा संसर्ति, चेन हेतुना च—तदु-भयमान—

पुरुषार्थेह्वतुकमित्र निमित्तेन्मितिक्रस्थतेः।
प्रक्तेर्विभुतोऽयोगाघटविवचारताः थिक्रम् || ४२ ||

“पुरुषार्थेह्वतुकम्” इति। पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम्। “निमित्तम्”

१९४। सूक्ष्मशरीर-धर्माधसिदि, “नैमित्तिकम्” तेनू तेनू निमावृत्तसंसरणप्रकारः ||

पुरुषोऽयायं पाटकाशिकशरीरग्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनविमोचनविमचारम्। निमित्तेनैमित्तिकम्—तत्र यः प्रसंगः प्रसांकित्याः “नल-वच्चविवचारे थिक्रम्” सूक्ष्मशरीरस। यथा हि नत्तस्त तां सूक्ष्मायं धर्मायं परस्परामो व जगतात्तजुः वस्ततोऽव भवति, एवतत्त्वत्सूक्ष्मशरीराचिदिधाव)

१९५। सूक्ष्मशरीर—कुङ्गस्यः पुनःस्वाधो महिमेवत्य आह—

रससहो हेतुः प्रक्तेर्विभुतोऽयोगाघटू” इति। तथा च पुरुणम्—

“वेदृश्याम् प्रथानस्य परिणामो स्यमदुःत” इति || ४२ ||

“निमित्तेनैमित्तिकक्रस्थतेः” इतुकम्—तत्र निमित्तेनैमित्तिके विमोचे—

सांसिद्धिकाश्च मावः। प्राकृतिका वैगृहिकाश्च धर्माया। ||

वत्थाः करणाभिर्या। कार्यभाषिण्यं कहत्ता: || ४३ ||

“सांसिद्धिकाश्” इति। “वैगृहिकाश्” नैमित्तिकाः। पुरुषस्य जातस्यो—
(196) निमित्तते-भितिकविभागः-चर्मदिः-हृपतिनिष्ठस चार्कविकसितवेजकतिकमायकवनम् । तथा च कारणार्थितवर्णवेशनम् ॥

तर्कार्थेवताराद्धनार्थनिर्बेलन: | "प्राकृतिका:"
सांभाविकां भावाः | सांस्कृतिकाः | तथा हि--हर्गजः-दारवार्दिविभागनाभवानक् | कार्योऽधिक हस्ताक्षरम्बिन्धायः-नवेरागथेष्वर्थस्मपः | प्राचुवाभेति समर्थित | वैक-ताल्क भवासांस्कृतिकाः | ये उपायानुष्ठाननै-ल्याना; यथा प्राचैतस्प्रभुतानामधार्माणाम्। एवमधर्माणानद्वारायानेनाथ-योऽयोऽपि ॥

(197) शरीरप्रमात्र-प्रेमितिकस कार्यार्थित्वकवनम् ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तदार्थयिनः | तस्यावस्था: | कल-लेखयुद्धमार्गपरीक्ष्यदात्रधार्याः | गमनस्थस्य | ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य बाल्यक्रोमयी-वनवधार्थकानिति ॥ ४३ ॥

(198) निमित्तविशेषणां कार्यविशेषनिपः-पणम् ॥

अवगतानि निमित्तनैमितिकानि। कतमस्य-तु निमित्तस्य कतमनैमितिकमिवत अह—

धर्मणे गमनस्योऽधीरे, गमनमधस्यत्रवत्यधर्मणे।
शानेन चापवर्गे, विपर्ययादिदिष्टे वनस्थ: ॥ ४४ ॥

"धर्मणे गमनस्योऽधीरे" सुप्रभृतिः लोकेऽपुं । "गमनमधस्यत्रवत्य-धर्मणे" सुङ्गलादिपलुऽलोकेऽपुं । "शानेन चाप-वर्गे:।" तापिध्वं प्रकृतिमोभागमवते न याब्धवद्विधेक्यायाति करोऽति; अय विनेक्याति सत्या खंडक्यलम्या विनेक्यातिनमपुरुषप्रति निव-तिते। यथां—

"विनेक्यातिनम्यं स्यम् प्रकृतिभूतिस्तम्।" इति ॥

"विपर्ययादिः" अत्यचन्द्रानात् इच्छयते वनस्थ:। "॥
प्राकृतिकादिवन्धन्यत्रयम्।

स च त्रिविदः—प्राकृतिको वैद्यकिको द्राक्षि—(२००) बन्धूवितीच्यनिकम् प्राकृतिक—
ध्यानिर्मणम् प्राकृतिक—
वैद्यकिक—राशिषालिगुम्॥

“पूर्णे शतसहस्रं हि तिन्नयत्वक्षिणिन्तका:” इति ||
बैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारार्थ भूतेन्द्रियांह्यांबुधःे पुरुषाधिको पास्तेः, तान् प्रतीदमुः ||

“दश मन्नर्ताणोह तिन्नतीन्द्रियचिन्तन्का:।
भौतिकांस्तु शतपूर्णे, सहस्रस्वाभिमानिका:।
बौद्ध दश सहस्राणि तिन्नत्विं विगतज्ञा:।
ते खल्ली हि देवेः ये पा वैद्यकिको बन्धः” इति ||

इष्टौपूर्ण द्राक्षिकणकः। पुरुषत्वानसिद्धो हीणापूर्वकारी कामोमुः
पहतममा वनाये इति || ४४ ||

बैराग्यात् प्रकृतिध्य:। संस्कारो महति राजसाध्रागात।
ऐंव्याविचारो विपर्याचार्यमित्य:। || ४५ ||

“बैराग्यात् प्रकृतिध्य:” इति—पुरुषत्वानभिज्ञः वैराग्यान्त्रात्
(२०१) बैराग्यात् प्रकृतिध्यः, प्रकृतिमार्गः प्रकृतिमहतद्विगुरार्गः—
प्रकृतिध्यः। तेन्द्रियाणि गृहान्ते, तेज्वालमुक्कोपास्यमानेनु
लयः। कालान्तरेण च पुनरार्थिविभविण्यः। ||

१ ‘भौतिका’—ये भूतालेव पुरुषधियोपसाते। ‘आभिमानिका’—ये श्वर्द्वारस्तु पुरुषधि
योपसाते। ‘बौद्धा’—ये बौद्धस्य पुरुषधियोपसाते। २ विनेहा:—वैद्यकीकर्मम्वकां संजान्तकः
मिदम्, पारिशिक्षितम्। ३ वायुकुपसागरद्विदृष्टायत्ताओऽनं च। अज्ञावधामारामा:
पूर्तमथ्यां प्रज्ञाते। ॥ एकाकोनिकंहनन्ते नेतायां यथा ह्यूते। अन्तविवेंधनस्य च यहान्तमयं
स्वतिरीते। ४ य: प्रकृतिध्यव गच्छति।
(२०२) राजसाधना
गाव संसार: ॥
"संसारे भवति राजसाधनागात्" इति ॥
'राजसाधनः' इत्येवन रजसो दुःखेतुवात् संसार-रस्य दुःखेतुता सूचिता ॥
"अविचारःद्विवाचि" इति-इच्छाया: ॥ इथरो हि यद्वेच्छति तदेव करोति। "विपर्यायः" अनेत्थर्या "तद्विपर्यासः" सर्वत्रिच्छाविवाचि
इतिः: ॥ ८५ ॥

बुद्धिधर्मन् धर्मानीन्द्रो भावानु समासव्यासायो मुनुस्कृणां हेयोपदे-
यान् दर्शियतु प्रथमन्त्रावत् समासमाह—
पप प्रत्यासग्निचिंचद्याशक्तिुचित्बिस्वास्यः: ॥
गुणवेष्यविमृद्रीत, तत्स्य च भेदास्थ पथाशास्त ॥ ४६ ॥
"पपः" इति | प्रतीयते कनेनेि प्रत्ययो बुद्धि, तत्स्य सर्गः: | त्त्रा
(२०४) विपर्यायः
"विपर्यः" अध्यानमविस्या, सा अपि बुद्धिवर्मः;
बुद्धिमात्व यमासनकौ कथ-नमु ॥
एव । "तुष्टिस्वि" अपिष यव्यमानालक्षणे
बुद्धिधर्मानेव, तत्र विपर्यायामितुतिुत्तुष्ठत्यायोगं सतानाश धर्मान्दीनां ज्ञान-
वज्मान्तमवः; सिद्धति च ज्ञास्येति ॥

व्यासामाह—"तत्स्य च भेदास्थ पक्षाशास्त्" इति | कस्मात् । "गुणवे-
(२०५) तत्स्यव व्यास्यानि
"पर्यायामद्वितौ" इति | गुणानां वेष्यमेवेकस्या-
कथान्मु-पक्षाशास्त्रे:॥ धिकवलता द्योर्येवोऽ, एककस्य न्यूनवलता
द्योर्येवोऽ, ते च न्यूनविकस्ये मनमयाधिक्यमात्यत्या पक्षाकारङ्गमात्रेषीये।
तदिदो गुणाना वेष्यम् तेनापममः, एककस्य न्यूनस्य द्योर्येवोऽ दर्शभवः।
त्तसात्त्वया भेदः: पक्षाशास्तिः। ॥ ५६ ॥
প্রত্যয়সর্গপঢ়ায়াশ্রেষ্ঠতনম। [ সাং. ত।

তানীব পশ্চাদেদানূ গণযতি—

পশ্চ বিপঞ্জয়মেদ্রা ভস্মধারক্ষিত করণৈকদ্যাপ্তত।
অদ্যাবিশালিতেদ্রা তুরিন্তেধ্যা স্থায়া সিদ্ধঃ। ॥ ৪৭ ॥

“পশ্চ” ইতি। অদ্যাবিদ্যাসিতারাগদানভাসিন্ধেশা যথাসাংহ তমো-
(২০৬) বিপঞ্জয়থী—
মহমাহামহীভাসিতান্তাভসিতামৃদুত৷ পশ্চ বিপ-
লাপন্থায়াদেদ্রপরিগণনম।
যাবিশিষ্ট৷, বিপঞ্জয়ঘনভানামঃপ্রসিদ্ধতাজ্যানাং
বিপঞ্জয়স্বভাবত্রাজু। যত্ত্যথাদিঃ বিপঞ্জয়েনাবধায়িতে কস্তু, অসি-
তাদয়স্তলত্রাজু। সন্ততদভিষিক্ততম্যে। অত এত পশ্চপঞ্জিয়েত্যাহ
ভগবানূ বার্ধ্যগণ্যঃ। ॥ ৪৭ ॥

(২০৭) বিপঞ্জয়থীর্মণাং
প্রথ্যক্ষ প্রতিমান্তমেদদেদ্র-নমূত তত্ত্ব প্রথম বিপঞ্জয়-
মাহ—

বেদস্তমসস্ত অনিচ্ছো মহাস্ত চ, দ্রসাবিধো মহামহোধঃ।
তামিমো ত্রাদশায়া, তথা ভস্মধায়াং ভস্মিঃ। ॥ ৪৮ ॥

“মেদঃ” ইতি। বেদস্তমসস্ত দ্রনিয়া আদ্ররীধঃ। অদ্যাব্যয়-
(২০৮) অদ্যাব্যয়-
কমহদহ্যগার্পীশন্ত্রনাশনশাপমুদ্রিতৰাজিয়া
তমু, অর্থবিদ্যাপ্রতিমান্ত্রহাত্রিঃ। ॥

“মহাস্ত চ” ইতি, অদ্যাব্যস্তিধো মেদস্তকর্ণানঃ।
(২০৯) অসিমান্ত-
বিপঞ্জয়্যাশ্চিত্তমু ভুতিইম্যানি সিঞ্চাদি-
কমালিনঃ শায়াবিশালমিন্তন্ত, সায়মিমতা
মোহো স্তিতিবিচারধার্য্যবিস্তারধারিঃ। ॥

“দ্রসাবিধো মহামহোধঃ” ইতি। শব্দাদিপু পশ্চপু দিয়াদিক্ষ্যতত্ত্বা দৃশি-১
(২১০) রাগঘরবি-
প্রস্থঃ দ্রসাবিধিতমু ॥

স চ দ্রসাবিধিপ্রস্থাতিরশ্চাধিঃ। ॥
(कौं ४८-४९) अध्यात्मिक्रताकारकादकशतं: ॥

"तामिलो" द्वेषो "श्राद्धारा"। शब्दादयो दशविषया रजनीयः।

(२११) द्वेषपूर्विक-स्वरूपः। ऐर्थर्यत्वांगितिकव स्वरूपतो रञ्ज-वेयवाभाषादशीविलम्॥ नीयमः किन्तु रञ्जनीयशब्दादुपायः। तेष च शब्दादय परस्परतः परस्पर्णोपपन्थमानार्कस्तुपायाभाष्याणिमादयः। स्वरूपा-पूव कोपनिया भवन्तीसित शब्दादिदिशंशभि: सहानिमायथे कमःशादशश-धेति। तद्विपः द्वेषस्तांतिः श्राद्धाशङ्कपत्रवताशादशशेषेः॥

"तथा भवन्यता-मिहाः।" अभिबिन्दोऽि स्वतामिहाः। तथैवनेवना-

(२१२) अभिबिन्दोऽि रूपिर्वियवस्याभाषादशिविलम्॥ देवः। स्वरूपाणियमादिकम-प्रतीवियवस्याभाषाय दश शब्दादीनः विषयान्।

भुजानः। शब्दादयो भोगामर्तुपायाभाष्याणिमादयो स्माकमसुवादिरंभिमेत्प्रवाहिनिः। इति। विभ्यति। तदिदं भयमभिनिनेष्व स्वतामिष्टे। श्राद्धाशङ्कपत्रवताशादशशेषेः॥

(२१३) विपर्यायाव-न्तरभेदसारितिया द्वा-भेदाभाष्पुरितिः॥ ४८॥

(२१४) अध्यात्मिकर-प्रकारकारकुत्कितकयम्॥ दामाक्षीमाहे। एकादशोऽनियवधः। सह युद्धितविशर्कतिविद्धिः।

सतद्वः बघः युद्धितपर्योप्याचुतिस्थितिनाम्॥ ४९॥

(२१५) एकादशोऽनियवधः। "एकादश"। इति। [ इन्द्रियवधः प्रजो हि इन्द्रियवधः। जन्मान जना जन्मान न लशक्ष्मिनेव दूष पूणः।] इति। "एकादशोऽनियवधः।"

बाद्यिर कुष्ठिता स्वप्नं जडता स्वमित्वा तथा।

मूकता कौष्ठिकिकरं कौष्ठिकिकरमेवमेत्॥
व्यासलिङ्ग श्रोत्राद्वीपादिप्रयावरणां वथः: | एतावशे तु तद्वेद्यका बुद्देशसत्किले स्वव्यापरे भवति | तथा चैसादशेद्यकंकवादेकादशावा बुद्देश-शक्तिन्धृष्टे | हेतृत्वेदमेतेवेशविक्ष्या च सामानाधिकरण्यम्।

तद्रवयादिप्रयावरण बुद्देशसत्किले स्वरूपं दशकीराट- "सह (२१६) बुद्धेष: साश्र-बुद्धिस्वरूपं दशकिले सत्किले सत्किले शाबरा।" आह- "सत्किले बुद्धेष:। कुतः? "विपय-यातुतिदिनाम्।" तुर्मयो न्यथेति तदृपयाथस्तुतिश्रुपणाणवधा भवति, 
एवं सिद्धो द्वाराविन्द तदृपयाथस्तुतिश्रुपणां भवत्तीति। ४९।

(२१७) नवविधुतु- 

tुर्मयो युक्तम्, तत्: परिगमनयति—

आध्यात्मिकाद्रत्स: प्रकृत्युपादानकालभावायां।
बाह्य विषयोपरमातृ पञ्चः-नव तुर्मयो प्रभमता। ५०।

"आध्यात्मिकाः" श्रोति। आध्यात्मिकाः:- 'प्रकृतिविद्यतितिर्क्त आत्मा (२१८) चतुर्विन्दाल्
द्वितिः' श्रोति प्रतिपद, ततो कस्य श्रवणमनना-धारितिन्द्रविधित्तश्रीमम्।
दिना विवेकसाक्षात्काराय लवलुपेदेतुरुस्यो न 
प्रयत्ते तत्साध्यात्मिकाशस्तुतश्रुपयो भवति, प्रकृतिविद्यतितिक्षुदायामसचि-
क्षुद्र यस्मतास्तुत्यस्तस्माद्धायामिकाः। कामस्य आद्या आह- "प्रकृत्युप पादानकालभावायाः।" प्रकृत्यादिरिस्यां यासां तासास्थोऽकाः।

तत्र प्रकृत्यादिरिस्यां तुर्मितियां कस्यचिदुपेदशे क्रिया: प्रकृतिसार: कारोणेति क्रिया:।

(२२२ स्याध्यात- 

विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि 

न्द्रनामायामिनी, तस्मादेवमेस्वात्रस्तु कलः।" श्रोति: सेवमुदृष्ट्यस्य तुर्मित्खल्लोक, सा तुर्मित्खल्लोक- प्रकृत्यादिरिस्यां अभ्यां उच्यते।


\[ \text{बाहा } \text{दर्शा } \text{“बाहा:” } \text{लुष्य: “विषयोपरसात्, पश्चा” } \text{या:} \]

1. प्रकृत्या निःश्रुतः। २. प्रकृतिमहादिविक्षयायानि सत्येऽपि गौरवदेवैतः। ३. संयमक्षत्रिः विषयालब्धिः स्पष्टिः इत्ययूः। ४. ’मेघ’ इति पाठान्तः॥
(२२४) बाश्वतिष्ठू भवति। तथा हि-सेवाद्यो धनार्जनोपायाः। प्रथमा, पार्मू॥

ते च सेवकादिनू दुःखाकुञ्जेन्ति।

"द्यादुरीश्वरांश्चद्रिणिश्चप्रधार्चन्द्रजामू।

विद्वेदां भावयन् प्राणः कः सेवास्वनुपजजो।"॥

एवमन्ये द्वयनोपाया: दुःखा इति विषयोपसे या तुष्टि: सेषा 'पार्मू' उच्यते॥

तथा संभन्तनमू राजेन्द्रोगरिकाक्षिनलिचार्मू विनिद्रक्ष्यतीति तत्र-(२२५) दूर्तियाः, दुःखे शणे महृदःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपसे या पार्मू॥

तुष्टि: सा दूर्तिया 'सुपार्मू' उच्यते॥

तथा महत्ता सवयासेनानितन्तरं भुज्यामानं श्रीयते इति तत्प्रक्षय-(२२६) दूर्तियाः, श्री-भावयतो: विषयोपसे या तुष्टि: सा तृतीया शापार्मू॥

'पार्वपार्मू' उच्यते॥

एवं शाब्दादिभोगम्ब्यासातू प्रवर्जने कामाः, ते च विषयप्राः कामिनं-(२२७) चतुर्थै, अनु-मतम्मू॥

तथा: दुःखाकुञ्जेन्ति भोगस्तोपमू भावयतो विषयोपसे या तुष्टि: सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमम्म' उच्यते॥

एवनानुपहत्य भूतानि विषयोपमोगः समरहितीति हिसादेषदशर्शना-(२२८) प्रथमी, उत्त-द्रिष्योपसे या तुष्टि: सा प्रथमी 'उत्तमम्म' मतम्म॥

उच्यते॥

एवमाध्युताकामिकाभ्रतसुभि: बायामसिद्ध पश्चमि: 'नव तुष्ट्यो भिममता।'॥ ९०॥

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(२२९) सिद्धमेकसप-गौणमुल्यमेदः सिद्धोराह—
उहः द्रव्यो स्वरूपान्त दुःखविधातात्मकः सुदृढःप्राप्तः।
दानं च सिद्धयो यष्टी, सिद्धे: पूर्वी स्वल्पश्चिविन्य:।।५१।।

“उहः” इति। विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य विवाहायत्वात्मकः इत्याम्
(२३०) सिद्धिभेदकः
मुक्त्यासिततः सिद्धयः, तदुपायत्या विला, नम्॥
गौण्य: पद्ध सिद्धयः, ता आपि हेतुहेतुमचयः
व्यवस्थित:। तत्राया उपयनवलक्षण सिद्धिहेतुरेव। मुख्यास्तु सिद्धयो
हेतुमत्यं एव। मध्यमास्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यं:।

(२३१) अध्यनन्द-पा प्रथमा सिद्धः, तारस॥
विधिवर्दपुरुषाद्ध्यायार्थिनामकदस्त्रस्वरूपः
हम्मच्छिणामुखार्थिनामकदस्त्रस्वरूपः प्रथमा सिद्धिसत्तासभ्यः।

तत्कार्यमु शब्दः। ‘शब्दः’ इति पद्मः शब्दजनितमर्थ्यात्मकमुपक्षयति,
(२३२) सब्दहुः द्रश्यी तीया, भुतारस॥
कार्यं कारणोपचारः। सा हितीया सिद्धः
मुद्तासमुच्चेते पाठार्थायम्यात्मदिन्दनिधिः श्रवणम॥

“उहः” तर्कः आयामार्थोपस्थितयायेनागामार्थोपर्वश्चारम्। परीक्षणः
(२३३) उपहुः व्र-तीया तारतारस॥
संशयात्मपूर्वपत्निरशिक्षणेतर्पश्चिविस्तारपनम्॥
तदिद्रमनमाचलकते आगमिनः। सा तृतीया
सिद्धिसत्तासभ्यः।

“सुहृदप्राप्तः” इति। न्यायेन स्वयम्परीक्षितमत्थयः न श्रद्धते, न यावदुहुः
(२३४) सुहृदप्राप्तः शिष्यसङ्गारस्थाितिसह सवात्तेषे। अत: सुहृदः
रूपः चतुर्विं-रम्यकः। गुरुःशिष्यसङ्गाग्नागारण्यां सवादकानां अस्फः
सुहृदप्राप्तः: सा सिद्धिस्तुतिः ‘रम्यः’ उच्यः।।

“दानं” च दुःखविकाङ्गान्तः, ‘दैपु शोधनेच।’ [सिद्धान्तकोमुदी

१ “मननम् भमनमेवासहस्यमयतः। इति ब्रित्ये मननमाह मुहृदशिपिषि”
श्रीत पाठान्तरस्।
(२३५) दानकान ॥ । ||
(२३६) अन्ये व्याच्यक्ति-विनोदपदेशादिना प्रागभाविवायः वल्लतस्वत्सय स्याध- मूहान्य यत् सा सिद्धिरूह ॥ यस्य सांख्याश- बिपिकक्ष व्रजकारान्तर्य स्यायान्यम् ॥ अल्ला सिद्धि: साभ्यः, साह्यप्राधान्तरस्बायात् । यस्य 
शिख्यांचार्यमथम-ग्रन्थो सांख्याशां व्याख्यास्य तत्कालानुमोत्सते सा 
व्याख्यान्यम् ॥ सुक्त्वाप्राधिति यस्याद्विगतवतचं सुहुर्दं व्रजानुमयं प्रयत्वे सा व्रजानुमयं प्रयत्वे सा ज्ञानक्षण सिद्धिरस्वत: सुहुर्दः प्रयत्वात् । दानश्व सिद्धिनुहूः, चन्द्रानन्तराणाधिते ज्ञानी ज्ञानप्रणयं छभित । अस्य च युक्ते 
युक्तेव सूर्षभिवावगवन्तेव 'यति क्रतपदे खङ्गन्तन न: सिद्धराधान्तव्याय- 
व्यायाप्रतिनिधिनिष्ठित ॥

सिद्धिरस्वतिविभिन्नाविश्वातिगृहस्य तत्तदशाः तक्षण: । अत्र प्रत्यय- 
(२३८) प्रत्ययात कर्म समेत सिद्धिरस्य देशिते प्रसीदमेव । तत्तवारणः 
प्रियनियाश्वकलसितैव, सिद्धिरस्य तत्र साह्यात्मा तत्तसाय। 
किरायान्यां शास्त्रात्क्षिकृत: । यत्र इति। 'पूर्वः' इति। विप- 

'भिन्नाक्तेव नैर्वर्त्याम्' हेति पाप्तत्रमसा । २ अभ्यासोऽपि ।
न विना भावैठिंद्र, न विना भिक्षेन भावनिवृद्धिः।
विज्ञाप्योऽभावायस्तस्माद्धिविधिः प्राप्तते सगी: || ५२ ||

“न विना” इति। “लिङ्गेऽ” इति तन्मात्रासर्गमुपरक्षयति, “भावे:”
(२५०) दम्यविधि- इति च प्रत्ययसर्गमुः। एतदुक्तभवति-तन्मात्रासर्गसर्गसर्गक्षमात्रेनम्।
गृहं पुरुषार्थसाधनसं श्रव्यपाल न प्रत्ययसर्गविन्दना भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसर्गसर्ग स्वर्यं पुरुषार्थसाधनसं न तन्मात्रासर्गं गृहं इत्यज्ञास्त सगी:।
भोगः पुरुषार्थं न भोगायनो शब्दादीनो भोगायनं सर्वात्मान्तः सम्भवतितुपवस्तुनमात्रासर्गमुः। एवं स एवः भोगायनातीनिन्द्रायायण्यः करणानि चान्तरे न सम्भवति।

न च तानि धर्मदीनो भावानु विना सम्भवति। न चापवग्निहेतुविवेकः लघुतिरिहभसर्गये विना, इतुपप्पल उम्यविधः सगी:।

अनादित्वाच बीकांकुशवानायांश्रयर्दोपमा- 
(२४१) दम्यविधि- संहं अन्योन्याश्रयसंपरीक्षाः।

(२४२) भूतसर्गवि- भागः।
तन्मात्रसगीविभागः । ॥ स्रो. ॥

अष्टकिल्पो दैवस्तैयियोऽनुत्त्य रस्सर्व भवति ॥
मातृप्रेमधैविजः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

"अष्टकिल्प" इति । ब्राह्मणः प्राणावलयः, ऐनः, पैत्रो, गान्धर्वो, यायशः, राक्षसः, पेशाचः, इत्यपिनो दैवः" सर्गः ॥

(२४४) (२) तेष-प्रयोऽपर्षाधिक भवति," पद्मपुर-भिक्षुरीसृपस्थावरः ॥

"मातृप्रेमधैविजः" इति, ब्राह्मणत्वाचायान्तरजातिमेदाविवक्ष्या, संस्था-नस्य चतुष्क्षणि कर्णकेविशेषात् । इति "समा-सतः" संस्कृतः । "भौतिकः सर्गः" । वाटादय-स्वशारीवे दिपि स्थावरा प्रवेदित ॥ ८३ ॥

(२४६) भौतिकलगः भौतिकस्प्यम् सर्गः वैद्यत्यक्षर्कर्षनिकर्ष-तारत्तम्माभ्यांबधावम्बावेन नैविवधाभावः

ऊँधी सत्तविशारस्तमोविशालः मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये ज्योविशालो, वैभादिस्तमपर्षतः ॥ ५४ ॥

"ऊँधी सत्तविशालः" इति । युप्रभृतिसत्यांतो लोकः सर्वबहुः ।

(२४७) ऊँधी सत्त-प्रभाः-मध्ये ज्योऽर्थः-सत्ता-अन्ते तम-प्रभाः ॥

"तमोविशालः मूलतः सर्गः", प्रभादिस्य-वर्णान्, सो यम्मोहमयावतामोवहुः। मूकः कस्तु सदेहश्चुसासाक्षेपः "मध्ये ज्योविशालो, दर्मान्नान्योऽनुतावः खबुहुःवच ॥ ताभिमां लोकसिद्धिति संक्षिप्ति "ब्रह्मादिस्तमपर्षतः", सत्तमार्शेन वृद्धादयः संग्रहितः ॥ ५४ ॥

(२४८) सर्गेश्चूः-धैतुतः ॥ तदेवम् सर्गः दशौतिल्वा तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैद-हृदुतः ॥ ग्यायाग्योगीं दृःखेहुतामाह—
कौ. ९९-१९ ] सर्गस्य दुःखद्वेष्टता प्रकृतिकार्यवाच | ७७

तत्त्र जरामरणकः दुःखमामोति चेतन: पुरुषः।
दिक्षेत्रायचिन्तृदुःखमस्माः। स्वभावोऽहो ॥ ५५ ॥

“तत्” इति। “तत्” श्रीरादो। यद्यपि विनिगुः विचित्रतानन्दभोगभागिनः प्राणमुद्रेऽहः।
तथा नि परं जरामरणकः दुःखमोहिष्टम्।
सवैस्य खलु क्रमरपि मरणात्मा। “मा न भूवम्।” “भूयासम्” इच्छेवमात्मको
इतिः। दुःखः च मयेशतुरिति दुःखमरणम् ॥

स्वादेतु-दुःखादयः। प्राक्तता बुद्धिगुणः।
तत्कथोमेते चेतनसम्बन्धिनयो महतीयत आह्। “पुरुष” इतिः।
(२४९) प्राक्तंगुणस्मृत्तुः। दुःखाविशेष्येन सह
सत्तमप्रदश्यः। ॥

कः पुनःहिलुकनमभिन्धो दुःखपुरुषस्य चेतनस्येष्येत आह्।
“कः पुनः” अनिदिगुः।
(२५०) पुरुषप्रकृतिभेदाधिप्रमाणस्य: पुरुषः
दुःखाधिस्यः। ॥

(२५१) सच्चिदार्थस्य सर्गख सत्तमार्थार्थमेतिप्रतीतिप्रतिकारकरूपः।

इत्येष प्रकृतिकः महदादिभिषेपमूृत्यपर्यन्तः।
प्रतिपुरुषविषाणां स्वार्थवर्य पराध्य आरम्भः। ॥ ५६ ॥

“इत्येष” इति। आरम्भः।
(२५२) चार्कर्भेऽ इति। नेत्रवेदेऽ न ब्रह्मवादनो नाथार्थार्थः।
हात्यावमधुपूर्वः। अकरणके हात्यासार्थायो स्थितंमायो ब्र इत्यादि।

१ आर्यनब्रह्मसर्वत्र भार्यः।—उपसमृद्धयथः।
न ब्रह्मापादानः, चित्रितकेशपरिग्रामामाति। नेष्ठराधिष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतः, निव्याः-पारस्याधिष्ठातृवृक्षभ्रातः। न हि निर्यथपारस्य स्वायत्तमितिः॥

ननु प्रकृतिकिंकितेतः, तथा निम्यायः प्रृतितश्रीधार्या अनुपस्मात् सदैव(२५३) नित्यप्रमृ-तिश्रुतप्रकृतिक्षुदिक्षुके संधिः सत्तुतित्वाधिष्ठानमितिःक्ष-य च प्रक्षेपश्चा-ततिः राशिः॥

निर्विकल्पे—एवं प्रलेक्षयुप्पुरुषानो मोचयित्वप्रवृत्ता प्रकृतियो पुरुषमोचयित तप्तित पुनः प्रवर्तते—तदित्वाह—‘स्वार्थहुः,’ स्वार्थत्यथा तथा परार्थे आरम्भ इत्याः॥ २६॥

स्वादेततृ—‘स्वार्थ परार्थ वा चेतनः प्रवर्तते। न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवैं (२५४) अचेतनप्रधानः-भवितमहति तस्माद्धिति प्रकृतेर्धिष्ठाता चेतनः। न च केस्त्राधिक्षेतना अपि प्रकृतिमिधिष्ठातमहिन्दि, तेषां प्रकृतिसन्दर्भानिमिश्चालयू। तस्माद्धिति स्वार्थिदेशी प्रकृतेर्धिष्ठाता, स चेत्तर।’—इत्यत आह—

वत्साविवृद्धिनिमित्त् क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृतिरधारस्य। पुरुषविमोक्षानिमित्त् तथा प्रवृति: प्रधानस्य॥ ५७॥

“वत्साविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” इति। द्वृत्तचेतननमपि प्रयोजन्मप्रवृत्तमातु-मूः, यथा वत्सावृद्धिः श्लोकसंरस्त्रयम् प्रव-ततेत। एकमप्रकृतिरचेतना इपि पुरुषविमोक्षामय प्रवृतिः इत्यत्वेत।

न च—‘क्षीरप्रवृत्तिप्रधाराधिष्ठानिनिवधानवेन साध्यवृत्त्वो साध्यन्यमि—(२५५) ईशाविधिति चार।’—इति, साम्राज्यप्रेयोगविः प्रवृत्ते: स्वार्थ-तपातानो दोषा।॥ कारणायां व्यासालयू॥ तेच जगत्सर्गद्वार—
को. ९७-९८ ] पुरुषविमोक्षार्थप्रधानस्य प्रश्नति:।

तत्तमाने प्रेमार्थप्रति पूर्वकत्वार्थप्रमाणी न्यायक्तं। न द्वारात्सककलेपित् भन्ते जंग्लु सृजत: किमपर्यमिलितमभवति।

नापि कारूण्याद्वारे सर्ग प्रवृत्तिः। प्राक: सर्गाभिज्ञानामिन्द्रार्थार्थिगाविष्णुपुत्र: दुःखभेदेन कस्य प्रहार्येच्छा कारूण्यम्। सर्गोत्तरकारं दुःखिनो सवलोक्य कारूण्यायुपगमे दुर्स्तरमितेतराश्रयन्दूर्वनन्तान्—कारूण्येन सृजते: सृष्ट: च कारूण्यमिति।

अपि च करण्या प्रेमिते इधरः सुविनय एव जन्तुनु जन्तुवनसुविचित्रान्। ‘कर्मभिचविधावत्वम्’ इति चेत्—कतर्येश्व प्रेमार्थ: कर्मभिचित्रानेन। तदनिभिज्ञानात्माविदेशितवेत्तानन्तरतः प्रक्ष: प्रृचुत्युपपत्तेतत्—

कार्यशिरोरनिश्चितिगावयुपत्ताच्छै दु:खावतेऽपि पुनर्वतवात्।

प्रक्षेतेवतेवतानेयाय: प्रक्षेतेन स्थायिनुपहो न वा कारूण्यप्रयोजककमिति।

(२५६) प्रक्षेतिक्षेत्रे नोक्तकोकणसन्धावतारो। पारायनमात्रत्व वयोजऽ

तद्विशानाव:।

कम्पुपपति:। तत्सातू सुश्रुत्वम्—‘वस्तसिविन्द्रियिनिमित्तम्’ इति। ९७।।

(२५७) पुरुषविमोक्षार्थस्य प्रश्नति। “स्वार्थ इव” इति इश्यानितिसम्। [कारिका।

शार्म्शुम्य प्रधानस्य प्रश्नति।। ९६।] तद्विशानाव—

‘अतुक्षात्मिनिवृत्तर्थी यथा किम्यासु प्रचरस्मे तोकः।’

पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थाय प्रचरस्मे तद्विशानकम्। ५८।।

“अतुक्षय—” इति। अतुक्षायिनिक्षय, सा खलिक्ष्यमाण्यप्रती निविन

तते। इश्यामाणस्य स्वार्थः। इश्यार्थात्वानुक्षम फलस्य। दाश्रमिनिबोज

यतसे—“पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थ्यप्रचरस्मेते तद्विशानकम्” इति। ५८।।

(२५८) विवेकार्थवावात्यन्तरस्य प्रधानस्यप्रश्नति।। ननु भवतु पुरुषाय: प्रक्षे: प्रवत्तेन:। निन्दा

तिस्वतु कुतस्मा प्रक्षेते:। इत्यत आई—
स्यादेन- 'प्रवृत्तामङ्कः पुरुषपार्थस् पुरुषारुढःप्रकटिलोच्ये
(२५९) गुणवत्या कन्धुप्रकारस् अञ्जामप्रवदनरारायणिराक्राति
प्रक्तः प्रत्युक्तारारायणिराक्राति विनेत पायतुभृजिया तथा च न पाराधेः स्या
पुरुषपार्थस्।
आरभः-इत्यत आह—
नानाचिब्रैफ़यपार्थप्रकारिण्यनुपकारिणः। पुंसः।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमार्थकार्यरति। ६०॥
“नाना-“ इति। यथा गुणवानुप्लकारिणी सूर्यो निगुणेष सतएवानुपकारिणे
स्यामिनि निश्चिताराधनः। एतर्यक्षेत्रस्वपत्तिभृजिया निन्दिकते पुरुषपार्थस्य
व्ययपरिश्रेष्ठोत्तरते न नार्यस्रेष्ठते सिद्धम्। ६०॥

स्यादेन- 'नर्त्की नृत्यपरिष्कारः दर्श्यित्वा निवृत्वा। दृष्टिपुनः पुनस्तहस्रः
(२६०) सिवेक्ष्यात् कौतुकालस नवरातीते यथा। तथा प्रक्तिरीति पुरुष
पार्थात्मानं दर्श्यित्वा। निवृत्वा। दृष्टिपुनः प्रव- प्रत्यति।-इत्यत आह—
प्रक्तः सुकुमारतर्चन कितिक्षिदद्वैते मे प्रतिभावति।
या द्वा समि पुना दशीनामृपपि पुरुषस्य। ६२॥
“प्रक्तः:” इति। सुकुमारत्रता स्तिंपेश्वरः परस्तुपरपदनासहि
न्युतितं यावत्। असुर्यस्या हि कुकुमूहतिमदनासां स्माधादिग- नित्वसिचियाश्रलं वेदालोकयमेत परपुरुषाण, तदा यसे यथा प्रयत्ने,
स्यादेशतः—“पुरुषप्रदेशमाणो अपरिमाणी, कथमस्ताय मोक्षः? मृचेष्ठेनण—
(२६१)निग्रुंपुरुषमो- विशेषार्थवातू, सवासनक्रियामध्येरणानां वन्ध-क्षसंसारविश्वम्बन्ध्या || नस्माल्याना पुरुषे अपरिमाणिक्षसम्बन्ध्यात् || अत एवाय च पुरुषस्य न संसार: प्रेतमुक्तपाररसास्तिः, निन्दिक्षवातुौ तस्मात् ‘पुरुषविमोक्षायम्’ इति रितस्व वचः’—इतीमां शाखापुसंधाराय-जेनामयुग्गचन्द्रपाकरोति।

संस्मारी वथयेते स्या न सुचयेते नापि संसरतिकः कार्थितः।
संसरतिन्हे वथेते सुचयेते च नानाथ्या प्रकृतिः। || २२ ||

“तस्मात्” इति || अथा न कार्थित पुरुषो बथयेते, न कार्थित समस-रः, न कार्थितमुच्यते। प्रकृतितेव तु नानाथ्या प्रकृतितगतानी सवासनक्रियामध्येरणां सती वथयेते संसरतिकः मुच्येत चेति || बन्धमोक्ष-पुरुषे उपचारः। || संसारः पुरुषपुरुषचर्येते || यथा जयपाराज्ञी भृगुगताविपि स्वामित्वपुरुषचर्येते, तदाध्रेण मृत्युर्त्त्वदार्गितावतू, तत्त-क्षेत्र च शोकालमादि: स्वामिनि सम्बन्धात् || भोगपवर्गरपि: प्रकृतितगतारपि विभेकाप्रहात्तु पुरुषसम्बन्धु उपपादित इति सर्वेमुप्प्रकृतमू || २२ ||

(२६१) प्रकल्पा धर्म-प्रकृतितगता-वन्धसंसारपवर्गः। नववगतमू ‘प्रकृतितगता वन्धसंसारपवर्गः। पुरुषे उपचरयेते’ इति || किन्तुधना: पुनरेते प्रकृति: || इतात आह—

रूपः: सतमिश्रेय तु बधायत्मानमात्रमना प्रकृति:।
सेव च पुरुषार्थम्प्रति विमोक्षविशेषकरणेषु || २३ ||

“रूपः” इति। तत्त्वानन्तर्व वधातिधर्मादिनिरसतत्त्वैः हृदेमःविर-रिति। “पुरुषार्थम्प्रति” भोगपवर्गप्रति “आस्मानस्वत्मान्मू” एक—
अवगतमीदशः तत्वम्, ततः किमित्य आह—

प्रस्ततत्त्वाभ्यासाभ्यासम् न मे नायकमित्यपरिदेशम्।
अरविघर्घादिद्वादं केवलमुच्यते ब्राह्मम्। ६४।।

“प्रबू” इति। तत्चेन विप्रेण तत्त्वाश्रामपुक्षयति। उत्क्रपप्र- (२९४) अभ्यासता—
कारतत्त्वज्ञानाभ्यासादसादादरनैसत्तर्योयिर्मकाल-
तत्त्वाश्रामपति:। सैविततृ: सत्त्रुपाण्यतासाधारकारिज्ञानपुप-
यते। धिद्यंवाभ्यासस्त्रिशयक्मेऽव साधारकारिज्ञानपुपजनयति।—तत्त्वाध्वर-
भ्यास इति तत्त्वसाधारकारिज्ञानमेव जनयति। अत उत्क्रस्—“विशुद्वम्” इति। ॥

कुलो विशुद्माधित्य आह—“अरविघर्घातो” इति। संश्यविपर्ययो हि
(२९५) तत्त्वाश्राम अभ्यासारेण विद्वात्साविविद्वेद:। अरविघर्घाते:। इति। नियममित्यत्यत्त्यतय
गृहृपुर संश्यो सपि किपिर्यय:। तेन ‘अरविघर्घात’
इति संश्यविपर्ययम्यारो माधित्य माधित्य:। तत्त्वाध्वरवाच संश्यविपर्ययम्याभावः। ॥

स्यादेत्तत:—उत्पत्तादिशाभ्यासातो तत्त्वाश्रामम्, तथा इत्यादिना
(२९६) अनादेशम:—रिद्वानसंस्कारे रिद्वानां जनधितत्यः,
रिद्वानसंस्कार्थार्थम् तथा च तत्त्वसंस्कारेण संसारसम्यालुत्तद्विद्यः
समुच्छेदः। इति उत्क्रस्—“केवलम्” इतिविपर्ययेनस-
भिमनम्। यव्यनादनिद्वापरयावसना तथा सपि तत्त्वाश्रामवासना तत्त्वाध्वर-
साधारकारिज्ञानमेव ५५दिमत्या सपि शक्या समुच्छेदतम्। तत्त्वपक्षातो
हि धियां स्मान्य:। यदाहुबोधः अपि—
"निरुपद्रवमृतत्स्मभावस्य विषये: " नासिम, न मे, नाहम्" इति। 

नासिम इत्य- 

(२६७) तत्तंत्रानन्दद्रवस्म्य-सर्वविन- 

धाईयाविनिविनि:। तथा चाद्वात्मकाभिमानसहः 

तायात्मकाभिमानसहः। चान्त- 

राणे भाषाय सर्वे व्यापारा आभास प्रतिद्वानानि बोद्धव्यानि। 

यत्भावत्मकाभिमानसहः। नार्थसो नाहम्। अहंशिते कर्तव्यदम्। 

अहंशानामपि जुगहम्मह्यद्दे। इति सर्वत्र कर्त: परार्थात्। 

निद्रायिके च सर्वत्र कर्तृवाभाव:। तत: सुदुः-नाहम्। इति। 

अतं ‘न मे”। कर्त: हि स्वामितां सर्वत्र, तस्मात: कुत: स्वामिताकी 

स्वामितेश्तय:। अथवा। ‘नासिम’ इति। ‘पुरुषो दसिम, न प्रस्ववह्मा’। 

अप्रस्ववार्मितवाचकर्तव्यामहो-नाहम्। इति। अकर्तव्याच न स्वामि- 

तेत्यत आह्। ‘न मे”। इति। 

ननु ‘दलातसु स्त्रीत्यपि कवित्व कदाचिद्वां विपयि दसिम, तद्- 

(२६८) तत्तंत्रानन्दद्रवस्म्य वन्यपिथयति। इति आह्। ‘अप- 

स्वामित्तिलेखनु। इति। नासिम किल्लादसिमन् परिश- 

प्रस्ववार्मितवाचकर्तव्यामहो-नाहम्। वद्यां वन्यपिथयतेश्च:। ६८।। 

(२६९) तत्तंत्रानन्दद्रवस्म्य। कि पुनाकिरोहन तत्तंत्रासाधकारण सिध्यती- 

स्त्रिलेखनु। इति। अत आह्। 

तेन निर्ववालितवाचकवातु सतृपिविनिविनिच्चम्। 

प्रकटितम पद्यति पुष्य: प्रक्षकबवर्धित:। स्वर्ग्ग:। ६५।। 

“तेन” इति। भोगविवेकसाधकारण: हि प्रकटे: प्रशोत्त्थये। तौ। 

१ “मुख्य” इति दास्तावतम्।
स्यादेतत्—“निवृत्तप्रसावाभिनि न मृणामेव। संयोगक्रोतो हि सर्गे इत्युः

(२७०) एकाधिपत्यं कस्मु, योग्यता च संयोगः, भोज्यमयोगता च मपेश्य निवृत्ताय अपि पुरुषस्य चैतन्यमूः, भोज्यमयोगता च प्रक्तेऽतिश्रावः।

जेद्दवम् विपश्यवः। न च चैत्योरस्ति निवृत्तिः।

न च करणीयाभावाकिन्वृत्तः, तजातिस्थान्यस्य करणीयालात् पुनः पुनः शब्दायुपमोगवत्—इत्यत आह्—

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षकम् एको, दृष्टा शहित्युपरस्तवन्या।
सति संयोगं श्रवं तयाः प्रयोजनाभास्ति सर्गस्य। ६६॥

“दृष्टा” इति। करोतु नाम पैनः पुने शब्दायुपमोगप्रकृतियया

(२७१) तत्तिराः। विचिकस्याति न क्रता, इति विचिकस्याति निश्चतु शब्दायुपमोगाच्य जनयति। आविचिकस्याति निविव्वनो हि तदुपमोगो, निवय्यत्नांव न तद्वियुमहति, अक्षुर इव वीजामावे। प्राक्ततानु हि सुखदुःक्सः मोहाल्लनः शब्दादिीत्तद्विवकात् ‘समेतत्’ इत्यमिन्युनमाना आत्मा भुजीत।

एवं विचिकस्याति नाल्लिनादेविकाईयह्यात् ‘मर्न्येयम्’ इति मन्यते।

२ “मल्लक” इति पाठन्तरस्।
उपन्यासिक एवं प्राकृतिक रूप से है तथा इतर विवरण में नहीं है।

सम्पादकार्य द्वारा संस्कार किया गया है।
(२७४) शरीरनाशे ऐकानितकायनितक कुर्सितः || सं. त. ॥

पर्यंत तर तुलाब्यापरे चौं बेगालंसंस्कारवशात भंमू तिर्षितः।
काॅल्यणपाकवशाततु परिती संस्कृते नित्यित्रिक्यति।
शरीरसिद्धौ च प्रार-व्यपारिकौ धार्मिकमें संस्कृते।
तथा चाचातृशूर्युते-"मोगेन तितुरे क्षप-प्रियत्वा सत सम्पत्ते।"
इति "तस्य तवदेव चिरं तावध विमोक्ते सत सम्पत्ते।" इति।
[ढान्दोग्य-६।१४।२]। प्रक्ष्यियमाणानविद्यासंस्क-रावरोपितः
संस्कृतेत्तथा तत्सामाध्यात्मः ध्रुतनिरसितिः ॥ ६७ ॥

स्यादेतु-"यदि संस्कृतेश्योपादिप धृतसरी-
कानितकायनितकमुकितः।॥ रस्त्या दिप कदा सत्य मोऽो महिष्यति।"

इति त आह्—

प्राते शरीरमेंदे चरितार्थवतात् प्रधाननाभिविद्युतोः।
ऐकानितकमात्यनितकमुभर्यं कैलयमामारोणै ॥ ६८ ॥

"प्राते" इति। अनार्थविपकानान्तवतूकर्मिक्यात्मानं तस्चत्रान-शिना बीजभावो दग्धः।
प्रार्थविपकानान्तवतुपमोगेन क्षये सति, "प्राते
शरीरमेंदे" इति=निनाशे-"चरितार्थवतात्।"
इति=कृतप्रयोजनवतू।
प्रधानस्य तस्मुपश्चर्यस्थियमारोणै।"ऐकानितकमू"=अक्षयमाभि "आय-नितकमू"=अन्नाशि-इत्युभर्यं "कैलयमू" दुःखत् यस्माभिविद्युतोऽर्रुणः। ॥ ६८ ॥

(२७५) सन्यासाखः
प्रजानेपापदिते अध्ययनमूद्रोन्मानाय
स्थिर्यमणिश्रीमदनित्रुण्णे यत्र भूमानामू। ॥ ६९ ॥

"पुरुष" इति। "गुहामू" गुहानिवासिः, स्फूर्तिविंद दुबाण्गमिति
यावत्। "प्रालिन्सा" कापिलेन, तामें अद्रामागिनविकेन इद्यति- यस्माभिविद्युतस्य तत्र भूमानामू।" इति। 'यत्र' ज्ञाने=यदर्मः।
यथा ‘चर्म्रे दीपिनं हंसत’ इति। “भूतानास्मि”=प्राणिनां “स्थिर्य-लपितप्रवधः” आग्मे: “चिन्तन्ते” ॥ ६९ ॥

(२७६) सांस्कृतयश्र-चर्म्रे गुहिक्रप्रवधः कविलाहरुण्य पशुप्रतिल-पन्यन्तम् ॥

पत्तूऽ पवित्रमध्ये सुलिपाःसुरुपुलकपम्य यद्दृशेहो।
आसुरपिप पशुप्रथिकशाय, तेन च बहुधा कर्तनन्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

“एतत्” इति। “एतत् पवित्रमध्ये”=पावनम्–दु:खत्रहेतोऽ: पापमन:
पुनालिते—“अर्यमध्ये”=सर्वमये पवित्रमध्ये सुलिपाः। “सुनि:” काविक:
“आसुरपिप पशुप्रथिकशाय, तेन च बहुधा कर्तनन्त्नम्” ॥ ७० ॥

शिल्पपर्यम्य शुगतमेश्वरश्रणेन वैतदायांमिः।
संक्षिप्तमार्थमातिना सम्यविश्वाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७७) ईशारक्षणे शुगतमेश्वरश्रणेन श्रवणम्।
“शिष्य” इति। आरात् याता तत्वेत्य
इथार्या, आर्यारत्यस्य सो दयम् “आर्यातितः”
इति ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७८) सत्तित्वकाराकारानात् शास्त्रम्, सकान्तार्यासुसुचकलात्
एतच शास्त्रम्, न तु प्रकारणमिलाह—
सत्ताम् किल्ये स्थरस्ते स्थरा: कविलाहरुण्य पशुप्रतिल-पन्यन्तम् ॥
आश्वायिकचिरहिताः: परवादविवजिकताधिकपि ॥ ७२ ॥

“सत्ताम्” इति। तथा च राजवत्तिकम् ॥

“प्रधानार्थिलेकाःकारात्मकस्यत्िकमत्यतंतः”
पाराध्यं च तथा उक्ते वियोगो योग एवं सं ॥
प्रणवयपांशः

श्रेयस्वतिरक्षत्वं मैविक्याः सम्पत्ता दशाः

विपर्ययं: पञ्चविवस्तथोत्तरा नव तुष्णयः ||

करणानामसाम्यमध्यमोऽविश्वासतिध्य मतम्

इति पदिति: पदार्थानामश्रमिः सह सिद्धमिः” || इति.||

सैयं पदिपदार्थी कथिताति सकहशास्त्रायथकथनाचेदप्रकरणमपि तु

शास्त्रमेवदमिति सिद्धम्। एकलमर्मवचम् पारार्थूः प्रधानमविक्रयोऽक्तम्।

अन्यत्वमक्तृत्वम् बहुवशेषैति पुरुषमविक्रयै। अस्तित्वम् विन्योगो योगश्चतु

लघुमविक्रयै। वृत्ति: स्पष्टितिः स्थूलसूक्ष्ममविक्रयै || ७२ ||

मनोरीस कुमुदानीव बोध्यन्ती सतां सदा।

श्रीवच्चपतिमिश्राणाः कृति: स्तात्तू तत्त्वकौमुदी।

इसाराघ्नन्तन्तरतन्त्रपतिभद्रादशदशिनि काकङ्क्षी-

मद्राच्छपतिमिश्रक्ता साध्वत्चकीकौमुदी॥

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