THE
SÁNKHYA APHORISMS
OF
KAPILA,
WITH
Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.
TRANSLATED BY
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THE present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English, is an amended reprint of three volumes,\(^1\) published in India, which have already become very scarce. An abridged form of those volumes,\(^2\) which subsequently

\(^1\) Their titles here follow:


\(^2\) Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica, issued in 1862 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 32 pages of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Ballantyne; the rest, by Professor Cowell.

The title of the abridged form runs: "The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, with Extracts from Vijnána Bhikṣu's Commentary," &c. But this is a misrepresentation, as regards Book I., which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that Book is derived, very largely, from other commentators than Vijnána.
appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but the Aphorisms.

While, in the following pages, all the corrections obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to account, an immense number of improved readings have been taken from another source. Three several times I carefully read Dr. Ballantyne’s translation in as many different copies of it; entering suggestions, in the second copy, without reference to those which had been entered in the first, and similarly making independent suggestions in my third copy. All these were, on various occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyne; and such of them as did not meet his approval were crossed through. The residue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied

Vedánti Mahádeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards the end, well nigh exclusively, Aniruddha. Some share of it, however, will not be traced; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne’s pandits, whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act, as by his own acknowledgment, of preparing his elucidations.

1 Many of them, especially in Books II.—VI., rest on readings of the original preferable to those which had been accepted.

Though not fully published till 1856, my edition of the Sánkhyaprajñá-bhāṣya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early as 1853; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My advice was unheeded, that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first had access. Greatly to his disservice, he would not be induced even to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical corrections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross, which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimens, pp. 197, 288, 357, 373, 374, 381, 390.
in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated, as successively introduced. The renderings proposed in the footnotes are, for the most part, from among those which have recently occurred to me as eligible.

That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years after he had made over the abridgment of them to Professor Cowell, for publication. Otherwise, I should have placed at his disposal the materials towards improvement of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight drudgery, are here made available.

The Sánkhya Aphorisms, in all the known commentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by accessible productions of that character, have been drawn from the works, of which only one has yet been printed, about to be specified:

I. The Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, by Vijnána Bhikshu. Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest MS. of it was transcribed in 1654.

1 Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of idiom which have been removed; as, for example, by the substitution of 'unless' for 'without,' of 'in time' for 'through time,' of 'presently' for 'just,' and of 'between the two' for 'between both.'

2 "At the time of his departure from India, in 1860, Dr. Ballantyne left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sánkhya Aphorisms." "Notice," in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No. 81.

3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sánkhya-sára.
II. The *Kápila - sánkhyá-pravachana - sútra-vritti*, by Aniruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, one which I procured to be copied, in 1855, from an old MS. without date.¹

III. The *Laghu-sánkhyá-sútra-vritti*, by Nágeśa. Of this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is entire; but the other is defective by the three first Books.

IV. The *Sánkhyá-pravachana-sútra-vritti-sára*, by Vedánti Mahádeva. Here, again, only one of two MSS. which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in places, freely interpolated from No. I. Neither of them has a date.

Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the shorter, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the learned Professor Cowell, but for whose searching criticisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in several instances, have been far less accurate than they now are.

F. II.

**MARLESFORD, SUFFOLK,**

*Aug. 28, 1884.*

¹ I once had a second copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me.
THE great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary, the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible; they being designed, not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity which must needs attach to them, in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brāhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve, further, the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East, as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion.

J. R. B.

BENARES COLLEGE,
5th January, 1852.
a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila!°

b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain].:²

The subject proposed. Aph. 1. Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

1 श्रीकपिलमुनये नमः ||

2 ऋष्य जगद्धृष्टिधिपुष्पमहामुनि: कपिलः फलसान्दर्श्यानस्य फलच्छाद्या साधनप्रवृत्ता कारणां प्रश्नां प्रकाशितान्दर्श्यमाह ||
a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction;¹ [the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,—viz., (1) due to one's self (ádhyátmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ádhibhautika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ádidaivika),—is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation (see Sáhitya-darpana,§2)]² because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case.

c. But then, let it be that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty

¹ अथ शब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥
² चित्रिङ्गमकालोक्तिकार्थीतिकार्थिद्विवहः-पस्य दुःखस्यालगतनितिवृत्तिरत्नपुरुषार्थेऽशतुर्षु पुरुषार्थे शतु्रूप्ते मध्ये श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थं इत् शत्स्याग्यां श्रव्य-चान्मोक्षस्याश्चयौ विदितं भावः ॥
power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i.e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]:

\[\text{Aph. 2. The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] cessation.}\]

\[\text{1} \text{नन्वत्तृत्त्रनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थेऽस्तथा} \text{पुरुषान्यताख्यातिहृद्यत्त्वानहेतुशास्त्रप्रवृत्ते का हेतु: शारीरदु:खनिवर्तेकानामीशाधारिणीं मानस-}
\text{दुःखनिवर्तेकाना वरस्त्रीमित्रानामाधिमत्वेति-}
\text{कदुःखनिवर्तेकाना नीतिशास्के पदिप्रद्रत्ययस्या-}
\text{नाध्यासनानादीनामाधिदैविकदुःखनिवर्तेकाना म-}
\text{शिमनमहाषाधानीं सुकराणस सत्तोनानेकजनम-}
\text{परंपरायाससाधे तत्त्वज्ञानेन एतिदुःखरे प्रवृत्तेदुर्ल-}
\text{भवेन शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेदुर्लभंतर्लादत्र ज्ञाह ||}

\[\text{2} \text{Instead of निवृत्ते: the reading of Aniruddha, and of most MSS., Vijnāna has, to the same effect, निवृत्ते. Ed.}\]
a. 'The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned\(^1\) [§ 1. c.].

b. 'The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.\(^2\)

c. *Why* is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of *pain* is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general,\(^3\) [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1. b.)].

d. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be *not* easy [§1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired.\(^4\)

e. But then, grant that *future* pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by

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\(^1\) दृष्टादुःक्ष्याष्ठादिहृपात् Ꞵ

\(^2\) तत्सिद्धं:ःखाययनवृत्तिसिद्धि: Ꞵ

\(^3\) न भवति कुतः। निन्द्रृतेऽःखनिवृत्तेऽरनन्तर-मिति शेषोऽनुवृत्तिदश्नादुःखजातीयोत्सत्तिदश्न-नात्।

\(^4\) अर्थं भावो नान्नैस्पायथेपु:ःखान्नतिक्ष्विविशिष्टा दुःखनिवृत्तिभेऽवति तथदुपायायेऽत्तथुःखेषु नश्शेष्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्सत्तिदश्नाद्र। तस्मादसुकर्मादिपि त-ञ्ज्ञानमेष्टितविष्मिति Ꞵ
again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself],
there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt
he states [as follows]:

\[\text{प्रात्यहिकस्त्रिपीतीकारवत्तमतीतीकारचेष्टनात्पूर-}
\[\text{पायेचिरम्} \quad \text{II} \quad \text{III}\]

\[\text{Aph. 3. [Let us consider the doubt]}
that the soul’s desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for
the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

\[\text{a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue],}
then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul’s
desire, the cessation of pain; just as one should eat, when
there is hunger; and thus there is the soul’s desire of the
eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this
[doubt] he states the recognized decision:}

\[\text{सर्वसंभवालंभेचिरपि सत्तासंभवादेयः} \quad \text{3 \quad प्रमाण}-
\[\text{कुशले:} \quad \text{II} \quad \text{III}\]

\[1 \text{ ननु मा भूदार्थादिभिम्मातिविदुःखनिवृत्तिसत्वापि वुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकः तु भाविदुःखनिवृ-}
\[\text{तिरिपि स्वादिति श्रद्धते।}

\[2 \text{ यदा दुःखमुत्पत्तीते तदा तप्तिकर्त्तवं तथा}
\[\text{च दुःखनिवृत्ति: पुरुषार्थेऽऽथ यदा छ्रुद्दर्दा भेद-}
\[\text{हृदं भृज्ञानस्य दुःखनिवृत्ति: पुरुषार्थे इति सिद्धान्त-}
\[\text{यति \quad II}\]

\[3 \text{ The more ordinary reading of MSS., and that of Aniruddha, is}
\[\text{सत्ताठौ, ‘excellence,’ not सत्ताठौ with Vijnāna. \textit{Ed.}}\]
Aph. 4. This [method of palliatives (§ 3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,—i.e., even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art];—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul’s aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence,¹ [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof² [of his assertion]:

¹ नहि सर्वविषमन्देश्योऽसर्वविस्मिन्काले वैद्यादयं: सन्ति सभवेचिनि सत्वेचिनि वैद्यार्दिनां सत्वाभावाद्यः।
चहि वैद्यादितिभिरष्पुष्यमोधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते। किं च शरीरदुःखाधमे मानसादेतत्स्यं
संभव इति न सर्वेशा दुःखाधिमोकः। तस्मात्र-माणकुशलेऽन्त्रग्रिदपरुषार्था हेय इति॥

² युक्तन्तरमाह॥
Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted,] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§ 1. c.]; since Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [i.e., of Liberation]; because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text: 'There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul,\(^1\) [with the utter exclusion of pain].'

b. But then [it may be suggested], when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies [as follows]:\(^2\)

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\(^1\) न तैतिरियायीत्तसः खोजन्ते यतितत्वं मोक्षस्य निविष्ठेन सवैदुः खोजन्त्वहुः पीतार्थः। अत्मलाभायर्न न विद्यत इति सर्वाभक्षर्षशुतेरपि तस्याधने तत्स्निज्ञान एव यतितत्वम्।

\(^2\) ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते बन्धादिति प्रतीयते। स च
Aph. 6. And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 19. b.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place.¹

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage’s being essential² [§ 5. b.]:

Aph. 7. There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.

¹ Liberation must be possible; else the means would not have been enjoined.

² That bondage is essential.

बन्धः किं व्याबाहिविक उतागल्युकः। चाये नाशायोगोऽन्ये चेत्त्वत एव नन्दग्रति। किंतत्वबजानेनेवत चाह॥

प्रयोगवाच्यम् स्वाभाभिकागन्तुकायोमाष्ट्र-स्योपादेवलेवा मिष्टी:। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तियेष्या च माष्ट्रस्य तथा वयं वर्णु शक्रुम इत्यथः॥

¹ उभयार्चनस्य स्वाभाभिकागन्तुकायोमाष्ट्र-स्योपादेवलेवा मिष्टी:। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तियेष्या च माष्ट्रस्य तथा वयं वर्णु शक्रुम इत्यथः॥

² वर्ण प्रयोगस्योपपत्तियेष्यां तावेत्यक्षात्वर्षिकविकादेव प्रयोग दूषेर्याय।॥
a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is essential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.¹

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Īśwara-gitā]: ‘If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.’²

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] ‘Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, (§ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?’ Therefore he declares [as follows]:³

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¹ दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेऽमोक्षामाइन्यो दुःखयोगः स च पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः। तथा सति भोक्ष्याय साधनापदेशस्य चैतत्स्य स्मार्तस्य च विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति श्रेष्ठः। न ह्यर्गनेः स्वाभाविकादात्रा-प्रायान्मोक्षः संभवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावह्यभाव-विचारदिति भावः।

² उस्म चेष्बरगीतायाम्। यज्ञात्मा मलिनो स्ववच्चा विकारी स्यात्स्यभावतः। नाहि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिज्ञमात्तरशैरपीति॥

³ भववननुष्ठानं किमेतावते सत्य ओह॥
Aph. 8. Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i.e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows]:

नाशकृपदेशविधिरपदिष्टिप्रयुपदेशः ॥ ५ ॥

1 स्वभावस्यानपायितादनुशाननलक्ष्यामप्रामायण ॥

2 ननु भूतिभलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यात्वचाह ॥
An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9. There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning.¹

b. Here he comes upon a doubt:²

शुक्पपतवादीजवचेत् ॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removable.

Aph. 10. If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by

¹ शशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठानं न संभवति यत उपदिष्टे विहितेष्यशक्योपायेनो- 
पदेश एव न भवति किं तृपदेशभास्य एव वाधि-
तमथैं वेदोपधि न बाध्यतीति न्यायादिल्यर्थः ॥

² ऋच शशक्ये ।
fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus], such is the meaning¹ [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply].

b. He declares² [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised]:

\[\text{शत्कुङ्क्वननुक्ष्यवाभ्यं नाशक्षोपदेशं:} \| 99 \|\]

\[\text{Decision that an essential property may be hidden, but not removed.}\]

\[\text{Aph. 11. Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible].}\]

a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of] something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two

² समाध्वचे \|
instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogi, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.¹

b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.:²

¹ उक्तद्विशाश्तयोरंप्रश्चकाय स्वाभाविकायोप-देशे लोकानां न भवति। कुतः। शक्ति-नुक्षेवाभ्यः दृष्टान्तह्ये। शुक्लादेवराविभावतिराभि-वाचेत्व भवतो न तु। शाकुक्स्याङुरश्रुक्षापायः। रजकादित्यापारिष्ठोगिसंकल्पादिद्बिषभ। रक्षप्रभृत-बीजयोऽ पुनः। शाकुक्स्याङुरश्रुक्षार्ब्बावाद्वादित भावः।

² एवं बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकायं निराकृत्य नैमित्तिक-कलमपि निराकरिष्यचिनिन्न्यानि कालादीनि निराकरेति।
Aph. 12. Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men,¹ [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any].

Aph. 13. Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason].

a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? 'For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated

¹ न कालनिर्मित्तकः पुरूषस्य बल्यो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य कालस्य सर्वेः पुरुषेऽः सर्वकालावः खेदेन संवन्धानुमुक्तामुल्लभ्यवस्यानुपपतेः
or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated, also.\(^1\)

\[\text{नावस्यातो देहर्म्मवाचस्या:} \| 94 \|\]

Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.

a. By ‘condition’ we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.\(^2\)

b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares:\(^3\)

\(^1\) देशयोगतािपि न बन्धः। कुतः। ऋषमात्रृवेष्मूच्छोहान्मुहुक्तामुहुक्तासवपुरुषसंबन्धान्मुहुक्तस्यापि बन्धाप्रतिविरित्यथः।

\(^2\) ऋवस्या संघातिविशेषः। ततो न बन्ध-स्तस्या देहर्म्मवाचचायथम् सामृद्धयवत्थकेमुहुक्तस्यापि बन्धाप्रतिविरिति भावः।

\(^3\) ननु पुरुषस्यैवावस्या स्तातत्त्राह॥
Aph. 15. Because this soul is unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned. ¹

Aph. 16. Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal, ³ [if the case were as you imagine].

¹ इतिहृतै पुरुषस्यासंज्ञालादवस्याया देहम-चधमेल्लमिति पूर्वसूचेशान्वयः ||

² The commentator Aniruddha omits the final word, च. Ed.

³ Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result.' For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53, with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151, of this Book.

Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.
BOOK I., APH. 16.

17

a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated\(^1\), [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate\(^2\) [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not] even in such cases as the universal dissolution\(^3\) [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul].

c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection

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\(^1\) न विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्धः
कर्मणोत्यधमेवाद्वादनात्मधर्मेवादित्यथः। अन्य-
धर्मेण साक्षात्नयस्य बन्धे च मुक्तस्यापि बन्धायते॥

\(^2\) Upādhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed.

\(^3\) ननु स्वेदाधिकर्मणां बन्धाङ्गीकारे नायं द्रष्ट
इत्याशुयेन हेतुतरमाहातिप्रस्तेश्येति प्रलयादान-
वपि दुःखयोगुपवन्धायपि श्रेयेऽथः॥
of the *mind*, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the *soul*, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

\[\text{विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधमेले II १७ II}

\[Aph. 17. \text{If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.}

\text{a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the *mind*, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of *mind*, but of *soul*, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a *reflection* of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflection is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result}^2 [deducible from our theory].

\[\text{नन्वें दुःखयोगहृपोषापिबन्धः कर्मसामानाधिकरणानुरैधिनन्यन्यधिबन्धः दुःखस्य चित्रधमे-तायाः सिद्धवाच किमेण पुरुषस्यापिबन्धः कल्याणेन बन्धः}\]

\[\text{दुःखयोगहृपवन्यस्यायन्यधमेर्वे विचित्रधमेर्वे वि-}\]

\[\text{चित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः कश्चिदेव दुःखमोक्षा कश्चिएनि छेति विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः:}\]

\[\text{अतः पुरुषेश्चिप}^1\]
b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakṛiti) is directly the cause of bondage:

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

Aph. 18. If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] ‘no;’ [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say ‘no;’ because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution,³ [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

¹ सामात्प्रकृतितिनिमित्तकलमपि बन्धस्यापाक-रूपि ॥

² Here and in the comment, I have corrected त्स्यापि. Ed.

³ ननु प्रकृतितिनिमित्तार्थाय भवलित चेत्त यत-स्त्या चर्प्रकृतेर्पथुच्छरसूचि बन्ध्यमाणं संयोग-पारतक्षणं तेन विनापि बन्धकले प्रलयादापि बन्ध्यप्रस्त्रात् ॥
b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhaná¹ [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c.²

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire;³ [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle⁴ [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]:

न नित्यशुद्भुजमुखस्वभावस्य तत्योगस्तथ्यो-गादृते ॥ १५ ॥

¹ This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed.

² निबन्धना चेदिति पाटे प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाबहिता चेदिति योज्यम् ॥

³ झंठा यत्परतन्त्र प्रकृतिबैन्धकारणं भवेत्स्मादेव संयोगविशेषार्थापाधिको बन्धादिग्रिसंंयोगाज्ञानाध्यवस्तित ॥

⁴ स्वसिद्धान्तमुनिव्र प्रसंज्ञनात्तराल एववाद-धारायति ॥

⁵ Here follows, in the first edition, the particle तु, for which no authority has been discovered. The word translating it I have retained, but bracketed. Ed.
What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

Aph. 19. [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore,\(^1\) without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place.\(^2\)

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, ['not without']. For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential [§ 5. b.] nor adventitious\(^3\) [§ 11. b.].

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1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnāna here supplies the comment. Ed.

2 तस्मात्वेऽव्यागते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुर-
शस्य तवोगा बन्धसंपर्कारस्ति। अधि तु तत् एव
बन्धः॥

3 बन्धस्योपाधिकल्लभाय नन्द्रयेन वक्तौक्षिं।
c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiśeṣikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says ‘which is ever,’ &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously,¹ [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows: ‘As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose]

¹ वैशेषिकाशास्त्रीय पारमार्थिक दुःखयोग इति भमेऽ मा भूतिदित्यदेहाम निर्येव्यादिः। यथा स्वभाव-वशुभवाचिकस्य रागोऽ न जपायोऽ विगा घटते तथेऽव नित्यश्रद्धादिस्वभावस्य पुरुषश्चायापाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगोऽ न घटते स्वतोऽ दुःखायसंभवादित्यर्थं:।
that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul\(^1\) [is regarded as being affected by pain].’

e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage,\(^2\) [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19.c.]. And now enough as to that point.\(^3\)

g. Now he rejects [§ 18.d.] certain causes of [the soul’s] bondage, preferred by others:\(^4\)

\(^1\) तदुद्दृढः सारे। यथा हि केवलो रक्तः स्फरिको लक्ष्यते जने॥ रक्षकायुपधानेन तद्भरमपूर्व इति॥

\(^2\) तच् नित्यशुद्धं सदापुरुषपापशून्यवं नित्य-बुझलमलुभच्छवलं नित्यमुखवं सदापरमार्थिन-कदुःखायुक्तवं प्रतिविक्षरयं सङ्क्योगस्तुपारमार्थिन-को वन्य इति भावः॥

\(^3\) तथा च संयोगविशेष एवाच वन्यहेतुतथा सूचकृतविभ्रेत इत्यलम॥

\(^4\) इदानीमयाभिभ्रेतान्वन्यहेतूनिरस्यति॥
The Vedántic tenet on this point disputed.

Aph. 20. Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul’s bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word ‘too’ is used with reference to the previously mentioned ‘Time,’ &c., [§ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul’s] union with bondage result directly from ‘Ignorance,’ as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sūtra, § 20. b.)]; because, since their ‘Ignorance’ is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.

c. But, if ‘Ignorance’ be a reality [as some assert], then he declares [as follows]:

The Vedántti cannot evade the objection, without stultifying himself.

Aph. 21. If it [‘Ignorance’] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

1 ऋपितम्भं पूर्वात्त्वकालायप्रेक्ष्यय ||
2 ऋवियानालापि न सास्त्राध्ययोगोद्वैतवादिनां तेषामविययाय ऋषवस्तुलेन तत्र बन्धानाचित्यात्वहि स्वामराज्ज्वा बन्धनं दृष्टमीत्यथे: ||
3 ऋविययाय वस्तुले लाह ||
BOOK I., APH. 22.

25

a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyáya Aphorisms I., § 31] of the unreality of 'Ignorance;' and so you stultify yourself.

b. He states another objection:

विज्ञातीयहैतापतिच्छा ॥ २२ ॥

The Vedánti cannot evade the objection, without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.

1 यदि चावियाया वस्तुनं स्वीकिते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्यावियानृततब्य हानिरित्यथे: ॥
2 दूषषान्तरमाह ॥
3 यद्यविया वस्तुभूतानादिस्तदा नियात्मतुल्या। ऋतान्तः विजातीयहैततमाः। ते हि वेदान्तिनो उदितवादिनः सजातीयविजातीयहैताभावं मन्यत | इति ॥
b. He ponders a doubt:¹

Aph. 23. If [the Vedánti alleges, regarding ‘Ignorance,’ that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say ‘no,’ for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is: if [the Vedánti says that] ‘Ignorance’ is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal,² [like Plato’s ὄν καὶ ὑπό ὄν: (see Vedánta-sára, § 21)].

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal, we say] ‘no;’ because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say: it is not right to say that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words ‘because no such thing,’ &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known.

¹ शंकूः ॥

² चबिव्या न सति चेन विज्ञातीयदेहताप्सेनाप्यसति कार्यापलभात्म्यं तु सदस्तूपा चेदि-लयः ॥
For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyāya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the impor.¹

b. Again he ponders a doubt:²

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedánti may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeṣikas and others.'

a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeṣikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyāyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'ignorance,' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see

¹ सदस्तूपाविग्रहिति न युक्तमित्यर्थः। तच्छेतु-माह ताद्रूगिति सदस्तूपस्य कस्यचिदिपि पदार्थ-स्याप्रतीति:। चवाादास्यदे हि वस्तुनि दृष्टान्त ज्ञा-वशयकः स च भवन्येप्रसिद्ध इति भावः॥

² पुनः श्रद्धते॥
Vedánta-sára, § 21]; because this is established by proofs,¹ [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 35)].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories² [see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 1].

c. He confutes³ [this pretence of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]:

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

Aph. 26. Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaiseshika, § 25]; still, since being and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to

¹ न वचं नियतपदार्थेष्वादिन: | ऋताप्रतिते

¹ वचं नियतपदार्थेष्वादिन: | ऋताप्रतिते

² ऋताप्रतिते वचं नियतपदार्थेष्वादिन: | स हि शास्त्रपदार्थेष्वादिति दीति ।

² ऋताप्रतिते वचं नियतपदार्थेष्वादिन: | स हि शास्त्रपदार्थेष्वादिति दीति ।

³ परिहरति ।
admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness: otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning.¹

b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individually; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence² of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]:³

¹ पदार्थनियमो मास्तु तथापि भावाभाववि-रोधनायात्मिकत्व युक्तिविहडस्य सदसदात्मकप-दार्शेस्य संग्रहो भववचनमाचाराच्छाणां न सम्भ-वति। अन्यथा वालकायुत्स्यायायात्मिकत्व संयहः स्त्वादित्यर्थः।

² Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed.

³ कैतिकालिका श्राहुः सत्तिबाहविषयः: द्वसिकास्तेषां वासनया जीवस्य वल्क्क इति तहूँ-यति।
The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, as causing the soul’s bondage, rejected.

a. ‘Thereof,’ i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning.

b. He states the reason of this [impossibility]:

\[ न बायाध्यन्तरयोपर्वपरज्ञोपरस्मावाःपि \] वधानात्समस्यापारिति पुष्य्योरि ॥ २८ ॥

1 Instead of -निमित्तकः, Aniruddha has the substantially equivalent -निमित्तः. Ed.

2 ऋष्यात्मनः। ऋनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाह-रुपेनानादिकायिनी विषयवासना तत्त्त्विमित्तकार्पि बन्या न संभवतीत्यथे: ॥

3 ऋन हतुमाह ॥

4 Dr. Ballantyne had, most probably by mere oversight, the unauthorized बायाध्यन्तर, which I have corrected. The reading उपरजयः, here followed, is, perhaps, that of Aniruddha. उपरज्यः is the form of the word recognized by Vijnāna; and I know of no manuscript warrant for the alteration of it seen in the following page, 1,—an extract from his commentary. It is, further, a regular derivative, which the other is not, if it is not even unjustified by grammatical prescription. Ed.

5 Aniruddha has मेद्, ‘division,’ in place of -वधानः, ‘separation.’ Ed.
Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pāṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pāṭaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call ‘influence’ (vāsanā) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-basket\(^1\) [to which they impart their odour.]

b. By the word ‘also’ the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 15)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected\(^2\) [with the matter of the present aphorism].

\(^1\) तन्मते परिच्छेदः देहान्तरस्य एवात्मा तस्याभ्यंतरस्य न वाह्यविषयेः सहापरश्योपरज्ञक-भावोपिधि संभवति। कुन्तः। भुमस्यपारंतिपुच्च-स्थःयोरिव देशयवधानादि-दिनयथः। संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनायहं उपरागो तृष्णो यथा मन्निष्ठावस्त-योरिः वा पुष्पपुष्पकयोरिः॥

\(^2\) ऋपिष्यक्षेन स्वमते संयोगाभावादि: समु-च्छीयते॥
c. Srughna and Pātaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart.¹

d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]:

बयोरेक्तेश्लब्ध्यापरागान व्यवस्था \| २५ \|

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].

a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.³

¹ सुधपाटलिपुच्छ विप्रकृष्टेश्वविशेष।

² ननु भवतार्कियारामिवास्माकमातमनो विषयदेशगमनादिषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो व-\\| । तचाह।

³ एकसिमनिश्चमते लथायुपरागान्यो न
b. Here he ponders a doubt:

\[\text{अध्यापक मश्कगते} \parallel 30 \parallel\]

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if \(^2\) [this be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes,\(^3\) [as follows]:

\[\text{न दैयरेरक्षालयोगादुपकारकं} \parallel 31 \parallel\]

\[\text{संभवतीति शेषः। कुतः। यरमाहूयोवैद्युक्तमक्तना-} \]
\[\text{न व्यवस्था मुक्तस्थापि बन्धापन्नरित्यथः।} \parallel\]

\(^1\) छच शहक्ति। \parallel

\(^2\) नवेकदेशसंबन्धेन विषयसंग्रामसायैसायैदुधुप-\]
\[\text{वशादेयोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्यथः।} \parallel\]

\(^3\) परिहरति। \parallel
Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the ‘unseen’ [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He ponders a doubt:²

पुचकमेवदिति चेत् ॥ ३२ ॥

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that

¹ तब मते कर्तृभाष्कर्मदा०देककालासंबन्धाच नैवायप्रायिकारकभावे नर कर्तृनिष्ठादृष्टिने भौक्तृनिष्ठे विषयोपरायः संभवतीत्यथः ॥

² श्रद्धाः ॥
the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindú Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiate the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning¹ [of the heretic].

b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact.²

This will not help the heretic's argument.

\[ \text{Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing ;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.} \]

a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of

¹ ननु यथा पितृनिषेण गभोधाभानादिना पुच्छक-मेंशा पुच्छयोपकारारा भवति तद्यथाधिकरणेनेव-टृष्णेन भोक्तुविषयोपरागः स्यादिन्यथः \]

² दृष्टान्तासिद्धापरिहरति \]

³ Aniruddha has गभोधाभानादिकमेंशा; and Dr. Ballantyne's rendering suits it. \textit{Ed.}

⁴ A common reading, but inferior, is संस्क्रयते. \textit{Ed.}
the son, by [means of the performance of] the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Brāhmaṇ would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one,² [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction³ [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

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¹ The brackets are of my inserting. Ed.
² तत् लब्धते गम्बोधागारदिकम्यापि पुनेः-पकारो न घटते हि यस्माच्छ गम्बोधागारमार्भ्य जन्मपर्यन्तस्यायेक ज्ञात्मा नाति यो जन्माच्छ-रकालीनकोधाधिकारार्ष्यं संस्कृयते सता च दृष्टान्तासिद्धः ||
³ यस्माच्छ दृष्टान्तासिद्धिरित्यथः: ||
c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] ‘But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,’¹ [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:

\[\text{स्थिरकार्यासिद्धे श्राणिकालम्} \text{ अधिकरणम् } 34 \]

\[\text{Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].}\]

\(a. \text{ ‘Of bondage’: this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].²} \]

\(b. \text{ And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:}\)

\(\\text{1) Bondage, &c., is momentary; }\\)

\(\\text{2) Because it exists, }\\)

\(\\text{3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.³}\\)

¹ ननु बन्धस्यापि श्राणिकालद्विनियतकारणाको-भावकारणाको वा बन्धोस्वित्वाश्येनापरः नास्तिकः प्रत्यविषिष्टे ॥

² बन्धस्येति शेषः ॥

³ तथा चाकारणक एवास्वित्वाशयः । तथा चायं प्रयोगो बन्धादिकं श्राणिकं सत्ताहोपशिखा-दिवदिति ॥
c. And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., ‘existence’] does not extend unduly\(^1\) [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute, [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, ‘since there is no such thing as a permanent result’\(^2\) [§34].

*d. He objects\(^3\) [to this heretical view]:

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् II 35 II

Aph. 35. No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. b.], taken from such facts of recognition as, ‘what I saw, that same do I touch,’ [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz.:

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent;
(2) Because it exists,

\(^1\) Vyabhichāra is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by ‘contradiction,’ ‘derogation,’ ‘failure,’ ‘impossibility,’ ‘unoperativeness,’ &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.

\(^2\) न च घटदैव व्यभिचारलस्यापि पक्षसमलात्।
एतदेवाच्च स्यिरकार्यांसिङ्गरित्यनेन॥

\(^3\) दूषयति॥
(3) [Everything that exists is permanent.] as a jar, or the like.¹

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary:] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., 'All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?'²

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic:] because his instance is not a fact.

¹ न कस्यापि श्रीशिकां यद्वाच्छं तदेवाहं स्पृशा-मीतयादिश्चल्भिन्नानुभूतितेन वन्धाधिकं स्वरं सवृजार्वादिवृद्धिप्रत्यन्तामात्रेन श्रीशिकास्य बाधा-दिन्यर्थः: II

² सदेव सैम्येदमय श्रीसीदियादिश्चुतिधि: कथमसत: सज्जायेतेयादिश्रीशैलातिरियुक्तिबिभिन्न कार्य-कारशाक्तिकन्तिलष्ट्रप्रज्ञेश्च श्रीशिकास्यन्नामात्रय विरोधान्न श्रीशिकाः कस्यापीतिथः: II
a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary character does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§ 34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import.¹

If things were momentary, there could be no relation of cause and effect.

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect, [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:²

युगपञ्जायमानयेन कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३५ ॥

¹ दृष्टान्ते दीपशिखादै ऋषिकवल्लभसिद्धेन ऋ- षिकवल्लभानुमानमित्यर्थं। किं च सूक्ष्मानेकक्षिका- नाकलनेन ऋषिकवल्लभम एव तच तवेति भावः।

² किं च ऋषिकवल्लद् मृदुरादिन्यले कार्यका- रणभावो नापपयते। न च नास्त्येव स इति वाच्यं कार्यार्थिनं प्रवृत्त्यवाच्यानुपपय्या तत्सिद्धे- रित्यभिप्रेत्याह॥
It is not between two things that the relation of cause and effect exists.

Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar’s subsequent production]. Neither is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows] :

A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is ‘unfit,’ i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its
substantial cause,¹ [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it].

b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection² [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]:

\[ \text{तद्दृष्टवेत \ तद्योगाद्भिन्यव्यभिचारादिदि न} \ |
\[ \text{Aph. 40. Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.³} \]

\[ \text{a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'⁴ The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and sub} \]

¹ पूर्वस्य कार्यस्यापायकाल उन्नरस्य कार्यस्यायागात्त्वत्त्वाच्यनाचित्वादि न ्छाशिकतवादे संभ-\nवति कार्यकारणभाव उपादानकारणानुगतत्तत्यैव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्थः} \ |

² उपादानकारणामधिकृत्यैव दृष्टान्ततर्माह} \ |

³ For vyabhichāra, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed.

⁴ Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichāra. Ed.
stance,\(^1\) are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,\(^2\) that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion.] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent,\(^3\) belong to opposite times,\(^4\) [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause,

\(^1\) I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' \textit{Ed.}

\(^2\) The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singular number, see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. \textit{Ed.}

\(^3\) 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38, a, at p. 41, supra. \textit{Ed.}

\(^4\) पूर्वस्य भावकाल उत्तरस्यासंबन्धादुभवत्वविषयभिः
चारादपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेषः। यदौ-
पादेयम तदौपादानं यदौपादानाभावस्तदौपादेया-
भाव इत्यव्यव्यतिरिक्ता उपादेयोपादानयोः का-
र्याकारणभावयाहकी तै च धारणिकाचे कृमिक-
योग्यतै:र्विन्दुकालवाच सङ्ख्यः।
as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies:\(^1\)

अभ्यासों में नियमः \(\frac{87}{1}\)

Aph. 41. If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning.\(^2\)

b. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists, except Thought, neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no real exist-

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\(^1\) तनु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभावमार्गेऽव कारणतात्त्विति तचाह \(\frac{87}{1}\)

\(^2\) पूर्वभावमार्गाभ्युपगी चेदेश्वरादाननिर्मिति

नियमोऽन स्याचिनिमित्तकारणानामापि पूर्वभाववाविशेषादीग्रेव वि निमित्तोपादानयेवार्थमः

सर्वेश्लाकासिद्ध इत्यथः \(\frac{87}{1}\)
ence]. Therefore it has no cause; for it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these\(^1\) [heretics]:

\[न विज्ञानमाचं बाध्यप्रतीति: | ॥ ४२ ॥\]

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External, as well as for the Internal.

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.

\(a\). That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.\(^2\)

\(b\). But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies: \(^3\)

\[तदभावे तदभावाच्छूत्यं तत्ति: | ॥ ४३ ॥\]

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].

\(^1\) ओपरे नास्तिका ओवः। विज्ञानातिरिन्द्वस्त्त्वभावेन बन्धोऽपि स्वप्नपदार्थेन | ओत्तेज्यन्तमिथ्यावेन न तत्र कारणमंत्रिति तन्मत्तमपाकरोऽति ॥

\(^2\) न विज्ञानमाचं तत्सं बाध्यार्थानामपि विज्ञानव्यप्रतीतिसिद्धन्वादिस्वर्यः ॥

\(^3\) नन्दु स्वप्नप्रतीतिदृष्टान्ततन्वायामाओपितदुपपतिरिति । तत्चत ह ॥
a. That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought.¹

b. ‘Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all:’ with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:²

\[ \text{शृण्यं ततवं भावे विन्यथति वस्तुधर्मस्वाभिना-} \]
\[ \text{शस्य ॥ ४४ ॥} \]

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

Aph. 44. The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only

¹ ततः बायाभावे शृणयं प्रसज्जेत । कुः ।
बायाभावे विज्ञानभावान्ततितिहि विषयसाधिका वायाभावतिश्रेष्ठ विषयं साध्येविज्ञानप्रतीति
तिरंप न विज्ञानं साध्येदिति भावः ॥

² ऋशु ततः शृणयेव तत्वमस्तथ बन्धकारणां
वेष्यांसमयुक्तं तुख्तवादिति नात्तिकाशिरोमणिः
प्रयवतिष्ठते ॥
truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that
which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of
all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonenti-
ties, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and end-
ing], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal,
and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what?
This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned
for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to
perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the
very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting
its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased
to perish]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He rejects² [this heretical view]:

\textbf{अपवाद्माचमबुद्धानाम} \textit{॥ ॥}

\textit{Nihilism denied; as the indiscernible is in-
destructible.} \textit{Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-
assertion of unintelligent persons.}

a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this
is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-
assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable, because it

¹ शून्यमेव तत्वम् । यतं सर्वं श्री प्रभावो विन-
श्यति यथा विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वभवदत्: सर्वं-
वस्तूनामाच्यतयोर्भावमाच्यलानमध्ये श्रीजिकसङ्कं
सांवृत्तिकः न पार्मार्थिंं वन्धादि। ततं किं केन
बद्धेत् इत्याशयः । भावानं विनाशिले हेतुवेतु-
धर्मवाहिनिश्चत्त्वोति विनाशस्य वस्तुस्भाववा-
त्वभावं तु विहाय न पदार्थस्तिष्ठतीतयः ॥

² परिहर्ति ॥
exists; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.¹

b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that ‘the jar is old’ [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that ‘the jar has passed away,’ it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away.²

c. He states another objection ³ [to the heretical view]:

उभयपञ्चसमानश्रेष्ठमादयमपि⁴ || ४६ ||

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph. 46. Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

¹ ऋणुद्धाराण मूढानामपवादसारं भावलादिनाश्चित्तिमित्ति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकार्याभाभेन निरवाक्षनमासां नाशासंभवत् ||

² किं बहुना। कार्याकाशमपि न विनाशसिद्धः। घटो जीवो इति प्रत्येकेन घटोदतित इत्यादिप्रत्येकापि घटादृश्तिताख्यायाः अवस्थाया एव सिद्धः ||

³ दूषशाल्लतरसाह ||

⁴ Aniruddha, according to the MSS. which I have seen, reads -खेमादर्श. Ed.
a. This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one; because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [as stated in § 42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., ‘Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul’s aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],’ this, too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows]:

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1 यशीक्षांकाञ्चनप्रक्षेपं विज्ञानमाचपक्षेपं सह
समानवशेकवचुल्यानिरसनहेतुकवाद्यमयर्म पद्धो
न सम्यक। यशीकपक्षानिरास्येन प्रत्यभिन्ना-
रति:विज्ञानपक्षानिरास्येन बाह्यप्रतीत्यादिशाचार्यो
समान इति भावः॥

2 यदपि दुःखनिवृत्तिः परत्यादानतया च
शून्यमेतः पुरूषाध्यात्मिति तैमैन्यते तदपि दुः-
क्षमित्याह॥
Aph. 47. In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

a. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predictable].

b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside:

Aph. 48. Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result].

1 तु:खनिवृत्तिहृदयं दु:खनिवृत्तिसाधनत्या वा शुन्यस्य पुरुषार्थिः स्वात्। तत्र न घटते स्वनिव-ष्ट्रानेव सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थवत्तावगमामात्स्य-रस्य पुरुषस्यान्ज्ञीकारादित्यथः॥

2 इद्दानीं पूर्वनिरस्त्तविशिष्टायात्मात्मिकसंभाव्या-न्यपत्यानि बन्धकारशानि निरस्यने॥
a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic \(^1\) [of discussion].

b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.\(^2\)

c. He states a reason for this:\(^3\)

\[\text{Tishkiyastu tadasambvata} \ll 49 \ll\]

\(\text{What is all-pervading does not change place.}\)

\(\text{Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or, in other words, without motion].}\)

\(\text{a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].}\(^4\)

\(\text{b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size}\)

\(^1\) प्रकरणाङ्कमेव लभ्यते

\(^2\) गतिविशेषाः जरीरप्रवेशादिक्रपादपि पुष्पस्य न बन्ध इत्यर्थेण

\(^3\) ऋच हेतुमाह

\(^4\) निष्क्रियस्य विभोः पुष्पस्य तदसंभवाज्यसंभवादित्यर्थे
of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,

but this conjecture he repels:

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the

soul is other than all-pervading; be-

cause] by its being limited, since it

would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there

would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishable-

ness].

a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be,

like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in di-

mension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like,

in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perish-

able, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle,

[that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to

the motion* [of the soul, by showing that the motion is

not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:

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1 Śvetāsvatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed.

2 ननु चुरितमृत्यूंयोरिहलोकपरलोकगमनागमन-नान्यवेशात्मःपुष्टय परिच्छिन्नतत्त्वावासुत तथा च

चुरितरथज्ञातमाचः पुरुषोत्तरसमाज्ञातिरित्याश-ज्ञामपाकराति।

3 यदि च घटादिव्वमानंत्रेष परिच्छिन्नः स्वी-क्रियते तदा सावयवलवविनाशिवादिना घटादिस- मानधमापत्रावपसिद्वानि: स्यादित्यर्थः।

4 गतिश्चुरितमृत्पादर्थि।
Aph. 51. The text regarding the Soul moves not, any more than Space. 

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul’s unlimitedness, as the declaration that ‘It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,’ the text regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, ‘As the Ether [or Space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved]’; and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. b.),] belongs to Nature[see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. l.], from such maxims as this, that ‘Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful;

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1 Upádhi; often, below, ‘investment’ and ‘adjunct.’ Ed.
3 ‘Text’ and ‘maxim’ are here meant to represent śruti and smṛiti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms, in wider acceptations, ‘books of Scripture and of law,’ &c. The first is ‘revealed law,’ the Vedas; the second, ‘memorial law,’ or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed.
4 The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61.
and it is wilful *Nature* that, in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import.\(^1\)

*b.* It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works, in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover, does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom: \(^3\)

\[\text{न कर्मशापतदमेच्छात्} \parallel 52 \parallel\]

\[\text{Aph. 52.} \text{ Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.}\]

\[\text{a. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] oppa-}\]

\[\text{1 नित्यः सर्वेणा: स्थाणुरिज्ञादिना ग्रामाण्यो-}
\text{ल्लमनोपरिमिच्छन्ति गतिश्रूतिरैपाधिकगतिपरा}
\text{शाख्येया। घटसंवृत्तमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा।}
\text{घंटो नीयेत नाकाष्टं तहजीवो नभोपमं। इति}
\text{च्छुते। प्रकृति: कुर्हते कर्मो शभाशुभफलात्मकम्।}
\text{प्रकृतिश्च तद्भ्राति चिषु लोकेषु कामगा। इत्यादि}
\text{दिस्मृया गते: प्रकृतिनिश्चलवादगातैवति भावः।}\]

\[\text{2 For another rendering, see my translation of the Rational}
\text{Refutation, &c., p. 57.} \text{ Ed.}\]

\[\text{3 पूर्वः विहितनिश्चाल्यापारहृष्टे कर्मशा बन्धो}
\text{निराकृतं। इदानीं तत्रज्ञातृष्टेनापि न बन्ध}
\text{इत्याह।}\]
sioned by works.¹ Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see § 16. a.¹)] is no property of the soul.²

b. But then [some one may say], ‘Let it be that the bondage resulting from the ‘unseen,’ i.e., the merit [or demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;’ whereupon he declares [as follows]:³

अनिरुध्दा तत्वाकृतिरन्यायमेले ॥ ५३ ॥⁴

Aph. 53. If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly, [even to the emancipated].

a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the emancipated,⁵ [for the same reasons as those stated under § 16. a.].

¹ Dr. Ballantyne should have taken ‘unseen’ and ‘works’ as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Clearer than his original, and yielding substantially his sense, is the gloss of Vedánti Mahádeva: कर्मेण तत्वाकृतिरन्यायमेले । न पुंसः साधानव्यः । Ed.

² कर्मेण नुष्टीष्टेनापि साधारण पुरुषस्य बन्धः । कुतः । अत्रकल्वतात्सुरुप्तिमेलाभावावदितियथः ॥

³ नन्यथमेश्चायपुष्टीष्टेनायस्य बन्धः स्यात्तचाह ॥

⁴ Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed.

⁵ अन्यथमेले बन्धतत्त्वार्यार्ययात्मेले अनिरुध्दा

कर्मेण सिद्धस्यापि बन्धायपितुतिर्यथः ॥
b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture,¹ [that any one of these should be the cause]:

\[\text{निगर्गशादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति} \ \text{॥ 54 ॥} \]

\textit{Aph. 54. And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.}

\textit{a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of], among which its essential character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul]:'² such is the meaning.³}

\textit{b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means,}

\[\text{। किं बहुना । स्वभावादिकमोन्निर्येन वा} \]
\[\text{केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पलिनी घटते श्रुतिविरोधाधि} \]
\[\text{दिति साधारणं बाधकमाह ॥} \]

¹ \textit{Swetáswatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.}
² \textit{Swetáswatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.}
³ \textit{Svabháva-vágyametáni púrvaśya bandhotté shaśvaté saśkri} 
\[\text{चेता केवलो निगर्गश्चेति श्रुतिविरोधश्चेतिः ॥} \]
that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.¹

c. The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see § 7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.²

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows]:³

### तत्योगोऽपशविवेकानं समानवचम् ॥ ॥

*Aph. 55.* Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity,

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¹ इतिशब्दः बन्धेन्तुपरीश्वासमालोऽ॥
² तदेवं न स्वभावतात् बद्धसोर्वादित्ता प्रदर्शकेने-तत्प्रतिषेधाति: प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगः एव साक्षात्बन्ध-हेतुरवधारितः ॥
³ ननु तथा प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽपि स्वाभाविवेकं कालादिनिमित्तकं वा मुक्तस्यापी बन्धा-पादकः इत्याश्रयं समाधिते ॥
⁴ तत्योगे, the reading which I find in MSS. of Aniruddha, seems to be indefensible. *Ed.*
[in this respect, between the emancipated and the uneman-
cipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of
Nature and of the soul; this conjunction, moreover, does
not take place again 'through non-discrimination,' i.e.,
through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and
soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who
thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to dis-
criminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the
meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are
not on a level, [under the circumstances stated at § 54. c.]:
such is the import.¹

Aph. 56. Bondage arises from the
error [of not discriminating between
Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage]

¹ तद्योगः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽपि विवेकान्न्मुक्ते
यवविवेकाभावात् पुनः संयोगो भवतीत्वयः । तथा
च न मुखवब्बसाम्यमित्याश्यः ॥

² These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III.,
were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment
attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he re-
published the Sàṅkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted
them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the
numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I.
Ed.
which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting
rid of it :]

नियतकारणः दुःखितिभावान्तः ॥ ५६ ॥

Non-discrimination is removable by discrimination alone.

Aph. 56. The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.

a. The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by this alone is 'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and not by works, or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone,² [and by no other means].

b. 'But then [some one may say], if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body, &c.; and this is contrary to Scripture,

¹ एवं हेयहेतुः प्रतिपाद्य हानोपायं प्रतिपाद्यति ॥

² शुचिरज्ञातादिर्द्विले लोकसिद्धं यन्तियतं कारणं
विवेकाकाशाकारस्तत्तं एव तदुद्धिप्रितिभिवेको-
विचित्तिनं कर्मादिभिरित्यर्थं यथा ध्वालसत्मन्यकार: 
प्रकाशेनैव नष्ठति ॥
to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning." To this he replies:

प्रधानाविवेकाद्याविवेकस्य तद्दाने हानम् \|59\|

Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an effect, [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause].

1 ननु प्रकृतिप्रकृतियाविवेक एव चेतसयोगदारा बन्धुनत्स्त्कोट्तरिणी देहाद्भिमानसत्तेजपि मेंद्रः स्यात्तच भृतिश्रृतिन्यायविह्योभिमिति । तत्चाह ॥

2 पुर्णे प्रधानाविवेकाकारणाचार्याविवेको बुद्धायविवेको बुद्धायविवेको जाते कार्यावि-
b. The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

c. But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,' &c.]:'
well, if any one says this, I reply, ‘no;’ because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., ‘Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;’ because no products, such as the ‘understanding,’ when they have perished, can be created anew,\(^1\) [any more than a gold-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

\(\text{d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men’s conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] ‘understanding,’ &c., is [the primary cause of the soul’s bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because ‘understanding’ and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one’s identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., pro-}

\(^1\) ननु बुध्या
बिमानातिरिति प्रथानाभिमानेन
किं प्रमाणमहत्त्व इत्यादिखिलाभिमानानां
बुध्यादि
तन्द्रिष्यवेंचोपपतेरिति चेत्त मृत्त मृत्त पुनः
सृष्टिक्षणिन्य स्वामा च नारकीयादिभिमानानां
प्रधानविषयवलं विनानुपपतेरतिततानां बुध्यादि
खिलकायणां पुनः सृष्ट्यभावात् ॥
duced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property], there is the removal of those,¹ [i.e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property: and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding,' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].

e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus in infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it; or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of

¹ जिंच बुद्धादिषु पुरुषाशामभिमानाःनादिर्वेक्षु न शक्ते बुद्धादीनां कार्येवात्। कार्येष्व-भिमान्नववस्थायं नियमकाकालायां कारण-भिमान एव नियमकतया सिद्धति लोके दृश्वव-क्तस्यनायाय दृश्वानुसारिन्वात्। दृष्टे हि लोके छेत्राभिमानात्क्ष्णजन्यधात्वादिष्वभिमानः सूब-शाभिमानात्क्षण्यक्तकादिष्वभिमानतयोनिवृ -त्था च तयोनिवृज्ञिरिति॥
its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that] there is no occasion to look for any other ‘predetermining agency,’ in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance\(^1\) thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one’s self with Nature]; because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout,\(^2\) [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, ‘which was first, the acorn, or the oak?’ being a frivolous question].

But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul’s bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is ‘ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;’ and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., ‘The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effector [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].’\(^3\) This [charge of inconsistency] he repels:\(^4\)

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\(^1\) To render vásána, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. *Ed.*

\(^2\) प्रधानाभिमानत्रासनयोग्य बीजाङ्कुरबद्नादित्वाच तदभिमाने नियामकाल्परापेश्तिं ॥


\(^4\) नन्तु पूर्णयेचेतन्यमायो विवेकाविवेकी च स्वीकारी तत्हि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुज्ज्वलोच्चित्तिविरोधित्य यथा
Aph. 58. It is merely verbal, and not a reality [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i.e., it is vox et praeterea nihil; because is is merely a reflection, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under § 57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case.²

¹ Aniruddha has, instead of न तु, तु न. Hence: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Ed.

² बन्धादीनां सर्वशेषं चित्त एवावस्थानात्सर्वं पुरुषे वान्नाचं शन्त्मार्ण स्फटिकलाहित्यवप्रतिविश्वमात्रतान्तु तत्वमनारुपितं ज्ञानलाहित्य-वदित्यर्थः। तस्ता नात्तविरेत्र इति भावः॥
b. But then, if bondage, &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies:  

Aph. 59. Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by argument; as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By ‘argument’ we mean thinking. The word ‘moreover’ is intended to aggregate [or take in, along with ‘argument’] ‘testimony,’ 2 [or verbal authority, which no more than ‘argument,’ or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case].

1 ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्तुरुषं वाङ्गां तहिं ग्रवणेन युक्त्या वा तस्य बाध्या भवतु । किमर्थं श्रुतिसमूहं साक्षाकारपर्यंतं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मांश- हेतुतयेति । तच्चाह ॥

2 युक्तिमेवनम् । अपिशच्छः ग्रवणसमुचवार्थः ।
b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of \(^1\) a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i. e., without [his] directly perceiving\(^2\) [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception ‘testimony,’ or ‘inference,’ may conduce, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge, cannot supersede].

c. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in Aph. 56], viz., that ‘The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,’ that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing

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\(^1\) Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr. Ballantyne had: ‘That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul] is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case,’ &c. Ed.

\(^2\) वाक्षाचमपि पुरुषस्य वन्धादिकं श्रवणमनन-नमचेष्च न बाध्यतेपरोष्याट्रुते सामालकारं विना यथा दिग्भूजनस्य वाक्षाचमपि दिग्वैप-रीतं श्रवणयुक्तिमां न बाध्यते सामालकारं वि-नेत्यथे।
[of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enunciates the aphorism \([\S 59]\):

‘Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,’ &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception\(^1\) [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a direct perception of its whiteness].

\[d.\] Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from

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\(^1\) अथवेत्थ्य क्याख्यायं ननु नियतकारश्चातदुर्धिष्ठरित्यनेन विबेकज्ञानमविबेकोऽक्त्वमुक्ति ज्ञानं किं अवश्यादिसाधारणमुतात्ति कश्चिदिशेष इत्याकः यथायामाहे युक्तित्वापीयवादिसूचम्। अथवेको युक्तिम् अवश्यत्वं न वाध्यते नाष्टिच्छिते विबेकायोपरिश्च विना दृष्टोहकविश्वासः माध्याक्षरभम् साध्याक्षारविशेषदृश्यन्यैव विरोधितवादिदिः।
Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the ‘discrimination’ \[here referred to\].

\[e.\] This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that ‘instrument of right knowledge’ (pramána) which establishes the existence of these \[two imperceptible realities\] is \[first\] to be set forth :²

\[\textbf{अचाल्याःपांमनुमानेि बाधेय मूमादिभिरिििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििििşi
 perceive it,] is brought about by the ‘recognition of a Sign,’ occasioned by smoke, &c.¹

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by ‘Inference,’ is established by Revelation. But, since ‘Inference’ is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sánkhya] System, ‘Inference’ only is laid down [in the aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded ² [in the Sánkhya system; as will be seen from Aph. 88 of this Book].

c. He [next] exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated :³

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¹ अचाल्याशास्त्रमप्यथाश्चासां प्रकृतिपुस्तादर्शीनामनुमानेन प्रमाणेन बोध: पुश्यनिः सह सिद्ध भवति यथा धूषमादिभिजेनितेनानुमानेन वहूः सिद्धित्यथ:।

² अनुमानासिद्धमण्यागमालिङ्गतीत्य्यपि बोधम्। ख्य शास्त्रयानुमानप्राधान्यायतु केवलानुमानस्य मुख्यतेवैवेपनायसो न लागमस्यान-पेश्वोति।

³ प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रमं वस्त्रमासानुमानेन-योगिकार्यकारणभावं च दर्शैयति।
Aph. 61. Nature (prakriti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa), Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankāra); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mātrā), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthūla-bhūta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness,' &c., is their being neither less nor more [one than another]; that is to say, the state of not being [developed into] an effect [in which one or other of them predominates]. And thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' (guna), distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning.  

b. These things, viz., 'Goodness,' &c., [though spoken of as the three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guna) in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the word; because [the 'Qualities' of

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1 My MSS. of Aniruddha omit तन्माचेबे: . Ed.

2 सत्त्वादित्वायाभासं या साम्यावस्थायूनानाति-रित्र्नावस्थाकायोविशेषेऽर्थं: एवं च कार्यिमिवं गुणाचयं प्रकृतितिरिति पर्येवविस्तेऽर्थं; ॥

3 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.
the *Vaiśeshika* system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kanāda’s 16th Aph.); while these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force,¹ Weight, &c.² In this [Śāṅkhyā] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word ‘Quality' (*guna*) is employed [as the name of the three things in question],³ because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the *cords* [which the word *guna* also signifies], viz., ‘Mind,’ &c., which consist of the three [so-called] ‘Qualities,’ and which *bind*, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.⁴ ⁵

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called ‘the great one’ (*mahat*), viz., the principle of ‘Understanding’ (*buddhi*), is the product. ‘Self-consciousness’ is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the

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¹ *Balavatwa*; for which I find the variant *chalatwa*, ‘mobility.’ *Ed.*

² Read: ‘Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.’ *Vaiśeshikā gunaḥ* is equivalent to the *viśeṣa-guṇaḥ* in the original of Book V, 25. a. For the ‘specific qualities,’ see the *Bhāṣā-parichchheda*, st. 90. *Ed.*

³ For ‘is employed,’ &c., read, ‘is applied to these (*teshu*), [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].’ *Ed.*

⁴ For a different translation, see the *Rational Refutation*, &c., pp. 43, 44. *Ed.*
‘Subtile Elements’ and (2) the two sets of ‘Organs.’ The ‘Subtile Elements’ are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of ‘Organs,’ through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the ‘Subtile Elements’ are the five ‘Gross Elements.’ But ‘Soul’ is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing.¹

d. He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring² [of the existence of these principles, the one from the other:

Aph. 62. [The knowledge of the existence] of the five ‘Subtile Elements’ is [by inference,] from the ‘Gross Elements.’

¹ तस्या: कार्यं महत्तत्वम् बुद्धितथ्म्। ऋषिनिरो उभिमानः। तस्य कार्यं तन्मादाविवृभयमिनिद्रियं च। तन्मादाशिशी श्वस्यं पश्चात् वस्तुति। उभयामिनिद्रियं बायाभ्यलर्मेदैनकादश्विधम्।

² अनुमाननक्तमाह सचि।
a. 'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied,' [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60].”

b. Earth, &c., the ‘Gross Elements,’ are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gotama’s 5th Aphorism,] are the ‘Subtile Elements’ inferred, [the στοιχεῖα στοιχείων of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:

(1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtile Elements, or Atoms,) which have distinct qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; and so of the others]:

(2) Because they are gross;

(3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.;² [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the others].

In my MSS. of Aniruddha there is no च after तैः. Ed.
nal [organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph. 62].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.¹

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:

(3) Whatever is not so [i. e., whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i. e., is not a product of Self-consciousness]; as the Soul, [which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].²

c. But then, if it be thus [i. e., if it be, as the Sánkhyaśis declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or 'Mind,' the first product of 'Nature' (see Aph. 61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases.

¹ बाह्याभ्यतराभ्यामिन्द्रियाभ्यां तैतत्तमाचैशाहं-
कारस्यानुमानेन बोधः ¶

² तन्माचैन्द्रियार्ज्जर्ज्जमानवह्र्योपादानकान्य-
भिमानकार्येद्यत्वात्। यथेवं तन्तथेवं यथा पुरुष
इति प्रयोगः ¶
And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case; because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that 'This is that same jar [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intellect'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases, on his beatification: but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]:

e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and

1 नन्वें बुजालाचकारस्यापि घटपापानावा-पत्या बुजालामुक्तीं तदनं करणाश्रेणतत्तनिमित-घटनाशः स्यात्। न चैत्ययुक्तं पुष्पान्तरेऽसं एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानाचार्दित।

2 मेवं मुक्तपुष्पभोगहेतुपरिशामस्वैव तदनं-करणं मोक्षोत्तरसुखेदान तु परिशामसामाय्य-स्यातं करणस्तु स्वप्त स्वाम्भो वेंबे:।
not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c.,¹ [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiranyagarbha (see Vedánta-sára, § 62), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues].

And thence that of
Intellect.

Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63].

a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] ‘that,’ viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of ‘Intellect’ (buddhi), the great ‘inner organ’ (antahkarana), [hence] called ‘the great one’ (mahat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this² [product, viz., Self-consciousness].

b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case,] is as follows:

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind];

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and]

¹ ओष्ठवा घटादिष्वपि हिरण्यगर्भाहंकार एव कारणमस्तु न कुलालाश्रंकारः।

² तेनाहंकारेष कार्येष तत्कारणस्ततया मुखस्यान्तं: करणस्य महतायस्य बुद्धेनुमानेन बोध इत्यादः।
(3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c.¹

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one, having first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, ‘This is I,’ or ‘This ought to be done by me,’ and so forth: so much is quite settled; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called ‘Self-consciousness’ [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient,] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the cause;² [nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any

1 तथा चायं प्रयोगः । जाह्नकारद्वयं निष्ठयवृ-नित्मयेपोपादानकं निष्ठयकारद्वघ्नवात् । येन्व तन्निवं यथा पुष्पादिरिति ॥

2 अत्रायं तत्का बाथः । सर्वाःश्री माळः पदा-र्ममादि स्वरूपतो निष्ठ्यत विस्वादभिमन्त्यतेयमहं
product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in
the cause of that product].

Aph. 65. [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from
that ['Intellect,' § 64].

a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., the
principle [of Intellect, termed], 'the Great one,' which is
a product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of]
Nature, as [its] cause.¹

b. The application [of the process of inference to the
case] is as follows:

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain,
and Dulness, is produced from something which has these
affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:

(2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must, therefore,
have arisen from something consisting of that which
itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and
Dulness; [and]

¹ ततो महत्त्वः तात्कार्यः कार्यादृस्ततया प्रकृतेनुभेदः
(3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c.¹

c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of ‘Goodness;’ the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of ‘Foulness;’ and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indiffERENCE, and so partakes of the quality of ‘Darkness.’²

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is [the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.³

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been men-

¹ ऋयं प्रशोगः। सुखद्वः। अधमिर्मिणी बुझः। सुखद्वः। अधमिर्मिणक्रियायन्या। कार्यवेत। सतं सुखद्।।।।।

² कात्ता हि भर्तः। सुखदेति सात्त्विकः। ऋविनया। दुः। खदेति। राजसी। बिरहिण्य। मोहदेति। तामसी। भरवति।।

³ कारणारुदसारेिे व कार्यागुणाचित्वं। चाष्टानुकूलः।।।
tioned,¹ [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products]:

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 66. [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

a. 'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature,² Mind, and so on [unlike Soul, which is not made up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that Soul exists: such is the remainder,³ [required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]:

(1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the 'Great one,' with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself:

¹ अथ यथोक्तकार्यार्थकारणभावशौचन्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारार्थरेखानुमानमाह॥
² Here indicated by the adjective avyakta, 'the indiscrete.' See Aph. 136 of this Book. Ed.
³ संहतः कारणीभूतसंयोगः। तद्वैरवृत्तक्रमः हदादेः परार्थवादिते। पुरुषस्य बोध इति शेषः॥
(2) Because it is a combination [or compages];
(3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service].

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakṛiti):

मूले मूलाभावावादमूलं मूलम् \( \text{Aph. 67. Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.} \)

a. Since 'the root' (mūla), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three principles, [which, with Soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sāṅkhya,] 'has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhāna), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be

\[ \text{This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical principle, in the Sāṅkhya,] is rootless.'} \]

In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: मूलं मूलाभावावादमूलं मूलानाम 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying that A=A. Ed.
a regressus in infinitum,¹ [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without end].

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows]:²

ပारम्येःगृहीतं परिनिष्ठति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ ६८ ॥

¹ मूले चयोविशिष्टतत्त्वां कारणे मूलाभावालकारणाभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशूचयम ।
ऋनवस्याप्त्या प्रधानस्य न कारणान्तरालमर्तील्यथे: ॥

The source of the preceding exposition I have not ascertained.
Vijnána has: चयोविशिष्टतत्त्वां मूलमुपादानं प्रधानं मूलशूचयमनवस्याप्त्यं तच मूलान्तरासंभवादित्यथं:।
Nágeśa: मूलं सर्वापादानं प्रधानं मूलशूचयमनवस्याप्त्यं मूलभूतं तच मूलान्तरासंभवादित्यथं:।
Aniruddha: मूलप्रकृतेमूलाभावालकारणाभावान्मूलं यक्षकारणं तन्मूलम । सा प्रकृति:।
Vedánti Mahádeva: चयोविशिष्टतत्त्वां मूले प्रधानेतनवस्याप्त्यां कारणाभावावदकारणं प्रधानमित्यथं:। Ed.

² ऋच युक्तिमाह ॥
Aph. 68. Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kriti); for this [word prakriti, usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [some Vedántí may object, according to this view of matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out; for, in addition to the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] is the cause of Mind, another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára, § 21], presents

¹ प्रकृतेन्यत्कारणं तत्त्वाण्यविदिति कारणा-पारम्पर्यंत्याणवस्थादेहततोकारणा एकेक-स्मित्यवकृष्णविनियोगं परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भविष्यति। झोते यथा पर्यवसानं तैव प्रकृतिरिति हि मूलकारणस्य संज्ञामात्रमित्यथ:।

² Read 'in connexion with.' Ed.

³ Literally, instead of 'Mind,' 'the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed.
itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]:

\[
\text{समान: प्रकृतेदेयो: || धृ ||}
\]

\( \text{Aph. 69. Alike, in respect of Nature, and of both [Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].} \)

\( a. \) In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedánti]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz.: 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.' Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both ; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of,] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention

\[\text{ननु पञ्चविंशतितत्तत्तवानीति} \text{ नोपपयते मह-} \]
\[\text{तत्त्वकारणाव्यक्तोपेक्ष्याविद्यार्थ्यज्ञान्तराप-} \]
\[\text{तेतित्याश्च द्रव्रह ||} \]

\( 1 \) This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána, quoted and translated below, in \( b. \) The rendering now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to \( a.\), viz.: 'He meets a Vedántic objection.' \( \text{Ed.} \)
of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the *Kaurma* [*Purāṇa*], beginning, 'Of action [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the *Yoga*, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities,¹ [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled Ignorance].

b. Or [according to another, and more probable, inter-

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¹ प्रकृतेमूलकारणविचारे हयावैदित्यतिवादि-न्यारायणः समानः पश्चः। एतदृशं भवति यथा प्रकृतेहस्तम्भिः सूयतं एवमविद्याया ऋपि। ऋविद्या पञ्चपूर्ववै प्राचुभूता महात्मन इत्यादिवाकैः। ऋत एकास्या ऋवस्यं गौणयुतपरिवर्तक्रिया तत्र च प्रकृतेरेषु पुरुषसङ्गे योगादिभिरभियथात्तिष्ठता गौणयुतिपरिवर्तक्रियः। संयोगलक्षणात्तित्रिः कथ्यते कर्मेन्द्रायोरिति कौमेराको प्रकृतिपुरुषोऽगौण-शोकात्तिकस्मरणात। ऋविद्यायायाः कार्ये गौण-लक्ष्यश्रवणात्तस्य ऋतविद्या अनादिता। ऋविद्या च सी- भ्याज्ञानसः बुद्धिमें इति यथे सूचितम्। ऋते न तत्वाधिकायम्।
pretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states [as follows]:²

All do not profit by the saving truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

Aph. 70. There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions.

a. For those privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sānkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by

¹ अथ वा द्योः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः समान एव न्याय इत्यथेः द्व
² नन्तु प्रकृतिपुरुषायनुमानप्रकारसङ्गे सर्वेषां विवेकमनं कुतो न जायते। तचाह
arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha]. But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning.¹

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines ‘the Great one’ and ‘Self-consciousness’;² [the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three ‘Qualities’ in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the ‘Subtile elements’ (see § 61)]:

mahâbhâsya-kârthya tannâmaḥ

Aph. 71. The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called ‘the Great one,’ is Mind.

a. ‘Mind’ (manas). ‘Mind’ [is so called], because its function is ‘thinking’ (manana). By ‘thinking’ is here meant ‘judging’ (nîchâyâ). That of which this is the func-

¹ मनने हि मन्दमध्यमोत्तममेवद्धनि चिन्तितार् अ-<br>धिकारिणि:। तच मनैश्वरिक्यकृतकृतकृतवा

माननान्मिति हावः। सर्वेष्यांवधेत् तृतरीया

मनन-मिति भावः। सर्वेष्यां सर्वेष्यां मनन-<br>

नियमो नेत्याः॥

² महद्धांकारणेऽतः स्वरूपमाह सूचाभ्याम् ॥
tion is 'intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product, that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.¹

चरमोऽहंकारः ॥ ७२ ॥

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind. Aph. 72. 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist,' 'I do this, that, and the other thing'], is that which is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one'² [§ 71].

b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the Ego, in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows]:³

¹ मन इति । मननवृत्तिकं मनं । मननमच निर्मयः । तदृष्टिका बुद्धि: । तन्महदाःक्ष्यमां कार्येमित्यथः ॥

² ऋहंकारोऽहमानवृत्तिकं पदार्थेश्चरमो मह-तोऽहमानवृत्तिकार इत्यथः ॥

³ यतो अभिमानवृत्तिकोऽहंकारात्सवार्तकार्येलमु-चरोष्यामुपपमनित्याह ॥
Aph. 73. To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness].

a. ‘To be products thereof,’ i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others,\(^2\) the eleven ‘Organs’ (\textit{indriya}), the five ‘Subtile elements,’ and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements.\(^3\)

b. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogma, that \textit{Nature} is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as follows]:\(^4\)

\(\text{ Antarahetutu tadbhara paryayopasyabvat }\)
Aph. 74. Moreover, mediately, through that [i.e., the ‘Great one’ (§ 71)], the first [cause, viz., Nature] is the cause [of all products]; as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.].

a. ‘Moreover, mediately,’ i.e., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, ‘the first,’ i.e., Nature, is the cause of ‘Self-consciousness’ and the rest [mediately,] through ‘the Great one’ and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinations of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning.

b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation’s commencing? In regard to this, he declares [as follows].

1 पारस्पर्यैर्दिपि साःशादतत्तेनेवर्षयायायायोऽप्रकृ-
-तेनेत्ताहृकारादिषु महदादिहार्तति यथा वैषेषि-
कमतेद्यूनां घटादिहेतुता श्रणकादिहारवेयस्यः।

2 ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषारणयोवेर्योपरिपी नित्यवातसृष्ट्याति
कस्य कार्णतमित्त ज्ञात।

3 Slightly better, perhaps, than this reading is that of Aniruddha: न पूर्वभावितमाचेश
कारणत्वं किं वन्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यां द्योमेध्य एकस्य
Aph. 75. While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature].

a. That is to say: ‘while both,’ viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, ‘since the one,’ viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be ‘devoid,’ or lack the nature of a cause, ‘it is applicable,’ i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two.¹

b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this, he says:²

परिच्छेदः नः सर्वोपादानम्। ७६।।

पुरुषस्य कार्ण्योग्यताहानिरविकारित्वाय:।
ञ्जतोस्यतरस्य प्रधानस्य कार्ण्योगः।  Ed.

¹ हेयार्येव पंप्रकृत्योरिक्षिलकार्यपूर्वभावोचिते-कतरस्य पुरुषस्यापरिशासितेन हाने कार्ण्यताहान्यामत्तरस्य योगः कार्ण्यतासंभव इत्यथे।।

² नवविवादात्यमानासौनामेव कार्ण्यतासंभव इत्यत् द्याह।।

³ Aniruddha has, according to both my MSS., परिच्छेदः लात्।  Ed.
Aph. 76. What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things].

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He alleges Scripture in support of this:²

तदुपयन्तिश्रुतेषु || ७७ ||

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 77. And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature].

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in § 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, ‘From Nature the world arises,’ &c.³

¹ यत्परिच्छेन न तत्सर्वोपादानं यथा न तन्तु-घृतस्य कारणम्। तस्मात्तदाध्यायां पृथक् पृथक्कारणां
बकृष्यमेककारणे च लाघवम्। तस्मात्प्रधान-न्येव कारणविशिष्यर्थः। ||

² ऋच श्रुतिं दर्शयति ||

³ युक्तितावचप्रयोक्तः। श्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जगलकारणातामात्र प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति ||
b. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:

नाबस्तुने वल्लिसिद्धि: || ७८ ||

Aph. 78. A thing is not made out of nothing.

a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal: such is the meaning.

b. Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]:

न्यायात्मकाद्वैधकारणमन्यत्वाच नास्तुल्म: || ७५ ||

1 ननु प्रागसते घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते | नियत-पूर्बभावस्तूक्ताप्रागभावः कारणस्वतित्त्व झाह ||

2 नाबस्तुने भावाविलुसिद्धिभोत्त्वत्तित्त्व संभ-वतीत्त्व: | यय्यभावाः भावोत्त्वत्तित्त्वानि कारणस्वात्ति कार्यं दृश्यत इति जगते यथवस्तुलं स्यात्त्वित्त्व: ||

3 भवतु जगद्धश्वस्तु काः नो हानिरत्तत्त्व झाह ||
Aph. 79. It [the world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory to its reality, and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, 'This world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition, if any one ever really had such,] its being an entity might be opposed.¹

b. And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause; e.g., some one’s cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice, [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question, [that of the world regarded as a reality], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses]; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality.²

¹ शुक्ल रजतमिति ज्ञाने नेन्द रजतमिति ज्ञानाद्रजतबाधः। न च चाच नेन्द भावह्यं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावह्यवाधः स्यात्॥

² दुष्ककारशाज्ञान्वचन्मेये मिथ्येत्ववगम्यते यथा कामलादिरोषायत्वंशह्ज्ञानं कस्यचित्। च च च जगज्ञानस्य सर्वेंशां सर्वेंद्र सत्त्वं सत्त्वाच देशासित। तस्मात्तार्थवतु जगदिति॥
c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तद्भावावाकुलत्तरां
तत्सिद्धः || 80 ||

_Aph. 80. If it [the substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]?

a. If an _entity_ were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, ‘this would be the case,’ i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, ‘because of union therewith,’ i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a _nonentity_ [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world’s being [on that supposition,] necessarily a non-entity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case, [that it would be real]?

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1 नन्यभावः कारणमत्तु तथाप्यभावत्वं न जग-तात्न भविष्यतीति । तचाह ॥

2 भाव उपादानकारणः कारणगुणः: कार्यम्यि
b. But then [a follower of the *Mimáṃsā* may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of ‘Nature’? To this he replies:¹

\begin{align*}
\text{न कर्मेश उपादानायोगात्} & \| 81 \| \\
\text{Action cannot serve as a substratum.}
\end{align*}

Aph. 81. No; for *works* are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product].

a. Granting that ‘the unseen’ [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product]; and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. ‘Nature’ is to be accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56,³ and § 83,] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.⁴

\begin{align*}
\text{तयोगे भावयोगेन तत्सिद्धि: कार्येच्य वस्तुलसिद्धि:} & \| \\
\text{अभावे जगतेऽभावने तदभावाजगदभावस्यावश्यभावात्कुतस्तत्सिद्धिरिति} & \| \\
\text{¹ नन्दभावस्याभावहुपतालकैमेव जगत्कारणमल्लु} & \\
\text{किं प्रधानकत्यन्येत्यत ज्ञाह} & \| \\
\text{2 उपादानायोगात्} & \text{is the lection accepted by Vij-nāna, and by him only. \textit{Ed.}}
\end{align*}

It is the bracketed Aph. 56, at p. 58, \textit{supra}, that is here referred to. \textit{Ed.}

¹ निमित्तं कारणमृद्धमल्लु धर्माधमेयोऽत्यपा-
b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies: ¹

\[\text{Aph. 82. The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation,] is not, moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is, therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births.}\]

\[\text{a. 'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated}\]

\[\text{¹ ननु वेदोक्षार्यानुष्ठानादेव मुक्तिसंभवालिकं प्रकर्षेत्यत्र स्माह ॥}\]
[soul] is still liable to repetition of births,\(^1\) inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this,\(^2\) [which is gained through ritual observances].

\(b\). He shows what does constitute the chief end of man:

\[\text{तत्च प्राप्तिविवेकस्यानाबृत्तिः} \| 83 \|\]

\(\text{Aph. 83. There is Scripture for it,}
\text{that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e., Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.}

\(a\). 'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., 'He does not return again,'\(^1\) &c.\(^5\)

\(^1\) Literally, 'liable to return to mundane existence.' \(Ed.
\(^2\) \text{Compare the Chhdndugya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed.}
\(^3\) \text{Compare the Chhdndogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed.}
\(^5\) \text{Compare the Chhdndogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed.}

\(\text{In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sānkhya.}\)
b. He states an objection to the opposite view:¹

दुःखाहुःकं जलाभिषेकवच जाड्यविमोकः \[84\]

Aph. 84. From pain [occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness.²

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, ‘By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,’ &c. To this he replies:³

¹ बिपक्षो दोषमाह \[\|

² यदि कर्मसाध्यो माहो भवेकर्मणो दुःखबड़-लाभामाहोकैपि दुःखबड़लः स्थादन्तः छायिते-नापि दुःख स्थानहि जाड्यात्स्य जाड्यविमोको जलाभिषेकायत्युत जाड्यमेवेति \[\|

³ ननु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यतमप्रयोजजवं किं तु का-
Aph. 85. [Liberation cannot arise from acts]; because, whether the end be something desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire, [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer], still, though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation’s being produced by acts, [which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by such means]; and Liberation comes through knowledge; so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation.

1 The reading of Aniruddha, according to my MSS., is काम्याकामेद्धिः. Ed.
mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause].

b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality, [we, whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory, and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies: 2

निजमुक्तस्य बन्ध्वंसमाचे 3 परं न समानतमम्॥ ५६॥

1 मा भूतनिष्कामकम्पसाध्यं दुःखं तथापि काम्या-चिन्तनिष्कामकम्पि विशेषेष्वपि मोक्षस्य कम्पसाध्यतमविशिष्टं साध्यवात्सायिचेन पुनर्विपु दुःखं स्यात्। निष्कामकम्पेन मोक्षसाधनलघुति: ज्ञानार्थं ज्ञानां कृतं पारम्येऽणं मोक्षसाधनलम्॥

2 यदि प्रकृतिपुरुषविचेक्ज्ञानामोक्षो भवेत-यापि छवितात्मुनरं संसार इत्यवयोत्तुल्यं-मितं ज्ञाह॥

3 Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sánkhyā Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, adopted the genuine reading, बन्ध्वंसमाच, instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhyā-pravachāna-bhāṣya, but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation,
Aph. 86. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute: there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see § 56,1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity, 2 [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under § 85.b.].

b. It has been asserted [in § 61,] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]; and, since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by

which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most eligible. Ed.

1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed.

2 निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्धवंसः। बन्धे जविवेकः। ततरीराधिनाविवेकध्वंसो नाशः। ज्ञाविवेक-कनाशस्य च प्रद्वंसवाल्कुतः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त्त-नमिति न समवम् ॥
proof, therefore he displays this; [i.e., he shows what he means by proof):

Aph. 87. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramá). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given 'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramá)].

a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramátri); in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection 'of both,' i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramána): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter]: such is the meaning.4

1 पञ्चविंशतिर्गेषा इत्युतं तलिसिद्धं न प्रमादेशेन विनेति तद्हश्यति ||

2 Nágeśa has वासं. Ed.

3 Some MSS. have the inferior reading साथकं. Ed.

4 असंसनिकृष्टः प्रमात्येनाहृदादातिधिगत इति
b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions ‘not previously known’ [which excludes things remembered], and ‘reality’ [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and ‘discrimination,’¹ [which excludes doubt].

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if ‘right notion,’ is spoken of as located in the Soul [see § 87. a.], then the [proof, or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the ‘right notion’ is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from which ‘right notion’ results] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul’s cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] ‘right notion,’ then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other

¹ Smriti-bhumi-sanghyavadyasaya khema-anudhigat iti baltun ityadvadaramitir
case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramāṇa). You are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately\(^1\) [the sources of right knowledge].

d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies:\(^3\)

\textit{त्रिविवध प्रमाणं} \textit{तत्सिद्धा सर्वसिद्धेनाधिनिधिक्षीति}।

\textit{Aph. 88.} Proof is of three kinds: there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs].

a. 'Proof is of three kinds;' that is to say, 'perception'

\(^1\) अच यदि प्रमाणं फलं पुरुषानियष्टमुच्यते
\quad तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणम्।
\quad यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठं
\quad वृत्तिरुपं तदा तदेदिनियक्षितं
\quad तदि तू
\quad पौरूषेयो वेदयो बुद्धिवृत्तिवाभयमापि
\quad प्रमेयं\textit{मु}च्यते
\quad चस्मार्दिषु प्रमाणं
\quad भवति।
\quad \textit{चक्षुराधिषु प्रमाणं}
\quad \textit{शायवहार: परंपरणे}वेति बाह्यम्।

\(^2\) कति प्रमाणानीत्यत ज्ञात ॥

\(^3\) So reads Aniruddha; but Vijnāna, Nāgeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence: 'That which is, in the highest degree, productive thereof is proof, of three kinds.' \textit{Ed.}
(pratyakṣa), 'the recognition of signs' (anumāna), and 'testimony' (sabda), are the [three kinds of] proofs.¹

b. But then [some one may incline to say], let 'comparison' [which is reckoned, in the Nyāya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in the Mīmāṃśā], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof established,' everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of more;' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out; because of the cumbrousness [that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is the meaning.²

c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: 'By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute,

¹ चित्विधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानश्चः प्रमाणानीत्यथः: ॥

² ननौप्रमाणायेपि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकप्रमाणशम-स्तिति। अतः चाह तल्लिन्द्रविति। चित्विधप्र- माणसिद्धौ च सर्वेच्छार्थस्य सिद्धेनाधिक्यसिद्धनेन प्रमाणाधिकं सिद्धति गौरवादित्यथः: ॥
&c.].” And ‘Comparison,’ and ‘Tradition’ (aitihya), and the like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and ‘Non-perception’ (anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception;¹ [for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it].

d. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties² [of proof, having already (§ 87) given the general definition]:

³यल्स्बद्धं सत्तदाकारोऽस्त्रि भिज्ञानं तत्प्रस्त्र-क्षमं ॥ ८९ ॥

Perception defined. Aph. 89. Perception (pratyaksha) is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. ‘Being in conjunction,’ [literally,] ‘existing in conjunction’.

¹ अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणमेवोपन्ययतम्। प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम्। चयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मेश्वर्धिमभीप्ततेति। उपमानेन- तित्तादीनां चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेशोनुपपलब्ध्या- दीनां च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति ॥

² विशेषकारक्षमाह ॥

³ Aniruddha has यल्स्बचन्यसिंहं तदा०, yielding ‘determined by,’ &c., instead of ‘being in,’ &c. Ed.

⁴ Vedánti Mahádeva has यल्स्बन्धं (?) Ed.
junction;' ‘portrays the form thereof,’ i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]; what ‘discernment,’ or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. b.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, no ‘form of the thing, in conjunction’ [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define:²

¹ सबबं सत्संबं भवत्तदाकारार्लेषि संवस्त्राकारधारि भवति यद्विजानं बुद्विवृत्तिस्तत्र प्रत्येकं प्रमाश्चात्मिन्यषि: ||

² ननु योगिनामतीतानागतव्यवहितवस्तुप्रक्ष्ये व्याप्ति: संवस्त्राकाराभावादिविषाश्रेण: तस्यालक्ष्यवेन समाध्येऽऽ।
Aph. 90. It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the *Yoga*]; because that of the adepts in the *Yoga* is not an external perception.

*a.* That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined; and the adepts of the *Yoga* do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition]; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these;¹ [because there is no intention to include them].

*b.* [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification² [of the definition in question]:

1 ऐन्द्रियक्षणमेवाच लक्ष्यं योगिन्यावावैप्रक्षणकाः । अतः न दोषा न तत्प्रक्षणेव्यापिनिरित्यथः ॥

2 वास्तवं समाधानमाह ॥

3 Thus Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva. Aniruddha has संबन्धाच दीषः. The reading of Nágeśa is संबन्धान न दीषः. *Ed.*

4 For the term *atìsaya*, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation,' *vide infra*, p. 115, note 4. *Ed.*
a. Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogi, also, shall be the thing to be defined; still there is no fault [in our definition, § 89]; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of the Yogi, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes,1 [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered 'causal' (līna) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in § 89. b.]; for we, who assert that effects exist [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is possible.2

Objection, that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the "Lord."

c. But then, [some one may say,] still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions; because, since these are from everlasting, they can-

1 अथ वास्तु योगिप्रक्ष्ममीपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न
दृष्टो नाश्याप्रियते लीनवस्तुः लब्धयोगजथर्मञ्जः
न्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य संबन्धे घटते॥

2 अथ लीनशब्दः पराभिमेतासंनिकृष्टवाची स-
लक्षार्थवादिनां श्यतीतादिकमापि स्वधृपतास्लीति
तत्संबन्धः संभवेदिति॥
not result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies:

\[\text{Iśvarasiddha: II 92 II}\]

That any "Lord" exists is not proved.

Aph. 92. [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is not proved that there is a Lord (iśwara).

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied \(^2\) [from § 90].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with \(^3\) the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord,' but not the expression, 'because there is no Lord.' \(^4\)

\(^1\) ननु तथापीष्क्रियाप्रत्येक्याप्राप्तिस्तथ नित्यबेनासान्तिकर्षजन्यवात्। तचाह॥

\(^2\) इश्वरे प्रमाणाभावादादृष्ट इत्यनुवलेत॥

\(^3\) Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theism, as against the positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnāna, here followed, then goes on to say: ऋणयथा हीश्वराभावाद्विभोज्येत्। 'For, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been atheistic], it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of a Lord.' Ed.

\(^4\) ऋणं चेष्वरप्रतिषेध एकत्रेषिनां प्रात्वदवाद्वेव-
c. But, on the implication\(^1\) that there is a ‘Lord,’ what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, \((\S 89)\)] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction\(^2\) [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the ‘Lord’ may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source].

d. Having pondered the doubt, ‘How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his existence]?’ he states a dilemma which excludes [this]:\(^3\)

\[\text{मुक्तबिज्ञायर्यतराभावान् तत्सिद्धः} \]\(\text{। ५३ ।}\)

\[\text{A dilemma, to exclude proof that there is any Lord.}\]

\[Aph. 93. \] [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the ‘Lord,’] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other.

\[\text{a. The ‘Lord’ whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c.? Or is he in bondage through these?}\]

\[\text{ति । ज्ञत एवेश्वरासिद्धिरित्युत्तं न जीव्तराभावा-}
\[\text{दिति बोध्यम्} \]\(\text{।}\)

\[1\] Rather, ‘the view being accepted’ (\textit{abhyyupagame}).

\[2\] ईश्वराभ्युपगमे तु संनिकर्षेज्ञातीयत्वमेव\(\text{ विषक्षितम्}) \]

\[3\] खुतिस्मृतिभ्यं कथमीशो न सिध्येदित्याश्रद्धं\(\text{ तक्षिविरोधं बाधकमाह} \)]
Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning.1

b. He explains this very point:2

उभयाभासकल्पम् ॥ ५४ ॥

The force of the dilemma. Aph. 94. [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient.

a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation, &c.4 [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies:5

1 इश्वराभिमतः किं कः शादिशिमुस्क्तः वा तिर्भूते वा। अन्यतरस्यायभावादसंभवाचेश्वरसिद्धिरित्यथः॥
2 तदेवाह॥
3 The reading, in a later handwriting, of one of my MSS. of Aniruddha is -सकतैत्तरम्. Ed.
4 मृत्युवृद्धश्रायप्रतिपादक्षुन्तीनां का गति।
5 तत्वाह॥
The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

Aph. 95. [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized deities of the Hindu pantheon.

a. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended, in the shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the 'Lord,' [as Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, i.e., absolute Soul in general; and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahmá,

1 Another reading, that of Nágeśa and of Vedánti Mahádeva, प्रश्नोपारः, makes this word of the singular number. Ed.

2 उपासासिद्धस्य, a compound, is the reading of Aniruddha, followed by Vedánti Mahádeva. See 4, below. Ed.

3 In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed.

4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: रागाध्यभावान्मुक्तात्मन इव मुक्तात्मनो न तु मुक्तस्य तस्य संकल्पकारतैवायभावात् ततप्रशंसा विधिवाक्ष्योत्तमभन्नय। उपासासिद्धस्य। उपासनया लब्धातिशयस्य योगिनोदित्वादिदित्सिद्धस्य प्रशंसा-
Vishnu, Siva, or other non-eternal 'Lord;' since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense;¹ [seeing that the Soul, in every combination, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies:²

blersobhayethi. According to this, the term īśwara, 'mighty one,' 'lord,' is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogi. Resolution, agency, and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated; and such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by īśwara, 'a power.' Hence the expression, 'as it were liberated.' Also see, for atiśaya,—translated, above, 'transcendent faculties,'—Book IV., Aph. 21. Ed.

¹ यथायोगं काचिच्चृतिमुक्तात्मनः केवलात्मा-सामान्यस्य ज्ञेयताविधानाय संनिधिमाच्छेष्ययेकण स्तुतिहृप्प प्ररोचनायी काचिच संकल्पपूर्वकस्तृ-ल्वार्धित्रिपितादिका भुतिः सिद्धः ब्रह्मविष्णुहरा- देवेश्वरस्याभिमानादिमेतालयिग्यो गौणनित्य-ल्वार्धित्रिपितानित्यव्युपासार्थ्येः. II

² ननु तथापि प्रकृत्यायाधिष्ठातृतं श्रीयमायं नो-
Aph. 96. The governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that [its, Soul's,] creativeness, or [its] governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under § 95. b.] would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sánkhyaśas,] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]; "as is the case with the [lodestone] gem."

b. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] the ‘Great one,’ [or Mind, (see § 61. c.).] And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning.  

1 यदि संकल्पन सप्त्रत्माधिष्ठातः तदाय दृष्ट: स्यात्। अस्माभिस्तु पुरुषस्य सांनिधानादेवाधिष्ठातः सप्त्रत्माधिष्ठिस्मिष्टे मणिवत्।

2 यथायस्त्वकान्तमेवः सांनिध्यमात्रेऽऽलोह्कः प्रकल्पादितिविनाशा तश्यैवादिपुरुषस्य संयोऽ—
c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Purāṇas]:
`As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone] stands void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency [seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition; [and it is] an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature]."

*d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]:

विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम ॥ ५७ ॥

गमाचेषु प्रकृतेमेहत्वत्वह्येषु परिश्रमणम । इद-मेन च त्वापाधिष्ठितान्त्रिकमित्यथः ॥

1 The Translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed.

2 तथाचेतात्तुम । निरिक्ते संस्किते रते यथा लोहे प्रवतते । सत्तामाचेषु देवेन तथेवें तथज्ञानिः । ऋत ऋतानि कर्त्तेमकह्यां च संस्कितेतम । निरिक्तवादङ्कतेरसैं कर्ता सनिधिमाचत इति ॥

3 लौकिककार्येष्वपि जीवानां सनिधिमाचेष्व-शिष्ठतृत्तिमिद्याह ॥

4 Aniruddha has विशेषकार्येष्वपि. Ed.
In like manner, embodied souls do not energize.

Aph. 97. In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. ‘The agency is solely through proximity:’ so much is supplied\(^1\) [from § 96].

b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (see Vedánta-sára, § 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort; seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.\(^2\)

c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient ‘Lord,’ through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies:\(^3\)

\(^1\) ऋधिष्ठातृतं संनिधानादेवेत्यनुष्मयते ॥

\(^2\) विशेषकार्येषु व्यविध्वस्तादिश्ववपि जीवानाभ्य: करणप्रतिबिक्षितचेतनानां संनिधानादेवाधिष्ठातृतं न तु केनापि व्यवहारेण कृतस्यचिन्मा-चतवादित्यर्थः ॥

\(^3\) ननु नित्यसर्वेश्वराभावेज्ञपरंपरारशिष्या वेदामालायं स्थात् । ऋत ऋह ॥
Aph. 98. The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authoritative evidence].

a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiranyagarbha [i.e., Brahmá,] and others [viz., Vishnu and Śiva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence¹ [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term,—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says:²

¹ हिरण्यगर्भादीनाः सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य चेत- ज्ञातवर्णधृतको वेदवाक्यार्थार्थपदेशः प्रमाणमिति श्रेष्ठः ॥

² ननु पुरुषस्य चेतसंनिधिमात्रेषाः गौणमिथि- छातृतः तत्त्वं मुख्यमिथिष्ठातृतः कथेत्याकाङ्खाया- माह ॥
Aph. 99. The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].

a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; 'just as the iron,' that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction].

b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference\(^3\) (anumāna):

\(^1\) Aniruddha has महत्त्वः करणस्य; prefixing to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One.' Ed.

\(^2\) अन्तः करणस्य बुद्धः पुस्तच्छायायापत्या तेन चेतन्येज्ज्वलितवाच्छेत्नवाभिमानाद्धिष्ठातृत्वं लाहवदिति यष्टाकर्षेको लोहो निष्क्रियाजिप सन्निधिमार्गेश कर्ष्टीति. इ

\(^3\) अनुमानलक्ष्यमाहः ॥
Aph. 100. The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.

a. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by ‘connexion’ (pratibandha) here being meant ‘constant attendedness’ (vyápti); and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul; whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see § 87. c.)]

c. He [next] defines testimony (sabda):

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1 प्रतिबन्धृः: is the reading of Nágeśa and of Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

2 प्रतिबन्धृः आप्तिलहो आप्तिज्ञानाप्रति-व्यापकस्य ज्ञातं वृत्तिः प्रमाणप्रभ-मित्यर्थः: ||

3 अनुमितिस्तु पिते पार्थिः बोध इति ||

4 श्रुद्धं लक्षयति ||

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Valid testimony defined.  

Aph. 101. Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence,] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called] 'knowledge by hearing' (sabdamāda-bodha).

b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence:

Aph. 102. Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the declaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the

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1 अनिरित्रय योग्यता तथा च योग्य: शब्दस्त-ज्ञानं ज्ञानं शब्दायथ ममायमिथ्यर्थः। फलं च पौप्धेय: श्रवणबोध इति।

2 प्रमायणप्रतिपादनस्य स्वयंते फलमाह।
other]: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such is the meaning.¹

b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively.²

सामान्यते उद्यादत्तमयसिद्धः\[3\] ॥ १०३ ॥

The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy. Aph. 103. The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy (सिमान्यतो दृष्टा) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore be-token], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when,

¹ उभयारत्मानात्मनेविवेकेन सिद्धः प्रमाणादेव भवति। ऋतस्तत्य प्रमाणायोपदेशः कृत इत्यथः। ॥

² तत् प्रेमातुमानविशेषेष्य प्रमाणेन मुख्य-तोषः प्रकृतिपुरुषा विविच्य साधनीया तद्यथेष-यति। ॥

³ My MS. of Nâgêsa has दृष्टासिद्धः. Ed.
for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul, are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning.¹

b. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,² [has the characteristic pro-

¹ यथा सामान्यतः प्रक्वेंष्कार्तिजातियमात्राय व्य- भियत्त्वष्कथर्मेताबलेन तहिजातियां प्रक्वेंष्कार्तः सिध्यति यथा पुनिवीलादिजातियमूऽहारुक- रजस्रामाज्य व्याप्रिच्छ गृहीता तहिजाति यमाज्यतैः ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत्सामान्यतो दृष्टं तस्मादुभयोः प्रक्कस्पुष्पेयोः सिद्धिरिययः।

² तत्र प्रकटे: सामान्यतो दृष्टं नुमानं यथा महत्त्वं मुखुदः खमेहद्वंश्रोपादानरा कायैव सति मुखुदः खमेहद्वंक्वातासुवर्षादिजकुशलादिव- दिति।
perties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like].

c. But, [as regards the argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning:¹

d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:²

चिद्वसनानो भागः ॥ १०४ ॥

¹ पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संह्यकारिवाज्ञ्ठादिनिर्दिति। छोट प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं देहात्मकं गृहादिशु गृहीता तद्विजातीयं: पुरुषं प्रधानादिपरवर्तनान्तमीयत् इति ॥

² ननु प्रकृतिनिर्मित्यज्ञात्र्यृत्वशीलवाच सर्वदा भाग इथिनिमायशं स्यादित्य ज्ञाह ॥
Aph. 104. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By ‘Thought’ [we mean] Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As ‘antecedent non-existence,’ though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92], surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case.¹

b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreasonable] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies:²

Aph. 105. The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c.

¹ चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भेगः। यथानादिरिप प्रागभावा नश्यति तथा नित्याया: प्रकृतेविवेकज्ञानपर्यन्तः प्रसर इति न सर्वेदा भोगापर्यन्तरितं भावः।
² यदि कत्तू प्रधानं भेक्का पुरुषस्तर्येक्युक्तस्य कर्मेऽक्षेत्रयो भेक्के निति स्थादियाहः।
a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook’s actions], so is the case here, also.¹

b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine,² [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. b.]:

\[ \text{Aph. 106. Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].} \]

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. ‘Or, since it is from non-discrimination;’ that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit;³ [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

¹ यथा सुपकारस्यान्नादिकपूराणमक्तुरैष्ठरस्य फालोपेक्षाकृति स्थानान्त्व: \[...

² व्यवहरसिद्धान्तमुक्ता स्वसिद्धान्तमाह \[...

³ न पुरुष: कर्ता न वा भोजना किं तु महात्म-
b. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106,] he states [as follows]:

Aph. 107. And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

a. ‘When the truth is told’ [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], ‘there is neither,’ i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient.

b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence:

1 एतद्विकरे क्योः

2 तत्त्वार्थाये प्रमाणोऽपि प्रकृतिपुरुषोऽसाध्यालक्षे नेत्यं न कर्तृवं न भोक्तलयमिति

3 प्रमाणसुचव्यं कर्मवेयवस्यामः
What is perceptible, under certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others.

Aph. 108. [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.

b. [To explain the ' &c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,) in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtilty,

\[1\] इन्द्रियस्योपादानात्संबन्धाविद्ययः । इन्द्रियस्य हानात्संबन्धाभावावदविद्ययः । असंबन्ध्यातिदूरादेर्योग्यवतः ॥
an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on.  

c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares:²

\[\text{सौक्ष्यात्रकुणपलब्धि:}^3 \parallel \text{१०९} \parallel\]

The subtilty of Nature.  

\[\text{Aph. 109. Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtilty.}\]

a. ‘Her,’ i.e., Nature’s, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyaś, but] all-pervasive.⁴

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¹ अतिदुराख्यिति पश्चि नापलभ्यते। अतिसामीपाल्लोचनस्याच्छनम। अवधानालक्षचस्य वस्तु। मनोभक्तवस्याच्छाकादिग्रंथस्य पार्श्वस्य-वस्त्वग्रहणम। सौक्ष्याद्गणः। अभिभवानमर्दल-धृतिनास्वत्त्वधृतनेरित्यादि।

² प्रकृते: कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत ज्ञाह।

³ Aniruddha, according to the MSS. seen by me, has सौक्ष्याद्गनुपलब्धि: . Ed.

⁴ तस्या: प्रकृतेरनुपलब्धि: सौक्ष्यात्। दुष्कहं सौक्ष्यं नवपूर्वं प्रकृतेरित्यतित।
b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:¹

Aph. 110. [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;² [(see § 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

b. Some [the Vedántás,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhyá doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon:³

¹ कथं तत्वं प्रकृतिव्यवस्थित ज्ञानं ॥
² यथा घटादशेनात्परसायुज्ञानं तथा चिगु-शकार्यदशेनान्तरकृतिज्ञानमिति ॥
³ ब्रह्मकारणं जगदित्ते केचित्सरसायुक्तकारणमिति मित्यष्टथे प्रधानकारणकमिति वृद्धा इति । तच संशयमाह ॥
Aph. 111. If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sáṅkhýas,] is not established.

b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sáṅkhýas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well,] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism].

c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]:

1 वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेतदसिद्धः प्राधानासिद्धः ॥

2 ननु कार्यं चेदुपबः प्राकिसदञ्ज स्याचदा तदा-धारत्या नित्या प्रकृति: कार्यसाहित्येनेव कारणानुमानसमाज्ञातादिविप्रतिपत्तत्कार्यस्येवा-सिद्धिरिति यदीत्यर्थः: ॥

3 सिद्धार्थामाह ॥

A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature, by the contradiction of dissentients.

तथाप्रेक्षरूप्येकतरसिद्धेनायापलापः ॥ ११२ ॥
Mutual denials settle nothing. 

Aph. 112. Still, since each doctrine is established in the opinion of each, a mere unsupported denial is not decisive.

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my side, also: therefore my inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted; how is it that this cause is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies:

1 I have corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered the unwarranted reading तथा तु, now replaced by तथापि, the correlative of चेत at the end of the preceding Aphorism. Ed.

2 यदि वार्तालापानि पञ्चासिद्धां विपक्षेऽपि विपक्षतित्वारस्तीति कथं तत्सिद्धः। यदि अय्योवऽनक्षापक्षानस्याविनाभाविवाच्यान्नस्याधः स्तित्तेन ममाम्येवविवति न कार्याद्युमानाः पलायः।

3 ननु कार्यासंतुमस्तु तत्व प्रकृतिरेवेति कथन्यिम्यत् च्राहः।
Aph. 113. Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.], viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning.

b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently], or of what did not exist:

1 Vedánti Mahádeva ends this Aphorism with the word च; and so does Vijnána, according to some MSS. Ed.

2 चिन्विधो गुणं सत्वरजस्तमांसित तद्विरोध
इत्यथे: ॥

3 इदमचाकूतं यदि परमाणुटीनां कारणं
तदा जगत्युपलभ्यमानस्य सुभद्रं खमोहात्मकलस्य
विरोधं स्थादिति ॥

4 इदानिनं कार्यस्य सतं उत्पन्निरस्तं बेति संशयं
निरस्तिति ॥
Aph. 114. The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.¹

b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity:²

Aph. 115. Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]:³

¹ नरशुङ्कतुल्यस्यामतं उत्सादोस्य न संभवती-त्वर्ध्: ! तथा च सदेव कार्यमुल्यध्य: इत्याशयः !

² ततः च तथा ज्ञायमानः !

³ कारणसंबन्धायं संबन्धायं विद्यमानयोऽवः । अन्यथे सर्वेऽस्मी सर्वेऽस्मी त्वात्। एतदेव-वाह !
Aph. 116. Because everything is not possible everywhere and always, [which might be the case, if materials could be dispensed with].

a. That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; ‘everywhere,’ i.e., in every place; ‘always,’ i.e., at all times.¹

b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not² [antecedently]:

Aph. 117. Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it].

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product’s condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since ‘that which is competent,’ viz., the cause, makes the product which is ‘possible’ [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes

¹ सर्वेच सर्वभित्ते सर्वेच सर्वभित्त्वाय सर्वभित्त्वाय नासुदुन्ताद इत्याह
² इतात्र नासुदुन्ताद इत्याह
place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another argument:²

\[ \text{The product is nothing else than the cause.} \]

Aph. 118. And because it [the product] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning.³

b. He ponders a doubt:⁴

\[ \text{A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.} \]

Aph. 119. If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that’s becoming which already is, [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

¹ कार्येशक्रिमन्त्रमेव हृपादानां शक्रिष्ण कार्य-स्थानागतािश्रैवेति शक्रिष्ण कार्याय्य शक्र्यकार्य- करणादपि नासत उत्पाद इत्यथ:।

² ज्यपरं यायमाह।

³ उत्पत्ति: प्रागागिप कार्याय्य कार्याभेदः शूयते तस्माच सत्यकार्यसिद्धा नासदुत्पाद इत्यथ:।

⁴ श्रद्धान्ते।
a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of *becoming*, the adjunction of *arising*, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] *arising* [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did *not* exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning.¹

b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]:²

नाभिम्यक्तिनिवन्धनः भवहाराभवहरीः ॥ २१० ॥

*Aph. 120. No;* [do not argue that production is only manifestation; and so of the opposite.]

*Production is only manifestation; and so of the opposite.*

a. *'No;* the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.³

b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c.,

1 नन्वेवं सति कार्येयत नित्यवे सति भावहेपे कार्यं भावयोग उत्सनिवियोगं न संभवस्तत एवोऽत्तनिववहारादिद्वचं चेदित्यथे: ॥

2 सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

3 न नानाप्रक्ष्णा युक्त इत्यथे: ॥
so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestness; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,¹ [and no longer appears as a pot].

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.²

d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity.³

¹ यथा शुक्करस्य मलिनस्य छालनादिना शुल्ककरमभव्यज्ञते तथा कुलालस्य व्यापारान्तो उभिव्यज्ञते मुद्रराभिघातान्तिराभ्यते ॥

² दृष्टा चाभिभव्यक्ष: पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य द्राहनेन गवि पयसः शिलामथस्यप्रतिमाया लेख्कव्यापारेश्वरावधातेन धान्येऽऽंधुलखेत्यादि ॥

³ तस्मात्कायोत्तरेर्त्वहरायववहार ऋभिभ- िनिवन्नना कार्याभिभिभक्तिनिमित्तनकौ। ऋभिभ-
e. But if [the employment of the term] ‘production’ is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction? To this he replies:

नाशः कारणालयः || ९२१ ||

What is meant by destruction.

Aph. 121. Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed] into the cause [from which it was produced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term ‘destruction,’ and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction].

क्षित उत्पत्तिवेहराइभिब्यञ्जनाभावाचापत्तियाः वहाराभावो नवसत: सत्तयेत्यथे: ||

1 ‘If production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is destruction occasioned?’ Aniruddha, here quoted, has, in my MSS.: ऋभियक्तिनिबन्धनोत्सचि: । ।

2 ऋभियक्तिनिबन्धनासूत्सचि: किन्तुकानावि निवाश इत्यत छाह ||

3 मुखरभियताहिस्त्य कारणे यो लयः तच्छी बन्धनो नाश इति शब्दार्थक्तियामेतदा ||

4 ‘From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is the meaning of the word [नाशा], and [such is] the particular action [which]
b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλιγγενεσία] of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.¹

c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation]. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and, there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifes-

¹ यदि लयः पुनस्क्षवो दृश्यतं न च दृश्यत्
इति मूहैनं दृश्यते विवेचकैदृश्यतं एव।
तथा
हि तत्तैं नष्टे मृदूपेशानि मृदुश्च कार्पासवृ.
ष्ठ्रुपेशानि परिशामस्तस्य पुष्पफलतत्तुष्रुपेशानि
परि
शामः। एवं सर्वं भावा इति॥

Ed.
tation, on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a *regressus in infinitum*. To this he replies:¹

**पारम्पर्येऽतःन्वेष्यणार्थवेष्टः** ² ॥ १२२ ॥

*How manifestation may occur without being an entity.*

Aph. 122. Because they seek each other reciprocally,³ as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there *is* no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant,⁴ [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally].

¹ किमभिव्यक्तिः सत्यसति वा। सती चेतनित्वकायोपलभिः स्यात्। ऋसती चेतसकार्याहानितस्या ऋषभिभविजीर्ण्या तस्या ऋषयेवनवस्थेऽत्तः ऋशाः ॥

² ऋषवेष्यणात्, the reading here given, is that of Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva. Vijnána has ऋषवेष्यणा. Ed.

³ Translating the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anveshaná, inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively;' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnána explains anveshaná by anudhávana; and Vedánti Mahádeva has, in definition of it, the synonymous anusaraṇa. Ed.

⁴ भवतवभिव्यक्तिसहस्रं तथापि न देषोजनादिन्वार्षिकाः तामीहामृदित ॥
b. He states another argument.¹

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 123. Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.'

a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.]. If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also;² [and

¹ युक्त्यत्तमाह ॥

² किमस्यतिर्मित्यत्रतेन वा। उत्त्यत्रतेचेदस्या उत्त्यतिर्मित्यनववस्य। नात्यत्रतेचेतत्कमसत्वचाचित्त्यत्तादा। यथसत्वचाक्षुचदाचिदपर्मित्यनास्तित्ति स-वेदानुपलभेन स्यात्। ऋषभ पिन्यत्वचाल्लबद्वा का-
thus every objection stated or hinted under §121. c., is capable of being retorted].

b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually:

हेतुमदनित्यमचापि सद्नियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम ॥ १२४ ॥

The characters common to all products.

Aph. 124. [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused,' i.e., having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. 'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,) is resolved into that from which it originated.
b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhya enumerates (see § 61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies:¹

Aph. 125. There is the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

¹ यदि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वम् किं ज्ञानसुखादिनां सामान्यकर्मेऽशामभाव एव तथा च दृष्टपरियाग इत्यत्र ज्ञाह।
a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things]—'there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sānkhya].

b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature,' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.

c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree:

1 आयुत्समयस्वरूपः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुर्विंशतितथानुभूत्तत्तत्तत्वस्तथायोगार्थसमानायादिनां 
तत्त्त्वोद्धेष्वेवान्तभावात्तिदिः॥

2 वारस्यः पञ्चान्तरं सूचयति। प्रधानच्यपतेश्चाद्रा गुशानां पारम्पर्येः प्रधाणवार्येष्वेन कार्य- 
कार्ययोगेतदाप्रधानन्वपतेश्चाद्रेव गुशादिदिशिदि॥ 
नलभावादननुक्रियनिन्तनिति॥

3 प्रकृतिकार्येऽः साध्यमेंमः॥
Aph. 126. Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression ‘&c.’ is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. ‘Of both,’ i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature :²

Aph. 127. The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves].

a. ‘Pleasantness,’ i.e., Pleasure. By the expression

¹ चिगुञ्जलमचेतनवलम् । ऋद्भवायायरार्थ-लम् । द्वोरिति कार्यकारणयाचिरिःः ॥
² प्रकृतिविभागस्य चिगुञ्जस्यायायोन्यबैधम्य-माह ॥
‘&c.’ is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i. e., not heavy,] and illuminating. ‘Unpleasantness,’ i. e., Pain. By the expression ‘&c.’ [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. ‘Lassitude,’ i. e., stupefaction. By the expression ‘&c.’ is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder,¹ [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree:²

लघ्वादिधिमैरन्यायं साधम्ये वैधम्ये गुणानाम् ॥ १२८ ॥

*In what respects the Qualities agree, as well as differ.*

Aph. 128. Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ.

a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the

¹ प्रीति: सुखम् । चारिदेशज्ञातयु प्रकाशकं सत्तम् । चार्मौतितंत्रं खम् । चारिदेशन्त्रावपायमकं चलं च रजः । विशादो माहः । चारिदेशन्त्रालुक्ष्ब-रसकं तमः । ऐतिथंमेगुणानं सत्त्रजस्तमसां वै-धम्यं भवतिति शेषः ॥

² तेषां वैधम्येकवनावसरे साधम्येमाह ॥

³ So reads Aniruddha only. Vijnâna, Nâgâsa, and Veddantî Mahâdeva have: लघ्वादिधिमैरः साधम्ये वैधम्ये च गुणानाम् । Ed.
shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to call attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghutwa)] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e., through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul.¹

b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,' &c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this: ²

₁ अथमथः। भावप्रधानो निर्देशः। लघुदिध-मैलेघुचलनगुलवीगुणानां वैधम्यम्। अदिपदसू-चित्तन साधम्यम्। तत्त पुरुषार्थमन्यथाभिभव-जननमिष्युप्पङ्क्तिकम्।

₂ हेतुमदित्युपविना महदादीनां कार्यचमकम्। तत्त प्रमाखमाह॥

Prove that Mind &c. are products.

Aph. 129. Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like.

a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the
rest are products; because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.¹

b. He states another reason:³

A second proof.  

*Aph. 130. Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one].

a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are limited in measure;³ [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited].

b. He states another argument:⁴

A third proof.  

*Aph. 131. Because they conform [to Nature].

a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things:⁵ [and it

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¹ नित्याभ्यं प्रकृतिपुस्पाभ्यामन्यवाहार्द्वां वत्तार्थिर्यिन महदोदेः कार्यरमित्यर्थः ॥
² हेम्न्तरमाह ॥
³ परिमित्तादित्यर्थः ॥
⁴ ज्ञापरां युक्तिमाह ॥
⁵ प्रधानेन सह सम्यगनवयाप्रधानगुणानां सब्बे-पदार्थेषु दर्शनात् ॥
is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause.

b. He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]:

शक्तित्वृत: ॥ १३२ ॥

A fourth proof. 

Aph. 132. And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that they do].

b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products].

c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn

1 एतदेवाह ॥

2 कारणशक्तिः कार्यं प्रवृत्ततः इति महदादयः
श्चीत: सन्तः प्रकृत्यसारे य त्यां जनयति ।
ञ्जन्यथा प्रवृत्तिशैलवाल्वर्तेता कार्यं जनयेयः ॥

3 इतिशब्दश्च हेतुवगीतमानविसूचनायः ॥

4 व्यतिरेकमाह ॥
from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products]:

Converse proof of the same.

Aph. 133. On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product and non-product; such is the pair of alternatives. ‘On the quitting thereof;’ i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul;¹ [these two alone being non-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:²

¹ यथार्थमकाथं चेति कोटिद्रयम्। तद्धाने महदादे: कार्यताहाने प्रकृततौ पुरूषे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति॥

² उभयकोटितिर्कित्शुक्ला एव महदादयो भविष्यन्तीत्याह।

³ Nagésa has तुष्टात्. Ed.
Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor non-product.

Aph. 134. If they were other than these two, they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides Soul and Nature].

a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i. e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i. e., in the shape of nonentity.¹

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies: ²

Aph. 135. The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it.

a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or

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¹ तयोः कार्याकार्येयार्याले महदादीनां तुच्छ–पलमभावहपलम् II

² अथ जिम्में महदादयः कार्येचेन प्रकृतेः–लिङ्गम् I अविनामावादेव लिङ्गं भविष्णली–त्वचाह II
essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen [into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. ‘Because it accompanies it,’ i. e., because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature,\(^1\) [i. e., Nature herself actually present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually present in the jar].

b. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle itself, the ‘Great one’ [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies: \(^2\)

\[
\text{भव्येवं यत् कारणश्रूपं कार्यं न दृश्यते यथा चन्द्रोद्यात्समुद्रवृज्ञानुमानम्। अति तु प्रथान-}
\text{प्रत्येक्य महदादै दर्शनात्कारणांशुमानमेव।}
\text{तत्साहित्याप्रकृतिरूपस्य महदादै दर्शनात्॥}
\]

\[
\text{एवं चेन्त्रहस्तकमेव जगत्कारणामस्तु किं प्रधान-}
\text{नेतनेत्यत् स्वाह॥}
\]
Aph. 136. The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable,¹ [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed lin-gin, since 'effect' has been termed linga].

b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:²

1 लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गः कार्येम्। तस्मार्चिगु-क्षान्महत्त्वात् प्रधानमनमात्मम्। महत्त्व चत-ख्यवसायः व्यक्तं विनाशिः प्रयक्तसिद्धम्। तेन लिङ्गुनामानम्॥

2 तनुः तथायन्यदेव कारणं भविष्यति किं प्रकृत्येत्यचाह॥
Aph. 137. There is no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.* If effects be from any *root* [to which there is nothing antecedent], then *this* is that [to which we give the name of* Nature]. ‘Because of its effects,’ that is to say, because of the effects of *Nature.* There is no denying ‘that it is,’ i. e., that *Nature* is.¹

b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that *Nature is*; yet [the opponent may contend,] *Soul* positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:²

¹ सामान्येन विवादभावासिंह माधवनम् ॥ १३८ ॥

² भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धि पुरुषस्य सिद्धिः न स्वातेव नहि तस्य कार्यमलीत्यचाह ॥
Aph. 138. [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] ‘merit,’ there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about ‘there being such a kind of thing,’ i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] ‘merit’ (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mí má násá creed, or good works, according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] ‘merit.’

b. ‘Not the means of establishing’ that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, ‘I will mention another means of establishing it.’

1 सामान्येन तावदात्मनि विवादो नाति विशेषे हि विवादास्तेनक एको व्यापकोज्यापक इत्यादि यथा सर्वस्मिन्द्वेशेने धर्मं इत्यविवादो धर्मेन-विशेषेण हि विप्रतिपत्ति: ॥

2 न तत्साधनं न तच कार्यकारणमाब: साधनम्। अन्यसाधनं विश्लेषीत्यभिसन्धि: ॥
b. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c. : what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies:¹

शरीरादिव्यतिरित्त्रः पुमान् || १३५ ||

Materialism scouted.

Aph. 139. Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.²

b. He propounds an argument in support of this:³

संहतपरार्थद्वात् || १४० ||

Aph. 140. Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus in infinitum.⁴

b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptible-

¹ तेहेन्द्रियाद्य एवात्मानः किमन्वकल्पनयेत्यत च्छाह ||

² चतृम ||

³ चच न्यायमाह ||

⁴ यत्सहन्तं तदसंहतपरार्थेम् || संहतपरार्थेले उपवस्था स्यात् ||
ness,] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c.¹

c. He elucidates this same point:²

चिंगुशादिविपर्ययात् ॥ १४१ ॥

Aph. 141. [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,' &c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression ' &c.' is meant, because the other characters of Nature, also, are not seen³ [in Soul].

b. He states another argument :⁴

¹ सन्हततमं च गुष्णानामन्येन्निमुनभावेन का-र्कम्। अथ वा द्वाकोकिन्ता सन्हतमाः। तत्त्र प्रक्तादः तिरोभूतमति। ऋण्यः तत्कार्येशु महेन्द्राद्वृषु सन्हततादश्रेप्रस्झात्। ॥
² तदेव स्पष्टयति ॥
³ पुरुषे चिंगुशादिविपर्ययाण्तदश्नानत्। ऋ-दिशस्ताद्शेषं प्रकृतिधमीशमयदश्नान्दित। ॥
⁴ न्यायान्तरसाह ॥
Another proof that Soul is not material.

Aph. 142. And [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintendency [over Nature].

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another argument:²

Aph. 143. [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer.

a. It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism] is made, because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it,³ [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § 58. a.)].

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature;

¹ चेतनो हाथिष्ठाता भवति प्रकृतिः जडेत्यर्थः ॥
² युक्तवतारमाह ॥
³ भोग्या प्रकृतिभोक्ता पुरुषः । यथापि कूटस्थि

लादात्मनो भोक्तो नास्ति तथापि बुद्धिज्ञायात

पत्येत् युक्तम् ॥
[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies:¹

\[ \text{कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तिः} \ \| \ 144 \ \|
\]

\text{Aph. 144. [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].}

\text{a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be \textit{not} eternal, [whereas, in reality, it \textit{is} eternal]. The isolation (\textit{kaivalya}) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul.²}

\text{b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies:³}

1 \text{माध्यार्थं प्रवृत्तिः। सा किमात्मनं प्रकृतेऽन्न्यत स्राह॥}

2 This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. \text{Vijnāna, Nāgēśa, and Vedānti Mahādeva end the Aphorism with \textit{च}, necessitating ‘and because,’ &c. Ed.}

3 \text{चिगुल्लम्भाववचात्प्रकृतेने स्वभावप्रच्यवोधिनित्यप्रस्थात्श। यस्तथा पाधिकगुल्लात्स्य कैवल्यं संभवति स चात्मेति॥}

4 \text{स किंचिदं इत्यत स्राह॥}
The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light.¹

b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Brihadáraṇyaka Upanishad²]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?’ 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?’

c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its

¹ ज्ञेया न प्रकाशत इति सिद्धम् । ययात्मा पि जडः स्वात्मस्याप्यन्येन प्रकाशेन भवितायं लाघवाचात्मेव प्रकाशशूपास्तु ॥

² II., 4, 14; or Satapatha-brähmana, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed.

³ च्छुतिष्ठ येनेंद सवं विज्जानासितं केन विज्जानीयादिति । विज्जातार्मरे केन विज्जानीयादिति ॥
attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies:  

अपी निगुणात्मक विचित्रम् **१४६** ।

*Aph. 146.* It [Soul,] has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality.

*a.* If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation;  

2. **१४७**

*It attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable.***

*b.* He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this,  

3. **१४७**

[i.e., in the view which he is contending against]:

अपी निगुणात्मक विचित्रम् नापलापत्तप्रवत्तम्बाधात् **१४७** ।

*Aph. 147.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence of qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary].

1 जड़पथायात्मस्यु चिन्हम्। तेन जगत्प्रकाशयति

नातु चिन्हप इत्यत्र चाह **१४७** ।

2 य्यायायमन्यते धर्म्येत्यागं: स्यात्मरिज्ञामिनि स्यात्मन्तरम्यन्मिष्ठ इति **१४७**

3 ऋष ऋत्विरिति। चाहमाह **१४७** ।
a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'¹ &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities² [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i. e., soul’s,] being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i. e., the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c.,³ [in the soul].

**सुषुष्णचालव्यासास्तिक्षितम्**⁴ न १४८ ॥

Argument against the soul’s being unintelligent.

**Aph. 148.** [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not

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¹ *Bṛihādāranyaka Upanishad*, iv., 3, 16; or *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa*, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed.

² ओसंजो हयं पुरूष इत्यादिश्रुतिगुण्योगे सा बाधिता स्वात् ॥

³ ओश्रार्थपुल्लो श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य निर्गुणाचारादेनापलापः संभवति तत्प्रभुक्ष्यस्य गुरादिप्रत्यक्षस्य यु-ल्यैव बाधात् ॥

⁴ सुषुष्णचालव्यासास्तिक्षितम्। नागेसः। सुषुष्णचाल-वस्य सास्तिक्षितम्। Vedānti Mahādeva. Ed.
the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasantly.' By the expression ' &c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included.¹

b. The Vedántis say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish: 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (sakti), i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows]:²

जन्मादिभवस्यात: पुष्पबहुतम् ॥ १४५ ॥

Aph. 149. From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the ' &c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i.e., from their being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls

¹ यद्यातमा जडः स्वास्मुप्रचादावसाशिलमज्जा-तृतं स्यात्म | न चैवं सुखमहस्वास्पामिति प्रतिभासनात् | ऋदिशब्राह्मणग्रहाम् ॥

² एक एवात्मेति वेदालिनः | तथा च | निन्यः सर्वंतो ज्ञात्मा कूटस्थो दीर्घवर्जितः | एकः सभिताते शक्या माय्या न स्वभावतः | ऋषाहः ॥

³ Vedánti Mahádeva has, agreeably to some copies of his work, पुष्पस्य बहुतम्. Ed.
are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all must be born, &c.¹

b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others; [viz., of the Vedāntīs]:

The view of the Vedānta on this point.

Aph. 150. [The Vedāntīs say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

a. As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];³ —so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e., of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking [to say], 'The soul has perished.' [This, indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but

¹ जन्मादीति । चादिनोपचयमारणादि गृह्यते ।
तद्वस्मातस्तत्तत्वमात । पुरुषबहुलं वहव चा-
त्मान इत्यथः । यद्रेक एवात्मैकस्मिन्द्वायमाने
सर्वे जायेरिति ॥

² परमतमाष्पृक्ते ॥

³ Vide supra, p. 53, Aph. 51, &c. Ed.
then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?¹

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt² [as to the point in question]:

उपाधिभिन्यते नतु तद्वाद् ॥ १५१ ॥

Aph. 151. The investment is different, [according to the Vedántíś], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity] belongs, is not different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not;³ [the destruction of De-

¹ यथैकमाकाशं घटायुपाधिभिन्यतेः नष्टं घटा-
काशं नष्टमिति वपदिप्रत्यते तथैकात्मपक्षोऽपि
देहावच्चेदभेदाचतुचाश्च चात्मा नष्ट इति वपदेश-
माचम। नानात्मपक्षोऽपि। ऋष्यात्मनो नित्य-
वालक्यं जन्ममरणविवश्येति ॥

² समाधानमाह ॥

³ Vide supra, p. 16, note 3. Ed.
vadatta, e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedānta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedānti may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,] are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion;¹ [whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies:²

एवमेकवेन परिवर्त्तेनान्यन न विविधधर्माध्यासः ॥ १५२ ॥

The Sāṅkhya is free from the charge of absurdity in which the Vedānta is open.

Aph. 152. Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sāṅkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul

¹ उपाधिभिःषयते तदानुपाधिभिः भियत इत्य- ध्येः। न चान्यनाशद्यन्तन्यन नाशज्ज्वराभोजितप्रस- ज्ञातेकामपि च ब्यक्त एव विविधधर्माध्यास एकस्य बन्धोऽशाभासवात्। चाकाशस्य तु धूमाद्यियोग- योगाविन्त्वेवं संयोगस्यायवायपविनितताः ॥

² एतेन फिं व्यादिति। अत ज्ञाह ॥
supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].

a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one,¹ [i.e., as a monad].

b. [But, the Vedánti may contend,] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature’s character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies:²

Aph. 153. Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor

¹ एवमुत्तरीयाक्षेत्य परितः सर्वं वर्त्त्यान-स्वात्मना बन्ध्मोन्मादिविश्रघ्न्यमाध्यास ऋ-रोपो न भवतीमयेः: ||

² ऋत्वमेष्यायायचारापो दृश्य यथा प्रकृते: कर्तृत्वं पुष्पंस्यचेति । ऋचाह ||
death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is
uncompanioned,¹ [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by
actions].

b. [But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be
an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that,
‘Brahma is one without a second:’² ‘There is nothing here
diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain,
who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.’³ To this he
replies:⁴

नान्देनात्मकतिविरोधो जातिपरन्वात् ॥ १५४ ॥

Aph. 154. There is no opposition to
the Scriptures [declaratory] of the
non-duality [of Soul]; because the
reference [in such texts,] is to the
genus, [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of
the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the oneness
of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus.

¹ पुरुषकर्तृत्वं भान्तं पुरुषाकर्तृत्वस्य सत्वादारो-
प्रसादस्यन्यानन्त च सत्यसत्ययाः संबन्धसत्तात्त्विको
भवति । असंख्यवादात्मनो न जन्ममरणादि
संभवति ॥

² Chhándogya Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word ब्रह्म does not
occur there. Ed.

³ Katha Upanishad, iv., 11. Instead of अप्रामो, however,
the correct reading is गर्भति. Ed.

⁴ एवं च भूतिलिंगाय स्यात् । तथा चैवमेवा-
By *genus* we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as *thus* indivisible]: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:²

³ All the commentators but Aniruddha read दृश्यात्तदृष्पम्; and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágeśa’s explanation of it is as follows: बिदितं प्रसिद्ध बन्धकारणमविवेको यच तादृश्यान्तपुरुः.
Aph. 155. Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].

The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage, or in other words, who is unable to discriminate, is the essential condition of souls mutletory, a condition the reverse of the one before referred to, unity; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, thus understood, must be assumed to proceed from a Vedántic disputant against the Sánkhya. Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by others, it is susceptible, with reference to the previous context, of a variety of renderings. Ed.

1 विदितं बन्धकारणं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकादर्शनं
यस्य तत्स्य दृष्ट्या विवेकज्ञानेन तद्रूपं कैवत्य-हृयम् ॥
b. [Well, rejoins the Vedánti,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that Soul is one, but not that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies: ¹

नान्यादृष्ट्या चक्षुषपर्यायनुपलब्ध: || १५६ ||

Aph. 156. No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning. ²

b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that Souls are many: ³

¹ विवेकादर्शननिमित्ता बन्धा न तात्त्विकः || दर्शनादर्शनं निवर्तेत इति यथः: || एवं चैकात्मपक्ष एव न्यायं पश्यामो न नानात्मक इति || ऋचाह ||

² ऋचा न पश्यतीति चक्षुषापनि किं नापलभ्ये। नानात्मवादिनामनेक न्याया: सत्तीत्यर्थ: ||

³ इतीश्च नानात्मान इत्याह ||
Aph. 157. Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense].

a. In the Puráñas, &c., we hear, ‘Vámadeva has been liberated,’ ‘Śuka has been liberated,’ and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory.²

b. [But the Vedánti may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedánti flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya]. To this he replies:³

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¹ Aniruddha perhaps has वामदेवादिमुक्तिनाभितम्.

² पुराणाद्य श्रुतं वामदेवं मुक्तं शुको मुक्त इत्यादि। यज्ञक एवात्माकमुक्तं सर्वमुक्तेन्द्रश्रुतित-बाधः स्यात्॥

³ नानात्मक्षणादित संसारे कदापि कार्यिप मुच्यत इति कमेश सर्वमुक्तं सर्वशून्यता स्यात्॥
Aph. 158. Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be infe-
rentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Libera-
tion¹ [of all Souls, so as to leave a void].

b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]: ²

Aph. 159. As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence.] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there

¹ अनादी संसारोद्ध यावच्छूयताया सदर्श-नाज्ञविष्ठति मुक्तिरिति पश्चे नाति प्रमाणम्
² समाधानान्तरमाह
will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal.¹

b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§ 157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the doubt² is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul’s association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void,³ [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sāńkhya].

c. Now, [if the Vedánti says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:⁴ ‘For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature

¹ अनन्तवादात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तिरिप स्यात्स-सारामेधारिप न स्याद्। उदानीमिव सर्वेच भविष्यत्कालेषु मुक्तिभविष्यतीति नात्मोद्देशे उस्य प्रवाहिनित्यवातः॥

² Anuyoga, here rendered ’doubt,’ rather signifies ‘difficulty raised,’ ‘question.’ Ed.

³ उपाधिविगमो मौष्ष इति पशुपिस सर्वशून्य- तापसां इति तुम्हेंन्युयोगः। यथा नानात्मनां क्रमेण मूल्य सर्वामेश्दतथा कर्मोऽक्षेते सर्वाधारधि- नाशाजगच्छूः स्यात्॥

⁴ The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained. Ed.
and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.'

d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies;

\[ \text{\textit{व्यावृत्तेऽभ्यर्पः}} \] ॥ १५५० ॥

1 ऋषीपाधीनामनन्तलावन शून्यता नानादयं-पक्षे तुस्यलयं । तथा च । ऋत एव हि विद्वंसु मुच्यमानेषु संततम । ब्रह्माण्डाजीवलोकानामन-न्तबादशून्यता ॥

2 किमात्मा बहो मुक्तो वा । बहले भ्रूपस्या-प्रच्छवादार्तिमेष्या प्रव्यवेदनित्यलयम । मुक्तवे अर्थो यथानादिरिति । ऋत चाह ॥

3 This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, यावृत्तेऽ-भ्यर्पः, 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].'

Messrs. Böhtlingk and Roth call Dr. Ballantyne's भ्यर्पः: 'Fehlerhaft für भूयर्पः.' Their substitute is, so far as I know, conjectural.

According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is
Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 160. It [Soul,] is altogether free, [but seemingly] multiform, [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &c.,¹ [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.² Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekarūpata) is predictable of it.

Introductions to the Aphorism, with expositions of it, here follow.

Vedánti Mahádeva: पुरुषस्य यदेक्कुपलं तल्लं मोक्षकाल उत सबेदेत्याकालायामाह। Nágeśa: पुरुषाणं चैककुपलं मोक्षकाल इव सबेदेत्याह। Vedánti Mahádeva: अण्तस्मतित्वायेभ्यो यावृत्ते नित्यनिवृत्ते उभयरूपं उभे रूपं रूपभेदं दति यावदस्मात्तथा। Nágeśa: पुरुषो यावृत्तो नित्यावृत्त उभयरूपभेदो यस्मात्तथेऽपि। Also see the commentaries on the Sānkhya-kārikā, st. 19; and § 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed.

¹ न बद्धा नायं मुच्यते किं तु नित्यमुन्नः। अङ्गानाशस्त्र ध्यानादिना ज्ञित दति॥

² Vide supra, p. 56, § 54. a., and p. 165, § 148. Ed.
is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies:¹

\[\text{ाश्वसंबन्धात्माक्षिलिम्} \ || \ 967 \ ||

\textit{Aph. 161. It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation].}

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?²

b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of \textit{what} nature is Soul? To this he replies:³

\[\text{नित्यमुक्खलम्} \ || \ 962 \ ||

¹ अत्मनं साक्षितमुक्खम् \ | प्राप्तविवेकत्वापि साक्षितेवनिमोक्ष इति \ | अचाह \ ||

² Only Aniruddha recognizes this reading. Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva have साभात्। Ed.

³ अश्वमित्रियम् \ | तत्संबन्धात्माक्षिलिम् \ | विवेके च केन्द्रयसंबन्ध इति ||

⁴ सर्वेदा विक्रिय अत्मवतः \ | अत अचाह \ ||

⁵ Vijnána says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither
The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 162. [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19]; because Pain and the rest are modifications of Understanding,¹ [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

Soul's indifference.

Aph. 163. And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.²

b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies:³

of those alluded to in Aph. 160: उभयरूपालभावसिद्धिः पुरुषस्यापरिविशेषावाह सूचाभ्याम्। Ed.

¹ नित्यमुन्नलं सदैव पुरुषस्य दूःखार्थवन्ध- शून्यलं दूःखादेवुद्दितप्रियंशामलादिद्विधेः।
² भ्रातासीयमकातिृतम्। इतिशब्दः पुरुषधर्मप्र- तिपाद्यलसमान।
³ भ्रातमन् कर्तृलं भूयते। तत्कथिति। भ्रात

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet an agent is, through the influence [of Nature], from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

a. [Its] 'being an agent,' i.e., Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,' 'through the influence' of Nature, [(see § 19,), of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification].

b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda: 'Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again'].

1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words 'through,' &c.

2 चित्सात्मिमयेन प्रकृत्युपरागादात्मन: कलूबं कर्तृवाभिमान: ||

3 चित्सात्मिमयादिति वीप्या परिसामान्या श्रूता तथा दृष्टवादिति. ||

4 These words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays (Prof. Cowell's edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, as a quotation, &c., in Vāchspati Miśra's Tattwa-kaumudi, near the beginning of the comment on st. 2 of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: भात्मा वा भरे ज्ञातव्य: || प्रकतितो विवेकश्यः ||
c. So much, in this Commentary\(^1\) on the illustrious Kapila’s Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter\(^2\) [of the Sánkhya system].

\begin{verbatim}
न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते। Of झातब्रह्मन्
there is a variant, दृष्टब्रह्मं, in one of my MSS. The words प्रति विवि are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chháñdaya Upanishad. Colebrooke’s ‘thus’ is unrepresented in the Sanskrit as I find it. \textit{Ed.}

\(^1\) Aniruddha’s is intended, though many passages in the preceding pages are from other commentaries. \textit{Ed.}

\(^2\) इति श्रीकापिलसाहूः प्रत्वचनमूच्वृत्ती विषयायः प्रथमः।
\end{verbatim}

END OF BOOK I.
BOOK II.

a. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in Book I.]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the Soul that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things], he will tell, very diffusely, in the Second Book, how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There, too, the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to [the verses],¹

b. ‘Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul, the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,’

c. we remark, that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration, that, if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the motive for the creation of the world:²

¹ Here add, ‘in the Moksha-dharma, &c.’; and read, instead of ‘we remark . . . . Emancipation,’ ‘there is the declaration that.’

² The verses quoted are from the Mahābhārata, xii., 7879, and occur in Chap. ccxvi., in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. Ed.
Aph. 1. Of Nature [the agency, or the being a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself.

a. The expression ‘the being a maker’ is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is [really] a shadow [Book I., § 58], belonging to the Soul, which is, in its very nature, free from the bonds of pain; or [to explain it otherwise,] for the sake of removing pain [connected] by means of but a shadowy link; or [on the other hand,] it is ‘for the sake of itself,’ that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself.¹

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¹ कर्तव्यमिति पूर्वाध्यायेश्वेषमृचादनुष्ठयते। स्व-भावते दुःखविधिमुरुष्ट्य पुरुषस्य प्रतिविभ-
b. Although experience [of good and ill], also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one.¹

c. But then, if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again; to which he replies:² ³

Aph. 2. Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is void of passion.

a. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all; but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and, therefore, [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has

¹ For another rendering of the original of a., b., and c., see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 62. Ed.
arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul: such is the meaning.¹

b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all:²

Aph. 3. It is not effected by the mere hearing; because of the forcible-ness of the impressions³ from eternity.

a. Even the hearing [of Scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes [not to all alike, but only] through the merit of acts done in many births, [or successive lives]. Even then dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that

¹  This reading is peculiar to Vijnāna, but seems to have some countenance from Nāgėsa. Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva have
²  Vāsanā. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
³  नैकं तु बहुशो जनमस्मात्-व्याधार्दिविवधतुः लेन भृश्न तपस्य तत्तत्र प्रकृति-पुरुषयोक्तिभियात्यतन्त्रवर्ते मोक्षानुपविकार्गीलसिद्धिरिष्यः. Ed.
have existed from eternity, but [the required direct cognition takes place] through the completion of Concentration; and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II]: therefore, only after many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all: such is the meaning. 

b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation:

**बहुभृत्यवहा प्रतेकम्** इ ॥ ४ ॥

Another reason for continuous creation. *Aph. 4.* Or as people have, severally, many dependants.

a. As householders have, severally, many who are dependent upon them, according to the distinctions of wife, children, &c., so, also, the Qualities, viz., Goodness, &c., [Book I., § 61. b.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls, severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the onflow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls; for Souls are [in number,] without end: such is the meaning. And so the Yoga aphorism [Book II., § 22] says: 'Though it have ceased

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1 श्वश्रामपि बहुजन्मकृतपूर्णेन भवति। त-चापि श्वশ्रामाचाच बैराग्यसिद्धि: किं तु साक्षात्कारात्साक्षात्काराः कृतिति न भवत्यनादिदिमिय्यावसनाय बलवच्छार्णिं तु योगानिधया येणे च प्रतिवन्धवाहुल्यमिति। छतो बहुजन्मभिरेव बै-राग्यं मेिष्ठाः कदाचित्कस्यचिद्व सिध्यतीत्यथेऽः।

2 मृष्टिप्रवाहः हेलत्तरमाह॥
to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not [absolutely] ceased to be; because it is common to others besides him.\(^1\)

\(b.\) But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text, ‘From that or this Soul proceeded the Ether,’\(^2\) &c., it is proved that Soul, also, creates? To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[\text{प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषाय्यायासिद्धि: ॥ ५ ॥}\]

\(N\)ature, not Soul, creates.

\(1\) यथा गृहस्थानां प्रत्येकं बहवो भरत्मया भवन्ति स्कीपुच्छादिभेंदृंति सञ्चितगुरुणानांपि प्रत्येकम-संख्यपुरुषा विमोचनीया भवन्ति। ऋतः किय-स्रुःमात्रोिढिप्प पुरुषान्तरमौचनाथं सृष्ट्रप्रवाही घटते पुरुषाश्राब्दान्त्यादिदियथं। तथा च योग-सूत्रं कृतां प्रति नर्ममणष्ठं तदन्यसाधाराश्वादिति।

\(2\) \textit{Taittiriya Upanishad, ii., 1.} But read: ‘From this, from this same self,’ &c. \textit{Ed.}

\(3\) ननु प्रकृतेऽर्थ सम्पूर्णं कथमुच्चयते तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनं ऋक्ष्याः सम्भूत इति स्रुः पुरु-ष्यायापि स्रुःसिद्धिरिति तत्ता ह।
a. And, since Nature's character of creator is decided to be real, there is, really, in the Scriptures, only a fictitious [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul.

b. But then, if it be thus, how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness, moreover, is real; since we are told [in Scripture,] that creation, moreover, is on a level with a dream? To this he replies:

कार्येत्तत्तसिद्धे:⁴ || ६ ||

The reality of Nature's creativeness.

Aph. 6. Since it is proved from the products.

a. That is to say: because the real creative character of Nature is established just 'from the products,' viz., by that evidence [see Book I., § 110] which acquaints us with the subject [in which the creative character inheres]; for products are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts.⁴ [The reality of eternal things is established here, just as it is by Locke, who says: 'I think

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¹ प्रकृता सदृश्य बस्तुश्र सिद्धे पुरुषस्य सदृश्याध्यास एव श्रुतियु सिद्धति ||

² नन्वेवं प्रकृताविग्ध सदृश वास्तवमिति कृतो-रत्नम् सृष्ट्यं स्वब्रह्माधितुल्यताय अधिपि श्रवणादि तथाह ||

³ Aniruddha alone has कार्येत्तत्तसिद्धेन, which reading Dr. Ballantyne at first accepted. Ed.

⁴ कार्याणामये ब्रह्मायाकारितया वास्तववेच्छ का-
God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since, by their different application, I can produce, in myself, both pleasure and pain (artha), which is one great concernment of my present state. These existing products being admitted, the Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause; and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause proves, at the same time, its creative character.

b. But then [it may be said], on the alternative [see § 1] that Nature works for herself, she must energize with reference to the emancipated Soul, also. To this he replies:

Aph. 7. The rule is with reference to one knowing; just as escape from a thorn.

a. The word chetana here means 'one knowing;' because the derivation is from chit, 'to be conscious'. As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who, being 'one knowing,' i.e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others; so Nature, also, is escaped by 'one knowing,' one aware, one who has accomplished the matter: to him it does not consist of pain; but to others, who are not knowing, it actually is a cause of pain: such is
the 'rule,' meaning, the distribution. Hence, also, of Nature, which is, by its own nature, bound [inasmuch as it\textit{consists} of bonds], the self-emancipation is possible; so that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated Soul\textsuperscript{1} [§ 6. b.].

b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at § 5], that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only fictitiously attributed, this is not proper; because it is fitting, that, by the conjunction of Nature, \textit{Soul}, also, should be modified into Mind, &c.; for a modification of wood, &c., resembling earth, &c., through the conjunction of earth, &c., is seen: to which he replies:\textsuperscript{2}

\begin{quote}
\textit{तत्त्वज्ञान इति व्यत्यत्वा चेतनासत्चाभिन्नः। यथैवकमेव कार्तर्कं यथेतनादभिज्ञानस्तमादेव मुच्यते तं प्रत्येकं दुःखात्मकं न भवत्यन्यान्यति तु भवलेव तथा प्रकृतिरिपु चेतनादभिज्ञातःताधार्यादेव मुच्यते तं प्रत्येकं दुःखात्मिका न भवत्यन्याननभिज्ञान्यति तु दुःखात्मिका भवलेवेति नियमो व्यवस्थेवतः। एतेन स्बावन्तो बद्धाया अधिप प्रकृते: स्वामीक्षा घटते इति। अभिता न मुक्तपुष्पं प्रति प्रवर्ततेत \textit{इति}}।

\textit{ननु पुरुषे सहस्रमधयस्तत्तमाचारणिति यदुर्वं तत्च \textit{युक्तं प्रकृतिसंयोगेन पुरुषस्यापि महदादिपरिश्व-}
मात्रिथाहृद्धि हि पृथियादियोगन काश्यादेन पृथिय-}
\textit{व्यातिस्तृष्णं परिश्वाम इति। तत्चाह}}।
\end{quote}
Aph. 8. Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz., Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately; just like the burning action of iron.

a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness, ‘immediately,’ i.e., directly. An illustration of this is, ‘like the burning action of iron:’ as iron does not possess, directly, a burning power; but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it: such is the meaning. But, in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both; for this is proved by sense-evidence: but, in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both; because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed.¹

¹ प्रकृतियोगेश्वपि पुष्पस्य न सन्न्यसि दिवराः-अम्येन साक्षात्। तच् दृश्यात्तौ दाताहवत्।
यशायसो न दग्धवं साक्षादृति किं तु स्वसंयुक्ता-रिनिदारकमथतमवेवथर्थः। उक्तकृत्तान्ते तूभया: परिभाषाम: प्रत्यक्षसिद्धात्मिते संदिग्धत्वले वेक-स्थैव परिभाषामनोपपत्ताबुध्ययो: परिभाषामक्यने गौरवम्। अन्यथा जयासंध्योगस्फटिकस्य रागप-रिभाषामापन्निरिति।
b. It has already been stated [§ 1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation:

\[
\text{Creation when.}
\]

\[Aph. 9.\] When there is passion, or dispassion, there is concentration, [in the latter case, and] creation, [in the former].

\[a.\] When there is passion, there is creation; and, when there is dispassion, there is ‘concentration,’ i.e., the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 32]; in short, emancipation, or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 23]: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that Passion is the cause of creation; because of their being simultaneously present or absent.

\[b.\] After this he begins to state the manner of creation:

\[1 \text{ सृष्टि: फलं मोक्ष इति प्रागुक्तम्। इदानीं सृष्टेमूल्यं निनित्त्वकारणामाह।}
\]

\[2 \text{ Vide infra, p. 211, note 6. Ed.}
\]

\[3 \text{ ‘Simultaneously,’ &c., is to render anwayavyatirekau, on which vide supra, p. 43, note 2. Ed.}
\]

\[4 \text{ रागे सृष्ट्वेवराग्ये च योगः स्वस्त्तपेल्लस्यानं मुक्तिरिति यावद्य वा चित्रृवृत्तिनिरोध इत्यथे:।}
\]

\[5 \text{ इति: परं सृष्टिमक्षयां वञ्चुमारभते।}
\]
Aph. 10. In the order [see § 12. 6.] of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five elements, [or of the material world].

a. 'Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism.

b. He mentions a distinction [between these successively creative energies and the primal one]:

Nature's products not for themselves.

Aph. 11. Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake.

a. 'Of these,' i.e., of Mind, &c., since the creativeness is for the sake of Soul, i.e., for the sake of the emancipation of Soul, the 'origination,' i.e., the creativeness, is not for the sake of themselves; since, inasmuch as they are perishable, they [unlike Nature, (see § 1)] are not susceptible of emancipation: such is the meaning.

b. He declares the creation of limited space and time:

1 Nágéśa has, instead of पञ्चः, च. Ed.

2 सृष्टिरिति पूर्वपूर्वादनुवत्तिते

3 विशेषमाह

4 एषां महादीनां सप्तत्रायात्मार्थवात्सरुसं-मोक्षार्थवाच स्वार्थ चारभं सप्त्रलं विनाशितं मोक्षायोगादित्यथेष्व

5 खरादिक्षालयां: सृष्टिमाह

a. The Space and Time which are eternal [and absolute], being the source of the Ether, are, really, sorts of qualities of Nature: therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that limiting object: such is the meaning. By the expression ' &c.,' [in the aphorism,] is meant 'from the apprehending of this or that limiting object.'

b. Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned [in § 10] as 'in the order of Mind, &c.'

Aph. 13. Intellect is judgment.

a. 'Intellect' is a synonym of 'the Great Principle' [or Mind (see Book I., § 71)]; and 'judgment,' called [also] ascertainment, is its
peculiar modification: such is the meaning. But they are set forth as identical, because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible. And it is to be understood, that this Intellect is ‘Great,’ because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.

b. He mentions other properties, also, of the Great Principle:

\[ तत्काये धर्मादि: \]

Products of intellect.

Aph. 14. Merit, &c., are products of it.

a. The meaning is, that Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Supernatural Power, moreover, are formed out of intellect, not formed of self-consciousness (ahankāra), &c.; because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness.] is a product of superlative Purity, [without admixture of Passion and Darkness].

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1 See, for a different rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45. Ed.

2 भक्तत्वस्य पर्याये बुध्दिरिति। ओष्ठवसायण निष्ठयायत्तिस्यासाधारणी वृत्तिरियथै:। ओष्ठवस्य निर्देशस्तु धर्मध्यस्यभेदात। ओष्ठवस्य बुधेमहेंस्वच स्वेतरसकलकार्यापायकलामहेंश्योक्त मन्तव्यम्।

3 महत्त्वस्यापरानपि धर्मानाह॥

4 From copying a typographical error, Dr. Ballantyne had, in both his editions, धर्मादि. Ed.

5 धर्मन्नानवैराग्येष्यासायिपि बुधुपादानकानि
But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of
demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle,
&c., be accounted for? To this he replies:¹

\[\text{Aph. 15. The Great one [intellect,]}
\text{becomes reversed through tincture.}\]

\(\text{a. That same 'Great one,' i.e., the Great Principle [or}
\text{intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Dark-
\text{ness, also becomes 'reversed' [see § 14. a.], i.e., vile, with}
\text{the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and}
\text{want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning.}^{\text{3}}\]

\(\text{b. Having characterized the Great Principle, he defines}
\text{its product, Self-consciousness:}^{\text{4}}\)


\[\text{Aph. 15. The Great one [intellect,]}
\text{becomes reversed through tincture.}\]

\(\text{a. That same 'Great one,' i.e., the Great Principle [or}
\text{intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Dark-
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\text{want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning.}^{\text{3}}\]

\(\text{b. Having characterized the Great Principle, he defines}
\text{its product, Self-consciousness:}^{\text{4}}\)
Aph. 16. Self-consciousness is a conceit.

a. ‘Self-consciousness’ is what makes the Ego, as a potter [makes a pot]; the thing [called] the internal instrument (antah-karana): and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as ‘a conceit,’ [viz., of personality], in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect [i.e., by an act of judgment (see §13. a.)], do the making of an Ego and the making of a Meum take place.²

b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which has arrived in order:³

Aph. 17. The product of it [viz., of Self-consciousness,] is the eleven [organs], and the five Subtile Elements.

a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, with the

¹ For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45. Ed.
² चाहं करौंतीत्यहंकार: कुम्भकारवदन्तः कारण-दृश्य स च धर्मेधस्यभेदार्थमित इत्युक्तासाधार-मृतितासूचनाय। बुद्धा निखित एवारेनः हंकारसमकारौ जायेते॥
³ ऋमागतमहंकारस्य कार्यमाह॥
five Subtile Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product of Self-consciousness.¹

b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction:²

सात्विकमेकादशकं प्रवृत्तिते वैकृताद्विकारायत् ॥ ७४ ॥


a. The 'eleventh,' i.e., the completer of the eleven, viz., Mind, [or the 'internal organ',—which is not to be confounded with 'the Great one,' called also Intellect and Mind,—alone,] among the set consisting of sixteen [§ 17], consists of Purity; therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 'modified,' i.e., pure: such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness; and the Subtile Elements, from the Dark Self-consciousness.³

b. He exhibits the eleven organs:⁴

¹ एकादशेष्वेण्ट्रियाणि श्चत्रद्विपञ्चतन्माच् चाहं
   कारस्य कायेमित्यथे: ॥

² अष्टापि विशेषमाह ॥

³ एकादशानां पूर्वमेकादशकं मन: श्रोदशा-
   त्मगृहामथे सात्विकमेकादस्वं कृतात्मा
   सात्विककाष्ठार्कारार्थ इत्यथे: ॥ शतस्वर राजमाहं
   कारार्धेष्वेण्ट्रियाणि तामसादंकाराच्च तन्माचार्यीस्वात्तथम् ॥

⁴ एकादशेष्वेण्ट्रियाणि दर्शयति ॥
Aph. 19. Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh.

a. The organs of action are five, viz., the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and, the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i.e., is the eleventh organ: such is the meaning.¹

b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements.²

Aph. 20. They [the organs,] are not formed of the Elements; because there is Scripture for [their] being formed of Self-consciousness.

a. Supply 'the organs.'³

b. Pondering a doubt, he says:⁴

¹ कमेंद्रियाः वाक्याः पादपायृपस्यानि पत्थ्र ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः च चक्षु:श्राचल्यससनघ्राहार्यानि पत्थ्र। एतेर्देशभि: सहात्तरं मन एकादशकमेकादशन्द्रियमित्यथे: ॥

² इन्द्रियां भातिकाचमतं निराकरोति ॥

³ इन्द्रियाश्रीति शेषः ॥

⁴ ज्ञासब्द्धाह ॥
A text explained.

Aph. 21. The Scripture regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator.

a. That Scripture which there is about absorption into deities is not ‘of an originator,’ that is to say, it does not refer to an originator; because [although a thing, e.g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet] we see the absorption of a drop of water into what, nevertheless, is not its originator, viz., the ground; [and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate].

b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, is eternal. He repels this:

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1 Aniruddha has, instead of -शुति-, -शुते-. His comment is as follows: कार्ये कार्येय इति स्थितम्। श्राद्वित्य वे चछुमेल्थतीति देवे लयः श्रुते। तस्माद्बारभक्त्य नारभकाभिमत्त्वय भृतस्य कारणतत्त्वमिति। Ed.

2 देवतासु या लयश्रुतिः सा नारभक्कस्य नारभकाविभिविषीत्यर्थोनारभक्केपिभृतले जलबिन्दोलेयदशिणात्।

3 इन्द्रियानल्गतं मनो नित्यमिति केचित्।

तत्सर्वर्हिति।
No organ eternal.

Aph. 22. [None of the organs is eternal, as some hold the Mind to be;] because we have Scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction.

a. All these organs, without exception, have a beginning; for the Scripture says, 'From this are produced the vital air, the mind, and all the organs;' &c., and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind, also, like the sight and the rest, decays, &c.: such is the meaning.

b. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for example,] is merely the set of eye-balls, [&c.].

1 Aniruddha's reading is तद्दृश्यति: चूर्यते विनाशः. Ed.

2 Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 3. Ed.

3 तेषां सर्वेण्मेवेद्दियाणामुत्ततिर्स्त्येतस्माज्ञायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेद्दियाणि चेत्यादिश्रुतेवृङ्गायवस्यासु चक्षुरादिनामिभि मनसोदयपचयादिना विनाशनिःशिवाच्छेवथे: ||

4 गोलकजातमेवेद्दियमिति नातिकमतमप्यकराति: ||

5 This is taken from my edition, where, however, it is corrected in the corrigenda. See the next two notes. Ed.
Aph. 23. The Sense is supersensuous; [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site.

a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible; but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist ‘in its site,’ e.g., [Sight,] in the eye-ball, in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball]: such is the meaning. The correct reading is: [‘The sense is something supersensuous; to confound it with] the site,¹ [is a mistake].²

b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through diversity of powers, performs various offices:³

Aph. 24. Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of powers be [conceded], there is not a oneness [of the organs].

¹ इन्द्रियं सर्वे मतीन्द्रियं नन्तु प्रत्यक्षं भालानामेव वधिष्ठानं गोलकं तदात्म्येन्निद्रियमित्यथं:। वधिष्ठानमित्येव पाठ: ॥

² The original of this shows that Vijñāna emphasizes वधिष्ठानं as the true reading. He seems to point to वधिष्ठाने, which Aniruddha has, and, after him, Vedānti Mahādeva. Ed.

³ एकमेवेन्द्रियं शक्तिसद्विभिलक्षणकार्यकारीति मतमपाकरोति ॥
a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established; because the powers are, assuredly, organs; therefore, there is not a singleness of organ: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness. To this he replies:²

न कल्पनार्थोराभः प्रमाणदृष्ट्यः³ ॥ २५ ॥

Aph. 25. A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight,] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence.

a. This is simple.⁴

b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers:⁵

¹ एकस्यञ्जीवितः शक्तिमेषदात्मो चिन्तकेकानाचरणानीन्द्रिययोगावधिकान्तः नेष्कर्ममन्द्रियस्यः प्रस्तुतः ॥

² नन्येक्षमात्रांकाराध्यानिन्द्रियोपत्यतिकल्पनायां न्यायविरोधः ॥ तचाह ॥

³ Nágeśa is peculiar in having प्रमाणदृष्ट्यात्. Ed.

⁴ सुगमम् ॥

⁵ एकस्यञ्जीवितः मुख्यं न्यायं स्मरे, दश शक्तिमेषदा इत्यादि ॥
Aph. 26. The Mind identifies itself with both.

a. That is to say: the Mind identifies itself with the organs of intellection and of action.

b. Of his own accord, he explains the meaning of the expression 'identifies itself with both':

Aph. 27. By reason of the varieties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their product, the Mind,] according to circumstances.

a. As one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent, indifferent; and, through association with some other, something other,—so the Mind, also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, from its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other; by its being [thereby] distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in support of this is, 'of the Qualities,' &c.; the meaning being, because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., to varieties of transformation.
b. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection and of action: ¹

What the organs deal with.  

Ap. 28. Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things], beginning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste.

a. The 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., means ordure, &c., ² [into which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, &c., is partly transformed].

b. Of what Soul (indra), through what service, these are termed Organs (indriya), both these things he tells us: ³

¹ Aniruddha reads, in lieu of -मलः, -वर्गः.  Ed.

² ऋऽबरस्तानां मलः पुरीशादि:।

³ यस्येन्द्रस्य येनोपकारेशितानीन्द्रियाशिखीयव्यते

तदुभयमाह॥
Aph. 29. The being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul; the instrumentality belongs to the Organs.

a. For, as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply, so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes a seer, a speaker, and a judge, and the like, merely through the proximity called ‘Conjunction,’ because it moves these, as the lodestone[1] [does the iron, without exerting any effort].

b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the triad of internal organs: ²

Aph. 30. Of the three [internal organs] there is a diversity among themselves.

1 यथा हि महाराजः स्वयम्बाप्रियमाखोडःपि सैन्येन कर्येन योद्धा भवत्याज्ञामाचेषा प्रेरकवातः
तत्रा कूटस्थोधपि पुरुषश्रुश्रुशादिलकोन्द्रेषा
वक्ता संकल्पयिता चेत्येवमादिभिवति संयोगार्थसाधिभिविषेव
माखोडःपि तेषां प्रेरकवादयस्कान्तमणिव- 

2 इदानीमेन्तः कर्षणभयस्याधारणवृत्तीराह
a. The aspect of Intellect is attention\(^1\); of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality]; of the Mind, decision and doubt.\(^2\)

b. He mentions, also, a common aspect of the three:

\[\text{सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणायाम वायुम् पञ्च } 31 \]

\(\text{A character common to the three.}\)

Aph. 31. The five airs, viz., Breath, &c., are the modification, in common, of the [three internal] instruments.

a. That is to say: the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as ‘airs’, because of their circulating as the air does, these [animal spirits] are the joint or common ‘modification,’ or kinds of altered form, ‘of the instruments,’ i.e., of the triad of internal instruments.\(^4\)

b. The opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiśeṣi-

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\(^1\) Adhyavāsāya, rendered ‘ascertainment’ and ‘judgment’ at pp. 156 and 196, supra. Also see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 46. Ed.

\(^2\) वृद्धिवृत्तिर्भवसायोऽभिमानोश्चकारस्य संक-त्यविकल्पोऽ मनस इति.

\(^3\) चयाणां साधारणिः वृत्तिमयाः.

\(^4\) प्राणादिकृपाः पञ्च वायुवसंचारःद्वयोऽ ये प्रसिद्धात्स्यमान्या साधारणिः करणाक्ष्यान्तः कर-शचयस्य वृत्ति: परिशाम्भेदा इत्ययः.
kas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously. So he says:

*Aph.* 32. The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.

*a.* This is simple.

*b.* Lumping the modifications of the understanding, with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, in the first place, exhibits [them]:

*Aph.* 33. The modifications [of the understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and] which are of five kinds, are [some of them,] painful and [others,] not painful.

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1 वैशेषिकाशास्त्रवास्माक नायं नियमो यद्दन्द्रयृति: क्रमेष्येव भवति नैकदेत्याह ॥

2 सुगमम् ॥

3 पितृइक्यु बुधिवृत्ति: संसारनिदानताप्रति-पाद्याध्येमादै दर्श्यति ॥

4 Literally the same words are found in the Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 5. *Ed.*
a. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by Patanjali’s aphorism,¹ [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 6 ²].

b. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul:³

तत्त्वज्ञानघुपशालोपरागः स्वस्थः \( \text{Aph. 34.} \) On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tincture⁴ ceasing, it [Soul,] abides in itself.

a. That is to say: during the state of repose of these modifications, it [the Soul], the reflexion of these having ceased, is abiding in itself; being, at other times, also, as it were, in isolation, [though seemingly not so]. And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga,⁵ [viz., Book I., §§ 2, 3, and 4⁶].

¹ \( \text{वृत्तीनां पञ्चप्रकारन्त पात्त्वलसूचनेश्वर्कम्} \) \( \text{II} \)

² Namely: \( \text{प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्त्रतयः} \)

‘Evidence, misprision, chimera, unconsciousness, memory.’ \( \text{Ed.} \)

³ \( \text{पुरुषस्य स्वरूपं परिचाययति} \)

⁴ I. e., ‘influence’, as in Aph. 15, at p. 198, supra. \( \text{Ed.} \)

⁵ \( \text{तासं वृत्तीनां विरामदशायां शान्ततप्रति-विमुक्तः स्वस्थः भवति कैल्य इवायदापीयथः} \)

\( \text{तथा च योगसूत्रस्यम्} \)

⁶ \( \text{योगशिचत्वृत्तिनिरोधः} \) \( \text{I} \) ‘Concentration (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.’ \( \text{तदा} \)

\( \text{दृष्टः स्वरूपस्यानम्} \) \( \text{I} \) ‘Then [i.e., at the time of Con-
b. He explains this by an illustration: 1

कुमुमवच मणिः || 35 ||

Aph. 35. And as [by] a flower, the gem.

a. The 'and' implies that this is the reason [of what was asserted in the preceding aphorism]; the meaning being, as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red, not abiding in its own state, and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its own state, in like manner 2 [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities].

b. But then [it may be asked], by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation; since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied 3 that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies: 4

\[\text{centreation,} \text{ it [the Soul,] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectacle].} \]

\[\text{At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the Soul,] is in the same form as the modifications [of the internal organ].} \]

Dr. Ballantyne's translation is here quoted. Ed.

1 एतदेव दृष्टान्तेन विवृणाति ||

2 चकारो हेता कुमुमकं मणिरित्वयें | यथा जपाकुपमेन स्फटिकमणी रक्षोस्वस्थो भवति तत्ब्रृत्ति च रागशृण्यः स्वस्थो भवति तहदिति ||

3 'Demurred to' is preferable. Vide supra, p. 112. Ed.

4 ननु कस्य प्रयत्नेन करणजातं प्रवर्ततां पुर-
Aph. 36. The Organs also arise, for the sake of Soul, from the development of desert.

a. The meaning is, that, just as Nature energizes 'for the sake of Soul,' so 'the Organs also arise;' i. e., the energizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the development of the deserts of the Soul: [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 13. b.]. And the desert belongs entirely to the investment;¹ [the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit].

b. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another:²

Aph. 37. As the cow for the calf.

a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously secretes milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously: such is the meaning. And it is seen, that,

1. Prahānānuprāṇibhūṣyāṃ karṇaṅgīrāpi pūrṣyaṅgīrāpi pūrṣyādṛṣṭābhāmyakṣerā ev bhavatiyārè. ¹
2. Paṣṭaṃ kṣatāmbryātṛṣṭānāmasaḥ. ²
out of profound sleep, the understanding of its own accord wakes up.\(^1\)

\(b.\) With reference to the question, how many Organs there are, external and internal combined, he says:\(^2\)

\[\text{कर्णं च योद्धादिबिधमवान्तरभेदात्} \parallel 38 \parallel\]

\(\text{The number of the Organs.}\)

\(\text{Aph. 38. Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subordinates.}\)

\(a.\) The triad of internal organs, and the ten external organs, combined, are thirteen. He says ‘sorts,’ in order to declare that, of these, moreover, there is an infinity, through [their] distinction into individuals. He says ‘through division of the subordinates,’ with a reference to the fact, that it is understanding which is the principal organ; the meaning being, because the organs [or functions,] of the single organ, called understanding, are more than one.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) यथा वल्सार्थं धेनुः स्वयंमेव छौरं सवति नान्ये यलमपेक्षाते तथैव स्वामिन्: पुरुषस्य कृते स्वयंमेव कर्खानि प्रवर्तन्त इत्यर्थं: \(\text{वृत्त्यते} \) च सुषुम्नास्वयंमेव बुद्धेऽल्यानमिति \(\parallel\)

\(^2\) बाङ्ह्राभ्यन्तरैःमिलिता कियति कर्खानीत्या-कार्यायमरी\(\parallel\)

\(^3\) चयोद्धादिबिधवान्तरभेदात्. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^4\) अन्तःकरणं दश बाङ्ह्रकरखानि मिलिता
b. But then, since understanding [it seems,] alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emancipation] to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary, in this case what is [meant by] secondariness?¹ [Why are they said to be instrumental at all?] In regard to this he says:²

Aph. 39. Because the quality of being most efficient is conjoined with the organs; as in the case of an axe.

a. The quality of the [principal] organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of soul, exists, derivatively, in the [other derivative] organs. Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds: such is the connexion with the preceding aphorism.³

¹ Instead of ‘in this case,’ &c., read, ‘what is the character of these [i. e., organs]?’ Ed.

² ननु बुझिरेव पुष्पेष्ठेसमर्यास्मधुरयः करणमयेषां च करणलं गौणं तत्त्वं को गुणं इत्याकाश्वायाप्रमाह ॥

³ इन्द्रियेषु पुष्पायसाधकतमलवृपः करणस्य
b. 'As in the case of an axe.' As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe, also, is an efficient, because of its close proximity to the quality of being the principal efficient, so [here, also]: such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ.¹

c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says:²

1 Atma-bodha, p. 242.

² Gita Katha, p. 83, note 2.
chief; in short, is the immediate cause; because it is that which furnishes Soul with its end; just as, among troops of dependants, some one single person is the prime minister of the king; and the others, governors of towns, &c., are his subordinates: such is the meaning.¹

b. Here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ,² [(§ 30. a.) but Intellect, or 'the Great One.‘]

c. He tells, in three aphorisms, the reasons why Intellect [or understanding] is the principal:³

A reason why Understanding is the principal.

Aph. 41. [And Intellect is the principal, or immediate and direct, efficient in Soul's emancipation;] because there is no wandering away.

a. That is to say: because it [understanding,] per-

¹ दयेवैभाष्यान्त्यामेध्ये मने बुद्धिरेव प्रधानं मुखं साध्योत्तर्ण्मिति यावत्मुखोपयोगमर्यक-ल्वादया महत्वगर्भं मध्ये कालिदेव लोको राजः प्रधाना भवत्यन्ये च तदुपसर्जनेभूता ग्रामाध्य-क्षाद्यस्तवदंदित्येष्यः ॥

² ऋच मनःशैवं न तृतीयान्तःकर्णवाचिः ॥

³ वदेः प्रधानवे हेतृनाह चिभिः सूचि: ॥
vades all the organs; or because there is no result apart from it.\(^1\)

\textit{तथाशेषसंस्काराधारतवात् \| \textit{\textbf{42}} \|}

\textit{Another reason.}

\textit{Aph. 42.} So, too, because it [the understanding] is the depository of all self-continuant impressions.

\textit{a.} Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuant impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self-consciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., would be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c.\(^2\)

\textit{समृयानुमानानाच \| \textit{\textbf{43}} \|}

\textit{Another reason.}

\textit{Aph. 43.} And because we infer this [its preeminence] by reason of its meditating.

\textit{a.} That is to say: and because we infer its preeminence, ‘by reason of its meditating,’ i.e., its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called ‘meditation’ is the noblest of all the modifications [incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no \textit{modification} at all]; and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is, further, named Thought [\textit{chitta}, from the

\[\begin{align*}
1 \text{ सर्वकरणायापककान्तकलाविभिचारादेव्यर्थे:} \| \\
2 \text{ बुझेरवासिन्संस्काराधारता नतु चक्षुरादि-} \\
\text{रहंकामनसेवी पूर्वदृष्टयुताद्यादोमनयन्तवा} \\
\text{दिमिः समरणान्यपञ्चे:} \| 
\end{align*}\]
same root as *chintā\textsuperscript{1}*, is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this: such is the meaning.\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{b}. But then, suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the *Soul*, [suggests some one]. To this he replies:\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{center}
\begin{verse}
संभवेच स्वतः \textsuperscript{2} 44 \textsuperscript{2}
\end{verse}
\end{center}

\textit{Meditation not essential to Soul.}

\textit{Aph. 44. It cannot be of its own nature.}

\textit{a}. That is to say: meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially; because of the immobility\textsuperscript{4} [of Soul; whereas 'meditation' is an effort].

\textit{b}. But then, if thus the preeminence belongs to understanding alone, how was it said before [at §26,] that it is the *Mind* that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in

\textsuperscript{1} The two words are, respectively, from *chit* and *chint*, which are cognate. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{2} स्मृया चिन्तनह्यया वृत्त्या प्राधान्यानुमानातन्त्रेयः। चिन्तावृत्तिः ध्यानाभ्या सर्ववृत्तिभ्यः। श्रेष्ठा तदाश्रयत्या च चिन्तापरनामी बुद्धिरेव श्रेष्ठान्वृत्तिककरणोभ्य इत्यथः।

\textsuperscript{3} ननु चिन्तावृत्तिः पुरुषस्यवास्तु॥ तत्ताह॥

\textsuperscript{4} स्वतः पुरुषस्य स्मृतिनें संभवेल्कूटस्यवादिकत्वः॥
apparent contradiction to the view propounded at § 39]?
To this he replies: 1

Aph. 45. The condition [as regards Soul's instruments,] of secondary and principal is relative; because of the difference of function.

a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, as secondary, or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is relative. In the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and, in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and, in the operation of Self-consciousness, Intellect, is principal2 [or precedent].

b. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement; viz., that, of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect, alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this, he says: 3

1 नन्वेवं बुढ़ेरेव प्राधान्ये कथं मनस उभ्यात्म-कां प्रागुक्तम् । तचाह ॥

2 ज्ञायाविशेषं प्रति करणामापेनिष्ठिको गुण-प्रधानभावं । चक्षुरादियापारेषु मनः प्रधानं मनोयापारे चाहंकारोऽहंकारयापारे च बुढः प्रधानम् ॥

3 नन्वस्य पुरुषस्येयं बुढ़ेरेव करणं न बुढ़ान्तर-मित्येवं व्यवस्या निनिनिनिषिकेत्याकाळ्यायामाह ॥
Every one reaps as he has sowed.

Aph. 46. The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul]; because of [its] having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul]; just as in the world.

a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing,' i.e., all operation, of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] Soul; because of [its] having been purchased by this [or that] Soul's works [or deserts]; just as in the world. As, in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e.g., of buying, by whatever man, the operation of that [axe, or the like], such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]: such is the meaning. The import is, that therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments [inquired about under § 45. b.]

b. Although there is no act in Soul, because it is im-

\[\text{Nāgāsa differs from all the other commentators in reading}\]

-नेमिप चेष्टा. Ed.

\[\text{तत्पुरूषीयकर्मेञ्जवान्करणस्य तत्पुरूषार्थमभि-}\]
\[\text{चेष्टा सर्वेऽपारो भवति लोकवैद्ययम्। यथा}\]
\[\text{लोके येन पुरुषेण क्रमदमकर्मेण जिते यः कुटार-}\]
\[\text{दित्तत्पुरूषार्थेमेव तस्य चित्तदैवियापार इत्यत्थः।}\]
\[\text{ञ्जत: करणव्यवस्थेति भावः।}\]
movable, still, since it is the means of Soul’s experience, it is called the act of Soul; just like the victories, &c., of a king [which are, really, the acts of his servants]; because of Soul’s being the owner\(^1\) [of the results of acts; as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops].

c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up,\(^2\) [as follows]:

\[
\text{समानकर्मेयः बुधे: प्राधान्यं लोकव्यस्तः-कपत्} \| 47 \|
\]

**Summing up.**

*Aph. 47.* Admitting that they [the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the preeminence belongs to Intellect; just as in the world, just as in the world.

*a.* Although the action of all the instruments is the same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the preeminence belongs to Intellect alone: just as in the world. The meaning is, because it is just as the preeminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister, among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the Institutes, Intellect alone is celebrated as ‘the Great One.’ The repetition

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\(^1\) यद्यपि कृतस्यत्या पुरुषे कर्म नाति तथापि पुरुषभोगसाधनत्या पुरुषस्वामिकवेव राज्ये जयादिवदेव पुरुषस्य कर्माच्यं्

\(^2\) बुधे: प्राधान्यं प्रकटीकरतुमुपसंहरित ्
[viz., 'just as in the world, just as in the world,'] implies the completion of the Book.¹

b. So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book, on the Products of Nature, in the commentary, on Kapila's Declaration of the Sāṅkhya, composed by the venerable Vijnāna Āchārya.²

¹ यद्यापि पुर्वार्थेन समान एव सर्वेषां कर-शानां व्यापारस्तथापि बुधरेव प्राधान्यं लोकवत्।
लोकेन हि राजार्थकन्तविशेषेषदिपि प्रामाण्यभाषार्थिः
मध्ये मन्निः प्राधान्यं तददिस्यथः। ऋतु एव
बुधरेव महानिति सर्वेशास्त्रेषु गीयत इति।
वी-प्ताध्यायसमाप्तः॥

² इति प्रीविड्गानाचार्यनिमिते कापिलसाहित्य-
प्रवचनस्य भाषे प्रधानकार्याध्याये द्वितीयः॥

END OF BOOK II.
BOOK III.

a. In the next place, the gross product of Nature, viz., the great elements and the dyad of bodies, is to be described; and, after that, the going into various wombs, and the like; [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one’s engaging upon the means of knowledge; and, after that, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third [Book] commences:¹

स्विशेषादिशेषारम्भः || 9 ||

Aph. 1. The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference.

a. ‘[Which] has no difference,’ i.e., that in which there exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called ‘the five somethings, simply;’ from this [set of five] is the origina-

¹ इतः परं प्रधानस्य स्तूलकार्यं महाभूतानि
शरीरवर्गं च वक्रवर्गं तत्तत्त्व विविधयो निगब्याद्यो
झानसाधनानुष्ठानहेलपरवैराग्याञ्च तत्तत्त्व परवैराग्याय झानसाधनाय विग्रहानीति
तृतीयारम्भः ||
tion of 'the diversified,' [so called] from their possessing a difference, in the shape of the calm, &c., viz., the gross, the great Elements: such is the meaning. For, the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater, and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile; because these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated,¹ [practitioners of meditation, but to no others].

b. So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the dyad of bodies:²

The Body whence. Aph. 2. Therefrom, of the Body.

a. 'Therefrom,' i.e., from the twenty-three Principles,

¹ नास्ति विशेषः शान्तधारमूढवादिक्रपा यष्ट- 
विशेषेऽभतस्मम यज्ञतन्माचार्यं तस्माच्छा- 
न्तारिद्विशेषवत् बेन विशेषायां स्थूलानां महा- 
भूतानामोर्भ्म इत्यर्थे:। मुखादातां व् ति शा- 
न्तारिक्रपां स्थूलभूतेष्वेय तारतम्यादिभिन्धिव्य- 
ज्यते न मूखेषु तेषां शान्तीकरपतिध्व योगिष्वभि- 
व्यक्तिरिति इ

² तदेवं पौरीधायामार्भ्य चयोविश्वितत्तत्वः ना- 
मुख्तिमुस्का तस्माच्छार्द्योत्त्वत्तिमाहिः
there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross [Body] and the Subtile: such is the meaning.¹

b. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles:²

तद्वीजात्सृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

Aph. 3. From the seed thereof is mundane existence.

a. ‘Thereof,’ i.e., of the Body; ‘from the seed,’ i.e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles, is ‘mundane existence,’ i.e., do the going and coming of Soul take place; for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of [its] all-pervading-ness, is immovable: such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works.³
b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence:¹

Mundane existence till when.

Aph. 4. And, till there is discrimination, there is the energizing of these, which have no differences.

a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatever, void of the differences of being Lord, or not Lord, &c., [though, seemingly, possessed of such differences,] ‘energizing,’ i.e., mundane existence, is inevitable, even till there is discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments]; and it does not continue after that.²

b. He states the reason of this:³

The reason of this.

Aph. 5. Because of [the necessity of] the other's experiencing.

a. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the

¹ संस्तृतेनवधिमण्ड ॥

² ईश्वरानीश्वरतात्विशेषरहितानां सर्वार्थवेश ् पुस्ता विशेषपर्यन्तभेदवर्त्तनां संस्तृतिरावश्यकी विशेषकात्रं च न सेव्यथः ॥

³ तत्र हेतुमाह ॥
other, i.e., that that very [Soul], which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] acts.¹

b. He states, that, even while there is a Body, during the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not:²

\[ \text{संप्रति परिमुखोऽ हाभ्याम्} \]

Aph. 6. It [Soul,] is now quite free from both.

a. 'Now,' i.e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul is quite free 'from both,' i.e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c.: such is the meaning.⁴

b. He next proceeds to describe, separately, the dyad of Bodies:⁵

\[ \text{मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश्च इतरच तथा} \]

Aph. 7. The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so.

¹ इतरस्याविवेकिन एव स्वीयकर्मवैलभेगाव-श्रयंभावादित्यर्थेः
² देहस्थ्रेणि संस्त्रितकाले भोगो नास्तीयाह
³ Aniruddha has परिष्क्रम, and comments accordingly. Ed.
⁴ संप्रति संस्त्रितकाले पुष्पो हाभ्यं श्रीतापा-सुखदुःखादिहः परिमुखः भवतीत्यथेः
⁵ ऋतं परं शरीरदयं विशिष्टं वञ्चुमुपक्रमते
a. The Gross one arises from father and mother, 'usually,' i.e., for the most part; for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb: and 'the other,' i.e., the Subtile Body, is 'not so,' i.e., does not arise from a father and mother; because it arises from creation, &c. : such is the meaning.1

b. He decides [the question], through disguise by which one of the Bodies, Gross and Subtile, the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.,] with Soul takes place.2

Which of the bodies is the cause of Soul's bondage.

Aph. 8. To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this; because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other.

a. 'To be that whose result is this,' i.e., to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i.e., at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Why? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs only to 'the one,' i.e., the Subtile Body, but not to 'the other,' i.e., the Gross Body; because all are

1 स्थलं मातापितृजं प्रायेण बाइस्यन्यायोगिनि- 
ज्ञापि स्थलशरीरस्य स्मरशादितरच सूक्ष्मश-
रीरं न तथा न मातापितृजं सगायत्थन्धवा-
दित्यर्थः ॥

2 स्थलसूक्ष्मशरीरयोगिध्ये किमुपाधिकः पुरुषस्य 
इत्योगाल्यदधायति ॥
agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth: such is the meaning.\(^1\)

b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned:\(^2\)

\begin{quote}
The Subtile Body how constituted.
\end{quote}

\textit{Aph. 9.} The seventeen, as one, are the Subtile Body.

\begin{quote}
a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen, [presently mentioned,] mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate; [as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one]: such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding.\(^3\)
\end{quote}

\(1\) पूंवं सगोदाबुधपवियोऽयय लिङ्गश्रीरस्य तत्स्येव तङ्कायेव मृतदुःखकायकालम्। कुतः। एकस्य लिङ्गदेहस्येव मृतदुःखाभोगायचित्तरस्य स्यूऽलश्रीरस्य मृतश्रीरे मृतदुःखाभावस्य सर्वसंसम-\(\) \(\)तबाद्वित्ययः।

\(2\) उज्जस्य सूक्ष्मश्रीरस्य स्वह्यपमाह।

\(3\) सूक्ष्मश्रीरमण्डलाराधाराधयभावेन द्विविधं भव-\(\) \(\)वित। तथ सम्रदश मिलिवा लिङ्गश्रीरं तथ सगोदी समस्तीहुपमेरे मेव भवतील्ययः। एका-\(\) \(\)दशेन्द्रियार्थं पद्ध तन्माचारण्युतिश्चेति सम्रदश। \(\) ऋषकारस्य बुधायेवालभेंव॥
b. But [one may ask,] if the Subtile Body be one, how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are [numerically] distinct, [one from another]? To this he replies:¹

\[\text{व्यक्ति भेदः कर्मविशेषात्॥ १० ॥} \]

_How there come to be individuals._

_Aph. 10. There is distinction of individuals, through diversity of desert._

_a. Although, at the beginning of the creation [or annus magnus], there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment [of Soul (see _Vedánta-sútra_, § 62,) named] Hiranyagarbha, still, subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality, partitively, in the shape of individuals;—as, at present, there is, of the one Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, ‘through diversity of desert;’ meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls._² ³

¹ ननु लिङ्ग चेदेक तहि कथं पुरुषमेवेन विल-क्षणा भोगा: स्युः। तच्चाह॥

² यदापि सगौदै विराध्यगमोपाधिहृप्तमेकमेव लिङ्गं तथापि तत्त्व पश्वायात्मकं व्यक्तिहृप्तं-शते नानातमिपि भवित येदानीमेकस्य पित्र-लिङ्गेहस्य नानातमंशते भवित पुत्रकाठिरिदिलिङ्गेहृप्त। तच्च कारणमाह कर्मविशेषार्दित जोवानलराक्षं भेगसहूकमाईदिरिथ्यः॥

³ See, for another rendering, the _Rational Refutation_, &c., p.36. _Ed._
b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be denoted by the term] Body, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies: ¹

तद्धिष्ठानायै देहे त्वादात्त्वादः ॥ ११ ॥

Why the Gross Body is called a Body.

Aph. 11. From its being applied to it, [viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body, which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof.

a. But then, what proof is there of another body,—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths,—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this, he says: ²

न स्वातन्त्र्यात्त्वे छायाविभववच ॥ १२ ॥

The Subtile Body dependent on the Gross Body.

Aph. 12. Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body]; just like a shadow and a picture.

a. That is to say: the Subtile Body does not stand independently, ‘without that,’ i. e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go

¹ नन्दवेव भोगायतनतया लिङ्गस्येव शरीरमेव स्मूले कथं शरीरव्यवहारं । तत्राह ॥

² ननु पद्मशिकातिरिक्ते लिङ्गशरीराधिष्ठान-भृते शरीरान्तरे किं प्रमाणमित्याकाश्यामाह ॥
to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle: such is the import.¹

b. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the Ether [or Space], without [its] being attached [to anything], be the site: it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to anything else. To this he replies:²

For it must have a material support.

Aph. 13. No, even though it be limited; because of [its] association with masses; just like the sun.

a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, without association; for, since, just like the sun, it consists of light, it is inferred to be associated with a mass: such is the meaning. All lights, the sun and the rest, are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body

1 तत्क्षब्जैरूं तदुतेदिधित्वं विना स्वात- क्यान्त तिष्ठति यथा ब्राया निराधारा न तिष्ठति यथा वा चिरचित्रित्यथं। तथा च स्वूलदेहं त्यक्त्रा लोकाल्परगमनाय लिङ्गदेहस्याधारभूतं शरीरान्तत्रं सिध्यतीत्वं भावः।

2 नन्तु मूर्तेद्रित्वतः वाबृद्धिरिव लिङ्गस्याकाशमेवासद्देनाधारारास्तु अर्थमन्यच सद्वक्लपन- मिति। तताहः।
consists of 'Purity,' which is Light: therefore it must be associated with the Elements.¹

b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body:²

\[ \text{सांक्यपरिमाणं तत्त्वातिश्रुते:} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 14. It is of atomic magnitude; for there is a Scripture for its acting.} \]

a. 'It,' the Subtile Body, is 'of atomic magnitude,' i.e., limited, but not absolutely an atom; because it is declared to have parts. Wherefore? 'For there is Scripture for its acting;' i.e., because there is Scripture about its acting. When a thing is all-prevading, it cannot act; [action being motion]. But the proper reading is, 'because there is Scripture for its moving.'³

¹ मूर्तेश्वराय न स्वातांक्यादसहस्पात्यायावस्थानं प्र- काशरप्रेम सूर्यस्य सहस्रास्यानादित्यस:।

² सूर्यादित्य सर्वोत्स्वते तेजांसि पार्श्ववद्वशंस्कृनेवाव- विशिष्टानि दृष्ट्यन्ते लिङ्गं च सत्यप्रकाशमयम्।

³ लिङ्गस्य परिमाणमवधारयति।

³ The reading तत्त्वातिश्रुते:, on which Vijnána remarks, is accepted by Nágéśa.

Aniruddha is singular in here inserting, as an Aphorism:

\[ \text{न्यायश्रव्यच प्रपन्धत इति। Ed.} \]
b. He states another argument for its being limited:

Another proof of this. Aph. 15. And because there is Scripture for its being formed of food.

a. That is to say: it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be all-pervading; because there is a Scripture for its being partially formed of food; for, if it were all-prevading, it would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food, &c.; because they are filled with homogeneous particles, through contact with food; as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil.

b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the migrating from one body to another [Gross] body, of Sub-

1. Parichchede yuktayantaraya

2. Nágéśa has the reading अनि. Ed.

3. Aniruddha and Nágéśa omit the word च. Ed.

tile Bodies, which are *unintelligent*? With reference to this, he says:¹

*Aph. 16.* The mundane existence of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul; just like a king’s cooks.

*a.* That is to say: as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul.²

*b.* The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities. He now likewise discusses the Gross Body, also:³

*Aph. 17.* The Body consists of the five elements.

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¹ चचेतनानां लिङ्गानां किमथं संसृतिदेहाभ्यं-हाल्तरसंचार इत्याश्रकायामाह !

² यथा राज्यः सूपकाराणां पाकशालामु संचारो राजार्थं तथा लिङ्गशरीराणां संसृतिः पुष्पवार्ष-मित्यर्थः !

³ लिङ्गशरीरमघेषविशेषते विचारितम् । इ-दानी स्थूलशरीरेऽपि तथा विचारयात् !
a. That is to say: the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled.¹

b. He mentions another opinion:²

चातुर्भौतिककमित्येके ॥ १४ ॥

Another opinion.  

Aph. 18. Some say it consists of four elements.

a. This [is alleged] with the import that the Ether does not originate⁵ [anything].

एकभौतिककमित्यपरे ॥ १५ ॥

Another opinion.  

Aph. 19. Others say that it consists of one element.

a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely supporters. Or ‘of one element’ means, of one or other element:⁵ [see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, § 13., &c].

¹ पञ्चानां भूतानां मिलितानां परिश्रामो देह
इत्यर्थः: ॥

² मतान्तरमाह ॥

³ चाकाश्यानारम्भतक्षमभिप्रित्येदम ॥

⁴ One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits the word इति. Ed.

⁵ पार्शिवेंवेव शरीरमत्यानि च भूतान्यपशुभ-कमाचारणिति भावः। ऋष वैकभौतिकमे कैकभौ-तिककमित्यर्थः: ॥
b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements:

Aph. 20. Intellect is not natural [a natural result of organization]; because it is not found in them severally.

a. That is to say: since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body,—which consists of the Elements,—but is adventitious.

b. He states another refutation [of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body]:

Aph. 21. And [if the Body had intellect natural to it,] there would not be the death, &c., of anything.

a. That is to say: and, if the Body had intellect natural to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., ‘of anything,’ of all things. For death, profound sleep, &c., imply the body’s being non-intelligent; and this, if it were, by its own nature, intelligent, would not take

1 देहस्य भौतिकवेन यस्तिथ्यति तदाह ॥

2 भूतेषु पृथकृतेषु चेतन्यादर्शनानाथौतिकस्य देहस्य न स्वाभाविकं चेतन्यं किं त्वौपाधिक-सिद्धार्थे ॥

3 वाध्यकाल्तरामह ॥
place; because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.¹

b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in § 20], viz., 'because it is not found in them severally,' he repels it:²

\[\text{मदशक्तिविचयप्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांह्ये}³ \text{तदुद्वारः} || \text{२२} ||\]

\text{An illustrative objection disposed of.}

\text{Aph. 22. If [you say that Intellect results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which, separately, have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen, in each [element, something conducive to the result].}

\text{a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed substance, so may Intellect, also, be; if any one say this, it is not so. If it had been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place; but, in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each.}

¹ प्रपञ्चस्य सर्वस्येव मरणसुषुप्प्रचाद्यभावस्य देहस्य स्वाभाविकचैतन्ये सति स्यादितिष्ठेः। मरणसुषुप्प्रचाद्यां हि देहस्याचेतनता सा च स्वाभाविकचैतन्येऽसतिं नापपध्ये स्वाभावस्य यावहृद्य-भें विवादिति॥

² प्रत्येकादृष्टेरिति यदुरुं तचाश्चक्ष्म परिहरिति॥

³ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva read सौद्ध्वात्सांह्ये. Ed.
Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture], it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is, in each ingredient, a subtile tendency to intoxicate, it is settled only that, at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the [latent] power of intoxicating; but, in the thing illustrated, it is not established, by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtile [or undeveloped] state, in the elements separately: such is the meaning.¹

b. It was stated [§ 16,] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. In regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation, dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished:²

¹ ननु यथा मादकता गच्छति: प्रत्येकद्रव्यावृत्तिरिप मिलितद्रव्ये वर्तते एवं चैतन्यमयि स्वादिति चेत
प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टि सति सांहले तदुद्भवः संभवप्रकृते तु प्रत्येकपरिदृष्ट्वलं नासिति। ज्ञता दृष्टान्ते प्रत्येकं
शास्त्रादिभिः सूक्ष्मतया मात्रावे सिद्धे संहतभावकाले मादक्षराविभावमार्गं सिद्धियति राधाशिवमिके
tu प्रत्येकभूतेषु सूक्ष्मतया न केनापि प्रमाणेन
चैतन्यं सिद्धमित्यथे:।

² पुरुषार्थं संस्तितिलिङ्गानामातिपुरुषम्। तच स्ति-
ज्ञानं स्थूलदेशसांचारार्थज्ञानमनो योः यः पुरुषाधी
येन येन व्यापारेण सिद्धिति तदाह सुचार्याम्।
Aph. 23. From knowledge [acquired during mundane existence, comes] salvation, [Soul's chief end].

a. That is to say: by the transmigration of the Subtile Body, through birth, there takes place the direct operation of discrimination [between Soul and Non-Soul]; [and] thence, in the shape of emancipation, Soul's [chief] End.¹

Aph. 24. Bondage [which may be viewed as one of the ends which Soul could arrive at only through the Subtile Body,] is from Misconception.

a. Through the transmigration of the subtile body, from misconception, there is that [less worthy] end of soul, in the shape of bondage, consisting of pleasure and pain: such is the meaning.²

b. Liberation and Bondage, [resulting] from knowledge and misconception [respectively], have been mentioned. Of these, in the first place, he explains Liberation [arising] from knowledge:³

¹ लिङ्गसम्सृतिताः जन्मद्वारा विवेकसाध्यात्का-रस्तस्मान्मुक्तिरूपः पुरुषार्थों भवतीत्यथः।

² विपर्ययात्सुखुःखात्मको बन्धुरूपः पुरुषार्थों लिङ्गसम्सृतिताः भवतीत्यथः।

³ ज्ञानविपर्ययाभ्यां मुक्तिवन्धावुः। तत्चादृश ज्ञानामुक्तिः विचारयति।
Aph. 25. Since this [viz., knowledge,] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e.g., good works] nor alternativeness, [e.g., of good works, in its stead].

a. In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness, he states an illustration:¹

Aph. 26. The emancipation of Soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like]; as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state, [together, or alternatively, which are, severally,] illusory and not illusory.

a. But, even if it be so, [some one may say,] there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One, all-constitutive, divine] Soul; since there is no illusoriness in this object of Worship. To this he replies:²

¹ समुद्धयविविक्ययोगरामवे दृष्टान्तमाह॥

² नन्वेशमण्यात्मोपासनायाध्याज्ञानेन सह तत्त्व-ज्ञानस्य समुद्धयविविक्यः स्यातामुपास्यस्यामायिकवादिति तथाह॥
Aph. 27. Even of that other it is not complete.

a. Even of 'that other,' i.e., of the [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness is not complete; because imaginary things, also, enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of the [object of] Worship,² [just referred to]:

Aph. 28. Moreover, it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory].

a. That is to say: 'moreover, it is thus,' i.e., moreover, there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it does not exist in reality]; for, the object of worship having been declared in such texts as, 'All this, indeed, is Brahma,'³ the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of 'the All' which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the world.⁴

¹ Chhandogya Upanishad, iii., xiv., 1. Ed.
² Ibid., vi., 13. Ed.
³ Ed.
⁴ Ed.
b. Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

The fruit of Worship.

*Aph. 29.* From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is, to the pure [Soul], all [power]; like Nature.

1. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes, to the ‘pure,’ i. e., the sinless, Soul, all power; as belongs to Nature: such is the meaning. That is to say: as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. [But this is not Liberation, or Soul’s chief end.]

b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge:

1  

2  

3
Removal of obstacles to knowledge.

Aph. 30. Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire.

a. That is to say: Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge.¹

b. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of Meditation:²

Aph. 31. It [Meditation,] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything].

a. He mentions also the means of Meditation:³

Aph. 32. This [Meditation,] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties.

¹ ज्ञानप्रतिवन्धको यो, विषयोपरागित्विनियमस्य तदुपयोगात्तेतुध्योपायनमित्यर्थः: II

² ध्याननिष्पत्येव ज्ञानत्तिन्त्वैरभुमाभित्वे-शयेन ध्याननिष्पत्तेल्यंमाहै II

³ ध्यानस्यापि साधनायाह II
a. That is to say: Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c.¹

b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in order, Restraint, &c.:²

निरोधण्डित्विधारणाभ्याम् II 33 II³

Restraint of the breath. 


a. That it is ‘of the breath’ is gathered from the notoriousness⁴ [of its being so].

b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order:⁵

स्थिरसुसमासनम् II 34 II

Postures.

Aph. 34. Steady and [promoting] ease is a [suitable] Posture.

a. That is to say: that is a Posture which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure; such as the crossing of the arms.⁶

¹ वस्माण्णेन धारणादित्वियेन ध्यानं भव-तीत्यर्थः: II

² धारणादित्यं क्रमाल्पणवेन लक्ष्ययिति II

³ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva transpose Aphorisms 33 and 34. Ed.

⁴ प्राभस्येति प्रसिद्धा लभ्यते II

⁵ क्रमप्राप्तमासि लक्ष्ययिति II

⁶ यतिस्यां सत्यसुखसाधनं भवति स्वत्तिकादि तदासनमित्यर्थः: II
b. He characterizes one's Duty: 1

One's duty.

Aph. 35. One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

a. Simple. 2

Knowledge by Concentration how attained.

Aph. 36. Through Dispassion and Practice.

a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those who are most competent [to engage in the matter]: such is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge been expounded. 3

b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, declared in [the assertion,] 'Bondage is from Misconception,' [§ 24], is to be expounded. Here he first states the nature of Misconception: 4

1 स्वकमेण लक्ष्ययति ॥

2 सुगमम् ॥

3 केवलाभ्यासायानहुपदेव वैराग्यसहिताज्ञानं तत्साधनयोगाण्युत्तममाधिकारिकारिवामित्यर्थः । तदेवं ज्ञानान्मोहो व्याख्यातः ॥

4 ऋतः परं बल्लो विपर्ययादित्युज्जो वन्यकारणं
The kinds of Misconception divided.  

Aph. 37. The kinds of Misconception are five.

a. That is to say: the subdivisions of Misconception, which is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of Dissolution; the five mentioned in the Yoga,¹ [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 3⁷].

b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability:³

The varieties of Disability.  

Aph. 38. But Disability is of twenty-eight sorts.⁵

a. Simple;⁶ [as explained in the Yoga].

¹ अविद्यासमितारागहेशाभिनिवेशाः पञ्च यो- 

गोच्चा बन्धहेतुविपर्ययस्यावानात्मेदात्यथः ॥

² The five are there called 'afflictions' (kleśa). Ed.

³ विपर्ययस्य स्वरुपमुह्या तत्कारणस्याशक्तेकर्षे 

स्वरुपमाह ॥

⁴ This word is omitted by Aniruddha and by Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

⁵ See, for these, Dr. Ballantyne's edition of the Tattwa-samása, § 63. Ed.

⁶ सुगमम् ॥
b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two, Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding:¹

\[ \textit{अपह. 39. Acquiescence is of nine sorts.} \]

a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts.²

\[ \textit{अपह. 40. Perfection is of eight sorts.} \]

a. This, also, he will, himself, explain.³

b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms:⁴

\[ \textit{अपह. 39. Acquiescence is of nine sorts.} \]

\[ \textit{अपह. 40. Perfection is of eight sorts.} \]

\[ \textit{एतदपि स्वयं वस्त्र्यति} \]

\[ \textit{उक्तानां विपर्ययाशिष्ठितुप्रतिगमिनीमां विशेषज्ञासायां} \]

\[ \textit{एतदग्म स्वच्छतुष्ट्यं प्रवर्तन्ते} \]
Aph. 41. The subdivisions [of Misconception] are as [declared] aforetime.

a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be particularized ‘as aforetime,’ i.e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers: they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity: such is the meaning.¹

एवमितरस्या: ॥ ४२ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 42. So of the other [viz., Disability].

a. That is to say: ‘so,’ i.e., just as aforetime [§ 41], the divisions ‘of the other,’ viz., of Disability, also, which are twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their particularities.²

ञ्चाध्यात्मिकादिभेदानबधा तुष्टि: ॥ ४३ ॥

Acquiescence divided.

Aph. 43. Acquiescence is ninefold, through the distinctions of the internal and the rest.'

¹ विपर्ययस्यावान्तरभेदादये सामान्यतः पञ्चो-ञ्चासते पूर्ववत्सूवीचार्यमेकोञ्चास्तथैव विशिष्याव-धायेः विस्तरभयानेहोच्यन्त इत्यर्थः: ॥

² एवं पूर्ववदेवतरस्या ऋष्क्रेष्यवान्तरभेदां ऋष्याविन्यतिरिश्चैष्टोतवगत्त्वा इत्यर्थः: ॥
This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse,¹ [No. 50²].

Perfection divided. Aph. 44. Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfection [is eightfold].

That is to say: Perfection is of eight kinds, through its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This aphorism, also, has been explained in a memorial verse,³ [No 51⁴].

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¹ इत्य सूचं कारिकया याख्यातम् ॥

² Quoted below, from the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, with Mr. John Davies's translation:

आध्यात्मिकाष्ठतसः प्रकृत्युपादानकाल-भाग्याख्या: ॥

बायता विषयोपरमात्मक्ष्च नव तुष्योभिमता: ॥

‘Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth; four internal, named from Nature, means, time, and fortune; five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.’ Ed.

³ ज्ञातिधेचं सिद्धिरः भवतित्वथः: ॥ इत्य-मापि सूचं कारिकया याख्यातम् ॥

⁴ Here appended, with Mr. Davies's translation:

उह: शब्दोऽथ्ययं दृःखवियातास्य: मुहत्यापि: ॥

दानं च सिद्धियोऽष्ठौ सिद्धे: पूवोऽकुश्विनिविध: ॥

‘The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (dhi), word or oral instruction (sabda), study or reading (adhyā-
b. But then, how is it said that Perfection consists only of ‘Reasoning, &c.,’ seeing that it is determined, in all the Institutes, that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of assuming] atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies:¹

The enumeration defended.

Aph. 45. Not from any other [than what we have just stated does real Perfection arise; because what does arise therefrom, e.g., from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else, [viz., Misconception].

a. ‘From any other,’ i.e., from anything different from the pentad, ‘Reasoning, &c.,’ e.g., from Austerity, &c., there is no real Perfection. Why? ‘Without abandonment of something else;’ i.e., because that Perfection [which you choose to call such] takes place positively without abandonment of something else, i.e., of Misconception: therefore [that Perception], since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, and not a real Perfection: such is the meaning.²

yana), the suppression of the three kinds of pain, acquisition of friends, and liberality (dána). The three fore-mentioned (conditions) are checks to perfection.' Ed.

¹ नन्हादिभिरेव कथं सिद्धिह्यते मन्त्रम:स- 
माध्यादिभिरण्यिमायाध्यसिद्धि: सर्वशास्त्रसिद्धवा- 
दिति तत्राह ॥

² इतरादेहनादिपम्भकाभिन्नात्मकर्षणादेस्तात्तिकी 
न सिद्धः। कृतः। इतरहानेन विना यतः सा
b. Now the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion, ‘There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert,’ [§ 10], is set forth diffusely:

The creation viewed in its parts.

Aph. 46. [The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c.

a. Supply, such is that creation, of which ‘the subdivisions,’ the included divisions, are the demons, &c. This is explained in a memorial verse,² [No. 53³].

1 साम्प्रतं व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषार्दिति संज्ञेपादुक्ता व्यविध्मृत्तिविष्टतः प्रतिपादते ॥

2 देवादि: प्रभेदाद्वान्तरभेदं यथा: सा तथा मृत्तिरिति शेषः । तदेतत्कारिकं व्याख्यातम् ॥

3 It here follows, with the translation of Mr. Davies:

‘The divine class has eight varieties; the animal, five. Mankind is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (sarga, emanation,) of living things.’ Ed.
b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation, also, is for the sake of Soul:

\[
\text{अश्वत्तस्तवपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिरातिवेकात्} \parallel 47 \parallel
\]

This creation, also, for Soul's sake. Aph. 47. From Brahmá down to a post, for its [Soul's] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature].

a. He mentions, further, the division of the subdivided creation, in three aphorisms:

\[
\text{अधिं सच्चविशाला} \parallel 48 \parallel
\]

The celestial world. Aph. 48. Aloft, it [the creation,] abounds in [the quality of] Purity.

a. That is to say: 'aloft,' above the world of mortals, the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity.

\[
\text{तमोविशाला मूलतः} \parallel 49 \parallel
\]

The infernal world. Aph. 49. Beneath, it [the creation,] abounds in Darkness.

a. 'Beneath,' that is to say, under the world of mortals.

\[1\] अखान्तरसृष्टिरथुष्टकाया: पुरुषार्थेवतमाह \parallel

\[2\] रचिष्टत्रसिद्धिविवेयो विभागमाह सूचचयेश्व \parallel

\[3\] अधिं भूर्लोकादुपरि सृष्टि: सत्ताधिका भव-तीत्यर्थः \parallel

\[4\] मूलतः भूर्लोकादध इत्यर्थः \parallel
The world of mortals.

Aph. 50. In the midst, it [the creation,] abounds in Passion.

a. 'In the midst,' that is to say, in the world of mortals.¹

b. But then, for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, affluently, purity and the rest? With reference to this, he says:²

Why Nature operates diversely.

Aph. 51. By reason of diversity of desert is Nature's [diverse] behaviour; like a born-slave.

a. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of Nature, as asserted, in the shape of diversity of operation. An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example], 'like a born-slave.' That is to say: as, of him who is a slave from the embryo-state upwards, there are, through the aptitude arising from the habit³ of being a dependant, various sorts of behaviour, i.e., of service, for the sake of his master, so⁴ [does Nature serve Soul in various ways].

¹ मध्ये भूलेल्या इत्ययः ॥
² नन्वेकस्या एव प्रकृते: केन निमित्तेन सत्या-दिविशालतया विचिन्तः सृष्ट्य इत्याकाल्याया-माह ॥
³ Vāsanā. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
⁴ विचिन्तकमेनिनित्रादेव यथोक्तः प्रधानस्य
6. But then, if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [the element of joy], since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation? To this he replies:¹

अर्थवृत्तिस्वत्त्वग्रुहे अयोनियोगाद्ये इ।

Why Heaven is to be shunned. **Aph. 52.** Even there there is return [to miserable states of existence]: it is to be shunned, by reason of the successive subjections to birth, [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no immunity].

a. Moreover:²

समानं जरामरणादिदुःखम् इ।

Transitoriness of heavenly bliss. **Aph. 53.** Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death.

चेत वाचित्वचिच्चर्ह्या भवति। वैचित्वे दृष्टान्तो

gabhêdâsâvidhîti। yê yâ gabhêavâsyamârabhyê tâ-
satâsâ vyâvâsanâpâtavê nânâprâkara chêtā

1. ननु चेतौत्त्व सच्चविशेषाला सृष्टिरति तहिं तत

एव कृतार्थवात्स्युर्वस्य चिं माध्ये शेति। तताह इ।

2. किं च इ।

³ Vedânti Mahâdeva has, instead of समानं सर्वे ष। Ed.

⁴ Nâgeśa, according to my sole MS., has जरामरणादिदुः-

कम्। Ed.
BOOK III., APH. 54.

a. Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock, is the 'sorrow produced by decay and death'; therefore, moreover, it [heaven,] is to be shunned: such is the meaning.¹

b. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause, either; as he tells us:²

न कारणालयालकृतकृप्ता मग्नव्युत्पानात् ॥ ५४ ॥

Absorption into Nature ineffectual.

Aph. 54. Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end; because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.

a. In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from worship of Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place; for it is declared: 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i.e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained; 'because there is a rising again; as in the case of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear, [at the commencement of a new annusmagnus], in the condition of Lords; because it is

¹ उद्धृताद्विगतानां ब्रह्मादिस्यावरान्तानां सर्वे-
शामेव जरामरणादिजं दुःख साधारणमतोड़पि हेय
इत्यथे: ॥

² किं बहुना । कारणे लयाद्धपि न कृतकृप्तेन-
त्याह ॥
impossible that one's Faults should be consumed, without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], in consequence of the reappearance of Passion, by reason of the non-destruction of habits,¹ &c.: such is the meaning.²

b. But then, the cause is not by any one caused to act. Being independent, then, why does she [Nature] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies:³

\[ \text{अञ्जायेर्वेदिद्य तद्योगः पारवश्यात्} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 55. Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting; because of her being devoted to another.} \]

¹ To render sanskāra. Ed.

² विवेकज्ञानाभावे यदा महदारिशु वैराग्यं प्रकृतुपासनया भवति तदा प्रकृति लया भवति वैराग्याल्पकृतिलय इति चचनात्। तस्मात्कारश्चलयादिनि न कृतकृत्यताति मगनवदुत्थानात्। यथा जले मगन: पुरुषः पुनर्मिथित्येवमेव प्रकृति-लीना: पुरुषा इश्वरभावेन पुनराविभेवति संस्कारार्द्दर्शयेषु पुना रागाभिभिबिवेकित्याति विना दाशदाहानुपपत्तित्यथः।

³ ननु कारसं के नापि न कार्यते। अथः साप्ततन्त्र कथं श्वापासकस्य दुःखनिदानमुक्यादान पुनः करोति। तत्चाह।
a. Though Nature is 'not constrained to act,' not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet 'this is fitting;' it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should rise again. Why? 'Because of her being devoted to another;' i.e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is, that he who is absorbed in her is again raised up, by Nature, for the sake of Soul's end, which consists in knowledge of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. And Soul's end, and the like, are not *constrainers* of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize; so that there is nothing detracted from her independence. 1

b. He mentions, further, a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature: 2

The gain of absorption into Nature. Aph. 56. [He who is absorbed into Nature must rise again;] for he becomes omniscient and omnipotent [in a subsequent creation].

1 प्रकृतेयथावेचित्तप्रेयिष्कर्षंप्रेयिष्कर्षंचाभान्धिनवेष्टिपतर्योगः पुनरुप्यानौचित्यं तद्विन्नस्य कुतः। पार्वश्वतपुरुषार्थतन्नवलात्। विवेकस्वरूपेन पुरुषार्थवशेषः प्रकृत्या निमित्तायते स्वलीन इत्यर्थः। पुरुषार्थविद्या प्रकृतेन प्रेक्षा किं तु प्रवृत्तिस्वभावाय: प्रवृत्ती निमित्तानीति न स्वात्तल्यस्यति॥

2 प्रकृतिलयात्पुरुषस्थोल्यान निमाशचामशाह॥
a. For 'he,' viz., he who, in a previous creation, was absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent;' the Lord, the First Spirit.¹

b. But then, if that be so, it is impossible to deny² a Lord, [which, nevertheless, the Śāṅkhyaśas seem to do]. To this he replies:³

\[\text{इद्दृश्यश्वरसिद्धि: सिद्धा || ५७ ||}\]

\(\text{In what sense there is a Lord.} \)

Aph. 57. The existence of such a Lord is a settled point.

a. It is quite agreed, by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute [between Śāṅkhyaśas and the rest,] is altogether about an eternal Lord: such is the meaning.⁴

b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature’s creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book:⁵

¹ स हि पूर्वसंगृं कार्यश्ली: समानते सर्ववर्त्कर्तर्षः ज्ञातिपुष्टो भवति ||

² Pratishedha, on which vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed.

³ नन्येवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः || तथाह ||

⁴ प्रकृतिलोकस्य जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः सर्वसंमतैव नित्येश्वरस्येव विवादास्पदादित्यथः ||

⁵ प्रधानसृष्टे: प्रयोजनं द्वितीयाध्यायाधिसूचे दिश्याचेषोऽशं विस्तरतः प्रतिपाद्यति ||
**Aph. 58.** Nature’s creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous;—for she is not the experiencer;—like a cart’s carrying saffron [for the sake of its master].

a. But then, it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be, spontaneously, a creator; for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies:

**Aph. 59.** Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts; as is the case with milk.

a. That is to say: as milk, without reference to men’s efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other.
b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism, 'As the cow for the calf,' [Book II., § 37]; because there the question was only of the operation of instruments, and because cows are intelligent.¹

c. By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid:²

Aph. 60. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings]—for we see them—of Time, &c.

a. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings,] of Time, &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on: let the behaviour of Nature, also, be thus; for the supposition conforms to observed facts: such is the meaning.⁴

ćeवहृष्टेवै कालादेव: ॥ ६० ॥

Another illustration.

विनापि महदाटिक्षपरिश्रामः प्रधानस्य भवती-ल्यर्थः ॥

¹ धेनुवदायत्यनेन सूचिगच्चयू न पैनस्यन्तं
扩充 ॥

² दृष्टान्तान्तरप्रदर्श्येन पूर्वकमुक्तार्थे हैतुमाह ॥

³ One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has कालादेव. Ed.

⁴ कालादेव कर्मवहा स्वतः प्रधानस्य चेष्टितं
b. But, still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way; because of there being [in her case,] no such communing as, ‘This is my means of producing experience, &c.’ To this he replies:

From her own nature she acts, not from thought; like a servant.

a. That is to say: as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone.

1 नन्तथापि समेत भोगादिसाधनमिति प्रतिसंधानाभावान्मूहाया: प्रकृते: कदाचित्रप्रवृत्तिरिपि न स्यादिप्ररीता च प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । तत्चाह \n
2 As here, so again just below, this word renders sanskára. Ed.

3 यथा प्रकृतभृत्यस्य स्बभावालंस्कारादेव प्रतिनियतावश्यकी च स्वामिनेव प्रवर्तते नन्तु स्वभोगाभिप्रायेष तथैव प्रकृतेष्वेष्ठितं संस्कारा-देवेष्यथः॥
Or through the influence of Desert.

Aph. 62. Or from attraction by Deserts, which have been from eternity.

1. Here the word 'or' is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from eternity, therefore, moreover, through attraction by Deserts, the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed: such is the meaning.

2. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for the sake of another, he tells us, in the following section, that, on the completion of that other's purpose, Liberation takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing to act.

1 Aniruddha inserts ओपि after वा. Ed.

2 वासनात्मक समुच्चये। यतः कर्मोनाध्यतं क-मेंभिराक्षेणादिपि प्रधानस्यावस्थ्यको व्यवस्थिताच प्रयृत्तिरित्वयः।

See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 36. Ed.

4 Read, instead of 'in the following section,' 'by an enunciation.' Ed.

5 तदेव प्रधानस्य परार्थतः मनुष्ये सिद्धे पर- योजनसमाप्तः स्वतेत एव प्रधानानिन्वृत्या मोक्षः सिद्धितीत्याह प्रघटकेन।
Aph. 63. From discriminative knowledge there is a cessation of Nature’s creating; as is the case with a cook, when the cooking has been performed.

a. When Soul’s aim has been accomplished, by means of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge of Soul, Nature’s creating ceases; as, when the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases: such is the meaning.¹

b. But, at that rate, since Nature’s creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. To this he replies: ²

इतर इतरत्वचह्वोषाति ³ || 66 ||

Liberation of one involves not that of all. Aph. 64. Another remains like another, through her fault.

a. But ‘another,’ i.e., one devoid of discriminative knowledge, remains ‘like another,’ i.e., just like one bound by

¹ विविक्षपुषङ्क्ज्ञानात्यर्वीरार्गेश पुष्वार्थेम-मांश्रा प्रधानस्य सृष्टिनिर्वर्तिते यथा पाके निष्परी पाचकस्य व्यापारे निर्वर्ततं इत्यतः: ||

² ननवेकमेक्रुष्कशोपाध्या विवेकज्ञानोपनया प्रकृते: सृष्टिनिवृत्ती सर्वेमुक्तिप्रसङ्गं इति। तत्राह ||

³ Aniruddha’s lection of this Aphorism is: इतर इतरत्वचह्वोषात्। Ed.
Nature. Why? 'Through her fault,' i.e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim: such is the meaning.¹

b. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act:²

हेयोरेकतरस्य वैद्यादीन्यमपवर्गः ॥ ६५ ॥

_Liberation consists of what._

_Aph. 65._ [The fruit of Nature's ceasing to act], the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [which comes to the same thing] of either, is liberation.

a. 'Of both,' i.e., of Nature and Soul, the 'solitariness,' i.e., the being alone, the mutual disjunction, in short, this is liberation.³

b. But then, how would Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation, for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection, because Nature consists of different portions, [it is not another Nature, but the same]; because we see, that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the

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¹ _विविक्तेऽवाधर्षितं वित्तविश्ववदेव प्रकृत्या तिष्ठतिः। कुत: || तद्ध्वादित्स्य प्रधानस्येव तत्पुरस्वार्थासमाप्नाह्ये दोषादित्यथे: ॥

² _सृष्टिनिवृत्तेऽ फलमाह ॥

³ _द्योऽ प्रधानपुरुषे वैद्यादीन्यमेकातिप-रस्परवियोग इति यावलोकपवर्गः ॥

liberated person, viz., his dust, &c., things are created for
the experience of another. To this he replies:

\[
\text{नन्वेकपुर्षमुक्तावेव विवेकाकारवृत्ता विरात्ता प्रकृति: कथमन्नुपुष्पां पुनः सृष्टा प्रवर्तते-}
\text{ताम्। न च प्रकृतेश्रमेताधिशेष देपि इति वाच्यं}
\text{मुक्तपुष्पोपकारशैर्पिप परस्यादिभिरञ्जस्य भेयग-}
\text{सृष्टिदश्यानादिति। तत्ताह।}
\]

1 Nāgęśa has अन्यसृष्णुपरागाधिपि न विरज्यते प्रवुद्धरञ्जुत्स्व- 
स्यावोरागः। Ed.

2 Nāgęśa has अन्यसृष्णुपरागाधिपि। Ed.

3 Vijnāna’s genuine reading seems to be विरज्यतेः. His com-
ment, however, recognizes also विरज्यतेः, the reading of Aner-
ruddha. One MS. of his work which has been consulted has, like
Vedānti Mahādeva, विरज्यतेः. Nāgęśa has विरज्यतेः। Ed.

4 -स्यो, instead of -स्यो, appears to have very little good
warrant; and Dr. Ballantyne, indeed, translates इव, not एव। Ed.

5 Of this Aphorism, and of the comment on it, MSS. of Vijnāna’s
treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. In one
of its more approved forms, that which Vijnāna seems to elect, the
original enunciation runs thus: अन्यसृष्णुपरागाधिपि न विर-
ज्यतो प्रवुद्धरञ्जुत्स्वस्यावोरागः। 'Furthermore, she [Na-
ture,] does not give over effecting creation, with reference to another,
[i.e., another soul than that of the spiritual sage, though she creates
for such a sage no longer; and she acts, in so doing,] analogously to
a snake, with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real
Aph. 66. Moreover, [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated,] she does not desist, in regard to her creative influence on another; as is the case with the snake, [which ceases to be a terror,] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake].

a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she have desisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, but does create in respect of that one; as the snake [so to speak,] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but does produce it, in respect of him who is ignorant [that what character of the rope’ [which is mistaken for it; this illusory snake keeping him constantly in a state of alarm, though it ceases to affect him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a yard or two of twisted hemp]. More closely, so far as regards the construction of the original: ‘Furthermore, in like manner as a snake goes on influencing him who ....... [Nature persists] in effecting creation,’ &c.

That upārāga, as embodied in the expression sṛṣṭyupārāga, signifies ‘causing,’ ‘effecting,’ is the view of both Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva, who define it by karana.

The Aphorism in question, mainly as just exhibited, together with preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne, will be found at p. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the Sānkhya-pravachana-bhāshya. Nāgāśa, following Vijnāna very closely, explains the Aphorism as follows: यथा प्रबुधर्जुट्टत्वम् प्रति निबृत्तोप्यहिरप्रबुधर्जुट्टत्वस्य भयादितिसृष्ट्य- परागान्त निर्विविधते तथा ज्ञानिनं प्रति निबृत्तापि प्रकृतिर्नयं प्रति सृष्टि प्रवर्तेत् इत्यर्थ:।
he looks upon is a rope, and not a snake]: such is the meaning. And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves Vedántés, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of Scripture and of the legal institutes are to be elucidated by means of this [or that] example offered by the Sánkhyas, who assert the reality of Nature: it is not the case that the matter is simply established to be as is the example;¹ [the analogy of which is not to be overstrained, as if the cases were parallel throughout].

¹ एकस्मिन्युर्षेव विविल्कोधायादिरक्षेमपि प्रधानं
नायस्मिन्युर्षेव सृष्टिपरागाय विरा क्षं भवति किं
तु तं प्रति सृजयेव यथा प्रबुझरज्जुच्छियोवैरोगा
भयादिकं न जनयति मूढः प्रति तु जनयत्येवेत्यथं:।
उरगतुल्यवं च प्रधानस्य रज्जुतुस्य पुरुषेष्व समारो-
पणादिति। एवंविधं रज्जुसपादितृष्णालानामाश-
यमबुढ़वाबुधा: कोचिवेद्यान्तिबुवा: प्रकृतेत्यन्त-
तुःखलं मनोमाचलं वा तुलयति। एतेन प्रकृति-
सत्तात्वादिरिसायोंद्वृत्तालेन भूतिस्मृत्यर्थे वायू-
नीया न केचलं दृष्टान्तवहिनायमर्थे: सिध्यति॥
Another consideration why Nature should act. 

Aph. 67. And from connexion with Desert, which is the cause.

a. 'Desert,' which is the cause of creation, in consequence of the conjunction of this, also, she creates, for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire [Nature’s interference], what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and to desist in regard to that one? And Desert is not the determiner; because here, too, there is nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert; [Desert being inferrible only from, and, therefore, not cognizable antecedently to, its fruits]. To this he replies:²

Nairapakṣyepadipam prakṛtyupakāreṣāvibhako nīmi-

Nature's selection how determined. 

Aph. 68. Though there is [on Soul’s part, this] indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature’s service.

¹ सृष्टि निमित्तं यकमे तस्य संबन्धाद्यपनपु- 
र्धार्थं सृजतीतथ्यथं: ||

² ननु सर्वेषां पुरुषाग्रामप्रथंकतया नैरपेक्ष्याव- 
विशेषीपि कांचिफ्रायेव प्रधानं प्रवतेते कांचिप्रति 
च निवर्तेत् इत्यच किं नियामकम् । न च कर्म 
नियामकं कस्य पुरुषस्य किं कर्मयजाति किं नियाम- 
काभावादिति । तत्चाह ॥
a. That is to say: although Souls are indifferent, yet Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying, 'This is my master,' 'This is I myself,' serves Souls, [towards their eventual emancipation], by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself [therefrom], she has the habit$^1$ of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize; and this it is that determines her: such is the import.$^2$

b. Since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist, even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies:$^3$

Nature energizes only till the end is attained.

Aph. 69. Like a dancer does she, though she had been energizing, desist; because of the end’s having been attained.

a. Nature’s disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it fitting that

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$^1$ Vāsanā. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

$^2$ प्रवृत्तिविभावलाभ्यं नैरपेक्ष्ययप्यं मेव स्वामप्यमेवाह्मित्यविवेकादेव प्रकृतिः सृष्टिदिबिः प्रुषानुप- करोतीत्यथेऽऽधृत्य वासना वर्तते तं प्रत्येक प्रधानं प्रवर्तत इत्यदेव नियामकमिति भावः।

$^3$ प्रवृत्तिस्वभाववलाभकथं विवेकेश्चिपि निवृत्तिहुत्य- पद्यताम्। तत्राह।
Nature should desist, though she has been energizing, when the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul's aim; as a dancer, who has been performing, with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists, on the accomplishment of this: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another reason for the cessation:²

This illustrated.

Aph. 70. Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul]; like a woman of good family.

a. That is to say: Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul's having seen her fault,—in her transformations, and her taking the shape of pain, &c.,—does not again approach Soul; 'like a woman of good family,' i.e.; as a [frail] woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault

¹ पुरुषार्थेऽव धारानस्य प्रवृत्तिक्ष्वभावो नतु सामान्येऽऽत: प्रवृत्तिक्षापिधारानस्य पुरुषार्थंसामान्यंमित्रपूर्वविविविविन्ति चरितार्थवेचति निवृत्तिद्‌युक्तं यथा परिष्ञो नृत्यदृश्याप्रवृत्ताया नतैंक्षात्सतत्सिद्धि निवृत्तिरिलिथे।

² निवृत्ती स्वल्पस्तरमाद॥
has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.¹²

b. But then, if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul, Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation, [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. To this he replies:³

Aph. 71. Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul, [and would not even appear to do so,] but for non-discrimination.

a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction of Pain, and its disjunction, do not 'actually,' i. e., really, belong to Soul; but, in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism, they result only from non-discrimination: such is the meaning.⁴

¹ पुरुषार्थार्थमिलतुः खात्मकवादिशाष्ट्रेनादि लज्जिताया: प्रकृते: पुनर्म पुरुषं प्रत्युप-सर्पेष तुलवधूवद्या स्वामिना मेह देवो द्रुष्ट्र इत्यवधारणेन लज्जिता कुलवधूवेन स्वामिनमुप-सर्पेति तददिग्यथः: II

² See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 61.

³ ननु पुरुषार्थमेव प्रधानप्रवृत्तिमथेव बन्धमो-क्षाभ्ययं पुरुषस्य परिशामापत्तिरिति: तत्चाह II

⁴ तु: खयोगवियोगरूपो बन्धमोक्षों पुरुषस्य नै-
b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, belong to Nature alone: so he asserts: ¹

Aph. 72. They really belong to Nature, through consociation; like a beast.

a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, really belong to Nature, ² 'through consociation,' i.e., through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain; as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation: such is the meaning. ³

b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage? Or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies: ⁴

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¹ परमार्थतत्त्वात् तथा किं तु चतुर्थमूचवस्यमात्रप्रकृतिरेखाविवेकदेवेत्यथः॥

² रीत: 'Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone; because to it, in truth, belongs misery.'  Ed.

³ प्रकृतेरेव तत्त्वात् दुःखेन बन्धमाक्षो सत्कङ्काहः खसाधनेन्तर्मादितिमिलिपवाद्यमया पशू रज्जवा लिप्नश्च। बन्धमाक्षाभागो तद्दिव्यः॥

⁴ तच कै: साधनावथ: कैवै मोक्ष इत्याकाद्यामाह॥
Aph. 73. In seven ways does Nature bind herself; like the silk-worm: in one way does she liberate herself.

a. By Merit, Dispassion, Supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of Power, viz., by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, 'does Nature bind herself' with Pain; 'like the silk-worm,' i.e., as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way,' i.e., by Knowledge alone: such is the meaning.

b. But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper; because Non-discrimination can neither be

1 Nāgeśa has कोशकारव्यन्मो. Ed.
2 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have मोचयत्येकेन हृपेण. Ed.
3 धर्मवैराग्याध्याभधर्माचार्यान्मेकैस्वभी रूपधेमं।: खेतुषभिः प्रकृतिरात्मानं दुःखेन ब्रह्मां कोशकारवक्षकारकृमियथा स्वनिमित्तेनावासेनात्मानं ब्रह्मां तदहत्। साव च प्रकृति-रेकेपत्ते ज्ञानेनेवात्मानं दुःखामोचयतीत्यथः।
quitted nor assumed, and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative, Pleasure, &c., can, themselves, be neither quitted nor assumed: otherwise, [if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to], there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [not leaving it to a commentator,] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism: ¹

निमित्तलमविवेकस्य न दृष्ट्यानि: ॥ ७४ ॥

An objection met.  

Aph. 74. Non-discrimination is the cause [not the thing itself]; [so that] there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.

a. What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself is these two; therefore ‘there is no disparagement of sense-evidence;’ [for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted]: such is the meaning. ²

¹ ननु बन्धमुक्ती अविवेकार्थति यदुत्कं तद्यु- 
ङ्कमविवेकस्याहैयानुपादेयवातःकोकुःखस्य तद- 
भावसूलादेव च स्वतः हेयापादेयवाद्यथा दृष्ट- 
हानिरित्यायहः चतुर्थसूचः स्वयं विवृतोति ॥

² अविवेकस्य पुरुषेषु बन्धमोक्षानिमित्तलमेव 
पुरःक्त्व न लाविवेक एव ताविविति नातो दृष्ट्यानि- 
रित्यथः: ॥
b. He mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimination, Study, which is the essence of them: 

 Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything], expressed by a 'No, No,' through study of the [twenty-five] Principles.

a. Discrimination is effected through study of the Principles, in the shape of abandoning, by a 'No, No,' in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit [that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul]. All the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only supplemental to Study: such is the meaning.

b. He states a speciality in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination:

\[\text{Vedánti Mahádeva has ऋधिकारिप्रभेदान्} \text{ नियम: II अष्टे II}\]

\[1 \text{ विवेकस्य निष्प्रयुपायेषु सारभूतमभास-}\]
\[2 \text{ प्रकृतिपर्येलेषु जडेषु नेति नेतीत्यभिमान-}\]
\[3 \text{ विवेकसिद्धि विशेषमाह II}\]

\[4 \text{ Vedánti Mahádeva has ऋधिकारिप्रभेदान्}. \text{ Ed.}\]
Aph. 76. Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful].

a. Since there is a division, among those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished: such is the meaning. Therefore, every one should, by strenuousness in study, acquire for himself the highest degree of competency: such is the import.¹

b. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the effecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise:²

³बाधितानुवृत्त्या मध्यविवेकतारण्यपभोगः ॥ ७७ ॥

Imperfect Discrimination inefficacious.

Aph. 77. Since what [Pain] has been repelled returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect,] Discrimination, experience, [which it is desired to get entirely rid of].

a. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the

¹ मन्दाधिकारिभेदसत्त्वादभ्यासे क्रियमाणेषण-сिमन्त्रव जन्मनि विवेकनिष्ठत्वीन्तीति नियमो नात्तीत्यथे: ॥ ऋत उत्तमाधिकारभ्यासपारवे-नात्मन: संपादयेदिति भाव: ॥

² विवेकनिष्ठत्वीव निस्तारो नाययेत्याह ॥

³ The reading of Aniruddha is बाधितानूवृत्त्येत्रेय्यः. Ed.
middling variety], antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating: such is the division\(^1\) [of Discrimination].

\[\text{Of Liberation during life.} \quad \text{Aph. 78. And he who, living, is liberated.}\]

\(a.\) That is to say: he, also, who, while living, is liberated is just in the condition of medium Discrimination.\(^3\)

\(b.\) He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated, though still living: \(^4\)

\[\text{Proof that this may be.} \quad \text{Aph. 79. It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor.}\]

\(a.\) That is to say: it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Discrimination,\(^5\) of the relation of preceptor

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\(^1\) जीवन्मुक्ताला साक्षात्कारात्यूँ अवशमनन्यात्माच्युप इति बिभागः \(\|\)

\(^2\) The च is omitted by Vedánti Mahádeva. \(\text{Ed.}\)

\(^3\) जीवन्मुक्तारस्प्रथमञ्चन्त्रवेशस्य एव भवतित्वर्थः \(\|\)

\(^4\) जीवन्मुक्तेऽपि प्रमाणामाह \(\|\)

\(^5\) This I have substituted for 'Liberation,' a mere oversight. \(\text{Ed.}\)
and pupil; i.e., because it is only one liberated during life that can be an instructor\(^1\) [in this matter].

Further proof.  

*Śrutisatya\(^2\) II 80 II*

Aph. 80. And there is Scripture.

a. There is also Scripture for there being persons liberated during life.\(^3\)

b. But then, merely through hearing, too, one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies: \(^4\)

*Itarāṇyaparāṇopara\(^5\) II 81 II*

A suggestion repelled.  

Aph. 81. [And not through merely hearing is one qualified to become an instructor]: otherwise, there were blind tradition.

a. That is to say: otherwise, since even a person of sluggish Discrimination [but who, yet, had heard,] would be an instructor, we should have a blind handing down\(^5\) [of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost].

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\(^1\) शाखेषु विवेकविषये गुणशिष्यभावश्रवणवाम-
जीवनमुक्तसिद्धिरिर्यो जीवनमुक्तायेपदेश्वनं-
भवार्दिति ||

\(^2\) None of the commentators but Vijnāna recognizes an Aphorism in these words; and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. *Ed.*

\(^3\) śrutirōpi जीवनमुक्तेष्वति ||

\(^4\) ननु श्रवणायच्छायुपदेश्वत्स्यात् । तथाह ||

\(^5\) इतरथा मद्दिवेकसरायुपदेश्वेत्यपरारा-
पतितिरिप्यः ||
b. But then, when, through Knowledge, one's works [which are the cause of mundane existence] have perished, how can there [still] be life? To this he replies:

चक्रभ्रमणवश्वतशरीर: ॥ ८२ ॥

Aph. 82. Possessed of a body, [the emancipated sage goes on living]; like the whirling of a wheel.

_a._ Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel, of itself, revolves for some time, in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action. So, after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living, yet liberated; [and, if he did not, but if every one who gained true knowledge were, on gaining it, to disappear, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally; and Kapila, probably, did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine]: such is the meaning.

1 ननु ज्ञानेन कर्मेष्ये सति कथ जीवनं स्यात्।

तथाः ॥

2 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 31. Ed.

3 कुलालकर्मेनिवृत्तावपि पूर्वेकर्मेगात्रस्य-मेव कियत्तालं च भ्रमित। एवं ज्ञानोत्तरं कर्म-नुत्त्रावपि प्रारंभकर्मेगेन चेष्टमानं शरीरं धृता जीवनमुक्तस्थिष्टतीतिथथः। ॥
b. But then, since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,' which [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 17,2] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies: 3

अभिनवान्त कर्माणि।

Aph. 83. This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression.

a. That is to say: the retention of a body is caused by even the least remains of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body. 5

b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute: 6

1 Vāsanā. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
2 Which here follows, with Dr. Ballantyne's translation: भविष्यविचारान्तर्द्विमितानुगमालसंप्रज्ञाति। ' [Meditation, of the kind called] that in which there is distinct recognition [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) argumentation (vitarka), (2) deliberation (vichāra), (3) beatitude (ānanda), and (4) egotism (asmitā). Ed.
3 ननु ज्ञानेऽतुसंप्रज्ञातयोगेन भोगादिवासनाश्चक शरीरधारणम्। तत्वाः।
4 This is to render the technicality sanskāra. Ed.
5 शरीरधारणेहि विषयसंकारास्तेषामस्य श्वायक्षेपात्मकृत्यो शरीरधारणस्य सिद्धिरित्यथ:।
6 शास्त्रवाक्यार्थमृपसंहरित।
Recapitulation. 

Aph. 84. That which was to be done has been done, when entire Cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination; not otherwise, not otherwise.

a. So much for the Third Book, on Dispassion.²

¹ Vijñāna, according to some copies of his work, has कृतकृत्यो, the preferable reading, and that of all the other commentators known to me. Ed.

² इति वैराग्याध्यायस्तृतीयः
BOOK IV.

Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognized in the Institutes, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed: so, for this purpose the Fourth Book is commenced.¹

राजपुच्छवचत्चोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

Soul set right by hearing the truth.

Aph. 1. As in the case of the king's son, from instruction as to the truth [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature].

a. 'Discrimination' is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is: as, in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. The story, here, is as follows: A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion [of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea, that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister informs him: 'Thou art not a forester; thou art a king's son.'

¹ शास्त्रसिद्धाख्यायिकाजातमुखेनेदानी विवेक-क्षणसाधनानि प्रदर्शनीयानीयेतदर्शं चतुर्थो-ध्याय च्यार्मयते ॥

² The Sanskrit yields 'under the star [named] Gaṇḍa.' Ed.
As he, immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, 'I am a king;' so, too, it [the Soul], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art [thysel,] a portion thereof;' having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or of being something material or phenomenal], rests simply upon its own nature, saying, 'Since I am the son of Brahmá, I am, myself, Brahmá, and not something mundane, different therefrom:' such is the meaning. 1

b. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women,
Súdras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Bráhman, by hearing the instructions of a Bráhman: ¹

Even when the instruction is not addressed to the hearer.

Aph. 2. As in the case of the goblin, even when the instruction was for the sake of another, [the chance hearer may be benefited].

a. That is to say: though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Krishna, for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]: and so it may happen in the case of others, too. ²

b. And, if knowledge is not produced from once instructing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made; to which effect he adduces another story: ³

¹ स्नीष्ट्राद्योपेण ब्राह्मणं ब्राह्मणयोपदेशं युञ्य तृतार्थां: स्युरित्यतद्धर्ममाक्खायिकान्तं दर्शयति ॥

² अज्जुनाथं श्रीकृष्णनं तत्वोपदेशं क्रियमाणेऽधिः समीपस्यस्य पिशाचस्य ववेकज्ञां जातमवम-न्येषामपि भवेदित्युथः: ॥

³ यदि च सकृद्धपदेशाज्ञां न जायते तदोपदेश-शावृत्तिरपि कतेयतीतिहासान्तरमाह ॥
Aph. 3. Repetition [is to be made], if not, from once instructing, [the end be gained].

a. That is to say: a repetition of instruction, also, is to be made; because, in the Chhándogya [Upanishad],\(^1\) and the like, there is mention of Áruní, and others, as having more than once instructed Śwetaketu and others.\(^2\)

b. With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul's accompaniments: \(^3\)

Aph. 4. As in the case of father and son; since both are seen; [the one, to die, and the other, to be born].

a. That is to say: Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred, in respect of one’s own self, also, that there is death and birth; since these are seen in the case of father and son. This has

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\(^1\) VI., i., &c. Ed.

\(^2\) उपदेशावृत्तिरिपि कर्तव्यं चानोग्यादै स्वत-केवलाति विप्राहृताप्रभृतिनामसूदुपदेशतिहासादित्वर्थः: ||

\(^3\) वैराग्याथं निर्देशनपूर्वकमात्मसंघातस्य भक्तु-रत्नादिकं प्रतिपाद्यति ||
been stated as follows: 'The coming into being, and the departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature], may be inferred from [the case of] father and son.  

b. He next explains, by illustrative stories, the subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion:  

Aph. 5. One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively], from voluntary abandonment or [forcible] separation; as in the case of a hawk.

a. That is to say: since people become happy by the abandonment of things, and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made; as in the case of a hawk.  

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1 Read, instead of 'of Soul,' &c., 'of one's self.' Ed.

2 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6648. Ed.

5 Read, 'molested' (upahatya). Dr. Ballantyne followed an error of the press, apahatya, which he did not observe that I had pointed
BOOK IV., APH. 6.

at being separated from the food; [but] if, of his own accord, he leaves it, then he is free from grief.¹

अहिन्नित्वेवनि वत् ॥ ६ ॥

How Soul ought to abandon Nature.

Aph. 6. As in the case of a snake and its skin.

a. That is to say: as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted, just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete, when he knows that it ought to be quitted. Thus it has been said: ‘As a snake .. its old skin,’ &c.²

out in the corrigenda to my edition of the Sánkhyā-pravachana-bhāṣya. Ed.

¹ परिग्रहो न कर्तव्यो यतो द्रव्याः यागेन लोकः सुखी वियोगेन च दुःखी भवति श्येनव- दिल्यथः। श्येनो हि सामिषः केनापुष्पत्यामिषात- हियोध्य दुःखी जियते स्वयं चेत्त्जिति तदा दुःखा- हिमुच्यते॥

² Two of my MSS. have -निल्यिनीः; the rest, -निल्यिनीः. I have restored the etymological form of the word. Ed

³ यथाहितीर्घं लचं परित्यज्यनायासेन हेय- बुध्या तथैव समुखं प्रकृति बहुकालोपभुक्ताः जीव- शों हेयबुध्या लघुदिल्यथः। तदुच्चम्। जीवाः लचमिभोरग इति॥
b. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest. So, in regard to this, he says: 1

अष्टाध्नानुपचिलनं वन्धाय भरतवत् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph. 8. What is not a means [of liberation is] not to be thought about, [as this conduces only] to bondage; as in the case of Bharata.

a. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is ‘not to be thought about;’ i.e., intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made; since it tends to Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination. ‘As in the case of Bharata:’ that is to say, as was the case

1 तत्कसं च प्रकृत्यादिकं पुनर्न स्वोकुर्यादित्य-चाह ॥

2 यथा छिंचनं हस्तं पुनः कोरिप नादते तथेव-तत्त्वकं पुनमाभिमयतत्त्यर्थः । वाशष्टृष्टिर्यथर्थः॥
with the royal sage Bharata's cherishing Dinánátha's fawn, though [this was] in accordance with duty.

Company to be avoided. Aph. 9. From [association with] many there is obstruction to concentration, through passion, &c.; as in the case of a girl's shells.

a. Association is not to be made with many; because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the manifestation of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration; as a jingling is produced by the mutual

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1 The original, dinánátha, compounded of dína and anátha, 'miserable and having no master,' is an epithet of 'fawn.'

For the story of Bharata and the fawn, see the Vishnú-puráṇa, Book ii., Chap. xiii. Ed.

2 विवेकस्य यदनृत्ताधानं न भवति स चेष्टा-मौडस्य स्यास्त्यायिपि तदनुचिन्तनं तदनुद्घाने चित्रस्य तत्भवं न कर्तव्यं यत्तल्लभाय भवति विवेकाविस्मारकतया। भरतवत्। यथा भरतस्य राजवेंशमेवस्मापि दीनानाथहरिश्चावकस्य पोषण-मित्यर्थः।

3 बहुभिर्योंगविरोधो is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.

4 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6652. Ed.
Contact of the shells on a girl’s wrist: such is the meaning.¹

Aph. 10. Just so, from [the company of] two, also.

a. Just so, even from two there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide quite alone: such is the meaning.²

Aph. 11. He who is without hope is happy; like Pingalá.³

a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment; ‘like Pingalá;’ that is to say, as the courtesan called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy, when she had left off hoping.⁴

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¹ बहुभि: सहो न कायो बहुभि: सहो हि रागाद्विभित्यक्या कलहो भवति योगश्रेष्ठको यथा कुमारीहस्तश्वाज्ञानमन्योथ्यज्ञेन भण्कारो भवतीतिथ्यः *

² दाम्यां योगेंद्रिपि तथैव विरोधो भवल्यतएकाकिनेऽव स्थात्वमितिथ्यः *

³ See the Mahābhārata, xii., 6447. Ed.

⁴ अराषं त्यज्या पुरुषं संतोषाल्यसुखवान्भुया-
b. But then, granting that Pain may cease, on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be happiness, in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied: That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, itself resumes its influence, on the departure of hope; as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself] by heat: there is not, in this case, any need of means. And it is laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul.  

c. Since it is an obstructer of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will be effected quite otherwise; as he states:  

\[
\text{त्पिङ्कलावद्या झिङ्कला नाम वेश्या कान्तार्षिनी} \\
\text{कान्तलमलम्बा निन्दियश्या सती विहायाश्यां सुखि-} \\
\text{नी बहुव तदनिद्यथे: II} \\
\]

1 नन्वाशशानिवृत्या दुःखनविवृत्या: स्याञमुखं तु \\
कुतः साधनाभावादिति। उच्यते। चित्रस्य सत्य- \\
प्राधायनेन स्वाभाविकं यत्तुखमाया पिछितं \\
तिष्ठति तदेवशायैविगमे लम्बवृत्तिकं भवति तेजः- \\
प्रतिवदलज्जलशैयवदिति न तथ साधनापेतत। \\
एतदेव चात्मसुखंमित्युव्यत इति II \\

2 योगप्रतिवदलकलामारमोगियि भोगायं न \\
कर्त्योत्यथायेह तदपपचेरियाह II \\

Aph 12. [One may be happy,] even without exertion; like a serpent happy in another's house.

a. Supply, 'he may be happy.' The rest is simple. So it has been said:¹ 'The building of a house is, assuredly, painful, and in no way pleasant. A serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another [e.g., a rat], does find comfort.'²

b. From Institutes, and from preceptors, only the essence is to be accepted; since, otherwise, it may be impossible to concentrate the attention, from there being, by reason of implications,³ discussions, &c., discrepancies in declared unessential parts, and from the multiplicity of topics. So he says:⁴

¹ Quoted from the Mahābhārata, xii., 6649. Ed.
² अभ्युपागमसंस्थापि सारादानं षट्टदवत् ॥ ९३ ॥
³ Abhyupagama, 'acceptings' (of positions, &c.). Ed.
⁴ शास्त्रेयो गृहसत्त्वे सार एव याहोस्यस्य-भुस्मवादादिभिनि विशारामस्योच्यविरोधेना-बधविन्यन चैकायततया ऋसवात्तिवाह ॥
A bee-like eclecticism recommended.

Aph. 13. Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made]; as is the case with the bee.

a. Supply ‘is to be made.’ The rest is simple. Thus it has been said: ‘From small Institutes, and from great, the intelligent man should take, from all quarters, the essence; as the bee does from the flowers.’

b. Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness, through maintaining Meditation; as he tells us:

इषुकारविचित्रत्स्य समाधिहानि: || ७४ ||

Intentness on one object.

Aph. 14. The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object; like the maker of arrows.

a. As, in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of

1 कर्तव्यमिति शेषः। ओम्यत्सुगमम्। तदुक्तम्।
धार्मिक्यथ महह्यथ शास्त्रियः कुशलो नरः। सर्वं:
सारमाद्वात्स्पष्टेभ्य इव षट्टुदः। ||

2 साधनानां यथा तथा भवेकायतप्यते स-
माधिपालनहाराविवेकसाध्यात्कारो निष्पादनीय
इत्याह ||

3 See the Mahābhārata, xii., 6651. Ed.
other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king’s passing at his side, so, too, of him whose mind is intent on one point there is in no way an ‘interruption of meditation,’ i.e., a failure to exclude other thoughts.¹

Aph. 15. Through transgression of the enjoined rules there is failure in the aim; as in the world.

a. Whatever rule, for the practisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the effecting of knowledge, is not attained. ‘As in the world.’ That is to say: just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, this or that effect thereof will not be obtained.⁴

¹ यथा शर्तिमाशायिकचित्रस्थेषुकारस्य पाख्ये राज्यो गमनेनापि न वृत्ततार्निरोधो हीयत एवेकायचित्रस्य सर्वेषापि न समाधिहानिवृत्तर्निरोधश्चतिभे वति।

² Aniruddha reads वृत्तनियमः. Ed.

³ Nāgēśa is singular in here, apparently, adding, as an aphorism: ऋशक्या ज्ञानरक्षाय वा लक्ष्ये तु न ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः। These words occur in the midst of Vijnāna’s comment, and there introduce a quotation from the Mahābhārata. Ed.

⁴ यः शास्त्रेषु कृतो योगिनां नियमसत्स्योष्णेन
He states, further, that, if the rules be forgotten, the end will not be gained:¹

Rules must not be forgotten. Aph. 16. Moreover, if they be forgotten; as in the case of the female frog.

a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this: A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation: ‘When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.’ But, on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king, ‘Where is water?’ The king, too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog Kámarúpiṇī,² daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water. And then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her.³

¹ Probably this is an epithet, ‘changing one’s form at will,’ not a proper name. Ed.

² Probably this is an epithet, ‘changing one’s form at will,’ not a proper name. Ed.

³ सुगमम्। भैक्ष्यश्रेयसाधृः यत्र नियमम् च कश्चिद्राजा मृगयां गतो विपिने सुदर्शनं कथयां ददशे। सा च राजा भायभावाय प्राधिताः नियमे चक्रे यदा महां लयं जलं प्रदश्येते तदा मया गतव्रि-
b. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them:¹

\[ नोपदेशश्रवणेष्यपि कृतकृयतां परामशादृढ़े विरोचनवत् \]

**Aph. 17.** Not even though instruction be heard is the end gained, without reflexion; as in the case of Virochana.⁴

\[ अयैं सतो भेकिराजशुद्धिता कामहुँगिनीं भेकी भूल्न जलं विवेश। तदृश राजा जालादिभिरनिविधापि न तामविन्ददिति \]

\[ ¹ श्रवणवद्धवाक्यमोमांसाय ऋषिवश्यकाव इतिहासमाह \]

2 Vedánti Mahádeva has simply नोपदेशेष्यपि. *Ed.*

3 The reading of Aniruddha is कृतकृयः. *Ed.*

4 See the *Chhándogya Upanishad*, viii., viii., 4. *Ed.*
between Indra and Virochana, wanted discrimination, from want of reflexion:

\[ \text{दृष्टयोरिन्द्रस्य} \ \| 18 \ \|
\]

Of this further. Aph. 18. Of those two, it [reflexion,] was seen in the case of Indra [only].

a. Of those two who are mentioned, [indicated] by the expression ‘of those two,’ reflexion [was seen, &c.]. And, as between those two, viz., Indra and Virochana, reflexion was seen in the case of Indra: such is the meaning.  

b. And he tells us, that, by him who desires to understand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time:

\[ \text{प्रश्नतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पेणानि कृता सिद्धिवेहका-लाभहत्} \ \| 95 \ \|
\]

1 परामर्शों गुरुवाक्यतात्त्वयन्तिषायोविचारः। तं विनोपेश्वाक्यस्यवेषेष्यं तत्त्वज्ञान-नियमो नास्ति प्रजापतेश्वरस्य परामर्शाभावेन विवेकाभावशुतेवित्यथः।  

2 तच्चन्तोनिचमानयों परामर्शः। तयोरिन्द्र-विरोचनोन्योऽभूवत इन्द्रस्य दृष्ट्यशैल्यथः।  

3 सम्यज्ञानार्धिना च गुर्षेवा बहुकालं कर्ते-बेल्याह।
The process requires time.  

Aph. 19. Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, one has success after a long time; as in his case.

a. ‘As in his case.’ That is to say: as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another, too, only after having practised, under a preceptor, reverence, study of the Vedas, service, &c., is there ‘success,’ i.e., the revelation of truth; not otherwise.¹

न कालनियम वामदेवत् ॥ २० ॥

The time for the process may embrace successive states of being.  

Aph. 20. There is no determination of the time; as in the case of Vāmadeva.²

a. In the arising of knowledge, there is ‘no determination of the time,’ as, for instance, in its taking place only from causes dependent on the senses. ‘As in the case of Vāmadeva.’ That is to say: as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vāmadeva, even when in embryo, so it may in the case of another.³

¹ तहत् । इन्द्रस्येवान्यस्यापि गुरौं प्रश्नातिवेदाध्ययनस्वेदांदीन्द्रैव सिद्धित्वार्थस्फूर्तिभूति

नान्यकेत्यर्थ: ॥

² Aniruddha seems to intend, as an aphorism, after No. 20, these words: वामदेवस्य तथाज्ञानातिस्म मुक्तिदशनात् ।. But perhaps there has been tampering with the text, on the part of copyists. Ed.

³ See the Aitareya Upanishad, ii., iv., 5. Ed.

⁴ ऐन्द्रियकसाधनादेव भवतीत्यादिद्धानोदये कार
b. But then, since it is written, that the means of knowledge need be nothing other than devotion to those [viz., Brahmá, &c.,] who [unlike the Absolute] have Qualities, knowledge may result from this. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies:¹

Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, knowledge takes place by degrees; as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.

Supply 'there is attainment.' Through devotion to Souls, e.g., Brahmá, Vishnu, Śiva, under the forms superinduced on them, the effecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees,' i.e., by the successive attainment of

¹ Here the aphorism ends, in my copies of Nágeśi's commentary, and also in some copies of Vijuána's commentary which I examined in India. Ed.
the worlds of Brahmá, &c., or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not directly; as is the case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back, so far, in the road to emancipation]: such is the meaning.¹

b. He tells us, that, moreover, there is no certainty that successive rise to the worlds of Brahmá, &c., would effect knowledge:²

³ इतरलाभेवः याबृत्तिः पञ्चार्गिनयोगतो जनमाप्युः

|| 22 ||

Aph. 22. Moreover, after the attainment of what [like the world of Brahmá,] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th Prapáthaka of the Chhándogya Upanishad]¹: ‘From conjunction with the five fires there is birth,’ &c.

¹ सिद्धिरित्यनुष्टयते । अध्यस्तेवः पुरुषाणं ब्रह्मविश्वाशृंहारातिनामुपासनात्यार्थपदेष् ब्रह्मादिलोकप्राप्तिर्मेण सत्त्वशुद्धिवारा वा ज्ञाननिष्पञ्चिती साधारणया याज्ञिकानामित्यथे: ||

² ब्रह्मादिलोकपरंपरधापि ज्ञाननिष्पञ्ची नास्ति नियम इत्याह ॥

3 One of my copies of Aniruddha omits अध्यपि after इतरलाभें. Ed.

4 This reference is taken from Vijnána, who, however, does not
a. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion:

विरक्तस्य हेयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हस्मेरवत्

Ⅱ २३ Ⅱ

Discrimination illustrated.

*Aph. 23.* By him who is free from passion what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken; as in the case of the swan and the milk.

a. That is to say: only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting ‘of what is to be left,’ i.e., of Nature, &c., and a taking ‘of what is to be taken,’ i.e., of Soul; as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—that, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk;³ [as the Hindus insist that it does].

1 ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविरक्तस्यबेल्यच निर्देशनमाह Ⅱ

2 Vijnána, according to some MSS, has, peculiarly, हेयहान-मुपादेयोपादान; and his comment, in those MSS., follows this reading. *Ed.*

3 विरक्तस्यव हेयानं प्रकृतादिनां हानमुपादेयस्य चातमन उपादानं भवतिरिष्या दुग्धजल-योरेकीभावापनयोंमेध्येःसारजलसागोन सारभूत-छीरोपादानं हस्म्यैव नतु काकादेरित्यर्थः Ⅱ
b. He tells us that both of these also take place in consequence of association with a perfect man:

Benefit of good society.  

Aph. 24. Or through association with one who has obtained excellence; as in the case thereof.

a. That is to say: moreover, from association with him by whom ‘excellence,’ i.e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place; just as in the case of the swan, [§ 23]; as, in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through simple association with Dattātreya.

b. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those who are infected with desire:

न कामचारिलं रागोपहते शुकवत् ॥ २५ ॥

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1 Siddha. Vide supra, p. 115, note 3. For the cognate siddhi, vide infra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.

2 सिद्धपुरुषस्माद्ये तद्भवतीत्वायः ॥

3 Nāgēśa omits वा. Ed.

4 See the Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa, ch. xvi. Ed.

5 लभ्योर्विशेषयो ज्ञानकाष्ठ्यो येन तत्स्मादपुरुषं भवति इसविद्वेदेवतियो यथालक्ष्यं द्वाचार्यस्माद् मानचादेव स्वयं विवेकः प्रादुर्भूतिः ॥

6 रागिस्मृतं न कार्यं इत्याह ॥

7 Aniruddha has न शुक्वकामचारिलं रागोपहते: ।

Ed.
Aph. 25. Not of his own accord should he go near one who is infected with desire; like the parrot.

a. Association is not to be made, voluntarily, with a person infected with desire. ‘Like the parrot.’ That is to say: just as the bird [called a] parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful, does not [by going near people,] act in a rash manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty.¹

b. And he states the harm of association with those who labour under desire:²

Of this further.

Aph. 26. [Else he may become] bound, by conjunction with the cords; as in the case of the parrot.

a. And, in the case of associating with those persons, he may become bound, ‘by conjunction with the cords,’ i.e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [the Qualities, punningly compared to cords]; just ‘as in the case of the

¹ रागोपहते पुष्पे कामतः सज्जने न कर्तव्यः।
शुकवत्॥ यथा शुकप्रसी प्रकृतिरूप इति कृता कामचार न करोति रूपलोमुपर्वन्तनभयात्रहि-
दिखचः॥

² रागिस्द्र सु दोषमाह॥

³ All the commentators but Vijnána read बन्धः, instead of बढः. Ed.
parrot; that is to say, just as the bird [called a] parrot becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, of the hunter.¹

b. He determines, by two [aphorisms], the means of [effecting] dispassion:²

न भोगाद्रागशालिमुनिवत् ॥ २७ ॥

Means of dispassion. Aph. 27. Not by enjoyment is desire appeased; as in the case of the saint.

a. That is to say: as, in the case of the saint, Saubhāri,³ desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so, also in the case of others, it is not.⁴

b. But, further:⁵

दोषदश्नादुभयोः ॥ २८ ॥

Of this further. Aph. 28. From seeing the fault of both.

¹ तेषां सज्ज तु गुणयोगाति रागादियोगादि

² वैराग्यस्याशुपायमवधारयति दात्माम्

³ See the Vishnupurāṇa, Book iv., Ch. ii. and iii. Ed.

⁴ यथा मुने सौभरभोगान्तरागशालितिरभूदेव

⁵ औषपि तु
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a. That is to say: only 'from seeing the fault,' e. g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i. e., of Nature and her productions, does the appeasing of desire take place; just as in the case of the saint [§ 27]. For it is written, that Saubhari, just from seeing the evil of society, was afterwards dispassionate.\(^1\)

b. He tells us that incompetency even to accept instruction attaches to him who is infected with the fault of desire, &c.:\(^2\)

\[\text{न}^3 \text{मलिनचेतनस्युपदेश्वरीजप्ररोक्तज्ञवत्} \| २५ \|

Agitation excludes instruction. \hspace{1cm} \text{Aph. 29. Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout; as in the case of Aja.}

\[\text{a. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. 'As in the case of Aja.' That is to say: as not a sprout from}

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\(^1\) उभयो: प्रकृतितत्कार्यैः परिणामिलुःकारकवादिदोषद्वैव रागान्तिलिङ्गति मुनि-चेतनोक्तियथः। सांबरेर्ग्नि सहस्रोष्ट्रेनादेव पञ्चाधेरायां त्रूयते \|

\(^2\) रागादिदोषोप्रहतस्युपदेश्वर्यहस्यनधिकारमाह \|

\(^3\) Vijnána, agreeably to some MSS., has मलिनचेतनस्युपदेशः. One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has मलिने. Ed.
the seed of instruction, though delivered to him by Va-
sishtha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife.\(^2\)

\(b\). What need of more?\(^3\)

नाभासमात्रमणि मलिनदपेशवत् \(\|\text{Aph. 30}\|\)

Of this further. Not even a mere semblance [of this true knowledge arises in him whose mind is disturbed]; as in the case of a foul mirror.

\(a\). Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from instruction, in one whose mind is disturbed, through the obstruction caused by its wandering away, e.g., to other objects; as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the obstruction caused by the impurities: such is the meaning.\(^4\)

\(^1\) उपदेशस्तु यज्ञानवृद्धम स्वेता तस्याकुरो-
\(\text{दिप रागार्दिमलिनचित्ते नोत्यस्यते} \| \text{अजबत } \|
\(यथाजनात्मिन्नुपे भायोशोकमलिनचित्ते वसिष्ठे} \| \text{रस्यायुपदेशवीज्य नाकुर उत्तम इत्यथे} \|

\(^2\) See Kālidāsa's Raghuvansa, Book viii. Ed.

\(^3\) किं बहुना \(\|

\(^4\) ऋषापत्यानमणि मलिनचेतस्यपदेशान्न जायते।विषयान्तरसंचारादिभिः प्रतिवन्धाद्यम ललैः। प्रतिवन्धान्तमलिनदपेशशर्यो न प्रतिविर्भवति तद-
\(\text{क्तियथे} \|

\(\)
b. Or, if knowledge should spring up in any kind of way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with the instruction:\(^1\)

\[ \text{न तत्त्वापी तदृपता पप्पमुचत् ॥ ३१ ॥} \]

\textit{Aph. 31.} Nor, even though sprung therefrom, is that [knowledge, necessarily,] in accordance therewith; like the lotus.

\(a\). Though sprung ‘therefrom,’ i.e., from instruction, knowledge is not [necessarily,] in accordance with the instruction, in case this has not been entirely understood. ‘Like the lotus.’ That is to say: just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed, when the mud is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the mud\(^4\) [in which the lotus-seed was sown].

\(^1\) यदि वा यथाकथं चिज्जानं जायेत तथापि

पदेशानुरूपं न भवेद्यायं ॥

2 Vedânti Mahádeva reads \textit{तत्त्वापी.} \textit{Ed.}

3 Aniruddha has \textit{पप्पमुचत्.} \textit{Ed.}

‘तस्मादुपदेशाज्ञातस्यापी ज्ञानस्योपदेशानु-

रूपता न भवति सामग्रीभानव्योधात् । पप्पमु-

चत् । यथा बोज्ज्ञोक्तमवेलेगि पप्पमुष्टीजानु-

रूपतापप्पमुच्य । भवति । पप्पमु-

स्यानीयं शिष्यचित्रम् ॥
b. But then, since the Soul’s end is, indeed, gained by [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds [§ 21. a.] of Brahmá, &c., to what purpose is the effecting of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies:¹

Aph. 32. Not even on the attainment of glorification has that been done which was to be done; as is the case with the perfection⁴ of the objects worshipped, as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.

a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, ‘that has not been done which was to be done,’ i.e., the end has not been gained; because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess. ‘As is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.’ That is to say: as, though the possession of perfection [so called,] belongs to ‘the objects

¹ According to Nágeśa and Vedánti Mahádeva, भूतः; and this bhúta, a synonym of bhúti, the former explains by aíswarya. See note 4, below. Ed.

3 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits छापः. Ed.

4 Nágeśa, commenting on this aphorism, explains siddhi, here rendered ‘perfection,’ by aíswarya, ‘supernatural power.’ Ed.
worshipped,' i.e., to Brahmá, &c., [still] that has not been done which was to be done; since it is written, that even these, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., [still] practise Concentration, [from fear of losing what they have attained to]. Just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to their supernatural power. Such is the meaning.¹

b. So much for the Fourth Book, that of Tales, in the Commentary, composed by Vijnána Bhikshu, on Kapila’s Declaration of the Sánkhya.²

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¹ एस्थर्योगेशिप कृतकृत्यता कृतार्थता नाति ज्यातिशय्दुःखरुनुगमात्। उपास्यसिद्धवत। यथोपाल्यानं ब्रह्माद्वैनं सिद्धियोगेशिपि न कृतकृत्यता तेषामपि योगनिद्रादृष्टो योगाभ्यासाःश्रवणात्।

² इति विज्ञानभिज्ञनिनिमिति कापिलसाध्यमद्रव-चनस्य भाष्य ज्ञायात्यिकाध्यायश्चतः॥

END OF BOOK IV.
a. The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the primâ facie notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression ‘Well,’ in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless:

Māṇḍalācārṇa śiśṭācārānīkhaladśrēṇācchūrtītŚri-
tī \[1\]

Reasons for a Ben-
dictory Opening.  
Aph. 1. The [use of a] Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by Scripture.

a. The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved to be proper to be made, by these proofs: such is the

1 śvāśācārśaśiśaśānt: paryāpa: \[2\]. इतः परं स्वाशाले  
परेषा पूर्वपक्षानपार्कतु पञ्चमाध्याय चारम्यते ।  
तद्भवावादिसूचेतेशशब्देन यन्मझलं कृतं तद्गर्भे-  
मित्याभिपं समाध्यते \[2\]

2 Aniruddha has, instead of चुति°, भूति°. Vide supra,  
p. 310, note 2, for bhūti. Ed.
meaning. The word iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons.

b. He repels those who entertain the primâ facie view, that what was asserted in the expression, ‘because it is not proved that there is a Lord’ [see Book I., Aph. 92], is not made out; because [forsooth,] his existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works:

नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिध्याति: कर्मेण तत्सिद्धे:॥ २॥

Needlessness of a Lord. Aph. 2. Not from its [the world’s,] being governed by a Lord is there the effectuation of fruit; for it is by works [i.e., by merit and demerit,] that this is accomplished.

a. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the cause is ‘governed by a Lord;’ because it is possible for

1 मझलाचरणं यत्कुतं तस्यः प्रमाणे: कर्तव्यतासिद्धिरित्यथे:। इतिशब्दे हेवलंतराकाद्वानिरासारे:॥

2 इश्वरासिद्धिरिति यदुः तत्वोपपद्यते कर्मफलदात्तत्या तत्सिद्धिरिति ये पूर्वपक्षस्तान्ताचिराकरोति॥

3 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed.

4 Aniruddha’s reading is फलसंपत्ति:, and Vedânti Mahâdeva has सदाफलसंपत्ति:. Ed.
the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and
demerit,] alone, which are indispensable; [and, if we do
make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord,
he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to
his works].\textsuperscript{1,2}

\textit{b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it
is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit}:\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{quote}
\textit{स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत्} \textit{\textsuperscript{2} II 3 II}
\end{quote}

\textit{The supposed Lord would be selfish.}

\textit{Aph. 3. [If a Lord were governor, then,] from intending his own benefit,
his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with or-
dinary governors] in the world.}

\textit{a. If the Lord were the governor, then his government
would be only for his own benefit; as is the case [with
ordinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning.}\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{ईश्वराधिष्ठिते कारणे कर्मफलहपपरिशास्मय
निष्पत्तिने युक्तावश्यकेन कर्मणौव फलनिष्पत्तिः-
संभवादिन्यथे:} \textit{\textsuperscript{2} II}

\textsuperscript{2} See, for a somewhat different translation, the \textit{Rational Refutation}, \&c., p. 78. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{ईश्वरस्य फलदातृत्वं न घटतेपीत्याह सूचः} \textit{\textsuperscript{2} II}

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{ईश्वरस्याधिष्ठातृत्वे स्वोपकारार्थमेव लोकव-
दधिष्ठानं स्यादिन्यथे:} \textit{\textsuperscript{2} II}
b. In reply to the doubt, 'grant that the Lord, also, be
benefited: what harm?' he says:

\[\text{लोकिकेश्वरविद्यतर्था} II 8 II\]

\(Aph. 4. [\text{He must, then, be} \text{ just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of him}.]\)

a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also, must be something mundane, 'just like a worldly lord;' because, since his desires are [on that supposition,] not [previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: such is the meaning.\\

b. In reply to the doubt, 'be it even so,' he says:

\[\text{पारिभाषिको वा} II 5 II\]

\(Aph. 5. \text{Or [let the name of Lord be] technical.}\)

a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for

\[\text{1 भवलीश्वरस्यापुपकारः का छत्तिरित्याश-}
\[\text{झ्याह} II\]

\[\text{2 इश्वरस्यापुपकारस्वीकारे लोकिकेश्वरवदेव}
\[\text{सोंधपि संसारी स्वादपूर्णकामतया दुःखादिग्रस-}
\[\text{झ्यादित्यर्थः} II\]

\[\text{3 तथैव भवलित्याशझ्याह} II\]
that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation; since there cannot be an eternal lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states another objection to the Lord’s being the governor:²

न रागादृते ³तत्सिद्धः प्रतिनियतकारशालात्

Objection to there being a Lord.

Aph. 6. This [position, viz., that there is a Lord,] cannot be established without [assuming that he is affected by]. Passion; because that is the determinate cause [of all energizing].

a. That is to say: moreover, it cannot be proved that he is a governor, unless there be Passion; because Passion is the determinate cause of activity.⁴

¹ संसारसच्चे दिप चेदीश्वरस्ततहि सगोचाचचयत्रपुरुषे
परिभाषामाचमस्माकमिभ्र भवतामपिस्यासंसारिवन्ति
परिवर्तहेतुविविधमौर्योद्भान्तोधान्तैष्यानुपपत्तेर्विन्यासंशयीः।।

² ईश्वरस्याधिष्ठितृले वाधकाल्लरामह।।

³ जगत्सिद्धः is the lection of Vedánti Mahádeva, in the text, and also in the comment. Ed.

⁴ किं च रागेण विना नाधिष्ठातृले सिद्धितिं
प्रतिप्रवृत्ती रागस्य प्रतिनियतकारशालादिस्तय्ये।।
b. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the Lord, even. To this he replies:

This objection, further.  

Aph. 7. Moreover, were that [Passion] conjoined with him, he could not be eternally free.

a. That is to say: moreover, if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be eternally free; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated.

b. Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative:

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1 नन्वेवमस्तु रागोऽपि श्वरे। तत्राह।

2 रागयोगोऽपि स्वीकिष्मयमात्रो स नित्यमुक्तो न स्यात्तथ ते सिद्धान्तहां निरित्यथः।

3 ऐश्वर्यं किं प्रथानधर्मवेतनास्मदभिमतानामी-झाडीनां साम्वादेव चेतनसंबन्धः। किं बाय-स्कालमणिवतेसंनिधिसत्तामाचरेण प्रेक्षावाद्वित।

तत्त्वादं पक्षं दूषयति।
Pradhanashkritiyogachchedastapatti: || 8 ||

Objection, on one branch of an alternative. Aph. 8. If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul].

a. From the conjunction, with Soul, of 'the properties of Nature,' i.e., Desire, &c., Soul, also, would turn out [contrary to Scripture,] to be associated with properties.²

b. But, in regard to the latter [alternative], he says:³

‘Sattamachchachcheyashyem' || 9 ||

Objection, on the other branch. Aph. 9. If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then lordship would belong to every one.

1 -Yogachchedastapatti: is the reading of Vijnána, in some MSS., and, in some, that of Nágeśa, who, however, in others, omits चेत. Ed.

2 Pradhanaeshkarichade: puhbe yogatpurushastapapi dharmastapatti: ||

3 Anye lāh ||

4 Some MSS. of Vijnána exhibit, instead of सत्तमाचात्, सत्तमाचेन. Ed.
a. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that even all men, indifferently, experiencers in this or that [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship; because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature produces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated.¹

b. Be it as you allege; yet these are false reasonings; because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. He therefore says:²

"Denial that there is any evidence of a Lord." Aph. 10. It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord]; because there is no evidence of it.

¹ अन्यस्ंभा सत्संनिधिसत्तामारेखा चैदेश्वरं तत-हिन सर्वेश्वामेव तत्तत्संभं भोक्तं पुषामविशेषेश्वरयमस्मद्भिरतत्तेव सिद्धमिलभोक्तसंयो-गातेव प्रधानेन महादाट्सेजनादिति। तत्तथेऽक एवेश्वर इति भवक्षिदान्तहानिरिस्यथः॥

² स्यादेतदीश्वरसाधकप्रभासभ्रोधििनेतेवसत्तका एव। अन्यथेवविधासत्तकमसहृः प्रधानमणि वा-धित्वं शक्यत इत्यत ज्ञाह॥
a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is not sense-evidence; so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning.

b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms:

\[\text{Sāṃkhyābāvaśāvānuḥ}\text{नम्} ॥ ७७ ॥

Denial that it can be established by inference. Aph. 11. There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken].

a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none;' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy is not established; since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning.

---

1 तत्त्वादिनित्येऽश्चरसिद्धिः। इस्हेरे तावप्रक्षं
नास्त्यत्युभानामश्चावेव प्रमाणे वञ्ज्ये ते च न
संभवत इत्यः॥

2 असंभवमेव प्रतिपाद्यति मूचाभ्याम्॥

3 Vyāpyatva, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyāpti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed.

4 संबन्धो व्याप्तिः। अभावोपसिद्धिः। तथा च
b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] Testimony\(^1\) [to there being a Lord]:

\[
\text{शुतिरस्य प्रथानकार्यनस्य II १२ II}
\]

Denial that there is Scripture for it.

\textit{Aph. 12.} Moreover, there is Scripture for [this world’s] being the product of Nature, [not of a Lord].

\textit{a.} Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause.\(^2\)

\textit{b.} He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms],\(^3\) the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section,\(^4\) viz., ‘Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,’ [conjoined with Soul].\(^5\)

\[3\text{ Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed.}

\[4\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[5\text{ नाविद्यातो बन्ध इति यत्सिद्धान्ततं प्रथम-पादं तत्र परमं विस्तरतः प्रघट्टकेन दृष्यति II}

\[1\text{ For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[2\text{ Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed.}

\[3\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

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\[1\text{ For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

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\[1\text{ For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[2\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[3\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[4\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[5\text{ नाविद्यातो बन्ध इति यत्सिद्धान्ततं प्रथम-पादं तत्र परमं विस्तरतः प्रघट्टकेन दृष्यति II}

\[1\text{ For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[2\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[3\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[4\text{ Pada, here used for adhyāya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed.}

\[5\text{ नाविद्यातो बन्ध इति यत्सिद्धान्ततं प्रथम-पादं तत्र परमं विस्तरतः प्रघट्टकेन दृष्यति II}
Conjunction, in the case of the solitary, would be a contradiction.

**Aph. 13.** With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance.

*a.* Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance.¹

*b.* But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies:²

**Aph. 14.** Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.³

*a.* And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is 'a vicious circle,' [lit-

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¹ For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what introduces and succeeds it, see the *Rational Refutation, &c.*, p. 257. *Ed.*
rally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a resting a thing on itself, or, in short, a *regressus in infinitum.*

b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika], ‘but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the *regressus in infinitum* is no objection,’ he replies:

The world has a beginning.

*Aph. 15.* It is not as in the case of seed and sprout; for Scripture teaches that the world has a beginning.

*a.* There cannot belong to it such a *regressus in infinitum* as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a beginning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. Such is the meaning.

*b.* But then, [you Vedántís will say], according to us, Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in

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1 अविद्यायोगादविद्यासिद्धि चान्योन्याग्रयत्व- मात्माग्रयत्वमन्वस्या वेति शेषः॥

2 ननु बीजावकरवदनवस्या न टोषायेवाश- इयाह॥

3 बीजावकरवदनवस्या न संभवति पुरुषां संसारस्याविद्याद्विलानर्थपत्य सादित्वाहुः॥ प्रलयसप्ताहादावभावश्रवणादित्यथः॥
the shape, specified by the *Yoga*, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitari-
ness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it:¹

\[\text{विद्यातोऽन्यते}^2 \text{ ब्रह्माध्यापसङ्गः}^3 \parallel १६ \parallel\]

Soul and knowledge not identical. *Aph. 16.* Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge.

a. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (*avidyā*) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then *Brahma*, soul itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since *he* is other than knowledge: such is the meaning.⁴ [Further]:

¹ नन्वस्माकमविद्या पारिभाषिकी नतु योगो-
ञ्चनातम्यातमबुद्धार्थिपया तथा च भवतां प्रधा-
नवदेवास्माकमपि तस्या छहरदानार्थितया पुरुष-
निविवेशिपि नामक्रताहानिरिवच्छद्भायां परिक-
ख्यतमविद्याशब्दायं विकल्प दूषयति \parallel

² One of my MSS. of Nágeśa has विद्यायले. *Ed.*

³ -प्रसङ्गः, found in some MSS. of Vijnána, is the reading of Aniruddha and of Nágeśa. *Ed.*

⁴ यदि विद्यान्यलोकेवाविद्याशब्दार्थितिः तस्य
Aph. 17. Were there not exclusion, then there would be resultlessness.

a. But, if the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning.1

b. He censures the other alternative,2 [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]:

Aph. 18. If it [Ignorance,] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predicable], in like manner, of the world, also.

a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties,
be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man’s knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import.¹

The Vedánta theory self-contradictory.

Aph. 19. If it [Ignorance,] were of that nature, it would be something that had a commencement.

a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántis (see § 15, b.)], but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such re-

1 यदि पुनर्विद्या चेतने धर्मिष्ठ बाध्यत्मे-वाचविद्यात्मचतुष्यते तथा सति जगत् प्रकृतिम-हदा द्वाक्ष्यप्रपञ्चस्यापेक्षमविद्यां स्वात्। तथा चाचायक्ष्यायाविश्वाविद्याले सत्येनाविद्यानाशद्ध्येयरिप्रपञ्चो न दृश्यतेतिनि भावः॥

2 Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nágeśa’s work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed.
cited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,'\textsuperscript{12} &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the \textit{Yoga} system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{b.} By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,\textsuperscript{4} he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit: \textsuperscript{5}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Brihadranyaka Upanishad}, ii. 4, 12; or \textit{Satapatha-brâhmana}, xiv., 5, 4, 12. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{2} Professor Gough has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' \textit{Philosophy of the Upanishads}, p. 153. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} भवति वा यथा कथंचिद्विद्यावाभ्यायवेयाच्ये विद्यार्थ्यत तथापि तादृशवस्तु: सादिवभव पुष्पेषु नवनादित्यप्रवर्तिति । विज्ञानक्षेत्र एवंत्यांचि-रोपणीतिभ: प्रलयादी पुष्पस्य चिन्मात्सिद्धे-रित्वर्थः । तस्माद्योगद्वृत्तोक्तमादन्त्या नास्यविद्या ज्ञाननाश्या सा च बुद्धिधर्मात्वं न पुष्पधर्मं इति सिद्धम् ॥

\textsuperscript{4} Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{अचैवाध्याये कर्मेनितिमित्या प्रधानप्रवृत्तिरिति यदृच्छं तत्र परपूर्वपुष्य समाधेये प्रघटकेन ॥}
\end{flushleft}
अधर्माप्रलापः प्रकृतिकार्यंवैचिन्त्यात् ॥ २० ॥

Merit is undeniable.

Aph. 20. There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature.

a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another,] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning.¹

b. He states further proof, also:

शुरुविन्द्रादिभिमिस्तसिद्धः ॥ २१ ॥

Proofs of this.

Aph. 21. It [the existence of Merit,] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c.

a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it:²

न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् ॥ २२ ॥

¹ ऋपर्यश्वतया धर्माप्रलापो न संभवति प्रकृतिकार्येषु वैचिन्त्यायायथानुपपत्तया तदनुमानादित्यर्थः ॥

² प्रमाणान्तरमणयाह ॥

³ प्रत्यश्याभावायाद्मयासिद्धिरिति परस्य हेतुमाभासीकरोति ॥
Aph. 22. There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs.

a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs.¹

b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit:²

उभयचार्येयम् ॥ २३ ॥

Demerit as certain as Merit.

Aph. 23. It is thus, moreover, in both cases.

a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit.³

ऋषीत्सिद्धिश्चत्समानमुभयोः ॥ २४ ॥

The proof of each the same.

Aph. 24. If the existence [of Merit] be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both.

a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction

¹ लौकिकप्रत्यक्षाभावावत्सत्वभाव इति नियमो नाति प्रमाणान्तरेणापि वस्तूनां विषयविकरणादिव्यर्थःः ॥

² धर्मवद्धर्ममपि साध्यति ॥

³ धर्मवद्धर्मेदपेवं प्रमाणानीत्यर्थःः ॥
would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning.¹

6. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.:²

\[ \text{अन्न्तः करणंधर्मं धम्मादीनाम्} \| \text{अ} 25 \| \]

\[ \text{Aph. 25. It is of the internal organ}^3 \]

\[ \text{[not of soul,] that Merit, &c., are the properties.} \]

¹ ननु विध्यन्यथानुपपत्तिः प्रवाणमिथ्या धर्मं-

-सिद्धि: सा च नास्त्यधर्मं इति कच भौतिकविज्ञा-

-तिदेशोधर्मं इति चेन्न यतः समानमुभयोर्धर्मी-

-धर्मयोर्यापत्तिः प्रमाणमिति परदारानं गच्छे-

-दिति निषेधविध्यन्यथानुपप्पेरित्यथः।

² ननु धर्मादिद्रिं चेन्नवीक्रतं तच्छे पुष्पां 

-धर्मादिमीत्रेण परिशामाद्यापत्तिरित्याश्चा परि-

-हरति।

³ The 'great internal organ' (mahat), called also buddhi, is here referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64, a. Aniruddha's comment runs:
a. In the expression ' &c.' are included all those that are stated, in the Vaiśeṣika Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul.\textsuperscript{12}

b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, he replies]:

\textbf{गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तरायथः || २६ ||}

\textit{Aph. 26. And of the Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment.}

\textit{The Qualities exist, though not in soul.}

a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron,] belongs to the iron.\textsuperscript{3}

b. In regard to the doubt, 'Why, again, do we not deny

\textbf{बुधिधर्मम् । ज्ञात्मधर्मेऽन्ति:सङ्कल्पनातिविरोधः || Ed.}

\textsuperscript{1} ज्ञात्मशब्देन वैशेषिकशस्त्रोत्त्वं सर्व ज्ञात्म-\vspace{0.5em}

\textsuperscript{2} Vide supra, p. 71, Aph. 61, b. Ed.

\textsuperscript{3} गुणानां सच्चादीनां तद्भर्तौ शुक्रादीनां तत्कार्याखृतं महत्तादीनां स्वाधिकारं नात्यि \vspace{0.5em}

\textsuperscript{3} गुणानां सच्चादीनां तद्भर्तौ शुक्रादीनां तत्कार्याखृतं महत्तादीनां स्वाधिकारं नात्यि \vspace{0.5em}

\textsuperscript{3} गुणानां सच्चादीनां तद्भर्तौ शुक्रादीनां तत्कार्याखृतं महत्तादीनां स्वाधिकारं नात्यि \vspace{0.5em}

\textsuperscript{3} गुणानां सच्चादीनां तद्भर्तौ शुक्रादीनां तत्कार्याखृतं महत्तादीनां स्वाधिकारं नात्यि \vspace{0.5em}

\textsuperscript{3} गुणानां सच्चादीनां तद्भर्तौ शुक्रादीनां तत्कार्याखृतं महत्तादीनां स्वाधिकारं नात्यि
them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words
sleep, wish, &c? he says:

The above thesis argued. Aph. 27. By a conjunction of the five
members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists].

a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his
assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the
matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter.
But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness,
&c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative
statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Syn-
thesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the
'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things,
viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the
meaning.

1 कुतः पुनः स्वस्थपत एव बाधो न भवति
स्वप्नमनोरप्यादिपदांश्चविद्याकालाहयामाह ॥

2 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has संयोगात्. Ed.

3 Nāgēśa has सुखादिसंबिन्दिति:, the lection which, according
to Vijnāna, is to be preferred. Ed.

4 अः विशिष्य पक्षीकरणाय विवादविषये-
केदैशस्य सुखमचस्य यहां सवैवविषयोपलब्धकम्
सुखादिसंबिन्दिति पाठसु समीचीनः । पत्खा-
वयवाच्य न्यायस्य प्रतिज्ञाहेतदाहरणोपनयनिग-
b. And the employment [of the argument] is this:

(1) Pleasure is real;
(2) Because it produces motion in something.
(3) Whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are sentient beings;
(4) And pleasure produces motion in things, in the way of horripilation, &c.:
(5) Therefore, it is real.¹

c. But then the Chárváka, next, doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion], that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.²³

¹ प्रयोगश्चायम् || मुखं सत्र || अर्थेत्क्रियाकारिकारितवात् || यद्यद्येक्रियाकारि तत्स्यथा चेतनः || पुनरादिक्रियाकारिच मुखम् || तस्मात् दिदित ि

² नन्तु प्रत्येकतिरित्रं प्रमाणमेव न भवति व्यासवधासिद्धिर्चार्वाकः पुनः श्रद्धते ि

³ For the Chárvákas' rejection of the authority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed.
The validity of inference questioned.

Aph. 28. Not from once apprehending is a connexion established.

\[\text{a. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a 'connexion,' i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened,] is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows}^{1}\text{ [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up:}^{2}\]

\[\text{3नियतथर्मसाहित्यमुभयोरैक्तरस्य वा व्याप्ति:}^{3}\]

\[\text{II २९ II}^{4}\]

\[\text{Aph. 29. Pervadedness is a constant}^{5}\text{ consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them.}\]

\[\text{a. 'Consociation of characters,' i.e., consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' [furnishing solid ground for infer-}\]

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\[1\] As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Sāndilya, &c., p. 8, text and foot-note. Ed.

\[2\] सकृततधारयहसात्सानब्यो व्याप्तिनें सिध्यति भूयस्वं चाननुगतम्। ज्ञातौ व्याप्तियहासायत्वाचानुमाणनाथसिद्धिरिववर्षः। समाधिते। II

\[3\] Nāgēśa has, instead of नियतः, नियतं. Ed.
ence], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of 'both,' the predicate and the reason, or in the case of 'one of them,' the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e. g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness,' [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import.¹

b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e. g., of some such power as is to be mentioned² [in § 31]:


¹ धर्मसाहित्यं धर्मेतायं साहित्यं सहचार इति यावत् । तथा च चौभयोः साध्यसाधनयोरेकतरस्य
साधनमाच्यं वा नियतोऽध्यभिचरितो यः सहचारः स व्यापृतित्यर्थं । उभयोरिति समवा-
प्रिप प्रोक्तम् । नियमशान्तकृतस्य याह इति न व्यापृतियहासंभव इति भावः ॥

² व्यापृति वैमायमाण्यशक्त्यादिधृष्पं पदार्थान्तरं न
भवतीत्याह ॥
a. "Pervadedness" is not an entity other than a fixed con-

sociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose,

further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes

"pervadedness." But we consider that what constitutes

"pervadedness" belongs to extant things simply. Such is

the meaning. ¹

b. He states the opinion of others: ²

A heterodox opinion regarding "Pervaded-

ness." Aph. 31. [But certain] teachers say

that it [Pervadedness] is [another prin-

ciple, in addition to the twenty-five,]

resulting from the power of the thing itself.

a. But other teachers assert that "Pervadedness" is,

positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of

power, generated by the native power of the "pervaded."

But [they continue,] "Pervadedness" is not simply a power

of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever

the thing is, [which "pervadedness" does not do]. For

smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point

of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going

into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore

[contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the

¹ नियतधार्मसाहित्यातिरित्रं बल्ल व्यापिनें भ-

वति व्यापिवाच्ययस्य बल्लोप्रिय कल्याणाप्रस-

ज्ञाति। अस्माभिभु सिद्धवस्तुन एव व्यापिवाच्यं

कल्याणाप्रसमित्यर्थव। ||

² परमतमाह ||
above-stated definition; for, according to our doctrine, the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. Such is the import.  

\textit{Aph. 32.} Panchaśikha\textsuperscript{2} says that it 
[‘Pervadedness,’] is the possession of the power of the sustained.

\textit{a.} That is to say: Panchaśikha holds that \textit{pervadingness} is the power which consists in being the \textit{sustainer}, and that ‘Pervadedness’\textsuperscript{3} is the having the power which consists in being the sustained; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.;\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{अपरे वाचार्या व्याप्ति स्वशक्तिजन्यं शक्तिविशेषहृण्यं तत्स्तवान्तरमेव व्याप्तिरित्याहुः। निजशक्तिमार्गं तु यावह्वस्यायितया न व्याप्तः। देशान्तरगतस्य धृमस्य बहूच्छवाय्यवाहेशान्तरस्तम्भनेन च सा शक्तिनाश्यत इति नोक्तल्क्षणेऽतिव्याप्तः: स्वमते तूत्तरतिकालाविशेषवानेन धृमो विशेषणीय इति भावः।}

\textsuperscript{2} The translator's ‘the Panchaśikha’ I have everywhere corrected. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} This is to render \textit{vyāpyatwa}, on which vide supra, p. 320, note 3. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{बुद्धादिषु प्रकृत्यादिव्यायणतायथवहारादाधार-}
[and this means that each product, in succession, is sustained by what precedes it in the series].

b. But then, why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this he [Panchasikha,] replies:¹

अभ. ३३. The relation is not an essential power; for we should have [in that case,] a tautology.

a. But 'the relation,' viz., 'Pervadedness,' is not an essential power; for we should [thus] have a tautology; because, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so, also, there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature, of which Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning.³

¹ Aniruddha and Vedânti Mahâdeva read स्थूलपश्चिनिन्यमः Ed.

² ताशक्षियापकताधियताशक्षिमच्चां च वायुलमिति पञ्चशिख इत्यर्थे: A

³ स्थूलपश्चिनितु नियमो व्याप्तिनेन भवति पौ- नस्कर्मप्रस्तावः: कलश इतिवदिश्यायेत्यचाष- र्षामेंद्रेत्यर्थे: A
b. He himself explains the 'Tautology':

The reason why.  

Aph. 34. Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer].

a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism.

b. He [Panchasikha,] mentions another objection:

A further reason.  

Aph. 35. And because it [Pervaded-ness,] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c.

a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the

1 पौर्णस्थ्यमेव स्यमेव विवृणेऽति ॥  
2 पूर्वसूच एव आख्यातप्रायमिदम् ॥  
3 टूषणान्तरसाह ॥  
4 Aniruddha omits च. Ed.
character] of the ‘sustained’ is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no ‘Pervadedness’ then. Such is the import.¹

b. But then what? Panchaśīkha says that ‘Pervadedness’ is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that ‘sustainedness’ is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke] is not [as token of something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this he says: ²

\[\text{Aph. 36. \ Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the ‘sustained,’ then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers...}\]

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¹ पञ्चशिक्षा वृद्धादिव्यापतात्त्वि । स्वहृदय-क्षिमां तृ सत्य लक्षण न संभवति । चिन्तन-लवेशपि स्वहृदयकर्णपायेन तदनीमापि व्य-पतापत्रिरस्यं । चाध्येयश्चित्तु । खेदकाले विनधेति न तदानी व्यपिरिरिति भावः ॥

² नन्दु किं पञ्चशिक्षेन निजभक्त्युज्वलो व्यपिरिरि नोच्यते । तवें सृष्ट्य वहृदाधिकर्भवाविर्वहृदय-पतापिरिरिति । तचाह ॥
referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much].

a. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness,' it would be really settled 'by the like argument,' i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power, also, [§ 31, a].

b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions].

c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge, in the shape of [the objection

1 व्यायामिन्ते वाक्यालौऽसिद्धि निजशक्त्यज्ञवोऽपि 
व्यासिन्वेन सिद्ध एव समानन्यायादुक्तिसाम्या- 
दिव्येषः।

2 पञ्चावयंश्योगाधिकारितिः यदुः तदु- 
पपदनाय व्यासिनिवेचनेनानुमानप्रामाण्ये बा- 
धकमपालतमृ।

3 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders प्रमाणया, 
represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' Ed.
of its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words: 1

वाच्यवाचकसंबन्धः संबन्ध: 2 शन्त्याष्ठयोः । 37 ॥

Aph. 37. The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser.

a. To the ‘meaning’ belongs the power termed expressibleness; to the ‘word,’ the power termed expression: simply this is their ‘connexion;’ their interrelation, as it were. 3

1 इदानीं पञ्चायवव्यवःपश्वन्द्य ज्ञानजनको-पपत्तये शन्त्यश्वर्तितिनिर्वचनेन तदनुपपत्तिः पुराणाध्यायेऽरेषां बाधककपास्यते ॥

2 वाच्यवाचकसंबन्धः is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.

3 Instead of ‘simply,’ &c., read, ‘this itself is their connexion, such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.’

The ‘connexion’ in question is the swarūpa-sambandha, for which see Professor Cowell’s translation of the Kusumānjali, p. 13, note †.

A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, ‘to the word, the power termed expression.’ According to Nāgęśa, ‘the expressibleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended]’:

अर्धगतं वाच्यलमनुयोगितावतंबन्धः ॥

Anuyogin and anuyogita, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogita, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by ‘antithetic’ and ‘antitheticity.’

Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin,
From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import.¹

b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers² [in question]:

चिन्ति: संबन्धसिद्धि: ॥ ३८ ॥

Aph. 38. The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means].

a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37,] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sáhitya-darpana, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name,⁴ [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].

or 'anathetic,' of ghaṭābhāva, 'non-existence of a jar,' is ghaṭābhāva itself, and the pratiyogin, or 'antithetic,' of ghaṭābhāva is ghaṭā, 'jar.' Ed.

¹ अथर्थ वाच्यताय शक्ति: शन्त्रे वाचकताय शक्तिरति मैव तयोः संबन्धोऽनुयोगितावत् ।

तह्राथनाछन्त्रेनार्थोपस्यितिरितिवर्थे: ॥

² शक्तियाहकारायाह ॥

³ Aniruddha has संबन्धसिद्धि: . Ed.

⁴ अञ्जोपदेशो वृद्धयवहारः प्रसिद्धपदसामाना-

धिकरणमिल्येतोलित्विभिन्भक्तसंबन्धो गृह्यात् इत्यथे: ॥
Aph. 39. There is no restriction to what is to be done; because we see it both ways.

a. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37] should occur only in the case of ‘something [directed] to be done;’ because, in [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., [§ 38] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant], also, as well as in regard to what is to be done.¹

Aph. 40. He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.

a. Here he entertains a doubt:²

¹ स च शक्तियाः कार्यं एव भवतीति नियमो
नानाज लोके कार्यं वद्कार्यं दपि वृद्धव्यवहारार्दे-
दर्शनादित्यर्थे: \|  
² Aniruddha reads लोकवृद्धव्यवहारादि (Ed.)
³ Vijñāna is singular as regards the lection -प्रतीति:, instead of -प्रतीते: (Ed.)
⁴ अर शक्ते: \|
A doubt.

Aph. 41. Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.

a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses;²

This cleared up.

Aph. 42. Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrificings, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently.

a. What is asserted [in § 41,] is not the case; since sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, are really, in themselves, ‘what constitutes merit,’ i.e., what is enjoined by the Veda, ‘preeminently,’ i.e., because of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of which we are perfectly conscious,] are not something transcending intuition. But ‘what constitutes merit’ [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition,] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrif-

¹ Aniruddha exhibits the reading तद्धेष्यायतीन्द्रिय-
लात्. Ed.

² तच्यातीन्द्रियार्थेन्मादृ निराकरोति.
ficings, &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. Such is the meaning.¹

b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that, inasmuch as it [the Veda] is superhuman, there can be no instruction by any competent person,² [in regard to its import]:

अन्तर्ज्ञानशक्तिप्रेरणेत्य व्यवस्थायते ॥ ४३ ॥

Knowledge of the Veda traditional.

Aph. 43. The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge].

a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of actions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies:³

¹ यदुत्तं तच यतो देवतोहिष्यक्त्राव्यागादिरिणस्य यज्ञदानादेः स्वभूपत एव धर्मरत्नं वेदविहितविशिष्यात्र्याकृत्वलक्षणात्। यज्ञादिकं चेष्ठारिद्विपवाचातीन्द्रियम्। नतु यज्ञादिविशयकपूर्वस्य धर्मरत्नं येन वेदविहितस्यातीन्द्रियता स्यादिरिणयः ॥

² यद्भक्ष्मपौष्पेषयनवनानोपदेशाभाव इति तद्रूप निराकरोति ॥

³ ननु तथायतीन्द्रियदेवताफलादिदु कथं शक्तियहो वेदिकपदानां स्यात। तष्ठाह ॥
Aph. 44. This really takes place; because they [viz., the words,] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted.

a. He defines the peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:

Aph. 45. The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production.

a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No':

1 Aniruddha, according to one of my MSS., has तत्सिद्धेः.

2 शब्दप्रामाण्यप्रस्तावेन्स शब्दगतं विशेषमव-धारयति

3 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render pramāṇya. Ed.

4 One of my MSS., of Aniruddha originally had कार्येष्वुः.

5 तत्सिद्धेः शब्देः परमेष्याया वेदाः । नेत्याह
The Lord not the author.

Aph. 46. They [the Vedas] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] their maker.

a. Supply, ‘because we deny that there is a Lord.’¹ [This is] simple.²

b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says:³

मुन्नामुक्तयोर्योग्यालत् ॥ ४७ ॥

Who are not authors of the Vedas.

Aph. 47. Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so, [by his want of power, neither of these can be author of the Vedas].⁴

a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies:⁵

नापौरूषेयलाञ्चित्यलमदुरामित् ॥ ४८ ॥

¹ Vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed.

² इष्यप्रतिषष्ठादिति शेषः । सुगमम् ॥

³ ऋपरः कर्ता भगवियाकाशायामाह ॥

⁴ See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra. Ed.

⁵ नन्वेवमपौरूषेयलाञ्चित्यलमेववागतम् । त-चाह ॥
An illustration.

Aph. 48. As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man.

a. [This is] plain.¹

b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies:²

तेशामपि तद्योगे द्वेष्वायातादिप्रमसक्षि: ॥

Aph. 49. Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c.

a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,³ that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning.⁴

b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal

¹ स्यष्टम् ॥
² नन्यवद्युरादिदिश्वपि कार्येण घटादिवल्योहेष्वे-यलमनुमेयम् । तत्ताह ॥
³ 'Invariable fact' is to translate vyāpti. Ed.
⁴ यत्योहेष्वेयं तत्त्यार्ज्ज्यठिति ब्याप्लिंशष्ये-दृष्टा । तत्स्य बाधादिरेवं सति स्यादिर्ष्यर्थः ॥
Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies: 1

यस्मिन्नः पुष्टेऽधि कृतबुद्धिह्यजायते तत्योर्षेः
यम् ॥ ५० ॥

Only what is voluntary is a work. Aph. 50. That [only] is Man’s work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place. 2

a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes place ‘an effort of understanding,’ i.e., a consciousness that Thought preceded, 3 that thing alone is spoken of as Man’s work: such is the meaning. Thus it has been re-

1 नन्वादिपुष्टेऽधिततवाधिदा ऋपि पौर्षेवया
एवेत्याह ॥

2 Read: ‘Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.’

Aniruddha, Nāgeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva agree in supplying kartari after adrishtē. Ed.

3 Instead of Vijnánä’s expression, ‘the idea of [its] being preceded by consciousness,’ Nāgeśa has: बुद्धिपूविकृततवुद्धिः;
‘the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,’ i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought.

Vedánti Mahádeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a production of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed.
marked that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unpreceded by thought. Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work.¹²

¹ दृष्ट इद्वादृष्टेश्च यस्मिन्बल्लुनि कृतबुद्धिवहृ- तिपौर्ववृक्कवृद्धिजायते तदेव पौर्णेयमिति जव- हितं इत्यथः। एतदृशं भवति। न पुरुषोपरित- तामाच् भितु। या श्रास्प्रश्चास्योः मुखस्त्रिका- लोपोः पौर्णेयलवन्यवहाराभवात्। किं तु बुद्धिपूर्ववक्तेन। वेदात्तु नं श्रास्वेवद्वादृष्ट्वाश- दृष्ट्वाद्वृद्धिपूर्वका एव स्मयभुवः सकाशात्स्यं भवति।

² Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahmā, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.'

Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya, before तु. Ed.
b. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences,¹ the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge.² To this he replies³:

निजशक्त्याभिष्यकः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ॥ ५१ ॥

Aph. 51. They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly].

a. That is to say: the authoritativeness⁵ of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer’s knowledge of the truth, but quite ‘spontaneously;’ because, as for the Vedas’ ‘own,’ i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations⁶ [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical

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¹ Read, instead of ‘since they are,’ &c., ‘since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously.’ Ed.

² The implied ‘power to convey right knowledge’ represents pramāṇya. Ed.

³ नन्वेव यथार्थवाक्यार्थव्यासानांपूर्वकवाक्यवा-
कस्येव वेदानामपि प्रामाण्यं न स्वात् । तचाह ॥

⁴ Vedānti Mahádeva has the reading निजशक्त्याभिष्यकः, and comments accordingly: निजशक्तव्यव ज्ञानजनकनिज-शक्तिवाभिष्यकः प्रमातस्येति शेषः । Ed.

⁵ As in the aphorism, pramāṇya, which, soon after, is rendered by ‘validity.’ Ed.

⁶ Mantra, a word of various meanings. Ed.
Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. And so there is the aphorism of the *Nyāya* [Book II., § 68]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture,' &c.¹

b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,' there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that² [same proposition]:

\[
\text{नासत: र्यानं नृष्णुःवत्} \quad 52
\]

Cognition is evidence of existence.  
*Aph. 52. There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man's horn.*

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¹ The correct reading of the aphorism is \(मन्त्रायुवेदवचं तत्प्रामायमायमायमायायात् \) *Ed.*

² वेदानां निजा स्वाभाविकी या यथार्थ्यान-जननशक्तितस्यां मन्त्रायुवेदालोभस्यस्यम् भवादिकवेदानायेव स्वतं एव प्रामायमं सिद्धिति न वक्तुर्याधिश्रान्मूलकल्फाद्विनेभ्यः। तथा च न्यायसुचम् । मन्त्रायुवेदप्रामायवचं तत्प्रामाय-र्ग्यमिति ।

³ गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तबाद इति प्रतिज्ञायां न्यायेन सुखादिसिस्तिरित्योऽहिुपपन्यतः प्रप-म्भ्वतः । साम्यतं तस्यामेव हेलन्तरमाह ।
a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under §27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, [interposes the Naiyáyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in §26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies:²

न सतो बाधदशेनातः ॥ ५३ ॥

The Qualities, &c., not absolutely real.

Aph. 53. It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities].

a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognition of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted

¹ ज्ञातां तात्वत्यज्ञावयवेन मुखादिसिद्धिः-नमःचादिपि तत्तिति: । ज्ञात्यत्यज्ञावयवेन मुखादिनां ज्ञानमेव नोपपद्यते नरशृढ़ादीनामभानादित-त्यर्थः ॥

² नन्दवेंवं गुणादिरत्यवेन सन्नेवं भवतु तथा च नात्यत्वबाध इत्यत्लपद्वैयथ्यथमिति । तत्राह ॥
to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system], &c.¹

b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be different both from real and from unreal; nevertheless, the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26,] is untenable. To this he replies:²

नानिवैचनीयस्य तद्भावात् ॥ ५४ ॥

A Vedántic advance rejected. Aph. 54. It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]; because there exists no such thing.

a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing; ‘because there exists no such thing,’ i.e., because nothing is known other than what exists or what does not exist: such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen.³

¹ ऋत्वनतस्तोऽस्मि गुणादेभां न युक्तं विनाशादिकाले बाधदशेनात् ॥

² नन्वेवमपि सदसंज्ञां भिन्मेव जगज्वतु तथापत्यतलबाधप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिरिति । तत्राह ॥

³ सचनेनसच्चेन चानिवैचनियं तादृशस्यापि भानं न घटते तद्भावात्सदस्तत्तलबस्त्त्रप्रसिद्धि-রित्यर्थं । दृष्टानुसारेनेव कल्यनाया सौरिचित्या-दिति भावं ।
b. But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyāya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise,' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, 'No':

नाय्यशास्त्राः २ स्ववचोभाषाघाताः ३ व ५५

Aph. 55. There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive.

a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; 'because your own proposition is self-destructive.' Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth]; both a man's horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own

\[1\] नन्वेवं किमन्याशास्त्रातिरविवेष्टा | नेत्रायं

\[2\] Dr. Goldstücker, in his Sanskrit Dictionary, erroneously speaks of anyathā-khyāti as if it were a technicality of the Sānkhya philosophy, and quotes, by way of proof, the aphorism to which this note is appended. Ed.

\[3\] In one of my MSS. of Aniruddha was, originally, -बाधात्, instead of -भाषाघाताः. Ed.

\[4\] See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed.
proposition is self-destructive. For even those who con-
tend for ‘cognizing otherwise’ [as one mode of cognition,]
declare that the cognition of what \textit{does not exist} is impos-
sible. Such is the meaning.\textsuperscript{1,2}

b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26,] ‘not
absolute debarment,’ he sums up his doctrine:

\textbf{ब्रैह्माण्यम्} सदसत्यामित्वः \textit{वैधाभावाधात्} \textit{पद्ध} \textit{ते}

\textit{Aph. 56.} They [the Qualities,] are
cognized rightly or wrongly, through
their being denied and not denied [appropriately or other-
wise].

\textit{a.} All the Qualities, &c., ‘are cognized rightly and

\textsuperscript{1} अन्यहस्तव्यमुपेश्वराः भासत इतिपि न युक्तं स्व-
वचोव्यः। अन्यचायहृतपर्व नृशृङ्खलतुल्य-
लमन्याशश्चोदनेनौचतेिस्या ृ तस्य भान्मूच्यत
इति स्ववच एव व्याहतम्। अस्तो भानासंभव-
स्यान्यायाभिताविदिमभिरपि वचनादित्यर्थः।}

\textsuperscript{2} The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very
inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. Espe-
cially, as to the original, \textit{अन्यथाच} \textit{च} copies an error of the press,
my correction of which to \textit{अथ च} was not heeded. See, for the
purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the \textit{Sānkhyā-
pravachana-bhāshya}. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} नात्यन्तवाथ इति पूर्वाकाङ्सं विवृत्तानाः स्वतिनि-
झाल्मुपसंहरति।
wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-deny, as far as regards their existing at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c. [which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent].

b. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end; [the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]:

**Pratitypratitiibhyam na sfoaratyam: shabd: ॥ ५७ ॥**

The Yoga theory of speech rejected.

Aph. 57. A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (spóta); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary

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1 सदस्तव्यातिरिव सर्वेषां गुणादीनाम्। कुतः।
   बाधाबाधात। तत्र स्वघृपेशवातः सर्ववस्तूनां निखयवात।
   संसर्गेतत्तु बाधः सर्ववस्तूनां चैत्येशति यथा।
   शुक्कादिबुद्धिम्यरजताद्वा: स्फोटिकादिव वा लौहित्यदेस्तदत।

2 ऋयं विचारं पर्याप्तः। इदानीं शच्चविचारं,
   प्रसंनागत ऋग्नलुक्तयात्ने प्रस्तूयते।
thing,] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it].

a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression';\(^1\) just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyaśas assert, in opposition to the Yogas,] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression']? For,\(^2\) by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) For sphaṭa, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expression,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq.

It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, sābda is variously rendered, besides that sābda and pada are not discriminated. Ed.

\(^2\) प्रस्तेकवर्गोऽभोजितिरित्तिक्षण इत्यादिद्विपम-खरामेेकपदं स्फोट इति योगेऽभ्युपगम्यते क्षुद्री-
b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted before, [under § 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters:

APh. 58. Sound is not eternal; because we perceive it to be made.

a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mīmāṃsakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that ‘This is that same G’; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that ‘[the sound of] G has been produced’: such is the meaning. And the recog-

1 Pratishiddha, ‘demurred to.’ Ed.

2 पूर्वेन बेदानां नित्यं प्रतिषिद्धम्। इदानीं वर्गेनित्यत्वमापि प्रतिषेधति॥

3 Nāgeśa has वर्गेनित्यत्वम्. Ed.
nition has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized.¹

b. He ponders a doubt.²

Aph. 59. [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds,] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp.

a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was 'previously settled,' the manifestation, through noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, 'as of a jar by a lamp.³

¹ स एवायं गकार इत्यादिप्रययभिभित्रलाभलाभीनित्यलं न युक्तमुख्यते गकार इत्यादिप्रययेनानित्यवचारितयथः। प्रयंभिष्या च तज्जातियताविषयशी। ऋत्यथा घटादेरपि प्रयंभिष्या नित्यात्मप्रेषित॥

² शांते॥

³ ननु पूर्वसिद्धस्त्राक्षेयं शब्दस्य ध्वनिग्रेष्यं याभिभ्रक्षितगतमाचमुक्तसिम्बतीतेर्विषयः। ऋत्यभयः दृष्टान्तो दीपिनेव घटस्येति॥
b. He repels this:

Aph. 60. If the dogma of products' being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved.

a. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future,] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I., § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory,] that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory,] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import.  

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1 परिहरित \\
2 ज्ञाभिविक्षित्यद्यक्ष्णाग्तावश्यायागेन वर्तमानावश्यालाभ इत्युच्ते तदा सक्ययसिद्धान्तस्तादृश-नित्यां च सर्वकार्याया।मेतेति सिद्धास्धनमित्यथ:, यदि च वर्तमानतया सत एव ज्ञानमात्रहृदिय-भिन्नविक्षित्य तदा घटादीनामिष्ठित नित्यात्पर्व: कार्यक्षायापरेण शब्देष्टिष्विष्व घटादिशुष्पिज्ञानस्यवो-स्पष्टिर्गतितिविशयत्वात्विचित्यार्दि भावः.
b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced,¹ [having been already handled under Book I., § 149]:

²नादैत्मात्मनो लिङ्गात्मक्षेत्रप्रतीते: ॥ ६१ ॥

Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference.

Aph. 61. Non-duality of Soul is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs.

a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another not does quit it, &c.³

b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, ‘All this is Soul only,’⁴ ‘All this is Brahma only.’⁵ ⁶

²नानात्मनापि प्रत्यक्षवाधात् ॥ ६२ ॥

¹ ज्ञात्माचेते पूर्वानुस्रा मापि बाधकमुष्यसनाय-मिल्येतदर्थमात्माचेततिरास: पुनरारभ्यते ॥

² Nāgęśa, as also some copies of Vijnāna’s work, has नादैत्म-मात्मनां, ‘non-duality of Souls.’ Ed.

³ प्रकृतियागतयागादिदिनिक्षेत्रस्येव सिद्धर्त-लघ्येऽः ॥

⁴ Chhándogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed.

⁵ ज्ञात्माचेते सवं ब्रह्मेत् सर्वमिति ज्ञूत्यात्मनो-ज्ञात्मभिरह्येऽः तु प्रत्यक्षसीपि बाधकमात्मीयाह ॥

⁶ For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.
Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense. Aph. 62. Moreover, there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul; because this is disproved by sense-evidence.

a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web].

b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established:

नोभाभ्यां तेनेच। ए 63 ॥

The reasons combined. Aph. 63. Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul, is there non-difference]; for that same [couple of reasons].

a. ‘Between the two,’ i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference;

1 ज्ञातमनापि भोगप्रपञ्चनात्मनो नाहैतं प्रत्यक्षेषापि बाधात्। ज्ञातमः सर्वभोगाभेदे घटपटयोगणेभेदं स्यात्। घटादे: पदाधिभिन्नात्माभेदात्। स च भेदमाहकप्रत्यय्यवाहितं इत्यं:॥

2 जीवनुसब्दवैशारद्याय प्राप्तमण्यं विशद्यति॥
for the couple of reasons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, ‘[All] this is Soul only? ’ To this he replies:²

Aph. 64. There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating.

a. That is to say: ‘in respect of the undiscriminating,’ with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case of non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is ‘there for the sake of something else;’ i.e., the observation³ is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent;⁴

¹ उभाभ्यं समुचिताभ्यामवामशत्मानात्मभयं नात्मत्वात्मेद्वैसैव हेतुहयेत्रयशः ॥

² नन्येवमात्मवेदमित्वादिदिश्रुतीनान का गतिरिद्धि ॥ चताह ॥

³ To render anuvāda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies ‘the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.’ Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. At pp. 24 and 25, he translates anuvāda by ‘confirmatory repetition’ and ‘illustrative repetition.’ Ed.

⁴ अन्यपरतममवववेकानां तत्त ॥ ६४ ॥

*Scripture accommodates itself to human frailty of understanding.*
b. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Non-duality [of Soul], there can be no material cause of the world, either:

\[ \text{नात्माविद्या} \text{ नोभयं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसख्लवात्} \text{ II ६५ II} \]

_Aph. 65._ Neither Soul, nor Ignorance, nor both, can be the material cause of the world; because of the solitariness of [Soul].

\[ \text{आयंपरतमुपासनार्थकानुवाट इत्यर्थः} \text{ II लोके हि शरीरशरीरिशोभेयंगभोङ्कोश्चाविवेकेनाभेदो व्यवहित्यते} \text{ II} \]

\[ \text{आदेहितवादिनां जगदुपादानकारणमिध न संभवतीत्याह} \text{ II} \]

1 According to Nāgēśa's reading, नात्माविद्या, ‘Ignorance’ is qualified as ‘beginningless,’ or ‘eternal a _parte ante._’ Vedānti Mahādeva reads, as do some MSS. of Vijnāna, नात्मानाविद्या. Ed.
which is called ‘association;’ hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply ‘because of the solitariness.’ Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul,¹ [for which you Vedántís contend].

b. He himself [in Book I., § 145,] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the prima facie view, founded on the text, ‘Brahma

¹ केवल ऋत्मात्माश्रिता वाबिधा समुचित वा कपालइयवदुभयं न जगदुपादानं संभवत्यात्मनोऽसज्ज्वात्। सद्याख्यो हि यं संयोगशेषस्तनावं द्रव्याणां विकारो भवति। ऋतोस्मद्धवाक्वत्यात्मनोऽधितीयस्य नोपादानलम्। नाविधायाधारायि संभवत्यस्मज्ज्वेनाविधायोगस्य प्रागेव निरस्त्वात्। प्रत्येकोपादानलव-द्वोभोपादानलमणस्मज्ज्वाद्वासंभवीयथः। यदि चाविधा द्रव्यरूपा पुरुषाश्रिता गगने बायुविद्यधेते तदात्माहैवतहानि।
is reality, knowledge, and joy,\textsuperscript{1} that the essence of the soul is \textit{joy}, also:\textsuperscript{2}

\begin{quote}
\textit{नेक्ष्यानन्दचित्रपले दयोमेदात्} \textit{II} 66 \textit{II}
\end{quote}

\textit{Aph.} 66. The two natures, joy and knowledge, do not belong to one; because the two are different.

\textit{a.} A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning.\textsuperscript{3}

\textit{b.} But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul,] consists of joy? To this he replies:\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{quote}
\textit{दुःखनिवृत्तेगाः} \textit{II} 67 \textit{II}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1} The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the \textit{Brihad\'aranyaka Upanishad}, iii., 9, 28; or \textit{Satapatha-br\'ahmana}, xiv., 6, 9, 34. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{2} प्रकाशस्वरूप आत्मेति स्वयं सिद्धान्तितम् इति सत्यं विज्ञानमानं बहसोति \textit{अतेरानन्दोप्यष्ठात्मनः स्वरूपसमिति पूर्वपक्षं निराकरते} \textit{II}

\textsuperscript{3} एकधार्मिष्ठ आत्मन्दचात्मयस्यरूपम् न भवति \textit{दुःखन्नुमकाले मुखाननुभवेन मुखन्न्योमेदादिध्यये} \textit{II}

\textsuperscript{4} नन्वेदमानन्दरूपताश्रुते का गति: \textit{I} तत्तथा \textit{I}
Aph. 67. Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain.

a. That is to say: the word ‘joy,’ in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], ‘Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.’

b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment:

\[\text{विमुक्तिप्रशंसा मन्दानाम} \, \text{॥ ६८ ॥}\]

Why the term was used in a sense not literal.

Aph. 68. It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull.

a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to ‘the dull,’ i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;\(^4\) [for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain].

b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already

\(^1\) तुःखनिवृत्यात्मनि श्रौत आनन्दशृंदो गौण
इत्यथः। तदुज्जु सुखं तुःखसुखात्य इति ॥

\(^2\) गौणप्रयोगे बीजमाह ॥

\(^3\) मन्दानज्ञानप्रति तुःखनिवृत्यपामात्मस्वहः-
पमुक्तिः सुखवेन श्रुति लोकि प्ररोचनाथमितर्यः॥

\(^4\) For another translation, beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed.
declared, of the internal organ, he repels the prima facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading:

न अयापकतं मनसः करणातिद्विद्रियवादः ॥ ६५ ॥

The Mind not all-pervading.

The Mind is not all-pervading; because it is an instrument, and because it is, moreover, an organ.

a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instruments, is not all-pervading; for it is an instrument, as an axe, or the like, is. The word ‘and’ [literally, ‘or,’ in the Aphorism,] implies a distributive alternative, [not an optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments,] the particular internal instrument, the third [the Mind, manas],

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1 Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that ‘the subtile body’ was pointed to, here added, in brackets, ‘in B. III., §§ 14, 15, &c.’ Ed.

2 अनन्तःकरणोत्तक्तः पूर्वोक्तः अञ्ज्ञस्येनोप-पत्र्ये मनोवेभवपूर्वपञ्चमपाकरोति ॥

3 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva seem to add the words वास्यादिद्विशुरादिवच. See the passage immediately following the aphorism. Ed.

4 The term manas, the translator’s ‘Mind,’ denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed.

5 See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed.

6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for ‘the subtile body, mentioned under B. III., § 12, a.’ Ed.
is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.\(^1\)

But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable as only of medium extent,\(^2\) [neither infinite nor atomic].

\(b\). Here, there being a doubt whether this be convincing, he propounds an appropriate confutation:\(^3\)

\(a\). That is to say; since, inasmuch as there is Scripture regarding the going of the Soul [which, being all-pervading, cannot go] into another world, it being settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is movable, [see Book I., § 51], it cannot be all-pervading.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed.

\(^2\) मनसोऽज्ञ: करण्यासाधारयत्त। वासुध्रो व्यवस्थितविकल्पः।

इद्भवोत्तत्तत्त: करण्यविशेषयथ: तृतीययथ: न विभ्वलमित्यथः।

देहव्यापित्तादिन्दुः तु मध्यमप्रिमाशोऽशोपपध्यतः इतिः।

\(^3\) अचाप्रयोज्ज्वलश्रध्द्यामनुकूलतकमः।

\(^4\) अत्यमो लोकान्तरगमनश्रवन तेषुपाधिभृत्तस्यान्त: करणस्य सक्रियः सिद्धेन न विभुतं संभवतित्यथः।
b. In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts:¹

न निर्माणां तद्योगात्मकत् ॥ ७१ ॥

The Mind has parts.

Aph. 71. Like a jar, it [the Mind] is not without parts; because it comes in contact therewith, [i.e., with several Senses, simultaneously].

a. The word ‘therewith’ refers to ‘organ,’ which occurs in a preceding aphorism, [§ 69]. The Mind is not without parts; ‘because it comes in contact,’ simultaneously, with several sense-organs. But, ‘like a jar,’ it is of medium size, [neither infinite nor atomic], and consists of parts. Such is the meaning. And it is to be understood that the internal organ, when in the state of a cause, [and not modified and expanded, e.g., into knowledge, which is its product,] is, indeed, atomic.³

¹ कार्यविहोपपत्त्ये मनसो निरवयवलमपि निराकरोति ॥

² घटवत्, in both my MSS. of Aniruddha, is changed, by a later hand, to घटादिवत्, the reading of Vedánti Mahádeva. Ed.

³ तथाच पूर्वसूच्ये श्रेष्ठं परामृष्ठं मनसो न निरवयवलमनेकौन्द्रियेष्वेकदा योगात विन्तु घटवन्मधयमपरिमायां साध्वमित्यथे।। कारणावस्य चान्तः कर्षमश्वेति बोध्यम् ॥
b. He demurs to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c.:

Prakṛti pūruṣāyaṁ prakṛtāṁ pratiṣeṣadhītī ॥ ७२ ॥

Eternity belongs to what.  

Aph. 72. Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal.

a. [This is] plain. And the Mind,² the Ether, &c., when in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are called Nature, and not Intellect,³ &c., by reason of the absence of the special properties, viz., judgment,⁴ &c.⁵

b. But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, ‘He should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him,’⁶ since Soul and Nature,

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¹ मनः कालादीनां नित्यतं प्रतिषेधति ॥

² Intended to represent antalīkarana, ‘internal organ.’ Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed.

³ The very inferior, because ambiguous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne’s corresponding ‘Mind.’ Ed.

⁴ Vyāyasāya. For its synonym, adhyāyasāya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed.

⁵ सूक्ष्मम्। कार्यायस्यं चान्तः कर्षणाकाशा- 

्द्विं प्रकृतिरेवोथ्यते नतु बुद्धादिकं व्यवसाया-

द्वाधारायणांभोजवात् ॥

⁶ Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough translates, differently: ‘Let the sage know that Prakṛti is Máyā, and that Maheśwara is the Máyin, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.’ A foot-note explains ‘Maheśwara’ as intending ‘Īśvara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.’ Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 224. Ed.
also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To this he replies:\(^1\)

\[\text{न भागलाभो भोगिनों निभोगलवश्रुते: II 93 II} \]

\(^1\) ननु। मायां तु प्रकृति विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम। तत्स्यायत्यभूतस्तु व्याप्त सर्वमिदं जगत। इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मः पुन्प्रकृतिोरपि साययवतादनित्यचर्मित। तचाह॥

2 This reading is peculiar; many MSS. of Vijnána, with which agree Aniruddha, Nágéśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva, having भागिनः. Their elucidations of the aphorism here follow. Aniruddha: न कारक्षालभो भोगिनो जगकारणाय स्यो ध्रुवाय श्रुते। मूलकारणावाचाय स्यो ध्रुवाय श्रुते। नागेश: पुन्प्रकृतिविषये भोगिनो भागलाभो व्ययवाचवाविभावो न युञ्जते। Then follows the quotation as in Vijnána. Vedánti Mahádeva: भागः कारणानि स्यस्य कार्ये न सति तत्स्य प्रधानस्य न कारणालभो निभोगलवश्रुते। Some MSS. of Vijnána have precisely the words of Nágéśa, transcribed above, barring the quite immaterial substitution of प्रकृतिपुष्पविषये at the beginning.

भागिन: is, without doubt, the correct reading. Vijnána and Nágéśa take it to denote ‘Soul and Nature;’ Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva, ‘Nature’ only. \textit{Bhāgin} means, literally, ‘that which is made up of parts,’ or ‘the Whole.’ Hence, ‘Whole’ is to take the place of Dr. Ballantyne’s ‘Experiencer.’ It occurs again in Aph. 81 of this Book, at p. 379, infra. \textit{Ed.}
Aph. 73. No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible, one might infer destructibility,] are found in the Experiencer; for there is Scripture for its being without parts.

a. Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experiencer,' i.e., to Soul, or to Nature; for there is Scripture for their being without parts; that is to say, because of such [texts] as, 'Without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'

b. It has been stated [in Book I., § 1,] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Emancipation:

A view of Emancipation disputed.

Aph. 74. Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy; because there

1 Bhogini: pusthikat pradhanastra chaavyavo na yujyate nirvayavatalshuto: | nishkalam nishkritam shalam nirvadanyanirjnam: | ityadhinaivyarthah: ||

2 Śvetásvatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed.

3 du:khinivyavrittimaàsa istyuktam | tadavdharanyay 

4 Vedánti Mahádeva omits mukt from my sole MS. Most probably, however, there is, here, a mistake of the copyist. Ed.
are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of joy].

a. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, or in the shape of manifestation; and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be produced by means: therefore, Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning.¹

न विशेषगुणोल्लितत्तत्त् ॥ ७५ ॥

Aph. 75. Nor, in like manner, is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of special qualities.

a. Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all special qualities, 'In like manner.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see § 74)]. Such is the meaning.²

न विशेषगतिस्यनिष्क्रयः ॥ ७६ ॥

Aph. 76. Nor is it [Emancipation,] any particular going of that [Soul,] which is motionless.

a. Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world

¹ ऋतमञ्ज्ञानसमेतप्रभविभाजित्रह्यप्रय धर्मा नाति स्वरूपं च नित्यमेवेति न साधनसाध्यम्। ऋतो नानदाभिभाजित्रिमैष्ठ इत्यथे।

² ऋशेषविशेषगुणोदस्तोदिष्टिः न मुक्ति। तहदत् निर्मलात्वेति।
of Brahmá;¹ because the Soul, since it is motionless, does not go.²

A fourth view disputed. Aph. 77. Nor is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of the influence of [intellectual] forms, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c.

a. The meaning is, that also the doctrine of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,³ is inadmissible; because, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c., [such] emancipation is not the Soul's aim.⁴

b. He censures another [conception of] emancipation of the Nihilist's:⁵

¹ See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed.

² बहसलोकगतिरपि न मोक्ष ज्ञात्मो निष्क-यलेन गत्यभावात् ||
³ Vāsanā; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.

⁴ क्षणिकज्ञानमेवात्मा तस्य विषयाकारता व-न्यस्तदासनाख्योपरागम्य नाशो मोक्ष इति यन्त्र-स्तिकमतं तदपि न क्षणिकविद्वेशेल्मोक्षस्य-पुरुषार्थादित्यथे: ||
⁵ नालितिकशैव मुक्त्यतां दूषयति ||
A fifth view disputed.  

Aph. 78. Nor is it [Emancipation,] destruction of all; for this has, among other things, the fault of not being the Soul’s aim.

a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not emancipation; because, among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the annihilation of the soul is the soul’s aim: such is the meaning.¹

एवं शून्यमपि || ७५ ||

A sixth view disputed.  

Aph. 79. So, too, the Void.

a. The annihilation of the whole universe, consisting of cognition and the cognizable, is, thus, also, not emancipation; because Soul’s aim is not effected by Soul’s annihilation: such is the meaning.²

संयोगात्र वियोगान्ति न देशादिलाभो- 

ढप || ८० ||

A seventh view disputed.  

Aph. 80. And conjunctions terminate in separations; therefore, it [Emancipation,] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either.

¹ ज्ञानन्तप्यात्मनः सामग्रियोऽवृत्तिर्पि न मोक्ष ज्ञात्मनाशस्य लोके पुरुषार्थवादर्शनातिभ्य इत्यथः: ||

² ज्ञानन्यात्मकाखिलप्रभुनाशोऽवृत्तवमात्म- 

नाशेनापुरुषार्थवाच मोक्ष इत्यथः: ||
a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emancipation.¹

न भागियोगो भागस्य \| ८१ \|

An eighth view disputed. Aph. 81. Nor is it [Emancipation,] conjunction of a Part with the Whole.²

a. Emancipation is not absorption of 'a Part,' i.e., the Soul, into 'the Whole,' i.e., that of which it is [on the view in question,] a part, viz., the Supreme Soul; for the reason assigned [in § 80], viz., 'conjunctions terminate in separations,' and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I., § 92], and because, thus, self-dissolution is not Soul's aim: such is the meaning.³

1 विनाशित्वात्वाम्यं न मुक्तिरिति \| ॥

2 Aniruddha writes as follows, in his elucidation of the eighty-first Aphorism: न ब्रह्मणो भागो जीवात्मा ब्रह्मणो भागाभावात्। योगस्य वियोगान्तवात्युनवर्भ-प्रसादः। तहूषयति। Ed.

3 भागस्यांशस्य जीवस्य भागिन्यविनिपरमात्तमिनि लयो न मोक्षः संयोगः हि वियोगान्ता इतयुक्तेतौरीश्वरानभुपगमाच तथा स्वल्यस्य-पुरुषार्थवाचैत्यथैं। ॥
A ninth view disputed.

Aph. 82. Nor is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the [power of] becoming as small as an atom, &c.; since, as is the case with other conjunctions, the destruction of this must necessarily take place.

a. Moreover, conjunction with superhuman power, e.g., the assuming the size of an atom, is not Emancipation; because, just as is the case with connexions with other superhuman powers, the destruction of this, also, follows, of necessity: such is the meaning.

A tenth view disputed.

Aph. 83. Nor, just as in that case, is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the rank of Indra, &c.

a. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of Indra, &c., Emancipation,—just as is the case with other superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk];—by reason of perishableness: such is the meaning.

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1 Both my MSS. of Aniruddha exhibit the questionable reading.

2 भगिमायुक्त्रसंवयसंवुरीत्येव न मुनिरेश्वरन्न-रसंवयसर्वेऽवत् तत्‌

3 इन्द्रायुक्त्रसङ्गतन्त्रिर्

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Ed.
b. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I., § 61], that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness:

न भूतप्रकृतिविविधियाशास्त्राभ्यासकर्मस्य अथुते: ॥ ५४ ॥

The organs whence.  

Aph. 84. The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyáyikas assert]; because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness.

a. With advertence to the opinion that *Power*, &c., also, are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely:

न षट्टार्थनियमलक्षणोधानान्मुक्ति: ॥ ५५ ॥

1 इन्द्रियाशास्त्राभ्यासकर्मस्य यदुत्तं तत्र परविप्रतिपत्तिः निराकरोति ॥

2 Védánti Mahádeva has, instead of अश्चाह्न्यारिकारव, अश्चाह्न्याराव. *Ed.*

3 शक्त्यादिकमपि तत्वमस्तत्वाभ्याशयेन परेषां पदार्थप्रतिनियमं तन्माच्छानामन्मुक्तिं च निराकरोति ॥

4 Nágeśa and Védánti Mahádeva add च, as does Vijnána, according to the best MSS. *Ed.*
Aph. 85. The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]; nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vaiseshikas maintain].

Aph. 86. So, too, is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the Nyáya], &c.

Aph. 87. [The five Elements being products, as declared in Book I., § 61], Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged in the Nyáya]; for there is Scripture for their being products.

a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from the tradition of Manu,² [Ch. I., v. 27].

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¹ पञ्चभूतात्तन्त पूर्वोऽकार्ये वोपपत्त्यं वैशेषि-काद्यभुपगतं पार्थिवाद्यापुनित्यलमपांकरोति //

² यद्यहयस्माबिः सा श्रुतिः दृष्यते काललु-
b. But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product? To this he replies:

न निभङ्गवः कार्येलवः ॥ ॥

The Scripture decisive of the question.

Aph. 88. Since it is a product, it is not without parts.

a. That is to say: since the fact, established by Scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts.

b. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognition of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible; because [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour:

ननु निरवयवस्य परमाणोऽ कथं कार्येलवं घटते । तत्वः ॥

1 Aniruddha reads न तन्त्रभङ्गवः Ed.

श्रुतिसिद्धकार्येलवान्यायानुपपत्त्या पृथिव्याद्गुणां न निरवयवत्वमित्यथः ॥

3 प्रकृतिपुरुषसास्थानाः न संभवति रूपस्य दृश्यसास्थानार्हेतुत्तवादितः नास्तिकाष्ट्रेपं निरा-करोति ॥
Aph. 89. There is no necessity that direct cognition should have colour as its cause.

a. It is no rule, that to be directly cognizable should result from colour only, [or other object of sense], as the cause; because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., [viz., mystical practices, and so forth], also: such is the meaning. 3

b. Well, if that be the case, pray is the dimension of an Atom a reality, or not? With reference to this, he decides the question of dimension, 4 [as follows]:

1 A marginal note in one of my MSS. of Aniruddha mentions as a variant. Both my MSS. of Nāgēśa have, erroneously, instead of -निवन्धनात्. Ed.

2 Aniruddha and Vedānti Mahādeva have प्रत्यक्षालिनियमः. Ed.

3 हृपादेव निमित्ताच्युतश्चति नियमो नाति धम्मादिनापि साश्चालकारसंभवादित्यसः. II

4 नन्वेवं किमण्यपरिमाणं वस्तवति न वेत्याकाद्वाद्यां परिमाणनिर्णयं करोति. II

5 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has परिमाणे. Ed.
Aph. 90. There are not four varieties of dimension; because those can be accounted for by two.

a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short; but there are only two sorts. 'Because those can be accounted for by two:' that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic [or positively small,] and the great. Such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great; else we should have, e.g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the crooked, &c.

b. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera,² [as follows]:

Genus proved by recognition.

Aph. 91. Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus.

¹ अशु महदीर्घं हस्तवति परिमाणचातुर्बिंध्यं नास्ति द्विबिंधं तु वर्तैत एव। दाभ्यां तद्योगात्।
दाभ्यामेवायुमहत्दरिमाणायं चातुर्विंध्यसंवंशवादित्यं। महत्दरिमाणायावत्तरभेदवेदि हि
हस्तदीर्घकाण्डः। ऋन्या वश्चादित्वेप्रियं परिमाणानन्त्र-प्रसज्ञादिमि:।

² सामान्येषु नास्तिकविप्रतिपत्ति निराकरोति॥

³ Nāgeśa, according to one of my MSS. omits च्रपि. Ed.
a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence of] genus:

न तदन्तपलायःस्मात् ॥ ५२ ॥

And not to be denied. Aph. 92. Therefore it [genus] is not to be denied.

a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus.' To this he replies:

नायवत्सृवृत्तिः हावप्रतीति: ॥ ५३ ॥

Genus positive, not negative. Aph. 93. It [genus] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity.

a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive; for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be, 'This is not a non-jar.'

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1 तस्माच सामान्यायापलापो युक्त इत्याह ॥
2 नन्नत्स्त्रावृत्तिःप्रेषाभावेनैव प्रत्यभिजोपपा-दनीया सैव च सामान्याण्यायांश्राणीस्तु । तचाह ॥
3 One of my MSS. of Nāgęśa has, pretty obviously by mere error, नायवत्सृवृत्तिः. Ed.
4 स एवायमिति भावप्रत्ययान्त्रिकवृत्तिः न सामान्यस्तेऽत्थि: । अन्यणि हि नायमंघट इत्येव प्रतियेत ॥
b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies:

\[
\text{Likeness not a distinct principle.} \quad \text{Aph. 94.} \quad \text{Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community].}
\]

a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness;¹ [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either].

b. The conjecture, 'But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' he repels:²

¹ ननु सादृश्यनिवन्धना प्रत्यभिज्ञा भविष्यति ।
तत्राह।

² भूयोःयवयवादिसामान्यादतिरितिः न सादृश्य-
मल्लित्व प्रत्यक्षत एव सामान्यसम्पत्योपलभा-
दिक्षयेः।

³ ननु स्वाभाविकी शक्तिरेव सादृश्यमस्तु ननु
तत्त्सामान्यमित्यमशुङ्खांमापा करोति।

¹ Aniruddha has निजधर्माभि। \(\text{Ed.}\)
Nor a peculiar power.  

*Aph. 95.* Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something's] own power; because the apprehension of it is different.  

*a.* Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative,\(^1\) as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning.\(^2\)  

*b.* But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e. g., of jar. To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[न संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धोऽपि II ५६॥\]

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\(^1\) *Pratiyogin*; on which *vide supra*, p. 342, note 3. *Ed.*

\(^2\) वस्तुः स्वाभाविकशक्तिविशेषोपादोपि न सादृश्यं शक्तिपलबः सादृश्योपभिविलक्षणवति। शक्तिज्ञानं हि नायन्धमिङ्ङानसापेक्षा सादृश्यज्ञानं पुनः प्रतियोगिज्ञानमपेक्षा भावज्ञानवर्दिति ज्ञानोपविलक्षणयमित्यमिधः॥

\(^3\) ननु तथापि घटादिसंज्ञिकवमेव घटादिश-क्षीरां सादृश्यमल्लु॥ तचाह॥

\(^4\) The reading of Nāgēśa is न संज्ञासंज्ञिनोः संबन्धोऽपि. *Ed.*
Aph. 96. Nor, moreover, is it [likeness,] the connexion between name and named.

a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness,¹ [e.g., between two jars].

b. Moreover:²

न संबन्धनित्यतोभयानित्यवात् II ७ II

How it cannot be so. Aph. 97. That connexion [viz., between name and named,] is not eternal; since both [the correlatives] are uneternal.

a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning.³

b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let

¹ संज्ञासंज्ञिभावमजानतोपि सादृश्यज्ञानादिति II

² अपि च II

³ संज्ञासंज्ञिनौरनित्यत्वात्संबन्धस्यापि न नित्यता। अतः कष्ठ तेनातीतवस्तुसादृश्यं वर्तेमातनवस्तुनि स्यादित्यथे: II
the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies:

\[ \text{नात:} \text{ संबन्धो धर्मियाहकमानबाधात्} \]

Aph. 98. The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term].

a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning.

1 ननु संबन्ध्यनित्यवेदिपि संबन्धो नित्यः स्यात्।
किमच बाधकम् तचाह॥

2 Read नाजः, 'not unoriginated,' i.e., 'not eternal,' qualifying 'connexion.' 'For this reason' renders अन्। The reading नातः in the manuscript authority for which is of the slightest, is treated as if no better than a typographical error, in the corrigenda to my edition of Vijnana's work. Ed.

3 Aniruddha has, instead of -मान°, -प्रमाण°. In the margin of one of my MSS. of his commentary is the variant -मानाभावात्. Ed.

4 कादाचत्कालविभागे सत्वेव संबन्धः सिध्यति।
b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyāya]. To this he replies:

3 न समवायोजिति प्रसाशेत्यभावात् ॥ ५५ ॥

The Category of Intimate Relation rejected.

Aph. 99. There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyāyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it].

a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies:

śन्यथा वर्षमानारीत्या स्वरूपेष्वोपपपत्ती संबन्धसंक्त्यनानवकाशात् । स च कादाचिच्चो विभागो
न संबन्धिनित्यवे संभवति । ज्ञातः संबन्धायाः
प्रमाणेऽव बाधाच्छ नित्यः संबन्ध इत्यथः।

1 Samavāya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is 'interpenetration.' Ed.

2 नन्वेवं नित्योगुणगुणशिणोनित्यः समवायो
नोपपद्वेत् । तचाह ॥

3 The reading of Nāgāsa is तचापति. His gloss runs:

4 ननु वैशिष्ट्यप्रत्येकं विशिष्टबुद्धन्याभानुपप-
स्तिष्ठ प्रमाणाम । तचाह ॥
Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]; since, as regards both alike, the case is otherwise disposed of. 

a. Since, 'as regards both alike,' i.e., the perception of qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, 'the case is otherwise disposed of;' viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning.

b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where

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1 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha simply omits न; while the other has उभयचाययासिद्धे: Ed.

2 Nāgeśa gives प्रत्यक्षानुमाने. Ed.

3 Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed.

4 See the preceding note. Ed.

5 उभयचायपि वैशिष्ट्यप्रत्यक्षे तदनुमाने च भवहपेशैवान्यायसिद्धेनौ तदुभयं समवाये प्रमाण-मित्यर्थे: ||
it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is
proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with
another place;’ [the fruit, for instance, which appears to
reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent,
which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies:

नानुमेयतमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्टस्य तत्तदतोरेवा-3
परोश्चप्रतीतेः || १०१ ||

Motion is matter of perception. Aph. 101. Motion is not a matter
of inference; for he who stands very
near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of
what it belongs to.

a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely
mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and
so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard
to this question, he denies the view of an opponent:4

1 प्रकृते: छोभात्यकृतिपुरुषसंयोगस्तस्मात्सृष्टि-
रिति सिद्धान्त: । तचायं नातिकानामाष्पो
नाति छोभात्य कथ्यापि क्रिया सवं वलु छा-
प्रिकं यथोत्पदते तचैव विनश्यतीत्ततो न देशान-
न्तरसंयोगोबजेया क्रिया सिद्धतीति । तत्राह ||

2 Some MSS. of Vijnana omit एव, as does Nageśa. Ed.

3 Nageśa omits एव. Ed.

4 द्वितीयाध्याये शरीरस्य पाच्चर्मीतिकालीदी-
हृपपेरंतबंदेक्क एवोक्ता नातु विशेषोदवधृत: । श्राष-
परपश्च प्रतिष्ठधति ||
The Body is of earth only. Aph. 102. The Body does not consist of five elements; because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material.

a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth:

There is a Subtile as well as a Gross, Body. Aph. 103. It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one.

a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, that the senses reveal what they do not reach to:

1 एकोपादानक्षेत्रिपि पृथियेवोपादानं सर्व-शरीरस्येति वच्यति।
2 गोलक्षेत्रितिरिन्द्रानीर्दिव्याशयं प्रागुक्षानि।

तदुपपादानयेल्दिव्याश्यामप्राप्तकाशकं निराक-रोति।
Aph. 104. The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach everything.

a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent;—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object. ¹

b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas,] that the sight is luminous

¹ स्वासंवहार्यानीन्द्रियाशि न प्रकाशयति।
श्रमापि। प्रदीपादीनामप्रात्मप्रकाशकादर्शनादप्रात्मप्रकाशकाले व्यवहितादिसर्वस्थिरप्रकाशकालप्र-संक्षात्ते। चतो दूरस्यसूर्यादिसंबन्धायं गो-लकातिरिक्तमिद्रिययमति भावः। करणानां चा-र्थप्रकाशकालं पुष्पेऽदेशसम्पर्शादिरिव चतो जडला-
हथ्यस्य मुखप्रकाशकलवत। इष वार्षिकाप्रतिवि-
श्रोदृष्टाश्चेत्वा वार्षिकप्रकाशकलवति॥
is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays:\(^1\)

\textit{The Sight not formed of Light.} \textit{Aph.} 105. Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so, too,] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be now explained].

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp,] to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification.\(^2\)
\end{itemize}

\(^1\) नन्वेवं चक्षुष्ट्वेव युक्तं तेजसं एव विरङ्कत्वेतेन शुद्धरापस्पर्शादशेनादिति शुद्धं निराकरेति \(\square\)

\(^2\) तेजसोपस्पर्शं दृष्टमिति कृला तेजसं चक्षुनं वाच्यम्। कुतः। ऋतेजसवेद्यपि प्राणावदेव वृत्ति
b. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies:

Proof of his theory of vision, that it accounts for the phenomena.

Aph. 106. By the sign of the display of the attained object the existence of the modification [which could alone account for that display,] is proved.

a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body:

Of the theory, further. Aph. 107. The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment, or

1. नन्वेंवंभुत्वृत्ती विं प्रमाणम् तत्ततः ॥
2. देहमपरित्यायापि गमनोपपत्त्ये वृत्ते स्वरूपं दयैऽयति ॥
The modification is not a fragment of the sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning.1

But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances, how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of desire, &c.? To this he replies:2

1 Aniruddha and Vedânti Mahâdeva have the reading Ed.
Aph. 108. It [the term 'modification,'] is not confined to substances; because it is etymological, [not technical, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well].

a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says: ¹

न देशभेदेप्योपादानसरस्मदातिवचनः ॥ १०२ ॥

The materials of the organs everywhere the same.

Aph. 109. Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us.

a. Not through 'difference of locality,' as the world of Brahmá, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness; as is the case, e.g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body

¹ इन्द्रियां भौतिकवस्मापि श्रवशालकदा-
चिल्लोकविशेषभेदेन श्रुतिवस्मस्या शंक्रेत । ता-
चाह ॥

² Some MSS. of Vijnána exhibit ऋस्मदातिवच नियमः,
the lection of Nágéśa. Ed.
[made up of the organs], transmigrating generally through the different localities. Such is the meaning.¹

b. But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies:²

निमित्तवपदेशात्त्रायपदेः:" || १९० ||

A non-literal text accounted for.

Aph. 110. The mention thereof [viz., of materiality, as if it belonged to the organs,] is because there is [intended to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause.⁴

a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a

¹ न ब्रह्मलोकादिदेशस्भेदतोऽस्पिन्द्रियाशामहंकारातिरिक्तोपादानकलं किं लस्मदाटीनां भूलोकस्थानामिव सर्वेषामेवाहुवाह्राणिकलनिमयः। देशभेदनियव लिङ्गोरीरस्य संचारमाचारवर्षा-दित्यपथः।

² नवेबि भौतिकतयस्तिः कथमुपपद्यताम्।

तचाह ||

³ Probably from mere oversight, my MS. of Vedánti Mahádeva's work omits तद्। Ed.

⁴ Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-kāraṇa is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed.
view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as arising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light,¹ [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone].

b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body:²

Aph. 111. The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one].

¹ निमित्तेषुपि प्राधान्यविवक्ष्योपादानलव्यप-देशो भवति यथेन्थनादिगितरिति। ज्ञतो भूतोप- दानलव्यपदेश इत्यथे। तेजःचारित्वृत्तोपष्टमेतेव हि तद्भुतांकारासंसुरातीदियारिणि भवलि यथा पार्षिवेत्यनोपष्टमेन तद्भुतांत्सुजसोगिन-भूवत्तिति॥

² म्यूळशरीररगतं विशेषं प्रस्फादवधारयति॥
a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connexion, he observes discriminatively, as follows:¹

The material of Bodies. Aph. 112. In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110].

a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. 'In consideration of some speciality; ' i.e., in consequence of intensity through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as consisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Such is the meaning.²

b. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in

¹ शरीरसौक्यमानमभोपालकांकव पूर्वाङ्कम् । ऋनेनेव प्रसङ्केन विशिष्याह ॥

² सर्वेषु शरीरेषु पृष्ठिचिकोपालानम् । ऋसाधारणयात् । अधिकाविदिकल्कक्षारीरे पञ्चचतुरादितितकलवप्पदेशस्तु पूर्ववादिन्द्रियांणां भौतिककलवद्यस्मकमाच्छेन्यथे: ॥
the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies:

न देहारभक्ष्य प्राणालमिलिंद्रियशक्तितत्त
तिझः॥ ११३ द॥

The vital air not the source of the Body.

Aph. 113. The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs.

a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body.

b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies:

1 ननु प्राणस्य शरीरे प्राधान्यात्रप्राण एव देहारभकोःस्तु। तत्वाह।

2 Instead of तिझः, Vedánti Mahádeva has तिझः.

Ed.

3 करणवृत्तिहृष्ट: प्राण: करणवियोगे न तिष्ठ-ति। ऋतो मृतदेहे करणभावेन प्राणाभावान्व प्राणो देहारभक्ष्य इति॥

4 नन्वें प्राणस्य देहारकारणवे प्राणं बिनापि देह उपायीत। तत्वाह॥
Aph. 114. The site of experience [viz., the Body,] is constructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise, we should find putrefaction.

a. ‘Through the superintendence,’ i. e., only through the operation, ‘of the experiencer,’ i. e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is ‘the construction of the site of experience,’ i. e., the Body; because, ‘otherwise,’ i. e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import.

b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which

1 Aniruddha reads -प्रसक्तः; Vedânti Mahádeva, -प्रसन्नः.


3 भोक्तः: प्राणिनोधिश्लान्ध्रापारादेव भोगायतनस्य शरीरस्य निमेशाः भवति। छन्दोऽथ प्राणायापाराभावे शुक्रशोभितयोः पूर्तिभावप्रसन्नन्तदेहविदित्यर्थः। तथा च रससंचारादिभापारविशेषः प्राणो देहस्य निमित्तकारसां धारकवादित्य मायः॥
operates, not the Soul, since it is motionless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies:

\[\text{\textbf{भृत्यद्वारा}}\text{\textsuperscript{2} स्वाम्यधिशिलितनिकान्तात्} \text{II 195} \text{II} \]

\textit{The Soul 'acting by another's actions.'}

\textit{Aph. 115. Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[a.] In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning.\textsuperscript{3}

\item[b.] It was stated before [Book II., § 1,] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the

\begin{flushright}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{1 ननु प्राणस्यैवाधिशिलानतबं संभवति यापारब-}
\text{व्यायाम प्रशिनः कूटस्यतात्त्विकाऩारस्याधिशिलाने}
\text{प्रयोजनाभावाभैरैति | तचाह II}
\end{tabular}
\end{flushright}

\textit{According to one of my MSS., the lection of Aniruddha is भृत्यवर्गेद्वारा. Ed.}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{2 देहनिमित्तै क्यापारहुपमधिशिलान स्वामिनिष्ठे-}
\text{तन्त्रिकान्तात्माक्षालातिः किं तु प्राणहुपभृत्यहारा}
\text{यथा राजः परानिमित्तै इत्यर्थः II}
\end{tabular}
\end{flushright}
soul be eternally free, when we see it bound? with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says:  

\[ \text{समाधिसुपुष्पिमोक्षेषु ब्रव्हमहता} \]  

\[ \text{Aph. 116. In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul,] consists of Brahma.} \]

\[ a. \text{ Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies:} \]

\[ \text{द्योः सबोज्मन्यचे तद्विदि} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 117. In the case of the two, it is with a seed; in the case of the other, this is wanting.} \]

\[ a. \text{ ‘In the case of the two,’ viz., concentration and profound sleep, the identity with Brahma is ‘with a seed,’ i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance in the mundane state]; ‘in the case of the other,’ i.e.,} \]

\[ 1 \text{ विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं प्रधानस्येतुतुम प्राक्} \]  

\[ \text{And so has Vedánti Mahádeva, according to some copies. Ed.} \]

\[ 5 \text{ Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed.} \]
in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinc-
tion. Such is the meaning.\(^1\)

b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are
evident; but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This
objection of the atheist he repels: \(^2\)

\textit{द्वयोरिच च व्यस्तापिः दृष्टवच्चतु चौ इ ॥ ११८ ॥}

\textit{Aph. 118. But there are not the two}

\textit{[only]; because the triad, also [Emanci-
pation inclusive], is evident; as are}

\textit{the two.}

a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is
‘evident,’ i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Con-
centration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz.,
profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation,
also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitt-}

\textit{ing of that identity with Brahma\(^4\) which [identity] exists}

during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a
fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if
this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results

\footnotesize{\(^1\) ह्योः समाधिसुषुप्त्योः सवीजं बल्बीजसहितं}

\footnotesize{व्रह्मतम्यच मोक्षे वीजस्याभाव इति विशेष}

\footnotesize{इत्यर्थे: ॥}

\footnotesize{\(^2\) ननु समाधिसुषुप्री दृष्टे स्तो मोक्षे तु किं प्र-

\footnotesize{मात्ममिति नात्तिकाक्ष्रेः परिहरति ॥}

\footnotesize{\(^3\) Vedánti Mahádeva omits ढःपि. \textit{Ed.}}

\footnotesize{\(^4\) \textit{Brahma-bháva, the same as brahmatwa. \textit{Ed.}}}
a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.\textsuperscript{1,2}

\textit{b.} But then \textit{[suggests some one, with reference to § 117]}, granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' \textit{[or source of return to the mundane state,]} called Memory,\textsuperscript{3} a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during \textit{concentration}, inasmuch as Memory is \textit{[then] dull} \textit{[or deadened]} by apathy, &c., yet, in the case of a person in \textit{profound sleep}, since Memory prevails, there will really be cognition of objects; consequently, it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he replies:\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{quote}
\begin{center}
\textsuperscript{1} समाधिसुषुप्रिपेत्रुष्टा-दनुमितत्वाचन्तु दौ सुषुप्रिसमाधी एव विं तु, मो-
क्षोणयतीत्यथः। अनुमानं चेत्यम। सुषुप्याद्वितः
यो ब्रह्मावस्त्त्यागाध्विगतागदागदोषादेव भ-
वति स चेदोषो ज्ञानेन नाशितस्तिहिः सुषुप्यादिस-
टृप्येववावस्या सियरा भवति सैव मोक्ष इति॥
\end{center}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{2} See the \textit{Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed.}

\textsuperscript{3} Here and below, this renders \textit{vāsanā}, on which \textit{vide supra}, p. 29, note 2. \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{4} ननु वासनाक्ष्यीजस्वेदर्षीपरे वैराग्यादिना
वासनाकौष्ठ्यादर्षाकारकरी वृत्तिः समाधी मा भवतु
सुषुप्ते तु वासनागावल्यादर्षान्तः भविष्येवेदिति
न सुषुप्ते ब्रह्मकुप्तमुक्तित। तचाह॥
BOOK V., APH. 119. 409

Aph. 119. There is not the revelation, 
by memory, of an object likewise during 
the conjunction of a [more potent] fault 
such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar the 
principal.  

1 This I find nowhere; and I believe it to be without warrant. I have printed, agreeably to the reading of Aniruddha, Vedánti Mahádeva, and the best MSS. of Vijnána, वासनयानामंश्चयापनं, and have noticed, in some copies of the last-named commentator, the variant वासनयानं स्वामृत्यापनं. Nágeśa has the latter reading, followed by दोषयोगात्, with omission of ऋपि. The Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bhāshya has वासनयानं स्वामृत्यापनं, for which I find no authority. Ed.

2 The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].'

Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed.

3 Sanskára, here used as synonymous with vásaná. Ed.
more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import.¹

b. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is ‘in consequence of a mere vestige of impression.’² To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]; because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies:³

¹ यथा वैराग्ये तथा निद्रादोषयोगेपिष्ठि
वासनया न स्वार्थेष्यापनं स्विविधयस्मार्गं भवेति
यतो न निमित्तं गुणीभूतं संस्कारस्य
बलवत्तरनिद्रादोषंबाधकं संभवत्तत्त्वं
तत् बलवत्तरं एव हि दोषो वासनां दुर्भला
स्वकायेंकुलां
करोति तत्त्वं भावः।

² Here, and often below, ‘impression’ is to render sanskára. Ed.

³ संस्कारलेष्टो जीवन्मुक्तस्य
शरीरधारणं
मिति तुतीयाध्यायेऽ प्रोक्तम्।
तत्त्वायमाख्येपः।
Aph. 120. A single impression [suffices to generate, and] lasts out the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; else, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice].

a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle, called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirling.

b. It has been stated [§ 111.] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external:

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1 The reading निवर्तेन, found in several MSS., is a gross error. Ed.
2 Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed.
3 This phrase is meant to translate sanskára. Ed.
4 कुलालचक्रभमणस्यलेक्पेन वेगाक्यः संस्कार एक एव भमणसमाप्पित्यंलस्यायी बोध्यः। तच्च बाह्यबु-
Aph. 121. Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]: trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case.

a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, 'as in the former case,' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture.²
Aph. 122. And from the Legal In- 
stitutes [the same fact may be inferred, 
viz., that vegetables have bodies and 
are conscious].

a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus 
conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to 
them. To this he replies:

Vegetables not moral 
Aph. 123. Not merely through a 
Body is there susceptibility of Merit 
and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction.

a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of 
Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For 
Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in 
Scripture, that the liability results just from the being

1 Nāgāśa pretty evidently does not regard these words as an 
aphorism. Ed.
distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds:²

चिधां चयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मेन्द्रहायमोगद्वेष्टोभयः तेहः ॥ ९२४ ॥

Aph. 124. Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both.

a. There is a threefold distribution of Body ‘among the three,’ i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the pre-eminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for,

¹ न देहमाचेष धर्माधर्मोत्पत्तियोगयल्वं जीवस्य।
कुतः। वैशिष्ट्यस्य:। ब्राह्मणादिदेहविशिष्ट्ये-वाधिकारभ्रवणादिलिख्ये:॥

² देहेनेव कर्मात्मिकारं दर्शायन्देहवैशिष्ट्यमाह॥

³ Vedánti Mahádeva, if my single copy of his work may be relied on, omits this word. Ed.
otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience,1 [like Indra].

b. He mentions also a fourth Body:2

A fourth kind of Body.  Aph. 125. Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic.

a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattatreya, Jadabharata, and others; for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge.3

b In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of

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1 चयायामुन्तमधमधमध्यमानां सवेर्प्राणिना चिन्नकारो देहविभागः कमषेहरोगदेहोभयदेहा इतिल्यथे: । तथ कमषेहः परम्परीया भोगदेह इन्द्रादेहिः स्यावरादीना चोभयेद्विष्ट राजषीणामितिः । ऋष्ट्र प्राध्यायेन चिथा विभागोऽह्या सवेर्प्राणिव भोगदेहलापन्ते: ॥

2 चतुर्थमपि शरीरमाह ॥

3 विचरकन्त शरीरमेतचयविलक्षणमित्यथः: । यथा द्वाचायजवभरतादीना तेषां ज्ञानमाचप्राध्यान्तेहलापदित ॥
knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others\(^1\) [as existing in the case of the Lord]:

\[\text{न बुद्धादिनित्यतमाण्यविशेषिष्ठि बहु-वत्} \\| \text{१२६} \\|\]

Aph. 126. Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord,] belong to knowledge,\(^2\) &c., even in the case of the particular site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case with fire.

\(a.\) That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire,\(^3\) also, is not eternal.

\[\text{८१८१२७२७} \\|\]

\(^1\) \text{उक्तस्येष्वराभवस्य स्थापनाय पराभुपगतं} \text{ज्ञानेच्छाकृत्यादिनित्यत्वं प्रतिषेधिति} \\|

\(^2\) \text{Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Much as at p. 209, supra, Vijnána hereupon remarks:} \text{बुद्धिरचाय्यवषा-याख्या वृत्ति:} \\| \text{Ed.}

\(^3\) \text{The world, viewed as Brahmá's egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the \text{āvarana-tejas}, Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vishnu-puráña (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference.} \text{Ed.}

\(^4\) \text{यथा लोकिकबहिष्टःद्वान्तेनावर्षेतेजसोऽपि-नित्यवानुमाननिमित्यथे} \\|
Aph. 127. And, because the site [viz., the supposed Lord,] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c., may be eternal, or not].

But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies:¹

The argument really ex abundantia.

Aph. 128. The superhuman powers² of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid.

That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established.³

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¹ नन्वेवं ब्रह्मादासिद्धिज्ञेनसमथं सवेञ्ज्ञादिकं कथं जन्यं संभाव्येतापि लोकं तपस्वादिभिरेवमेभ्याद्वेश्वनादिति। तदाहं॥

² Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed.

³ ऋषिधातिदिशिन्दृष्टान्तेन योगजा ऋषिष्मान्दितित्यम्: सृष्टायुपयोगिन्य: सिध्यतीत्यथः॥
b. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul:

अभूतचैतन्यं प्रतेकादृश्यं सांह्येज्जिपं च सांह्येज्जिपं च ॥ १२९ ॥

Argument against Materialism.

Aph. 129. Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination.

a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, severally, at the time of disjunction; and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause.

पूर्वासिद्धिप्रतिकृल्लतया भूतचैतन्यवादिन्य प्र- स्याचष्ट्यै ॥

1 Aniruddha has प्रतेकानुपलब्धेः; Nāgēśa, प्रतेकादृश्येः.

2 Both here and just before, Nāgēśa reads स्वसां, as does Vijñāna, also, according to some MSS. Ed.

3 संहतभावावस्थायामपिर पञ्चभूतेषु चैतन्यं ना- स्ति विभागकालेन प्रतेकां चैतन्यादृश्यरित्वर्थें ॥

END OF BOOK V.
HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced.¹

¹ अध्यायचतुःष्केण समस्तशास्त्रार्थं प्रतिज्ञाय पञ्चमाध्याये परपश्चानीराकरणेन प्रसाधेष्टानि तमेव सार्वभूतशास्त्रार्थं षष्ठाध्यायेन संकलयन्त्र-संहरति। उक्तार्थानां हि पुनस्तन्त्वाख्ये वितरे कृते शिष्याणःसंदिग्धाविपर्ययस्तौ दृढतरो बोध उत्पद्यत इत्यतः स्युपश्चानिखनन्यायाद्वृज्जुःयुक्तः-द्युपन्यासाच नाच पौनश्चं दोषाय।

² Vedānti Mahādeva, in my single accessible MS., reads नास्तित्वे. Ed.

³ साधकाभावत्, agreeably to Nāgeśa. Ed.
Aph. 1. Soul is; for there is no proof that it is not.

a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are aware of this, that 'I think;' because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the meaning.¹

b. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of two proofs:²

The existence of Soul.

Aph. 2. This [Soul] is different from the Body, &c.; because of heterogeneity, [or complete difference between the two].

Aph. 3. Also because it [Soul] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive] case.

a. That is to say: Soul is different from Body, &c., also because the learned express it by the possessive case, in

¹ जानामोलेवं प्रतीयमानतया पुरुषः समानत्: सिद्ध एवासि बाधकप्रमाशामावात्।
नतत्तंतिवेकमाचं कतेवमित्थर्थः।
² तच विवेकं हेतुदेयेन साध्यति।
³ Some copies of Vedánti Mahádeva’s work omit असौः. Ed.
such examples as, ‘This [is] my body,’ ‘This [is] my understanding,’ for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession].

b. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, ‘The Soul’s Thought’ [Soul and Thought being identical], ‘Ráhu’s head’ [the trunkless Ráhu being all head], ‘The statue’s body,’ &c. To this he replies: 2

\[नंशिलापुच्छवद्विमियाहकमानबाधात् \| 8 \|\]

\[Aph. 4. \text{It is not as in the case of}\]
\[\text{the statue;}^4\] because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing.

a. This expression by means of the possessive case,

\[1 \text{ममेदं शरीरं ममेयं बुद्धिरित्यादेविनिद्रां पष्टी-}\]
\[\text{वपदेशादिपि देहादिध्य ज्ञात्मा भिन्नोऽत्यन्ता-}\]
\[\text{भेदे ज्ञात्मनुपस्त्वरित्यर्थं:} \|\]

\[2 \text{ननु पुरुषस्य जैत्यं राहों शिरः शिला-}\]
\[\text{पुच्छस्य शरीरमित्यादिव्यपदेशवद्यमापि भवतु} \|\]
\[\text{तचाह} \|\]

\[3 \text{Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva have शिलापुच्छको.}\]

\[\text{Siláputra} \text{is ‘grindstone,’ according to the dictionaries; } \text{siláputtraka, in the few places where I have seen it, may well signify ‘torso.’ } \text{Ed.}\]

\[4 \text{With reference to the word thus rendered, see the preceding note. } \text{Ed.}\]
[viz., 'My body' (§ 3)] is not like 'The statue's body,' &c. In such a case as 'The statue's body,' there is a mere fiction; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing;' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by evidence; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. Such is the meaning.¹

b. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., he settles its emancipation:²

\[अङ्क्यन्तदुःखरिणवृत्ता कृतकृत्यता \| ५ \|\]

\(\text{Aph. 5. Through the entire cessation of pain, there is done what was to be done.}\)

a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the

¹ शिलापृथ्व्य शरीरमित्वादिवद्यं षष्ठियप्रदेशो न भवति। शिलापृथ्वादिकाश्च धर्मियाहक-प्रमाणेण बाधादिक्यप्यमाचम्। मम शरीरमिति व्यपदेशो तु प्रमाणावधो नास्ति देहातत्तताया एव श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणामैैैंबाधादित्यर्थमेशः॥

² देहादिक्यातिरिरित्तत्या पुरुषमवधायं तन्मुख्य-मवधारयति॥
ceasing of Pleasure, also, *that* cannot be Soul's aim. To this he replies:

यथा दुःखित्वृत्त्या पुरुषस्य न तथा मुखाद्भिलाषः ॥ ६ ॥

Pleasure no compensation for Pain.

*Aph. 6.* Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul, as there is annoyance from Pain.

*a.* And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for the cessation of Pain simply; so that there is not an equality of gain and loss,⁴ [but a clear gain, in the desired release].

*b.* He declares that Soul's aim is simply the cessation of Pain; because Pain is, indeed, abundant, in comparison of Pleasure:⁴

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1 नन्तु दुःखित्वृत्त्या सुखस्यापि निवर्तनाचुत्यायोप्यलेन न सा पुरुषाथि इति ॥ तथाह ॥

2 Instead of खेषः, some MSS. of Vijnāna's commentary, as also Nāgēṣa and Vedánti Mahādeva, have देषः; and a marginal note in one of my copies of Aniruddha states this to be the true reading. *Ed.*

3 तथा च मुखाभिलाषः वाधिलापि दुःखेषो दुःखित्वृत्त्यावेवेवें जनयतीति न तुत्यायययत्मिति ॥

4 मुख्येष्वया दुःखस्य वहललाद्पि दुःखित्वृ- सिरेव पुरुषाथि इत्याह ॥
Pleasure sparingly

Aph. 7. For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy.

a. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy: such is the meaning.2

Pleasure undeserving of the name.

Aph. 8. It [Pleasure,) is also mixed with Pain; therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,) Pain.

a. He rejects the opinion that Soul's aim is not the simple cessation of Pain, but this [cessation] tinctured with Pleasure:3

1 Vedánti Mahádeva prefixes न. Ed.

2 अनन्ततृत्थवृङ्गपशुपक्षिमनुष्यादिमध्ये स्वल्पो मनुष्यदेवादिरैव सुखी भवतीत्वर्थः. II

3 केवला दुःखिनिवृत्तिनेन पुष्पार्थेः किं तु सुखो—परश्रोतिः मतमपाकरोती. II

4 Aniruddha has चेन्नैव. Ed.

5 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has वैचित्र्यात्. ' Ed.
Aph. 9. If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say; for there are two kinds [of things desired].

a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration: [the first,] 'May I be happy;,' [the second,] 'May I not be miserable;' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude].

b. He ponders a doubt:

निर्गुँठलमातमनोऽसजलादिघ्रुते: ॥ १० ॥

Aph. 10. The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality; for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c.

a. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim: such is the meaning.

b. He clears up this [doubt]:

1 सुखी स्यां दुःखी न स्यामिति हि पृथगेव लोकानां प्रार्थना दृष्यत इति ॥
2 श्वाते ॥
3 Aniruddha has असज्जादिघ्रुते; Nāgēśa, असज्जलादिघ्रुते: । Ed.
4 अतो न दुःखनिवृत्तिरपि पुह्वाषों घटत इत्यथे: ॥
5 तमाधिषे ॥
Aph. 11. Though it [the Pain] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul] through non-discrimination.

a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the shape of a reflection, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non-discrimination,' as the cause, owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning. And this has been set forth in the First Book.¹

b. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters] arises from non-discrimination: but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this, he says:²

Aph. 12. Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless; because, otherwise, two objections would present themselves.

a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated;

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¹ सूक्तः प्रातिविन्दुस्पूख्यामवस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः तत्रात्मनि सिद्धिः प्रतिबिम्बस्पूख्यावस्तिः । एतद्व प्रथमाध्यायें प्रतिपादितम् ॥

² श्राविवेकमूलः पुञ्जे गुणवन्योपवेक्षतु किं-मूलक इत्याकाद्वायामाह ॥
and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a *regressus in infinitum*, inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, &c., also: such is the meaning.¹

b. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be everlasting. To this he replies:²

अ प्रतिः स्मादात्मवद्यथानुचित्तिः। \( \text{Aph. 13.} \) It [non-discrimination,] cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is; else, it could not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be].

a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless, in the shape of an *on-flow* [which may be stopped]. For, otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless *entity* would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, [though the beginningless antecedent *non-entity* of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the production of the jar]. Such is the meaning.⁴

¹ सादिले हि स्वत एवोलादे मुक्तस्थापि बन्ध-पति: कमादिजन्यले च कर्मादिकं प्रत्यपि कारण-विनाविवेकात्तरानवेष्टनवस्थेयर्थः।
² ननु चेदनादिस्तहि नित्यः स्मादिति। त-चाह।
³ Nāgēśa has स्मादात्मवदुचित्तिः। *Ed.*
⁴ *नरात्मवचनिलोकश्यादादिने भवति किं तु*
b. Having stated the cause of [Soul’s] Bondage, he states the cause of Liberation:

Aph. 14. It [Bondage] is annihilable by the allotted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light].

Aph. 15. Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation; [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not].

a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book, viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c.
Aph. 16. Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [which cannot be innate].

a. "Bondage" here means the cause of Bondage, named the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain.  

b. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place over again. To this he replies:

Aph. 17. Further, Bondage does not recur. Because there is Scripture for its non-recurrence.

1 Vedánti Mahádeva has प्रकारान्तरभावाद्. Ed.

2 बन्धोऽभूत दुःखयोगार्धवन्धकारशम्। शेषं सुगमम्।  

3 ननु मुक्तेरपि कार्यत्या विनाशापया पुनः बन्धः स्यादिति। तथाह।  

4 Vijnána and Nágeśa quote the text: न स पुनरावर्तते।  

Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva cite the longer passage: ज्ञात्मा ज्ञात्य: प्रकृतितो विवेक्ष्यो न पुनरावर्तते।  

See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words ज्ञात्मा वा ज्ञे दृष्टव्यः in the Brihadá-
Evidence of this.

Aph. 18. Else, it [liberation,] would not be Soul’s aim, [which it is].

a. He states the reason why this is not Soul’s aim:

Force of the evidence.

Aph. 19. What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable].

a. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound; because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and, therefore, such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul’s aim, [but emancipation final and complete].

b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it

ranyaka Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 5. Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the twenty-third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a fact which suggests that my criticism on Vāchaspati Miśra’s quotation, ventured in the note above referred to, may be hasty. Ed.

1 Aniruddha, in one of my MSS., and Vedánti Mahádeva have

2 ऋषीपुश्चर्थर्थे हेतुमाह ||

3 भाविवन्धितसम्मेधनोभवण्थोमुन्न्विद्योरिषेषो न स्यायत्तायापुश्चर्थीर्षिलितयेष्ये ||
that you have asserted [Book I., § 19] the eternal freedom of all souls alike? To this he replies:

\[ \text{The nature of liberation.} \] 

Aph. 20. Liberation is nothing other than the removal of the obstacle [to the Soul's recognition of itself as free].

a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen]; to which he replies:

\[ \text{An objection repelled.} \] 

Aph. 21. Even in that case, there is no contradiction.

\[ a. \] That is to say: 'even in that case,' i.e., even if Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim.

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1. तन्वेवं बद्धमुक्त्योविरेष्याभ्युपगमे नित्यमुक्तं नक्षमत्ते । तचाह ॥


3. The rare word dhvasti, thus rendered, Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva explain by dhvansa. Ed.

4. तन्वेवं बधमोक्ष्योविरेष्याभ्युपगमे मोक्षत्व पुरुषार्थं तत्ताप्रतिपदक्षेत्रयादिविरोध इत्याह ॥

5. तचाष्णत्तरायणमथवयः मोक्षार्थव्यविरोध इत्यथः ॥
b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one’s neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one’s neck with a string], is attained, [on one’s hearing where it is]. To this he replies:¹

²अधिकारिचिबिध्याच्य नियमः ॥ २२ ॥

Another objection repelled.

Aph. 22. This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it].

a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also:⁴

³ न नवनत्तरायुक्तसमां चेन्मुक्तितां हृ अध्वनामावेशैव तत्तति हि: स्त्राद्वानमप्रतिबद्धकहचामीकारसिद्धवदिति । तत्वाह ॥

¹ Nágeśa, in some copies, and, according to some copies, Vijnána read अधिकारः. Ed.

² This Aphorism, as given, is a literal repetition of Book I., 70, at p. 87, supra. Ed.

³ न केवलं अवश्यमात्र ज्ञाने दृष्टकारणमन्य-दयील्याह ॥
Aph. 23. Of others [viz., other means besides hearing], for the sake of confirmation, [there is need].

a. He speaks of these same other means:

स्यिरसुखमासनमिति न नियमः ॥ २४ ॥

Aph. 24. There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., § 34].

a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a 'posture' should be the 'lotus-posture,' or the like; because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] 'posture.'

b. He states the principal means [of Concentration]:

ध्यानं निरविषयं मनः ॥ २५ ॥

Aph. 25. Mind without an object is Meditation.

a. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is 'Meditation,' i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word 'cause' is employed for 'effect.' For it will be
declared how Meditation effects this\(^1\) [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].

\(\text{\textit{b.}}\) But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up:\(^2\)

\[\text{उभयथायविशेषश्रेणिवेप्रभुमुपरारगनिरोधाधिशेषः} \]
\[\text{\textit{Aph. 26.}}\]

\[\text{If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the exclusion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case].} \]

\[\text{\textit{a.}}\] But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies:\(^3\)

\[\text{निःसङ्केषुपरागोज्विवेकात्} \]

\(^1\) वृत्तिशून्यं यदृश: करणं भवति तदेव ध्यान
योगसिद्धवृत्तिनिरोधधुप एवंयः। कार्यकारणा-
भेदेन कारणशब्दः कार्यः प्रयुक्तः। एतत्साधनवेन
ध्यानस्य वस्त्रमाणवादिति

\(^2\) ननु योगयोगयो: पुष्पस्वैकमुल्यालिकं योगेन-
नेत्राशङ्ख्यं समाधश्च

\(^3\) ननु निःसङ्के कथमुपराण:। तचाहुः।
Soul tinged by what does not belong to it. 

*Aph. 27.* Though it [Soul,] be un-associated, still there is a tingeing [reflexionally,] through Non-discrimination.

*a.* That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, *as it were,* a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a *reflection,* by those who discriminate the tinge¹ [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to].

*b.* He explains this same:²

### जपास्फटिक्योरि नोपरागः किं लभिमानः: || २५ ||

*Its seeming presence explained.*

*Aph. 28.* As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I., § 19, c.], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such].

*a.* He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge:³

### ध्यानधार्शाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिमिताणिरोधः || २५ ||

*How to be got rid of.*

*Aph. 29.* It [viz., the aforesaid tinge,] is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.

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¹ नि:सङ्ख्ये यद्यपि पारसार्थिक उपरागो नास्ति तथाप्रयुपराग इव भवतीति कृत्वा प्रतिविष्ठ एवो-पराग इति व्यवहित्य उपरागाविवेकिनिरित्यथः: ||

² एतदेव विवृषोति ||

³ यशोक्षोपरागस्य निरोधोपायः महा ||
a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, in regard to the exclusion—through Meditation, &c., lodged in the Mind,—of the tingeing of Soul:

The ancient dogma on this point.

*Aph. 30*. It is by the exclusion of dissolution and distraction, say the teachers.

a. That is to say: through the removal, by means of Meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of [being dissoluted in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflection: so say the ancient teachers.

b. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, &c., should take place in caves and such places:

1 चिन्तनिष्ठ्यानाविना पुरुषस्योपरागनिरोधे पूर्वाचारयेंसिंध दारां दर्शेयति ||

2 'Inertness [of mind]' is a better rendering of *laya*. *Ed.*

3 ध्यानाविना चिन्तस्य निद्रावृत्तेः प्रमाणादिवृत्तेऽविनृत्या पुरुषस्यापिः वृत्तुपरागनिरोधे भवति विन्दनिरोधेऽपि निरोधादिति पूर्वाचार्येः आहरित्यथेः ||

4 ध्यानादी गुहाहिद्यानाविनियमो नास्तिलियाः ||

5 Aniruddha has, to a very different effect, भगवानारामावात्. 
Aph. 31. There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind.

a. That is to say: Meditation, or the like, results simply from tranquillity of Mind. Therefore, such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it.

b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles compendiously the cause of the world:

Aph. 32. Nature is the primal material; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.

a. That is to say: since we learn, from Scripture, that Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these.

b. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies:

His comment runs: यथ चित्तप्रसादो न भवति तच न कर्तंत्रभयमनुष्ठानम्।

1 चित्तप्रसादादेव ध्यानादिकम्। अततत्तच न गुहादिस्थाननियम इत्यथ:॥

2 समाप्तो मोक्षविचारः। इतानीं पुरुषापरिशामिति जगकारणमुपसंहरति॥

3 महद्धार्दिनां कार्येन्ध्रवार्षिकाः मूलकारणतया प्रकृति: सिध्यतीत्यथ:॥

4 नातु पुरुष एवोपादानं भवतु। तचाह॥
Aph. 33. Not to Soul does this [viz., to be the material of the world,] belong, though it be eternal; because of its want of suitableness.

a. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies the possession of qualities, and the being associable: [and,] by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal, [and, therefore, no product,] cannot serve as material.¹

b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,'² we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered this adverse suggestion, he replies:³

Aph. 34. The despicable sophist⁴ does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul; because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to Scripture.

¹ Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed.
² Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed.
³ ननु बली: प्रजा: पुरुषासंप्रसूता इत्यादिश्रुते: पुरुषस्य कार्यालयमाहित्तिदिव्याः 'आश्रय-खोया इत्याश्रयः ॥
⁴ Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste.' Ed.
a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof,¹ have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the *Naiyáyikas,*] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the *recipient* cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation² [of Soul, as material, into the world, as product].

b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than

¹ 'Lowest . . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' *Ed.*

² पुरुषकारणतायं येन येपश्च: संभाविताते सर्वं अनुत्तिरुक्त इत्यतत्तदभ्युपगत्सु रुणं कुतार्किका-काद्यधमानामात्मस्वहृद्यानं न भवतीत्यर्थः। एतेत्तात्मनि सुखदुखादिगुणोपादानलवादिनो-रुपि कुतार्किका एव तेषामपूर्णमयायथार्थं ना-स्तीत्यवग्रंत्यथम्। यदि चाकाशस्याभावाधिष्ठानकारणातवदात्मनः कार्यकमुच्यते तदा तथा निराखुमें परिशामस्यैव प्रतिशेषादिति॥
earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies:

Aph. 35. Though but mediatelly [the cause of products], Nature is inferred as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes,; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiśeshikas].

Aph. 36. It [Nature,] is all-pervading; because [its] products are seen everywhere.

a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, 'Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or act];' [for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find no other space to move into]. To this he replies:

Aph. 37. Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms.

a. 'Motion' means action. Though it be present, this does not prevent its [Nature's,] being the radical cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other
Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vaiśeṣikas: such is the meaning.  

\[ \text{रसिद्धार्थिकं प्रधानस्य न नियमः} \]

Aph. 38. Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyāyikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine].

a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import.

Aph. 39. Purity and the others are properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence.

a. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature; because they are what constitutes Nature.

b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing;

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1 गति: क्षिया । तत्त्वेऽकारण मूलकारणताया
\[ \text{ऋहानियेया वैशेषिकमते पार्थिवायणामिल्यर्थे:} \]

2 ऋष्ट्रानमेव कार्येत्ययच चाह तर्क इति
\[ \text{भावं:} \]

3 सत्वादिगुणानां प्रकृतिधर्मेत्व नात्ति प्रकृ=
\[ \text{तितिस्वहृप्यनादिल्यर्थे:} \]
since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, Emancipation would be inexplicable:¹

\[ \text{नरुभोगेषिप पुमथैं मृतिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुम्र-} \]
\[ \text{वहनवत्}^2 \| 80 \| \]

Aph. 40. Nature, though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing], creates for the sake of Soul; like a cart’s carrying saffron, [for the use of its master. See Book III., § 58].

a. He states the concomitant³ cause of diversified creation:⁴

\[ \text{कर्मान्विच्छाल्सिंधिविचिचिच्यम्} \| 41 \|

Aph. 41. The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert.

¹ प्रधानप्रवृत्ते: प्रयोजनमवधारयति निष्प्रयो-

² Nāgēsa is peculiar in giving, as an Aphorism, in substitution for these words, the clause from the introduction to it, printed just above, viz., निष्प्रय, &c., but ending with the nominative case

³ Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.

⁴ विचिचसृष्टी निमित्तकार्यमाह ||

Ed.
a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies:

सामवेष्म्याभ्यां कार्येद्यम् ॥ ४२ ॥

Aph. 42. The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise.

a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; and their ‘reverse of equipoise’ is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is ‘equipoise’. through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same: such is the meaning.

b. But then, since it is Nature’s attribute to create, there should be the mundane state, even after [the discriminative] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. To this he replies:

1 ननु भवतु प्रधानालस्त्ति: प्रलयस्तु कस्मात् ।

2 Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed.

3 सत्त्वादिगुणानं प्रधानं तेषां च वैश्वम् न्यूना-

4 ननु प्रधानस्य सृष्टिक्षेमाभ्याज्ञानोत्तरमपि
Aph. 43. Since [or when,] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil, when the king’s purpose has been accomplished].

a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies:

Aph. 44. Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause, [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature’s invasion].

1 Compare Aph. 66 of Book III., at p. 267, supra. Ed.

2 ननु प्रधानस्य सृष्टुपरमो नास्त्यज्ञानां सं-सार्ट्तेनात्माथा च प्रधानसृष्ट्यमुक्त्यापि पुन-बेंवः स्यात् | तच्चाह ||

3 Some copies of Vijnána here introduce भवति; and Nágeśa has the lection विमुक्त्यभोगो भवति. Ed.

4 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
a. But then, *this* arrangement could be possible then, [only] if there were a *multiplicity* of souls: but *that* is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. Having pondered this doubt, he says:¹

*Aph. 45.* The *mul*teity of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the *Veda* itself].

*a.* That is to say: the *mul*teity of Soul is proved, absolutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, 'Whoso understand this, these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.'²

*b.* But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct. To this he replies:³

¹ नन्यिन व्यवस्था तदा घटेत यदि पुरुषव्यवस्थान स्यात्। तदेव व्यात्माविभेषत्रुतिवादाधित्तिमियास-झाह॥

² ये तविदुरमृताले भवन्यथेतरे दुःखमेवोध्य-लीयादिश्रुत्युक्तबन्ध्योद्धवस्थाय एव पुरुषव-हुतम सिघ्यतीत्यर्थः॥


⁴ नन्यपाधिमेषा द्वारबन्ध्योद्दशाय-वस्थाय स्यात्। त-चाह॥
Aph. 46. If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being established, there is duality, [upsetting the dogma founded on in §44].

a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of 'Ignorance,' [which, according to the Vedánta, is no reality]; so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedántic dogma of] non-duality. With reference to this doubt, he says:

Aph. 47. Even by the two the authority is contradicted.

a. That is to say: even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contradiction is constituted to the text, [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality.

b. He states another couple of objections, also:

1 Nágeśa has उपाधिश्चेत्तिष्ठितिः. Ed.

2 नूपुपाध्योपायविद्या इति न तैरैदैत्यमध्ये

3 पुनःविद्याइति दाब्यमपद्धतिकृताभामाहैत- 

4 ऋपरममणि दूष्यादयमाहः
Aph. 48. The prima facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality].

a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. To this he replies: ¹

Prakāṣṭatstātisidhii karmekārteśvīroddḥ: ² ॥ ४५ ॥

Aph. 49. [And.] in its [Soul’s,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself, as you Vedántis say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction].

a. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of, there is the ‘opposition of patient and agent’ ³ [in one].

b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish

¹ ननु स्वप्रकाशत्यात्मा सेत्यति । तचाह ॥

² Aniruddha has कर्मेकार्त्त्वेविरोधः; Nāgeśa, कर्तृक-मेविरोधः. Ed.

³ चतुन्यहुप्रकाशत्यात्मसिद्धि कर्मकार्त्तवी-रोधः इत्यथः: ॥
the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, an object to itself. To this he replies:

\[ \text{Aph. 50. This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent.} \]

a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies:

\[ \text{Aph. 51. There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to} \]

1 ननु नास्ति कर्मेक्तृत्विरोधः स्वनिष्प्रकाश-रमेहारा स्वस्य स्वसंबन्धैः संभवत्। यथा वैशेषिकाकान्त स्वनिष्प्रज्ञानदारा स्वस्य स्वयं विषय इति। तत्चाह।

2 Aniruddha has । वृद्धो। Ed.

3 From this point, Vedánti Mahádeva, according to my one poor MS. of his work, has a very different reading, which, however, owing to the carelessness of the copyist, I am unable to reproduce. Ed.

4 नन्वेवं प्रमाणान्यनुरोधेन इतिसिद्धवहैत्युते: का गति:। तत्चाह।
assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in ‘the nothingness of the things of time’].

a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal:¹

Aph. 52. The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].

a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep,² &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,³ ⁴ [according to Book I., § 71].

¹ न केवलमुख्युक्तीवाद्वादिनो हेया भ्रष्ट
तु जगद्वितायाहक्रमाणाएवेनापियाह

² For ‘injured,’ &c., read, ‘impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.’ Ed.

³ Instead of ‘in which,’ &c., read, ‘[consisting of] the Great One, &c.’ Ed.

⁴ निद्रादिकोषदुष्टान्:करणादिज्ञातन्न स्वाप्र- 
किञ्चिवृह्पीतिमादीनामसत्यवं लोके दृष्टं तच 
महद्धिमपञ्चन्त नाति

2 a
b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always:

\[ \text{Creation excluded.} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 53. Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].} \]

\[ a. \text{ That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form.} \]

\[ b. \text{ Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, he asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:} \]

\[ \text{अर्हका: कर्ता न पुरुष: \ II \ ५४ \ II} \]

\[ \text{The real agent who.} \]

\[ \text{Aph. 54. Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.} \]

\[ 1 \text{ न केवलं वर्तमानदशयामेव प्रपञ्चः सन्नपि तु सदैवेवाह} \]

\[ 2 \text{पूर्वाक्षुण्यतितिभिरसदृष्टादासंभवात्सृष्टसृष्टपेश सदैवोत्पत्तिभिविभण्ड स्वततीवथे} \]

\[ 3 \text{कर्त्तृतवोक्त्योगोपयविधिकरणेवेदपि व्यवस्थामुपपद्यति मूच्छम्याम} \]
Aph. 55. Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul’s, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].

a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmá:

Aph. 56. Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to mundane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].

a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c.

b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies:

1 बहुतोकान्तर्भवितिनिर्माणात्वि निष्कृतिर्भि पूर्वोैः कारणं दर्शियति ||
2 Instead of -सञ्चावात्, Aniruddha has -संभवात्. Ed.
3 निमित्तमविवेककर्मादिकम ||
4 ननु तत्तत्त्वक्रিযासिज्जनोपदेशात्तत्त्वावृत्तिः स्यात् । •ङ्काह ||
Aph. 57. Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors].

a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there is no return from the world of Brahmá? To this he replies:

Aph. 58. There is Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of Brahmá]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate means].

a. He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul’s going [to the locality where it is to experience], even though it be all-filling, [and can, therefore, have no place into which to move]:

Aph. 59. And, in accordance with the text of its ‘going,’ though it [Soul,]

1 Aniruddha has, instead of सिद्धः, तत्सिद्धः. Ed.
2 नन्वेवं ब्रह्मलोकानावृत्तिः का गतिः।
3 तत्वाद्ध।
4 परिपूर्णंवेदयात्मनो गतिः।
is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.

a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it \(^1\) [here].

b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body,] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer; \(^2\) [Soul]:

\[\text{अनधिष्ठितस्य पूर्तिभावप्रसज्ञान} \text{ तत्सिद्धः} \]

\[\text{II 60 II} \]

\textit{The Body's existence dependent on Soul.}

Aph. 60. This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].

a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls,] take place

\(1\) यथा इकाशस्य पूर्णर्वेदिप देशविशेषगतिर्भूमियोगाज्ञविशिष्टते तथैवेति ॥

\(2\) भोजप्रायस्मात्मानाश्रोगायतननिर्माणाभिमृत्युदाते तत्प्रपञ्चविषयति ॥

\(3\) The reading of Aniruddha is पूर्तिभावयोगात्र. \textit{Ed.}
THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS.

without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Mii Aph. 61. If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.}
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other elements of the Body, should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant.  
\item According to the system of the \textit{Vaiśeshikas} and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doc-
\end{enumerate}
trine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause\(^1\) [of the Body]:

\begin{quotation}
Aph. 62. For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul].
\end{quotation}

\(a\). And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the Body:] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import.\(^2\)

\(b\). But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says:\(^3\)

\begin{quotation}
\(1\) वैशेषिकार्दिनयेनादृष्टस्य संबन्धक्षत्तत्यात्म-नोष्टिष्ठात्तूलं स्थापितम्। स्विद्रान्ते लदृष्टादी-नामात्मधर्मालाभावातः भोक्तुहेतुलमेव न सं-भवतीयाह्॥

\(2\) तथा चास्मन्मते हार्तेरपेष्येन संयोगमाचेना साश्वादेव भोक्तुरथिष्ठानं सिध्यतीति भावः॥

\(3\) नमु चेत्युष्णो व्याप्तकल्पितं भृतिप्रतिपादितं जीवपरिनिर्धारवत्मनुपपचम्। तामिमामामाश्च रात्रि०॥
\end{quotation}
Aph. 63. The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to Soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect arguments.¹

a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure Soul,² [which is unlimited].

b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness;³

Aph. 64. The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiseshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].⁴

a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established

¹ On anwaya-vyatireka, vide supra, p. 428, note 2. Ed.
² जीवलं प्राणिलं तचाहकारविशिष्ठपुरुषस्य धर्मं नन्तू केवलपुरुषस्य II
³ इदानीं महद्हाकारयोः कार्येन्द्र प्रतिपिपादिषुरादावहकार्यमाह II
⁴ See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed.
by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the
destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra\(^1\) [respectively],
owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness,\(^2\) [or per-
sonality].

\(b\). But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker
of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness?
To this he replies:  

\[अष्ट्रोग्न्तिविलसमानचम् \]  
\[एष \]  
\[The real agent whence. \]

\(Aph. 65. \) It is the same as in the
arising of Desert.

\(a\). Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of
Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from
the particular \(\textit{time},\) —since, if we were to suppose other
Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite
regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from \(\textit{time}\) alone,
as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof,
also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.\(^4\)

\(^1\) This is an appellation of Šiva. \(\textit{Ed.}\)

\(^2\) अनेन सूचेशाकारोपाधिकं बहस्त्रृयोः सृ-\nषिष्ठिसंहारकर्तृत्वं चतुर्मृतिसिद्धभूमि प्रतिपा-\nदितम् \(\)  

\(^3\) नन्तु भवलहं कारोड्येषां कताहं कारस्य तु \(\textit{k} \)\
कर्ता \(\textit{I} \) तचाह \(\)  

\(^4\) यष्ट सर्गादिषु प्रकृतिद्वेषबंकनमाभिव्यक्ति:\nकालविशेषमाचायज्ञ तदुवधककमान्तरस्य क-
Aph. 66. The rest is from Mind, [the
Great Principle].

\( a \). What is other than the products of Self-conscious-
ness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preser-
vation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone;
because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having
no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence
towards others: such is the meaning. And by this apho-
rism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishṇu,
owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct\(^2\) [of the soul,
which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve,
nor destroy (see § 64)].

\( b \). It has been stated, before, that the relation of
Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is
causd by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other].
Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by?

\[ \text{THE SĀNKHYA APHORISMS.} \]

\[ \text{महतोद्वयत्} \quad 66 \quad \text{॥} \]

Orthodox recognition of Brahma, Siva, and Vishnu, put forward.

\[ \text{a. What is other than the products of Self-conscious-
ness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preser-
vation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone; be-}
cause, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having
no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence
towards others: such is the meaning. And by this apho-
rism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishṇu,
owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct\(^1\) [of the soul,
which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve,
nor destroy (see § 64)].} \]

\[ \text{b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of}
Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is
causd by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other].
Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by? \]

\[ \text{ल्पनेननवस्माप्रस्खात्मचाच्यैवाहकारः कालमाचाचान-}
मिन्नादेव जायते नतु तस्यापि कर्मलक्षणतीति
समानात्मावधोरितियथः \quad ॥} \]

\[ 1 \text{ ऋहकारकार्यस्मात्} \quad \text{तन्महत्त्वाच्य} \quad \text{दन्त्यमालत्त्वादिकं} \quad 
\text{सत्त्वानत्त्वादि} \quad \text{भवति} \quad \text{विशुद्धस्त्वत्त्वाभिमानरा}-
\text{गायबाचवेन परानुभावमात्रप्रोजनकवात्तित्वथः} \quad ॥} \]

\[ 2 \text{ The text here followed is very inferior. Ed.} \]
With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this regress is valid; [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]:

A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.

Aph. 67. The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants], is beginningless.

A second.

Aph 68. Or [the case is, likewise, one of an infinite regress], if it [the relation between Nature and Soul] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchasikha [holds].

1 चविवेकनिमित्तकः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोभौमायणभो-कृष्णोव इति प्रागुक्तम्। तत्राविवेक एव चिन्तिनिमित्तक, इत्याकाद्धायामविवेकधाराकत्यनेऽनव-स्थापतिरिथाश्चैना: प्रामार्शेङ्केन परिहारः सर्ववृद्धिद्वाधारण इत्याह॥

2 -निमित्तकः is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.
A third.

Aph. 69. [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world].

a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute:

Aph. 70. Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim.

THE END.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

IN THE BODY OF THE PAGE.

P. 12, l. 19. Instead of 'indestructible,' read 'impracticable.'
P. 23, l. 7. 'That is to say,' &c. See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63.
P. 25, l. 2. Read, instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the dogma which you accept.'
P. 32, l. 8. The reference to the second note is omitted.
P. 35, l. 14. एक ज्ञात्मा is the reading of Aniruddha and Nāgęśa; एकात्मा, that of Vijnāna and Vedānti Mahádeva.
P. 44, l. 3. Aniruddha has पूर्वभाविमाचे.
P. 52, l. 10. 'That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119.
P. 56, l. 7. Read निगुणा.
P. 58, l. 13. Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the Serampore edition of the Sánkhyā-pravachana-bhashya. My copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Hiráñanda Chaube, who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corresponds to pp. 1—183, supra, in which, additions, compressions, interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable frequency.
P. 59, l. 15—p. 61, l. 18. For another rendering, from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, &c. pp. 12, 13.
P. 85, l. 13. 'This Ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Vishnu-purāṇa.
P. 143, l. 4. Read -डुरवत्.
P. 149, l. 1. Read 'is meant.'
P. 199, l. 5. 'An internal' is better.
P. 216, l. 8. Instead of 'it is one with the internal organ,' read 'the internal organ is really one.' The implication is, that buddhi, ahankára, and manas really make one whole, called manas, in the wider sense of that term.

P. 233, l. 8. Read मूतेक्ष्टपि.
P. 246, l. 12. Remove the brackets which enclose 'promoting.' Compare p. 433, l. 7.
P. 272, l. 16. Read 'family;' i.e., as.'
P. 292, l. 9. Read पिण्डलावत.
P. 437, l. 10. Read कार्यालयशुने:

IN THE NOTES.

P. 13, l. 1. Read स्वाभाविकायायाप्यो, and remove, in p. 12, a., the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravacanabháshya.

P. 18, l. 2. Read चितस्येवास्त.
P. 30, l. 1. Nágéśa has -निमित्त:, which Vijnúna and Vedánti Mahádeva recognize as a reading.
P. 35, l. 5. Read 'Aniruddha and Nágéśa have.'
P. 39, ll. 5, 6. See, for the true reading of what is here given corruptly, the Chhándogya Upanishad, vi., ii., 1, 2.

P. 47, l. 5. Read बध्येतेयाशयः.
P. 54, l. 3. In the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravacanabháshya, the reading is घटसंवृत ज्ञाकाश, which obviates the anacoluthism spoken of in p. 53, note 4.

P. 54, l. 4. From the Indische Studien, where referred to at the foot of p. 53, it appears that Professor Weber found, in the Amrita-bindu Upanishad, v. 13, here quoted, घटोपम:, instead of नभोपम:. Compare, further, Gaudapáda's Mándúkyopanishat-káriká, iii., 4, et seq.

P. 55, l. 4. Read, instead of 'Vedánti Mahádeva,' 'Nágéśa.'
P. 63, l. 4. Read सिध्धति, and so in p. 70, l. 5, and p. 107, l. 6.

P. 64, l. 1. Read vāsanā.

P. 64, l. 4. The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gauḍapāda's Māndūkyopanishat-kārikā. They are quoted and translated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190, where they are professedly taken. I cannot now say how tenably, from the Viveka-chūḍāmani, which is credulously affiliated on Śankara Ṭhārya.

P. 68, l. 6. Read सास्कालिका.

P. 77, l. 1. Read ऋषि वा.

P. 102, l. 4. Read -श्रुतिज्ञानाधिकारः.

P. 118, l. 3. The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4, of the Yoga-vāsishtha. For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 214.

P. 182, l. 7. For emendations of sundry matters in note 4, see p. 429, note 4.

P. 204, ll. 2, 3. The Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya has लधिष्ठाने, answering to its ऋधिष्ठाने in the Aphorism; also, ऋधिष्ठानमिम्येव वा पाठः.

P. 326, l. 6. Read 'clerical.'

In the foregoing pages, reference has been made, again and again, to the Serampore edition of the Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāshya published in 1821. Of the imperfections of that edition some notion may be formed from the facts, that it gives, as if they were commentary, no fewer than twenty-six of the Aphorisms, that it wholly omits six others, repeats two, curtails or mangles several, and, more than once, represents, as Aphorisms, fragments of Vijnāna's exposition. Still, if great liberties have not been taken with his materials by the pandit who prepared it for the press, it may be considered as possessing the value of an inferior manuscript. Hence it has been thought worth while to extract from it, as below, its principal peculiar readings of the Aphorisms, over and above those already remarked on. The pages and notes referred to are those of the present work.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.


